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**Definitional Struggles, Field Assemblages, and
Capital Flows:**
**A Comparative Sociogenesis of Post-Independence
States in Morocco and Tunisia**

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

This dissertation is an attempt at introducing a new approach to the study of the emergence and transformations of authoritarian states, and to provide a better account of the sociogenesis of the authoritarian State in Morocco and Tunisia. To do so, it analyzes the cases of post-independence Morocco and Tunisia, investigating them through a theoretical framework that builds principally upon Pierre Bourdieu's insights on the State. Using the notion of political field as an analytical point of entry, this study attempts to analyze the emergence of the political and its development in each case, while also avoiding the reification pitfalls associated with the adoption of more politically loaded and emergent analytical categories. It also strives to include both the material and symbolic levels of analysis, along with their mutually-constitutive interplay, within the scope of its analysis and the explanatory account it produces.

Therefore, instead of starting with an inferred category such as "an authoritarian political system" or a specific emergent regime type and investigating its 'ingredients' retrospectively, this dissertation tries to focus on the interplay of factors that ends up taking that specific form. This is pursued through a sociogenetic tracing of the processes which brought the State into existence and perpetuated it as this sort of holistic entity, as a bank of both physical and symbolic violence in the Bourdieusian sense. It also attempts to highlight the contingent and emergent nature of the object as a product resulting from the complex interplay of various processes and fluctuating relations amongst actors who are, in turn, constrained by their structurally-shaped personal trajectories through the social space and relative positions within relatively autonomous fields. These fields, with their sets of rules and logics, are also viewed as spaces of struggle, both materially and symbolically, are in turn situated within a meta-"field of power". Processes of struggle, and attempts at ensuring the reproduction of the sources of domination, then ensure the emergence of variable assemblages of fields and inter-field relations that construct and transform the State and its performances.

After reviewing the relevant literature and introducing its theoretical framework, and situating it in light of the existing theoretical debates that it relates to; this dissertation proceeds in a primarily chronological way, with the relevant explanatory processes traced and highlighted empirically. These are then analyzed and compared for recurrences, similarities, and differences. The dissertation is divided into three main parts. The first part is comparative and analyzes the emergence of the political field in Morocco and Tunisia. The second part is focused solely on Morocco and traces the evolution of the political field and the State until the *alternance* period. Each part consists of empirical chapters, followed by an analytical one. They are then followed by a concluding chapter that highlights and draws the theoretical implications and potential generalizations that can be extracted from the dissertation and their prospective implications for the study of authoritarian states and their politics.

Note on Transliteration and Translation:

This dissertation will mostly follow the French-based transliteration system used in Morocco and Tunisia for proper names, except when a commonly adopted English spelling is available. Other Arabic terms will follow the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES)* transliteration system.

Finally, unless otherwise noted, all translations from Arabic and French are the author's.

Key Abbreviations:

AL	Armée de Libération
AMDH	Association Marocaine des Droit de l'Homme)
ANN	Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord
AWI	Justice and Charity (Al Adl wa al-Ihsan)
CDT	Confédération Démocratique du Travail
CGEM	Confederation General des Entrepreneurs du Maroc Confédération Générale Economique Marocaine
CGT	Confédération Generale du Travail
DDF	Documents Diplomatiques Français
FAR	Forces Armées Royales
FDIC	Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionnelles
FEN	Fédération de l'Education Nationale
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut
LMDH	Ligue Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme
MND	Mouvement National Démocrate
MNP	Mouvement National Populaire
MP	Mouvement Populaire
MPDC	Mouvement Populaire Démocratique Constitutionnel
MUR	Mouvement Unite et Reforme
ND	Neo-Destour
OADP	Organisation de l'Action Démocratique Populaire
OMDH	Organisation Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme

ONA	Omnium Nord-Africain
ONPT	Office National des Postes et Télécommunications
PADS	Parti de l'Avant-garde Démocratique Socialiste
PCM	Parti Communiste Marocain
PDC	Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel
PDI	Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance
PI	Parti de l'Istiqlal
PLS	Parti de la Libération et du Socialisme
PND	Parti National Démocratique
PPS	Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme
PSD	Parti Social Démocrate
PSD	Parti Socialiste Démocratique
RNI	Rassemblement National des Indépendants
SNE-Sup	Syndicat National de l'Enseignement superieur
UC	Union Constitutionnelle
UGAT	Union Générale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens
UGEM	Union Générale des Etudiants Marocains
UGTM	Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains
UGTT	Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail
UMT	Union Marocaine du Travail
UNEM	Union nationale des Etudiants du Maroc
UNFP	Union Nationale des Forces Populaires
USFP	Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires
UTT	Union Tunisienne du Travail

Part I: Introduction

Since the Arab Spring, the durability (or lack thereof) of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been receiving renewed academic attention. The surprising rapid collapse of several hitherto robust authoritarian regimes under the wave of protests that spread through the region was a challenge to the dominant explanatory paradigms and was begging for new approaches. In investigating what made some political systems collapse while others succeeded in containing the protests, the question became one of identifying which elements may have played a role in the divergent outcomes seen around the region.

The dominant scholarly approaches to the study of politics in the MENA region, especially in political science, can generally be characterized as adopting a ‘top-down’ approach when setting up analytical questions and framing the relevance of particular cases. The conventional method is first to adopt a ‘big-picture’ perspective and categorize states in the region using a fixed conception of regime type¹. This categorization often goes along with a snapshot view of a state that rarely takes into account the long term contentious historical processes that brought about the present setup. The resulting simplifications lead to the drawing of misguided conclusions, such as an overstatement of both the intra-category similarities (e.g., amongst monarchies) and the inter-category differences (e.g., monarchies vs. republics). In a region where,

¹ Examples of these approaches will be provided and discussed in the Literature Review section below.

more often than not, the implications of these distinctions/similarities barely go beyond resemblances or variations at the formal levels of titles and protocol, such approaches provide minimal analytical value into the structuring of its regimes and states.

Further examples of ‘top-down’ explanatory accounts abound beyond the regime category, with their popularity varying with time and in reaction to contemporary developments at the empirical level. For instance, some scholars focus on the cultural ‘ingredients’, using the region’s cultural or religious specificities to explain the prevalence and resilience of authoritarian political systems in the region². As such, “Arab monarchy” becomes a broad category that, while regrouping a very diverse range of states with similarities rarely going beyond the superficial level, somehow serves as an explanation for the authoritarian resilience puzzle. Other scholars adopt the universalistic narrative of modernization theory, and focus on variables that they relate to ‘development’. Their explanatory accounts often center on a ‘political development’ inducing ingredient that is missing in the region, or in a specific country, and thus prevents it from democratizing.

Though insufficient in and of themselves to provide a sufficient explanatory framework for the working of the region’s states, the above approaches are not entirely lacking in merit. Indeed, they do shed some light on different facets of the same

² Examples of these approaches will be provided and discussed in the Literature Review section below.

empirical object, despite various issues in their construction of it, and they ought to be brought together into an integrated framework that would build upon their respective insights while avoiding the pitfalls associated with each approach when taken on its own.

The issue with top-down analytical approaches resides in their tendency to drive the focus of the researcher principally to the specific ingredient or dimensions privileged within the theoretical framework at the “top” level, often obscuring and making it more likely to miss other crucially relevant dimensions. The focus on the constitutional dimensions, regime-based arguments, or institution-centric accounts of power associated with these approaches, can often obscure the very different manner in which it is actually deployed and the mechanisms through which it flows in the social space, replacing them with a reification of those constructs.

By using the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, this dissertation analyzes two countries that, while being different in some aspects, share important similarities. The more apparent cultural and geographical similarities aside, Morocco and Tunisia were both French protectorates, unlike Algeria. Also, they both gained independence in 1956 through negotiations and with limited violence, whereas Algeria had to go through a protracted war of independence. At the geostrategic level, both countries were mostly associated with the Western camp during and after the Cold War, maintaining close relations with France and the US, and generally categorized amongst the so-called “moderates” of the MENA region, given their reticence to embrace the pan-Arabist and socialist ideologies that were prominent in the rest of North Africa. At the economic level as well, both Morocco and Tunisia differed from their neighbors in that they did

not have access to significant oil rent (available to Algeria and Libya), and that they overall opted for a capitalistic economic model³, and went through a Structural Adjustment Program prescribed by the International Monetary Fund through the 1980s. The identification of these similarities, though consequential, is not viewed as determinant for the comparability of the cases within the framework of this dissertation.

The two cases differ on a number of dimensions, which I will later argue lose in significance by the onset of the critical juncture period, and consequently do not account for the divergent paths followed by each case afterward. At the structural level, demographic differences stand out. In addition to the more obvious difference in terms of population size, Morocco was a more segmented society than Tunisia, very divided along tribal lines throughout the pre-colonial and early colonial periods (up until the 1930s and the end of the French “pacification” campaign). Institutionally, the Tunisian State was also relatively more “modernized” before the Protectorate onset. The relative early modernization in Tunisia is due, in large part, to the efforts made under early reformers such as Ahmad Bey⁴ and Khayr al-Din Pasha (Grand Vizier from 1873 to 1877) in developing central institutions and weakening tribal actors (Charrad 2001). On the other hand, the State in Morocco remained comparatively weak and archaic, unable to extend its authority beyond urban centers, with vast swathes of the country controlled

³ An exception would be the 1961-1969 socialist-leaning period in Tunisia. However, both countries resorted regularly to economic planning in the early phases, as opposed to a more *laissez-faire* approach.

⁴ Tunisian ruler from 1837 to 1855.

by tribal actors with varying degrees and conceptions of autonomy towards the Sultans. To some extent, these differences reverberated throughout the colonial era, as even though both states' reaches extended, the French policies in the two countries differed. Whereas in Morocco, the colonial administration chose to maintain the power of tribal actors as part of its divide-and-rule strategy, in Tunisia, the French Protectorate further strengthened the pre-existing central authorities at the expense of the already weak tribal actors. This set of differences during the pre-colonial and colonial periods will be accounted for in the analysis, and this dissertation argues that though significant as antecedent conditions, the interactions and decisions that took place during the highly conjunctural foundational early independence phase were more critical in shaping the subsequent events of relevance to the evolution of the State in each of the two countries.

1. Aims and Goals:

This dissertation aims to introduce a new perspective to the study of the emergence and development of political regimes, particularly authoritarian ones. Taking the cases of Tunisia and Morocco from independence until the late 1990s, this dissertation proposes to develop an alternative approach to the dominant paradigms that are often applied when analyzing authoritarian states, especially the widely accepted regime-theory based ones. Through a comparative historical analysis of the development of the two countries' respective political fields, this dissertation also aims at providing a

detailed and complex picture of the development of state-opposition relations, which does not reify or fetishize specific regime types. It instead views them as fluid and continuously renegotiated outcomes of the power struggles occurring amongst a variety of actors simultaneously and at different levels of analysis.

The narrower goal of this research, and its contribution to the field of MENA studies, will be the provision of an explanatory account for the divergent paths that the States and oppositions, in Morocco and Tunisia, have developed along following their independence, and how they reacted to several similar exogenous and endogenous challenge. Through a theoretically guided Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA) of the two cases, this dissertation will provide an explanatory account that elucidates the importance of field-level interactions and struggles amongst the main political actors throughout the foundational post-protectorate period in shaping the evolution of state institutions and the development of political oppositions in each of the two countries. It will then try to make the case that contemporary differences in the shapes of each of the two country's political opposition fields can be traced back to the different options selected during specific critical junctures, with their enduring impact setting the cases along increasingly divergent paths. In doing so, this dissertation will also shed more light on the historical processes shaping the evolution of authoritarian regimes, and their relation to the dynamics taking place within the political field. It will also try to demonstrate how alternative approaches that tend to focus on more static and/or ahistorical conceptualizations of regime types, without engaging in a sort of historical genealogy of a case's authoritarian politics, tend to overlook some subtle but crucial reconfigurations. These frequently unfold over longer time horizons and on different

levels of analysis, calling for a more nuanced approach that does not scarify complexity in a rush towards parsimony in their categorization and study.

Situating the cases within the analytical framework of Bourdieusian Field Theory, this dissertation aims at a detailed marshaling of historical evidence gathered through a comprehensive application of process tracing methods to significant episodes and critical junctures of each of the two countries' political development. In doing so, it provides an account that, by bringing together data on the dynamic processes unfolding at different levels of analysis, delivers a detailed picture that questions the taken for granted assumptions implied by the different explanatory accounts adopting more "topographical" conceptions of the State and how it can be analyzed⁵.

Throughout its chapters, this dissertation will deploy a different conceptual arsenal and state-theoretical perspectives towards the analysis of each of Morocco's and Tunisia's post-independence political history. For this reconstruction, along new analytical lines, it will draw upon a diverse array of scholarly works that tried to tackle the topics it deals with, be it theoretically or empirically. Combining their various insights within a unified theoretically-guided explanatory account, it will highlight the complex, nonlinear, fluid, and fragmented nature of the processes that shape the evolution of authoritarian states over the long-term. Moreover, by drawing on Bourdieu, this dissertation will show how the different forms of capital flow through any given

⁵ Examples of these approaches will be provided and discussed in the Literature Review section below, more specifically in the section on "Geographies of State Power" (p.41).

social space and struggle to extend their respective reaches within the various relatively autonomous fields that it contains. At the same time, this account will highlight the limitations of other conceptions of authoritarian politics that end up constraining the analyst's sensitivity to the fluidity and complexities that are crucial in understanding how power and the rules of the game are contested and changing within authoritarian contexts.

The theoretical framework through which this dissertation approaches the cases is structured principally around two main theoretical "languages", in different proportions. The first, and most central one, is Pierre Bourdieu's field theory, especially its fundamental conceptual apparatus and the heuristic insights that it provides. The second language is that of approaches to the State, such as of John Allen's (2010; 2016) that reject the restrictions imposed by various vertical or horizontal imageries of states and their power in favor of a topological reimagining of both. These two theoretical and conceptual languages are combined, in different 'proportions' and levels of the analysis⁶, to provide an account of the State and its power that transcends the limitations usually found in competing approaches in terms of their centering on one level of analysis at the

⁶ The analysis is predominantly Bourdieusian in its conceptualization of the social, the topological and assemblage aspects come into play *within* that framework, principally in how to conceptualize the interplay of the changing and contested assemblage of fields that constitute as state. In the reverse direction, the notion of power is disaggregated through the prism of Bourdieu's conception of forms of capital and their relations to the other conceptual elements of his theoretical approach. For more details, these points are further elaborated in the literature review and theory sections below.

expense of other relevant ones, and also in terms of how their conceptualization can be restricted by visualizing the State in a variety of geometric or networked ways. Instead, the framework adopted in this dissertation imagines the State as a continually fluctuating assemblage of relatively-autonomous Bourdieusian fields, changing in centrality and relevance depending on their power, which is conceptualized as the reach and intensity/negotiability of the forms of capital intricately and inherently tied to them and to the habitus of the actors they include. These two perspectives have not been combined before, and they have developed out of different research traditions. However, this dissertation will demonstrate that they can be combined into a single framework that allows for the development of generalizable and transferable concepts and insights regarding the State and the political as a whole.

The above more significant theoretical part of the framework is then combined with some medium-range theoretical insights from the broader Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA) research program. More specifically, the path dependency and critical junctures conceptions that are associated with the more neo-institutionalist applications of CHA⁷. This influence is reflected in this dissertation through the comparative design it adopts, and its sensitivity to the effects of path dependence and critical junctures on the evolution of the political fields of Morocco and Tunisia, and the importance it places on issues of sequencing and temporality in analyzing them and building explanatory

⁷ We can mention the works of Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Kelemen (2007) for critical junctures, and those of James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2010; 2015) or Paul Pierson (2003; 2015) regarding the idea of path dependency and CHA.

accounts. Employed within a Bourdieusian framework, CHA is leveraged in a manner that is not just focused on institutions or regimes, but on the interplay of the three key elements that are the *fields*, *forms of capital*, and *habitus*, and how it continually reconstitutes the State and the political in each of the two cases. This choice stems from the view that Bourdieu's field theory is particularly apt at exploring political processes due to its ability to take into account multiple types of political actors, their respective agencies, agendas, and horizons for action; while embedding them and their actions within historically emergent arenas of political action that are in turn being structured by material and symbolic constraints, both collectively made and experienced, at both the field level and the actor level, and continuously renegotiated and redefined in a path-dependent way. Besides, the theory and its conceptual apparatus synergize perfectly with historical analytical methods. In his own works, Bourdieu (1993) has continuously emphasized the necessity of applying historical process tracing approaches to the study of the State, which by its very nature as the organizing and institutionalizing principle of the social space, requires a "sociogenesis" to be analyzed:

This is why there is no more potent tool for rupture than the reconstruction of genesis: by bringing back into view the conflicts and confrontations of the early beginnings and therefore all the discarded possibles, it retrieves the possibility that things could have been (and still could be) otherwise. And, through such a practical utopia, it questions the 'possible' which, among all others, was actualized. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1994, 4)

This dissertation falls within that perspective, by using the political field and political capital as analytical entry-points to construct a fluid conception of the

State and authoritarianism, and to conduct a sociogenesis of the post-colonial political field in each of Morocco and Tunisia. In doing so, it will trace the historical evolution of two non-European/Western states, with an experience of political field collapse and re-emergence after a colonial phase that saw most local actors at best hold dominated positions, and more commonly, not have any access to the field. The dynamics of emergence, collapse, and re-emergence, as well as the cultural and social specificities of the two cases, present a compelling, unexplored testing ground for Bourdieu's theoretical insights on the State⁸. It is also a very appropriate undertaking for a theory that emphasizes the necessity of continually testing and redesigning concepts and conclusions in a sort of dialogue with the data and the case (Bourdieu 2015).

Therefore, this dissertation can be read in a few different ways, theoretically. First, it is a statement about the explanatory power of Bourdieu's field theory, when applied via its full conceptual apparatus⁹, to a complex and hard to grasp object of analysis such as the State. Second, it highlights the analytical power gained through a leveraging of the Bourdieusian framework to guide and conduct

⁸ Knowledge accumulation within State Theory regarding the emergence of modern state institutions and their evolution, especially within post-colonial and non-european settings, is quite limited. See Tuong Vu (2010) for a more detailed review on the current state of knowledge regarding State Formation and its Eurocentric nature.

⁹ A number of studies that draw upon the work of Bourdieu tend to use his concepts in an isolated fashion, which could be argued to becomes merely a terminological adoption than a conceptual one.

genealogical CHA. Third, it demonstrates the importance of moving beyond the various topographical (top-down, bottom-up, horizontal, networked, embedded) conceptions of the State and politics, towards a conception as a fluctuating assemblage of fields, connected topologically. Fourth, it demonstrates the importance of taking the non-material dimensions of state emergence and of political struggles into consideration and highlights the persistent impacts that they can have throughout the social space. Finally, it suggests new concepts and definitions through which states can be analyzed in dynamic and fluid ways, and their level of authoritarianism assessed without the unnecessary categorical divisions and hybridizations associated with other approaches.

Thus, instead of starting with an inferred category such as “an authoritarian political system” or a specific regime type and investigating its ‘ingredients’ retrospectively, this dissertation tries to “work its way” up towards the bigger conceptual picture. It does this by exploring and tracing the processes which brought the State into existence and perpetuated it as this sort of holistic entity, as both a bank of symbolic power and other forms of capital; a contingent and emergent product resulting from the complex interplay of various processes and the fluctuating relation of numerous actors who are in turn constrained by their structurally-shaped backgrounds and relative positions within emergent fields. These fields, each with relatively autonomous sets of rules that are often challenged continuously and renegotiated by the actors acting within them, striving towards redefinitions in an attempt to improve their respective lots and positions in the “serious games” within

which they are all “seriously involved, also interact with one another in complex ways through changes in their size, boundaries, and power.

Hence, and even though it is empirically focused on the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, this dissertation situates itself in connection with the existing bodies of knowledge and ongoing debates around the concepts of State, authoritarianism and its dynamics, and the political and its transformations. In doing so, it aims to extract transferable theoretical insights, formulating and elaborating concepts and perspectives that can contribute to a better understanding of these matters while simultaneously being grounded in and supported by an extensive range of empirical evidence.

Before providing a more detailed explanation of the theoretical framework, a look at the accumulated knowledge in the relevant bodies of scholarly work is necessary. The next section provides a review of the relevant fields. First, it reviews the different approaches and conceptions used to analyze the State and Authoritarianism, and their application to the MENA region. Second, it is followed by a presentation and detailed explanation of Bourdieu’s core theoretical and conceptual apparatus, and how it can be operationalized within a historical analysis. Third, it introduces the topological conception of the State and state power, contrasts it to other approaches, and explains how it can be effectively deployed in combination with a Bourdieusian historical analysis.

2. Literature Review:

a) Approaches to the State and Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Regimes

The literature on authoritarian regimes is one of the most significant ones addressing and trying to make sense of authoritarian political systems. Early on, the field it was included within the body of early works that focused on the study of dictatorships in general, often with a heavy focus on ideology, such as Hannah Arendt's (1951) or seminal works on totalitarianism, or Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski's (1956) work, which was more centered on the identification of specific features typical of that form of dictatorships. The focus of these early works reflected the concerns of their time of writing. It mostly analyzed the features of that type of heavily ideological and "revolutionary" dictatorships that emerged after the First World War, and the Cold War era that followed.

The second wave of works would build upon that foundation and distinguish between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore's (1970) contributions focused on a predominant form of authoritarian regime at the time, namely the one-party systems, analyzing and conceptualizing variation within that sub-type in terms of strength of the party, and dominant actor in weak party cases. They also theorized that the party's strength was correlated to the length and intensity of its prior struggle. Around that same period, the seminal work of Juan Linz (1975) was published. Linz (1975) argued that differences in the role of ideology, popular

mobilization efforts, politicization, and social control distinguished authoritarian regimes from totalitarian ones. These works contributed to laying the conceptual ground for the following generation of studies that would build on that distinction and further deepen it, focusing on authoritarian regimes, analyzing the variance within the category, and trying to arrange them within a variety of typologies based on different dimensions.

The next generation of studies emerged with renewed interest in authoritarian regimes and their persistence, or lack thereof, around the late 1990s and the early 2000s. There were two main trends in that scholarship, differing at a fundamental level on their conception of authoritarianism. One approach viewed authoritarianism and democracy as a spectrum and as continuous categories, such as the works of Larry Diamond (1999; 2002), which introduced the concept of “hybrid” regimes. Hybrid regimes were conceptualized as authoritarian regimes that have the institutional trappings usually associated with democracies. Works in that tradition tend to focus on aspects such as representative institutions or elections in authoritarian regimes, such as the work of Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way (2010).

In parallel to the hybrid conception of authoritarian regimes, there are also many studies based upon a more binary and discrete concept. The fundamental difference is that these studies would conceive of authoritarianism as a discrete category, qualitatively distinct from democracy. Within the authoritarianism category, the same logic would be replicated, with a conceptualization of various regimes as separate categories of their own right. One of the most prominent works in that tradition is arguably that of Barbara Geddes (2004 refer), which created a typology of four different

authoritarian regimes' categories, based upon their institutional specificities. In that typology, authoritarian regimes are either militaristic, one-party, personalistic, or a mixture of the precedent categories. Equally significant, the work of Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski (2007) proposed an alternative typology based upon the type of leader of a given authoritarian regime. Thus they would classify authoritarian regimes as either military, civilian, or monarchic. Building upon that typology Gandhi (2010) then developed a theory relating the survival of various autocrats to their decisions to institutionalize. Positioning herself against previous conceptions that considered such institutions as merely cosmetic, Gandhi (2010) used a rational-choice institutionalist model and Large-N quantitative approach to argue that dictators use institutions to “neutralize threats” and to “ensure the cooperation of outsiders” (2010, 181). A similar typology was provided by the work of Cheibub et al. (2010).

Monarchies as a form of authoritarian regime

A sub-strand of the latter category of authoritarian regime studies emerged, which focused its analysis principally on monarchies. A foundational study in that category is arguably Michael Herb's (1999) study of monarchies in the MENA region. Further dividing the monarchic subtype of authoritarianism, Herb (1999) argued for the existence of another subcategory, the dynastic monarchy. Found in the Gulf region, these monarchies were differentiated by the predominance of members of the ruling family in state positions. His argument's main thrust was that the dynastic-family approach explained the longevity of those regimes, especially when coupled with oil rents.

Connected with the study of monarchies in the MENA region, several scholars focused their attention on the comparative analysis of monarchies and republics in the region. Especially after the 2011 uprisings, and given the fact that monarchies survived relatively unscathed while some, namely republican regimes collapsed, several studies investigating the difference in outcomes were published.

Lucas 2014 draws upon the neo-institutionalist and social movements' theories to investigate what he terms the "monarchy-republic gap." He argues that rather than the regime type, some inherent internal mechanisms allow monarchies to withstand protests better. However, the data used to test the hypotheses is quite problematic, as it severely underreports protest events in some cases, which irremediably weakens all the quantitative tests on which the study builds bases its conclusions¹⁰.

Institutionalist works have also addressed the case of authoritarian regimes. One prominent example is Ellen Lust-Okar's (2005) study of State and opposition relations within the MENA region. Using a combination of formal modeling and qualitative investigation of a selection of cases (Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco), Lust-Okar's study comes to the conclusion that institutional rules regarding which political opponents are allowed shape state-opposition relations significantly, independently from the particular regime-type.

¹⁰ The database that his analysis uses includes a very limited number of protests in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, leading to the odd result of Saudi Arabia having had more protests than either of the two countries in 2011. Unlike what that database reports, Morocco had a total of 23131 protests in 2011, according to the official numbers published by the CNDH (a public institution).

b) Bourdieusian Field Theory and the State

Bourdieuian Field Theory (BFT)

The work of Bourdieu is quite vast and expansive. However, if one had to single out its most distinctive feature, it would have to be its struggle to overcome dichotomies, especially the structure and agency one. This dichotomy's relevance to the question of “authoritarian political systems” and the importance of overcoming it has been alluded to in the introduction. Bourdieu’s approach, which offers a unique solution to the structure-agency dilemma, allows for an exploration of the emergence and development of political systems that pays attention simultaneously to both the actor’s agency and to how the relevant arena of action (the field) structures, shapes, enables and constrains their actions; all the while emphasizing that the field itself is emergent from the cumulative and historical product of that interplay.

The structure-agency dilemma is overcome in Bourdieu’s theory by virtue of a triad of concepts: *habitus*, field, and capital, often deployed in combination with a historical genealogy of the object studied. As these concepts can only be adequately understood in relation to one another, this section will briefly introduce each and show how they all fit together. This task is also essential to clarify how the empirical cases in this dissertation are treated in a way that weaves together the ‘cultural’ and material influences and resources available to actors, with the constraints imposed upon their actions due to their positioning relative to their peers, as all these interwoven dimensions are manifested in actors’ choices, strategies and shortcomings at every decisive moment during the unfolding of each case’s political history. As readers will see in the following

section, the unfolding of this history is formulated in Bourdieusian vocabulary in order to reap the analytical powers of his approach.

The conceptual triad: Habitus, Field, Capital

The first concept is the *habitus*, which refers to the internalized and embodied effects of structures on an individual, shaping his dispositions (Bourdieu 1990). The *habitus* affects how the individual perceives the social world, his position within it, and the range of possible courses of action available to him. The concept operates without "presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them" (Bourdieu 1990, 53). Concerning the idea of fields, explored below, the habitus plays a role in endowing the actors with "socially constituted dispositions to perceive and assess what is happening in the field, and consequently, (their) social actions cannot be described as the mechanical effects of the field's forces." (Bourdieu 2016, 2:432). Concerning the concept of capital, discussed below, the habitus can be understood as an embodied form of previously acquired capital (Bourdieu 2016).

The second element in the conceptual triad is the idea of *forms of capital*. Capital comes in various forms, the main ones being economic, social, cultural¹¹, and symbolic

¹¹ Cultural capital can come in three main forms. First, it can take an embodied form, integrally associated with its holder. Second, it can take an objectivized form, as in the case of cultural items, such as books or artworks. Finally, it can come in an institutionalized form, which is as in the case of degrees and other official credentials, a sort of official "objective guarantee of the ownership of embodied cultural capital" (Bourdieu 2016, 2:329). This guarantee is not always or necessarily true,

capital¹² (Bourdieu 2002). Most differentiated, or “modern” societies, have these main species of capital, as they usually have the relevant relatively autonomous fields they respectively require. One of the most straightforward definitions that Bourdieu gives of the concept is that capital is as follows:

a species of capital is defined in its relation with a specific field: all capital is specific.

In simple terms, we could say that a field’s specific capital is what works in that field.

Put more directly; it is “what pays” in a field, what one should have to really belong to a field. (Bourdieu 2016, 2:236)

Moreover, these different forms of capital can be converted into one another at variable exchange rates, which are set through competition within the field of power (Bourdieu 2012). Furthermore, capital comes in many forms other than the

in the sense that the holder of institutionalized cultural capital might not necessarily have the requisite embodied form of it.

¹² Symbolic capital is defined as any species of capital when it is in a significant enough quantity to be “perceived, known and recognized (it is, roughly speaking, what we refer to as prestige)” (Bourdieu 2016, 2:238). The perception of various forms of capital by other social agents is tied to the specificities of the form in itself, of the specific structure and perception categories of the field that it is deployed in (Bourdieu 2016, 2:769). This means that a change of categories of perception within a given field can affect the symbolic status of the types of capital active inside it. Finally, the acquisition of symbolic capital usually involves a significant time investment by the individual actor, and it is very difficult to transfer.

abovementioned; there are no general fixed limits on the number of forms of capital in existence¹³.

The reproduction and transfer of each form of capital follows specific rules, which are often another stake for the actors to struggle over. Furthermore, some forms of capital tend to play a specific role in the general structure of domination within a society. As Bourdieu (2016) states:

Power cannot be recognized and cannot recognize itself without a network of legitimacy; a division of the work of domination that tends to present an invariable structure is then required, and we find, in very different historical conjunctures, some oppositions having more or less the same form between the holders of dominant power (economic power, political power, warlike power, etc.) and the holders of a more dominated form of power, with a cultural component, that can grant to dominant forms of power what they cannot grant themselves, namely symbolic recognition. (Bourdieu 2016, 2:975)

The level of distinction and that of the diversity of species of capital, and the fields that they relate to, is viewed by Bourdieu as profoundly tied to the general form of any

¹³ “There will be then as many species of capital as there are fields and sub-fields, which does not forbid considering a given number (two or three) big species of capital of which the others are specific forms” (Bourdieu 2016, 2:202)

given society¹⁴. It is also a crucial dimension to assess any given society's process of historical change¹⁵.

While the concept of habitus refers to an actor's dispositions, the concept of *field* emphasizes an actor's relational position. Fields are quite central to Bourdieu's approach, as it is through them that the other two concepts are brought together. In the broad sense, a field can be defined as the space formed by "a network, or configuration of objective relations between positions" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). They can also be viewed as microcosms with a variable degree of autonomy in relation to the rest of the social space, with their own set of internal rules (Bourdieu 2000). Actors constantly vie for positions within a field, with better positions granting access to more benefits in terms of status and power. As Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) put it, the positions that actors compete over are:

objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present potential situation (*situs*) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or *capital*) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97).

¹⁴ "I believe that one of the great principles of distinction among the different forms of society lays in the degree of differentiation of capital, and simultaneously, in the degree of differentiation of social spaces" (Bourdieu 2016, 2:205).

¹⁵ Bourdieu more specifically ties this dimension to "the constitution of relatively autonomous fields and sub-fields" (Bourdieu 2016, 2:205).

A field can be viewed both as a space within which positions are organized by the "forces" of capital and reflect the capital distribution and as a space of struggle between the dominants and the dominated (Bourdieu 2015). In addition to their constant jockeying for position, actors are often engaged in a struggle over what is at stake in a given field, over the rules of the game itself, and over who belongs within it. Thus, one of the advantages of using the concept of fields as an analytical tool is that it helps in avoiding a reification of official categories and boundaries. A field can refer to specific formal institutions, or they can be "inter- or intra-institutional in scope; they can span institutions, which may represent positions within fields" (Swartz 1997, 120). Furthermore, fields vary in their degree of relative autonomy. The more relatively autonomous a field is, the less its internal balance of power is affected by changes to the forces in the social space surrounding it, and the more the struggles within it take place following its own internal logic (Bourdieu 2015). For instance, Bourdieu (2015) considered that the literary and artistic fields were relatively autonomous from the forces of the economic field.

Furthermore, the more relatively differentiated powers are within a society, the more differentiated the fields and the capitals that tend to be represented amongst the dominant classes¹⁶. When differentiation is lower, fields and forms of capital are more bundled “ we could have, for instance, caesaropapism, meaning universe within which

¹⁶ Bourdieu (2012; 2015; 2016) conceptualizes the dominant classes as the universe of agents occupying positions within the field of power.

the possession of economic or military capital implies a religious authority, a cultural authority or an aesthetic power.” (Bourdieu 2016, 2:431)

There is also the idea of a "field of power", wherein a set of actors highly endowed with various forms of capital, in more colloquial terms, the powerful elites of a given society struggle with one another over dominance and the reproduction of their dominance. Bourdieu defines the field of power as follows:

It is a space in which the principle of structuration is the distribution, not of capital (such a space would be the social space as a whole), but of power over the different species of capital. The difference corresponds to the distinction that economists draw quite frequently among holders of capital, such as small shareholders, and those holding of enough (quantity of) capital to have a power over capital. (Bourdieu 2016, 2:428)

The struggle within the field of power is the primary determinant of the exchange rates among the various forms of capital and their relative power (Bourdieu 2015). According to him, Actors within the Field of Power tend to hold more than one form of capital to be viewed as legitimate actors within it:

In fact, I believe that one condition for belonging legitimately, completely, to the dominant class, is the possession of many species of capital... This being said, the holder of a generationally acquired particular form of capital needs to add other species of capital to be a full member of the field of power. The upstart or the self-made man who acquired his capital in one generation will not become a full-fledged

member of the dominant class until he adds to that capital [another species of capital], and that applies to cultural capital as well. (Bourdieu 2016, 2:985)

Another characteristic of the field of power is that the actors involved within it are intensely focused and invested in the reproduction of the field and their positions within it:

...to understand what I mean by ‘field of power’ and the logic of the struggles that take place inside that field, one must keep in mind that there exist many species of capital endowed with specific properties. These specific properties explain that the reproduction strategies, the strategies of perpetuation in dominant positions are very variable depending on the species of capital possessed. So, the holders of different species of capital have different relations to their own reproduction. (Bourdieu 2016, 2:986–87)

These reproduction strategies, despite their expectable variation, tend to all share a common trait, which is their reliance on a set of legitimating ideas as a basis for their domination. This brings in another crucial concept, which is Bourdieu’s notion of *sociodicy*. In introducing and situating the concept during his lectures, Bourdieu draws on Max Weber’s idea of *theodicy* and Karl Marx’s conception of ideology. He considers that both concepts point at that same set of discourses aimed at justifying the privileges and the dominant position of a given social group. As the dominant position occupied by a society’s elites is tied to their capital endowments, the discourse they deploy tends to differ according to the types of capital they are most endowed with and dependent on. Bourdieu cites the example of the “ideology of the gift”, which is often deployed within the educational system, and which associates the cultural capital accumulated by the dominants with the ideas of them being gifted and hardworking, giving a meritocratic

legitimation to their domination that obscures other factors (Bourdieu 2016). However, he criticizes the notion of ideology in that he considers it to be often associated with more premeditated and ideational conception focused on actively created discourses. In defining sociodicy, Bourdieu brings in the idea of predispositions and their association with different forms of capital and their respectively associated legitimation discourses:

The different sorts of capital predispose very unequally to the different forms of privilege-justifying discourses, given that all justifying discourses are naturalizing discourses. Finally, we could slightly correct Weber's beautiful formula: it is a sociodicy. We could say that the justifying discourses are sociodicies by naturalization: they are discourses that justify historical phenomena, unequal distributions, for example, by their naturalization... They transform what is by law, by distribution, into something that is by nature. They transform what is arbitrary, in the sense of contingent or a product of history, into a necessary, in the sense of natural. This general and generic logic of the sociodicy bases itself on the species of capital. (Bourdieu 2016, 2:991)

Thus, by adopting different reproduction strategies and promoting different sociodicies to justify their domination, actors in a field struggle over both a vision of the world, as well as a conception of how to construct the world.

Bourdieu's conception of the political field

The main analytical focus of this study is on the *political field*, its nature, and its evolution. The political field is conceptualized as the organized social space that regroups all the actors that have an interest in, and a willingness to shape and influence

the institutionalized political system in one way or the other. This covers a broad spectrum of actors, from those striving for radical revolutionary change to those invested in, and interested in maintaining the status-quo, passing by those advocating more reformist agendas.

Truth over the social world is a stake in struggles within the social world and the political field is evidently one of the universes where this struggle to impose one's point of view, to show, to make believe and make do, takes its most transparent form (Bourdieu 2016, 2:999)

According to Bourdieu (1981), the *Political field* is the independent sort of social microcosm, with its own rules, where political actors compete to impose one of the many legitimate competing visions of social order. Using an economic metaphor to illustrate his point, he defines it as the space where specialized actors produce political “products” for the “consumers”, the ordinary citizens (Bourdieu 1981). He further specifies that the *Political field* is the organized social space where official and legitimate political activities take place (Bourdieu 2012).

The central form of capital that is fought over in the *political field* is Political capital. For Bourdieu, political capital can take two different forms. The first type is what he refers to as the “Personal” political capital, which is embodied in a specific individual politician and refers to his ability to mobilize in his personal name (Bourdieu 1981, 18). Personal political capital comes in different forms. One is the “good” reputation and renown related to the other forms of capital accumulated by the actor in

other fields¹⁷; the other form is described as “heroic or prophetic” and relates to the Weberian charisma¹⁸ (Bourdieu 1981). The second type of political capital is the “Delegated” type, where the political actor receives his legitimacy and capacity to mobilize from being the representative of a political organization, by a transfer of the symbolic capital that the organization has accumulated over its history of political struggle (Bourdieu 1981, 19). Delegated political capital is provided in exchange for the individual actor’s devotion to the organization, and is conditional on the continuation of that relation. The delegated and personal types of political capital are, of course, not mutually exclusive, as actors sometimes hold a combination of the two, and in the some situations, are able to convert one type into the other.

Bourdieuian Field Theory and Historical Analysis:

Though Bourdieu was reticent to turn his approach into a more formalized methodology, there have been efforts by other scholars towards that end. One such framework of relevance to this study was the one developed by Philip S. Gorski (2013) in the conclusion chapter to his edited book. Unlike other scholars who combined their formalization efforts with a ‘lighter’ version of the approach focused only on some isolated component(s) of Bourdieu’s conceptual toolbox (e.g., Fligstein and McAdam

¹⁷ For example the actor can be drawing on the capital earned from being a well respected academician, a businessman, or a famous actor in some cases.

¹⁸ This form tends to be more frequent in times of crisis.

2012)¹⁹, Gorski's (2013) approach is comprehensive and compatible with the general implications of the broader Bourdieusian theoretical framework and its foundational ontological and epistemological principles.

The main focus of Gorski's edited volume is to highlight the insights that can be reached through the application of BFT's concepts to historical analytical approaches. For this dissertation, its most valuable contributions lie not only in the innovative ways in which the contributors elaborate upon Bourdieu's original framework and the new directions into which they develop its theoretical implications but in the insights that it comes up with in suggesting a more structured format to deploy the concepts within the framework of historical analysis. In suggesting and highlighting specific dimensions around which the analysis can be structured, Gorski further reinforces the capacity of Bourdieusian concepts to be deployed in a relatively similar fashion across different empirical contexts. In his own words, Gorski's tried to "...show that Pierre Bourdieu's three master concepts, field, capital, and habitus, can be elaborated into a more general framework for describing sociohistorical change and tracing out causal interconnections" (Gorski 2013, 327). In an attempt to pre-empt the expectable criticism of his work as

¹⁹ Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam's (2012) iteration of the theory of field only borrow from superficially from the Bourdieusian framework. The main connection is their usage of the field concept, which they disconnect from both the notion of habitus and that of forms of capital. Instead, they introduce the ideas of 'social skill' from the Symbolic interactionist approach (Mead 1934; Goffman 1959; Giddens 1984), and the concept of resources in a way that is more generic and borrowed from Social Movement Theory (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).

being “un-Bourdieuian” in its attempts at systematizing the framework, Gorski points out that Bourdieu was not opposed to the idea and that he was working on such a project towards the end of his life, trying to spell out a “general theory of fields” (2013, 328). He further points out that Bourdieu’s “only concern was that the quest for generalization and routinization not lead us to reify particular concepts or fetishize particular methods.” (Gorski 2013, 328). Thus, the project upon which Gorski (2013) embarks is not “an attempt to fix the meaning of his (Bourdieu) concepts or the tenets of his approach, but as an initial effort to develop some new conceptual tools and methodological axioms that might prove useful in and be sharpened through a new wave of sociohistorical research” (2013). This dissertation agrees with the position developed above and sees the value in the systematization of the conceptual apparatus as a way of creating standard conceptual scaffolding upon which a comparative historical analysis program of research can be built.

At a more concrete level, the system that Gorski provides is principally based upon the *mapping* of changes in both objective and symbolic relations over time, through the identifications of specific dimensions at the level of each of the main Bourdieusian concepts of Field, Habitus, and Capital.

For the field concept, he identifies three primary dimensions. The first one is *Genesis*, where the onus is placed on identifying the moment of and the processes through which a field comes into existence or disappears. At the objective and relational level, this is done by looking for “appearance or disappearance of a set of social positions and dispositions that is structured hierarchically or doxically” (Gorski 2013,

329). At the symbolic level, the focus is on two complementary ideas that reflect the discursive dimensions through which the “ultimate value”²⁰ of a field is established for its emergence, namely the *sociodicy*²¹ and the mythologies²².

Once a field is established, it becomes important to ascertain its degree of autonomy and heteronomy. At the objective level, the idea of autonomy refers to the degree of explicitness that characterizes the rules and positions of a given field, while the heteronomy refers to the degree to which these rules and positions are dependent on other fields. As Gorski puts it, “The more systematic and explicit the structure and logic of a field is, the more autonomous it is; the more that structure and logic are distorted by actors and principles of other fields, the more heteronomous it is” (2013, 330). Symbolically, the autonomy is reflected in the degree to which the field has its own ‘rationalized’ discourse. This means having its own distinguished discourse, an ontology based upon it, and an ethical theory flowing from it (Gorski 2013). As for heteronomy, it is measured through the extent to which the autonomy dimensions are subordinated to those of another field (Gorski 2013).

²⁰ Ultimate value here is defined as the “discourse which asserts that some family of social practices is not only inherently and relatively valuable, but also ultimately more valuable than all others, so that it can potentially provide an *ultima ratio* for individual and collective life” (Gorski 2013, 334)

²¹ *Sociodicy* is defined as “systematic and explicit theories about the general conditions of social order and the essential character of human flourishing” (Gorski 2013, 334)

The next step consists in the analysis of the size, shape, and boundaries of a field. At an objective level, the size refers to the number of actors and positions available in a field. As for boundaries, the dimensions to be traced are their location and permeability. The location of boundaries can expand or contract, either on its own or at the expense of other fields (Gorski 2013, 331). As for permeability, it can be traced in terms of the degree, the number of resources and actors flowing through a boundary, and the directionality of that flow (Gorski 2013, 332). On the symbolic side, the size of a field can be traced via the spread of the field's discourse through the social space, in terms of its concepts and values, and permeability of the boundaries can be assessed through the tracing of the flow of concepts from one field into another (Gorski 2013, 338). Finally, the shape of a field, a concept that refers to its degree of hierarchization, is also to be traced. At the objective level, it can be assessed through the degree of hierarchy amongst actors in the field. Symbolically, the degree of difference between the sort of discourse used by the dominants and the dominated is indicative of the level of hierarchization (Gorski 2013, 337).

When mapping the evolution of a form of capital, Gorski (2013, 339) structures his analysis around the same primary field-related levels of analysis: “the genesis of fields, changes in relations between fields, and changes in relations within fields”. During the genesis period, the primary process at work is that of “primitive accumulation, in which one actor or class amasses a stock of capital sufficient to establish a new and autonomous field”. Accompanying this process when looking at state emergence is the ability of the dominant actor to secure and maintain the belief of other actors in the

legitimacy of his dominance, conceptualized as the continuing accumulation of symbolic capital (Gorski 2013).

Once a field is established, the concept of capital can be deployed to investigate both the inter-field and intra-field level trends in more detail. At the first level, analyzing capital within the field can provide a good entry point to trace the evolution of a given field's levels of autonomy and heteronomy. The higher the exchange rate of a field-specific form of capital vis-à-vis others, the higher the producing field's degree of autonomy. As for heteronomy, its levels in any given field can be assessed by investigating the degree to which external forms of capital can be used to conduct transactions within its boundaries (Gorski 2013, 340). Boundaries can also be traced from the perspective of capital, as the circulation of a field-specific form of capital reflects both the position of the field's boundaries within the social space and their rigidity/porosity (Gorski 2013, 341).

At the intra-field level, the focus is on the degree of hierarchy and orthodoxy. Assessing the degree of hierarchy can be done by measuring the distribution of capital among a field's dominants and dominated, providing a picture of the degree of inequality within it. As for orthodoxy, its levels are correlated with "the heterogeneity of portfolios held by actors across the field" (Gorski 2013, 342).

The approach to capital proposed by Gorski (2013) does not neglect the symbolic level of analysis. One way he proposes to go about it is to look at the genesis of a specific form of capital, through both a genealogic and analytical approach, by tracing the mechanisms through which a given form of capital comes into existence, gains

legitimacy, and ensures its reproduction. Changes in exchange rates would have symbolic dimensions as well, characterized by “debates within the field of power over the value and valuations of various forms of capital”(Gorski 2013, 345). Other aspects of the field-specific form of capital with a symbolic relevance include its negotiability and the rates of exploitation characterizing its production, as well as the degree of heterogeneity within actors’ portfolios (Gorski 2013). All of these dimensions can be investigated by tracing the arguments and debates they give rise to both within the field and beyond its boundaries.

Concerning the final element of Bourdieu’s conceptual triad, the habitus, Gorski argues that the formation of new fields and the emergence of new field-specific forms of capital are accompanied by the formation of new habitus. These can be identified through the new boundaries which appear both “in terms of lifestyle, but also symbolically, with a social category” (Gorski 2013, 348). Habitus also tends to potentially disappear or have their degree of differentiation reduced along with fluctuations in a field’s levels of relative autonomy and heteronomy. Similarly, changes in the degree of hierarchy and contestation within a field are also accompanied by a proportional degree of differentiation between the habitus of the dominant actors and the dominated ones within it.

Through his approach to the evaluation of sociohistorical change through the prism of Bourdieusian field theory, Gorski (2013) provides a way to systematically and exhaustively trace the evolution and transformations of complex empirical objects of

study. Like some other social scientists²³, Gorski also conceives of sociohistorical explanation as the process of unearthing causal mechanisms and using them to construct a detailed causal account.

c) Geographies of State power and the Topological approach:

The central object of study in the “geographies of state power” field is the way that state power, and to some extent power in general, is deployed spatially through society. Briefly put, it tries to offer ways to understand and visualize how power is distributed in a given context. Classical approaches have relied on conceptualizations of the State and its power that visualized it in vertical terms. In other words, they generally viewed the State as separate from and situated above society²⁴.

Aside from the vertical-inspired conceptions of state power, a number of more horizontal visualizations were proposed. These were proposing a model where the power of the State was, despite appearances to the contrary, not necessarily exercised from above in a hierarchical fashion, but rather deployed in a horizontal manner through the actors themselves. This was often combined with a view of power as diffusing from a center towards the outside, gradually losing its strength as distances, physical or institutional, increased (e.g., Mann 2012). In that vision, power was located within a network of sites situated on a horizontal plane. The origins of that conceptualization can be traced all the way back to Max Weber’s view of the powers of the center as being

²³ Such as Charles Tilly (2001).

²⁴ See Joel S. Migdal (1988) for instance.

delegated through the hierarchical, bureaucratic apparatus of the modern State, decreasing in proportion to its distance from the center.

These conceptions are nowadays often brought in along with it a scalar imagination of the spaces wherein power is deployed. For instance, the international or the global would be viewed as being above the national, which was, in turn, conceived of as located over the local. A recent, and more sophisticated, exemplar of this multiscale conception of state power is the dynamic conception theorized in the works of Bob Jessop (2007) and Neil Brenner (2004). Within that framework, state power is still deployed within a multiscale framework, but it can be “scaled up or down through the different units of spatial authority, both transnational and sub-national” (Allen 2016, 21). While it does, to some degree, critically assess the vertical and horizontal diffusion models of state power, their conception remains nevertheless one in which power operates within pre-determined times and spaces.

Another type of approach is that of Saskia Sassen (2001; 2006), which emphasizes the temporal and spatial variations that characterize the overlapping of state power along with that of various other types of actors. The particular aspect that is most highlighted in that framework is how the national State can see its traditional sovereignty over its territory and some aspect of social life within it curtailed by the power of other actors. In that view, the global assemblages within which different types of actors, including the states, are tied into, give rise to “transversal forms of territorial authority”. The powers and authority of international financial institutions, or of supra-national institutions, are all illustrative of these new transversal forms of authority. As a

side effect of these processes' unfolding, the idea of territorial borders as boundaries on nation-state authority is put into question as well.

In parallel to the above approaches, there are also a number of more network-centric approaches to the analysis of state power. One of the more prominent is Manuel Castell's conception of networked forms of domination. Power within this networked conception is viewed in terms of the flows of various resources, material and immaterial, and their marshaling towards the achievement of the dominant's goals. Thus for Castell's, what matters is "network-making power", as in the ability to make and shape networks in a way that furthers goals and control over the strategic nodes of the network:

The programming capacity of the goals of the network (as well as the capacity to reprogram it) is, of course, decisive because, once programmed, the network will perform efficiently, and reconfigure itself in terms of structure and nodes to achieve its goals. (Castells 2011, 45)

Networks are also viewed as important in understanding power and its deployment in the works of Michael Mann (2012) on the topic. In Mann's framework, power comes in various forms, and networks are essential in how it is deployed to further some specific goals from a distance. Thus, the space and distance aspects remain a fixed externality within that framework as well. As Allen puts it:

There is, however, an underlying spatial sensibility to many such networked practices in an age of globalization, one that rests largely upon a geometry of lines and connections extended horizontally from site to site. Space in this framework is often akin to a lattice-like pattern mapped over a flat surface, where leverage and influence

cut across nominally sovereign states. Authority is something that is seen to span the networks; it is used to exercise control over what is carried through them, rather than, as in earlier boxed accounts of authority, over bordered blocs of territory. Power, effectively, is conceived as the result of extensive interaction, where networks act as carriers of resources mobilized across multiple sites and locations. Yet such defined connections rarely capture quite how transnational actors have been able to exert an influence often way beyond their means. In part, this is because a concern for the control and co-ordination of resources across space tends to emphasize the organizational extent of power, as if the connections themselves were already drawn across the topographical landscape. Not all networked understandings work with such an inscribed geometry, however. (Allen 2016, 27)

The Topological Approach

The topological approach proposed by John Allen (2016) provides a way of thinking about power that transcends the limitations of the above topographically focused conceptualizations. While the former focuses mostly on measures of pre-existing distance and how power diffusion occurs through it, topology instead adopts a more relational and constructivist/dynamic perspective on space. As Allen (2016) succinctly puts it:

What does it mean to talk about ‘topological reach’ as opposed to reach in general? Conventionally, reach is thought about as an extensive arrangement: when something like power is extended outwards over mappable distances, it is common to expect that the greater the distance over which it is extended, the greater its reach. With greater reach, however, it is also supposed that control and influence will likely diminish in

line with its extension over greater numbers across ever-expanding distances. The extensiveness of power and its intensity are usually assumed to be conversely related; increase one and the other diminishes or lessens. No such assumption holds, however, when topology enters the frame. Reach, when grasped topologically, is more about presence than distance; it is intensive rather than extensive, a relational arrangement where power composes the spaces of which it is a part by stretching, folding or distorting relationships to place certain outcomes within or beyond reach. (Allen 2016, 2)

Thus, from that topological perspective on the topic, power itself can shape the environment within which it is deployed. This can be done in various ways, depending on the types of powers at play. Distance can be increased or decreased irrelevant of the geography via the application of power. Duration can be similarly reshaped as well.

3. Theoretical Framework

Drawing upon BFT's conception of the State, this dissertation focuses on tracing the development of the *political field* in each of Morocco and Tunisia. More specifically, it tries to do a genealogy of the political fields in each State since they both regained their independence, in relatively similar circumstances. It then compares and contrasts the trajectories followed by each country, looking beyond formal regime type differences to focus on the gradual changes shaping the assemblages of field dominating their social spaces since their emergence following the French protectorate era. The continuously fluctuating assemblage is conceptualized and assessed in terms of flows of capital between its component fields. The flows are imagined in a topological fashion

that does not reify the different forms of hierarchies that are in themselves historically emergent, constructed, and contested component of the struggles involved in the emergence and evolution of the State. Their respective trajectories are analyzed in terms of fields and flows of capital. Focusing on the *political field* and its specific form of capital as primary entry points, the analysis then traces the evolution of the two as a way of assessing and tracing the changing assemblage of fields that dominate each of the two societies. With that focus, the framework aims at avoiding the issues associated with holding the regime type as an analytical starting point, or with adopting historically emergent categories in ways that obscure their constructed and contested nature, and artificially restricts the comparability of the two cases at a surface level.

Hence, the analysis begins with an investigation of the genesis of the political field in each country, through the tracing of the historical process through which it came into being, and both the objective and symbolic struggles that it emanated from. In doing so, it also highlights the struggle over the foundational sociodicies of the field and their implications in terms of primitive accumulation of symbolic capital. This contested and conflictual foundational symbolic struggle is subsequently brought into the picture. Its evolution is traced along with the changes of the political field at a more objective level, by looking at the changes in its objective dimensions, and at the topology of power within it.

In relation to the *political field*, the principal dimensions of variation that the analysis focuses on are the size of the field, its shape, degree of hierarchy, autonomy, and heteronomy, all of which are then investigated at both the objective and symbolic

levels. Simultaneously, the analysis also pays close attention to *Political Capital*, the primary form of capital produced and perused within an autonomous political field. It traces the evolution of its exchange rate within the field of power and its negotiability throughout the rest of the social space. It also traces the power and influence of external forms of capital within the *political field* and unearths the processes that brought them there eventually. By tracing the evolution of these two main dimensions, this dissertation will try to draw conclusions at different levels. At the theoretical level, it will try to come up with observations about the nature of the political field and its forms of capital, and assess the fundamental dynamics shaping the evolution of the two within modern postcolonial states, and the ways in which they react to endogenous processes and exogenous shocks. Bourdieu's (1981; 1993; 2000; 2012) theory of the State has been mainly developed based on a 'sociogenesis' of the French State principally, as well as some comparative observations drawn from other states that did not experience the ruptures associated with colonization. As such, this dissertation will fill in this gap empirically, through its detailed historical analysis of the development of the political field in two postcolonial cases, and focus on drawing out both the similarities and the differences, at a mid-range theoretical level, that the dynamics of power in these cases present in comparison to Bourdieu's (2012; 2015) own observations about the emergence and development of the State in his works. It will also present and argue for a conception of authoritarian regimes that is not built around individual rulers or institutional characteristics, which instead focuses on inter-field relations and capital

exchange rates. The more influence an external form of capital within the political field²⁵, at the expense of political capital, the more a state can be viewed as authoritarian. Variations can then be drawn based on the dominant form of capital. For instance, if the dominant form of capital is a form of social capital that stems from connections, of various degrees of separation, to the individual ruler, the political regime would then be characterized as a personalistic authoritarian one. In topological terms, the form of capital and how it is deployed and accrued can be viewed as different ways of deploying power to shape the social space in ways that are not captured by, and often obscured with, a focus on the official institutional structures and hierarchies of a state.

After it covers the emergence of the political field and the historical processes through which it came to be, and its positioning vis-à-vis other fields, this dissertation will then be drawing upon the insights of Gorski (2013), and structure its analysis of the Political Field around a tracing of the historical evolution the following main dimensions: The size of the field and the status of its boundaries, the degrees of autonomy and heteronomy of the field, and the form of capital that dominates within it, as well as the type of habitus associated with it. All of these dimensions will be traced through and tied with struggles within and outside the political field, material, and symbolic ones. Through this process, the emergence of the State will also be brought to light, in terms of it being the result of an accumulation of different forms of capital, through the various dynamic topological mechanisms with which differentiated social fields are brought into the assemblage that brings it into being.

²⁵ Taken as a proxy for the rest of the social space

In this dissertation, political parties will be analyzed in two connected manners. First, they are considered as collective actors located within an organized part of the social space, a field in which they must compete with one another. This field is referred to as the political party field, and it is conceptualized as being a fraction of the larger national political field. The latter includes several other actors that are involved in the political game through the carrying of stances and positions associated with specific conceptions of how the social space should be organized, and/or with the defense of some specific interests or constituencies.

4. Methodology and Sources

Methodologically, this dissertation will be relying on methods of within-case analysis, principally process tracing, along with cross-case comparisons, as well as some counterfactual analyses in developing its argument. The sources that it draws upon are both primary and secondary sources in Arabic, English, and French. Secondary sources will be primarily highly regarded historical and social scientific studies of relevance to some aspects of the cases. At times, these would be scholarly analyses contemporaneous with the assessed events, which provide a window into scholarly assessments of the events free of post-facto rationalizations. One of the primary sources used for that purpose is the highly regarded *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* (ANN). The ANN is an ongoing yearly publication that contains articles by prominent francophone scholars of the Maghreb region addressing relevant events of the year, and also thematic articles analyzing a variety of topics. Its yearly “Chroniques” are especially useful as they provide expert scholarly contemporary views and assessments of developments in

the political, economic, and cultural fields. Each issue also contains a detailed chronology of the year's marking events and a reproduction of important primary documents for each country. Those include speeches, legal texts, and official bulletin excerpts, significant statements, or publications by political actors and other relevant material. Overall, it is an essential source of both secondary and primary data, and it has been a well-curated reference in the field.

This dissertation also uses several primary materials from a range of sources. These include governmental and diplomatic archive documents, as well as political statements and writings by relevant political actors, published interviews, biographies, memoirs, and relevant journalistic archival sources. The primary source of diplomatic notes used is the published *Documents Diplomatiques Francais* (DDF), a series of publications by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, curated by a committee of historians. The notes included in these volumes provide a precious glimpse of the contemporary analyses and reports that a country as involved and informed about events in both Morocco and Tunisia had at the time²⁶. In combination with other sources, it helps in piecing out a more complete and complex picture of the internal political dynamics taking place in each country's political field, including observation and analysis that were later found to be misguided in hindsight. Granted, the published notes are not exhaustive, and the more sensitive ones are likely not included, but the previous point on the utility of the source still stands.

²⁶ The volumes accessed and analyzed for this study cover the period from 1954 until 1970, the author did not have direct access to subsequent volumes.

5. Outline of the Dissertation:

This dissertation will be structured in a primarily chronological way, with the relevant explanatory processes traced and highlighted empirically. These are then analyzed and compared for recurrences, similarities, and differences. Before going into the empirical chapters, this dissertation began with an overview of the bodies of literature and the theoretical debates in light of which it situates its arguments in the above introductory part.

This dissertation is divided into two main parts. The first part is comparative and analyzes the emergence of the political field in Morocco and Tunisia. The second part is focused on Morocco and traces the evolution of the political field and the State throughout the reign of King Hassan II in 1999. Each part consists of empirical chapters, followed by an analytical one. The two arguments are then followed by a concluding chapter that highlights and draws the theoretical implications and potential generalizations that can be extracted from the dissertation, and their potential implications for the study of authoritarian states.

In the first part, for each of the Tunisian and Moroccan cases, this dissertation will trace the emergence, reconfigurations, and evolution of their respective political fields during the foundational first years of independence, with attention given to both the micro and macro-level processes, throughout a period of time starting from the last years of the protectorate until the end of the period of relative fluidity in the meta-field of power of each country, and the more or less solidification of the general structure of fields that dominated their state apparatus. The part starts with a historical account of the events in the Moroccan case, followed by a similar chapter covering the events in

Tunisia. These two chapters provide an overview of the principal local political actors, with a particular focus on the nationalist movement actors in each country. This will be followed by identifying and characterizing the main actors (individual and collective) in terms of their habitus and capital endowments, and proceed to clearly delineate the relevant fields to the development of the national state institutions during that first period. It will be followed by a multilevel analysis of the definitional struggles that occurred throughout each country's social space over the objective and symbolic characteristics of the political field and the nature of the State. Chronologically, this chapter will cover the period from around 1954 until the late 1960s. The two chapters are then followed by a comparative and analytical section that analyzes the processes at play in each case, highlighting their homology despite the complexity of the diverse set of factors shaping their unfolding

The second part begins with chapters focusing on the period that this dissertation refers to as the era of personalized authoritarian rule in Morocco. Continuing the analysis after the closing up and restructuration of the post-independence political fields after the proclamation of the State of emergency in 1965, this chapter traces the processes through which the political regime was redesigned in a manner that redirected the flow of power away from institutionalized political actors and the institutionalized part of the political field towards the seemingly depoliticized and tamed bureaucratic and military fields, contrasting the different paths that brought that same outcome to bear in both cases. At the same time, the chapter also traces the flow of the political capital itself outside of the political field, which by that time had lost its autonomy vis-à-vis the power of the States, and how it diffused itself around alternative and, as of yet,

relatively autonomous other fields that still maintained an opportunity for the making of politically contentious claims vis-à-vis the State. After a review of the mechanisms and dynamics that sustained these arrangements, the chapter will move on to an analysis of the exogenous and endogenous factors and processes that made them increasingly untenable and led to their gradual withering, forcing up a timid reopening of the political field, and a revaluation of its position in the broader meta-field of power. Chronologically, the chapter covers the period from the mid-1960s until the late 1970s.

The second chapter focuses on the reemergence of the political fields in Morocco. More specifically, it traces how the various political actors tried to leverage their positions and negotiate a better valuation of their field's specific form of capital. In doing so, it also provides a window at how the processes of cooptation were successfully deployed in each case, and the effects that developments in several other fields had on making the political field's opposition actors settle for a less than optimal arrangement. The chapter also highlights the gradual enlargement of the "political" fields in Morocco to encompass new types of non-traditional and/or non-partisan actors with new repertoires, ideologies, and forms of capital. Chronologically, the chapter covers the period from the 1980s until the middle of the 1990s.

The fifth chapter takes the analysis onward to the early 2000s period. It starts by analyzing how both the State, the political field, and its actors were transformed throughout the years by the new doxa of depoliticized participation and neoliberal governance, leading to new alteration of the flow of political capital and its value and power in comparison to other forms, and their general diffusion across the country's

social space. Reviewing the processes through which these changes took place, the chapter analyses the different approaches adopted by the Moroccan State and the country's main opposition actors in managing and containing these developments and their effect on their political fields. This part is then followed by an analytical chapter that reviews and highlights the theoretical implications of the unearthed empirical processes.

The dissertation then concludes with an analytical and comparative chapter. This chapter starts with an empirical comparison of the emergence of the political field and the development of the Moroccan and Tunisian political fields, comparing the findings of this dissertation to previously made arguments within the literature on Authoritarian regimes. Afterward, it moves to discuss its finding in light of state theory, addressing issues relating to conceptualizations of the State and of the nature of the political field, and the insights brought in through addressing these topics using the Bourdieusian conceptual toolkit and sociogenetic approaches.

Part II: Emergence

Chapter 1: Morocco:

A crucial period no doubt, the few years leading up to independence played out differently in Morocco and Tunisia. Behind a façade of unanimous opposition to the protectorate system, national movements in both countries were actively re-shaped by internal struggles. Be they mainly over power, ideas, or personal rivalries; these struggles come quickly to the fore as national actors vie for control over the spoils of independence, and for the filling of the political vacuum left by the French withdrawal.

This chapter will focus on the emergence and restructuring of the national-level political field in Morocco on the eve of independence. It will start by identifying the central struggle(s) at the level of the political field and the actors involved in it, and trace their reflections in the relevant relatively autonomous fields (political parties, corporatist organizations, etc.), as well as the reverberations the struggles generated throughout the national social space. International level influences will be accounted for as well by tracing their impacts on the relevant fields. While reviewing the unfolding of the contentious historical processes that took place in the country, this chapter will be delving into the evolving positions of actors, the various forms of capital they have access to, the fluctuating value of each form of capital, and the habitus of individual

actors and its relevance to the struggles in which they are involved. The struggles will be conceptualized as both a struggle over positions and, especially in this era, a struggle over the nature of the political field and its rules and boundaries. Finally, it will also try to highlight how the struggles occurring at the national level, in the political field and the field of power, are reflected at the lower local level and within a selection of other relatively autonomous fields of relevance.

1. Independence and Early Rivalries

As Morocco regained its independence in 1956, the Alaouite dynasty found itself in a relatively advantageous situation compared to others in the region. The Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef (the future king Mohammed V), seen as the institution's embodiment, accumulated a high amount of both social and symbolic capital. The preservation and use of the monarchic institution and its forms of capital by the French protectorate to bolster its own legitimacy stands as a testimony to the privileged position enjoyed by the palace within the Moroccan field of power. Following independence, the monarchy's position was reinforced by the modern state apparatus that fell under its direct control. The protectorate also granted the monarchy access to significant social capital accruing from the connections it was allowed to maintain and develop under its rule, both with the traditional conservative elites and within the more modern

technocratic institutions²⁷. By 1955, the monarchic institution had regained a significant amount of social and symbolic capital, mainly through the political positioning of the sultan in support of the nationalist movement. The Sultan's late opposition to the protectorate authorities' policies and the connections which he developed with nationalist leaders laid the foundations for the cooperation of the two factions against the French authorities, which were strengthened following his deposition by the French authorities and exile in 1953. As the French authorities appointed Mohamed ben Arafa as the new sultan²⁸, the nationalist movement actively used the return of the sultan as a central frame around which to mobilize the population.

The decision of the *Parti de l'Istiqlal* (hereafter PI) to articulate its mobilization campaign around the return of the Sultan was not fortuitous. Instead, it was, in significant part, motivated by the party's realization of its limited reach outside the major urban centers. They viewed the Sultan as an actor that could provide them with access to the traditional and religious forms of symbolic capital that they were lacking.

²⁷ The Moroccan state remained reliant on significant numbers of French staffers and consultants for many years after independence.

²⁸ This basic and well established fact is nevertheless confusing for some scholars of the topic, such as Sylvie Thenault (2018, 4) who wrongly asserts that the French brought “a more compliant substitute, the Pasha of Marrakesh, to power, before deposing Mohammed V on 20 August 1953 and sending him into exile”. Thami El Glaoui, the definitely not compliant Pasha of Marrakesh in question was not brought in as a substitute. Rather it was Mohammed Ben Arafa, who was a not too distant cousin of the then Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef.

These forms were highly valued, especially in those parts of the country that were hard to penetrate for the party. The view that the Sultan was the religious embodiment and the symbolic representative of the *ummah* was a notion deeply rooted in the local culture and widely spread. Therefore, for the PI, the plan was to use the monarchy as a tool to further its efforts at dominating the post-independence political field and the state apparatus (Chambergeat 1964; Marais 1964; Monjib 1992; Willis 2012)²⁹. The PI itself had a heterogeneous membership and leadership, with a certain degree of diversity in terms of *habitus* that gave it, especially during the struggle for independence, the capacity to navigate efficiently around several fields. Some of the party's leaders were more proficient at mobilizing workers or students. In contrast, others had, from their traditional aristocratic upbringing, access to the embodied forms of cultural and symbolic capital that allowed them to feel at ease in some other social settings, such as the traditional and modern bourgeoisie.

The PI's mobilization campaign against the protectorate was very efficient. The party succeeded in increasing its membership significantly and began a coordinated armed resistance campaign. Faced with the general escalation of violence around its colonies, especially in neighboring Algeria, the French authorities decided to enter into

²⁹ Paul Chambergeat and Octave Marais are both pseudonyms used by the famous French political scientist Remy Levau to publish his work during the time when he was a legal councilor at the Moroccan Ministry of Interior, from 1959 until 1965 (As reported in Amiraux, Bennani-Chraïbi, and Bozarslan 2005).

negotiations with the National movement³⁰. The negotiation process culminated in Morocco regaining its independence, and in the triumphant return of the Sultan Muhammad ben Youssef. This foundational moment laid the ground for the definitional struggle over the political field that characterized the period from 1955 to 1965, which would, in turn, profoundly impact the future evolution of Morocco's politics.

2. Main Actors: Positions, Habitus, and Ressources

Even though it was by far the largest and most influential organized actor, the PI was not alone in the emerging political party field. As far as political parties went, there was also the *Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance* (PDI), the *Parti Communiste Marocain* (PCM), and the later organized *Mouvement Populaire* (MP). The PDI was in no way comparable to the much larger and better-organized PI. It mostly represented a small urban and bourgeois constituency. The PCM was an old party, which was banned under the protectorate, and mainly operated underground. Its reappearance on the post-independence political field was to be short-lived, as it was banned again in 1959. As for the MP, its growth was supported by the monarchy, and it regrouped several actors whose *habitus* and pre-colonial political field positions put them at odds with the PI and the nationalist movement as a whole. A considerable number of rural notables chose to be part of this regrouping. Among these rural notables who eventually formed the

³⁰ It is worth pointing out that the PI was not able to impose itself as the sole (or even principal) representative of the Moroccan side during the negotiations. Though it was much larger than the other actors, the French made sure that representatives of the traditional rural notability which was more supportive of the protectorate, would be represented as well.

backbone of the MP, were those who were relatively supportive of the protectorate prior to independence, along with those who were not supportive but resented the domination of the urban-based PI. This feeling of resentment was partially an expression of the mismatch that notables felt between their traditional "ways" and the modernizing goals and strategies espoused by the PI. Some of these significant differences can arguably be traced back to the differences in education as well. The protectorate authorities had prior to independence, since 1923, established a separate educational system catering exclusively to the Berber population, with the expressed goal of insulating them from the nationalist discourses that had already started spreading in the cities. On that matter, a remarkably prescient report written in 1930 by the commander of *Dar el-Beida*, the elite military school built in Meknes and designed principally to train the sons of rural notables, mentions that one of the institution's main goals was the creation of a "loyalist bloc" that would serve as a counterweight to the nascent nationalist faction (as quoted in Vermeren 2002, 32).

The foremost leaders of the MP were Mahjoubi Aherdane and Abdelkrim Khatib. They were both involved with the *Armée de Liberation* (AL, Liberation Army). Aherdane was a captain in the French army, and was known for his very pro-Berber and pro-rural positions, and was later appointed as a *Caid* by the protectorate (Dalle 2004). As for Dr. Khatib, he was particularly close to the palace and was born into a wealthy family. He was married into a prominent family from the Rif region and was the first Moroccan to train as a surgeon in France. Under the protectorate, he was supporting the

resistance with fundraising amongst Moroccan migrant workers in Europe³¹. Both were known as staunch monarchists, without any deep ties or formal to the PI, and thus able to gain the support of those various groups that held grudges against the party and its policies.

Within the PI, the MP was viewed as an assemblage of "*cooperators*", if not outright traitors to the nationalist cause. Through its closeness to the monarchy and its ability to use traditional social networks to mobilize the rural population, especially in Berber areas, the MP was increasingly viewed as a threat by the PI.

Soon after independence, the relationship between the PI and the monarchy started to become increasingly antagonistic. At stake was the definitional struggle over the rules of the Moroccan Field of Power. The central disagreement was over the claim to represent the nation. In other words, the question they were debating was: which form of capital should/would have more purchase, the nationalist symbolic capital accruing from closeness to the party and involvement in the nationalist movement, or the traditional and religious symbolic capital embodied by the monarch and earned from closeness to him. The PI viewed itself as the principal force that led the country towards independence, and most of its leadership considered that it should be able to continue the process by being able to govern alone. The monarchy was wary of such demands, especially that around the same time, a similar process had led to the side-lining of the Husseinid dynasty in neighboring Tunisia. Allowing the PI to control the state apparatus

³¹ See Dalle (2004, 126–30) for a more detailed interview with Abdelkrim Khatib.

at this point, single-handedly, would have led to an increase in its appeal, augmenting its reach and membership. It would become the dominant actor in the national political field, and from the perspective of potential new recruits, the party would be seen as the main gateway to achieve social ascension by acquiring positions within the state bureaucracy. As the Moroccan monarchy was not willing to be pushed into a position that would at best be secondary to the party, if not outright ceremonial, it entered into a conflict with the PI.

a) Definitional Struggle: National Representation and Symbolic Capital

The monarchy had many advantages in the struggles that followed independence. First, its claim to represent the nation was bolstered by the fact that the PI had previously relied on the institution's appeal for its mobilization campaign during the phase leading up to independence. Mohamed V was described as accumulating the traditional influence of the Sultan, added to the administrative power of the Resident-General, and the national hero prestige equivalent to that of a figure like Bourguiba (Aubin and Aubin 1965). The PI had good relations with the Sultan and was relatively confident in, and counting on, being able to leverage the latter's position to further the party's program.

Second, the monarchy actively engaged in what could be labeled a strategy of dilution. It "diluted" the PI's claim by actively supporting the various alternative actors

that the party was trying to side-line³². It also granted them disproportionately large representation within the first government at the expense of the PI ("Documents Maroc" 1964, 742–82). The insurrectionary reactions of traditional local elites³³ to the PI's attempts at asserting its authority over Berber and rural areas, through the state bureaucracy, gave more support to the monarchy's efforts (Monjib 1992).

To drum up support for its reform plans, the PI, very early on, used the governmental positions that it controlled to appoint its members into administrative posts in various rural areas. This strategy could have proved to be a fruitful move. However, the young, and often modern educated party members who were dispatched to rural areas as part of this strategy, and to plan and push for an agrarian reform plan substantially failed at their task. Furthermore, in their failure, it is possible to read a fine

³² Through legal means, as well as less than legal ones, such as the use of kidnappings and assassinations.

³³ Especially the Addi ou Bihi rebellion in the Tafilalet, and the Rif rebellion. The uprising of Addi ou Bihi was clearly in favor the Sultan, and of a return to the traditional pre-independence rules of the game, rejecting what he viewed as the encroachment of the PI beyond urban centers and into the traditional 'fiefdoms' of local notability. The Rif issue was somewhat different in its causes, erupting in connection with the assassination of Abbas Messaadi, which was allegedly committed by the PI, and encouraged by actors connected with the monarchy (Aherdane and the MP). In both the Rif and the Addi ou Bihi cases, the monarchy gained a lot of credit by appearing as the actor fixing the mistakes caused by the PI's assertiveness and maintaining the unity of the country, whether by using its social and symbolic capital to appeal to the local notables and/or populations, or through the use of coercion.

demonstration of the importance of *habitus* and the decisive effect that it can exercise on social actions and capabilities. These young party members often displayed condescension towards the regressive traditional norms and mundane concerns of the mostly illiterate peasants. What they cared more about was the reforms and plans at the national level, as set up by the central party leadership. It was part of their *habitus* to display this condescension, and never in their usual social circles was this attitude challenged or questioned, so it naturally manifested in the way they spoke and in the way they interacted³⁴.

The local administrators came principally from within the ranks of the PI, except in the Northern provinces, where many of the appointees belonged to the local factions of the AL. They were generally from a low urban background. They often failed to display the leadership traits required to gain and maintain the respect of the villagers. The villagers were until then used to deal with local French administrators, representing the protectorate, who were often very well trained and had an in-depth knowledge of the social and cultural features of the villages that they oversaw, unlike the newcomers (Leveau 1985, 45). Furthermore, a number of the new PI administrators overseeing Berber-speaking areas had reportedly "no knowledge of the local Berber dialect or customs" (Leveau 1985, 46). The fact that these low-level positions were not very

³⁴ This form of *habitus*-related condescension, which can still be noticed in contemporary Morocco, was not unique to the PI but is a feature that can be found across numerous social boundaries (ethnic, regional, linguistic, educational etc...)

prestigious or appealing made it even more difficult for the new administration to find enough qualified appointees.

At the provincial level, communication and understanding between the administrators and the rural people were not any smoother. The rural notables who would at times convey the villagers' grievances to the provincial level authorities often found themselves in what they viewed as the uncomfortable position of having to be lectured by young French-speaking and westernized PI-affiliated bureaucrats about the primacy of national-level goals over the more practical needs of their villages (Leveau 1985, 46). This reportedly made the rural people often feel that their whole existence and lifestyle were targeted and that the administration (and therefore the PI) ultimately aimed at making them leave their villages for the sprawling shantytowns surrounding the main cities (Leveau 1985).

Thus, the rural community representatives (often local notables) would have what they viewed as their legitimate demands for modern infrastructure and services dismissed. Peasants, in turn, were very familiar with what they deemed to be a westernized demeanor and modern values that were previously associated with colonial administrators, often reciprocated with contempt to these young urban party members (Monjib 1992). In many cases, the villagers would often end up circumventing the new local administrators, leaving them at times so isolated from the population that some would reportedly end up abandoning their posts after a few months (Leveau 1985, 45). In other cases, they would react violently, drawing upon a repertoire that has been

compared to those of the pre-colonial rural rebellion patterns against the *Makhzen* authority (Marais 1969).

The concept of *habitus* helps us to contextualize that sort of interaction and to connect them to the cultural and symbolic setting, while that of *forms of capital* allows us to unpack further and analyze the content of these interactions. On the ground, the other factor to be taken into account is that at the local level, the young PI administrators were pitted against rural notables. Besides the *habitus* dimension, this has implications associated with the concepts of forms of capital and field as well. The rural notables were entirely at ease in their environment and had a lifetime of experience and an accumulation of field-specific capital on their side, all of which young PI administrators lacked in. The notables had large clientelistic networks in their areas and would often be respected and/or feared by the villagers as powerful and influential local leaders. That domination was generally taken for granted and not questioned by most of the rural population. The notables often combined this social capital with economic capital, as many of them had acquired significant private agricultural landholdings under the protectorate, and accumulated significant amounts of economic capital, which they were able to efficiently deploy to protect their positions when needed (Marais 1969)³⁵. So they were the ones and not the young party members who succeeded in winning over the support of the peasantry, mobilizing it against the outsiders, and

³⁵ For a more detailed analysis highlighting the importance of local field-specific forms of capital in ensuring political success, see the review of legislative elections' candidates in Leveau, *Le Fellah Marocain Défenseur Du Trône*, 146–240.

ironically at the expense of the peasants' own material interests, in a way cutting the potential for the party to connect to that crucial demographic. These factors limited the effect of *homology* that is often noted in linking the dominated actors of different fields together. Though the political field was yet to be formally established, it had a crucial path-dependent effect on the future of relations between the national movement parties and the rural masses, setting them at odds, which as Remy Levau (1985) had stated, later on, made the peasantry become in a way the bulwark of the monarchic institution.

These events further supported the impression that the monarchy was crucial for the maintenance of a national unity that was endangered by what appeared as the PI's dangerous power-plays. The monarchy took advantage of this favorable conjuncture to pass the *Charte des Libertés Publiques* (Public Liberties Charter) in 1958, which paid some lip service to ideals such as democracy and freedom, but at the same time, shattered the party's hopes of domination by defining the structure of the emerging *Political Party Field* as a multiparty system. The fact that the palace had already created security forces whose loyalty it could count on was another critical development tipping the balance of power in its favor. It still, however, made sure to neutralize potential contestation from the PI's most important ally on the political field, the large and powerful *Union Marocaine du Travail* (UMT)³⁶, by granting it some of its demands for

³⁶ The UMT was principally allied with the leftist factions within the PI. The alliance between the union leadership and the leftist wing of the PI was for the leftist within the PI away of building up a strong progressist ally that could serve as a source of support and power in their rivalries against the more conservative-minded factions within the party, as well as in the promotion of the leftist policies

official recognition.³⁷ A similar strategy was used when granting the PI the *homogenous government* that it had campaigned for since independence, a few months before the passing of the charter. Though it granted the PI control over most ministerial posts, the monarchy made sure that those appointed came principally from the conservative and monarchist members of the party. The above moves made it so that any attempts by the PI to dominate either the political field or the political party field would face staunch opposition not just from the monarchy, but from a number of relatively autonomous actors who would view such domination as a threat to their positions within their respective fields.

The effects of the monarchy's successful campaign at dominating the field of power, its establishment of a multiparty system in the political party field, and its opening of the political field to alternative actors such as unions and other forms of associations, impacted the internal dynamics of the PI. Given its heterogeneous composition, the party had many dormant internal fault lines, and the loss of the prospect of a unified political field under its control facilitated their activation.

The primary division pitted the progressive and conservative wings of the party against each other. Control over the political and bureaucratic fields would have been a necessary step to the implementation of the party's ambitious reform program, which

they favored at the state level. As such, they made sure to support the union's autonomy and to help it acquire a number of financial and material resources from the state (Claisse 1985, 221) .

³⁷ Dahir n° 1-57-119 (16 July 1957) on Labor Unions.

aimed at implementing an agrarian land redistribution program and the achievement of territorial integrity.

The appointment of the Balafrej (PI) government in May 1958 further complicated matters internally, and the political line that it followed led to growing discontent within the party's left wing. Ahmed Balafrej, who came from an upper-class family background, was the secretary-general of the PI since its foundation was respected as an intellectual figure, and was reportedly known to be a very diplomatic person. He disliked open confrontation, and some regarded him as the palace's man inside the PI³⁸.

The more radical faction of the left, in association with the UMT, was very active in spearheading the opposition to the Balafrej government, organizing a number of labor strikes. Mehdi ben Barka and Allal al Fassi were still focused on maintaining a united front, and both factions at first avoided the leveling of direct critiques at each other and at the Balafrej government. A few months later, in December 1958, the monarchy appointed Abdallah Ibrahim, one of the closest PI leaders to the labor movement, to lead the government ("Documents Maroc" 1964). A significant nationalist and leftist figure, Ibrahim was born in Marrakech in 1918, to a modest but respected Sharif family. He excelled in his studies within both the traditional and western education systems. Ibrahim acquired a reputation as a very efficient political organizer at a young age, developing and leading an extensive network of nationalist cells in Marrakech. He was

³⁸ According to an interview with his son, Anis Balafrej, Ahmed Balafrej was “not a convinced monarchist, but a monarchist by interest”, even if he enjoyed good relations with the palace (Dalle 2004, 143).

known to be an incorruptible and morally rigorous man of convictions within the political field, committed his leftist values. These values made Abdallah Ibrahim one of the closest people within the party to the positions of the UMT.

The appointment of Abdallah Ibrahim further exacerbated the tensions within the party, while also putting its more radically leftist wing to the test of governance. As Ben Barka (Ben Barka 1966) was to observe later on, being in the government did not necessarily mean that the PI had the power to apply its program. It had still to deal with an increasingly assertive monarchy, especially with the then Prince Hassan, who was at the time very involved in organizing the forces opposed to the PI. The King was uncooperative as well, at times using a tactic that he had previously resorted to against the Protectorate, refusing to sign bills with which he disagreed.

Within the PI, taken as a field of its own, the confrontation turned around the rules of the game, and the lines of demarcation between those wanting to reform the internal functioning of the central organs of the party were aligned with the actors' positions within the broader social space. At the level of the party leadership, both Mehdi ben Barka and Allal al-Fassi, while situated on different sides of the issue, still kept in mind their party's position within the broader field, and reportedly preferred the avoidance of a split that would principally benefit the monarchy at the expense of the national movement (Monjib 1992). Nevertheless, while it was a reflection of the on-going struggle for domination within the broader political field between the monarchy and the nationalist movement, the relative autonomy of the PI field meant that the struggle would be played out through the field's own internal dynamics.

Internal strife accelerated soon after the appointment of the Ibrahim government. By late December, the dispute transitioned from the more limited circle of the leadership to become a more public issue at the level of the whole party (Ashford 1961). The left-wing considered that the internal organization of the party had to be rethought. More specifically, they were pushing for a more democratic mode of selection for party delegates. The conservative wing was opposed to that proposal and adamantly insisted on maintaining a given number of seats for unelected notables. A compromise that would have granted the notables the status of observers was rejected as well (Monjib 1992). The leftist faction, following this disagreement, began mobilizing the provincial party sections for a move against the central leadership.

Opposition membership within the PI struggle reflected and coincided with the positions occupied by the many protagonists within the Moroccan social space. Endowments in various forms of capital, as well as the *habitus* factor, both coincided quite well with the positions adopted by the actors during the struggle. This distribution was noticed in earlier works that highlighted the variation in terms of age, social and geographic origins, and education of each side's supporters (Ashford 1961; Monjib 1992; Willis 2012).

The "Orthodox" PI³⁹, headed by Allal El Fassi, successfully maintained the support of several executive committee members, regional inspectors, and local hierarchy structures. It also managed maintained control over the party's offices and bank

³⁹ That was how the El Fassi-aligned faction was referred to by observers at the time.

accounts (Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français. 1994, vol. 1, n. 302). The main groups supporting the factions were the upper bourgeoisie, big landowners, and merchants, as well as some administrative cadres and the youth that went through the traditional education system (Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français. 1994, vol. 1, n. 302). The prestige of Allal el Fassi was a significant source of symbolic capital for the party, as he was often viewed to be only second to Mohamed V in symbolizing and embodying the struggle for independence.

The faction that supported Mehdi Ben Barka and the move against the central leadership did enjoy a significant support base as well. The faction was dubbed "Autonomous PI" in contemporary sources. It had a strong presence within urban centers, both within their working-class districts and the urbanized middle class. It also received the support of youth groups such as the student union (UNEM), and the party youth. Within the labor union field as well, it unsurprisingly received the support of the UMT, which was, as previously mentioned, very close to Abdallah Ibrahim. In the areas where it still had a presence, the remaining groups affiliated with the AL also supported the faction, principally due to the connection with Mohammed Fqih Basri⁴⁰, who was very close to the Ben Barka group.

⁴⁰ Mohamed Fqih Basri was born in 1927 in Demnate, a small Berber town in the High Atlas area. He did his studies in Marrakech, where he developed a radical attitude in opposition to the protectorate and its representatives, becoming one of the main heads of the AL. He was widely

Some exceptions to this observation were noted, for example, the actors primarily involved in the internal struggles of other fields, and who viewed their position within the PI's internal game as secondary. For instance, the regional/ethnic and economic rivalry between businessmen from the Fez and Sūs regions played a role in making the latter throw their weight behind the Ben Barka faction (Marais 1964; Monjib 1992; Vairel 2014). The ideological implications of the struggle appeared less salient to observers at the time. For instance, a diplomatic note reporting on the schism and dated from May 23rd, 1959, from the French embassy in Rabat observes that the ideological goals professed by each faction at that point were not significantly different. Instead, the note describes the differences between the two sides as being principally related to tactical questions, regarding how to work towards the achievement of their goals, which the note views as boiling down to the different intellectual stances and personal rivalries that the PI schism developed along (Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français. 1994, vol. 1, n. 302). The same note also highlights the apparent disinterestedness of the population to the conflict within the party, not only in rural areas but in urban centers as well. It then concludes by predicting that the Ben Barka faction, principally due to its alliance with the UMT and social progressiveness, would have better odds of political success.

Within the labor movement field, the PI's internal frictions were reflected and mediated through the field's own relatively autonomous internal dynamics. The field

respected for his actions within the resistance, such as organizing a massive prison evasion of resisters that were to be executed from the Kenitra prison in 1955 (Bennouna 2002).

was dominated by the UMT, headed by Mahjoub Benseddik since its founding in 1955. Benseddik was known as a cunning leader with a very independent and often authoritarian character. He was born in 1922 to a modest family of Meknes, ended his studies at the high-school level, and quickly went on to work for the railway company. At that time, and even before the founding of the UMT, Benseddik became more involved with the existing unions, especially the CGT (*Confederation Generale du Travail*), of which he managed to become General Secretary for the Railroad workers section. He was very close to Abdallah Ibrahim, who played a role in providing Benseddik with an ideological instruction through their early friendship, and during the time that they had spent in prison together (Daoud 2018, 294). Benseddik reportedly viewed the organization that he led, the UMT, as his personal fiefdom, and resented the attempts by the PI, and any other political actors for that matter, to turn the union into an appendage of the party ("Les Hommes: Mahjoub Ben Seddik" 1972). He was personally opposed to the Balafrej government and was one of the main left wing actors strongly favoring the scission within the PI. Ideologically, as Benseddik's focus was the maintenance of the autonomy of the UMT vis-a-vis the political party field, he reportedly aimed to leverage that autonomous position to prioritize the interests of the labor class, even if it implied confrontation with the State and/or allied political parties. This has earned him a reputation for duplicity with other actors of the political field, as will be apparent later on.

The UMT was very close to the PI's left, mainly to Abdallah Ibrahim. Throughout the tenure of the Balafrej government, the UMT engaged in a strong opposition

campaign, organizing many strikes, and publishing several critical articles, some of which were penned by Ibrahim himself. However, politically motivated strikes did not come cheap, and opposition to the union leadership increased as some of its membership viewed that the purely political use of strikes against the Balafrej government was not in the labor movement's best interests. For instance, the conservative wing managed to mobilize the dockworkers of Casablanca against the union leadership, in favor of a potential split, by challenging them on the priority they often granted to the games occurring in the broader political field at an economical cost to the workers (Monjib 1992).

Events accelerated quickly afterward. Despite their stated personal disapproval of the scission, the divided party membership coalesced around the charismatic figures of Mehdi Ben Barka and Allal al Fassi. In 1959, the rivalry culminated with the schism that led to the foundation of the *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires* (UNFP). The new party regrouped the leftist factions of the PI and was closely aligned with the labor movement, under Ben Barka's leadership. The conservative faction remained united around Allal al Fassi within the old PI.

On the Labor Union field, the attempts by the PI to split the support base of the UMT in an attempt to subdue it and turn it into an organ of the party turned out to be counterproductive. Instead, the creation of the UGTM (*Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains*) by the PI in an attempt to counter the hegemony of the UMT only served to antagonize further Benseddik, who responded by personally supporting the secessionist

factions within the PI, using both his influence within the *political party* field and the labor union one (Claisse 1985, 222).

The division within the nationalist movement was a significant victory for the monarchy, as this development strengthened its claims to be the chief representative of national unity and the champion of independence, and granted it exclusive access to the symbolic capital that accrues from these roles. The monarch's share of the symbolic capital that came to be associated with the struggle for independence increased, as the independence-related symbolic capital held by the nationalist movement was now split between the PI and UNFP, and was eroded by the fierce competition and the accusations of collusion and lack of commitment that the two parties exchanged through their respective press organs.

Building upon the gains it reaped from that victory, the monarchy solidified its dominant position within the field of power, and dramatically increased its autonomy from the now subordinate political party field (Waterbury 1975). However, autonomy did not mean withdrawal. The monarchy still partook in the political party field through the tacit, and at times explicit support it provided to the eclectic range of parties opposing the PI and UNFP.

In a process that paralleled the internal struggles within the PI field, the monarchy had also managed to monopolize the legitimate use of force, by dissolving the AL, and integrating a portion of its members into the still newly established *Forces Armées Royales* (FAR, Royal Armed Forces), the police, and the bureaucracy. The presence of several veterans from the French and Spanish colonial militaries within these

institutions ensured, to some extent, their continued hostility towards both the PI and the UNFP. The central figure within the security services was Mohamed Oufkir. A veteran and highly respected officer of the French colonial army, he was a close and long-time ally of the monarchy since independence. Oufkir was a complex character, known within the political field to be always willing to break the rules of the game if it allows him to break his opponents. His father managed to bring his family to prominence by becoming a Caid through audacious and ruthless power plays, gaining the attention and support of Lyautey himself. This upbringing, combined with his education at the Azrou College and Meknes Military academy, made Oufkir stand out as a highly-skilled military officer, and later on as a ruthless and skilled political actor. Both within the political field and within the Makhzen, his unique habitus and shrewdness made him a feared adversary to most of his peers. More importantly, his colonial military education made him develop a very disdainful view of politicians and parliamentary politics, considering them to be weak and inefficient actors. Following independence, Oufkir was assigned as an assistant to Mohammed V, and he would remain as a central figure within the monarchy camp until his ultimate demise. He reportedly was a hardliner against any liberalizing tendencies and concessions to the political opposition and national movement. Oufkir played a significant role in a number of bloody repressive episodes in the country's history, especially the Rif rebellion, where his heavy-handed approach earned him the nickname of "Butcher of the Rif", and later on in the

repression of the 1965 repression. He would, later on, be involved in the failed coups attempted in 1971 and 1972, after which he would meet his end⁴¹.

The sudden death of Mohamed V changed the dynamics significantly. His son, the then Prince Hassan, was a very active political actor. He was known to be favor a more traditional and absolutist conception of monarchic rule and opposed any plans to relinquish any of the palace's powers. The then prince was reported to have played a significant role in the weakening of the nationalist movement through the promotion of scissions within its ranks.

When he ascended to the throne after the death of his father in 1961, the monarchy was already successfully occupying a dominant position within the field of power. Within the political field, this was reflected in the marginalization of the UNFP by the monarchy in the discussions preparing the 1962 constitution. The PI, though still represented in government, was relatively pushed aside as well, and expressed some reservations over the increasing concentration of powers that was engaged in by the new King. A note written in June 1961 by Roger Seydoux, the French ambassador at the time, describes the tendencies of the new king to hold all the levers of power and govern in a very personalistic fashion, one of his first acts being to appoint himself as head of the council, and delegate many strategic positions to his personal friend and ally, Ahmed Reda Guedira (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 1997, n. 288). Seydoux goes

⁴¹ Oufkir supposedly committed suicide after a meeting with the Hassan II following the 1972 coup attempt. His son insists that his father was killed and that his body had 5 bullets in it. Oufkir's family, his wife and kids, would subsequently be imprisoned by the king for a very long time.

on to correctly observe that the new king would rather have a depoliticized and technocratic government, an impossible task at a time when most educated and skilled cadres were generally affiliated with the PI or UNFP, highlighting the degradation of the government efficiency to a level lower than it was in the earlier years (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 1997, n. 288). A related telegram sent in the same year also highlights the impulsive and prone to risk-taking character of the new king, which according to Seydoux, had to be taken into account by the French government in relation to bilateral relations (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 1997, n. 147). Finally, the mistrust was mutual between the new king and the national movement. However, both parties were wary of direct conflict during the first months and kept abiding by the rules of the game, deferring to each other with public shows of respect and a lack of direct attacks.

Having played a central role in the foundation of the FAR and the police force, Hassan II could count on their indefectible support in any rivalry pitting him against the PI/UNFP. That relation was made more robust, given that most of the Moroccan officer corps in that period came from the French or Spanish armies. William Zartman describes them as "aristocrats, frequently sons of merchants or pashas and caids who had occupied their tribal posts with the favor of the protectorate" (Zartman 1964, 75). They reportedly displayed staunch monarchism and preferred to keep the institution out of politics, resisting the attempts that the PI reportedly made to infiltrate the ranks⁴².

⁴² Only the MP, through its networks within the officer corps and the troops that previously belonged to the AL prior to integrating the FAR, combined with its monarchist positions, managed to have a

3. Institutionalization Attempt: The new settlement and Politics under the 1962 Constitution

Confident in the security services' support, and reassured by the schisms and infighting within the national movement, Hassan II decided to give the *coup de grace* to the National Consultative Assembly (NCA), which was by now one of the only remaining official bodies still technically under the control of the national movement actors. In a unilateral decision, he decided that not to follow its recommendation, and to instead draft the country's first constitution on his own, along with experts that he would personally select.

Before tracing the processes through which King Hassan II succeeds in drafting and passing the 1962 constitution, an analysis of the symbolism and politics of the NCA is required. The Assembly, which was inaugurated in November 1956 by Mohamed V, who appointed its members in a manner supposed to reflect the diverse political composition and the various regional differences of the newly independent country. It included a member of the PI, PDI, and other political actors, along with representatives of the various social classes and of the religious establishment (both Islamic and Judaic) (Ebrard 1964). The presidency of the assembly was held by no other than Mehdi Ben Barka until 1959, and its debates were generally dominated by the PI and its allies.

relatively significant level of support within the institution according to Zartman (1964). He also mentions in a footnote that the PI was rumored to have encouraged some of its youths to enroll into the FAR.

The symbolic dynamics of the Assembly's work are worth noting. Starting with the setup of the space where its meetings were held, the NCA reflected a conscious effort at the deployment and usage of traditional and religious symbolic capital by the monarchy. In addition to its habitual usage, one could probably assume that there was a connection to the dynamics taking place in neighboring Tunisia⁴³. For instance, the inaugural session, as well as those where the King was attending, were carried out in an atmosphere somehow placed under the spell of sacralization from his presence and speeches that are extensively drawing on the themes of tradition and ritual religious formulations (Ebrard 1964, 50). The royal usage of religious formulas is a powerful tool that helps in asserting the monarchic *doxa* over the institution, as it grants it the cover of religious duty, and forces the opposition to adopt a similar discourse when in the king's presence (Ebrard 1964, 50) which, by its very nature, puts it into a more submissive and conciliatory position. The assembly room is also designed with prominent reminders of the monarchic institution and of its primacy over the assembly. Such reminders included a prominently and placed throne of red velvet with a large golden crown symbol visibly embroidered upon it, with next to it, a slightly smaller throne for the crown prince, all of it a constant reminder of the monarchic institution and dynastic continuity (Ebrard 1964, 49).

⁴³ Where the Bey was facing constant pressure and deligitimization attacks targeting his symbolic power emanating from Bourguiba and the ND in the Tunisian constitutional assembly, that wasted no time declaring itself sovereign and free from external control.

Nevertheless, Hassan II could not command or deploy the sort of symbolic capital that his father often relied upon. Being an embodied form of capital, it was not easily transferable, even though a part of it was already institutionalized. Without the central figure of Mohammed V at its helm, the institutionalized symbolic capital of the throne was not enough to allow him to subdue the National movement actors within the political field into compliance. The unexpected death of Mohammed V opened a path to the questioning of the emerging settlement within the field of power on the primacy of the monarchic field's claim to be the dominant holder of symbolic capital. The nationalist symbolic capital earned through the struggle for independence by the monarchic institution was principally embodied in the late king. Though the capital was slowly becoming institutionalized and associated with the monarchy, it was still not fully transferred. The assertions of the monarchy's supremacy over the social space, acquired through its successful ability to dominate the field of power, and established as norms and rules of the game during the reign of Mohammed V were now openly questioned or challenged by many actors, especially the UNFP and its allies.

When he got on the throne, Hassan II lacked the religious and nationalistic credentials of his father, and had, at the time, a reputation for being a "Francophile" and Western-friendly figure, and was further handicapped by his young age (Le Tourneau 1964). The rationale for the rapprochement and opening from the palace to the PI and Allal El Fassi, who accepted to be appointed as minister of Islamic Affairs, can be understood within that perspective. The leader of the PI was personally involved in supporting the new king's legitimacy building efforts with his own embodied nationalist

and religious symbolic capital, probably in the hope of maintaining a seat at the king's table for the PI, and in ensuring his support for at least some of the PI's positions. Thus, in a fateful decision that would come back to haunt him later on, El Fassi extended this support to the new king's plans to draft a constitution for the country without much consultation with other national movement actors. Moreover, El Fassi abdicated the role that was to be given to the Constitutional Consultancy Council, even though the PI was well represented within the institution, of which he himself held the presidency. This calculus, based upon both the capital endowments and field position, is made more understandable by the habitus dimension of the actors. For Abbas el Fassi, The monarchy was at the core of the traditional ideological conceptualization of Moroccan identity that his academic and personal curriculum predisposed him to theorize and adopt. The ideological preferences of the PI and its leader, at their core, along with the social origins of the party's membership, not radically at odds with the traditional prominent role that King Hassan intended for the monarchy to hold within the new system. Neither of the two actors was interested in the promotion of a socially progressive and modernist agenda such as the one championed by the UNFP and its allies, which under Mohamed V seemed to sometimes be palatable for the palace. Nevertheless, the PI, and El Fassi himself, did disagree with the new king about the role to be granted to elected political institutions and, especially, disagreed quite strongly with the foreign policy positions that he favored.

a) The Referendum on the "King's Constitution"

By 1961, the UNFP was boycotting the Constitutional council and demanding an elected constitutional assembly. The Council was viewed as increasingly deadlocked and falling into irrelevance. This was to the satisfaction of the king, who took the opportunity to dismiss the council and take another approach to provide the country with its first constitution.

The constitution, prepared in relative secrecy by King Hassan II and some advisors of his own choosing, was a way for him to institutionalize the mechanisms of continued domination over the field that the palace had developed through the accumulation of various forms of capital during the early phases of the post-independence struggle, and which gave the monarch a sort of backdoor access into most organized social fields. Symbolic capital was primarily embodied in the persona of Mohammed V, and it was not the sort of capital to be easily transferred to the young Hassan II. He was not able, in the early years, to command the same deference within a political field that still included significant nationalist figures with arguably more nationalist credentials than him. The timing of the announcement and publication of the constitutional draft to be submitted to referendum did reflect that symbolic concern as well, as Hassan II chose to make it coincide with the anniversary of Mohamed V enthronement on November 18th, 1962. He also made sure to insist in his speech that the new constitutional order was as his father would have liked it to be, and to call on all Moroccans to vote for its adoption in the referendum.

The publication of the first constitutional draft was also signaling the start of a new phase in the struggle, where the monarchy would try to institutionalize its dominant position within the field of power, by structuring the social and institutional space in a fashion that would ensure the reproduction of that dominance. This could not be done in a mutually beneficial and consensual way with the parties and unions as it was by design being done at the expense of their position within the political field. Thus, the period of mutual deference between the palace and the national movement actors was coming to an end, and a phase of more direct confrontation was beginning.

The UNFP opposed the king's constitution draft from the start, disputing the legitimacy of the move and renewing its calls for an elected constitutional assembly. Other actors, such as the UNEM⁴⁴ and the banned PCM, supported the boycott. The PI took a more conciliatory position, partially supporting the plan. The UMT and the PDC (ex-PDI) chose to abstain from either supporting or boycotting the referendum.

Despite the national movement's actors' lack of enthusiasm for the project, the constitution was drafted and passed after a popular referendum in 1962. The choice of the referendum mechanism was made to give the new constitution the legitimacy of popular support, somehow making up for the dismissal of the Consultative Constitutional Council, and countering the attacks on its non-inclusive drafting

⁴⁴ The student union had in its 5th congress in July 1961 strongly stated that it rejected the royal approach and reiterated its insistence that the constitution be drafted by an elected assembly (Monjib 1992).

mechanism (Chambergeat 1964). The short timeframe for the referendum, planned to take place less than a year after the project's announcement, was a significant element as it did not allow the UNFP and its allies to mount an efficient popular mobilization and information campaign against the project. That limited timeframe was compounded by an increase in repression, especially targeting the UNFP, its resources, and its allies. The party's press organs, as well as its logistical and mobilizational infrastructures, were significantly affected by the state's attacks (Monjib 1992).

The constitutional referendum was a significant victory for the monarchy, with 82% of the votes favoring the constitutional draft, as it also served to signal the massive support it enjoyed throughout the country, especially outside of the urban centers. This high level of support was in part due to the respect that most of the Moroccan population traditionally had for the monarchy. This genuine popular support was facilitated and further bolstered through the significant material and logistical backing that the campaign received from the ministry of interior and its representatives at the local levels, and by the hurdles faced by those that tried to campaign against it (Chambergeat 1964; Monjib 1992).

Now that the National movement was divided and weakened, drowning in internal fights and unable to stake a unified claim for control of the discourse within the broader political field, the Monarchy had the opportunity to exert more influence in shaping it and redesigning the rules of the game. The struggle for dominance of the political field was to be a continuation of the earlier contest within the field of power over who could

control the symbolic capital owed to the actor who could convincingly claim to have brought independence to the country.

Beyond the legal aspects, a significant issue at stake in the struggle over institutionalization was the rejection by the national movement actors, even the conciliatory PI, of the monarchy's attempt to significantly alter the rules of the game through the imposition of a new sociodicy or foundational myth on the political field, which would serve to legitimize and reinforce its dominant position by making it unacceptable to challenge it openly. To that end, the monarchy attempted to establish the narrative of the monarchy as being the principal architect of the country's independence and the supreme representative of the nation as the core doxa of the Moroccan social space and the sociodicy of the political field. In doing so, it was trying to decrease the autonomy of the political field, by increasing the value of royal favor, an exogenous form of capital, vis-à-vis the fields' original form of capital.

At that point, the reaction of the national movement actors, while non-unified given the conflicts dividing them, was to resist and lash out at that attempt by challenging the monarchy's narrative and disputing its legitimacy on different registers with varying degrees of directness, such as by calling it out on its reticence to conduct the significant economic reforms, or its protection and support of actors previously associated with the protectorate, as well as its general friendliness to the interests of France on the foreign policy level. Through these attacks, the National movement actors were contesting the sociodicy asserted by the monarchy in the institutionalization attempt, and taking a

stand for an alternative narrative that still allowed some space for the form of capital that they controlled, and for the maintenance of the political field's relative autonomy.

One significant level where the struggle over the country's foundational narrative took place was in the competing actors' attempts at shaping defining which historical events were worthy of celebration and remembrance. The strategies adopted by the various actors were played out principally through their press organs. A review of the post-independence press, relatively free until 1965, provides a glimpse into the battle over the national foundation myths taking place at the time. The leading PI newspaper, following 1961, reportedly did not write anything in relation to the 20th of August, which was previously celebrated by both the party and the monarchy as the "Revolt of the king and the people"⁴⁵, instead choosing to commemorate the ties between the throne and the national movement on the date that Mohamed V climbed on the throne (Valensi 1990, 283). This omission was indicative of the party's disapproval of Hassan II's decisions, while nevertheless indicating their continuing support for the monarchic institution, and the figure of the now-deceased Mohamed V as a model monarch, as central to the PI and its leader's conception of the nation. On the left, the newspaper of the UMT was even more stringent in its symbolic choices. While it did commemorate the date of the 20th August as the other actors, it did so without any mentions of the monarchy, instead proposing it as a celebration of the "Moroccan people" and their struggle for liberation (Valensi 1990, 286). Holding and voicing such positions

⁴⁵ This date refers to the date the French authorities deposed the Sultan, and the PI mobilization and general uprising that began demanding independence and his return on the throne.

publically will be maintained for as long as the relatively permissive political field of the time, still not dominated by the monarchy, afforded the national movement's press organs the ability to contest the foundational myths asserted by the palace. Symbolically significant, the fight over commemorative dates and the meaning embedded in them was a crucial step into shaping the national foundation narrative and the sociodicy of the Moroccan social space, aimed at shaping the yet disputed rules determining the relative value of each source of symbolic capital to the winning actor's benefit.

At the constitutional level, one of the crucial elements introduced by the new constitution was its institutionalization of the Commander of the Faithful (*Amir al Muminin*) title in a way that gives the monarch a sort of supra-constitutional set of executive powers⁴⁶. The same article also enshrined the king as the “symbol of national unity, and the guarantor of the continuity of the state”, thus creating a mechanism to ensure the reproduction and maintenance of the dominant position that the monarchy achieved as the primary holder of both religious and nationalist sources of powerful symbolic capital. Going even further, the constitution also made sure to describe the monarch as being “inviolable and sacred” in Article 23. These articles, which will remain virtually unchanged until the 2011 constitution, will play a significant role as a form of failsafe and last resort trump card that the monarchy would efficiently deploy to defuse and repress any significant intra-institutional challenges to the monarchy's dominant position in the field of power.

⁴⁶ Article 19 of the 1962 constitution.

During the period preceding the constitutional referendum, the UNFP and the PI were not in a very favorable situation in comparison to their opponents, who were in positions that granted them access to state capital through their control of the bureaucratic field, and thus allowed them to deploy state power at different levels to support their campaign efforts and repress their opponents’.

To some extent, the PI had, through its early stance in support of the new king and its campaign for the constitutional draft, been included within the ruling coalition, in an uneasy cohabitation with staunchly monarchist actors such as Guedira. However, that cohabitation was not to last very long after the enactment of the new constitution in December 1962. In early January 1963, Allal El Fassi announced his party’s decision to withdraw from the government, justifying it by the insufficient representation that the PI was allotted within it. This withdrawal of support was accompanied by a repositioning of the PI within the opposition field closer to the UNFP and, to a lesser extent, the UMT.

The positions adopted by the UNFP following its second congress of 1962 reflected its leaderships’ awareness of the processes reshaping the rules of the game within the political field in their outspoken criticism of the new institutional structure. Along with the adoption of increasingly radical discourse focused on agrarian land reform, promoting the notion of popular sovereignty as opposed to the traditional monarchist legitimacy advocated within the constitution, the UNFP was single-mindedly focused on attacking the new orthodoxy by challenging its core and asserting that the only source of legitimacy was popular sovereignty, going as far as threatening direct action

and a popular revolution if that was left unheeded (“Documents Maroc” 1964; Ben Barka 1966; Gallissot and Kergoat 1997).

While it clearly favored the interests of the palace, the new constitution still had kept some space for maneuvers open to the national movement actors, especially the PI/UNFP, maintaining some space for the opposition to mount a challenge to the newly imposed order. The new struggle took place principally within the newly created bicameral parliamentary institution. With its confidence bolstered by the results from the referendum, and its opinions strongly influenced by the monarchist ‘liberals’ led by Ahmed Reda Guedira, the monarchy assumed that the legislative election would be dominated by its allies and be pliant to its vision.

b) Politics under the 1962 constitution

This was the general situation under which the first parliamentary experience was to begin. The personal influence of Ahmed Reda Guedira, a close friend and ally of Hassan II, was to have crucial implications in shaping the course of events. Guedira, who at the time was the Minister of Interior and of Agriculture, in addition to being the General Director of the Royal Cabinet, was also very active within the journalistic field and wrote a number of opinion pieces in support of the palace’s positions. Generally viewed as a modernist with socially liberal preferences and as an indefectible monarchist, Guedira appeared to initially believe that he could ensure popular support for the monarch’s plans through a victory at the level of the battle of ideas, as opposed to resorting to outright repression. His opinion pieces often attacked the UNFP and its arguments as being attempts to roll back “pluralism”, and he also promoted the king as

the only guarantee for the political pluralism and freedoms of the smaller actors within the political field. His arguments reportedly took a number of inflections depending on the audience and the constituencies that were targeted (Chambergeat 1962)

The creation of the *Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionnelles* (FDIC) on March 20th 1963, a staunchly pro-monarchist and self-styled liberal party, forced the PI and UNFP into uneasy cooperation despite the still fresh rivalry of the scission. Headed by Guedira, the FDIC was designed to serve as the trusted “avatar” of the palace on the newly refounded political party field, allowing the monarchy to maintain a somewhat plausible appearance of political neutrality within it (Marais 1964; Le Tourneau 1964). Nevertheless, the FDIC, in its campaign meetings, was reportedly branding itself as the party of the king, a claim that was given more credibility through the display of cooperation and organizational support that the authorities were providing the new party with (Vairel 2014). The creation of the FDIC represented a significant development in the battle between the Monarchy and the National Movement parties for control over the political field, as it represented a coalesced and formalized alliance of anti-PI forces, very responsive to directives from the palace, in theory.

Following the enactment of the new constitution, the next significant battleground pitting the national movement against the monarchy revolved around the control of the newly established parliament. As for the monarchy, it expected to be able to dominate this new institution as successfully as it had won the referendum, building on the wave of support it had garnered during the campaign for the constitution. The PI and UNFP, on the other hand, viewed this as a fitting occasion to try and sabotage Hassan II’s plans

by keeping the legislative branch out of his control. The FDIC represented the framework and field within which the pro-monarchic actors were to coordinate their effort and try to dominate the parliament. As a field, the FDIC was very heteronomous; an essential currency within it was royal favor, a form of social capital acquired through closeness with the monarchy's inner circle. Capacity for mobilization and popular support were important but less valuable. Ahmed Reda Guedira was in charge of leading the movement, which also included some established political figures with different forms of capital and a somewhat higher degree of autonomy, such as Abdelkrim Khatib and Mahjoubi Aherdane from the MP, and Mohammed Hassan el Ouazzani and his PDI party. Though the leadership of the new formation was held by Guedira and other "independents" connected to the palace, the MP provided the mobilisational backbone for the new party throughout the country, an arrangement that MP leaders favored as it made them have more of a say than they would otherwise have had (Marais 1965).

Thus, the political party field pitted the PI and the UNFP, scions of the nationalist movement, against the FDIC, avatar of the monarchy, in alliance with the populist and rural-focused MP. The electoral campaign began in a heated atmosphere, with the PI and the UNFP criticizing the role of the non-neutrality of the government, and going as far as to make implicit revolutionary threats⁴⁷. That tension was reflected in the

⁴⁷ Allal el Fassi declared during a press conference on May 14th 1963 that any instances of vote rigging would prepare the conditions for a revolution, adding that his party was in contact with the UNFP over the issue ("Chronique 1963. Vie Politique" 1965)

proximate fields as well, with both the UNEM and the UMT stating their distrust and dissatisfaction with both the electoral process and what they considered to be the institutional powerlessness of the parliament.

Despite all of the logistical support provided by the administration to the FDIC, the PI and the UNFP managed to secure a large number of seats within the newly established parliament. While the FDIC secured 69 seats, the PI and UNFP controlled 41 and 28 seats, respectively. Independents held the six remaining seats out of the 144 available.

The performance of the UNFP was especially surprising for the monarchic camp, as it was assumed that its failure in opposing the constitution was a sign of its general weakness (Marais 1965). That assumption was also compounded by the significant crisis between the UMT and the party, which ended with a formal separation in January 1963⁴⁸, a few months before the elections. The process leading to the separation began following Ben Barka's triumphant reassertion of control over the party at the expense of the General Secretariat, which was more dominated by the UMT supporting figures. During the 2nd Congress of the UNFP, Ben Barka managed to impose the creation of a Central Committee regrouping mid-level cadres within the party, which served to counterbalance the UMT-deadlocked General Secretariat (Monjib 1992)⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ Decided during the party's 3rd Congress.

⁴⁹ Two days following the congress, Ben Barka was targeted in a failed assassination attempt in Morocco.

The struggle between the two sides was not solely about power; it was also a battle over the path to be followed in interacting with the monarchy, the strategy to be adopted in the broader political field. Whereas the UMT and its allies within the party advocated participation in the government if granted the opportunity⁵⁰ in order to achieve corporatist gains for the workers, the faction supporting Ben Barka rejected the idea of participation without winning the elections and radically reforming the constitutional framework in order to limit the powers of the king and expand those of the government (Ben Barka 1966; Monjib 1992).

The two organizations then started attacking each other, the UNFP accusing the UMT of being too conciliatory with the monarchy, and the UMT retorting that its primary role was the defense of workers' rights and that it would not participate in the institutions created by a constitution that did not recognize popular sovereignty as the sole source of legitimacy (Marais 1965). The tension was very noticeable in the limited support that the union offered to the UNFP's candidates⁵¹, and in the rejection by the party of candidacies known for their strong unionist sympathies.

⁵⁰ As they did with the Abdallah Ibrahim government.

⁵¹ While it did not call outright for its members to support the UNFP, the UMT did however encourage them to cast their votes in support of 'progressist' candidates (Marais 1965; Monjib 1992). Moreover, the union presented its own candidates as well in competition with the UNFP's (Claisse 1985, 224)

Mahjoub ben Seddik was personally targeted by the UNFP press and accused of collusion with the FDIC over that matter. Marais (1965) observes that the UMT's limited support for the UNFP was not a selfless or idealistic move, as officially portrayed by the union's leadership. Here again, the relative autonomy of the labor union field was once again determinant, as the UMT and its leadership were principally interested in securing their gains and dominance within the labor field, and their field's position within the broader social space. Conscious of their ability to significantly impact the elections, they took the opportunity to increase the value of their native field's form of capital. On the one hand, they remained open to negotiations with the royal government when it was in the interest of their members or to settle various labor disputes.

On the other hand, the UMT made sure that the UNFP paid a significant price in exchange for the maintenance of a limited relationship following the January 1963 separation, by making the party agree to condition any further rapprochement or fusion with the PI with the dissolution of the UGTM (Marais 1965). Despite the official distancing, the UNFP was still, to a significant extent, dependent on the UMT's electoral support, especially in Casablanca. The dispute with the UMT and its consequences took their toll on the campaigning efforts of the UNFP, which were relatively limited compared to those of the PI and the FDIC. The additional conditions of the UNFP for an alliance with the PI were equivalent to a request for ideological surrender. For the two parties to ally, the PI was to recognize that opposing the

constitution was the right decision and conduct a self-criticism culminating in a new program that would better reflect the interests of the ‘popular masses’⁵².

The position of the UMT is hard to understand if analyzed without remembering the fact that its leadership grants primacy to the struggles of the labor union field at the expense of those within the political one. Indeed, the UMT-associated syndicalist faction within the UNFP leadership was always more open to an alliance with the PI. In contrast, the Ben Barka faction tended to consider the PI, following its support of the constitutional referendum, as a representative of the conservative bourgeois part of Moroccan society and thus as an ideological enemy that would be opposed to the radical social projects advocated by the UNFP (Monjib 1992). For the UMT, the idea of a more powerful UNFP under the leadership of Ben Barka and his allies was a worrying prospect that would reduce the union’s strength and their own ability to pursue their corporatist and personal agendas independently.

The PI was conducting its campaign relatively smoothly, drawing significantly on the prestige and symbolic capital of Allal El Fassi. As such, the old party and its leader were viewed as the main threat by the FDIC, and thus were the principal targets of its attacks. The PI was retaliating as well, focusing its attack on Guedira, as even though the FDIC was an avatar of the monarchy’s project, direct attacks on the monarch were not compatible with the PI’s sensibilities.

⁵² UNFP Internal Bulletin n 5, January 1963 (As cited in Bouaziz 1997, 117)

The limitations to the reach of political capital, especially in its delegated form and of the political field in itself, were made quite evident throughout the campaign. Mostly, the parties faced a mostly illiterate population with a very confused understanding of the election's purposes and national level politics⁵³. Beyond urban centers, in the rural parts of the country, the lack of awareness of national-level political dynamics was even starker, and to complicate matters further, the only efficient ways to mobilize voters was through reaching out to local notabilities or through taking a position on regional or ethnic rivalries.

All the parties had to adapt their strategies to fit the local rural settings. For instance, the FDIC would, when profitable, not hesitate to mobilize people against the 'Fassi dictatorship'⁵⁴. In other cases, most candidates would need to go through the local tribal assembly, or *djemaa*, and try to gain its blessings and support in order to ensure get the village or tribe's votes. Often those pacts would reportedly be concluded in a traditional ceremony involving prayers, the ritual sacrifice of a sheep or cow, and/or the organization of large dinners (Marais 1965). The fact that the parties were forced to adopt these strategies is a further indicator of the still low degree of autonomy of the political field, and the limited rate of exchange and negotiability of the modern form of

⁵³ Reportedly, some electors were under the impression that they were electing a new sort of local boss or *caid*, or a sort of delegate in charge of relaying their concerns to the monarch. Very few were aware of the legislative function to be played by those they elected (Marais 1965).

⁵⁴ Fasi as in the inhabitants of Fez.

political capital in the crucial category of rural area social fields. Actors within these fields were more responsive to traditional social and symbolic forms of capital, which the National movement actors were not that well-endowed in.

The results of the parliamentary election were by any measure a harsh wake-up call for the monarchy, which had hoped that the parliament would be under the sway of its allies and would allow it to govern through them and pursue its policy goals unchallenged and with the legitimacy of constitutional and popular support. Instead, the resulting parliament was barely under the FDIC's control. This was a personal failure for Guedira, and it affected his standing with the monarch, and consequently, within his party (Chambergeat 1965). While he remained as the leader of the FDIC, he was less secure in his position, especially vis-a-vis actors like the MP. Guedira would nevertheless lose his position as Minister of Interior in early June

In July 1963, a few months after the parliamentary elections, and a few days after the beginning of the electoral campaign for the communal elections, an alleged plot by the UNFP to overthrow the monarchy was uncovered by the security services. As a consequence, a large number of UNFP members, including prominent figures such as Abderrahman Youssoufi⁵⁵, were arrested, and a significant number endured sustained torture sessions. Whereas there probably was an actual plot that was stamped out⁵⁶, it

⁵⁵ Youssoufi with later become Prime Minister of the "*Alternance*" government.

⁵⁶ The plot may have been more of a sting operation aimed at incriminating the UNFP and legitimating harsher repression against it. King Hassan would later state himself in his memoirs that "the plot label can be discussed, but it was one in the minds of those that prepared it. As they were

was mostly limited at some radical elements within the lower levels of the party (Monjib 1992; Dalle 2004). However, the overreaching reaction of the authorities indicated that they wanted to use the opportunity to stem the growth of the UNFP and break the party. The show trial that followed sentenced several UNFP leaders, including Ben Barka, to death. With hindsight, the Plot affair was the beginning of a significant transformation of the political field. It indicated the fall out of favor of Guedira and the relatively liberal approach that he advocated, and the increasingly influential position of hardliners, such as Oufkir, advocating an abortion of the emerging political field, and a more repressive and intransigent attitude towards the opposition. In response to the massive repressive campaign that it was facing, the UNFP declared that it would boycott the communal elections, and was supported by the UMT in that decision. The PI appeared as if it would be the sole representative of the national movement to challenge the FDIC officially on the communal elections, ended up calling for a boycott as well in reaction to the interventions of the state in favor of the FDIC.

Many political actors previously associated or known to be supporters of the National movement were forced to run either as independent or to join the FDIC in order to avoid the repression and to maintain their positions within their local fields (Chambergeat 1965). Some opposition candidates remained on the campaign despite the directives of the party leadership. This reflects the limited ability of parties to fully maintain discipline in that period, especially under constant repression. In the PI case,

amateurs judged by the standards usually applied to professionals, people thought that we had maybe exaggerated things” (Bennouna 2002)

many of those that defied the party and maintained their candidacy were local *notables*, the kind that holds a personal type of political capital stemming from the capitals that they have accumulated within the local field. As such, local *notables* prioritize their positions within the local field, especially that in rural areas, the delegated political capital that they receive from the party is not that valuable.

Moreover, many within the party's upper-class support bases resented the boycott decision in that it located them on the same side as the UNFP, which they very much wanted to distance themselves from after the 1963 plot and its repressive consequences⁵⁷. This difference explains the variation in discipline between the PI and the UNFP to some extent. First, the UNFP did not really depend on rural *notables* with their own independent resources. When they held significant personal political capital, UNFP actors did so because of their individual renown and the opposition values that they publicly espoused, which meant that those UNFP candidates with personal political capital were those that would face the most repression and hurdles from the state, thus making it highly unlikely that they would even have the option to violate the boycott decision. Second, most of the party's strongholds were in urban centers, where there was rarely a significantly autonomous local field whose games and stakes would trump those of the national level political field. The same generally applied for the UMT candidates.

⁵⁷ The PI published an internal document listing "6 dead and 1600 arrests" within its ranks in that period (Bennouna 2002).

The 1963 plot was a significant development at the symbolic level as well. It was the beginning of a new classification struggle, where the monarchy was trying to classify all those who opposed the new constitutional order as illegitimate violent actors. The effects of this new development were to make it more costly to associate overtly with the UNFP specifically and the National movement actors in general. It also led to a reflection of the struggle in lower levels as well. Within the national movement actors, the same struggle was reflected between those open willing to soften their positions in exchange for a seat at the hypothetical table, and those adamant on reestablishing the primacy of “popular sovereignty” at the center of the political field as a sine-qua-non condition for any cooperation. Within the pro-monarchist camp, the 1963 plot reinvigorated the collective identity and mobilization power by providing an outside actor to unite against.

The communal elections, and therefore the elected positions at the local level, fell overwhelmingly under the control of the FDIC. Some independents and other actors affiliated with the PI, or previously associated with the UNFP, managed to win a few positions. The only institution where the opposition had any significant share of the seats, and thus the opportunity to try and confront the monarchy was the parliament. The parliament was designed as a bicameral institution under the 1962 constitution. The second Parliamentary Chamber was composed of the Trade and Professional Chambers and of the Provincial assemblies. Modes of elections varied a lot depending on the type of seat contested and the constituency concerned (Flory and Miege 1965). Here again,

the FDIC succeeded in dominating the upper chamber, due to the non-representation or boycotts organized by the opposition actors.

The first parliamentary session was, despite all of the above, a very foundational period in the evolution of the Moroccan political field. It was a period during which competing visions about the shape of the political field, its autonomy, and its position within the overall field of power were clashing in a very public fashion. Within the various collective actors and camps as well, various struggles were taking place. Within the UNFP, the radical tendency associated with Benbarka was facing the syndicalist tendency that was open to cooperation in exchange for a seat at the table, with each of the two camps being analyzable as an additional field in its own right. Inside the PI as well, a classification struggle was taking place over two potential positions: association with an increasingly radicalized UNFP, or distancing and affirmation of the pro-monarchist stance. Within the FDIC, the struggle was between those associated with Guedira and the members of the MP, which was further divided between the actors closer to Aherdane and those favoring Khatib. The monarchy as well, the Makhzen field, was going through its own definitional struggle. That conflict opposed the hardliner anti-parliamentarian vision popular with the like of Oufkir and more dependent on the support of the security forces at the expense of the political field and the conception of Guedira, who favored the maintenance of a political field with some degree of limited formal autonomy from the monarchy.

c) The First Moroccan Parliamentary Experience

The 1962 constitutional experiment did not last for long. The institutionalization attempted by the monarchy showed its limits when faced with oppositional actors with significant symbolic and political capital, and a stake in the preservation of the political field's autonomy. The period was characterized by a significant polarization of the political field, which was to be expected given the unsettled and contested nature of the field's sociodicy and purpose at that time. The national movement opposition, while it was participating in the political game to some extent, was mainly focused on using the parliament as a platform to challenge and undermine the narrative advanced by the monarchy. The FDIC, representing the monarchy and controlling the government, was trying to push forward its policy agenda.

In practice, these factors meant that the parliamentary session was deadlocked most of the time as far as the drafting of legislation was concerned. As far as significant sociopolitical projects were concerned, each side was camping on its positions, with the FDIC and monarchy blaming the deadlock on the opposition, and the latter blaming it on the majority for supporting the interests of either the imperialist former colonial power, or those of the country's 'feudal elites'.

However, there were also some interesting and unexpected dynamics reflecting the importance of the struggles taking place within each party in affecting the positions they adopt in the broader political field. For instance, the rivalries within the FDIC, where the Guedira faction was allowed to take over most of the ministerial position, making the MP-related actors often side with the opposition in passing rules reinforcing the powers and roles allocated to the parliament. This dynamic was compounded by the fact

that the members of parliament affiliated with the FDIC became more supportive of the institution's independence as opposed to it being limited to a rubber-stamping role. Members of a powerless parliament receive limited returns on the often personal investments that their election required. If the parliament were autonomous and relevant, their positions within the political field and the amount of political capital that they would accumulate within it would be more significant, as well as more negotiable. The low party discipline of the FDIC and limited cohesion amongst its components facilitated that dynamic. Indeed, Khatib, who presided over the parliament and was a staunch monarchist figure within the MP, played an unexpected role in that process, likely due to his personal disappointment for not having been offered a ministerial position.

This parliamentary solidarity displayed during the first session was surprising to many observers at the time. For instance, not without irony, Paul Chambergeat⁵⁸ (1966, 105) notes that the first instance of a unanimous parliamentary decision, taken in secret committee, was to increase the salary and advantages of members of parliament to a level comparable to that enjoyed by ministers. He also observes the following:

While misunderstandings persist about core issues, the institution was functional to the surprise of some actors. Politicians began to matter according to their parliamentary weight, not just their nationalist past, family alliances, or royal favor. Those not belonging to the parliament saw their influence reduced.

The areas of interest of the government, even those on which it contests the

⁵⁸ A pseudonym used by French scholar Remy Leveau.

assemblies competencies, tended to be conceived with the reactions of members of parliament in mind. (Chambergeat 1966, 106)

This observation denotes that the institutionalized delegated form of political capital acquired from holding a position within the parliamentary institution gained in value and that the parliament, as a central space within the political field, gained in autonomy, even vis-à-vis the government, with its own games at times overtaking partisan concerns and more significant ideological oppositions in importance. The salary increase was also a significant point, in that it allowed the members of parliament to receive a substantially higher income compared to the rest of the population, and consequently, for some of them, further increasing the centrality of the maintenance of the institution and their presence within it in the current conditions.

The second session was to take place under a different mood, however. With the PI and UNFP in a closer association, and sensing an opportunity in the malleable and influenceable position of the majority parliamentarians to some parts of their discourse, they decided to adopt a more confrontational attitude towards the monarchy. Not only resulting from the parliament level dynamics, this decision also reflected concerns germane to the internal struggles within both the national movement as a whole and the actors composing it, as well as a sort of path-dependency at the discursive and ideological levels.

While it was carried through the championing of several policy issues, the focus of the opposition seemed to be more responsive to the field-level dynamics and the challenging of the dominant position of the monarchy (through its avatars and narrative).

At times playing on the rivalries between the FDIC, now rebranded as *Parti social Démocrate* (PSD), and the MP, and at others times using the parliament as a platform for fiery speeches targeted at the monarchy and its interests, the national movement opposition was by skillfully challenging the rules of the game within the parliament in its favor, reshaping those of the larger political field as well.

The most significant episode revolved around the technicalities of holding an extraordinary session and setting up its agenda. The vagueness of the rules proved to be an opportunity for the dominated to exercise their agency in a way that basically forced the dominant's hand to some extent. The session before its end was not very productive in terms of legislative works. Instead, the opposition focused its efforts on politically charged issues, which one could say were principally aimed at highlighting the structural flaws of the system, and eroding attacking the constitutional orders' legitimacy by embarrassing the monarchy's government.

Issues such as judiciary unification⁵⁹ and the agrarian reform were the main points of contention brought up for that purpose (Chambergeat 1966). The government was not able to efficiently oppose the opposition campaign or to successfully impose discipline on its parliamentary allies. For instance, with unanimous support, the judiciary unification law was passed by the parliament, and the government was forced to accept it. Similarly, the majority parliamentarians refused to support the government plan to

⁵⁹ Judiciary unification referred to the unification of the judiciary system across Morocco, which was still divided along the lines set up under the protectorate. The language to be used in the tribunals was switched to Arabic as well.

increase the prices of sugar as required by the IMF (Chambergeat 1966). What these two events highlighted was that the members of parliament of the majority were prioritizing their own personal position within the institution and would not put it at risk by supporting an unpopular measure or opposing a popular one. The importance of political capital was getting reinvigorated through the limited autonomy that the opposition forces had managed to regain for the parliamentary institution, through their successful exploitation of the majority's internal divisions within the FDIC, and within the Makhzen itself⁶⁰.

4. The death throes of the first institutionalization attempt

The culmination of the first institutional experience was to be related to the exceptional session matter. The opposition forces, leveraging the rules of the field and the new relative autonomy regained by the parliament and its actors vis-à-vis a non-committed palace, pushed for an extraordinary session to be held following the end of the regular one, making sure to pursue some highly politicized issues further. On June 7th, 1964, the two opposition parties published their agenda for the extraordinary session that they had requested. The PI advanced the three following items: the recuperation of agricultural lands still owned by French settlers, the nationalization of mines, and the nationalization of sugar production (“Chronologie Intérieure” 1965). The UNFP

⁶⁰ As exemplified by the apparent indecision of the monarch and his lack of outright support for the Guedira ‘liberal’ tendency versus the traditional monarchist tendency of the rural notability versus the hardline securitarian tendency of Oufkir

included two additional agenda items aimed at reforming the press laws and advancing the agrarian reform (“Chronologie Intérieure” 1965).

The majority, which by then was severely weakened by its internal dynamics, was not able to reject the request. A significant development was the fact that the parliament’s president, Dr. Khatib, who nominally was part of the majority camp, was crucial in tilting the outcomes to the opposition’s favor. Khatib’s support to the request forced the government to instead focus its efforts on arguing that the setting up of the session’s agenda fell within its prerogatives (Chambergeat 1966). According to Monjib (1992, 328), the government’s decision to try to force the agenda was not supported by either Guedira or Khatib, which he argues indicates that it must have come from the King himself. He further adds that the choice of agenda item was not random and that by picking the fight against corruption, the palace was pursuing a populist approach that did not threaten the structural bases of its power, and that put the opposition in an awkward position when rejecting it (Monjib 1992). The fact that Khatib refused to preside the session in protest against the position adopted by his nominal FDIC allies in the government supports that interpretation. Reacting to this new approach, the opposition rejected the move, and Allal el Fassi called on the king to settle the dispute in his role as arbiter over the institutions. The king, who was at that point unwilling to be openly associated with the government and its majority, appeared to have his hand forced by El Fassi’s appeal, and was consequently obliged to agree with the opposition’s request. An alternative account, if we follow the argument of Monjib (1992), would imply that the whole series of events following the request for an

extraordinary session was in some way engineered by the monarch as a way of activating the lines of friction within the parliament, and within the parties of the opposition as well. Indeed, the agrarian reform was not in the interest of everyone, and especially within the PI, a lot of dissenting voices came to the fore, including the agricultural union, UMA, which despite being controlled by the party, had to prioritize the material interests of its members by supporting the PSD's arguments⁶¹. The extraordinary session, after a month passed by waiting for the king to state his opinion on the agenda-setting dispute, ended up only being able to take place for four days before the start of the ordinary session, a delaying strategy that appears to have been calculated by the king in order not to allow any significant advances on the agenda issues to happen. The approach also gave support to his claim to being the ultimate arbiter on the political field, with the opposition which usually opposed that interpretation, turning to him as a last resort judge.

The aforementioned developments and the precedents established by the opposition through them were quite significant in increasing the autonomy of the political field to a point that was becoming noticeably unpalatable to the monarchy. Already, the king was voicing his displeasure with the path the parliamentary institution was developing along, and how the rules of the parliamentary game were reinterpreted, creating openings for a disciplined and robust opposition to assert its domination.

⁶¹ The main arguments were that the reform would be economically harmful, and would violate the principles of property that were enshrined by both the law and the Islamic tradition.

The king's disappointment at the performance of the Guedira-led faction in its project to provide a liberal cover to the monarchic domination of the political field, that the 1962 constitution was aimed at instituting, had significant repercussions within the monarchic camp. The discredit suffered by the liberal faction opened the way for the securitarian faction to become more prominent within the Makhzen field. After Guedira's resignation on the 15th August 1964, the King formed a new government five days later, where the securitarian wing was well represented, with two Generals, Oufkir and Ameziane, holding the Interior and the Defense ministries respectively ("Chronologie Intérieure" 1965). The state media reportedly emphasized their military background in its reporting, reportedly to signal the availability of other alternatives to the parliamentary experience (Monjib 1992). The nomination of *Commandant*⁶² Mohammed Dlimi to head the security services was a further confirmation of the new distribution of capital within the Makhzen field, favoring the securitarian wing at the expense of the more liberal faction. The MP, especially its most purely rural monarchist wing, was placated as well, with the appointment of Aherdane to the Ministry of Agriculture, a move that has been explained by the potential risk of the MP supporting the agrarian reforms advocated by the opposition (Monjib 1992).

Within the political field at large, the agrarian reform was by then a significant point of contention. Both the PI and the UNFP were vigorously campaigning for the

⁶² A rank equivalent to the rank of Major in the English speaking ranking systems.

redistribution of the colonial agrarian land to small farmers and agricultural workers⁶³. This was unacceptable for the monarchy for many reasons. First, the redistribution would weaken its hold on the rural world, which it controls and mobilizes efficiently using the social and religious capital that it commands. A modern structural transformation of the rural world would hinder the ability of rural *notables* to maintain their dominant positions within it. Opening the rural political fields, which proved crucial in defending the monarch's prerogatives, to potential infiltration by the national movement via its plans to organize the rural dominated masses and educate them on the implications of the national level political struggles for their interests.

Within the UMT as well, whose leadership's tensions with the UNFP's intrusions within what it viewed as its exclusive domain were well established, there were several supportive actions undertaken in response to the repressive actions targeting the party. These actions were generally done by sections known to be under the influence of the UNFP, despite their official affiliation with the UMT, such as the PTT⁶⁴ and the education (FEN⁶⁵) federations, which undertook coordinated strike actions in support of the party. The strikers notably demanded the liberation of the arrested leaders and the

⁶³ In a very socialist and leftist sounding declaration by its National Council, the PI stated that "the lands should be redistributed to small peasants within the framework of state directed cooperatives and production units" ("Chronologie Intérieure" 1965).

⁶⁴ Postal and phone services.

⁶⁵ *Federation de l'Education Nationale*, or National education federation

restitution of the party's headquarters, which had been occupied by the police during their intervention (Claisse 1985, 225). These actions were viewed with suspicion by the UMT leadership, who considered that these strikes risked affecting its own negotiations with the government on more corporatist issues that would benefit its supporters and members, which their conception of syndical autonomy prioritized. As a reaction, the UMT engaged a purge against those it viewed as "anarchists" and "troublemakers" who had a tendency to engage the union in what they considered to be unnecessary political battles with the monarchy (Claisse 1985, 225).

The new ascendancy of the securitarian faction within the Makhzen field and the bureaucratic field started to be felt within the same year across the political field and other politicized subfields. The first target was the increasingly radical and combative UNEM, strong support of the Ben Barka faction within the UNFP, which had made many radical statements and was a potent vehicle for the mobilization of universities and thus of educated and intellectual cadres. This was both dangerous at the level of the mobilization capacities it provided (as will become apparent in 1965) and in terms of the production of a discourse that challenged the narrative advanced by the monarchy, especially the traditional and religious foundations of legitimacy within the Moroccan field of power, and their implications on the political field. At the mobilization level, the UNEM was very active during the 1963 Plot trials, as its members successfully organized demonstrations and occupied some Moroccan embassies all around the world in protest (Monjib 1992). By the middle of October 1964, the UNEM had its authorization rescinded, its president jailed, and legal pursuits engaged against it

(“Chronologie Intérieure” 1965). Simultaneously within the student union field, the *Union Generale des Etudiants Marocains* (UGEM), which did not share or support the positions of the UNFP, was being promoted through the granting of audiences with governmental institutions.

At the societal level as well, an increase in religious conservatism was noted by observers. Le Tourneau reports, for instance, the unusual arrest of 600 people for breaking the Ramadan fast in public in early 1965, with 30 of them being condemned to jail sentences at the insistence of the prosecution (1966, 181). The illiberal turn taken by the state in that aspect was understandable in that it was the first step to impose the public respect of traditional religious norms, which were at the core of the narrative that it promoted for its legitimation.

Nevertheless, despite all these repressive developments, it appears that the monarchy was still not intent on going into the political field by itself. However, it still wished to have a compliant political field and parliament that would not obstruct its projects. During his annual Throne day speech, the king made an appeal for political unity. A national unity government would allow for a potential defusing of the political deadlock within the parliament, without running the risk of new elections, which could either be to the opposition’s favor or cause further radicalization in case of substantial state intervention on the results level. Nevertheless, the UNFP and UMT did not show much interest in the proposal.

In March 1965, a decision by the Ministry of Education to lower the maximal age allowing access to secondary education was issued. In other words, it was condemning a

large number of students to go into technical education institutions, denying them any chances to get into a university. This relatively minor decision was to be a very momentous one. High schools in the major cities went on strike, and soon after, they were supported by the UNEM and teachers' unions. On the 23rd of March, the student strikes were joined by the disaffected proletariat and the unemployed masses and quickly turned into violent riots. The army, under the personal supervision of Gen. Oufkir, was deployed in Casablanca, and the massive repression caused around 600 deaths and 2000 wounded, according to the French newspaper *L'Express*, which also reported that the protesters chanted slogans demanding new schools instead of new mosques⁶⁶ ("Chronologie Intérieure" 1966). These estimations, which contradicted the official version by the Moroccan government, were confirmed by internal telegrams from the French ambassador of the time, and by the memoirs of political actors from the period (Vaïsse and Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères 2004). According to most observers, as well as in light of their reactions, most political actors, including the opposition, were taken by surprise by the explosion of popular anger during these events. The government later blamed the events on foreign manipulation by Baathist agents, with the king, in an angry speech, putting the blame squarely on the teachers and those he referred to as "pseudo-intellectuals", famously adding "that it would have been better if they were illiterates instead" (*Discours et Interviews de SM Hassan II*. 1979).

In the aftermath of the March 23rd events, the king showed a final attempt to entice the opposition into joining a national union government. As a goodwill gesture, he also

⁶⁶ "Assez de mosquée, des écoles" ("Chronologie Intérieure" 1966)

declared a general amnesty on the 13th of April 1965, a measure that was amongst the demands of the opposition forces, and included leading radical figures such as Fqih Basri and Mohammed Haloui (UNEM president).

Despite these conciliatory gestures, the king was nevertheless not budging on the core issues. The action plan on which basis he wanted to establish a national unity government was not addressing any of the institutional and constitutional issues that were dividing the political field. The reaction of the opposition was, as could be expected, to refuse participation in the government without a redesigning of the separation of powers and the establishment of the political field's autonomy.

Faced with the refusal of the national movement actors to participate in a national unity government under the 1962 constitution, the monarch decided to declare the state of exception (*Etat d exception*) in accordance to Article 35, blaming the opposition and the political class for the non-functioning of the constitutional institutions. As a result, the parliament was dismissed, and the king assumed direct control of the government.

In his speech, on June 7th, 1965, announcing the proclamation of the state of exception, King Hassan II put the blame squarely on the political class, accusing them of being behind the failure of the parliamentary experiment. The king justified his decision by the futility of the debates that the parliament was locked in, and by what he considered to be the inadequacy or impossibility of the enactment of alternative solutions that he could have adopted, such as the dissolution of the parliament and the holding of new elections or the creation of a national union government ("Documents Maroc" 1966, 696). The last option was unachievable as the king's platform for

cooperation was rejected by the opposition as its actors refused to abandon the positions and demands of their respective programs, which had some commonalities amongst them, but were not very palatable to the monarchy.

Before the speech and the enactment state of exception, the government majority was collapsing rapidly. As the PSD's leadership started losing its position within the Makhzen field following the gain in favor of the securitarian faction after the 23 March events, many of its members started deserting it (Le Tourneau 1966). The avatar of the monarchy on the political field, after having failed to control the parliamentary institution, had demonstrated to the monarchy the necessity of redrawing the rules of the game in a way that would avoid such outcomes. The first step in that process was taking over the political field directly.

The state of exception was followed by the appointment of a new government that was directly headed by the King himself. This development was a shrinking of the political field, a suspension of its autonomy, and its almost total heteronomization vis-à-vis the Monarchy. Political parties could still exist, but the capital they held within the political field until then had lost all value. That did not mean that they had no resources, though, as each formation maintained, to some extent, a diverse mix of alternative forms of capital that they had used to position themselves on the political field at the moment of its inception. The opposition actors still maintained an elevated level of symbolic capital, both in relation to their roles during the independence struggles and as a result of their political positions and opposition to monarchic hegemony.

The worsening of economic and social conditions that characterized the post-independence years until that point did play a role in facilitating the monarchic upending of the political field's rules and of the constitutional institutions that it had designed for it. The focus on political topics and on the internal rules of the game within the parliament on the part of the opposition and parts of the divided majority was portrayed in the royal speech announcing the state of exception as irresponsible and harmful to the interests of the people:

faced with the double impossibility of constituting a national unity government and of creating a strong parliamentary majority, We have found ourselves faced with two options: To remain faithful to the virtues of democracy, which we have always considered as the best and most efficient path, or to resign ourselves to the maintenance of a parliamentary system that only gave rise to sterile discussions, and that, if it were perpetuated, would impair that very democracy, our moral values, our dignity, and our creative genius (7th June 1965 Royal Speech, as cited in "Documents Maroc" 1966, 696)

Discontent at this decision came from almost all political actors, including some of those representing and defending the monarchy's positions on the political field. Within the MP, that translated in a further dislocation of the party's leadership, with Khatib publically stating to the press his disapproval of the interpretation and usage that was made of the constitutional provisions relating to the proclamation of the state of exception, characterizing them as "an unfortunate development that opened the door to future abuses" (Le Tourneau 1966, 187). It is worth mentioning that Chambergeat (1966, 101) reports that

Khatib, along with Guedira, had voiced their support for the monarch's plan behind the scenes. However, the public position of Khatib is arguably more significant as it is verifiable and speaks to a potential change of position in reaction to the evolution of the situation in the monarchic field as it came ten days after the proclamation of the state of exception and the appointment of the new king-led government. This statement did not mean that Khatib had suddenly become a fervent defender of popular sovereignty; instead, it is better understood as a protest against the loss of relevance that he realized that he was to incur on the monarchic field as was made clear by the predominance of the non-political capital dependent actors within the newly appointed government. On another level, it can also be read as a reflection of the struggle for position taking place within the MP itself, with Khatib declaration having been made in response to a statement made by the party under Aherdan's impetus voicing full support for the royal decision. Khatib, having not been consulted, this statement was also a move by Aherdane to grab the leadership position for himself. A few days later, on the June 21st, Aherdane would retaliate by making the MP's central committee publish an official warning targeted at Khatib, accompanied by the exclusion of some of his allies from the party ("Chronologie Intérieure" 1966).

Ironically, this development was opposed by the PI as well as the PSD of Guedira, and the faction of the MP associated with Khatib. All three actors contested the royal interpretation of Article 35 advanced by the monarchy. Even more, ironically, the UNFP was the only actor supporting the proclamation of the

state of exception. The openings made by the palace towards the UNFP in the period leading to the state of exception caused the party leadership within the country to assume that it was a first step toward the satisfaction of its demand concerning the replacement of the 1962 constitution as a prerequisite to any further association with the monarchy.

As the UNFP was deluding itself with the idea that the March 23rd events had made the monarchy realize the importance of having the urban masses on its side, by including them as their representative in the government, the monarchy's perspective was quite different. For the King, two lessons were learned from those events. The first was that the urban masses, which are losing their traditionalism due to the modern socio-economic structures impacting them, and the access to modern forms of education and the dislocation of the primordial ties impacting them, were a dangerous base of support for the opposition. The second lesson was the belief that the security apparatus, especially the military, was a reliable base of support capable of preempting, and when required, countering and neutralizing even the most potent forms of popular challenge that the opposition could potentially have at its disposition. The irruption of the military into the political scene was the final stroke aborting the first institutionalization attempt initiated by the 1962 constitution and the liberal factions of the monarchist camp.

Chapter 2: Tunisia:

1. The Autonomy Agreements and Early Independence Era

a) Main Political Actors:

The central actor in the postcolonial Tunisian social space was the Neo-Destour party (ND). The party, which was at the core of the negotiations for Tunisian autonomy with the French authorities, was formed following a split with the more traditional conservative and elite-based Destour party in 1934. Unlike the older Destour⁶⁷, the ND opted for a more populist approach to mobilization and succeeded in drawing support from all social classes, thus acquiring a vast membership, dwarfing most other organized political forces in the country by 1939. It also generally had a more secular, leftist, and pragmatic outlook than the older Destour, regarding both internal politics and negotiations with France.

With a very pyramidal and centralized structure, the ND was organizationally modeled after the Fascist and Bolshevik principles. It did not shy away from the use of

⁶⁷ Sometimes referred to as “archo-destour” in the literature of the time, this dissertation will however only refer to it simply as the Destour.

unsavory and violent tactics when the situation was deemed to necessitate it. In fact, a few years after its creation, it had already begun supplementing its core constituency of urban artisans and liberal professions by the active recruitment of quasi-criminal marginalized individuals that would be willing to do the dirty work when needed (Kraïem 2011). For example, a few months after its creation, the ND was already resorting to the use of violence in order to stop the older Destour party from holding its congress in April 1934, and made it so that the mobilizational activities of the older party's leadership were faced with the constant risk of attack by bands of armed thugs affiliated with the ND (Kraïem 1990). This situation reached such a degree that open letters were publically addressed to the Bey, asking him to intervene and put an end to the violent campaign that targeted any organized or individual actor that opposed the ND party's hegemonic aims.

Organized student groups of the Zeitouna, such as *Saout El Talib*, were especially targeted, with the armed ND groups attacking any activities that they attempted to organize, be they political or social in nature⁶⁸. Leveraging the fact that it held the Ministry of Justice⁶⁹ within the negotiation government, the ND was able to use its bureaucratic capital to make sure its Zeitounian opponents faced legal troubles while also opening the way for its supporters to access higher positions within the Judiciary

⁶⁸ Such as the organization of anti-illiteracy classes, or political meetings with Destourian nationalist figures.

⁶⁹ Held by no other than Salah Ben Youssef, who later on, would rely on the Zeitounian current that he made sure to repress in that first period.

(Kraïem 2011). Later on in 1955, *Saout El Talib* had to distance itself from the older Destour publicly, and a delegation headed by the organization's president was sent to meet Bourguiba and assure him of their attachment to his personal leadership (Kraïem 2011).

Physical violence was not the only approach used by the party. The ND had shown that it was proficient in attacking its opponents ruthlessly on other levels as well. Thus, in addition to the physical disruption and raising of the costs associated with joining their activities⁷⁰, the groups were also targeted by slander campaigns accusing them of holding the fight for independence back, or of being apostates and traitors to the nation and religion. In other words, the party was aiming to reduce and erode the various forms of capital that these groups had accumulated through the years. First, by allowing the ND to catch up, and later to outmaneuver them through its willingness to reject the rules of the field and “play the game” in ways that seemed hitherto unthinkable to other more established actors.

By 1955, after two decades of maneuvering in the pre-independence political field, the ND had established itself as the only legitimate representative of the Tunisian nation. The monarchy and the other actors were, at this point in time, unable to organize any serious challenges to that situation. Even the French authorities, which remained an

⁷⁰ In a report to the Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, the Resident General Boyer de LaTour detailed how a number of older Destour figures were assassinated or attacked, and how the party was generally unable to conduct its activities without facing violent attacks from the ND militias .

important actor given that they remained in control of both the security services and other strategic factors, had grudgingly accepted the ND's bold claims and were, at that point, not unfavorable to seeing Bourguiba hold the dominant position in the field personally.

The ND was led by Habib Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef. Bourguiba was the head of the party, and Ben Youssef its Secretary-General. The two individuals, both trained as lawyers in France, and who shared a bond of trust as comrades in the fight for independence, had different backgrounds and upbringings. Bourguiba was born to a modest family from Monastir, which had to concede many sacrifices to ensure that he would be able to continue his studies at the College Sadiki⁷¹, followed by the Lycee Carnot, both highly regarded institutions within a very politicized educational field that played a crucial role in shaping his personal development. After his graduation, he was then able to move to Paris, where he studied law at the Sorbonne, before enrolling in the School of Political Science (future Science-Po) and graduating in 1927. Throughout his studies, he had to rely on scholarships and the help of some supportive philanthropists. He was described by Charles-Andre Julien, a prominent French scholar of the Maghreb, who developed a friendship with Bourguiba in France during the 1930s, as being convinced that he was destined in some quasi-messianic sense to be the leader of his people (1976). After returning to Tunisia, Bourguiba joined the old Destour, rising

⁷¹ Established in the pre-colonial era (1875) by then-Grand Vizier Khayr ed-Din Pasha, it provided a modernized bilingual education, and was aimed at creating an administrative elite that would then serve within the Beylicate's modernizing bureaucracy.

through the ranks. By 1933 he was an elected member of its executive committee. His disagreements with the conservative positions adopted by the older Destour will lead him to draw his supporters into the ND, which he founded a few months later in 1934. A French government official meeting with Habib Bourguiba in 1954, described him as a very charismatic and intelligent character who was sensible to rational arguments and in control of his emotions (Ministere Des Affaires Marocaines et Tunisiennes 09 18 1954). He was at other times less open for what he viewed as compromises that did not advance his cause, and as a result, spent several years in prison and exile. Very charismatic and eloquent in his public interventions, he was reputed to often prepare his arguments and interventions well in advance, constructing them as a lawyer would an opening address (Bessis and Belhassen 2012, 102). He was also known to be quite a liberal and 'fun' person who enjoyed going out with his comrades during his visits to France during his youth. Nevertheless, even at that stage of his life, Bourguiba was also a ruthless and manipulating political operator who did not hesitate to trick his political opponents, as demonstrated in numerous episodes, such as when he sidelined Sheikh Thaalbi, the spiritual leader of the older Destour⁷², who after a brief attempt at reasserting his authority over the nationalist movement following his return to Tunisia in 1937, ended up being threatened into cutting his public appearances, by a mixture of slander and physical violence (Kraïem 2011; Bessis and Belhassen 2012, 107–8).

⁷² A prominent Islamic scholar and nationalist leader, with a traditional Islamic education and conservative aristocratic values.

Bourguiba's longtime lieutenant and future rival, Salah Ben Youssef, was born to a wealthy merchant family on the Djerba island in 1907. The two leaders shared a similar educational background, both traditional and modern legal training. After Ben Youssef joined the ND, he quickly became its secretary-general during the critical period when the party's president, Bourguiba, was exiled outside Tunisia.

Moreover, Bourguiba and Ben Youssef had developed a bond of mutual respect and relative trust during their common struggles against the protectorate authorities. These bonds were reinforced by their common imprisonment and exile to Bordj LeBoeuf, in the Tunisian desert. Given that Bourguiba was forced into exile outside the country, Ben Youssef was, for all intents and purposes, the main person in charge of the mobilization and the organization of the day to day interactions of the party within the pre-independence political field, especially as he was appointed as a minister representing the ND within the Bey's pre-independence government.

Both Bourguiba and Ben Youssef had what could be described as a strong will to power, and as such, their cooperation was a pragmatic one more than anything else. They were both fully involved in the struggle for the domination of the ND field and its institutions, and neither of them seems to have been able to satisfy himself with anything other than primacy over the political field as well. Often blamed on ideological differences, their opposition was more focused on gaining the dominant position within the party, and later on the post-independence political field.

Nonetheless, the two leaders and their respective factions came at odds over the approach to be adopted in the negotiations with France. Bourguiba, who was famous for

his step-by-step approach to political projects⁷³, was open to the proposal of internal autonomy with the maintenance of some French interests as a stepping stone towards full independence. Ben Youssef claimed that this was unacceptable and that he would not support this approach, and instead started criticizing it and mobilizing against Bourguiba.

Following the signature of the Internal Autonomy Agreements with France in 1955, the aforementioned differences gained more salience within the ND field, as well as within the general Tunisian social space. Organized actors began positioning themselves in relation to, in support, or opposition to the political vision advocated by either of the two competing leaders. The people that coalesced around Ben Youssef were opposed to what they viewed as the overly soft and collaborationist approach proposed by Bourguiba. Instead, they advocated for the adoption of a more pan-Arabist perspective that would prioritize the full independence of both Tunisia and the rest of the Maghreb, especially Algeria. Moreover, they also tended to disapprove of the modernist and secularist positions advocated by Bourguiba, instead favoring a more conservative approach that was better reflected in Ben Youssef's plans.

Before moving on to tracing how the split within the ND evolved, it is essential to introduce the other major actor in the Tunisian social space. The *Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail* (UGTT) monopolized the labor union field and drew its strength

⁷³ "سياسة المراحل" as it was referred to, it basically meant the achievement of small gains that would later on be leveraged to achieve the ultimate goals. This approach was evidently viewed negatively by other parties to the negotiations, like the French government for instance.

from the capital it gained through its control over a disciplined and easy to mobilize constituency. Closely associated with the fight for independence, the UGTT was historically connected to the ND since its foundation in 1946. The UGTT leadership was simultaneously affiliated with the ND, and its membership expanded rapidly beyond the urban proletariat to include several different constituencies. By 1952, the UGTT had already managed to implant its cells throughout the country and had around 80 thousand members. This expansion made the organization, from the onset, play a more significant role than that of a simple labor union. The activities of the UGTT had a very political character from the onset; it was being supported by the ND and played a role in enabling and complementing some of its activities. Its first leader, Farhat Hached, was the principal figure of the national movement whenever Bourguiba was jailed or exiled⁷⁴. More often than not, members of the UGTT were also affiliated with the ND. The leadership of the UGTT was at the same time, either officially or unofficially, included within the Political Bureau of the ND (Kraïem 2011). Nevertheless, due to the old history of the syndicalist movement in Tunisia, which preceded the appearance of the nationalist parties by many years, and the fact that its leaders and members had accumulated a significant amount of political capital and experience, the UGTT maintained a significant autonomy vis-à-vis the ND, despite their close cooperation in the fight for independence (Ben Hamida 1990).

Apart from the ND and the UGTT, the remaining relatively autonomous collective actors present within the Tunisian social space were not very significant in terms of size

⁷⁴ Until his assassination in 1952 by a French settler organization.

or influence. The Destour party still existed, but it did not have much influence anymore, with some observing that its influence was limited to its headquarters (Clement Henry Moore 1962). As for the old *Parti Communiste*, its situation was not that different, and while it remained autonomous, it had no significant influence on the events.

The Husseinid monarchy, which was still in place at the time, had managed to conserve a modicum of power and some support in those early years. It was more popular with the traditionalist aristocratic *Beldi* families, and to some degree, maintained connections within the old Destour and the Youssefist faction as well (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 1997). Nevertheless, its situation was different in comparison to the Moroccan monarchy, as it did not enjoy any significant credible basis on which to challenge the ND and Bourguiba's claims to the symbolic spoils of the victorious struggle for national independence.

b) The Autonomy Agreements and the Struggle for the Political field

After the triumph that welcomed him on his return, Bourguiba had to invest his prestige and symbolic capital in reasserting his control over the party. As Salah Ben Youssef was the chief organizer and leader of the party during the years when Bourguiba was in exile, he had managed to accumulate a significant amount of capital as inside the party and within the broader social space. He built significant connections with the national movement's bases, both inside the party and outside it. After a forced

public display of union during some parades early on following Bourguiba's return to the country⁷⁵, the two leaders quickly started trading blows.

Ben Youssef, having openly and publically criticized Bourguiba and voiced his rejection of the Autonomy Agreements, arguing that they did not officially receive the support of the party and that the necessary support could only be procedurally secured through a vote during the general Congress of the ND (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003a, n. 295). Bourguiba's response was to summon Ben Youssef to explain his positions in front of the Political Bureau, which supported the agreements. As Ben Youssef refused and insisted that a congress be called to settle the matter democratically, Bourguiba called on the political bureau to issue a statement excluding the secretary-general, Salah Ben Youssef, from the party. In a move to sideline and preempt potential mediation attempts by other prominent members of the party, Bourguiba made sure to communicate the statement to French press agencies for publication rapidly.

As a consequence, the ND split into two factions competing for legitimacy. The "ND - General Secretariat" headed by Ben Youssef, and the "ND – Political Bureau" controlled by Bourguiba. With each faction advocating a different social project, the ND began emerging as an autonomous political field already at this point. The project of

⁷⁵ In an interview for a documentary by Al Arabiya that was aired in 2007, Ahmed Ben Salah claimed that the tensions were already quite high between the Bourguiba and Ben Youssef, to the extent that during the parade, he had to physically bring their hands together and lift them up for the crowds to see.

Ben Youssef received the support of various factions, including a large number of the *fellagha*⁷⁶ groups active in the South of the country, the agricultural union UGAT⁷⁷, the Artisans Union, the older Destour, as well as numerous provincial cells of the party all around the country, and almost all of the country's newspapers including those associated with the ND (Mestiri 2011; Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003a, n. 336). He also had the support of the Zeytouna institution, where his brother was an established Sheikh.

On his side, Bourguiba received some support from the UGTT, and that of the majority of the ND cells, as well as the support of demobilized *fellaghas* from the Sahel region. He was also very active in countering the advantage that Ben Youssef had in the press field, quickly creating and launching a new newspaper to represent his faction (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003a, n. 336). Roger Seydoux, the French High Commissioner to Tunisia, reported in a telegram to the ministry that his sources estimated that a large majority of the ND cells were supportive of Bourguiba⁷⁸. He also controlled the government, even though most significant powers were under French control at this point, and most other departments were severely understaffed and

⁷⁶ Armed groups that engaged in a guerilla warfare campaign against the French forces. They were composed of rural people, and generally embraced very traditional Islamic ideals (Kraïem 2011)

⁷⁷ *Union Generale de l'Agriculture Tunisienne*

⁷⁸ 1360 ND cells for Bourguiba, and merely 180 for Ben Youssef.

paralyzed by the rivalries triggered by the schism (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003a, n. 336).

According to Ahmed Mestiri⁷⁹ (2011), the country was pushed to the brink of civil war, as different actors started settling scores for various reasons, with kidnappings and assassinations by both sides taking place during broad daylight, even in the capital. A situation that was made more severe as some of the Algerian armed groups operating from within the Tunisian borders started supporting Ben Youssef and harassing French troops along with the *fellaghas* of the south, which in turn triggered the French army to conduct more aggressive operations against the two (Mestiri 2011, 83). For him, as for many other individuals who were involved in the events⁸⁰, the ideological dimensions were secondary; the actual primary issues that the schism revolved about were the positions and the rivalry for domination over the party and the state by each of the two leaders.

Having sidelined all other political actors that tried to compete with it into irrelevance, the ND was, by this point, both an organized actor and a sort of proto-political field. While it did not tolerate dissent and disagreements outside its structures, the ND was nevertheless allowing discussions and competitions of ideas to be expressed

⁷⁹ Ahmed Mestiri, who was a prominent figure in the ND, and was later Justice Minister under the first Bourguiba Government, before serving in a number of different ministerial positions until the late 1970s where he went into the opposition, published his memoirs in 2011.

⁸⁰ Such as Ahmed ben Salah, Bejji Caid Sebsi, amongst others.

within its cells and associated organisms, at least until the point when an official position is adopted. Each of Bourguiba and Ben Youssef, in their struggle for dominance within the ND field, was championing the interests of different parts of the Tunisian social space and advocated a different set of rules for the newly independent country's emerging political field. Other organizations and actors were only contributing to the political debate by delegating their support to one or the other sides of the struggle and were not in a position to propose and defend their own independent vision of how the polity should be organized.

Ben Youssef, playing the cards of pan Arabism and traditionalism, made a highly symbolic speech, in the Kairouan mosque, attacking Bourguiba and accusing him of cowardice and collaboration with the French, and of abandoning the goals of liberating the whole Maghreb region from colonial domination. After claiming that the Agreements were only signed by “a group of astray fools”, Ben Youssef accused Bourguiba and his allies of wanting to maintain Tunisia under French tutelage, and assured the attendees that his vision of Tunisia was that of a country “turned towards the Orient and the Arab countries to which we are connected by religious, cultural, and racial links” (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003a, n. 337). Groups associated with Bourguiba, and headed by his close ally Mongi Slim⁸¹, made sure to disrupt the speech (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003a, n. 337).

⁸¹ Born to an aristocratic and learned family, Mongi Slim was involved with the ND from the first days, and he was often Bourguiba's trusted man for tasks requiring discretion. He was the chief

The strategy followed by Bourguiba was not to use any official armed groups to counter the *fellaghas* and Algerian armed groups supporting Ben Youssef. Instead, he used thuggish militias to disrupt his meetings and conduct other covert operations⁸². For the more military sort of operations, Bourguiba did not mobilize his own supporters, and under the mantle of respecting legality and the Internal Autonomy agreements, he left the task to be tackled by the French military and police forces, which happily obliged (Kraïem 2011). The French clearly favored Bourguiba over Ben Youssef, given how the latter favored a generalized North African insurrection and the Nasserist positions he held.

Inside the ND, the new political field, events were following a different approach. Bourguiba and his supporters organized a general congress of the party to be held in Sfax in November 1955. As he made sure to invite a number of Arab figures, including representatives of Egypt, to attend, he declared that the Autonomy agreements were only a step to gain a better position from which to reach independence for the whole region and that independent Tunisia would not turn its back on the Arab world (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003a, n. 383). Ben Youssef, who was invited to participate in the event as well, rejected the invitation and the resolutions. Instead, he

negotiator for the Autonomy Agreements, and would later on hold a number of ministerial and diplomatic positions.

⁸² Such as kidnappings and targetted assassinations of the oppositions, sabotage of their logistics, amongst other methods.

organized his own congress in a stadium in Tunis, where he focused on leveling the same charges at the other side.

According to diplomatic telegrams by Roger Seydoux, the Beylical court, and especially Prince Chadly⁸³, was not totally neutral, expressing to visiting officials their view that Ben Youssef would prevail in the end, as he was “championing freedoms”, unlike Bourguiba, whom they viewed as an authoritarian with limited prospects (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003a, n. 383). Bourguiba was not unaware of this connection; as in another telegram, Seydoux reports that the president of the ND complained of the ‘moral’ and potentially material support that the Court was providing to his opponents. Another telegram reporting on a meeting with the Bey related that, at least officially, he did not seem to be favoring either party personally and expressed his wish that the French provide the same degree of protection to both parties (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003a, n. 383).

The strategy of Bourguiba was similar to the ones that he used to dominate the pre-independence field: cutting the support bases of his opponents, either through their cooptation or their destruction. Practically speaking, this started with the UGAT. The agricultural union was a strong supporter of Ben Youssef. This was done by both repression and the organization of a competing union, a strategy that would often be followed by Bourguiba when dealing with independent fields and organization of a corporatist nature. He also ensured that the UGTT, which was supportive of his faction

⁸³ The oldest son of the Bey.

but still maintaining its independence, would be immunized against any potential infiltration by the Youssefists or other groups like the communists. He was also wary of the increasing visibility of Ahmed Ben Salah, the young secretary-general of the union. As such, he intervened in the internal crisis within the UGTT and supported the factions opposed to Ben Salah, later encouraging his primary challenger, Habib Achour, to take the step of creating a competing union.

Thus, by the time that Ben Youssef decided to leave the country in January 1956, he was isolated from his supporters, who were paralyzed under the constant attacks of the Bourguibist faction. The Bey himself was very disappointed by that departure and tried to pressure the French side into being more assertive in containing Bourguiba, threatening to abdicate if the situation remained as it was (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003b, n. 78). Abdication was the main card that the Bey had in his hand, as the continuation of the monarchic form of rule was necessary for the Bardo treaties not to become invalid, and those treaties were crucial in ensuring the protection of French interests in the country.

Thus, the French government had to conduct a balancing act, whereas it was interested in supporting Bourguiba, who they felt was more favorable to their interests, while also ensuring that support did not drive the Bey to abdicate. The Bey, on the other hand, was interested in maintaining his dynasty, and as such, would have instead kept the political field divided rather than under the hegemonic control of a united ND, especially with Bourguiba at its helm.

Looking through the lens of field theory, a number of dynamics come to the fore. First comes the habitus aspect, which plays a significant role in the fluid struggle for positions that characterizes the field emergence period. The slight differences in the personal background of the main protagonists shaped their predisposition in the selection of alliances and regarding the adoption of different social projects. Their investment in the game was, however, more important than the values that they defended. There is an unsettled debate about whether the clash was about values and ideas, or principally a fight for leadership and domination. As the ND field was, for all intent and purposes, the closest thing to a political field within the Tunisian social space at the time, that distinction appears like a false debate. The struggle was a battle of ideas and a battle for position, as the two go together in a political field. The struggle over dominance within a political field is done through the advancement of sociopolitical projects and the identification with a set of values through which the actor tries to mobilize those outside the field into identifying with his proposals and delegating their support to his person as their representative. Thus, what the two leaders were primarily after was both domination of the field and defense of a sociopolitical project, two sides of the same coin that cannot be achieved independently of each other given that the field in question was the political field. As the two have gone through a comparable trajectory in their political upbringing, they did adopt similar strategies and had a good understanding of each other's approach to the game.

At the end of the day, the internal dynamics of the ND mattered, but they were not decisive in settling the first rounds of the schism. Both factions had to rely on the

support of external actors, be they foreign patrons or allies from other fields with significant capital holdings that they would bring to bear on the ND dispute. Bourguiba ended up betting on the right positions, with an ally like France that still controlled the security services in Tunisia, by adopting the positions and social project that they would favor. He also pragmatically adopted and modified some of his opponents' public positions, as a way of undercutting the support that they received both internally and internationally.

After having reasserted his dominance over the ND following the Sfax congress, and reinforced his hold over significant parts of the wider social space, Bourguiba was ready to move to the next step. The creation of a political field that would legitimize his future moves. Through the organization of elections for a constitutional assembly, and by maneuvering to be appointed as Prime minister by the Bey, within a homogenous ND government of his own choosing, Bourguiba was working towards the deactivation of potential challengers for his domination of the Tunisian political field.

2. Constitutional Assembly and the Path to Institutionalized

Hegemony

By January 1956, Ben Youssef was forced to flee to Libya, where he tried to organize an armed rebellion with Egyptian logistical support. Meanwhile, Bourguiba was actively preparing for the next phase of his plan to take over the field of power,

after having dominated the ND field. While the Youssefist movement was still a threat for him, it was a more distant and weakened one.

To ensure the election of a compliant constitutional assembly, Bourguiba deployed the capitals that he had access to as the president of the ND, and as the popular champion of the nationalist struggle, to make sure that the mode of elections selected would make it impossible for the smaller actors that still held some limited degree of autonomy to gain access to the assembly. As a result, the Constitutional Assembly was more of a platform designed to advance Bourguiba's plans vis a vis the only two autonomous actors still existing and capable of hindering his plans: the French authorities and, to a much lesser extent, the Beylical institution.

As the Constitutional Assembly began its work, elected members unanimously decided to elect Bourguiba to its presidency. A few days later, the Bey had to appoint Bourguiba to the position of Prime Minister in charge of forming a new government⁸⁴. From the start, Bourguiba began hinting at the irrelevance of the monarchic institution and eroding its symbolic power by using the party to spread the view that it was anachronistic and collaborationist. At the same time, and using the tactic that served him well with other fields, he provided his support to the dominated actors within the Beylical field.

Sensing that the end was nigh, many princes and other members of the court were trying to convert the capitals they had accumulated into other forms. Monarchic

⁸⁴ The previous governments mandate had ended with the elections of the Constitutional Assembly.

symbolic capital was quickly losing its worth, and only those who held large quantities could hope to convert it into other forms. One such case was Prince Hassine, who was both heir to the throne and the brother of the Moncef Bey⁸⁵, who had excellent relations with Bourguiba. His son, Prince Ali, was also actively providing his support to Bourguiba by publishing an open letter in the ND newspaper expressing his support for the leader's reforms and for the modernization of Tunisia through the abrogation of Beylical privileges (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003b, n. 390). Others whose symbolic capital was not significant enough to be negotiable had to instead rely on their economic capital, sending money abroad when they were able to, and or selling their cars to invest in various commercial venues (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003b, n. 390).

At the same time, Bourguiba was actively taking over the symbolic capital of the monarch. At first, he canceled all the distinctions that symbolically indicated any superiority of the Bey over the Prime minister⁸⁶. Second, he took over the role of the Bey in a number of traditional and religious ceremonies. For instance, the Throne day festivities lost a lot of their monarchic character and became instead focused on

⁸⁵ Moncef Bey was deposed by the French under the pretext of having collaborated with the Axis powers. However, he was widely respected as his deposition was actually more related to his closeness and support for the nationalist movement.

⁸⁶ The throne would be situated on a platform, at a higher level, when the Bey received government officials. This platform would be removed whenever he received Bourguiba. The ceremonial hand kissing practice was ended as well (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003b, n. 390).

celebrating the 'nation', and Bourguiba replaced the Bey would traditionally walk through the souks receiving gifts from the merchants during the traditional ceremony held on the 27th of Ramadan. The traditional gift that the government made to the Bey every year for the throne day was also significantly lowered, to the point that the Bey turned it down (Ministere Des Affaires Etrangeres 2003b, n. 390).

Using the Constitutional Assembly and the Government both as public platforms and as sources of additional legitimacy, Bourguiba started more aggressively pressing for control over the state apparatus from France (Debbasch 1964). To that end, he engaged in a policy of 'Tunisification' of the State administration and founded the Tunisian armed forces.

The French security forces, while they proved to be crucial for the first phase of his fight against the Youssefists, were now becoming more of a hindrance. First, their presence and support were costly in terms of symbolic capital, both internally and internationally. The Youssefists, with the support of Nasser's Egypt, made it impossible for his government to take part in the Bandung Conference. It was also harming his reputation regionally, especially with the Algerian forces of Ahmed Ben Bella, who was visibly more supportive of Ben Youssef. Secondly, internally, it was no longer in Bourguiba's interest to keep the legitimate monopoly of force in the hands of a force that was not entirely under his control. Finally, France's interest in the maintenance and upholding of the monarchic form of government was at odds with his own personal republican goals.

Thus, by the 20th of March 1956, as Tunisia regained its full independence, the political field and the state were already firmly in the hands of the ND and its president. The Youssefists, while they still held some influence and significance, were pushed to the fringes of the political field. Their last supporters within the country became more or less securitized as a problem to be addressed militarily, rather than as political opponents to be composed with politically.

However, that was not enough to satisfy Bourguiba, who was still intent in removing any potential challengers. Though he dominated the ND and political fields, these were still autonomous to a degree, and their internal rules of the games revolved around the accumulation of political capital, which some figures other than Bourguiba embodied large amounts of symbolic capital. The next step for Bourguiba was to change the rules of the political field, to ensure that he alone would be in a position of permanent superiority. What this meant was that he had to reduce the autonomy of the field and make the only form of political capital that would matter within it be that which was acquired through delegation from his person. Resistance was to be expected from the parties that still had an independent political capital, both due to their ideas and to their ability to mobilize support for them.

a) Weakening potential opposition bases: the UGTT

The UGTT was thus the principal target of Bourguiba. Not only was it as an organization strong enough to oppose him on the field of power, but due to its historical connections to the party, it could potentially provide a platform to challenge his

domination of the ND itself. Additionally, the UGTT had prominent individuals with significant amounts of symbolic capital; in other words, a recognized legitimacy stemming from their role in the nationalist struggle. Ahmed Ben Salah, who then held the position of Secretary-General of the UGTT, was one such individual. A skilled and educated unionist, he had many connections both within the country and outside of it and was well respected by many within the ND as well.

The danger that could be posed by a strong united labor field to the plans that Bourguiba had for the party and its role within the state became clear early on within the Constitutional Assembly debates. The UGTT, represented by Ahmed Ben Salah, who early on in a statement published by *Le Monde* 8 days after the country's independence, expressing his expectation that the Assembly would be a sort institutionalized political arena, a parliament of sorts, "For the first time, the notions of Right and Left will appear in Tunisia and be consecrated at the level of an Assembly. It would not surprise us if oppositions arise." (as cited in Debbasch 1964, 90). This was clearly at odds with the role envisaged by Bourguiba and his allies.

These conceptual differences morphed into political conflict soon enough, in some of the rare episodes of political opposition taking place within the Assembly. First, Ben Salah and the UGTT pushed for the adoption of a motion clarifying the relations between the Assembly and the government, clearly establishing the responsibility of the latter towards the former in all policy realms. This would have endangered the position of the Government and the ND Political Bureau within the Political Field, and reinforced that of the assembly, potentially leading to the development of an

autonomous space that would have necessarily led to the emergence of political factions that were at a minimum independent of Bourguiba's personal control, if not to the formation of actual parties such as a potential Labor party connected to the UGTT⁸⁷. In addition to the above factors, the positions of Ben Salah were also hurting the unanimity doctrine that the party was instilling within the Assembly by making proposals that would doubtless activate the class-based faultlines within it. Such a proposal was the economic Plan proposed in September 1956 and advocated clear socialist policies and anticapitalistic positions. This was the final issue that convinced Bourguiba of the urgent need to weaken the labor union and its leadership, in order to make them toe the official party line, or at least maintain an apolitical attitude of neutrality and a focus on corporatist demands.

Thus, when the occasion presented itself, Bourguiba played upon the interpersonal and factional rivalries within the Labor Union field. Habib Achour, one of the founding leaders of the UGTT, was also a member of the ND and a strong supporter of Bourguiba in that period⁸⁸, but he resented the positions of Ben Salah. According to Mustapha Kraiem (2011, 82), in 1954, Ben Salah once visited Achour, who was then under house

⁸⁷ An idea that was reportedly entertained by the union's historical leader, Ferhat Hachad, prior to his assassination

⁸⁸ Achour played a crucial supportive role in Bourguiba's favor at the onset of the Youssefist schism. At a moment when Bourguiba was relatively weaker and isolated; Achour, who headed the UGTT section in Sfax, provided Bourguiba with the labor union's support in the organization of the crucial Sfax Congress of 1955.

arrest, and in front of witnesses, promised him that he would give him the position of Secretary-General when he would recover his freedom. The two also disagreed on union policies, with Achour arguing that union leaders should be barred from holding any governmental positions (Ben Hamida 1990). Overall, Achour and Ben Salah disagreed on the role of the UGTT and its relation to the party, which in this case, was fast becoming increasingly indistinguishable from the state.

The election of delegates for the UGTT congress was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Achour, arguing that the elections were fraudulent, contested their results. Consequently, he withdrew from the UGTT along with his allies. With the support of Bourguiba, they, later on, announced the creation of a new competing union, the *Union Tunisienne du Travail* (UTT).

The schism provided Bourguiba with an occasion to intervene in the labor union field, which was still staunchly independent. As Abdeslem Ben Hamida (1990, 136) noted, the primary goal was not the weakening of individual opponents, but rather it was about the position and roles of the labor movement vis-à-vis the State and society. In other words, this episode was about establishing the primacy of the ND within the Tunisian field of power, with Bourguiba as its leader playing the role of arbiter and final judge in all organized social spaces whose autonomy only lasts for as long as he wishes it to. While it was not the primary goal, the erosion of individual actor's symbolic capitals was a welcome side effect if nothing else. The clash between the two union leaders reduced both of their symbolic capital as they traded accusations and, as the supporters of each side, became suspicious of the other.

That weakening became more apparent later on when the short-lived UTT was disbanded and reintegrated within the UGTT. The reunification happened following the intervention of Bourguiba, who was called upon by Ben Salah to intervene and help find a way out of the situation. While the field was again unified under the UGTT monopoly, Ben Salah was personally sidelined when the administrative commission of the union voted to dismiss him while he out of the country. He was subsequently attacked in a speech by the president who blamed him for the situation. After that, Bourguiba made sure that Ben Salah would remain outside of the union field by promoting him into the position of Secretary of State for Public Health. Achour, on the other hand, became Joint Secretary-General of the UGTT, with the leadership position was given to Ahmed Tlili, an old-time syndicalist that was a more consensual choice.

b) Establishment of the Republic and Monopolization of the Political Field

As the assembly was dominated by Bourguiba's supporters, and as the other fields where oppositions could emerge either controlled by his allies or deactivated by the rallying effect of the struggle pitting them against a Youssefist faction that was increasingly costly to associate with⁸⁹, the path was open for Bourguiba to abolish the weakened Beylical institution and proclaim the establishment of the Republic. Voted to the unanimity by the assembly on July 25th, 1957, the proclamation of the Republic surprised many who, while they expected it at some point, did not expect it to happen so

⁸⁹ Many of those who were associated with Ben Youssef, or who failed to support Bourguiba in some way, had to become overzealous supporters of the president in order to avoid his anger (Kraïem 2011)

soon. What was not surprising, however, was that Bourguiba would be the republic's first president.

Famously described as a “Presidential Monarchy” by Clement Henry Moore (1965), the new regime was one where all powers were to be concentrated into the hands of the leader. Bourguiba was at the core of the system. In addition to the powers he already held as leader of the ND and as Prime Minister, he now controlled also those technically held by the Bey. The government, now composed of State secretaries, was responsible to him personally, and not to the assembly or the party. Having the leader's favor was the single most crucial factor in reaching a dominant position within the Tunisian political field that was increasingly centered on the ND-State nexus.

The modern forms of power were not the only ones that he accumulated. While he was known as a staunch secularist, Bourguiba was not interested in the separation of church and state as much as he was interested in the submission of the first to the latter. In that case, that meant the submission of the religious field to his personal domination. The ongoing Youssefist episode served as a reminder of the risks that an autonomous religious field could represent for his socio-political plans. The traditional values still prevalent in the society made the religious field impossible to ignore, given the hitherto high value of religious symbolic capital. Leveraging his embodied symbolic capital through increasing usage of the title of “Supreme Combatant”⁹⁰, and references to his role in liberating the country from French occupation, Bourguiba claimed what he

⁹⁰ “*Le Combattant suprême*” in French.

argued was the traditional 'right' of a Muslim country's leader to issue religious rulings. Thus, not only were the institutional and modern forms of power in his hands, but he also made sure that he controlled or embodied the traditional and religious forms of power as well (Larif-Béatrix 1988)

For Bourguiba, control over the religious field was a crucial step in his sociopolitical project for the country. To achieve that goal, he methodically proceeded towards the gradual reduction of the symbolic and material foundations upon which the religious field's autonomy rested even before the actual proclamation of the Republic and his ascendancy to the presidency. First, he attacked the historical record of the traditional religious scholars, accusing them of being the causes of backwardness given their doctrinal rigidity, and of collusion with the French authorities (Frégosi 2004). This last point was the centerpiece of his attacks, as he would often use his public speaking appearances to contrast the traditional religious scholars' record with his own and that of the nationalist movement in restoring independence to the country and in preserving its Islamic identity.

The attitude of the religious scholars towards the protectorate provided Bourguiba with a number of arguments to discredit them. Their position during the struggle over the naturalization of Tunisian under the Protectorate was often brought up by him. The debates and conflicts, centering over whether naturalized Tunisians were still Muslims and if they retained the right to be buried in Muslim cemeteries, were a definitional moment in the nationalist struggle. The religious *chara'* tribunals sided with the protectorate at first, allowing the burials to take place in Muslim cemeteries, before

backing down under pressure. As he achieved domination over the political field and leveraging both this episode and their collusion with Ben Youssef, Bourguiba quickly struck at the institutional and material foundations of the religious field's autonomy. First, he removed the special status of the Zeitouna university. By making it into a regular university, the state had more authority over its programs and faculty, removing the ideological autonomy that previously made it into a hotbed of opposition. Second, he removed the religious tribunals (both Islamic and Rabbinical) and replaced them with modern tribunals. This reduced the employment prospects and thus the appeal of the traditional Zeytounian education. Finally, Bourguiba nationalized both private and public *Habous* properties, cutting off a crucial source of economic capital for actors within the religious field. These properties were a considerable source of revenue, especially for the *Zaouia* and *Sufi* orders in the country (Taymūmī 2006)

Having struck at the sources of autonomy of the religious field, Bourguiba moved on to attacking the religious symbolic capital available in the traditional religious field on two levels; first by eroding it and taking it over; and second, by attacking its negotiability across the Tunisian social space. The first part involved speeches attacking traditional Islamic institutions and blaming them for underdevelopment and backwardness (Frégosi 2004). As mentioned above, Bourguiba combined those attacks with the claim that he was a valid source of interpretation of Islam and able to issue new rules through the principle of *Ijtihad*. Additionally, he also made sure to play the religious leader role by taking part in religious occasions at important historical mosques, dressed in traditional clothes, and giving the sermon (*khutba*) to the faithful

(Kraïem 2011). For the second part, and in combination with the modernization of the educational system and the judiciary, Bourguiba also passed the very progressist Personal Status Code, which through the granting of more freedoms and rights to women⁹¹, was also allowing him to reduce the hold of the traditional structures that ensured the reproduction of the traditional religious field's influence within the social space.

c) The 1959 Constitution or the Institutional Foundations of Personal Rule

The period preceding the 1959 constitution was basically one of shaping the social space, removing opposition, and the coopting or controlling any potentially fertile ground for political contestation. Having succeeded in establishing the hegemony of the ND over the political field, and then in controlling the state apparatus through the party, and finally, in establishing his own personal domination over the two, Bourguiba managed to reach a position where he could shape both the social space and the institutions to fit the role that he envisioned for himself.

As we have seen, the constitutional assembly was the central institution within the political field already, and reflected the hegemonic position of the ND in its composition. However, discipline could have been an issue limiting the plans for

⁹¹ The Personal Status Code was a landmark of Bourguiba's reign, it was a very progressive legal framework that he devised out of his own personal initiative and without any real pressure or expectations. For a more detailed analysis of the evolution of women's rights in Tunisia and the rest of the Maghreb, both before and after independence see Mounira Charrad (2001)

personalization. The risk, which would have stemmed from the various faultlines both active (e.g., Youssefism) or latent (opposition to personalization), would have been compounded by the presence at that time of a number of prominent individuals with significant embodied symbolic capital that could have spearheaded an internal rebellion against divisive proposals. To avoid any sort of issue that could have contravened his plans, one of the first texts passed by the assembly was its rules of procedure.

The rules of procedures established the predominance of the ND's Political Bureau over the assembly and its functioning. They included the power to, amongst other things, set the order of the day, the power to adjourn sessions, call sessions, call votes, and discipline members by suspending them for up to a month (Debbasch 1964, 89). Most importantly, however, these rules also enshrined the political nature of the assembly's presidency, by allowing the president to, whenever he felt it was necessary, temporarily abandon his position to take part in the debates and address the assembly in a partisan manner. Whenever a sensitive political issue was brought up, it would start with a long speech by the president, followed by a unanimous vote in support of it, consecrating the nature of the Assembly as a political tool of legitimation rather than a space for political discussions. In the post-Youssefist period, political debates and disagreements would, when tolerated, generally take place within the party, far from the public eye. These established a set of norms that would continue after the passing of the constitution, making the assembly barely political and the presidency a very political office that cumulated all powers and faced very few realistic institutional limitations to their exercise.

Chapter 3: Analysis

1. Emergence of the Political Field

The Pre-Constitutional eras in Morocco and Tunisia were foundational periods for their respective political fields. In both cases, actors with different sociopolitical projects, values, and symbolic narratives were competing for domination over the field of power. The competing actors in both cases represented a relatively comparable set of categories: progressist nationalism, conservative nationalism, syndicalism, and traditionalism. The actors within each of these categories, in both countries, represented a homologous, if at times varied, set of habitus and endowments in terms of forms of capital.

As can be seen, in both cases, the fluidity that characterizes the periods of field emergence opens up a lot of room for agency on the actors' part. Rules are yet to be established. That does not mean that there is a total vacuum on that level, as options are

constrained in a path-dependent fashion by the previous historical arrangements. The latter in these cases are principally related to the collapsed Colonial political field and the set of inter-field relations that it served as a significant linchpin for.

That vacuum means that there is a lack of agreement on, and different conceptions of, the social and how it should be organized. Competing projects can, and do, try to impose themselves as the legitimate manner in which the field should be constructed, whom it should include, what its various rules should be, and how it should relate to other fields. With such a fluid situation, and given the arguably high significance potential of the political field for the shaping of society through its centrality to the functioning of the State, the conditions and struggles giving rise to the political field are crucial in understanding the development of inter-field relations and in shaping the evolution of the State in the newly independent countries.

As a given field is yet to emerge formally, and its sociodicy and rules are yet to be stabilized and agreed upon, its autonomy tends to be limited, and its boundaries unclear and porous. The struggle over the shape and rules of the emerging field tends to require competing actors to draw upon external resources through the mobilization of support in, and/or the subordination of connected preexisting autonomous fields. This process generally takes place in a manner where it is reflected and resolved through the prism of the interplay of the respective rules of the game within each of these already well-established fields, proportionally to their degree of relative autonomy. This dependence opens the door for the path dependency aspect to influence the outcome on the political field level. The actors that have a higher ability to either dominate those fields, or leverage the support of the dominant actors within them, are granted access to the

various forms of capital that they hold, in addition to symbolic capital acquired through that very domination of another field, bolstering their credentials as significant and skilled actors. This, in turn, grants further support to the narrative of legitimacy that they assert as a basis upon which to ground the political field, as its sociodicy, and then grants them an opportunity to design and impose their rules upon it. This capacity to mobilize support across the social space is particularly applicable when the newly emerging field in question happens to be the political field, wherein the central issue that actors compete over is that of the legitimate social order; and where the endogenous form of capital is, in one way or the other, tied to their capacity to mobilize support across the social space for their visions of said order.

In both the Tunisian and Moroccan cases, national liberation struggle symbolic capital has started as the dominant form of capital that served in situating actors within the nascent political field, and the fluid social space that resulted from the vacuum left behind by the French withdrawal⁹². On the other hand, previous association with the colonial administration turned into a negative factor that all but eliminated its holders' eligibility for inclusion. Legitimate political activity was viewed as a privilege earned by those viewed as having participated in the fight for independence in one form or the other and denied to those who were accused of having collaborated with the protectorate in one way form or the other. Aside from that eliminating factor, the proto-field's

⁹² At the official level at least, and mostly a symbolical withdrawal, as the French state maintained a military and bureaucratic presence in both countries during that phase. Economic influence remained very significant as well.

boundary remained relatively fluid and porous during these early stages, and their size fluid and relatively large.

As events unfolded, a number of struggles took place both within the nascent political field among the competing actors and inside the various organized actors as well, amongst their different factions and sub-organizations. Simultaneously, a number of seemingly separate struggles unfolding at superficially disparate levels were actually articulated, interconnected, and feeding into one another in ways that paid little care to the geographic or hierarchic organization supposed to shape the way in which they unfold. In Tunisia, the internal ND struggles, the relations between Habib Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef, their distinct alliances with actors outside the party, and the relative positioning of a variety of actors within the wider social space all intersected and contributed to shaping the result and laying the foundations of the shape to be taken by the country's political field for decades to come. Similarly, in Morocco, the struggles unfolding within the PI, the PI's forceful attempt at hegemony, along with the reactions it triggered directly or indirectly, and how these related to the preferences and interests of various other actors, including the monarchy, played a similarly crucial role in that foundational moment.

Analyzed comparatively through the prism of BFT, in both cases, the foundational struggles showed a high degree of homology and similarity at the unfolding processes level. First, the struggle over the legitimacy which related to the roles played by the actors in question as part of the national liberation struggle was, *ceteris paribus*, the most central element fought over in the early phases. Not unlike the more traditional Marxian conception of capital and its origins in primitive accumulation, or more

specifically, David Harvey's "accumulation by dispossession" idea, the central dynamic of that early period was one of a struggle for accumulation and for the laying of the foundation that would ensure the perpetuation of the gains of the dominant actors. These processes of accumulation are also related to the necessities associated with the emergence of the independent State, and its role as a central bank of sorts for forms of capital, and its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and symbolic violence.

Therefore, the struggle opposed a number of actors that each carried a different narrative that they tried to impose as the central foundational myth of the newly independent nation and the sociodicy on which the political field would be based, which in turn would allow them to shape the rules of the political game, and its position within the larger social space, and in relation to the other organized social spaces. Both the Moroccan PI and the Tunisian ND shared a homologous will to assert a narrative that placed the future political field under their hegemonic domination in a way that would have made each of their respective party's institutionalized forms of political capital a dominant currency within the country's political field. For the two national liberation parties, the main goal of this hegemony was to be able to implement modernization and independence reinforcement programs, though there was much variation in what that meant from one prominent actor to the next.

This was challenged in both cases by the actors that were previously well situated within the protectorate's meta-field of power, and that rightly viewed the two parties' hegemonic tendencies as threats to their ability to maintain their social positions. Though many were to some extent compromised in some form by association with the

protectorate, only a few were irredeemably compromised, and even then, they could provide discrete support to other actors.

The fluid and changing positions of the actors in relation to each other were, in a way, the scaffolding supporting and shaping the field as it began taking form and its boundaries along with the evolution of the early struggles. At the objective level, there was a homology in the distribution of actors and positions, and the different alliances between them in the two countries at the onset of the emergence process, after the French political withdrawal⁹³. The struggle at the objective level was centered on the marshaling of various forms of capital by each of the main actors, be they individuals or collective, and their deployment of those resources in a way that would enhance their ability to shape the outcomes in ways that they deemed favorable to their interests.

At the symbolic level, the scaffolding consisted of the various competing narratives and discourses championed by the different actors. The symbolic level is not disconnected from the material one; however, as the latter constrains the former and vice-versa. Thus, the closer a narrative was to a widely known and accepted as a factual version of reality, the more compelling it was for the broader population, and the more politically powerful it could become. Access to the material means through which a narrative can be widely distributed and reinforced was another crucial way in which that meaning-making work was connected to the objective level factors above. A coherent narrative backed by significant objective supports could then establish itself as a central

⁹³ In the case of Tunisia, as we have seen, that precedes the actual independence, and began earlier than it did in Morocco, as soon as the Autonomy agreements came into force.

sociodicy of the political field, which in turn had substantial implications in that it would serve as a significant constraint on the evolution of the objective dimensions of the field from then on. The sociodicy can remain contested by relatively autonomous sections of the political field at first, and it is not irreversible, but the longer it lasts, the more commonsensical and natural it starts to appear. As that takes place, the dominant actor(s) behind it starts to reap increasing dividends in terms of symbolic and political capital over time, at the expense of the others, whose symbolic capital stops growing and ultimately starts eroding.

Not all of the proposed sociodicies are necessarily aimed at, or centered on, improving the position or general autonomy of the field that they contend to serve as a foundation for. In fact, a large number of the proposed sociodicies were, to varying degrees, trying to ensure that the political field would be tied to another field and subsumed to its interests. This was especially true of those advanced by the better-endowed actors. This was the case with both the PI and the ND since the onset. For the monarchies, the original approach was to champion the idea of pluralism, which allowed them to align with a broad coalition of actors that opposed the hegemonic aims of the strongest one.

The events in Tunisia began unfolding at an earlier date than they did in Morocco, which affected the way in which actors made their plans in the latter. This non-independence of the two cases is significant at that period and played a role in making the Moroccan monarchy warier of making concessions to the PI or the concept of a sovereign Constitutional Assembly. It also made it take a more leading and active role in the struggle. While the monarchy in Tunisia tried to maintain an appearance of

neutrality and pinned its hopes mainly on the Youssefist faction gaining control of the ND and shaping the field in a way that would safeguard its interest; the Moroccan monarchy took a more prominent and active role in the process, federating various interest groups and constituencies against the PI's hegemonic prospects, and actively playing on the party's internal divisions in order to weaken and ultimately induce schisms within it.

Thus, autonomy and heteronomy levels were central and contested aspects within the process of political field emergence in these two cases. Analyzed from that perspective, it appears that in the foundational phase, in both Morocco and Tunisia, the main actors all were aiming for a more or less relatively autonomous field that would have clear rules and logics, centered on and enforced through a number of formal institutions at the objective level. Symbolically, they also generally shared a number of common discursive frames, as reflected in their narratives, which all appealed to ideas such as national sovereignty, progress/modernity, and democracy. Differences come to the fore when digging into how these terms were conceptualized by each actor, and they will emerge later on as central elements of their struggles as the contention processes unfold. Some differences existed from the onset, however, but they were mostly emerging and unfolding as internal struggles within the main political parties, with inputs/nudging from external actors. Conceptual and ideological differences notwithstanding, there was a general agreement over the nascent political fields' autonomy at the onset.

On the other hand, positions were more markedly different regarding the heteronomy of the political field. The main difference was not so much over the idea of

the field being heteronomous in itself, as much as it was about the direction of that heteronomy. At the objective level, the main dominant actors all tried, to varying degrees, to make the political field and its rules pliant to their hegemonic aims. In practice, this meant that they favored having its rules be easily alterable to their favor when needed. That entailed, in one way or the other, a heteronomisation of the field in relation to the rules and interests of another field, be it the monarchic field, the internal field of the party, the religious field, or the bureaucratic one. At the symbolic level, that process expressed itself in the grounding given to the various narratives advanced by the actors, who would draw upon a mixture of values and symbols to construct a narrative that better fits their agenda. The legitimation of these claims was one of the significant stakes at play in the definitional struggle that had the main actors laying exclusive claims at their role in bringing about national independence, in an attempt to accumulate the symbolic credit that is required to bolster and ultimately impose their narratives. Another dimension of the struggle was over national identity, its symbols and values, and how to maintain it and assert it in a way that is free of non-authentic influences inherited from the protectorate period.

At the same time, as the struggles over each of the two countries' political fields' foundations unfolded, there was a slow emergence of a number of new categories of actors and positions within the field. The positioning of actors, both individual and collective ones, coincided with their endowments in terms of capital, and for the individual ones, that was also tied to their personal habitus. In both Morocco and Tunisia, there was the category of "National movement" actors, which served as an umbrella including a diverse array of actors with different and often multiple

organizational affiliations that affected their positioning within the movement and the broader political field, and shaped their affinities, especially when it successfully fit with their personal habitus. The habitus was tied to both the class background and the trajectories of the actors, prominent or otherwise, and it was to a large extent similar in both countries, as they had a large number of categorical pre-colonial similarities in the social structure and shared into a similar experience under the French Protectorate regime. The national movement figures were also similar in their educational background and had for an extended period very similar national liberation struggles, as illustrated by their creation of a common Arab Maghreb Bureau in Cairo that served as a base in exile from which to plan their struggles for independence, and where many prominent figures spent some years, often meeting and interacting with each other. Inside the two countries, and at the more rank-and-file level of the national movement organizations, as well as the mid-level, the membership was often expanding through pre-existing social networks, which were generally tied to a number of similarities at the personal habitus level. For instance, at the medium cadres level, students of the Sadiki College or the Zeytouna in Tunisia, or those of Al Qarawyin or Youssoufia in Morocco, came into the independence struggle through similar mechanisms and channels of recruitment. The same could be applied to the individuals joining the armed resistance in both countries, who tended to come from rural and lower-class origins, as well as newly urbanized rural origin individuals; all were often recruited through networks of kinship or regional affinities. The connections played a role also outside of the National movements, for instance, in shaping the affinities and connections that developed within the monarchic fields and across the rest of society, be it in support of or in opposition to

the hegemonic aims. For instance, the ability of the Moroccan monarchy to successfully mobilize the country's rural notabilities in many areas against the early attempts of the PI at controlling the regions through the positions that its members held within the state's administrative apparatus, was in no small part due to the traditional sort of habitus traits and understandings of the social that they shared. Needless to say, the role of habitus in these matters is in no way determinant or inflexible; instead, it works more in shaping the odds of an actor in making sense of the stakes and rules of a given field, a sense of the game, and how it is to be played.

These personal level factors, along with the more social and structural commonalities in terms of endogenous processes and exogenous impacts, favored the emergence of homologies and outright similarities between the two nascent national social spaces and political fields. Though not meant as an accurate picture, the schematic display in figure 1 offers a perspective on the size of collective actors along with a characterization of the various types of actors and their relative positions in terms of their average endowments of economic capital (CE) and cultural capital (CC).




Figure 1 Schematic display of The National Movement composition (the +/- sign indicates higher/lower levels of the specific capital)

The aforementioned homology and similarities in terms of positioning and struggles were not limited to the political field *per se*. It was also reflected within other fields, be they those internally composing and/or embedded within the various collective actors or those based upon more interpersonal individual dynamics extending across and into a variety of fields, despite their apparent separation and distance in symbolic and objective terms from the central definitional struggles unfolding at the national level.

The variable importance of Spatio-temporal factors in these struggles is better understood when assessed from a topological perspective. Spatiotemporal factors and distances can be squeezed and expanded as different actors deploy their powers. For instance, a rebellion in the eastern parts of Morocco, or events in the south of Tunisia, or even outside the territorial boundaries of each country, were often more present and central to the field than activities occurring right in each of the two countries' capitals. Similarly, events that unfolded at a temporal distance were often "closer" to the unfolding struggle than some of its less critical, actively unfolding aspects.

The new struggles and fields do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they are built onto a preexisting relational map shaped by the power deployment and accumulation that is needed to enforce and maintain previously established domination and resource distribution arrangements, whatever their nature may be. These sorts of dynamically evolving setups play an important role in constraining and shaping the strategic options available to actors at different levels. At the habitus level, the positions that result from the previous accumulation of struggles and their resulting arrangements are reflected in the various early socialization mechanisms and class-related predispositions of the actors. Second, the distribution of capitals and their reproduction being embedded in the rules of their respective fields, it shapes how much of an advantage or handicap future actors have to contend with in trying to modify or maintain the arrangements in which they are embedded. Finally, the differential exchange rates of the various forms of capital, along with their negotiability and their distribution within the fields, also play a significant role in constraining and shaping the options available to actors at a later point in time.

Last but not least, there comes the contentious process through which the political field's specific form of capital, Political capital, emerges along with, and through the unfolding of the foundational struggles associated with the field's emergence. As indicated above, symbolic capital associated with participation in the national struggles for independence was one of the central stakes of the struggle's early phases. At the same time, as the struggle was unfolding, there was, in both cases, a sort of primitive accumulation stage, via dispossession. In that stage, the main hegemonic collective actors all laid claims to the symbolic capital that was held by smaller actors, be they included and/or aligned with them or not, whether they went along with it willingly or not. Inconvenient and or recalcitrant elements that disagreed with that process or were hard to fit within it were effectively pushed out, and their worth was attacked. For instance, in the case of the PI and the ND, the hegemonically minded mass parties, the process of accumulation by dispossession took place in remarkably similar ways, as both parties rebuilt narratives and asserted organizational claims that placed them at the helm and core of almost every act of resistance. The PI, for instance, asserted a relatively hard to support leadership claim vis-à-vis the armed resistance actions engaged in by the AL, especially that said leadership claims were not strong enough to convince most of the organization to surrender its weapons and suspend its activities after independence. Similarly, the ND tried, with some success, to lay claim to the symbolic capital of the Fellagha's and the UGTT's struggles, by asserting a leadership role over the two. Another form through which the same process unfolded was via the physical elimination and intimidation of competing organizations. Such was the case of the PI's campaign against the PDI and the armed urban resistance cells of the Black

Crescent organization, or the ND's attacks against the Old Destour and its prominent figures and allies.

As these processes of accumulation unfolded, the formation of political capital as a category, with a number of subtypes, started emerging, associated with the different "states" in which the new form of capital could be found. The two standard states of political capital identified by Bourdieu, namely "delegated" and "personalized", were the first categories to begin emerging and to acquire increasing circulation within the two countries' respective social spaces. Both parties managed to successfully accumulate a large amount of symbolic capital and expand their organizational apparatus throughout large swathes of the country, centralizing large amounts of social and economic capital in the process. The parties were also very successful at recruiting a large number of educated individuals, especially younger adults, who brought in significant amounts of cultural capital at the parties' disposition. Being a crucial and scarce resource for the management of any state's administrative and bureaucratic affairs, that latter form was also important in making groups with access to it gain symbolic capital, especially in contexts where illiteracy remained widespread. The second state that political capital took was a personalized form, tied during the emergence phase to the amount of symbolic capital that an individual could command, related either to the national liberation struggle or to the holding of a dominant position within another field or organization, officially or otherwise. As the national movement political parties accumulated symbolic and political capital in the institutionalized delegated form, it became increasingly personally institutionalized and/or embodied in those active within them, depending on their prominence.

Actors opposing the parties were also advancing an alternative version of what political capital should be made of, and what its value in relation to other fields should be. For the monarchy and its allies, especially in Morocco, political capital had to be within a subservient position in relation to royal favor. The latter could be conceptualized as a sort of social capital associated with the royal court field and the various rules through which closeness to the monarch was achieved, and his favors/blessings secured. Similarly, older elite families that generally lacked good nationalist credentials, and at times had a collaborationist history, offered their support and resources to the monarchy, which they maintained a common set of interests and old social ties with. In exchange for the safeguarding of their status against a threatening PI-dominated actively anticolonial state, elite families, as well as colonial interest groups, cast their lot with the monarchy as a dominant actor within the meta-field of power, and a relatively heteronomous political field in which exogenous forms of capital would have a more favorable exchange rate. Aside from the landed elites, a number of actors from rural and more impoverished areas aligned with the monarchy against what they viewed as a hegemonic and arrogant urbanite takeover and invasion of their previously highly autonomous regional political fields⁹⁴.

⁹⁴ As illustrated in the historical chapters, this sentiment was often compounded with a variety of ethnic/regionalist and familial rivalries. The ethnic dimension was more prominent in Morocco with the Arabist frames advanced by the PI being staunchly rejected in Berber majority areas, playing a significant role in the eruption of a number of violent episodes. In Tunisia, the rivalry was more pronounced in regional terms, especially in the Interior regions' resentment at the continuing dominance over national politics exercised by the Sahel regions.

Nevertheless, at these early stages of field emergence, as the field's sociodicy and the composition of political capital remained unsettled, the circulation and value of its various competing versions within the social space and other fields remained relatively low. Instead, political competition was mostly conducted by relying on other more basic forms of capital, namely, the symbolic, economic, social, and to some extent, cultural forms. Mobilization of support was done through the deployment of those resources in various ratios by the different actors. Depending on the field and context in which they were deployed, one form might be more efficient than another and more readily recognized and responded to by the targets of its deployment. For instance, in the early PI attempts at asserting control, the party and its cadres failed to succeed in outcompeting various regional notables who deployed their own resources, mostly social and symbolic, to ensure that the region's inhabitants would not align with the party against them, despite their objective interests in doing so.

2. Beyond the political field: Interfield relations and definitional struggles

a. Other national actors and Fields

Across the post-independence social space, the definitional struggle taking place over the emergence of the new political field was having many reverberations. Actors in other fields have an interest in ensuring their autonomy and privileges vis-à-vis the new field and its core actors. These actors were not too different in the two cases at hand, but their distribution of power and their willingness to jump into the fray and strongly assert

their views differed to some extent. The ND and the PI were both central and massive actors at that point in time, as both had significant resources that dwarfed those available to their rivals. In both cases, other actors had to situate themselves vis-à-vis the divisions and struggles unfolding inside the heterogeneous dominant organizations. As a degree of independence was achieved, internal factional divisions within the parties began to gain in salience.

In the case of Tunisia, the main issue was over the Autonomy Agreements, the gradual negotiated approach advocated by Habib Bourguiba and his allies, which was opposed by Salah Ben Youssef. The latter, as Secretary-General and significant organizer, enjoyed sizeable support within the party's rank and file, was also advocating a more traditional conception of the independent state. The sociodicy he advocated was more compatible with the values and interests of more traditional elite groups, and those who felt alienated and unrepresented by Bourguiba's project. Thus, the group quickly secured the support of a number of actors that aligned with those views, among them the Beylical monarchy, and the older Destourians, the religious students, the UGAT agricultural union, and the armed resistance *Fellagha* groups. Ben Youssef also managed to retain control, thanks to his personal role in the organization of the party structures and leadership during the years of Bourguiba's absence, of a number of provincial party cells and its newspapers.

The Moroccan case, beginning a few years after the events in Tunisia, was nevertheless presenting significant homologies in positioning, even if a number of actors had better strategies, potentially informed by the events in Tunisia. Thus, the ND

split had its equivalent in the PI split between Allal el-Fassi and Mehdi Ben Barka. The latter had a significant role in managing and organizing the party's structures during the protectorate period and after, and on that level was similar to Ben Youssef. However, the two were not that similar in terms of values and views. Despite a common preference for a more complete and quicker "true" independence from France, Ben Barka represented the modernist and socialist-leaning wing of the PI, a significant contrast with his Tunisian 'organizer' equivalent. Allal el-Fassi, despite a positional similarity in the PI field with Bourguiba, differed significantly from him in terms of his views and conceptions of independence and the state. The PI was also less dominant across the Moroccan social space as the ND was in Tunisia, and so a number of actors remained outside of its influence and were available for mobilization by the more proactive Moroccan monarchy. Instead of placing its bets on one side or the other of the PI internal struggles, as the Tunisian monarchy did, the Moroccan palace used its symbolic power to prop up and organize the disparate actors into a significant alternative to the PI. At the same time, it also used its control over appointments to positions within the state apparatus to increase the discord and strife amongst the PI factions.

b. External Actors and their influence

In both cases, however, French support played a significant role in shaping the outcome of the struggles. The influence of the former colonial power remained significant within the countries, both at the economic level and within the state administration structure. During the Autonomy Agreement period in Tunisia, the French

maintained control over the security apparatus of the Tunisian state, despite the ND dominating the government. This proved to be a significant factor in how the ND schism unfolded, with the decision by the security apparatus to intervene against the *Fellagha* groups while maintaining neutrality in relation to the less than legal operations conducted by Bourguiba's faction. The decision may have been in part forced upon them by the armed groups associating with the Algerian resistance and their attacks on French positions within the Tunisian territory.

In Morocco as well, the French maintained a significant presence within the state administration due to the lack of qualified Moroccan staff. They also had a significant influence over the security apparatus, especially the newly-created FAR, which was primarily staffed with Moroccan officers having served within the French and Spanish armies, along with more traditional influence roles such as military advisors and military equipment provision. Similarly, the events in Algeria and the deep ties between the ALN and the Algerian resistance, of which a high number of cells refused to end their activities until Algeria achieved its independence as well. . Another factor to consider in the Moroccan case was the presence of US military bases that were increasing in importance in a cold war context. The position of the PI in opposition to the presence of foreign military bases and interests was problematic in that regard. It was even more of a problem when the left-wing of the party and its socialist-leaning positions, and non-aligned movement involvement were taken into consideration⁹⁵.

⁹⁵ The left wing of the party, especially during the Abdallah Ibrahim government days, managed to somewhat succeed in gaining the support of Mohamed V for some of these positions, which alarmed

Finally, and of specific relevance to Morocco, the events occurring in Tunisia during the Autonomy Agreements period played a role in shaping the decision-making processes of Moroccan actors. By the time both countries officially regained their independence, the ND had already had experience governing the country and allies inside the state apparatus; moreover, the Bourguiba faction had already succeeded in dominating the party and was slowly but surely solidifying its control over the political field, irremediably sidelining the ailing Husseinid monarchy.

c. Boundary formation and Flows of capital

As the struggles began settling down in each country's political field, their boundaries increased in prominence and began solidifying, acquiring a certain degree of directionality in their permeability. In both countries, this was tied to the dominant discourse and narrative that managed to establish themselves as foundational to the political field. Common ones were the ideas of an Arabo-Islamic identity, with a degree of national specificities, tied to a strict conception of national unity and suspicion towards potentially divisive conceptions. These narratives had their root in the struggle for independence as they were championed by all the main actors as a central mobilizing frame against the protectorate. Thus, in both countries, demands framed around ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or regional specificities were barely tolerated within the political field, if not outright forbidden. This meant that actors who had ideas that were not necessarily fitting those criteria had to deploy more resources and efforts to many of the country's western allies, and may have motivated their more active support for then-prince Hassan and his more antagonistic position towards the PI and its plans for the Moroccan state.

frame their goals and programs in ways that would be acceptable within the field. At that point, this applied to all actors, even those that emerged victorious from the foundational struggle and dominated the field. For instance, Bourguiba's plans for the modernization of Tunisia and for the preservation of its independence vis-à-vis the larger players on the regional field had elements that were somewhat incompatible with the Arabo-Islamic conception hitherto dominant within the country, and it took him a lot of capital accumulation, investments and struggles all across the social space to construct and enact his program in a palatable fashion. Similarly, in both Morocco and Tunisia, the main actors all tried to define the boundary in a way that would empower them and ensure the safety of their position. The Monarchy and the Political parties in Morocco both made sure to defuse the legitimacy traditionally held by the religious field's native actors, the Ulemas. In terms of capital, this was done both through erosion and dispossession. The PI had a number of people with significant religious capital within its ranks, and the monarchy had its *sharif* lineage and traditional imam role. At the same time, both actors agreed on excluding the ulema as a category in itself from participation within the political field, and attacked their legitimacy as political actors; similarly, they also decided on keeping the religious field very distant from, and subservient to, the newly emerging assemblage of fields making the newly independent state. The same dynamic unfolded in Tunisia, where Bourguiba made sure to do the same in relation to both the religious field and the Monarchy. Modernist and secularizing views notwithstanding, he made sure to perform the acts traditionally associated with a religious leader and historically performed by the Bey.

At the same time, another homology is perceivable in regards to the attempts by the victorious actors to officially establish the dominance of their field within the state assemblage, and in the process to codify a heteronomous dependence of the political field to their field of origin. For instance, as Bourguiba emerged victorious in the struggle for control of the ND, he began methodically institutionalizing rules that would ensure that the political field itself, and the issue of which actors were to be allowed within it, would be decided within by and within the ND party field. In Morocco, the victorious monarchy adopted a similar, though less direct approach. Early on, it asserted a power of decision over the shape and nature of the actors to be allowed within the field by imposing a multi-party structure on the PI, both legally and in practice, via the support and empowerment of other actors. This was accompanied by an assertion of monarchic supremacy in relation to the national liberation related symbolic capital⁹⁶, through the imposition of acceptance the monarchic nature of the regime as a sine-qua-non condition for participation within the political field.

In both cases, achieving control over the political field, and the degree to which it was made heteronomous towards one field or the other, was a determinant step in shaping the mold that the State and its institutions would evolve and slowly solidify along. The shape of that mold was not in any sense predetermined, and it emerged

⁹⁶ Accompanied, in large part, by a slow but steady methodical process of eroding the claims to symbolic capital held by the national movement actors. The change of the officially celebrated Independence Day to fit the date in which the King returned from exile to an already independent country is a fitting illustration of that process.

historically through the complex interplay and competition that pitted a number of different actors in each country.

In the next part, this dissertation will build upon the above and expand the analysis to trace the evolution of the state, assessing the foundational mold's "solidity" or lack thereof, through an analysis of the effects that a variety of emergent endogenous and exogenous developments have on it.

Part III: Transformations

Chapter 4: The Era of Personalized Rule

This chapter analyzes and compares the developments that characterized the period that followed the sudden collapse of the relatively autonomous political and party fields of early the post-independence years in Morocco under Hassan II. This unexpected development was accompanied by the emergence of social connections to the ruler as the most dominant and valuable form of capital within the social space. The following chapter will uncover and compare the mechanisms through which this transformation took place, and trace the processes that led to the displacement of political capital into the outskirts of the national political field and its general devaluation within the field of power.

1. Collapse and Personalization: The Shrinking Political Field

The State of exception's aftermath was characterized by a suspension of the "normal" rules of the political field as a whole. The parliament was disbanded, and the country went on to a phase of personal rule, where political capital and the political field

as a whole became dependent on the palace to a total extent. Positions in the state administration, or any non-opposition organizations, were granted in accordance with closeness and loyalty to the palace. Political affiliation with the nationalist movement's parties became a cause for repression in all fields. Seizures of party newspapers, arrests, and disappearances were some of the common forms of repression targeted at the parties and their allies during that phase.

A symbol of the repression that faced the national movement parties during that phase is the disappearance of Mehdi Ben Barka. The UNFP leader was kidnapped in Paris in mysterious circumstances, never to be heard of again. The Ben Barka affair is yet to be clearly resolved and has been under investigation since then, with some clear suspicions connecting it to the Moroccan security services⁹⁷. The loss of Ben Barka was a big hit to the UNFP as an organization. Not only was he one of the principal organizational figures within it, but he also was a significant ideologue whose writings appealed to the youth wings, and he had developed a significant international support network through his involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Tricontinental.

French Diplomatic reports from that period note the reactions of the various relevant actors to the UNFP leader's disappearance. The first thing they note is the efforts deployed by the government to control the narrative. Contrasting it with the relative freedom that the press was enjoying only a few months ago, the ambassador notes the strict censorship applied to both Moroccan and international papers that took a

⁹⁷ Talk about the benbarka theories and some sources for more details about the affair

position that disagreed with, or cast doubt on, the official narrative of the events championed by the government (Vaisse and Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères 2004, n. 348). The censorship was not only limited to the opposition newspapers, but it also targeted other publications if they gave too much coverage to the event. The affair would later negatively impact the relations with France, as a dispute over the warrants incriminating Oufkir and Dlimi led to the recall of the French ambassador to the country.

The significance of the disappearance was highlighted by the reactions within the national movement. The UNFP, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was somewhat supportive of the State of exception declaration, as it had assumed that it was a first step towards the reformulation of a new constitution that would be more in tune with its interests and values. That was in part due to the openings that the palace made towards the opposition forces in the lead-up to the declaration when it was exploring the national unity government option. The UNFP had assumed that the failure convinced the palace to conduct a constitutional reform to entice the party into participation in the government. The disappearance of Ben Barka was the ultimate wake up call. It made it clear that the direction the monarchy was heading towards was not going to be favorable to the political field and its actors. The UNFP, along with the UMT and the UNEM, all issued strong statements condemning the disappearance soon after it happened. The statements were soon followed by labor and student strikes.

Thus, in combination with the repression that was aimed at the opposition political actors, the State was also adopting a strategy that reflected the lessons it had learned from the student riots, and also targeting various politicized fields. The field of

education, with its students' unions and generally opposition supporting faculty and staff, was one such politicized field. By politicized, it is meant that political capital, and the symbolic capital earned through oppositional activities within the political field, had a substantial purchase within the field of education. In universities as well as high school, the UNFP, especially the Ben Barka faction, was the dominant force, and even those more conservative-minded actors tended to identify with the more oppositional currents of the PI.

In a speech on December 17th, 1965, the king announced the instauration of mandatory military service for some categories of youths. It would, later on, be complemented by a civil service option within the state administrations ("Chronologie Intérieure" 1966). Rather than being aimed at increasing the numbers of military or administrative personnel available to the country, this move was more aimed at curbing the influence and the reach that the opposition actors, particularly the UNFP, maintained within the schools and universities and with urban youths in general. These groups, even without any careful planning and mobilization, had shown that they could present a significant threat to the monarchy through riots, as well as on the discursive and symbolic levels, where many were rejecting the traditional values and practices that the monarchy was drawing its symbolic power from. A more practical effect that of the instauration of military service was on display during the 11th UNEM congress of 1966, when all of the student union's leadership, including the president and most members of the executive committee, were unable to attend as they had been called up for their military service (Le Tourneau 1967, 241). As a result, the congress had to spend time

electing a new set of leaders, in addition to discussing the pressing issues of responding to the educational policy reforms planned by the government, and the reiteration of their opposition to the repressive policies of the State and insistence on the clarification of the Ben Barka affair (Adam 1967, 327–28). Spaces of mobilization were targeted as well, with a number of both high schools and universities being shut down at different points in reaction to students' political activities, with the Rabat university campus being invaded by the police forces⁹⁸, and its inhabitants evicted under the premise that they were "a minority of students terrorizing their comrades and imposing anarchy and disorder" (Adam 1967, 327). As for the symbolic side of the issue, on December 26th, 1966, the government announced its decision to make prayers and religious education mandatory in the national education system (Le Tourneau 1967, 254). That decision was explicitly justified by the king as a step aimed at countering the "contempt" towards the teachings of Islam amongst the youth (Adam 1967, 328).

Since the proclamation of the State of exception, the ability to express political opinions, which translates into participation in the political field, was increasingly curtailed and limited for political actors of all types. The expression of political opinions that defied or criticized the monarchy's positions, on issues relating to the organization of the political game and its rules, was often met with repression and censorship. For instance, the UNFP's principal Arabic language daily newspaper was forced into suspension throughout most of 1966, along with a reduction in the general number of

⁹⁸ It is important to take into account that until then the police was not allowed on university campuses.

newspapers published prior to 1965, and in the diversity and strength of the critiques expressed through them, a result of increasing self-censorship facilitating the official censors' tasks (Souriaux 1967, 845).

In other words, this indicated that a number of actors, be they political parties or others, who had until then the ability and legitimacy to promote competing and alternative political projects were stripped of that right. The new normal was that the political field became a much smaller field with limited positions, and its center was the palace, the monarchic field, instead of the then suspended parliament. The political field's boundaries, along with the heteronomization that it experienced retracted in absolute terms as the number of positions and actors allowed to participate within it. Actors who did not have royal favor were not allowed inside the field. As such, the political field, in so far as it is conceptualized as the field revolving around the acquisition of political capital, had been dismantled. Its replacement since 1966 was a mostly heteronomous, small size field, where the actors' positions are structured according to the amount of royal favor that they held. That meant that positions within this field were only reflections of the actors' positions within the monarchic field. At the symbolic level as well, the curtailing of the access that political actors had to spread their discourse and voice their political opinions was also taken away. Oppositional political discourse was being actively censored and repressed throughout the social space, and as such, its spread became limited to only a few organized social spaces.

King Hassan II, who headed the new government of 1965, took advantage of the forced silence of political actors to conduct several initiatives at the economic and social

levels. Ruling in a very personalistic fashion through the usage of royal decrees, he expedited the agrarian reform in a manner that was quite different from the one proposed by the national movement actors a few years ago. Instead, the reform was mostly used as a way of strengthening and rewarding local level notabilities that were loyal to the monarchy (Le Tourneau 1966). A modernization of the structures within the rural heartland of the country being a clear threat to the networks that isolate it from opposition influence, the redistribution of agrarian land to local notables was aimed at reinforcing and perpetuating that protective system.

The security services, especially the army, were increasingly involved in this new monarchy dominated political field. With the appointments of several military officers to government positions, the king was noticeably relying on the army as an important actor within the government. Military capital, coupled with royal favor, was a winning combination that allowed its holders to gain influence over state affairs. The alleged personal involvement of both Oufkir and Dlimi in the Ben Barka affair, along with the king increasingly resorting to the army and security forces to deal with challenges, is evidence of the increasingly deep dependence and trust he placed in them. As a matter of fact, the obligatory military service was a delegation to the military to resolve youth issues, be they the instillation of 'patriotic' values and discipline, or the mitigation of youth unemployment rates.

Meanwhile, the national movement was as divided as always in those years and at its weakest historical position yet. The combination of repression and suspension of the political field had, in some way, been so radical a development that the opposition

actors found themselves unprepared and unable to issue a coordinated response. The UNFP, which was the main target of repression from the State, was also paralyzed by a number of internal issues. The party's foremost leaders were Abderrahim Bouabid, Abdallah Ibrahim, and Mahjoub Benseddik, who was still leading the UMT as well. The trio officially formed the party's new political bureau starting from early August 1967. Ibrahim and Benseddik⁹⁹ represented the syndicalist wing. Bouabid, along with allies such as Omar Benjelloun¹⁰⁰, were increasingly critical of the positions adopted by the UMT, and especially Benseddik. Many observers noted the cold reaction of the union and its newspapers to the disappearance of Ben Barka, a reaction that was not lost on other UNFP factions, as was reported by French diplomats after a meeting with Bouabid (Vaïsse and Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères 2004, n. 348).

Omar Benjelloun was an interesting actor within both the party and the union fields in that period. He was closely allied with Abderrahim Bouabid and Ben Barka before his disappearance. He was a firm supporter of their positions regarding the prioritization

⁹⁹ It must be noted that this appointment came after the arrest of Mahjoub Benseddik in July 1967 following his open letter criticizing Zionist influence on the state. More details on this affair can be found in the following pages.

¹⁰⁰ Born in 1936 in the eastern city of Oujda, Benjelloun graduated and went on to pursue his studies in France in 1957, where he was involved in the Maghrebi and Moroccan student movement. He returned to Morocco in 1960, and started working in the Postal service, where he became very involved in labor unionism, and later headed the postal union. He was also a leading figure within the UNFP and UNEM, and held progressist views that were close to those of Mehdi Ben Barka.

of the party and the political field struggles over those of the labor movement and its sectorial demands. Benjelloun was also a very dynamic and active cadre within the UNFP, the UMT, and the UNEM. Within each of these organizations, he was often voicing opinions and critiques similar to those of Ben Barka in their severity and content. Omar Benjelloun's critiques of the UMT leadership have often put him in harm's way, as he was kidnapped and tortured by a group allegedly associated with Benseddik in January 1963. His relations with Abdallah Ibrahim were not good either, as he was viewed him as a naïve ideological façade for the UMT¹⁰¹. His positions were always critical of the strategy adopted by Benseddik, whose presence within the UNFP's bureau, along with his allies, was granting him a quasi-veto power over the positions adopted by the party; while at the same time, he was working ruthlessly towards purging any party members within the UMT if they were deemed to prioritize the party's interests over the union's. Benjelloun was also jailed, tortured, and sentenced to death in relation to the 1963 plot against the monarchy¹⁰², and was only released later in 1964 along with other UNFP members.

The UNFP was thus paralyzed at the onset of the State of exception on many levels. At the internal decision-making level, the inability to take strong positions due to the differing approaches favored by each party, and organizationally, given the repression

¹⁰¹ Their tense relation might have also had to do with the differences of habitus between the two figures, as they belonged to two different generations (Daoud 2018, 280).

¹⁰² See previous chapter for details on the 1963 plot.

targeting the party's members and allies made the organization turn inward in a way. The principal statements made by the party focused on the Ben Barka affair and its developments. The interdiction of the party's newspapers further complicated the situation, as it curtailed the UNFP's ability to inform and potentially maintain its constituency mobilized. It was not until late April 1967 that the party was able to start publishing a new paper (Le Tourneau 1968, 307).

The UMT, even with the dual membership of a number of its leaders within the UNFP, was nevertheless less targeted by the State. The union was permitted to keep its press organs, publishing articles that focused mostly on labor issues, and insisting on the independence of the organization from the party. It was not facing as systematic a repression campaign as its partisan allies. The principal clash that the union had with the State in these years was more affected by external factors, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict and the "Six days war". In 1967, there were several strikes and riots in many Moroccan cities, targeting Zionist and American interests after the onset of the war. A series of strikes in the chemical industry sectors, which was supported by a general strike call from the UMT on May 5th, led to the publication by Mahjoub Benseddik, after the onset of hostilities in the Middle East, of a strongly-worded open letter criticizing the government's reaction, and blaming it on "Zionist provocateurs", and on the "domination of Zionism over the nerve centers of decision-making within the state apparatus" (Published telegram by Mahjoub Ben Seddik as cited in Le Tourneau 1968, 308). The reaction of the authorities was swift, and Benseddik was arrested on July 8th and condemned to 18 months of jail-time. Both of the UMT and UNFP displayed their

support for Benseddik by maintaining him as head of the union and including him within the new political bureau of the party.

The other main national movement party, the PI, was also in a period of relatively reduced political activity. Its main focus was, since 1965, to call for the lifting of the State of exception and the restoration of the constitutional order. The party was still under the leadership of Allal El Fassi, who would be in convalescence for many months in 1967 following a car accident. In the meantime, the PI critiques of the monarchy were noticeably less radical than those expressed by the other opposition actors, and there were contacts between the palace and the party for eventual participation in the government, which was conditioned by the PI with a return to the constitutional order (Chambergeat 1966; Dalle 2004).

In an unlikely development during the State of exception years, a new opposition political party was allowed to exist by the monarchy officially. Viewed by many as the revival of the banned communist party (PCM), the *Parti de la Liberation et du Socialisme* (PLS) came into official existence in July 1968, headed by Ali Yata, and it was regrouping many figures from the older PCM. The party would soon after its creation face its share of the harsh repression that targeted opposition actors in that era.

Within the monarchic camp, the main actors were the PSD and the MP. However, both were in a dire situation, with an increase in the intensity of the issues that characterized them during the first parliamentary experience. The PSD was in a steady decline, being increasingly abandoned by the elites and notabilities that it had regrouped before, who were increasingly encouraged by the authorities to run without any partisan

affiliation. As for the MP, the divergence in opinions between its two leaders, Mahjoubi Aherdane and Abdelkrim Khatib, concerning the king's decision to declare the State of exception and suspend parliament, proved to be strong enough to lead to a schism in the party. As previously mentioned, following a statement by Aherdane supporting the State of exception, and its latter denouncement by Khatib, the rivalry between the two kept escalating. By January 1967, the schism became more concrete, with Khatib founding a new party, the *Mouvement Populaire Démocratique Constitutionnel* (MPDC). This new party, while royalist, positioned itself in opposition to the State of exception and called for a return to the constitutional order. It was a representative of the liberal monarchist tendency, whereas the old MP and Aherdane were closer to the securitarian wing and its figurehead, Gen. Mohammed Oufkir.

2. A limited reemergence of political capital? The 1966 Professional and Trade Chambers elections

The 1966 elections for the professional chamber provided a limited reopening of the political field. The elections, which occurred in general popular indifference, showed the increasing disillusion with the value of participation in the political game across the country (Chambergeat 1967, 99). They were nevertheless significant analytically in illustrating the surprising persistence that political capital maintained within a locked-down, narrow, and heteronomous political field. The participation in these elections was limited to professionals of various sectors such as agriculture and other businesses. In addition to the monarchist parties such as Aherdan's MP and the

PSD, the PI was also taking part in the elections¹⁰³. The significance of the elections was more symbolic than anything else. For the PI, the main aim was to show the monarchy that its political capital and symbolic capital substantial portfolio was still strong enough to allow it to gain positions even within a heteronomous political field where that form of capital was being undervalued when pitted against the monarchist actors. The need to show the ability to win seats and mobilize support was the principal aim of the PI, whereas the monarchy reportedly was not intent on countering that effort as it allowed it to present a democratic façade by having an opposition actor actively take part in the process (Chambergeat 1967).

In his analysis of those elections, Chambergeat (1967) identifies a number of mechanisms used by the State to control the game. Analyzing these mechanisms allows us to identify and trace the evolution of the different forms of capital deployed within the restricted and heteronomous political field of that period.

The core institution and actor within the field was undoubtedly the reinvigorated Interior Ministry, which by then was already a sort of super-ministry, uniquely endowed with powers and influence that reaches into all fields, at both the national and local levels (Rousset 1969). When intervening in the political field, the ministry of interior had access to an extensive toolset of both direct and indirect measures to influence and ultimately change the results if required, especially given its role in overseeing the

¹⁰³ Some UNFP candidates also ran and scored 6 seats, but the party in itself did not give much attention or put much efforts towards these elections, as it was still focused mostly on the Ben Barka Affair and the internal issues with the syndicalist wing.

electoral process (Chambergeat 1967, 101). The oversized role of the Interior as an institution displays a historical path dependency inherited from the protectorate administration's roles in territorial administration and the organization of elections. At the provincial administration level, the interior ministry mirrors in its organization and appointed local authorities the system of civilian controllers in place under the protectorate, with the elected communal assemblies and other local representative institutions being kept in the relatively weak position that was previously held by the protectorate era Makhzen apparatus. While arguing that the protectorate did not really have a robust electoral management tradition, as its experience in that field was mostly limited to the organization of the French colons' participation to metropolitan elections and for the council of Government; Chambergeat (1967, 101) still notes that the experience accumulated was transmitted through the inclusion of the Protectorate official previously responsible for elections under the as a consultant within the team in charge of organizing the country's first independent communal elections of 1959.

Thus, the Interior Ministry inherited and maintained a sort of project-oriented mentality and top-down, centralized approach to the management of elections. This role is especially more preponderant within the rural parts of the country, where high illiteracy rates and low political awareness, coupled with more practical aspects such as the control exercised by the ministry over communal agricultural lands, local infrastructure budgets, and the granting of agricultural loans (Rousset 1969, 97–99), further amplify the sway that it holds over local populations (Chambergeat 1967). It also has a more direct control over the electoral procedures, by controlling registrations on

the electoral lists¹⁰⁴ and on candidates' lists. Especially useful in the low literacy setting of rural areas, the lack of legal knowledge and political awareness reportedly granted the authorities a number of potential direct intervention strategies. For instance, some hopeful candidates would be denied their right through the non-issuance of a receipt, only to discover later on that they were never registered, while some unwilling local notables would have their candidacy registered without their consent (Chambergeat 1967, 103). In other areas, the intervention was done more subtly, for instance, through the loan facilitation promises, or through the prospect of granting/revoking various state-issued licenses¹⁰⁵; while at other times, the prospect of retaliatory administrative or financial measures would be impactful enough to make their actual usage unnecessary (Chambergeat 1967, 104). Additional tactics are available to the local authorities, for instance, through control over the voting bureaus and the ability to campaign. The latter allows the authorities to directly reject demands by opposition candidates for the holding of electoral rallies, and at other times to directly make it impossible for them to find anyone willing to rent them a space to hold their events (Chambergeat 1967, 105).

Though there were some legal procedures for parties to have observers in voting bureaus, or to engage in lawsuits in case of violations, their efficiency remained

¹⁰⁴ A required step for the reception of the voters' cards, which are necessary to cast one's vote. In practice, this can be used to exclude voters known to have the 'wrong' electoral preferences, or to keep deceased people included and cast their votes for the candidates favored by the authorities.

¹⁰⁵ Such as transportation agreements, allowing the operation of taxis or buses within and between cities, a notorious patronage mechanism in Morocco up to this day.

dependent on the goodwill of the administration given the lack of independence of the judiciary branch (Chambergeat 1967). The ability to mobilize the population in reaction to these abuses was quasi-inexistent in those days as well, given the increasing disinterest in whatever remained of the political field and the much higher costs to be faced for collective protest, in an era where even prominent political figures were not immune from the State's repression.

Hence, the PI's participation in the professional chambers' elections of 1966 took place in a context where most cards were in the hands of the State. The party was nevertheless able to score a significant and unexpected success in its electoral performance. Taking advantage of the infighting within the various avatars of the monarchist camp (PSD, MP, independents), and the fact that it was the only nationalist movement actor to take part in the elections actively, the PI managed to gain more than half of all seats (Chambergeat 1967, 99). For the trade and industry chambers, the PI was able to secure 48 seats, higher than any other organized political actors, with the MP gaining 21 and the PSD at seven seats¹⁰⁶ (Le Tourneau 1967, 254).

This demonstration of relevance by the PI was helped by its continued adoption of tactics that fit the illiterate nature of the electorate, such as the organization of group memorization sessions where its members and supporters would keep repeating the

¹⁰⁶ Independents or non-affiliated candidates, who are rarely linked to the opposition, managed to secure 55 seats.

names of their area's party candidate until they learned them by heart (Chambergeat 1967, 105).

The 1966 elections, despite their limited significance on both the institutional and participatory levels, remain analytically crucial in that they provide a snapshot of the State of the political field right after the proclamation of the State of exception. The shrinking of the political field is made apparent in the limited scope of participation and interest that was generated. The PI's participation is better understood in light of the secretive negotiations that the party was reportedly engaging in with the monarchy concerning a potential government participation (Chambergeat 1967, 100), with the elections' being mainly viewed as an occasion to demonstrate an electoral capacity that would reinforce the party's negotiating positions. Absent this factor, one could assume that the party may have preferred to remain in a more passive position similar to the rest of the opposition. The procedures of control over the registration of candidacies and issuance of voter cards also go in that sense, indicating that the boundaries of the political field in that period were less permeable to actors and voters who contested its current shape and setup.

Similarly, the ability of the state administration to shape the outcomes and distribution of positions within the field, through both direct and indirect interventions, upstream and downstream, is an indicator of the high level of heteronomy that the political field had towards the monarchy and the state apparatus that it controlled. Participation and positions within the political field in that period were still mostly determined by the actor's closeness to, and position within the monarchic field, which

correlated with the holding of royal favor and social connections to actors within the state apparatus, as can be seen in the success of a high number of non-affiliated individual candidates. The surprising success of the PI in these elections can be traced to several factors. First, comes the lack of efficiency on the part of the state administration and its compounding by the fragmentation and infighting within the monarchic camp's representatives in the political field¹⁰⁷, and the generally low political stakes of these specific elections; and to more situational factors like the unwillingness to radically antagonize the party with a heavy-handed intervention while it was engaged in talks with the palace over a potential return to the government. Nevertheless, and in a clear reminder of the State of the political field and political capital, the relevance of the PI score in terms of its translatability into an ability to pursue independent sociopolitical projects within the limited purview of the chambers was quasi-inexistent. It was a reminder of the field's heteronomy and of the control exercised over it by the monarchy through the state apparatus over all the lever of power.

¹⁰⁷ As noted by Chambergeat (1967), who remarked an increased difficulty in managing rival candidacies within the monarchic camp, and the transfers and reassignments of local state representatives who failed to back the right candidate (99-100).

3. Reshaping the social space: Islamisation and Arabisation of the

Educational system

The social space was beginning to show signs of change, reflecting the successful efforts by the monarchy at reshaping the foundational discourses and values prevalent within it. The principal and most noted evolution concerned the increasingly central role allotted to religious values within all fields. This trend, which began as early as 1966, was, at this point, primarily focused on the education field and the efforts aimed at reforming it. The themes of Arabisation and Islamisation of the educational system, long requested by many within the nationalist movement, be it out of conservatism or pan-Arabist populist tendencies, was adopted by the monarchy after 1966. It provided it with the perfect opportunity to reshape the values of the social space in a manner that would be, over the long run, conducive to a weakening of leftist ideologies and a reinvigoration of the traditionalist mental structures that sustain the symbolic power of the monarch constitutional claim to the title of “commander of the faithful”. The trend, which began with the introduction of compulsory Islamic education classes in the curriculum in 1966, was further confirmed in 1968 through the “Quranic Schools” campaign launched by Hassan II in a speech declaring that those who spend two years in the *msid*¹⁰⁸ would be prioritized for admission within Moroccan public school. The monarch went on to criticize members of the “upper social classes” and “political class” for schooling their children within the French mission system, threatening that they will

¹⁰⁸ Traditional neighborhood Quranic School, also referred to as *Kuttab*, where children were made to memorize the Quran through repetition.

not receive any special treatment and that their children would not be allowed in “his” schools unless they went through the *msid*, adding that his own children would be going to it as well¹⁰⁹.

In addition to the efforts made on the educational field in order to ensure the creation and maintenance of the “structuring structure” that is the national education system, through its central role in constructing an individual’s habitus, the monarchy was also active on other fronts to situate itself better as the rightful defender of Islamic values and traditions. As early as 1964, stricter enforcement of religious-related regulations was noted, exemplified in the enforcement of laws prohibiting public eating during the Ramadan fast (Le Tourneau 1966, 151). This religious turn taken by the state authorities was not the result of the police’s religious zeal; instead, it was decided by the king himself, if reports in the official *al Anba’* newspaper are to be believed (as cited in André 1966, 251).

The usage of religious symbols by Hassan II became more pronounced as well. Verses from the Quran or Hadiths were more frequently used in his speeches, as well as references to the religious role and importance of the *bay’a* or allegiance linking the throne to the population, claiming that transcends and precedes every other tie and modern sources of legitimacy. In parallel to that trend, the State was also more involved in the construction of mosques all around the country, as well as with the promotion of more folkloric forms of religiosity, by supporting the organization of local “*moussem*”

¹⁰⁹ Speech by Hassan II on October 9th, 1968

or festivals associated with various *zawyas*, shrines, and Sufi orders¹¹⁰ (Dupont 1971, 168).

The traditionalist wave was noticeable within the country's print media as well. In that context, Valensi (1990, 288) notes the increasing prominence given to the Hijri calendar when dating various commemorations, even relatively recent ones, at the expense of the hitherto unique references to the Gregorian calendar. Increasing media coverage and symbolic significance are also given to religious celebrations such as the *mawlid* festival or '*Eid el Adha*. These events served as an occasion for the monarch to reassert his role as *Amir al Muminin* and his claim to the religious capital that he embodies as a *Sharif*, or direct descendant of the prophet. In these occasions, official newspapers would publish genealogical trees of the royal family highlighting the connection to the prophet, and would report on the ceremonials associated with the event were the monarch would play the central role (Valensi 1990). The rituals of '*eid el Adha* would also generally highlight the dominant position of the monarch, both religiously and politically, as it became customary for citizens to wait until the king offered his sacrificial sheep before offering their own.

The national movement opposition, including the leftist factions, was also resorting to the usage of religious symbolism in its mobilisational efforts (Adam 1967; Le

¹¹⁰ The PI, which regarded the increased role of religion in public life as a generally positive development, was however opposed to these forms of folkloric religiosity, as it viewed them as decadent and inauthentic/misguided practices to be stamped out and replaced with a more orthodox form of religiosity.

Tourneau 1968; Marais and Waterbury 1969; Dupont 1971). The PI, through Allal el Fassi, was especially adept and competent at the deployment of religious symbolic capital in support of its political aims. The campaign that the party waged for the Arabisation and Islamisation of the national education system through its press organs illustrates well the resonance of that form of capital with its bases.

4. The 1969 Communal Elections

The announcement of a date for the communal elections was carefully awaited by many analysts at the time, as there was a degree of uncertainty concerning their organization within the context of the State of exception. Their organization, or lack thereof, was viewed as a signal of the future direction to be taken by the monarchy in shaping the political game. Prior to 1969, the King had already started talking about his plans for a return to constitutional order, through the drafting of a new modified constitution. The parties, especially those of the opposition, who had been demanding that very same thing since 1965, were slightly skeptical about the conditions in which such a development would occur and viewed the communal elections as a good opportunity to assess the monarchy's intentions regarding the political field. As was shown earlier, the political field since 1965 has been characterized by a lack of autonomy, with its rules being flouted regularly by the State, and a high degree of heteronomy vis-à-vis the monarchy/makhzen field.

The centrality of the monarchy and its power over the political field and its rules in that period was very well established. Nevertheless, many of the parties had expressed a hope that the 1969 elections would signal a change of direction towards a reopening of the field, a return to the pre-1965 setup, when political capital did have an important role within a relatively autonomous field whose rules were accepted by all players, including the monarchy. Throughout the first months of 1969, both national movement parties, the PI and the UNFP, voiced through their press organs their willingness to take part in the elections as long as these were fair and heralded a return to political “normalcy” (Gourdon 1973, 332). A similar position was voiced by the MP through a statement by his secretary-general.

This enthusiasm wore off quickly; however, as the opposition parties realized that the monarchy, through the ministry of interior, was intent on controlling the candidacies and outcomes of the elections. All the opposition actors, including unions, voiced their criticism, with the UNFP and the PI issuing a joint statement of condemnation. This was a noteworthy development as it signaled the beginning of a rapprochement between the two main opposition parties, even though they still disagreed on several points. For instance, while the UNFP boycotted the 1969 elections; the PI adopted a more ambiguous position, allowing some of its members to run on the electoral lists prepared by the state administration, even though the party’s official position was to not take part in the elections (Gourdon 1970, 333). This position, which the party justified by the need to allow citizens the freedom to support the fight for “freedom, democracy, and egalitarianism” with their votes or candidacies; was attributed by Gourdon (1970) to the

internal dynamics within the party, whose notabilities and bourgeois members were growing increasingly uncomfortable with the official party line and hoped for a more ‘participationist’ attitude to be adopted. The PI was also the only opposition actor to have the ability to voice its critiques of the situation through its daily newspapers, as the rest of the opposition was having its press organs banned or regularly seized. Thus the ability of the opposition to spread its discourse through the social space was severely limited, as the critical voice of the PI, which denounced the abuses of the authorities throughout the electoral campaign, was dwarfed by the much more numerous and louder media outlets controlled –directly or indirectly – by the monarchy and its agents, and had in all cases a minimal popular reach (Gourdon 1970, 335).

The elections were unsurprisingly won in majority by ‘independents’, notabilities, and other figures allied to the Makhzen in one way or the other. Their victory was a given, supported heavily by the State through the various methods of intervention perfected by the ministry of interior, and through the popular disinterestedness in a political consultation that they correctly understood to be mere procedural window-dressing. The significance of this episode lies in its irrelevance and the lack of impact that it had. The days when the political capital of the opposition was valuable enough for it to threaten the monarchy with revolutionary consequences in case of electoral fraud were visibly gone, and the monarchic domination of the social space was more strongly established. Relying on its control over the coercive powers of the State, the palace forced the political opposition actors into a silence that eroding the connections to the population that made their strength in the earlier period. At the same time, King

Hassan II was increasingly at the center of public attention, both through frequent media interventions and speeches to the nation and through a more assertive personal involvement in the country's foreign policy. The emotional value of foreign policy issues, such as that of the Palestinian cause in that period, made the king's high profile diplomatic forays at the regional and international level a source of increased symbolic capital within the national level political game. The irrelevance of political capital was further confirmed at the government level, where political affiliation was pushed into irrelevancy, with the king frequently changing ministers and often picking politically unaffiliated individuals to fill the positions. The government members generally displayed a mixture of cultural capital or technical capital, but the determinant factor for their tenure's longevity was primarily the monarch's confidence and favor. Their role was primarily a managerial one, with all decisions reportedly being taken by the monarch or requiring his personal approval before their enactment.

5. The Constitutionalization of Personal rule: Two Constitutions, Two Failed Coups.

By 1970, the demands for a return to constitutional order were on the surface accepted by the king, who then appointed a committee tasked with the preparation of a constitutional draft to be submitted to a popular referendum. Of course, that approach did not fit the demands of the opposition, as the UNFP insisted on the election of a

constitutional assembly to design the new draft, and the PI was more interested in a return to the 1962 setup with the holding of free and fair legislative elections. For the palace and the king, the principal goal was not as much to satisfy the opposition, which was kept under control, as it was to improve his own international stature through the suspension of a hard to sell elongated State of exception and lack of a democratic facade. Given the dominant position that he enjoyed, the king was able to gain the best of both worlds, on the one hand returning to a nominally 'democratic' constitutional monarchy, and on the other hand, making sure that the new constitutional setup reflects and legally enshrines his dominant personal position over the State and the political field.

Thus, with the 1970 constitution, the king was more firmly concentrating powers in his own hands, and at the same time, reserving a supra-constitutional status for him to transcend the limited constitutional restrictions in place, in case he deems it necessary to quell potential constitutional challenges by the opposition. This new setup was a reflection of the balance of power, or the distribution of different forms of capital throughout the social space, and their increasingly unchallenged accumulation by the monarchic in an institutionalized fashion through formal domination over the different organized fields in existence. Political parties, political capital, and the political field were shoved into an even lower position within the new field of power that the 1970 constitution was reorganizing.

The new parliament it established reflected this situation, as well as a weariness on the part of the monarchy towards any potential openings that could be exploited by the national movement actors in opposing the monarchy, as had happened during the first

parliamentary experience. It also reflected the ultimate *coup de grace* for the more ‘liberal’ approach advocated by the faction of Guedira/Khatib, which favored an autonomous and independent political field that would subsequently be dominated through a political avatar representing the monarchy’s interests. Instead, the approach adopted was more in line with the heteronomization and disempowerment of the political field advocated by the securitarian faction headed by Oufkir.

Hence, the new parliament was to be a unicameral one, and out of the 240 seats that it includes, only 90 would be elected through direct universal suffrage. The institution’s name was changed as well, from parliament to “Chamber of Representatives”. Its members, the representatives, had their provisions for immunity modified as well; opinions critical of the “monarchic regime, the Islamic religion” and remarks deemed to be disrespectful to the King became sufficient grounds for lifting a representative’s immunity and engaging legal pursuits against him/her¹¹¹. Additionally, the initiative to call for constitutional reform, which used to belong to the prime minister and parliament in the 1962 constitution, was now exclusively held by the king¹¹². Moreover, the requirement for extraordinary sessions, a tool that was previously used with impressive efficacy by the opposition to assert its agenda, was increased from one-third of the previous parliament’s lower chamber to a requirement of absolute majority within the new unicameral one. Finally, the king was now designated as the “Supreme

¹¹¹ Article 37 of the 1970 Constitution.

¹¹² Article 97 of the 1970 Constitution.

representative of the nation”¹¹³ within the new constitutional text. At the same time, political parties saw their status slightly downgraded as they were now just one amongst a plurality of institutions and actors in charge of “organizing and representing” the citizenry¹¹⁴.

The announcement of this new constitution, which was deemed procedurally unconstitutional by some analysts at the time¹¹⁵, indicated a failure of the dialogue that had begun between the monarchy and the national movement parties since April of the same year. The new settlement was not satisfying to either the UNFP or the PI, as it reduced the space and relevance allotted to the political field, and started asserting a new sociodicy for it, designing it as a more apolitical space, in the sense that the basic distribution of power and the monarchic hegemony within it would be accepted by all parties as a precondition for participation that was not to be questioned. The only actor habilitated to decide on any significant sociopolitical projects that the country was to pursue in this new political field was the monarchy, and the political parties were only

¹¹³ Article 19 of the 1970 Constitution.

¹¹⁴ While Article 3 of the 1962 constitution mentioned only political parties as “contributing to the organization and representation of citizens”, the 1970 reformulation of that article expanded that role to labor unions, communal councils, and professional chambers.

¹¹⁵ Jacques Robert (1970, cited in Dalle 2004, 356) argued in his analysis that the king was violating the 1962 constitution by abrogating it in this fashion. A similar judgement was made by Allal el Fassi on June 21st 1970, when he described the abrogation as invalid (Camau, Santucci, and Flory 1971, 652).

to compete over a counseling or managerial role at best. Writing at the time, Jean Dupont (1971), in a comparative analysis of the new constitutional text with that of 1962, observes that:

An analysis of the content of the 1970 constitution does not even allow us to talk of an unbalance of powers as we could do in 1962; for there to be an unbalance there has to be many powers, which is not the case in; there is only one power in this new constitution, royal power. This observation that we can easily make following a clear reading of the text is even more evident when knowing the particularities of the methods of legal interpretation prevalent today amongst Moroccan jurists. (Dupont 1971, 180)

This situation had significant repercussions within the national movement field. Faced with a new deal that basically sentenced them into political irrelevance by condemning the political field into institutionalized heteronomy, the opposition parties decided to increase their cooperation with one another and to unify their reactions. Their unified rejection of the constitution was the first sign of a renewed cooperation between opposition actors¹¹⁶, especially the UNFP and the PI, premising an alliance what was to be dubbed as the *Koutlah el Wataniya* (National Bloc), which would then come into existence after the heavy-handed intervention of the Interior Ministry in the constitutional referendum.

¹¹⁶ Statements rejecting the new constitution were issued individually by all of the PLS, UMT, UGTM, UNEM, UGEM, UNFP, and PI by July 19th (Camau, Santucci, and Flory 1971, 652).

The foundational charter of the *Koutlah*, published in the PI newspaper *L'Opinion* on July 28th, 1970, listed several conditions and demands, as well as the main lines of the two parties, shared vision regarding the reorganization of the political field and the reestablishment of its autonomy, as expressed in its demand for the “establishment of a political, economic, and social democracy”. Other demands focused on support for the youth, education reform, agrarian reform, and the recovering of territories still under foreign domination.

Despite the lack of support that it received from political actors, the new constitution passed through a referendum, marred by several violations and heavy administrative intervention in favor of the ‘yes’ campaign. The passing of the new constitution was the beginning of what would later be described as “crystallization of the state of exception” by a former interior minister.

Faced with this significant drop in the value of political capital exchange rate, the political opposition actors had no other choice than to put their differences aside and to try to coordinate and unify their positions in order to gain more leverage. The monarchy, while it desired to gain the opposition’s cooperation and to make it submit to the new status quo, did not consider that cooperation as a necessity. Having the support of a reliable security apparatus that had proved its effectiveness at quelling political dissent, and that of the traditional elite networks, the monarchy was, at that point, principally interested in the opposition’s inclusion as a way to improve its image at the international level. Thus it was, at that point, more of a luxury than a necessity, as the monarchy’s survival appeared to be unthreatened.

Outside of the political field, the social space was increasingly tense, with a number of labor and student strikes taking place despite the constant repression. The metaphorical ‘crystalization’ of the State of exception was based on the premise that the repressive option would always be reliable, and the prominence gained by the Securitarian wing brought about the appointment of a number of military officers into state positions, either within the security apparatus or outside of it. One of the consequences of this development was that the monarchy relied increasingly on the military as the central institutional pillar through which the status quo was maintained. This, in turn, granted military elites both a first-hand experience on the way that the country was being run and an insider perspective on the high levels of inefficiency and corruption that plagued the State. This provided them with a tempting opportunity to use their influence and resources to wrestle a more dominant position within the field of power, at the expense of other actors (including the monarchy).

Analysts at the time did report the existence of a sort of dissonance between the image that the military institution had to embody, as an efficient and modernizing force, and the general inefficiency that characterized the core of the state apparatus (Regnier and Santucci 1972). Writing shortly after the 1971 coup attempt, they also highlighted the leading roles and resources that were available to the military institution and made it into both a pillar of the monarchic order, as well as a potentially autonomous actor that could pursue its own set of interests. In their view, the army had three core functions within the Moroccan political system: to serve as a coercive force, to serve as a

distributive mechanism for various material and immaterial resources, and to symbolize the prestige of the Monarchy and buttress its legitimacy. In other words, military loyalty was cementing the monarchy's dominant position in the field of power, maintaining its control over both the political field and the rest of the social space through its anti-subversive activities, and at the same time generating popular support through the redistribution of economic capital to military families, both of which combine to further enhance the symbolic dominance of the monarch as the commander in chief in charge of defending the country and of rewarding his loyal subjects.

Thus the events of 1971, when the army attempted a coup against the monarchy, represented an attempt by a part of the military elite to take advantage of what they saw as a weakening of monarchic symbolic capital vis-à-vis that of the military. It also came at an era where military takeovers were frequent in both the MENA region and the postcolonial context in general, and coup leaders were still viewed as progressive revolutionaries within some circles.

The coup attempt at the Skhirat¹¹⁷ royal palace, on July 10th, 1971, signaled that the instability of the post-1965 political order in Morocco was reaching a critically unstable phase. The consequences of the event varied, but for most of the main actors within the field of power, it rang as a stern warning shot. The King, the dominant player and principal target, reacted in a manner that signaled that he wanted to counterbalance the loss of trust in the military institution by bringing in a new source of support. First came

¹¹⁷ A small town near Rabat, reputed for its beaches.

a purge of the military from the elements that he deemed to be implicated in the plot. Second, the King reestablished contacts with the political field's actors, especially the Koutlah's leadership. Their support, sought after by the monarch, was valued for the political capital that was still institutionalized within these parties and embodied in their main leaders, especially for their symbolic legitimacy and for their ability to mobilize popular support.

As for the political field's actors, the coup was viewed as both an opportunity and a threat¹¹⁸. While they resented the heteronomization of the political field and the devaluation of political capital within the field of power, they realized that a military takeover would most likely not be in their favor, and instead lead to a worsening of their situation. Thus, they were willing to try to cooperate with the monarchy, trading their political capital for a return to a more open and autonomous political field.

As reported by Dalle (2004, 370), reported that Mohamed Lahbabi¹¹⁹, in a speech in 2001, stated that the negotiations between the king and the Koutlah had reached a point, around the middle of February 1972, where both sides came very close to an

¹¹⁸ As a caveat, it is important to highlight the contradictory nature of reports and statements relating to the two failed coup attempts. Given the nature of the event, the deaths of its central players and the repositioning of other potentially connected actors in relation to the monarchy; it is quite difficult to determine the veracity and reliability of their statements, including those that were made decades later. The conflicting nature of these versions increases the odds that they may well be politically self-serving statements uttered to further later political aims.

¹¹⁹ One of the founding leaders of the USFP

agreement that would guaranty the promulgation of a democratic constitution and the proclamation of a general amnesty. He also added that the announcement by the king of the 1972 constitution on February 17th came as a shock to the Koutla leadership, as it did not reflect any of the agreements reached during the negotiations (Dalle 2004, 372).

The 1972 constitution did not do much to address the distribution of power within the Moroccan State, which remained firmly monopolized by the monarch, and as such, it did not manage to gain the support of the political opposition parties. Without any real change at the institutional level, the political field was maintained in the same level of heteronomy, and the monarchy continued its reliance on the same elite circles for support. Indeed, following the enactment of the new constitution, the king appointed a new government, headed by a technocrat who was mostly viewed as someone with no political capital, entirely dependent on the monarch's support. This signaled that any reform to come would not be going along the path described by the Koutla, and as such, it expressed its opposition to it by calling for abstention during the referendum. This signaled a return to the starting point for negotiations between the Koutla and the Palace, as it indicated that the autonomy of the political field, and the re-valuation of political capital and the institutions and actors that held it was yet a demand that the monarchy did not consider as essential for its own survival.

At the institutional level, the 1972 constitution did introduce some limited changes to the setup introduced by the 1970 one. The parliament remained unicameral, but the

number of directly elected members was to be increased in the upcoming elections¹²⁰, from around 37.5% to 66% of its composition. The new constitution also increases and further clarified the domains over which the parliament could legislate, in comparison to both the 1970 and the 1962 constitutions. On the executive side, the prime minister's role and attributions were also enlarged, being attributed exclusivity over the exercise of the government's regulatory power.

The few months separating the proclamation of the 1972 constitution and the upcoming coup attempt of August 1972 saw a renewal of Koutlah-palace negotiations. For the monarchy, the referendum results and the new constitution provided enough of a show of popular support and institutional guarantees of control over the political field to shake off the embattled image projected by the Skhirat events, thus allowing it to restart the negotiations from a strong position. The Koutlah, on the other hand, realizing that its options were limited, and still reeling under the weight of repression, viewed the negotiations as its best hope for the potential achievement of its political goals. Both sides, however, had one worry in common, which was that a successful military takeover would be harmful to their respective existence¹²¹.

¹²⁰ These elections would be postponed after the passing of the new constitution by a royal decision.

¹²¹ Some reports have later on connected the UNFP to the coup attempts, however, their validity cannot be verified. As for fearing the consequences of a military takeover on the political field's autonomy, an examination of the situation of the political scene in the neighboring countries that had successful coups was enough to sustain them.

Yet, on the opposition fields, the failure of the negotiations with the palace to achieve the desired results had some significant repercussions. The most significant was the increasing tensions between the UMT and the UNFP, and their impact on the party at the internal level itself. As a number of the main actors within the UNFP leadership was also deeply connected to the labor field, and often affiliated or holding a position within the UMT, the tensions between the two opposition organizations created an increasingly large gulf between the main leaders of the party. This translated into an increasingly schismatic situation, wherein the party was divided between Casablanca and Rabat. Casablanca being the industrial heartland of the country and the principal stronghold of the UNFP's working class supporters, it unsurprisingly emerged as the rallying point and headquarters of those supporting the maintenance of close ties with the UMT. The Rabat section rallied mainly around Abderrahim Bouabid and a majority of members from the party's administrative commission, the party's intellectual elites, in addition to some the younger generation of UNFP leaders that came out of the UNEM ranks (Palazolli 1972, 249). Tensions flared up after the administrative commission met in Rabat in July, and declared the exclusion of its members that held positions within the UMT, and took over the powers previously held by the party's political bureau, including the organization of the party's general congress (Dalle 2004, 388). The hostilities did not take long to start, with the UNFP-Rabat publishing in August a strong attack on the UMT, blaming its leadership for what it viewed as their eagerness to strike deals with the monarchy aimed at ensuring the maintenance of their status, of using the working class for their own personal gain, as well as of having "definitively linked its fate to that of the regime in place, that dictates its (the union's)

decisions” (Palazolli 1972, 249). These developments brought the UNFP’s inner tension into public view, and the Rabat and Casablanca factions began a struggle over the symbolic capital of the organization, as well as its more material possessions.

On August 16th 1972, as King Hassan was returning to the country from a visit to France, his personal airplane was attacked by four fighter jets belonging to the country’s air force. The attack aimed at killing the monarch and being the first step in a military takeover. According to the King, the attack was planned by General Oufkir, who planned on putting prince Mohamed on the throne as a figurehead, while he would actually rule the country through the regency council (Gourdon 1973). A secret handwritten letter allegedly sent from Mohammed Basri¹²² to Abderrahim Bouabid and Abderrahman Youssoufi, and later published in *Le Journal* in November 2000, had a different version of the story. According to that letter, the coup was organized by the UNFP in tandem with Oufkir and the younger officers, with the aim of abolishing the regime and replacing it with a new one under the UNFP’s leadership, with a potential elimination of the cumbersome general afterward¹²³.

¹²² Also known as *Fqih* Basri, the radical leftist leader was living in exile at the time and did not return to Morocco until 1995.

¹²³ Youssoufi was holding the position of prime minister at the time of the letter’s publication, and his government would later ban *Le Journal*, accusing the publication of impairing the State’s stability (Dalle 2004).

The details of this second coup attempt, just like the previous one, are hard to verify, given the various and contradictory versions that emerged over the years. However, the significant consequences that it had are somewhat clearer. First, Oufkir, who masterminded the operation according to the King, did not survive for long after it. The details of his final demise are contradictory. Officially, he committed suicide following the failure of the coup. Unofficially, many sources state that he was brought into the palace and then executed¹²⁴. His wife, daughters, and maids were also detained and were to be jailed in various prisons for the coming two decades. An autobiographical account of the family's ordeal can be found in "La Prisoniere", the memoirs of the General's daughter Malika Oufkir (Oufkir and Fitoussi 2000).

Arguably, the second failed coup attempt of 1972 had more momentous consequences than the first one, especially on the military field. Aside from Oufkir and those directly involved in the coup who were swiftly removed after the events¹²⁵, the whole military field was about to lose its previous autonomy. The ministry of national defense was disbanded and replaced with an administration of national defense directly under the king's personal authority. Weapons and ammunition storage facilities management was modified as well; previously under military control, they were now placed under the control of the regional governors, who were generally civilians

¹²⁴ Unsurprisingly, sources disagree on the exact circumstances of Oufkir's final visit to the palace and the identity of his executioners.

¹²⁵ The removal method was either through direct execution, execution after a military trial, or jail and torture in secret detention centers.

(Gourdon 1973). Previously autonomous and highly valued within the field of power since 1965, the military field was now being phagocyted by the monarchic field, losing the heteronomy that twice allowed it to challenge its domination over the country. The new military field was no longer under the direct control and scrutiny of the king and of his closest associates, and the “securitarian” wing that was dominant within the monarchic field throughout the previous years saw its influence go on a steady decrease.

On the opposition field, the UNFP was still embroiled in its internal dissensions, somewhat reducing the ability of the Koutlah to efficiently maneuver for a stronger negotiating position with the palace. The two factions of the UNFP increased the intensity of their struggle over the party’s political and symbolic capital; with Abdallah Ibrahim penning a letter to Allal el Fassi, published on the Casablanca faction’s newly created press, organ demanding the provisional suspension of the Rabat faction from the Koutlah (Dalle 2004, 389). The Rabat faction reacted, unsurprisingly, by declaring the suspension of Abdallah Ibrahim from the party (Dalle 2004). This burning of bridges from the UNFP’s two rival factions will turn out to have significant consequences on the longer term for the opposition field. At a field level, the dynamics of this new schism were quite similar to those that took place in 1959, playing over both the party field and the labor union field, with various actors prioritizing the games taking place in one field or the other according to their positioning and capital endowments. Abdallah Ibrahim, being a longtime ally of the UMT and of its leader Mahjoub Benseddik, found himself in opposition to Abderrahim Bouabid and the rest of those whose primary interests laid in the UNFP and political fields. Though he was long gone by then, Ben

Barka, who had no love lost between him and Benseddik, was strongly present as a symbol around which the Rabat faction developed its discourse for a purge of the UMT from the UNFP field, especially with the youth organization of the party and the UNEM. Others like Omar Benjelloun, a dedicated labor unionist as well as party member, had their own griefs with the UMT leader, both personal and political¹²⁶.

At the same time, the monarchy was attempting to restart the dialogue with the Koutlah, on its own terms, however. To do so, the King offered the opposition parties to take positions within the government, which would be aimed at allowing them to supervise the upcoming elections and, in theory, ensure their fairness. The goal was to make sure that the opposition takes part in the upcoming elections at a low risk under the new constitution, which still ensured that the King would hold all the powers. On the other hand, integrating the opposition into the government would have allowed the monarchy to shore up its credibility and project a much needed image of reformism and stability following two failed coup attempts in a short period. However, for the Koutlah, this proposal did not offer enough benefits to legitimize the risks involved with associating with what was viewed at the time as a much shaken regime. Unsurprisingly, the Koutlah parties, including the two factions of the UNFP, rejected the offer. For their cooperation, they were demanding a much higher political price. While they varied in their details and secondary points, the parties' responses did agree on the need for a "homogenous" government, limited to the opposition parties. This demand, obviously

¹²⁶ They viewed Benseddik as someone who could not be trusted with sensitive information, and who was compromisingly close to the monarchy (Daoud 2018).

unacceptable to the monarchy, could be viewed as expressing a lack of interest by the Koutlah in associating itself with the monarchy at this point, similar to how in the previous round of negotiations, they were only aiming to commit younger leaders to the government, while keeping those with the highest embodied political and symbolic capital out of it and free to attempt a recovery of the ground lost by their parties and the political field as a whole due to the repression that they faced since 1965.

To head the government of technocrats that he had appointed, the king picked his own brother-in-law, Ahmed Osman. Osman was married to the king's sister and had done his studies along with the King in both the *collège royal* in Rabat and university in France. Born to a normal family in Oujda, he was brought into the royal school when Mohammed V decided to replace the sons of notables with students from humbler origins and had the five brightest students of the country at the time enrolled to study with the future Hassan II (Dalle 2004). Viewed as the archetypical spineless courtesan by some (Hughes 2006), he nevertheless offered the king the qualities he wanted at the time in a prime minister, namely complete devotion and no risks of treason.

The education field, a field that was increasingly politicized and whose main actors were close to the opposition parties, saw some interesting developments in 1972 as well. On the one hand, the year saw the occurrence of a number of strikes and protest events in both universities and high schools (Adam 1973). Students' protests were common in the country since independence, usually triggered by regulatory changes to the educational system that were seen by the students as unfair or reducing their employment prospects. That did not mean that they were apolitical, given the affiliation

and sympathies of a large part on both the students and the professorial corps with the leftist opposition's theses. However, 1972 saw a beginning of a shift towards an increased autonomy of the education field vis-à-vis the political field, especially towards the opposition actors, whose ability to control their allies within the educational field was increasingly waning (Adam 1973, 399). While the opposition was not really able to take control of the protest due to the increasing radicalization of their allies within the academic field, whose increasing focus on their own field and the gains to be achieved within it further complicated the relationship, the monarchy managed to give enough field-specific concessions to defuse the situation at a relatively low cost. The concessions included increases in scholarships amounts, the proclamation of the "inviolability" of university grounds and campuses, and the right of students to participate in campus governance (Adam 1973, 397).

6. Increased Repression and the Sahara Patriotic Card

In 1973, the monarchy decided to adopt a different, yet familiar, approach in its interactions with the political field. Dropping the carrot of negotiations and limited concession, it once again picked up the stick of massive repression. Somewhat regaining its confidence in the loyalty and cleanliness of its security apparatus following the purges and changes that were conducted as a result of the two coup attempts, the

monarchy resorted once again to a strict limitation of public freedoms and harsh attacks on the opposition actors, both political parties and others, similar in intensity to the early days of the State of exception. At the same time, the monarchy switched to a more populist approach, reaching out directly to the population and launching projects such as the so-called “Agrarian revolution”¹²⁷, which involved the redistribution of agricultural land to poor peasants, as well as a focus on the building of dams, which involved the king visiting various provinces and taking part in various very public inauguration events.

In the opposition field, the return of a very repressive environment increased preexisting tensions and complicated mobilization efforts, especially as it combined with the internal strife taking place with the UNFP and between it and the UMT. January 1973 was quite an intense month in terms of social upheaval and repression, with both student strikes and various other strikes by teachers and railway workers, amongst others, receiving the support of both the UMT and the UGTM unions. At the same time, a new level was reached with the attempted assassination of a number of leading figures of the UNFP and PI using parcel bombs sent to their homes. The targeted figures, Mohamed el Yazighi, Omar Benjelloun from the UNFP administrative commission, and M’hamed Douiri from the PI’s executive commission, all survived the

¹²⁷ This label has been criticized by some opposition actors, as the redistribution was not large enough and did not make much difference in the larger scheme of things where “60% of the land was still owned by 10% of the peasants” (Adam 1973, 402)

attacks with various degrees of harm (Santucci and Flory 1974). Opposition newspapers were regularly seized by the government throughout the year as well.

A number of arrests also targeted those involved in student strikes and some labor union field actors. On January 23rd, the government declared the dissolution of the principal student union of the country, the UNEM, after a police officer was killed during a demonstration (Santucci and Flory 1974). The dissolution was rejected by the other student union, the UGEM, as well as by the UMT and the UNEM's Parisian branch, whose members briefly occupied the Moroccan embassy in protest. By the end of the month, and in a show of force by the government, around 2000 students who had decided to continue the strike were dismissed from the university.

The apex of the abovementioned social tensions in 1973 was to be the so-called "March 3rd Plot". On that date, a number of armed groups began attacks in various areas, especially in the Middle Atlas Mountains. The affair is quickly controlled by the security services, and a number of those directly involved are arrested. According to the statement made by the ministry of interior, the armed groups were funded and trained by Libya and had the local support of "leaders and members of a legally recognized political organization" that was left unnamed (Dessaints 1975). The operation, long-planned in secret by the group of Mohamed Fqih Bassri, aimed at the creation of a number of guerilla hotspots in the Atlas mountains as a way of drawing the security forces into a protracted campaign that would then create the opportunity for the start of a revolutionary movement within the main cities. Originally planned to take place on March 3rd, the operation was postponed by a decision of its leaders. However, due to a

logistical or communication issue, one of the cells did not receive the new instructions, and went into action on the original date. It was quickly subdued by the security forces, and it led to the dismantling of the whole network, with large amounts of weaponry seized in the process.

Yet, as the wave of arrests began, it became clear that the organization in question, for the State, was the UNFP-Rabat faction. A large number of the organization's leaders and members were subsequently arrested, just as the government was decreeing the "suspension" of the Rabat faction for four months, and the postponement of any elections until the situation was more stable (Gourdon 1973, 395). The monarchy was also reportedly trying to capitalize on the plot at the expense of the national movement remnants, by focusing the public's attention on their collaboration with foreign forces¹²⁸, against the country's institutions, playing on the patriotic chord.

Despite the tensions pitting them against the UNFP-Rabat faction at the time, the UNFP-Casablanca joined the PI in condemning the heavy-handed response of the government against their former comrades. The trial, in front of a military tribunal, offered the occasion for leaders of the UNFP to denounce the heavy repression and the usage of torture in the investigation. Abderrahim Bouabid, the main leader of the faction, denounced the attempts by the State to portray the UNFP as a seditious organization and reiterated that its main demands were the democratization of the political system. The trial ended up with a number of heavy prison and death sentences, and reportedly the

¹²⁸ As in their access to the Libya radio, and alleged training camps in Syria and Algeria.

acquitted were soon after held by the security forces once again for some other “investigation” (Dessaints 1975)

7. Emergence of the “Radical” leftist movements:

The ire of the monarchy in 1973 did not limit itself to the UNFP; during a big show trial in Casablanca, it targeted other leftist opposition groups as well, and especially the Marxist-Leninist groups that were created under the State of exception years. The main organizations representing this ideological stance were the “23 Mars” and the “Ila Al Amam” groups. These groups emerged as expressions of more radical positions within the leftist opposition, especially in relation to those of the UNFP and the *Parti de la Liberation et du Socialisme* (or PLS)¹²⁹. Situated on the fringes of the opposition field, they did not have any official recognition from the State, nor were they seeking any, and they did not have any real access to the political field per se. Their main grievance vis-à-vis the mainstream leftist organizations was what they considered to be the organizational leadership’s constant willingness to compromise on the left’s foundational principles, in the hopes of reaching an agreement with the monarchy, maintaining a legal existence, and gaining/maintaining some access to the political field,

¹²⁹ The PLS represented a rebirth of the older Moroccan Communist Party (PCM), which was banned soon after the country’s independence in 1959, before being allowed to reappear under the above name in 1968. The PLS leader, Ali Yaata, was the secretary general of the PCM at the time that it was banned.

no matter how limited. The organization included among its founders a number of prominent figures of the exiled Moroccan opposition, such as Mohamed Bensaid Ait Idder¹³⁰.

These groups had a strong presence within the student and intellectual bodies, and they included a number of significant figures within their ranks. The high cultural capital characterizing their membership is on full display in the regular publication of the famed “Souffles/Anfass”, the prominent intellectual analysis and cultural critique outlet of that period on the Moroccan scene, edited for a time by Abdellatif Laabi, a famous author and poet. Despite its focus on culture, its critiques of the traditionalist conservative discourse championed by the monarchy served as a platform for the diffusion of an alternative culture centered on leftist ideas within the country’s intelligentsia and on university campuses.

8. Continuing Monarchy-Koutlah negotiations:

While maintaining the threat of harsh repression, which was unleashed on the opposition whenever it was deemed to have crossed the red lines, the monarchy was still

¹³⁰ Ait Idder, born in 1925 in the Chtouka Aitbaha region, was a resistant and member of the AL, and a member of the PI and then the UNFP following the scission. At the time of the creation of “23 Mars”, he was condemned to death in Morocco, and living as an exile in Paris. Ait Idder had left the UNFP following a dispute with Fqih Bassri over what he viewed as his adventurism (ايت ايدر، محمد) (بنسعيد، 2018).

attempting to gain more legitimacy by somehow acquiring the Koutlah's support. The acquisition of additional supports was not to be done at the expense of traditional ones, though, and so the monarchy was also attempting to reaffirm and strengthen its connection to both the traditional rural elites and the more modern urban ones. In order to achieve these two goals, the monarchy deployed two main interconnected strategies on both the political and the economic fields. The first strategy was the so-called "Moroccanization" politic adopted in 1973 and aimed at reinforcing the support and loyalties of traditional allies while also placating one of the oppositions' main attack angles criticizing the continuing control exercised by foreigners over the country's industries and lands. The second strategy was to play the territorial integrity patriotic card over the Sahara issue, using it to both stoke nationalist fervor at the popular level and as a common ground over which the bases of cooperation with the principal opposition actors could be established, without necessarily granting any significant concessions that would be satisfying the Koutlah's democratization demands.

The Moroccanization was, since independence, a constant demand of the National Movement parties. Though there were some predictable and slight conceptual differences regarding its actual implementation, both the PI and the UNFP had long considered that the principal beneficiary of such a policy should not ultimately be the country's well established capitalistic class, be it its rural or urban variant. While it did take up the concept of Moroccanization label in 1973, the monarchy made sure to discard the contents that the opposition had embedded it with over the years. The ability to benefit from state-funded loans to take parts in the previously foreign-owned

companies concerned by the new policy was limited, due to its regulations, to individuals with a significantly high net worth (Dessaints 1975).

This effectively limited the benefits of the policy to the high bourgeoisie and landed notabilities, and was, therefore, mostly serving as a way to solidify their support rather than acquire that of other classes¹³¹. The policy was a central element that allowed the creation of the largest and most prominent big private capital groups, with a large percentage of the granted state funding going to five groups only, including the royal-controlled ONA, along with the groups controlled by the Kettani and Laraki families (Oubenal and Zeroual 2017, 11–12). Nevertheless, by adopting that policy, the monarchy was taking that issue off the table and depriving the opposition of a critique that was targeted as much at the patriotic credentials of the monarchy as to its economic and social positions. In addition to being a pillar of support, as will become clear in the early 1990s, this newly created class of big capital holders was also designed to serve as a buffer against the emergence of an independent capitalist class that might have been problematic for the monarchy and could have proved to be a strong ally for the opposition's democratization goals. In exchange for political quiescence, this new class was allowed to enrich itself with the explicit and implicit support of the state, and often

¹³¹ According to Berrada and Saadi (1992), of the 136 thousand hectares of colonial lands redistributed between 1975 and 1979, at least 90% were distributed to individuals belonging to the high level bureaucrats and military officers, along with the upper class of the urban bourgeoisie.

without having to face the legal and fiscal constraint mandated by the law¹³². This “special treatment” was also a way of ensuring their support by maintaining a legal sword of Damocles, providing the monarchy with a legal basis for punishing any disloyalties.

While the Moroccanization served mainly as a means to consolidate preexisting support bases amongst the economic capital rich-elites; the Sahara issue provided the monarchy with an opportunity to extend those bases across a wide array of fields where the patriotic form of symbolic capital still held a strong influencing power. That strategy was, however, not without risks, and was arguably a maverick sort of move by the King. Long requested by the national movement actors, especially the PI and the AL, the recuperation of the then still Spanish-controlled Western Sahara was adopted and personally championed by the monarch. In addition to using the issue as a way to rekindle nationalist fervor in the country and to create some common ground with the opposition parties, the monarch also took the opportunity to position himself at the

¹³² This was not just a matter of tax avoidance, as there were also issues in the way taxes were calculated in various sectors. For instance, the agricultural tax rate was capped and calculated on the basis of the theoretical productivity of the land held by the individual. That remained tied to a productivity and average profit assessment made in the late 1961 on agricultural profits data collected from 1951 to 1960, without any updates to reflect price fluctuations and the productivity increases realized through the introduction of modern agricultural techniques (Berrada and Saadi 1992). This made the actual tax rate applied to the sector much lower than it should be, and reforms were not forthcoming for obvious political reasons.

center of a new patriotic narrative, wherein the monarchy and the state were the vanguards of the nation and the champions of territorial integrity.

Most of the opposition, with the exception of some parts of the Marxist-Leninist movement¹³³, agreed to actively support the monarchy's efforts on the Sahara issue. In what was later called a "sacred union" around the "national cause", leaders from the main opposition parties campaigned along with those associated with the monarchy, trying to mobilize both international support for the Moroccan claim and against Spain's attempts to change the territory's status¹³⁴; as well as by shoring up popular support for the project by touring by organizing rallies and through their media publications.

The newly emerging Sahara issue field would quickly start rising in importance within the political field. Political actors' positioning vis-à-vis the issue and the monarch's approach towards its resolution will become, as well as the priority and importance they give to the issue, will quickly emerge as a salient line of differentiation between various opposition groups that had until then been situated on the same. Thus,

¹³³ Divisions over the position to be adopted regarding the Sahara issue made a number of prominent opposition figures take their distance from the "23Mars" organization, for instance Ait Idder and Laabi (2018، محمد بنسعيد، ايت ايدر).

¹³⁴ Leftist opposition leaders such as the UNFP-Rabat's Abderahim Bouabid and the PLS's Ali Yata would campaign in the Eastern bloc's capitals, whereas PI figures such as Mohamed Boucetta would focus on Arab states, and government ministers were in charge of Western and African capitals (Dessaints 1975).

and despite the participation of the opposition's leading figures in the diplomatic and national mobilization process, the king was firmly positioned as the central actor within that field, receiving the lion's share of the symbolic patriotic/nationalist capital that it was generating. It was also a new way for the monarchy to delegitimize, and subsequently repress, the groups that did not express their support for its strategy on the issue.

On the other hand, the opposition actors that expressly supported the monarchy's strategy were now in a position where the monarchy appeared ready to engage with them on a more positive ground that would be a first step towards a reopening of the political field. This understanding was seemingly confirmed by the monarch as well. In the speeches that he delivered during the year 1974, the king called for a "union of all those with good will" around the issue, and assured that the country would have a "mature, conscientious, authentic" parliament by October of the next year (Dessaints 1975).

At the bottom level, the mobilization campaign had a significant impact on a population that had developed a certain degree of apathy to political issues after a decade spent under the repressive state of exception. The preexisting monarchy-centered national liberation narrative, which was losing its popular appeal and mobilisational power, especially for the younger generations, benefitted to a large extent from being redirected towards the contemporary concrete issue of territorial integrity. The fact that the population was called upon directly to play an active role in furthering that aim was crucial in reviving the patriotic form of nationalist zeal that the monarchy

required, both to successfully negotiate at the diplomatic level and to regain its prestige at the national level as the symbol of national unity and its defender.

Last but not least, the side goal of this operation was aimed at the military, which, despite the purges, remained a potentially serious threat to the monarch. In addition to the more public external diplomatic, and internal mobilization campaigns aimed at solidifying support within the national social space and reopening dialogue with the opposition inside the political field; the king was also working on a significant military operation that would send a large part of the FAR to the Sahara. In case of success, even limited, the army was to be kept engaged to the south in securing the territory and ensuring control over it, while being kept as apolitical as possible.

Nevertheless, it was overall a risky gamble that the monarchy undertook, highlighting the precarious situation in which it found itself following the failed coup attempts. The king was thus trying to establish new bases of support in different fields through a single maverick move. Failure would have been extremely costly and probably caused the end of the monarchic institution in one way or the other. Stoking the public's patriotism and failing to achieve any significant results would have been a severe blow to the monarch's personal prestige and credibility, which the opposition forces would not have failed to take advantage of.

At the political field level, on the margins of the efforts deployed by all actors in relation to the Sahara issue, the attempts at a negotiated solution that would restore its autonomy to the field, along with a higher value to political capital, were already on the way as early as 1974. Within the Koutlah, the main actors spearheading that effort were

the PI and the UNFP-Rabat faction. Despite the repression and the bans that it faced following the March 1973 events, the organization remained an important actor within the opposition field, and one whose leadership's willingness to pragmatically negotiate participation in the government was a valuable trait for the monarchy. Further to the left, Ali Yata was allowed by the monarchy to create a new version of his communist party, renamed as the *Parti du Progres et du Socialisme* (PPS), as a reward for his personal involvement in the diplomatic campaign in favor of the Sahara issue.

The UNFP-Casablanca section, headed by Abdallah Ibrahim, struck out a more oppositional note than the one voiced by the Rabat faction in response to the monarchy's overtures, especially regarding the expected parliamentary elections, which it viewed as meaningless if not preceded by radical structural and institutional reforms (Dessaints 1975). Around the same period, the Rabat faction made official the schism and took the new name of *Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires* (USFP). Its positions, while less radically opposed to participation in the government than before, remained nevertheless insistent on the necessity of having clear guarantees that future elections would take place in a free and fair environment.

The king's Sahara strategy culminated in 1975. Without dwelling on the diplomatic maneuvering that paved the way to the relatively successful move by the monarch, it is important to acknowledge the significance of the international context of the time in

making it even possible¹³⁵. Instead, the focus here will be on the implications these developments had on the political field and on the rest of the national social space. On that level, the Sahara issue reportedly “practically monopolized the Moroccan political scene and mobilized national energies in 1975, to such a degree that other big political issues, and even economic and social issues, were not only overshadowed by it but were totally subordinated [to it].” (Dessaints 1975, 465). On the political field, this provided a perfect excuse for the postponement of all the overdue electoral dates to at least the next year. Under different circumstances, this development would have likely caused a significant uproar within the opposition; however, given their support for the monarch’s Sahara plan, the critiques were much more muted than would have been expected in normal times.

The newly renamed USFP, despite its relative *détente* with the palace, kept on advocating significant reforms at the political and economic levels in its official positions. For them, the only way forward was the establishment of a truly democratic political climate, with a strong and independent parliament based upon free and fair elections. Economically, the focus was on the adoption of leftist reforms such as the nationalization of strategic sectors and the adoption of a planning system at the state level (Dessaints 1975). Abderrahim Bouabid was elected as secretary-general, along with other significant figures of the UNFP-Rabat faction who took positions within the political bureau of the new party.

¹³⁵ A number of sources, both academic and journalistic, offer detailed accounts of the diplomatic maneuvering between the main players regionally and globally. See for instance

At the official positions level, the USFP was not very far from the other newly reborn leftist opposition actor, the PPS, that held its congress in the same year as well. The concrete positions advocated by the party were similar to the above, sharing their focus on socialist reforms at the economic level, and the instauration of a democratic political system, along with a rejection of violence as a means towards the achievement of these goals (Dessaints 1975).

9. The Emergence of Islamist Actors:

The social and educational policy changes enacted by the monarchy aimed at promoting and reinforcing traditional Islamic values, along with some probable support received from the ministry of interior, contributed to the emergence and the increasing appeal of religious forms of political activism. Both in society at large and on campuses, the emergence of relatively organized Islamist groups of various obediences was becoming a more noticeable phenomenon. These groups were at odds with the different leftist tendencies represented both within university campuses, student organizations, and in the labor union field, competing with them over the same disaffected constituencies prone to adopt critical opposition frames. However, their presence was not yet reflected within the political field.

Whereas the emergence of Islamist actors during the 1970s was still taking place outside of the political field, it was arguably a development that was favored by the monarchy as part of its wider strategic goal of countering and weakening leftist

opposition movements and contesting their hold over various fields that stood as strongholds of opposition to its agenda.

The first organized actor based upon an Islamist ideology to make its appearance in Morocco around that period was the *Mouvement de la Chabiba al-Islamiya* (Islamic Youth Movement) appearing in 1969. The movement was founded by Abdelkrim Moutii, a former member of the UNFP, disappointed with the left following the 1967 Arab military defeat against Israel. Moutii was born in a small rural area east of Casablanca and was employed as a school teacher. After his disappointment with leftism and pan-Arabist ideals, he had turned to the writings of Sayyid Qutb. One book in particular, Qutb's *ma'ālim fī t-tarīq* (Milestones on the Way), had the most influence on Moutii's thinking and served as an ideological cornerstone for his organization (Dialmy 2000).

While it appeared in 1969 as a movement, the *Chabiba* did not become institutionalized until 1972. Under the name of the *Association de la Chabiba al-Islamiya* (Islamic Youth Association), the new organization gained legal recognition in 1972. Despite the official status, the association maintained a radical discourse, combined with a secretive style of organization similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, with members organized in closed cells and receiving a training including paramilitary and propaganda techniques (Tozy 1999). Members were usually young, with their ages ranging between 18 and 30 years old, and many were previously sympathizing or associating with leftist and pan-Arabist groups before joining the *Chabiba* (Seniguer 2013).

At the ideological level, the influence of Qutb's writing was very present in the *Chabiba's* vision. The organization viewed the Moroccan state and society as having strayed away from the path of Islam and into *Jahiliyya*¹³⁶, and advocated the waging of *Jihad* in order to return the country to the "right" path (Dialmy 2000; Seniguer 2013). The main target for the *Chabiba's* vitriol was leftist organizations, guilty in its eyes of being miscreants and/or atheists. This discourse was, however, kept within the confines of the clandestine faction of the organization, which was known as *Fassil al-Jihad* (Faction of Jihad); while simultaneously, the official association was claiming its pacifism and apolitical focus on religious education as its principal mode of action (Dialmy 2000).

After competing with the leftist movements for members amongst the disaffected and on the university campuses, the *Chabiba* decided to deal a significant blow to its leftist enemies. On the 18th of December 1975, the prominent USFP leader, Omar Benjelloun, who had already survived a parcel bomb attack two years ago, was stabbed to death by two attackers affiliated with one of Moutii's *Chabiba* cells. Like most events of this sort, the truth is often difficult to parse, and while the *Chabiba's* implication is hard to deny, many suspect that the attackers were manipulated by the security services into assassinating Benjelloun.

¹³⁶ A religious term referring to the pre-Islamic era and its alleged immorality and ignorance. A symbolically charged concept as it can serve to legitimize the usage of violence.

The second significant Islamist opposition group to make its appearance was the group started by Abdessalam Yassine. Unlike most typical Islamist movements, Yassine's movement was built upon a Sufi background. Yassine himself had been a member of the *Butchichiya* Sufi order before leaving it in order to establish his own movement. Professionally, Yassine, who was like Moutii employed in education where he had held the position of inspector of Arabic language education, had put an end to his career in 1967 for medical reasons. Soon after that, he joined the *Butchichiya* order. While Yassine came from a relatively modest background, born into a Berber agricultural family, he nevertheless had some embodied religious symbolic capital as his family was viewed to be of *Idrissid* Sherifian descent. Born in 1928, Yassine went to the same school as Abdallah Ibrahim or Mohamed Fqih Basri in Marrakech. However, he apparently did not get involved at any moment with the nationalist movement; a fact often used to criticize him.

Yassine's first public action, designed to steal the limelight, was his penning of a 144 pages long open letter addressed to Hassan II, titled "*al-Islam aw at-Toufan*" (Islam or the Flood), in 1974, wherein he called upon Hassan II to "reform" the state in a way more aligned with Islamic principles, dissolve political parties, and rule Morocco along with the army and Yassine as his religious guide. While it brought him instant

fame and prominence, the letter cost Yassine dearly, as it led to his imprisonment for four years, most of which was spent in a psychiatric institution¹³⁷.

Thus, by 1975, Morocco was beginning to see the emergence of an alternative form of political opposition, distinct from that associated with the national movement organizations. Given the reliance of this form of opposition on religious capital, and its attempts at converting it into a form of political capital, it is important to analyze the state of the Moroccan religious field around that period.

Even more so than in the political field, the monarchy was by far the most important actor in the post-independence religious field. While the field used to be relatively autonomous and quite central during the pre-protectorate era, with the Ulema and other figures rich in various forms of religious symbolic capital serving as a sort of counterweight to the Sultan's influence, the religious field in the post-independence era was quickly taken over by the monarchy. Nevertheless, it was the passage of Allal el Fassi at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs from 1961 to 1962, which was viewed by the young Hassan II as a way of shoring up a perceived deficit in the religious symbolic capital held by the monarchy during that period, that marked the beginning of the modern state's efforts at controlling the religious field in a more direct and bureaucratized fashion that would "establish total control over society" (Leveau 1980, 275). Given the history of the PI-monarchy relations, El Fassi's plans were received

¹³⁷ In deciding to intern Yassine in a psychiatric institution, It is said that Hassan II had reasoned that such an act could only be done by a mentally ill person. Whether this is true or not, it presented the advantage of being quite a summary procedure that was also aimed at discrediting Yassine.

quite apprehensively by the monarchic camp (Leveau 1980, 275) and viewed as a new attempt by the PI to establish itself as the dominant political actor via control over the religious field that it would then leverage along with its political capital to contest the monarchy's predominance. The plans were subsequently dropped, along with the PI's participation in government¹³⁸. Nevertheless, the main ideas were later on recuperated by the monarchy, which appeared as if it was reawakened to the political importance of ensuring its control over the religious field.

The monarchy's takeover of the religious field took place through a combination of strategies. First of all, the monarchy made sure to diffuse the power previously held by the famous Qarawiyyin religious university. The 1200 years old institution of Islamic learning, situated in Fes, had a long history as a focal point for both Islamic learning in the Maghreb, as well as for the emergence of religious opposition figures. Since the protectorate, and throughout the early years following Morocco's independence, the university and its student body were "almost entirely following the *Istiqlal*" (Leveau 1980, 274)

Its importance in pre-colonial Moroccan politics cannot be overstated, as the support of Ulemas from the university was crucial to ensure a sultan's legitimacy, and

¹³⁸ As noted by Leveau (1980), the timing of these reforms mattered as well for their non-implementation, as they came during a highly contested period, when the focus of both the government and the opposition was on other issues, such as the structural reforms and the institutional and political consequences of the country's first constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections.

to advise and at times oppose his policies if deemed contrary to Islamic principles. A radical example of their political sway can be found in the years prior to the establishment of the French protectorate when the Ulemas withdrew their support for the Sultan Abdul'aziz, and instead pledged their allegiance to his brother Abdelhafid who overthrew him and took the throne in 1909.

The solicitude of the sultans to the Qarawiyyin and its students in pre-colonial times was put on display on a yearly basis during the *Sultan et-Tolba* festival (Sultan of the students)¹³⁹, where one student from the institution would be chosen to play the role of the Sultan for a week while being provided with a court and guards from the real sultan. At the end of the week, the student's sultan was traditionally granted a request by the actual sultan, such as the liberation of a prisoner. The celebration of this yearly event would continue until their cancelation by the king in 1968, replacing his ritual interactions with religious scholars within the more controlled and limited framework of the "Hassanian lectures"¹⁴⁰, (Zeghal 2005).

After independence, the monarchy made sure to work on bringing the religious field and the Qarawiyyin under its control. The first steps taken towards the weakening of the Qarawiyyin were the creation of competing institutions and a reduction in its

¹³⁹ A number of detailed ethnographic accounts of this precolonial celebration are available, for a detailed description of the ceremony, see Doutte (1905).

¹⁴⁰ In arabic *Addurus al Hassaniya*, where a yearly lecture series given by religious scholars in the presence of the king and at his invitation on various Islamic topics during the month of Ramadan.

funding. The creation of the country's first modern university, the Mohamed V University in Rabat, and its prioritization in terms of funding at the expense of the Qarawiyyin, and the later creation of the Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya in Rabat, as well as the reclassification of the Qarawiyyin as an undergraduate institution drastically reduced its relevance and influence (Zeghal 2005; Waincott 2013). Additionally, the reforms also made sure that the student body would be geographically divided through the creation of campuses in other cities and that the institution would lose its appeal by classifying it as an undergraduate institution that could not confer the title of Alim upon its students (Zeghal 2005). Around the same time, in 1963, the Ulema were also assimilated within the state's administration, losing the degree of autonomy they had previously enjoyed (Waincott 2013). The Ulema were in no position to resist the monarchy's efforts at their subordination, as the involvement that many of them had in the past with the protectorate authorities had greatly tainted their reputation for autonomy and eroded their symbolic capital, including with the nationalist movement opposition parties and the population (Tozy 1980, 224–25).

In other words, by the 1970s, the monarchy held a strong control over the religious field, which had lost the relative autonomy that characterized it in the pre-colonial, and to some extent, the colonial era as well. Simultaneously, the religious capital, which had high convertibility and value on the political field, lost its sway in the post-independence era in the face of the increased prominence allotted to nationalist symbolic capital, both in its embedded and institutionalized forms. As a result, the only holders of religious capital to have some degree of political relevance were generally

those who were also endowed with nationalist symbolic capital through their affiliation with either the PI or the UNFP. This erosion was further enshrined following the 1962 constitution and its establishment of an agnatic primogeniture succession system that deprived the Ulema of the most symbolic political role they had, namely the selection of a successor after the death of a monarch. Their assimilation within the state administration made official the field's loss of relative autonomy, by turning the Ulema into remunerated employees of the state, under the control of the monarch.

In the meantime, the increasingly visible consequence of the monarchic domination of the religious field and its deactivation as a locus for political dissent was the near-monopolization of the use of religious capital on the political field by the monarch. As a consequence, the monarchy felt secure in shaping the social field, through the education system, in a direction that would grant more sway and relative value to religious capital throughout it. Increasing the hours allotted to Islamic education throughout the school curriculum and at all educational levels, conditioning access to the public school system with a record of attendance at the *msid* (small private qur'anic schools)¹⁴¹; in conjunction with other processes such as the push for Arabization of the educational system championed by the PI amongst other, all worked towards the increasing valuation of the monarchy's religious capital throughout the national social space. Given the crucial role that early education plays in shaping individual habitus, the long term political and social impacts of the increasingly conservative and religious curriculum cannot be overstated.

¹⁴¹ This decision was announced by Hassan II in a televised speech in 1968.

Thus, the emergence of Islamist movements and political actors came within a context of increasing religiosity and conservatism within the social space. This increase in religious conservatism synergizes with the developments that stemmed from an exogenous factor, namely the Arab defeat during the Six Days war against Israel, and the disastrous impact that it had on the credibility and appeal of Pan-Arabism and other relatively secular leftist ideologies. The heteronomization and bureaucratization of the political field by the monarchy played a role as well, in that it had created a vacuum by deactivating the Ulema's roles as intermediaries. As Tozy (1980) observes

This resignation by the Ulema, wished for at first by the public authorities as it facilitated the monopolization of symbolic production by the monarch, created an ideological vacuum with unpredictable consequences. In fact, it is the *Ulema's* loss of credibility that facilitated the creation of the conditions necessary for the emergence of (religious) counter-currents. (1980, 225)

Additionally, the monarchy under Hassan II actively favored the fragmentation of the religious field, as a way of ensuring that it would not develop as a contestation locus. The fragmentation was encouraged and achieved through the creation of competing centers of religious capital acquisition, all tightly controlled by the monarchy (Zeghal 2003). While the Ulemas could technically still choose to be independent, the fact that the monarchy had taken over the religious endowments (known as *Habous*) that used to financially sustain their independent status prior to the protectorate made it difficult. By also integrating them into clientelistic networks tightly connected to the makhzen instead, thus tying their interests to itself, the monarchy made it unlikely that the

Ulemas would go against its directives or seriously challenge its claims to religious hegemony¹⁴². The arrangement allowed the Ulemas within the institutionalized religious field to have a say on the legislative process, along with the financial and symbolic support of the monarchy, in exchange for their quiescence and/or acknowledgment of the monarchy's hegemonic position over Moroccan Islam (Zeghal 2003).

The emergence of groups leveraging religious capital as a basis for oppositional mobilization came within that context. At their core, these movements were contesting the monarchy's undisputed supremacy in the larger religious field, along with the validity of the official religious field's positions occupied by actors that they considered to be unwarrantedly dispensing religious legitimation to what they viewed as an un-Islamic state of affairs.

Thus, by the end of 1975, while the monarchy had managed to cultivate a degree of cooperation and even support within the political field and the national social space by leveraging the Sahara issue as a rallying point; political Islam, which remained outside the political field, was making its presence noted at the national level by two disruptive events: Abdessalam Yassine's public letter to Hassan II and the assassination of USFP leader Omar Benjelloun in 1975 by individuals connected to the *Chabiba*. The consequences of both events would be extremely significant over the development of the Moroccan political field, shaping the dynamics of rapprochement between the

¹⁴² More details on the processes of clientelisation and fragmentation of the Ulemas and the religious field, see Zeghal (2003; 2005)

Koutlah and the monarchy, along with the integration, or lack thereof, of new Islamist actors.

Throughout 1976, the intensification of the military conflict in the Sahara, opposing the FAR to the POLISARIO front and Algeria, further ensured the maintenance of the patriotism-fueled rally around the flag to the monarchy's benefit. The preponderant place given to the conflict by the press, in its military and diplomatic aspects, along with the increasingly negative coverage of the adversaries, was successfully maintaining popular mobilization and quasi-unanimous popular support for the monarch's plans in the Sahara (Santucci 1977). While it was a significant source of legitimacy for and a positive development for a monarch that not long ago was on much shakier ground, the popular nationalist fervor was also a source of pressure that closed out any other options (diplomatic or other) other than the establishment of full control over the territory.

Given those constraints, Hassan II had no other choice but to rely on the army that tried to overthrow him a few years ago. To minimize the risks, Gen. Ahmed Dlimi, who was viewed as the king's right-hand man at the time, was put in charge of the operations in the Sahara; while at the same time, the king worked towards balancing his unavoidable reliance on the military by attempting to revitalize the political field and cultivating new support bases within the wider social space. In addition to balancing against the military, the king's reaching out to the political parties and to the population was also viewed as an attempt to not bear the weight of the necessary costs, monetary and otherwise, that the war effort in the Sahara would necessitate. As such, Hassan II announced that the long-delayed elections would soon take place to ensure the presence

of an elected parliament that can serve as a buffer between the king and the potentially unpopular policies that would have to be enacted.

10. The Electoral application of the 1972 Constitution: A controlled return of political competition

a. The Communal Elections of 1976

In the political field, 1976 saw a reduction in the degree of state repression targeted at the Koutlah, and especially at the USFP. Ongoing political trials targeting leftist activists took place in a relatively more lenient atmosphere and often ended with more clemency being shown in the sentencings (Santucci 1977, 369)

The first elections to take place since the failed coups, and since the reestablishment of relatively improved relations between the monarchy and the political parties, were the communal elections of 1976. These elections were preceded by the appointment of a national council in charge of ensuring the fairness of the procedures, along with a new text of law broadening the attributions of local councils (Santucci 1977, 373). Both of these reforms were demands emanating from the political field's actors, opposition and loyalist parties included. Only Ibrahim's UNFP viewed these reforms as insufficient and consequently decided to call for a boycott of the communal elections.

While there were a number of complaints regarding interventions by the administration in favor of the state's preferred candidates, the limitations placed on the opposition parties were comparatively limited. The electoral campaign took place in an overall more liberated climate, with the PI and the USFP being allowed to conduct their campaigning activities in a relatively less repressive climate¹⁴³.

The most significant issue was related to a relatively new trend, namely the dramatic increase in the percentage of "independent" candidates, with no partisan affiliation. First, they numbered around 20.000 candidates, close to half the total number, and they reportedly consisted mostly of local notables and individuals connected to the state, with only a few of them being sympathizers of the opposition parties (Santucci 1977, 373). Another issue that irked the political parties was that some of those that ended up winning their seats as an independent had often been running for the parties in the campaigning phase. This was quite significant given that the independents took the majority of the seats, with candidates affiliated with political parties (opposition or loyalist) only winning one third of the seats.

The poor performance of political parties showed that political capital remained quite devalued across the social space and that many voters appeared to mobilize more around individuals endowed in locally-relevant forms of capital, rather than in the institutionalized form provided by political party affiliation. In the case of opposition

¹⁴³ It must be noted that the requests of the parties to broadcast their campaign messages on the national radio and television were denied.

parties, their performance was not all that disappointing considering the many years of state repression that they and their supporters were subjected to. The PI came first in the number of seats won by a political party; the USFP came in the third position, and the UMT and PPS in the fifth and seventh positions, respectively. For most of the Koutlah, these elections were primarily about testing their reach and strength in the different provinces. The fact that these were local elections meant that the campaigning was done mostly on local level practical issues (Santucci 1977, 378), as opposed to a concern with visions over the way that the political system ought to be organized as a whole.

The provincial and prefectural elections that followed further confirmed the trend, unsurprisingly, of “independents” domination. In these elections, they managed to win 369 out of 513 seats. The party ranking was similar to the communal elections, with the PI coming first, and the USFP in the third position, with the Koutlah as a whole faring better in urban centers than in rural areas.

Both the PI and the USFP strongly protested the behavior of the state authorities, whom they accused of “falsification” and “direct interventions” and “blatant attacks against the elected” (Santucci 1977, 500). The parties further threatened to withdraw their participation from the upcoming parliamentary elections. Faced with that prospect and with a potential return to the pre-1975 situation of radical opposition, the monarch offers a small concession by replacing the Interior minister and appearing to take the opposition’s protests into consideration. In addition, he also renewed his invitation to the heads of the main political parties to join the government as ministers in order to

ensure the fairness of the elections. The invited were the leaders of the PI, the USFP, the MP, and the MPDC¹⁴⁴.

In the case of the USFP, the offer to have Bouabid join the government was met with general reluctance by many within the party, but accepted by the leadership nevertheless (Dalle 2004, 446). For the bases and lower-level activists within the party, the leadership's tendency to monopolize the decision process for such strategic and definitional decisions such as its secretive rounds of negotiations with the monarchy was increasingly unpalatable, especially that they were the ones bearing the brunt of the security services repressive outbursts (Ghazali 1990). Along with the party's leadership's decision to take part in the electoral contests of the year, the USFP party field, just one year after its official split from the UNFP to pursue a reformist path rejecting the use of extra-institutional means, was already showing signs of a new internal crisis brewing amongst its rank and file.

The elections of the professional, agricultural, and craftsmen chambers came soon after, and were, for the parties, yet another confirmation of the monarchy's unwillingness to play by the rules. The "independents" managed to win over 91% of the total seats at play in these elections. The reaction of the Koutlah was best voiced by the PI's leader, M'Hamed Boucetta, who deemed the elections to be "100% falsified" (Santucci 1977, 501).

¹⁴⁴ The PI was headed by M'hamed Boucetta, following the death of Allal el Fassi in 1974. the USFP by Abderrahim Bouabid, and the MP by Mahjoubi Aherdane. The MPDC was the party created by Abdelkrim Khatib, following his departure from the MP (Santucci 1977).

On the monarchic side, the successful results achieved by the “independents” were presented as a confirmation of the popular support that the king’s vision enjoyed, leading official newspapers to start coin and start promoting the ideas of “Hassanism” and “Hassanian democracy” as being the platform uniting all those independent candidates (Santucci 1977).

Campaigning for the legislative elections, which were the most important event of the heavily politicized year that was 1976, began on May 21st. The campaign was reportedly very heated both in terms of the political and economic context in which it was taken place, as well as in terms of the modalities by which it was to be conducted. Using a first-past-the-post voting method with a high number of candidates, the elections gave rise to a heated competition between the candidates (Santucci 1977, 503).

For the USFP, participation in itself was a heavily debated issue within the party, especially given the manner in which the two previous electoral events of the year were managed by the state. The case of the campaign of the party’s leader, Abderrahim Bouabid, in Agadir, a city in the southern province of Sous, is enlightening regarding the interplay of various local level and national political field dynamics, mediated by the emerging definitional struggle pitting the national leadership against the regional leaders and lower-level activists that were taking place within the USFP in itself. Mohammed Benhlal’s (1990) detailed study on the legislative elections in Souss provides a wealth of data on this aspect.

As mentioned before, the provincial federations had begun voicing their discontent early on, before the start of the electoral campaign. The Sous federations were at the

fore of that movement, stating their opposition early on to any participation in the year's elections; becoming even louder following their experience taking part in communal elections, which in their view, demonstrated the bad faith of the state authorities and their lack of commitment to what the party's leadership was referring to as the "democratic option" (Ghazali 1990, 269). The Souss province is significant for the leftist opposition as it has, since the early independence era and the schism within the PI, been viewed as a stronghold of the leftist party. For the region, as stated in a communique by the regional council representing the USFP in the region and published on December 12th 1976, electoral participation was to be conditioned by the declaration of a general amnesty by the state. The Sous sections thus decided to boycott the professional elections, as they viewed that these elections were legitimating the non-democratic principle that was the indirect election of a third of the unicameral parliament (Ghazali 1990, 270).

For the USFP leadership, this regional mutiny was a serious issue, as it was denting the party's credibility and leverage in its negotiation with the monarchy. The decision to have the party's leader Abderrahim Bouabid running Sous's main city of Agadir was likely motivated by that national-level concern of ensuring that the rebellious provincial federation would not go through with its boycott threats.

The electoral race in Agadir, pitting Abderrahim Bouabid against an independent candidate, Ahmed Ramzi, is yet another illustrative case of how conflicts between national-level concerns and local ones tend to play out in the Moroccan context. While Bouabid was a highly respected national opposition political leader, he was based in

Rabat and had no connections to Agadir or Sous in general. His candidacy was therefore based on the premise that the institutionalized political capital of the party, along with his personal embodied political capital that he accumulated through his political positions and trajectories at the national political field level, would be enough to win the race. On the other hand, Ramzi had respectable nationalist symbolic capital; both himself and his larger family were connected to the national liberation army: Ramzi as a medical doctor, and his father and father-in-law as weapons providers (Ghazali 1990, 276). Additionally, Ramzi was well known in the region, and through his position as its Chief Medical Doctor, and later during his tenure as health minister when he oversaw a significant extension of the region's health infrastructure (Ghazali 1990, 276), accumulated significant amounts of social and symbolic capital. Moreover, as he was originally from Souss, a region where ethnic solidarity always played an important role¹⁴⁵, Ramzi was able to speak the region's local Berber dialect and devoted much more time than Bouabid to the personal conduct of his campaigning activities in the region.

The USFP candidate and leadership, on the other hand, kept most of their attention on the national level political field dynamics, relying on their resonance locally both with the general population and with their own party members, which somehow blinded them to the local dimension and led them to make a number of significant mistakes. The most illustrative of these mistakes was the organization and holding of a 48 hours

¹⁴⁵ It is worth remembering that Soussi ethnic solidarity and competition against Fassis was a determinant factor in their siding with the UNFP against the PI in 1959.

teachers' strike in the region during the final examinations period, which reportedly alienated both the student body and their middle-class parents; as both viewed the strike as a poorly timed, politically opportunistic and academically harmful test of party discipline (Ghazali 1990, 278). On the other hand, the independent candidate's campaign displayed more awareness of local cultural practices, drawing upon historically resonant local modes of artistic expression to appeal to the voters, reportedly swaying even card-carrying USFP members to come out in favor of the independent candidate (Ghazali 1990). This approach stood in stark contrast to the line adopted by the USFP campaign, whose ideological positions made it insist on portraying the region's local cultural specificities as a form of separatism, with Bouabid himself unwisely referencing to those harboring such sympathies as "nostalgic of the Berber *Dahir* and dividers of the country" (Ghazali 1990, 278).

Again prioritizing the labor field, the UMT, despite its officially oppositional positioning along the Koutlah, did not grant its support to the USFP candidate. However, this was more expectable, as the relations between the two organizations' leaders remained tense, with many personal and political rivalries lingering¹⁴⁶, resulting in many of its supporters voting for Ramzi against Bouabid.

¹⁴⁶ As previously observed, issues of syndical autonomy remained since independence a significant roadblock for cooperation between the two organizations, and were further compounded by the souring of relations between Mahjoub Ben Seddik and the UNFP-Rabat leadership (which later became the USFP).

Ironically, the monarchy and the administration had reportedly wanted to have Bouabid, the USFP opposition candidate, to have a seat in the parliament, as it would serve in increasing its claims of legitimacy and further its aims of rapprochement with the opposition in view of forming a national unity government, by committing the party to the institutional game. Thus, the situation in the Agadir electoral race was a confusing display of misalignment of priorities for multiple actors invested across a number of relatively autonomous fields. In fact, the independent candidate, which is usually the authorities' favorite and the recipient of their "unofficial support", was in this case, the one more worried about losing the race due to some foul play by the state (Ghazali 1990).

In addition to the impact of field dynamics, the structural changes that took place in the region helped transform the region's political outlook as well, especially as expressed through the transformation of the population's habitus and the capital exchange rate at the local level. Whereas the enclaved region previously valued the culture of national resistance associated with the Liberation Army, the transformations that took place in the two decades following independence greatly reshaped that setup. Migration of the region's poor peasantry to the bigger cities, facilitated through interpersonal patronage networks and usually through involvement in small scale commercial enterprises, was a big factor in reshaping the local fields' relations with the larger national ones, consequently transforming many of the local's habitus and increasing their valuation of social capital as opposed to its more institutionalized political forms.

Coupled with the repressiveness of the authorities against opposition candidates in other parts of the country, Bouabid's campaign and his ultimate defeat had a significant impact on the USFP's internal dynamics, and thus on the opposition's. Mainly, it further increased the salience of the boundary separating the party's leadership in Rabat from its bases and youth across the country, reducing the mass appeal that was its main source of institutionalized political capital, its only valuable negotiating card in its ongoing talks with the palace. The elections also revealed tensions within the various components of the Koutlah, as its composing parties, despite previous coordination plans, ended up competing and, at times, attacking each other, both through the press and in altercations between campaigning party members. Internal tensions within the Koutlah would come to the fore following the elections, with the PI voicing its willingness to participate in the government, and the USFP returning to the opposition after having voiced its "consternation with the results" (Dessaints 1978, 506).

It is worth noting that throughout the 1977 elections, the "independent" candidates, who mostly ran on a non-oppositional, monarchist platform, were, in theory representing and receiving the support of the authorities. This strategy was different from that adopted by the monarchy for the first parliamentary elections, where its supporters were organized under the loosely federated FDIC movement led by A.R. Guedira¹⁴⁷. During the 1977 elections, the independents were not as organized, and there were often a number of "independent" monarchist candidates running in the same district, in competition against one another. These different candidates often represented

¹⁴⁷ See above p.163 for information on his background.

different local level state actors¹⁴⁸ (Ghazali 1990), trying to advance their own local level personal agendas. While this did serve in diluting the races and reducing the number of votes received by each candidate, including opposition ones, they did, in some cases, prove to be counterproductive and complicated the authorities' national level priorities.

b. The New Parliamentary Setup:

By 1978, and following the previous year's electoral events, the political situation was beginning to change noticeably in comparison with the previous post-coup arrangement. The most significant change dynamics were the ones taking place on the political field, and the consequent reshaping of the opposition field that resulted from it.

Drawing the lessons from that experience, the monarchy deemed it preferable to organize its "independent" supporters within a more institutionalized framework. This idea was already being mentioned around in official journalistic analysis that noted the independent candidates' embodiment of the logic and ideals of the new "Hassanian Democracy".

¹⁴⁸ Benhlal (1990, 266) reports that there were candidates supported by the *pacha* (local authority at the rural commune level), as well as other supported by the governor (provincial level authority).

Ahmed Osman¹⁴⁹, who was already the prime minister since 1972, becomes a key figure in that period, as he was both charged with forming the new government and with heading a new party regrouping the independents. This party, named the *Rassemblement National des Indépendants* (RNI), would constitute, along with the MP, the backbone of the new governmental majority. As a palace insider, Osman was trusted by the monarch. His new government, which included some ministers from the PI, represented a partial success for the monarchy's efforts at shoring up the system's legitimacy through the ensuring of the opposition's participation in the government. This majority was not a strongly disciplined one, and conflicts often irrupted at various levels within it.

As reported by A. Azerdane (1978), the newly elected independent members of parliament came from different backgrounds, and as a result, often had differing interests and positions. The party's 144 members of parliament were relatively young, with 82 of them under the age of 45. They were also, in their majority, relatively well educated and belonged to the higher social classes; and geographically representative of all the country's provinces (Azerdane 1978, 247). The prospect of forming a political party was not that appealing for them as the partisan discipline that it would entail could conflict with their primary interests in using their parliamentary status as a way to strengthen their respective positions within their respective local fields, which they were more involved in and generally tended to prioritize. In fact, many of the civil servants and teachers elected under the independent label had positions and convictions that were often at odds with those of the large landowners or business-owning whom they shared

¹⁴⁹ See above p.163 for information on his background

that label with. The former group often had reform preferences that reportedly shared more affinities with the opposition's positions (Azerdane 1978, 249).

Within the governmental majority, the organization of the independents into a party was received with some apprehension. The MP viewed the newly created RNI as a threat to its position within the political field and as a potential competitor for the same constituencies¹⁵⁰, unfavorably comparing the new party to the FDIC through its press. As for the PI, its newspapers described the RNI as a party whose main purpose was to serve as a “gateway towards ministerial positions” (Azerdane 1978, 250), and its representatives were noticeably absent from the RNI's inaugural congress that they were invited to attend.

As for the opposition, both the USFP and the PPS considered the party to be yet another artificial party controlled by the administration and aimed at repeating the experience attempted with the FDIC during the first parliament. A prominent member of the UNFP's national council, Maati Bouabid, accepted to join the government as minister of justice, getting swiftly expelled from the party in the process (Dessaints 1978).

¹⁵⁰ In a number of districts reputed for being MP bastions, the party decided to not run any candidates and instead advised its supporters and clients to vote for the independents. Following the creation of the RNI, the new party reportedly tried to build contacts with these constituencies when organizing its regional congresses, an intrusion that strongly irritated the MP (Azerdane 1978, 252).

In addition to their original qualms about the creation of the RNI, the parties composing the new majority faced a number of issues that put their overall cohesion into question. The MP's positions on the promotion and usage of the Berber language and culture, and on the mismanagement of public institutions were harshly criticized by its coalition partners who compared the first demands to the colonial "Berber Dahir" and denounced the second as a violation of the government solidarity principle (Azerdane 1978).

The first parliamentary session being mostly focused on the elaboration of the new parliamentary institution's internal rules, it led to interesting cases where coalitional cohesion, and even intra-party loyalties, were put to the test. An illustrative case can be found in the vote over the ability of members of parliament simultaneously holding ministerial positions to cast their votes within parliamentary commissions, a proposal that was successfully opposed by the outnumbered opposition (USFP) after a number of independents rallied to its positions against it (Azerdane 1978, 257). A similar dynamic unfolded over the usage of colored labels for parliamentary votes, a measure that saw both the MP and the PI side with the USFP against their independent coalition allies.

Thus, following these new elections, the Moroccan political field seemed to be on the way towards a rearrangement, with the appearance of a new set of pro-monarchy elites organized within the RNI, regrouped within a formal, yet somewhat loose coalition, with the MP and the PI. Within the parliament itself, the main opposition actors that this majority was facing were the USFP and the PPS. While the opposition's numeric inferiority severely limited its ability to achieve any radical change through its

participation, it did ensure that it regained a certain degree of legitimacy as a political actor, which was hoped to be a first step towards a cessation of the severe repression that they faced in the previous years. As for the monarchy, the victory of the independents, and the decision of the PI to integrate the governmental coalition was a significant step towards the reestablishment of a semblance of autonomy within the political field, a development that was viewed as a way of increasing the monarch's legitimacy, including within elite circles, and reducing his direct exposure to the costs that the enactment of unpopular but necessary policies required.

Beyond the actors involved within the parliamentary institution, the opposition field saw a lot of new developments in that period as well. A number of leftist groups remained adamant in their opposition to participation within the framework offered by the monarchy. Many leftist militants, especially those affiliated with Marxist-Leninist groups, remained a target of the state's harsh repression campaign. These groups rejected the approach adopted by the USFP, and at times contested the positions adopted by all the institutional actors regarding the Sahara issue, a fact that was leveraged against them by the authorities to legitimate their repression. The efficiency of that approach was evident as a number of leftist opposition lawyers, often aligned with the USFP, refused defending those of the arrested who did not share their views on that issue.

This beginning of a fragmentation of the hitherto relatively solidary leftist opposition field was yet another positive side-effect for the monarchy's patriotism based union strategy. The monarchy succeeded in convincing the opposition to rejoin the

political game with minimal concessions and while also buttressing its own popular legitimacy in the process, through both the regaining of nationalist credentials and the measures associated with the limited reopening of the political field¹⁵¹. While the reliability and impact of the institutional concessions promised were yet to be confirmed, their direct impact was already improving the relationship between the monarchy and the major opposition actors.

c. Party-level Reflections of the New Political Field Positioning

Within the political parties, the above-mentioned reshaping of the political field had significant impacts on their internal dynamics. These changes were reflected most noticeably in the congresses held by the main political parties in 1978.

The PI's 10th congress provided an opportunity to look at the internal impacts on the party that made the most significant change of position within the political field, by moving from a member of the Koutlah opposition group to the majority coalition. During that three days event, the party adopted resolutions that “showed a tendency in some fields towards a pure and simple alignment on the government’s theses” (Santucci 1979, 392). The congress also displayed a softening of the hitherto irredentist claims that the party had championed regarding the Moroccan-Algerian border, instead of issuing a call for a united Maghreb that would transcend those “artificial

¹⁵¹ Through measures like the comparatively less manipulated electoral contest, or the abolition of official censorship for the national newspapers, in March 1977.

borders”(Santucci 1979). The party also voiced its rejection of “foreign ideologies”, instead calling for a return to Islamic principles and to the doctrine of “Egalitarianism” previously developed by Allal el Fassi, championing a classless society and rejecting leftist notions of class struggle. The doctrinal report presented by the party’s secretary-general Mhamed Boucetta expounding the idea of Egalitarianism relied mainly on Islamic references to support its claims, namely citing the examples of the Rashidun Caliphs and the thought of Islamic scholars Al-Shatibi and Ibn Hazm (Rapport doctrinal de M. Boucetta, “Documents Maroc” 1979). The reliance on religious sources as a base for the “egalitarianism” it advocated and their explicit contrasting with the principles advocated by the left provided for the party a way to avoid alienating either of its wealthier supporters or those with more modest social origins. Thus, at its core, while its positions changed towards a more conciliatory attitude towards governmental programs and ideals, the PI maintained a certain degree of oppositional language through its discourse and practice vis-à-vis the administration¹⁵². Finally, the congress also saw the election of new leadership organizations, which allowed for the access of a younger generation that was born during the 1940s and represented the PI’s “second

¹⁵² As reflected in its opposition to some laws championed by the majority, and in its direct calls for “cleaning up the administration” and criticism of its abuses towards some of the party’s membership (Rapport doctrinal de M. Boucetta, *Annuaire de l’Afrique Du Nord* 1979).

generation, that of independent Morocco” to leadership positions within the party (Santucci 1979, 393)¹⁵³.

The MP held its National Council as well in 1978. While its position in support of the monarchy remained unchanged, its congress did reflect some of the dynamics occurring within the party in reaction to the perceived threat of the RNI to its position and constituencies. The main change was the reformulation of the party’s discourse from one focused on rural issues and regionalist rhetoric to one centered around appeals for a defense of the middle class and opposition to prevalent monopolistic practices. For the MP, policies favorable to the middle classes and small enterprises were necessary, along with the dismantling of both public and private monopolies. These demands were not very different from those expressed by the RNI during its constitutive congress and can be viewed as the MP closing gaps that could allow the newcomer to poach some of its constituencies and threaten its regional strongholds. The party also maintained its traditional position in favor of greater recognition of Berber cultural rights. At the level of its membership, the MP was reportedly surprised by the numbers of new members it managed to attract during its council, as it reportedly sold over 70.000 new memberships in that short timeframe, and had more than double the attendance that it was expecting (Santucci 1979).

¹⁵³ Over the 15 members elected to the PI’s executive committee only 5 belonged to the first generation that witnessed the struggle for independence (Nouveau comite executif de l’Istiqlal, “Documents Maroc” 1979).

On the opposition side, the USFP held its third congress as well in August 1978. The party maintained its commitment to “scientific socialism” at the doctrinal level. It criticized what it called the government’s liberal capitalist economic orientation, blaming it for the increasing social disparities and pauperization of the lower classes and for increasing the country’s external debt (*Rapport de Synthèse du Bureau Politique, “Documents Maroc”* 1979). For the USFP, the economic alternative to be adopted is a socialist developmental plan focused on the country’s internal needs, agrarian reforms both in terms of land ownership and productivity structures, and on the democratic management of the public sector (Santucci 1979, 396). Overall this vision did not differ much from the traditional party line historically advocated by the Moroccan left. The main differences, reflecting the party’s decision to take part in the institutional political game, are found at the level of its opinions on the necessary political reform. Most noticeably, the persistent demand for a constitutional assembly that would be tasked with drafting a new constitutional framework was dropped. Instead, the party now argues in its General Political Resolution for a “strong, responsible, government representing the national forces” and for a move from a “presidential monarchy” towards a “constitutional, parliamentary, and democratic monarchy wherein the king would exercise an arbitrational role” (Santucci 1979, 396–97). While this softening of the party line ended up being adopted unanimously, it was reportedly limited in its concessions to the regime as a result of the opposition it faced from the party’s bases¹⁵⁴,

¹⁵⁴ The discussions, which were not public, lasted for more than 12 hours before an agreement could be finally reached.

some of which were more closely aligned with the more radical line associated with Mohamed Basri, while others generally remained wary of rapprochement given that they were still facing repression from the state¹⁵⁵. The party also reiterated its demands for a general amnesty for political prisoners.

d. The Labor Union field

A significant development in the 3rd USFP congress was the creation of a new labor union, the *Confederation Democratique du Travail* (or CDT). The new union was designed to be independent of the party, while also supportive of its general political line. This was an expectable development following the schism with the UNFP and the conflictual relations that opposed the UMT to the leadership of the USFP.

The creation of the CDT signaled the crystallization of the tensions opposing the UMT and the USFP on the labor field, which, as was mentioned previously, had often boiled over into violence. The CDT was created as a direct attack on the UMT, which it referred to as “the corrupted bureaucratic syndical apparatus”, and accused of collaboration with reactionary forces and non-respect of the rules set out within its own organizational statutes regarding the holding of national congresses (Adam 1979). More importantly, a high number of the founders and new adherents of the CDT came from

¹⁵⁵ Santucci (1979) reports that there were still around forty members of the party jailed, and a number of its leaders remained in exile. Interestingly, he also adds that the authorities censored the publication of the party’s General Political resolution in its newspaper.

the UMT, signaling the start of a conflict over the labor union field. The new organization was met with a certain degree of hostility by other unions. For instance, the CDT's calls for a general strike in the health sector were opposed by all the preexisting actors (such as the UMT and the UGTM). This marked the beginning of a strong rivalry between the CDT and the UMT, wherein each union would fight and try to sabotage the strikes called for by the other, and celebrates these failures in its respective press organs¹⁵⁶.

e. Student Unions: The UNEM reemerges.

Within the larger social space, the student union, UNEM, which was previously banned, was allowed back into existence in 1978. This allowance was both a part of the opening package of reforms that the monarchy decided to offer, as well as an attempt to have an organized interlocutor within the student field. This latter factor was a less risky prospect for the monarchy at this point, as the new generation of student's most urgent and insistent demands were expected to be of a more corporatist nature¹⁵⁷. While there were some student strikes in that year, they were triggered principally by issues such as examinations, expulsions, and financial support

¹⁵⁶ For instance in December 1980, the CDT celebrated the failure of the strikes called for by the UMT in various sectors (tobacco, railways, banking, etc) (Adam 1981)

¹⁵⁷ Many of those targeted by the above-mentioned state repression of Marxist-Leninist organizations were politically active members of the student movement. The UNEM had been very active as a locus of leftist politicization and political strike organizer since the mid-60s (For more details, see Clement H. Moore and Hochschild 1968; Adam 1973; 1979)

However, the exiled leadership of the UNEM rejected and questioned the sincerity of the state's supposed re-legalization of the union. The continuing detention of UNEM militants, labeled dismissingly by the state as "common criminals" instead of political prisoners¹⁵⁸, was one of the main issues. To draw attention to the jailed activists' issue, the union organized hunger strikes in 1979 in various European countries. A number of demonstrations took place in Morocco as well, where the student body was already angered by the king's decision to host the exiled Shah of Iran, soon joined by organizing strikes within the country as well (Adam 1980).

Meanwhile, in Morocco, the UNEM, with new leadership, was able to organize its first congress after a six years ban. The congress resolutions affirmed the student union's strong support for the Moroccan position on the Sahara issue and stated the readiness of the student body to participate in the defense of territorial integrity (Adam 1980). These declarations were especially significant given that these positions were diametrically opposed to those voiced by the organization at the time it was banned, and which were still defended by its exiled leadership. They showed that the new UNEM and the student body that it represented were sensible to the patriotic discourse around territorial integrity that was successfully deployed by the monarchy and that on that

¹⁵⁸ The case of Saida Menebhi, sister of UNEM's ex-president, who died in jail after a hunger strike in that period, became a symbol of that issue. The state's insistence as published in *Le Monde*, that Menebhi's death occurred in a hospital because of congenital heart disease (Adam 1979, 682), caused further outrage.

level, it showed a break in the hitherto domination of the organization by the more radical Marxist-Leninist faction.

Tensions reemerged and led to a number of strikes in the following year. The causes were both political and field-specific. The first strikes were related to developments in relation to the Palestinian issue, meaning they were mostly exogenous. The emergence of the leftwing Marxist-Leninist group *Ilal Amam* was followed by the expulsion and/or arrest of many of its members after their participation in student protest actions. The fact that *Ilal Amam* did not support the Moroccan position on the Sahara made their detention ignored by all the main opposition actors with a presence on the national political field. However, the UNEM, while reiterating its positions on the conflict, insisted on the release of the prisoners who were, in its view, only exercising their freedom of opinion (Adam 1982).

11. Economic crisis, Liberal reforms and the Weakening of Political

Consensus

a) Educational Sector Reforms and Strikes

That same year, the university reforms proposed by the government triggered a strong student mobilization accompanied by a number of strikes. Proposed by the PI minister Azzedine Laraki, the reform planned to make university admissions selective

and reduce their student intake. Scholarship amounts were also decreased despite the increase in the costs of living. The move was opposed by both the UNEM and UGEM, even though the latter was closely affiliated to the PI. A number of strikes occurred throughout the year, and the intensity of the mobilization, as well as its potential for politicization, was serious enough to draw the king's personal attention to the matter. Consequently, the monarch convened a special series of meetings with the concerned parties to reach a settlement. The UNEM withdrew from the process soon after it appeared that the concessions that the state was prepared to offer within the process were not satisfactory. This withdrawal was soon followed by a new wave of student strikes, which spread beyond the university campuses to affect high schools as well. Given the explosive potential demonstrated by that sort of mobilization to quickly escalate, the state responded swiftly through a combination of limited concessions and repression.

The Laraki reform, which also planned to create a number of new research institutions and training centers, was viewed as being detrimental to the interests of both the students and the faculty's interests. As a result, the UNEM and the *Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur* (SNE-Sup)¹⁵⁹ joined forces in opposing its implementation through joint mobilization and synchronization of their protest actions. The SNE-Sup was closely aligned with the USFP, and along with the UNEM, they were not solely focused on the direct impacts of the reform on their constituencies, but also

¹⁵⁹ It is worth noting that teacher-students were also affected by the reduction in scholarships (Adam 1982).

on the larger political implications it implied for the field. More specifically, they were considering that the end-goal of the multiplication of institutions was to weaken and divide the concentration of students and their solidarity by spreading them around a number of different campuses (Adam 1982). The UGEM did not support these strikes, probably due to its close ties to the PI.

The state responded to the various strikes with a series of repressive measures, arresting a number of UNEM members. This triggered a response on the political field, with the USFP calling for the liberation of the student activists. As for the UGEM, it began criticizing the positions of the UNEM, accusing it of “intellectual terrorism” in an allusion to what it viewed as its political exploitation of the conflict.

b) Political Consequences of the Economic and Political Tensions:

The financial impact of the continuing conflict in the Sahara over the country’s finances was noticeable in the increasing share of the country’s income allotted to military expenses. That reallocation came at the expense of other sectors, which affected the levels of public services. That same period was characterized by a severe drought that affected the country’s agricultural production (Jaïdi 1981), driving up the cost of basic staple products. As a result, the state had to resort to IMF loans (Jaïdi 1982). The consequences of this economic crisis and the measures taken to address it had a significant influence throughout the social space, sapping the fragile foundations of the post-1975 rapprochement between the various political actors.

Within the political field, the economic context further exacerbated tensions over two significant political issues: the extension of parliamentarians mandates by

referendum for two more years, and the approach to be adopted vis-à-vis the Sahara conflict. These two issues and the interactions that flowed from them had consequences that reverberated throughout the labor and student unions field as well as through the various political parties' internal fields, reshaping them in a significant fashion.

The USFP parliamentarians decided to boycott the assembly in reaction to the prorogation. The monarch took that as a direct challenge and asserted his dominance forcefully. He jailed the party's leaders (Bouabid, El Yazghi, and Lahbabi), and proceeded to make an argument appealing to both legalistic and religious bases to criticize the decision and justify the repressive response:

On that topic that we consider as extremely serious, more so that the loss of the Sahara or the abandonment of Sebta and Melilla, we will talk to you as well as to our dear people: It is the matter of the disdain towards the elections and the popular majority, of the disregarding of the collectivity's will, of the *Umma's* will... What are the consequences of this attitude? First of all, this attitude is contrary to the constitution and constitutes a hostile gesture towards the Muslim community. It puts us, in our quality as sovereign of this country, as commander of the faithful, as intellectual and moral guarantor of the national territorial integrity and of the normal functioning of constitutional institutions, in the obligation to ensure, by whatever means necessary, the good functioning of our institutions and to search for ways of putting an end to such casual acts.... We are personally very sensitive to the shameful character of the position taken by Moroccans who have been the first to have created such a constitutional problem.... Fate has decided that our country would be the first to offer such a case study for constitutional law, a case that definitely illustrates the casual

disdain by which a group has allowed itself to treat the entirety of the community and the opinion of all Muslims. If we allow this affair, it would mean that we are opening the way to anarchy... (Quoted in Dalle 2011, 560, translation my own.)

c) Referendums, economics, and political crises:

The king's decision to hold a referendum extending the tenure of the parliament by two more years exacerbated the divisions within the governmental majority. Focused on the Sahara conflict and negotiations with Algeria, the monarch decided to elongate what appeared to be a comfortable parliamentary setup that, with the PI's presence in the government and the USFP/PPS in the parliament, provided his position with a wider support base. In the hopes of striking a big bargain that would settle the Sahara conflict and its increasingly high budgetary costs, the king was not willing to risk the fragile balance with new parliamentary elections that would likely be expected by the opposition parties to be accompanied with more political concessions.

However, the PI, which had repeatedly stated that it considered that it deserved a higher number of seats, first assumed that the referendum would not be retroactive, but after that retroactivity was confirmed, it quickly voiced its opposition to it. This made it reposition itself along the USFP and PPS, who also rejected that referendum. It also began attacking the RNI.

The PI's attacks on the RNI were also motivated by the opportunity that it perceived in relation to the internal divisions that became increasingly prominent within that party. A very heterogeneous assemblage, to begin with, the RNI had a number of fault lines. The major one separated its more rural-based, agriculture and local issues

focused members on one side and its more urban industrial and commercial elites on the other. The two sides differed in their values and in the fields that they prioritized. For the first side, who took the label of “democratic independents”, the liberal austerity reforms that the government was engaging in were a threat to their holds on their local constituencies, which were generally poor and affected by high unemployment rates (Santucci 1981). The industrial/commercial elites of the party, who coalesced under the “liberals” etiquette with Ahmed Osman as their leader, were supportive of reforms that appeared set to positively impact their economic interests. Personal rivalries between Osman and other prominent figures within the RNI were also at play. The tensions were so severe within the party that the king’s intervention was twice needed to avoid an outright scission and to encourage the two factions to negotiate further (Santucci 1981).

Relations between the monarchy and the USFP deteriorated noticeably as well. The opposition of the party to the king’s decision to accept a referendum plan on the Sahara further complicated the already tense situation created by the social impacts of the government’s budget and monetary policy¹⁶⁰. Points of contention abounded, but they all related to what appeared from the party’s perspective to be a failure by the monarchy to respect the guarantees that it had offered the opposition within the grand bargain of 1975, wherein the opposition rejoined the political field, bringing much-needed legitimacy to the system, in exchange of democratization guarantees, and out of patriotism over the recuperation of the Saharan territories. Developments such as the

¹⁶⁰ The USFP accused the government of trying to print its way out of its debts through the devaluation of the country’s currency.

continuing harassment of USFP members by the state, the political implications of the referendum's usage to extend the parliament's tenure, the unsatisfactory and suspicious unfolding of the Omar Benjelloun investigation, as well as the economic liberalization measures adopted by the state¹⁶¹, all played a significant role in increasing the oppositions' mistrust of the monarch's reformist engagements.

Simultaneously, Morocco's economic situation was increasingly deteriorating over that period. The agricultural sector was severely affected by a continuing draught, reducing its productivity and increasing the pace of migration from rural areas into the cities. As for the phosphate sector, despite the increase in prices, its returns did not increase as much as hoped for, as other countries developed their productive capacities, too, thus creating more competitors for Moroccan phosphates on the global market (Santucci 1981). Consequently, the Moroccan government had to turn to the IMF and other external sources to fill up the gaps in its balance sheet, accepting a number of conditions and constraints on public spending.

Tensions flared up over the government's decision to increase the prices of a number of staple foods by a high percentage, and without going through parliament to discuss the decision. The reaction of the political opposition was swift and unsurprising. What was less expected was that the decision was rejected by a number of majority parliamentarians as well. The political unpopularity of the measures, which increased some basic prices by up to 85%, could not be overstated. In a subsequent intervention,

¹⁶¹ Such as the devaluation of the Moroccan Dirham.

the king later announced that the price increase would be half of the previously announced rates, along with an 8% increase in civil servants' salaries. Deemed insufficient, these concessions failed to gain the support of many political actors.

The UMT and the CDT, despite their rivalries, both called for strikes on the 18th and 20th of June 1981. The first strike, called for by the UMT and supported by the CDT, went on without any incidents. The two unions were demanding the annulation of the price increases. On June 20th, around 30 CDT union activists are arrested by the authorities (“Chronologie 1981” 1982, 800). As the day proceeds, the general strike turns into violent riots in Casablanca, necessitating a heavy-handed intervention of the army to reestablish order, deploying both troops and armored vehicles in the city. Victims ¹⁶² of this repressive episode were later dubbed as *Shuhada' Koumira* (or Bread Martyrs), as the price of bread affected by the increases in ingredients prices, was the main and most direct aspect that represented the steep pauperization of the general population that the government's reform entailed.

The Casablanca riots of 1981, aside from their human and economic costs, were very significant in that they decisively increased the distance between the monarchy and the oppositions. With the many thousands of people arrested, including a majority of the CDT's activists and leadership, along with USFP activists, and the interdiction of the leftist oppositions' newspapers, the break in the rapprochement was all but officialized.

¹⁶² Official sources report 66 deaths and 110 wounded. Other sources estimate the number of deaths to be between 600 and 1000. A number of mass graves confirming the higher estimations were found in 2005.

d) International Factors and their National Consequences

Within this tense social context, the king's decision at an African Summit in Nairobi to accept the holding of a referendum over Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara was to be the final straw for the post-1975 entente upon which the Moroccan political field was refounded. The USFP voiced a strong critique of the agreement accepted by the monarch, considering it to be a strategically mistaken and unnecessary concession. As a consequence, the party faced the ire of the state, which arrested many of the USFP's activists and its leadership, including prominent figures such as Abderrahim Bouabid and Mohamed El Yazghi, and sentenced them to jail terms for "inciting the people to disarray" and "impairing their attachment to the king's person" (Dalle 2011, 276), based on a controversial Dahir enacted during the protectorate period (Santucci 1982).

The implications of the Sahara referendum decision were not limited to the political field. The military, which was long considered to have been depoliticized following the reorganization and purges that occurred after the two failed coup attempts of 1971 and 1972, was rattled by the king's decision as well. While there were no statements made on the issue, the sudden death of Gen. Ahmed Dlimi in a suspicious car accident, and the arrests of a number of officers that followed it point to a potential plot by the

army¹⁶³. According to reports in *Le Monde Diplomatique* (1984), Dlimi had joined into a conspiracy led by younger officers opposed to the monarch's Sahara plans, and intent on making him abdicate in favor of a regency council. The plan was then to convince the Polisario of agreeing to a power-sharing agreement under Moroccan sovereignty and be part of a national unity government. The plot was preempted relatively early, but it did not improve the monarchy's trust in the military.

Thus, at the national level, of the king's decision to agree to a referendum in Nairobi had a direct impact on the relationship that he was rebuilding with the political opposition and with the military institution. Further complicating the situation, the increasingly dire economic situation of the Moroccan economy, and the imposition of IMF structural adjustment measures on it has limited the ability of the monarchy to contain the increasingly loud social dissatisfaction of the poorer population. It is within that context that the communal and legislative elections of 1983 and 1984 were to take place and highlight the influence that the above dynamics had on the political field and its actors' positions. However, and before moving on to the elections and their analysis, it is important to cover some new fields that emerged and began gaining importance within the Moroccan social space around that same period.

e) The 1984 Elections and the New Status-quo:

¹⁶³ "Tens of officers are arrested, especially in Marrakesh and the Rabat-Sale airbase, including Commandant Majoub Tobji, who was Dlimi's aide-de-camp, and Colonel Bouarat, chief of the Royal Guard's commandos." (Ramonet 1984)

With both legislative and communal elections taking place during it, 1984 was a very political year, in that it illustrated the transformations of the political and party fields in relation to the more recent developments that were affecting the positioning of the different actors in Morocco. The RNI, which was plagued by a number of internal dissensions from its early beginnings, was fragmenting, suffering a schism in 1982. The new party, the *National Democratic Party* (PND), was, like the RNI, an “administrative” party supported by the monarchy and the interior ministry. This support for the PND can be understood as stemming from the same logic upon which encouraged the creation of the RNI before. The ideal aim being the regrouping of the various monarchy-supporting social groups within a unified partisan structure, or, at a minimum, to further fragment the party field. The new majority built by the monarchy for the post-coup era was entering a period of relative flux, with the monarchy appearing to switch its strategy from one aimed at the domination of the political scene by its own clients, as it aimed at with the FDIC and RNI, to one more targeted towards the multiplication of loyalist actors. One potential reason for this change could be the difficulty of fusing sociologically diverse groups of clients within a single organization in a coherent manner. The differences between the groups have until then played a significant role in the weakening, incoherence, and often dislocation of the previous political parties that the monarchy had created and supported as a way to dominate the political field, such as the FDIC or the RNI, which often ended tied up in internal notable led factional struggles that numbed the parties capabilities on the political field, in a way that even a weakened opposition was at times able to profit from.

The road to the 1984 elections would provide further evidence of that change of approach, with the creation of yet another major administrative party, the *Union Constitutionnelle* (UC), under the leadership of Maati Bouabid. The latter was a member of the UNFP until he was expelled from it following his violation of the party's directives against participation in the Osman government, which he joined in as minister of Justice in 1977. He would then be appointed as prime minister in 1979 by the king, who tasked him with the creation of a new political movement advocating a form of "economic liberalism", which would later give rise to the UC, a new administrative party. As has been the case with the RNI previously, the newly created UC was quickly able to make an important electoral gain in the 1984 electoral elections, despite its somewhat recent official creation. The UC secured the highest number of seats overall, followed by the RNI. On the opposition side, the USFP came ahead of the PI, at the third position overall. These elections were especially punishing for the PI, as despite fielding the highest number of candidates, the party came in fifth in seats. The PPS and OADP¹⁶⁴, smaller opposition parties, managed to get a seat each.

Of course, these results are not to be viewed as those of free and fair elections, as there were a number of interventions from the authorities both before and after the vote. Rather, these results are informative of the state preferences and of the weight of various notable networks and their ability to influence and extract favors from the administration. The results achieved by the loyalist/administrative parties, with their slight differences in terms of policy preferences, can inform us of the options favored by

¹⁶⁴ A more radical leftist party created in 1983. Further details provided on page 344.

the state. As for the opposition parties results, they reflect mostly the ongoing exchange and negotiations taking place between the Koutlah and the palace, and the seats secured by the leftist parties reflects the monarchy's view of them as the principal representatives of the opposition and its insistent attempts at having them join the government to bolster the institution's legitimacy and obtain their support of the system. A similar sort of political goodwill show from the monarchy was viewed as being the most likely explanation of the ability of the PPS and OADP to secure their respective single seats (Claisse 1985). This brings the increasingly prominent role played by the ministry of interior to the fore. These elections saw a number of interventions, both before and after the actual vote, that highlighted the significance of that role in determining the results.

From the perspective of the monarchy, these elections had two principal aims, which were, at times, divergent. The first aim, which was often stated publically by the state and its allied actors, was that these elections would further the rapprochement process between the monarchy and the opposition actors, with the aim of having them participate in the institutions, potentially at the government level. The often-repeated claim was that the participation of the opposition in the government was desired by the monarchy as a way of furthering the process of "democratization" and of ensuring national unity aimed at the pacification of a tense social context and justified by the complex international issues facing the country.

The second strategic goal was noticeable through an analysis of the candidacies and results of both the opposition and the administrative parties in the 1984 elections. The

monarchy, through the state apparatus, tried to make sure that political parties would not be able to cultivate independent regional bases of support, and thus keeping them weakened and more pliant to its demands (Claisse 1985, 663).

In intervening heavily in the electoral process, the monarchy was rejecting the terms of the Koutlah and the USFP for participation in the government. Analysts viewed that in that rejection, the monarchy was also reasserting that it would not allow other actors to interact with it as equals, or in a transactional manner. Instead, it asserted that their only option was to adapt to the traditional *Makhzenian* rules of the game and ask for the monarch's favor without trying to impose any terms on him (Claisse 1985, 667).

f) New actors on the left: The OADP

The rapprochement between the monarchy and the leftist opposition in the early 1980s had some effects on the larger opposition field, in that it allowed for previously banned organizations and figures to legally organize and take part in the institutional political game. Such was the case of the *Organisation de l'Action Democratique Populaire* (OADP), which was created in 1983. The new party regrouped many of the people previously active with the banned "23 Mars" Marxist-Leninist organization. The central figure of the OADP was Mohamed Bensaid Ait Idder, who would be its only member to get a seat in the 1984 parliamentary elections. The OADP was allied with the USFP, which it supported through its newspaper "Anoual" when the latter's leaders were jailed and the party's candidates during the 1983 municipal elections, which it was not participating in. Its members were reportedly quite active on university campuses,

aiming to fill the void left by the gradual depoliticization of the UNEM (Santucci 1985). The organization accepted the state's positions on the Sahara issue during its first congress in December 1984, and in relation to the short-lived Morocco-Libyan union. It remained nevertheless quite vocal in its opposition to the economic and social policies, and the general liberal austerity line adopted by the state, and it staunchly defended a strengthening of the parliament's powers and independence for the judiciary branch (Santucci 1985).

g) Human rights and the Newly Autonomous Civil society field

That period of time was when the human rights discourse began increasingly gaining salience within Morocco, as well as on the global level. The creation of the country's first independent human rights associations epitomized that salience. Prior to that, it is important to note that there were two preexisting human rights NGOs, but they were affiliated with the main political parties. The first one was the *Ligue Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme* (or LMDH), recognized in 1973, was affiliated with the PI. The second one, was the *Association Marocaine des Droit de l'Homme* (or AMDH), created by the USFP in 1979. Both were at that the onset subordinated to their respective parties, with the leadership positions occupied by senior party members and their statements toeing the general party line.

The lack of autonomy in that period of the first human rights NGOs was on display on numerous occasions. The LMDH, for instance, was often publishing reports on the political trials targeting other opposition activists. However, as soon as the PI was back in the government, the LMDH stopped that practice (Sater 2007, 44). That, in turn,

played a significant role in motivating the creation of the AMDH by the USFP. For the AMDH, that lack of autonomy was on display in 1983. The NGO, which was mostly dominated by the USFP's more radical left wing, decided to sever its ties to the party and joined with a splinter faction that disagreed with the party's political bureau over participation in the upcoming elections. Then referred to as the USFP-Administrative Commission, the splitting faction, which would later become the *Parti de l'Avant-garde Democratique Socialiste* (PADS), successfully managed to take over the AMDH and associate it to their faction instead. While it became independent from the USFP, the AMDH did not necessarily gain autonomy. Instead, it became tied to the PADS and the new "radical left" political parties that were emerging at the time.

For the opposition political parties, the civil society organizations that were affiliated with them were viewed chiefly as a way of circumventing the heavy repression that they were facing within the political field. As the monarchy was limiting their ability to directly reach out to mobilize the population, the opposition parties decided to rely on their various affiliated "civil society" organizations to maintain their networks (Sater 2007).

According to Sater (2007), both the AMDH and the LMDH were, between 1982 and 1987, forced into a period of inactivity due to "massive repression" for the former and "political considerations" for the latter (Sater 2007, 53). This period played a significant role in paving the ground for the autonomization of the associative field. Thus, in 1989, the creation of the *Organisation Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme* (OMDH), as the first independent human rights NGO in Morocco, was a significant

milestone for the newly emerging civil society field. For many of the new breed of activists that decided to invest themselves in the new human rights NGOs, and in the larger associative field in general¹⁶⁵, independence from political parties was an important factor in allowing them to fully and efficiently campaign for their chosen causes (Sater 2007; Vairel 2014).

As it did with the political field, the associative field was also targeted by the state through strategies aimed at containing its oppositional potential. This was done through two main approaches: the modification of the legal frameworks and the creation of supportive actors within the field. The first strategy aimed at changing the rules of the game, which were until then less restrictive, based on the more permissive Dahir of Public Liberties of 1958. The new legal framework, instituted in 1973, made the creation of any sort of association dependent on a “prior declaration” being made to the Ministry of Interior, and that any association which would fail to satisfy that criterion can be either suspended or dissolved, with penal consequences¹⁶⁶ for its members (Ghazali 1990)¹⁶⁷. The second strategy deployed by the state was the creation of a

¹⁶⁵A number of causes were represented in this newly emerging autonomous associative field, along with human rights; some of the main issues include women’s right, Amazigh rights, and Islamic charities.

¹⁶⁶ Up to two years of jail and 10.000 to 50.000 Dirhams in fines.

¹⁶⁷ The prior declaration was previously optional, and only required for an association to enjoy the advantages of full legal capacity and/or public utility status. Under the 1973 framework, that step became instead a mechanism of control, as the authorities would often not issues the required receipt

number of supportive associations with ties to various state organism or notable groups. The “Regional Associations” illustrate this approach very well. These associations, which were often launched at the impetus of the state authorities, regrouped regional notables and supportive citizens around projects funded by the state and supportive of its general policy objectives; as the name indicates, these associations were focused on regional development goals (Ghazali 1990). For their members, these regional associations could provide a number of benefits, allowing them to connect with both the local notabilities and the authorities, gaining privileged access to various resources in the process, and improving their personal status. In addition to the Regional Associations, Ghazali (1990, 252), a number of other types of associations were created at the impetus of various state institutions, often maintained in a very “satellite-like” position vis-à-vis the institution, and mostly focused on cultural and social activities.

The main Political parties, in the opposition or otherwise, did not express much support towards this new form of organization. Understandably, they viewed the state-supported associations as a “factor participating towards the atomization of political life” (Ghazali 1990, 253). The strongest opposition was voiced by the PI leadership, which viewed these associations as promoting “regional chauvinism” at the expense of national unity, and furthering the creation of a “depoliticized society”, through the cooptation of its intellectual elites (Le Liberal March 1990, cited in Ghazali 1990, 253).

to associations even after they would have completed the prior-declaration requirements, thus keeping them in a judicial limbo that kept them under the constant threat of suspension/dissolution and legal pursuits (Ghazali 1990) .

Reflecting similar concerns, many of the other parties reportedly made sure to discourage their members from joining those associations. They did not, however, issue a complete interdiction, which was viewed as highlighting their awareness of the potential benefits that they could sometimes acquire for their constituents through these organizations. Overall, it was clear that for actors primarily involved in the political field, the emergence of professedly apolitical civil society actors, especially those sponsored by the state, was viewed as an emerging threat to their relevance, especially for non-administrative political actors trying to forward a democratization project.

h) Convergence of the different field-levels struggles

The simultaneous unfolding of the above-mentioned processes had the effect of reshaping the factors that made the post-1975 status-quo worth maintaining for the actors involved. For the monarchy, the main goals were that it needed to expand its support base within the political field, and allies to shoulder the costs for the austere structural adjustment measures imposed on it by external funding sources. However, it soon discovered that it did not urgently require the full support of the opposition, especially given the concessions that the Koutlah required from it. Instead, it found a more affordable strategy in partitioning the Koutlah by convincing the PI to take part in government, and by reorganizing its allies within the so-called “administrative parties. This approach proved to be sufficient in controlling the political game in a more indirect, relatively less repressive than before, approach.

On the political opposition parties’ side, the failure of their negotiations with the monarchy to extract any significant concessions was made worse by their increasing

inability to significantly and credibly impact the various forms of collective action that the population was resorting to in reaction to the increasing deterioration of social and economic conditions. The situation was especially problematic for the USFP, as the party's bases were increasingly under strain following the leadership's adoption of a more conciliatory approach towards the monarchy, while the repression targeted at the party's active members continued.

For the governmental majority parties, both the “administrative” ones and the PI, the new approach adopted by the monarchy was creating some problems. Having until then favored the creation of political “champions”, the monarchy now seemed to instead prefer the flooding of the political field with a number of distinct but equally loyalist new parties, each regrouping a different network of supportive actors. This change of approach, while reasonable in light of the repeated failure of the previous approach to achieving the desired results, was an unwelcome development for the older parties, and they voiced their opposition to the newcomers. The latter, when created, would often take names that reflect a variety of ideological and political stances, yet they often did not differ much in their actual politics, aside from a few superficial differences at the level of fiscal and other economic matters. While the RNI was often adopting a more standard orthodox approach to economic policy, with the state still maintaining a predominant developmental role, the newly-founded UC was advocating for an approach that favored the newer and more “fashionable” neoliberal set of policies focused on privatization and deregulation, in line with the approach encouraged by global money lending institutions such as the IMF.

As the 1984 elections unfolded and the results came in, the shape of the political field reflected the evolution of the country's political balance of power. The parties of the majority, mostly new and lacking in terms of real independent supportive constituencies and devoted cadres, depended mainly on the recruitment of local notables, which in turn brought in their own pre-existing clientelistic networks (principally in rural areas), and on the various forms of administrative support that the Ministry of Interior provided to them.

Chapter 5: Settling the field: Processes of cooptation and “*Alternance*.”

This chapter covers the interactions and developments that led to the final settlement between the monarchy and the main opposition actors in the Moroccan social space. It begins by setting up the context within which the settlement was reached, and then moves on to review the consequences of that settlement over the following decade in the Moroccan social space, with a particular focus on the transformations occurring on the political field and the form taken by opposition politics as a whole. In doing so, it will try to highlight the intricacies and details of the process through which the political field and its main actors were finally able to reach an agreement on the rules of the game and the costs that settlement entailed for the Moroccan political field and other relevant social spaces.

1. Increased Neoliberal reforms and Traditional revival (1985-1988)

The socio-economic situation in Morocco following the adoption of the IMF/IBRD recommended reforms had worsened significantly. The combined impacts of increased joblessness, a long and continuous drought since 1981, and the reduction in government spending mandated by international creditors for continuous financial support were severe. Unsurprisingly, this led to an increase in social upheaval, with a number of strikes taking place in that period. Regional disparities were exacerbated, and the influx of rural people to the cities in search of work increased.

These internal migrants would then settle down in the numerous *bidonvilles* shanty towns near the main urban centers, or in various unauthorized and unsafe illegal housing projects. For a time, the state viewed these areas as potential sources of trouble¹⁶⁸ and attempted to contain them and reduce their size through some resettlement projects. At the same time, the austerity measures required the state to cut off its subsidies programs that it ran for basic staple products (flour, sugar, oil, gas, etc..).

Given that such measures have, in the past, always been the source of major social upheaval¹⁶⁹, the government tried to negotiate their maintenance with the IMF. Proposing to instead freeze expenses on public workers' salaries and to reduce equipment expenses in the year's budget, the negotiators managed to gain the IMF's

¹⁶⁸ This approach would later be reviewed and illegal housing projects by local notables would become more tolerated given the opportunities for political control of the population that they facilitated.

¹⁶⁹ The 1981 riots being one of the most prominent exemplars of that.

permission to maintain the subsidy program in place. The technocratic government's satisfaction was short-lived, as a combination of delays in the allocation of funds from the IMF, and looming deadlines for debt repayment to the Paris Club, forced them to cut the subsidies in order to avoid defaulting on the debts (Santucci 1987). The subsidies cut led to the prices of basic staple products rising significantly, with the increase varying between 30 and 80% depending on the product (Santucci 1989). That increase was further compounded by the depreciation of the Moroccan Dirham, increasing the costs of imports. The opposition parties, as well as some of the majority/administrative parties, voiced their dissatisfaction and criticized the changes and their impacts. Yet, there was no major social upheaval, and the most significant reactions were limited to some strikes in the public sector.

On the political level, the post-1984 election developments impact were combining with the abovementioned social developments in affecting the positioning of actors and their strategies in the field. Reflecting the increasing primacy of the exogenous concerns associated with maintaining creditors' trust over national internal political concerns, the king decided to appoint a technocratic government. The decision disappointed many actors within the majority, who, despite their general dependence on the palace, were threatened enough by what that decision meant for their relevance to voice their dissatisfaction.

The RNI, the UC, and the MP all expressed their dissatisfaction with the new setup, in slightly different terms reflecting their own internal dynamics and position within the field. For the RNI, concerns were voiced in the mildest manner, principally

via Ahmed Osman, its main leader. In an interview to the magazine *Lamalif*, he expressed that he had some reservations on the privatization and neoliberal reforms promoted by the palace, and claimed that despite his deep personal connections to the monarch, he was independent and able to express his disagreements to him.

As for the MP, their disagreement came earlier than that of the RNI and was tied to the party's leader, Aherdane, rejection of the offer to participate in the new government. While Aherdane argued that it was because he did not want to have ministerial choices imposed upon him and his party, observers at the time were skeptical of that explanation (Santucci 1987). Many instead related it to the unwillingness of Aherdane, who controlled the party in a very personal manner, to associate the MP to the austerity measures without a more significant compensation for the likely popularity costs it would incur. This was very badly received at the palace, and it inaugurated, for Aherdane, a "fall from grace" period, where he was personally viewed as unwelcome in the palace, which had consequences on the MP as well. The decision of Aherdane having been made unilaterally, it served as a catalyst that activated a number of issues and a resentment that had slowly accumulated at the internal level within the party. His personal leadership style, based upon nepotism and clientelistic practices both inside the party and to score some gains for its constituencies, was less acceptable to the new and more educated generation of MP members. The state then built upon that resentment and indirectly encouraged internal opposition to Aherdane, and officially, through the

bringing up of police investigations into his management of the ONPT¹⁷⁰. Then later in 1986, the Interior Ministry denied Aherdane the authorization to hold the party's congress, before giving that right, a few months later, to the main opposition group challenging his authority over the party, led by Mohand Laenser¹⁷¹.

The UC also faced an internal crisis, with the staff of its newspaper going on strike over the firing of 30 technicians from their group (Santucci 1987). These reflected bigger tensions within the party, which was characterized internally by a lack of cohesion and conflicting orientations between the parliamentarian group and the rest of the party. Despite its official upholding of the values of neoliberalism, most of the party's membership was quite apathetic to the policies associated with that ideology. Instead, the main concern at the time was the internal struggle between Maati Bouabid and a group of other prominent figures in the party over control of the financing of the party's publications. The frustration of the palace with their internal issues became visible as it decided to cut off its financial support to the party's publications (Santucci 1987). As the party held its congress, observers were surprised that Bouabid was maintained at the helm of the party, as he was viewed as having issues with influential people in the palace, especially Driss Basri and Ahmed Reda Guedira.

¹⁷⁰ *Office National des Postes et Telecommunications*. The state institution in charge of postal services and telecommunications.s

¹⁷¹ MP member Laenser was minister of post and telecommunications.

On the opposition parties level, all voiced their rejection of the neoliberal direction followed by the country. Thus, both the PI and the USFP refused to take part in the government. Their critiques focused principally on the privatization plan and the reduction of subsidies, which were both required by the IMF, as well as the fiscal reforms proposed by the government. The OADP and the PPS shared the same positions as well. Unsurprisingly, labor unions were not in support of the austerity and privatization measures either.

The palace had at first sought to get the parties to take part in the government as a way of providing a sort of show of support for the measures, to convince the population of their necessity by presenting a unified political front backing them. As that did not succeed, the king went for a different approach, circumventing the parties, and instead tried to establish a different network of connections with the population. Royal speeches were increasingly focused on recalling the so-called “national constants”¹⁷², along with religious and patriotic themes and symbols. For instance, the parliamentary opening session held in Laayoune in the Sahara was one of such moves. So was the plan to hold the throne day ceremonies in the same city, but that was later canceled as it was problematic regarding the participation of foreign diplomats (Santucci 1985). Similarly, the palace also promoted a “decentralization” plan, wherein localities would be granted more say in the management of their affairs and receive a significant increase in funds allocated to them. This measure, along with the continuous support and promotion of

¹⁷² Islam, the Monarchy, and territorial integrity (i.e.: the Sahara).

the regional associations, often headed by figures close to the monarch,¹⁷³ served in creating an extra-institutional system through which the population could, in a way, connect to the state (Bras 1990), without passing by the mechanisms of representation and the parties/unions. A key element in this strategy was the Ministry of Interior. Its head, Driss Basri, was the central figure in charge of this system. His position was reinforced as he was also given control over the Ministry of Information, cementing his position as the new right hand of King Hassan and as the most powerful person in Morocco after him, having both the monarch's ear and a central institutional position within the state. Occupying that central position, Basri became the backbone and central node of the king's new *Makhzen* system, increasing direct contacts between notables and his ministry at all levels, mobilizing and involving them in the application of royal directives, in support of the technocratic government of the time.

Yet, the strategy of *Makhzen* reorganization was not supposed to totally sideline the political parties in the short term. That would have been technically problematic on various levels, internal and external. At the external level, the reform package advocated by the IMF/IBRD included political liberalization measures as a necessary

¹⁷³ Examples of the close connections between the regional association and the palace abound. For instance the Marrakech regional association was led by Mohamed Mediouri, personal bodyguard of the king and the head of his security service; the Rabat association by Abdelfatah Fredj, personal secretary of the king; while the Sale association was headed a councilor of the king, and that of Fes by the minister of public works (Bras 1990).

accompaniment of the economic ones¹⁷⁴. The state of the multiparty system was one of the main indicators the financiers would look at to assess those criteria. Internally, at the national level, the opposition political parties, while weakened in comparison to their heyday, were still a crucial component of the system, and the monarchy was relying on their acceptance of its predominance and of the general status quo since the coup attempts. That support, or lack of outright radical opposition, was a crucial element of the monarchy's approach to the passing of the unpopular financial and monetary measures it had to enact.

Later, however, in 1986, the King managed to convince the lending institutions to grant him some leeway in terms of public expenses. This was reflected in the budget of the year, as all budget posts increased in comparison to the previous years. The state investment program focused on infrastructural projects such as new train stations, ports, and dams, as well as some technology institutes. At the same time, that law included a provision for the instauration of a VAT on consumption. This made it less convincing

¹⁷⁴ Critiques of the public sector and advocacy for a withdrawal of the state from the economy to the private sector's benefit were increasingly prominent in the country. A significant early step in that direction were the reports ordered from the McKinsey consulting company in 1974, and that of Abdelatif Jouahri in 1980 (Catusse 2008). Jouahri was minister in charge of reforming public companies in 1978, and would become minister of finance from 1981 to 1986. He is the current Governor of Bank Al Maghrib, the Moroccan central bank, since 2003. The neoliberal ideas regarding privatization would quickly become dominant within the Moroccan administration's upper stratas, and the royal court.

for the parliament, as many MPs considered that such a tax was unnecessary and would be very unpopular, affecting the already minimal purchasing power of Moroccan families. These objections came from both the opposition and the majority parties as well. The budget was finally passed, but with a very minimal amount of support in parliament (Santucci 1987).

That relief was short-lived, and austerity returned with a vengeance in the following year. The budget bill for 1987 was the main focus of parliamentary activity, and political debates centered around it in the opposition press as well. The latter addressed critiques at the privatization projects and the laws that the government was going to pass to enact them. The budget that ended up being passed included 20% cuts to most budgetary post in comparison to the previous year. These cuts, along with the new set of taxes¹⁷⁵ that were passed to increase the countries revenues and which affected most social classes, were not very welcomed even by traditionally non-oppositional groups. One such group was the *Confederation General des Entrepreneurs du Maroc* (CGEM), the business association representing Moroccan entrepreneurs, which sounded like a labor union when it warned against the social consequences that such austerity measures could have (Santucci 1988).

While the opposition was critical of the plans, its critiques were more measured and timid than one would have expected. Though their press organs published critiques of

¹⁷⁵ These were the tax on companies revenues (the IS), the income tax on salaries (IGR), and the Value-added tax (VAT)

the ideological roots of privatization and of its potential consequences in terms of furthering the concentration of wealth at the expense of its redistribution¹⁷⁶, they made sure to keep their critiques not directed at the monarchy and at its central role in backing the project. One reason for this unwillingness to exploit the situation in a more political fashion was that the parties of the opposition were still unwilling to risk incurring the wrath of the palace. Despite the relative relaxation of the repression over the previous years, there was still a recurrent targeting of actors who were deemed to have crossed the line by directly criticizing the palace or its strategies and decisions regarding the Sahara.

a) Aspects of the re-organization of power at the micro-level: the politics of illegal housing

The economic crisis and the drought increased the exodus of rural people towards the cities in search of work, leading to the worsening of the housing crisis. Illegal

¹⁷⁶ As stated by Myriam Catusse (2008) “In it big lines, the privatization policy in Morocco is characterized by a redeployment of public power, and extreme control of the procedures by the central authority and particularly the Palace, and form of agreement within the current economic elites”. She further added that the procedures of privatization were a way for the economic elites to safeguard their interests and to solidify the political connections and networks of interests tying them to the state apparatus’s technocratic elites. This is further highlighted by the fact that most of the significant income earned through the sale of state assets would be kept out of the government reach and under the direct control of the monarchy within the Hassan II Fund.

housing projects, as differentiated from the shanty towns, increased during that same period, reaching a point where 13% of the Moroccan population was housed in such conditions (Zniber 1988). A characteristic of that sort of project was that the successful kind had to be undertaken by developers with high level and powerful connections in the state administration. The fascinating study of the phenomenon in the Sale area by Abdelghani (1986) highlights the dynamics at work in such projects and their political consequences and relevance at the national level. Without delving into the details on the housing regulations aspect, it is interesting to note that the regulations passed by the state to curtail the phenomenon had the reverse interest of encouraging it, with the outright support of other parts of the state apparatus that eased the hurdles of regularization for loyal notables. The result was the creation of areas that housed high numbers of people, that were in a legal limbo which placed them at the mercy and under the control of the notable who owned the land, allowed its development, and was the main interlocutor recognized by the state administration regarding the provision of services and utilities to the area which he still legally owned (Abdelghani 1986). This, in turn, ensured that the populations living in those areas would be both depoliticized and maintained in a situation of clientelistic support of the notable families, who drew on their votes to ensure that they would be represented and hold office at various levels of the administration, all the way up to parliament, often running under the label of one of the many administration/majority parties. The notables thus had their own support bases within urban areas, quasi-fiefdoms with some relative independence from the

local level state apparatus, often having enough power to bend the local level bureaucrats to their will¹⁷⁷.

b) Dimming political liberalization prospects and their consequences

A common incentive that was affecting both the opposition and the parties of the majority/administrative parties in that period was the expectation that the economic liberalization measures would be accompanied by political ones that would increase the powers and roles attributed to elected institutions. However, that did not happen, and the appointment of technocratic governments was viewed as a regression by the parties.

Consequently, many political parties voiced their disaffection towards the emerging status quo in ways that varied depending on their respective positions and interests. Within the majority, the UC was most vocal, focusing its critiques on the new code of investments as symbolic of the reforms that they opposed. Observers noted that the party's opposition was relaying that of the country's business owners and exporters to many elements in the law (Bras 1990). That positioning was maintained until the king's personal intervention in favor of the project, and though it did not modify the

¹⁷⁷ As the notables had access to, and often were part of, the new Makhzen extra-institutional setup, they had the ability to take matters beyond the local level and get the central Rabat authorities involved in the disputes. For the local bureaucrats, that was an outcome to be avoided, as they were assessed on their ability to settle issues locally without involving the central state apparatus. Thus, they often had to negotiate the enforcement of directives with local notables, often bending the rules to be able to reach local settlements (Abdelghani 1986).

content of the legal text much, it quickly made the UC change adopt a supportive position afterward.

The opposition, on the other hand, reactivated their plans to try and rebuild a new Koutlah group that would unite their efforts around a common platform. The efforts towards the concretization of that plan were mainly by the PPS and OADP. The prospects remained quite limited by 1988, as there was still a lot of unresolved issues, especially between the leftist parties and the PI, and among themselves over its inclusion and the details of the platform demands. This reflected in the way they conducted their oppositional activity in the parliament as well, as they focused their critiques of the privatization plan desired by the monarchy on the more technical and judiciary level rather than on its content, attacking its constitutionality. That approach had the added benefit of keeping them from appearing as too challenging vis-à-vis a plan strongly supported by the monarch. It was also viewed as being related to the upcoming elections of 1990. This softening of the critiques was also reflecting the divisions inside the party regarding the policy¹⁷⁸.

Unlike the previous years, 1990 marked a return of a more intense form of political contestation by the opposition actors. In a rare occurrence, for the second time in the country's history, the opposition parties tried to pass a no-confidence vote against

¹⁷⁸ Inside the USFP, the main division was between the CDT as the more ideologically opposed to the idea of privatization, and the prominent economists of the party who had a less radical position mainly critical of the procedural aspects, and the use to be made of the funds earned through it (See Catusse 2008, chap. 1 for a more detailed account).

the government. While it did not pass, it gave them the opportunity to attack the government and its policies in parliamentary sessions that were broadcast live to a large audience through national television.

The opposition took aim at many of the shortcomings of the government that it did not directly challenge in previous years. The PI particularly targeted the main components of the new parallel makhzen structures under construction to sideline the parties and elected politics, such as the new assertiveness of the Habous Ministry over the religious field and the regional associations promoted by the Ministry of Interior and headed by notabilities close to the palace, which is taken to task for promoting regionalism. On the left, the USFP focused on other issues such as the lack of coordination within the government and between the different ministries, while the PPS called for the formation of a national unity government (Santucci and Benhlal 1992, 721–24).

The degradation of living conditions increased further in that year as the currency was devalued by 9.25%. In that context, both the CDT and the UGTM called for a general strike. Despite their postponement of the strike's date, the government did not really agree to meet and negotiate with them. Instead, it preferred to get in contact with the UMT, which did not back the strike and criticized it as political, and the chambers of industry and commerce. This was viewed as a provocation by the CDT and the UGTM, and they voiced their concerns while also maintaining the general strike call for what they viewed as their legitimate demands for “higher salaries, a reduction of layoffs, and respect of syndical rights” (Santucci and Benhlal 1992, 750).

The last point on syndical rights was addressed as a response to the government's insinuations regarding the illegality of the strike. Despite it being a constitutional right since 1962, the organic laws supposed to regulate its exercise were still not passed after more than 28 years, as the PI and the USFP noted through their newspapers (Santucci and Benhlal 1992). The two unions received the full support of their respective parties, as well as of other organizations such as the agricultural union (*Union Generale des Agriculteurs du Maroc*), and a number of more localized strikes took place in the country through the months leading up to the general strike. They also withdrew their participation in a previously scheduled meeting of government officials and unions planned for December 8th and decided that the strike would take place on the 14th.

The general strike unfolded in a more violent manner than planned, with a number of violent clashes and riots taking place in the main cities and a high number of acts of destruction, arrests, and deaths¹⁷⁹. The whole endeavor was somewhat successful in achieving its goals, though, as in 1991, the government agreed to raise salaries by 15% and proposed a social charter that would be reviewed and discussed with unions on a yearly basis (Santucci and Benhlal 1992, 738).

The idea of national charters was quite popular in that period, with various organizations in different sectors mobilizing around that sort of demand. For instance,

¹⁷⁹ Many businesses and cars were burnt, and the severe repression cause many deaths. At the time the official Moroccan news agency put the number of deaths at 15, while the USFP stated that it was around 65. Later on in 2005, mass graves were discovered, bringing up the actual number of deaths to over 100.

the country's Human rights organization, as the topic of human rights grew into an increasingly central part of political discourse for both the state and the opposition and not just a topic limited to the associative field, began demanding that the state agrees to a national human rights charters that would clarify its responsibilities in that regard. Similar demands were voiced by education and health workers, whom each asked for national charters for their own fields. Even political parties adopted the national charter discourse, as a way of stating their demands in a newer fashion, and asked for a national political charter.

c) The Religious field

The monarchy, continuing its strategy of developing extra-institutional networks of support, and of deploying traditional values and religion as its main ideological cement, moved in to assert its religious credentials in an even more prominent manner. This came at a time when Islamist preachers and mobilization efforts became more visible, using cheap cassettes to distribute speeches and preaches by their ideologues in a way that could be accessible even to an illiterate population (Santucci 1982). At the same time as the government was promoting austerity measure and reducing its expenses, it launched a call for voluntary donations aimed at the construction of a gigantic mosque in Casablanca, which would have the world's tallest minaret and be third in size only to the mosques of Mecca and Medina. The campaign of fundraising was tarred with some irregularities, especially in relation to the "voluntary" nature of the donations. The Ministry of Interior was the principal institution in charge of the fundraising operations, with Driss Basri personally heading the inter-ministerial

committee in charge of coordinating the government's efforts in the project (Bras 1990). In practice, the voluntary aspect was quickly pushed aside and replaced with more top-down measures, which varied depending on the targeted organization/person and their resources. For instance, businesses were expected to donate one percent of the previous year's revenue, while employee committees in each workplace were in charge of determining a percentage to be held off their salaries (Bras 1990). In rural areas, the state administration agents had more leeway to exercise their judgment in determining how much each person could and had to contribute to the project. The non-application of the supposedly voluntary nature of the contributions had some negative effects on its symbolic aims, as many people resented the pressures exercised on them by the state authorities in the fundraising process. Such criticisms were also published by international newspapers who gave some coverage to the events, like *Le Monde* and *Liberation* in France (Bras 1990).

That reassertion of domination over the religious field by the monarchy was not a totally unchallenged process. Aside from the critiques from Islamist organizations, there was some discontent even within the usually more tame actors. One such issue was the state's assertion of control, through the ministry of Habous, over the content of preaches delivered by Imams in the country's mosques for the Friday prayers. The PI, through its newspaper, criticized the decision and challenged its validity both on Islamic doctrinal grounds and in reference to the country's laws (Burgat 1994). This was also accompanied by measures aimed at ensuring the support of the imams, preachers, and other mosque staff, who had their salaries doubled (Santucci and Benhlal 1992).

Simultaneously, as the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) rose in prominence in neighboring Algeria, the monarchy began perceiving the Islamist actors with a renewed sense of threat. Thus, the security services launched a staunch repressive campaign against these movements throughout 1990. The organization of Abdesslam Yassine, *Al Adl wa al-Ihsan* (AWI), was heavily repressed, with Yassine himself being put under house arrest. A number of the movement leaders were also arrested for “creation of an unauthorized organization, political subversion of religion, and disrupting public order”(Santucci and Benhlal 1992, 726).

Other organizations arguably less radical in their opposition than AWI, were targeted as well. The newspaper of the *Chabiba*, headed by Abdelilah Benkirane¹⁸⁰, was also seized and banned around the same period, despite the fact that its religious positions were not very different from those espoused by the monarchy (Santucci and Benhlal 1992). Aside from organizations, the state also targeted books imported and sold in the country, usually in front of mosques, that argued for Islamist positions. A number of books and audiotapes were seized by the authorities across Morocco.

The national movement opposition, despite its criticism of the assertion of control by the state over the religious field, was also worried about the increased appeal of Islamist movements. For instance, they voiced criticism of the usage of Islamist slogans during various demonstrations and strikes across the country. This was exemplified in their reactions to the violent clashes between students on campus at the university of Fes,

¹⁸⁰ Who would later become head of government after 2011.

opposing Islamists to Leftist leaning students. Both the PI and the USFP expressed their negative views of what they called “obscurantism” and “terroristic practices” that were invading the campuses (Santucci and Benhlal 1992). However, the PI tried to use its traditionalist aspects to appeal to the Islamist leaning youth, inviting them to join the party in a speech by one of its leaders in February 1990 (Santucci and Benhlal 1992)

2. Bouabid’s succession, the new Koutlah, and the 1992 Constitution

By early 1992, the political opposition parties grew more insistent in their demands for a new constitution. Though unified on that level, each of the opposition parties prioritized a different issue in its declarations. For the PI, the main issue was the need to reform the administration and control its tendency for intervention in the electoral process. For the USFP, the constitution needed to be free from foreign interventions¹⁸¹. As for the OADP, it demanded a reinforcement of the roles of the parliament and parliamentarians (Santucci 1994).

Aside from the constitutional reform prospect and their positioning towards it, two significant events impacted the political opposition field early in the year. The first was the death of the USFP’s leader Abderahim Bouabid on January 8th 1992, at the age of 69. His death was a very significant event on the political scene, as the party was

¹⁸¹ A concern motivated by the fact that foreign scholars, notably French jurists, plaid a significant role in the drafting of the country’s earlier constitutions.

internally divided amongst different factions that did not see eye to eye, and often had a deep-seated animosity towards each other.

There were two main actors vying for the succession of Abderrahim Bouabid as Secretary-General of the USFP. One was Abderrahmane Youssoufi, who was more a reluctant player in that race, as he was suffering from some health issues that he tried to use as a way out of the race, before bowing to the insistence of his allies in the political bureau of the party (Etayea 2014). Youssoufi had the support of many prominent actors within the party, given his history. One of the most important actors supporting him was Lahbib Cherquaoui, who was viewed as the USFP's "wise elder" and had very significant influence at all levels within the organization¹⁸². Some other important actors, such as Noubir Amaoui or Mohammed Sassi¹⁸³, while not really fond of Youssoufi, still found him to be more acceptable than the alternatives.

¹⁸² While he did personally favor Youssoufi for the leadership of the party, Cherquaoui was also acting to ensure that the party remains united, as he was aware of the unacceptability of El Yazghi to a high number of actors within the USFP.

¹⁸³ Sassi was the the exsecretary general of the party youth wing, *Shabiba Ittihadiya*, and had a lot of influence over it. He was closer to the more leftist factions of the party, and to Noubir Amaoui's CDT.

That main alternative was Mohamed el Yazghi¹⁸⁴, who was a rival of Youssoufi and was disliked by a number of people within the political bureau of the USFP, including Bouabid himself. The latter reportedly always tried not to get El Yazghi involved in the more sensitive and strategic discussion of the bureau. That was a hurdle that El Yazghi was aware of, and he leveraged his connection to Mohammed Lahbabi, another leader of the party, with a more friendly relation to Abderrahim Bouabid to secure an appointment into the vice-secretary position. On top of that, El Yazghi had control over the party and its bureaucratic and organizational structures, which was a significant advantage that he would put to use in his attempts at securing the secretary-general position. Finally, he was also known to be trying hard to ingratiate himself to the palace, presenting himself as a non-radical alternative to Youssoufi, in the hopes of securing monarchic support. For instance, Etayae (2014, 179) reports how during the some of the meetings of the party with the monarch in preparation of the *Alternance*, El Yazghi would often make subservient statements in the king's presence, such as "The words of his majesty the king are like a constitution for the USFP and its members".

As soon as the news of Bouabid's death reached El Yazghi, which was quite early given his position within the party, it came with the task of contacting the rest of the political bureau to inform them of the event. However, he reportedly made sure not to call Youssoufi, who was in France, until he was confronted about it by Cherquaoui,

¹⁸⁴ Aside from El Yazghi, some other figures were earlier in the race, such as Abdelwahed Radi, who was favored at some point by the king to succeed Bouabid, or Habib el Malki, who was also supported as a young candidate by the palace (Etayea 2014, 178).

who realized that something was amiss as there was no news of Youssoufi for a long time (Etayea 2014, 180). Cherquaoui also ensured that it was to be Youssoufi, who would get the honor of delivering a eulogy at the funeral. At the same time, he made sure to distribute a sort of “will” or succession notice that he managed to procure from Bouabid while Youssoufi was in France as a way of bolstering his legitimacy. A meeting of the political bureau was called right after the funeral by Cherquaoui; it decided to forbid El Yazghi from using that note and attempted to officially select Youssoufi as a leader. That attempt failed as both Amaoui and El Yazghi opposed making that decision so soon after the funeral, and without the presence of all the political bureau members. It would not be until four days later, when a second meeting was held with the attendance of all the members of the political bureau, that Youssoufi would be elected almost unanimously, with only El Yazghi and one of his allies abstaining from the vote (Etayea 2014, 183).

The second important development was the rebirth of the Koutlah on May 18th of the same year. Recreated under the label of *Al-Koutlah al-Dimocratiya* (Democratic Koutlah or Bloc), the group now included five parties: the PI, USFP, PPS, OADP, and UNFP. The new Koutlah was structured around a platform that outlined the main demands of the opposition parties. The chief political reform demands concerned the instauration of a constitution establishing a democratic system that would have “a real separation of powers” and “clear delimitations of the powers of its organ” and a “government that would represent the popular majority, and be fully responsible to the Chamber of Representatives”. Their desired constitution was to also guarantee the

independence of the judiciary, and civil liberties, with the aim of achieving “development, progress, and well-being, while striving for equality of chances, solidarity and social justice, with the aim of building a modern society based on Islam and the cultural and civilizational values of the Moroccan people.” (*L’Opinion* 1992). The platform also called for the establishment of democratic institutions at the local, regional, and national levels, highlighting the need for strong guarantees ensuring that the electoral process from which these institutions would emanate would be free of interventions and fraud to ensure their credibility. On the socio-economic level, they called for “satisfying citizens’ fundamental needs and ensuring their rights to work, education, formation, healthcare, transport, and a dignified life”. They also called for more efforts in the fight against joblessness and “social, regional, and sectoral disparities and ensured equality in rights and duties amongst all citizens”. They also called for a National Charter of economic, social, and cultural rights that would also advance women’s rights and protect the environment. Finally, the document also called for the release of remaining political prisoners¹⁸⁵.

A number of political prisoners were released in that year, with 500 of them receiving royal pardons in February. This was viewed as a further show of goodwill on the part of the monarch by the parties. This rapprochement was also reflected in the opposition’s increasing distancing from radical critiques of the institutions. The approach adopted by the USFP in relation to the trial of its affiliated union leader, Noubir Amaoui, was illustrative of that distancing, as the party made sure to limit its

¹⁸⁵ The full text of the platform was published on the PI’s French newspaper *L’Opinion* (27/05/1992).

solidarity to the critiques of corruption made by the defendant and not his more radical attacks. The monarch returned the courtesy by stating that the Amaoui case did not concern him, but was rather a conflict pitting the CDT leader against the government (Santucci 1994, 839). Amaoui had previously made a statement calling for a true parliamentary monarchy and severely criticized the country's leadership, labeling them corrupt during an interview with Spanish newspaper *El Pais*.

Yet, that quasi-cordial façade masked some serious disagreements that would come to the fore when the Koutlah brought up the topic of electoral law reform in the parliament. Their attempt to have the laws discussed during an extraordinary parliamentary session failed. The king instead proposes the appointment of a commission that would include him, and representatives from all political parties, along with the relevant ministers. The opposition accepted the offer, but the end draft presented by the government failed to satisfy its requirements.

Faced with that outcome, the opposition threatened to boycott the upcoming elections. In response, the king offered to intervene and arbitrate the matter, basing his offer on his status as *amir al-muminin*. The opposition accepts his arbitration proposal, and commissions are established to try and review the law in a manner that would satisfy them. Within the commissions, the opposition managed to get its main proposal accepted as a basis for negotiations with the government. The main issues of contention that remained concerned the voting age¹⁸⁶, the electoral system¹⁸⁷, and the appointment

¹⁸⁶ The opposition wanted the voting age lowered from 20 to 18 years old.

of elected officials to head the electoral commissions (Santucci 1994, 840). According to Santucci (1994) the Koutlah's insistence on these points was apparently viewed as related to their limiting to a consultative role regarding the constitution drafting process by the monarchy, which did not keep them updated on the draft's development, and did not involve them in the provision of input or any other debates over its content.

The constitutional draft of 1992 included a number of advances that were viewed as positive by the opposition parties. It introduced a statement affirming the country's "attachment to Human Rights, as universally recognized" in the Preamble. It also created a Constitutional Council, which could be tasked with verifying the constitutionality of laws if a quarter of the chamber voted for it¹⁸⁸.

Regarding the parliament, the number of seats was increased, but the chamber was still not elected fully through direct universal suffrage. It did, however, receive some strengthening mechanisms, such as the ability to address questions to the government, and an investiture vote procedure that could have the government dismissed if its program is rejected, and the ability to create inquiry commissions in order to investigate issues of interest. The king also had to enact passed laws within a 30 days timeframe.

¹⁸⁷ The opposition demanded that the electoral system be changed from a first-past-the-post system across the board to a two-rounds system for the national elections and a proportional representation system for communal elections.

¹⁸⁸ It is worth noting that 5 of the new constitutional council's 9 members were to be chosen by the king.

The new text also increased slightly the powers of the Prime Minister, who now had the authority to propose people to the king for appointment to ministerial and other government positions. This was viewed as a significant advance by observers at the time, and they also seemed to interpret the constitutional text as implying that the Prime minister would have to be appointed from the winning electoral coalition (Santucci 1994).

Nevertheless, and despite their statement recognizing the reforms and advances included in the new draft, these reforms turned out to be insufficient for a number of opposition actors, and thus failed to secure their support. The main points of contention that remained were the lack of democratic guarantees for the rights of political minorities, the non-inclusion of an option allowing the parliament to pass an amnesty law, and the indirect elections mechanism maintained for a third of the parliament's seats. Most of the Koutlah members (PI, USFP, OADP, UNFP) declared their dissatisfaction over the balance of powers allotted to the government and consequently refused to support the referendum. Only the PPS broke the ranks and called for an affirmative vote in the constitutional referendum. Aside from the unsatisfied demands, the position of the Koutlah parties opposing the reform may have also been due to the strong opposition and radicalization of their bases towards what they viewed as the overly conciliatory approach adopted by their respective party leaderships in offering concessions to the monarchy (Santucci 1994). In the context of upcoming communal and legislative elections, the leadership may have deemed it wiser to side with the bases in order to avoid their defection.

The constitution was approved on September 4th, with 99.96% vote in favor and a 97.26% turnout. The referendum was reportedly marred by irregularities, and the opposition parties criticized the negative role of the administration in encouraging and causing irregularities (Santucci 1994). Yet, despite these protests, the Koutlah did not go through with the threats of electoral process boycotts that it had previously brought up in its negotiations with the government over the electoral process. They also refrained from criticizing or directly blaming the monarch for the fraud, instead centering their attacks on the ministry of interior and Driss Basri. Building upon the critiques that they had addressed to the minister of interior, who was personally viewed as the main hurdle towards a democratic opening by the Koutlah, the USFP/PI critiques began increasingly referring to the ministry as a “secret single party”¹⁸⁹ and as “a savage party that the king does not seem to control” (Santucci 1994, 846).

a) The 1992 Communal Elections:

As the matter of the new constitution was settled, the center of political attention quickly moved to the communal elections. In preparation for the campaign, a law ensuring some public funding and access to mass media for all participating parties was passed by parliament. The only boycotting parties were the OADP, the UNFP, and the PADS. The participating Koutlah parties (PI, USFP, and PPS) were not able to agree on

¹⁸⁹ The expression reportedly originated with Mohamed El Yazghi.

a repartition that would let them coordinate their candidacies and not split the opposition vote.

The campaign started in October 1992. It relied on a serious electoral marketing effort by the competing parties, both modern and drawing upon local traditions and repertoires. The noticeable difference with previous electoral campaigns was the increasing use of economic capital. Both parties, rich notables, and less traditionally political actors such as narcotraffickers, were apparently spending large sums in support of their favored candidates. It reached such an extent that the state had to intervene and try to curtail the influence of the latter group (Santucci 1994). Vote-buying emerged as a newly prominent issue in the electoral campaign.

The elections saw the RNI get the highest number of seats (21%), followed by the non-affiliated/independent candidates (13.9%), and the UC. The PI came fourth (12.49%), and the USFP came in the eighth position (6.95%) overall. However, both the USFP and the PI did significantly better in urban communes, coming respectively at the second and third positions after the RNI. In terms of the number of votes, both the PI and the USFP retained approximately the same share of the vote as they did in the previous elections of 1983 (Santucci 1994, 847).

As always, the elections were not free of issues, but the opposition did recognize that the situation was slightly improved compared to previous years, especially in what concerned the interventions of the authorities. The most politically prominent case of intervention by the authorities was the sabotage of the UGTM's secretary-general election to a communal seat in Casablanca, which was vigorously denounced by the

Koutlah parties. There were some other cases of intervention by the authorities, but the most prominent issue was the deployment of money to buy votes throughout the country, with prices ranging from 50 to 2000 dirhams¹⁹⁰ (Santucci 1994).

A notable result of these elections, one that affected all participating political parties equally, was the failure of many incumbents to secure their reelection. As pointed out by the minister of interior, Driss Basri, the results indicated a sort of sanction vote, reflecting the popular dissatisfaction with the performance of incumbent political representatives.

b) The 1993 Legislative Elections and the failed *alternance* attempt:

For the Koutlah party, the legislative elections were viewed as the true litmus test for the sincerity of the monarch in engaging a process of democratic alternance. More than the constitutional level, the parties were increasingly viewing the electoral process, and by association, the role of the ministry of interior regarding it, as the central element of the reform process. Thus, the Koutlah parties made a number of declarations and demands regarding the conditions in which the elections were to take place. The most significant of these demands were the establishment of a control commission, ensuring parties' access to mass media, and the informatization and update of electoral lists.

¹⁹⁰ Equivalent to 5 to 200 US Dollar, a very significant amount of money for a majority of the population.

These demands were taking place against a background of organized labor agitation and increasing socio-economic tension throughout the country. Just within the months preceding the elections in April, a number of strikes erupted in a significant number of economic sectors; railroads, education, healthcare, coal mining, metallurgy, fishing, textiles, and the national airline all had strikes in the first trimester of 1993 (Benhlal 1995). There were also heavy tensions on university campuses, leading to violent and deadly clashes between leftist and Islamist student groups at times, and between students and the authorities at others, often with a number of arrests (Benhlal 1995).

The Koutlah parties issued a memorandum stating that they opposed the atmosphere in which the elections were being prepared, and viewed as far from what was agreed upon. Consequently, the USFP, the PI, the PPS, and the OADP declared their withdrawal from the national commission in charge of controlling the elections (Benhlal 1995). Outside the Koutlah, and more to the left, the PADS declared that it would boycott the elections and called upon other parties to join in a “patriotic liberation front” (Benhlal 1995).

Within the Koutlah, the PI and the USFP managed to reach an agreement to coordinate their candidacies and not compete against each other, setting up quotas for each party. The smaller members of the Koutlah, the PPS, and the OADP were not satisfied by those quotas, and so they did not join into the coordination agreement. At the program level, the Koutlah focused chiefly on the theme of democratic reforms, along with economic and social ones relating to the privatization and debt situation, as well as joblessness.

On the other side, the majority of parties reorganized for the elections. The RNI looked like the favorite and increasingly adopted a more left-leaning language, which many viewed to be a way of preparing itself to play the role of majority partner with a potential USFP-led government (Santucci 1995). It could have also been related to the king's stated preference for a party system with three main political poles, in which case the RNI would have been at the center of the spectrum. The right would be occupied principally by the newly created *Wifaq* alliance, regrouping the UC, the MNP, and the PND. The MP of Aherdane remained outside that alliance, but it was occupying the same nominal ideological space.

Despite this supposed ideological differentiation between the opposition and the rest of the parties, their proposed programs of the main political parties were not very different, as they all revolved around the same themes (economic, social reforms, Islam) and issues and remained lacking in terms of details (Santucci 1995). The campaign themes were more diversified than the programs. A post-electoral statement by Driss Basri¹⁹¹ enumerated the various themes that each group focused on in its campaign. The Koutlah focused on the “neutrality of the state administration and transparency and sincerity of the elections”, as well as the reform of some parts of the constitution, the human rights and political prisoners' issues, and the joblessness issue. That last point was often combined with a criticism of the previous government's economic and social policies (Benhlal 1995).

¹⁹¹ As reported by the official newspaper *Le Matin du Sahara* in its June 27th 1993 edition, cited in Benhlal (1995).

As for the majority parties, the RNI's campaign focused on a more centrist line, according to Basri, with the main point being a call for the creation of some sort of regional parliaments and more decentralization of the administration. The *Entente* alliance went in for a different and more fully neoliberal line and focused a lot of their critiques on socialist ideology associated with the Koutlah (Benhlal 1995).

Yet, despite the significance of these elections in terms of their potentially opening a path towards a consensual *alternance* and democratization hopes associated with it, they failed to generate the sort of popular enthusiasm or mobilization that may have been expected. The importance of the elections was reportedly lost on the population, which through the years, had become rightly skeptical of the effects of voting, given that most people realized that the significant decisions were made in the palace and not in the parliament or government buildings. The youth were especially less interested in the electoral process and failed to see themselves or their interests represented by the parties and their candidates (Santucci 1995; Benhlal 1995).

The elections took place on June 25th 1993. The Koutlah parties increased their share of the vote in comparison to the last elections. The opposition thus managed to gain 115 seats in the new parliament, with the USFP having 52 seats and the PI 50, with most of their seats situated in urban constituencies. The smaller Koutlah members, the PPS won 11 seats and the OADP 2. The number of seats was still insufficient for the Koutlah to hold a majority.

On the other hand, the *Entente* alliance came first, with 154 seats, led mainly by the UC and the MP with 54 and 51 seats, respectively. The RNI was less successful and lost seats in comparison to the previous elections, retaining only 41 seats.

Despite the previous assurances provided by the authorities and the monarch, the elections were not as free and fair as the Koutlah had expected. The positions of the member parties diverged regarding the king's offering them to participate in the government despite their not holding a majority of the seats. More specifically, the PPS was favorable to the participation, while the remaining members opposed it, and the party's membership in the alliance was put on hold as a result. As far as protesting reactions went, the USFP's reaction was the most notable, as Abderrahmane Youssoufi resigned from his position as secretary-general of the party in protest and left the country for a self-imposed exile in France.

On the other side, the king rejected the conditions of the Koutlah for participation in the government and tasked Karim Lamrani with the formation of a new technocratic government. Consequently, hopes for a political *alternance* dimmed rapidly. The king delivered a speech on November 6th 1993, clearly attributing the responsibility for the failed attempt to the Koutlah parties.

Analyses of that turn of events at the time pointed at what they viewed as the façade multiparty nature of the Moroccan political system, arguing instead that the majority parties were, in fact, all faces of the same administration party headed by the Ministry

of Interior and representing the deep-rooted pre-colonial makhzen system and its interests¹⁹². A similarly pessimistic view was shared by Santucci:

Overall, if the rules of the game have actually changed, we can ask ourselves if their effects are not limited to the generation of a simple “immobile transition” of the Moroccan political system. The consultation of political parties by the king has led to the formation of a government directly connected to his person and his options, and largely foreign to the electoral majority, in the pure tradition of the monarchy’s preeminence and of the arbitration function of the Makhzen. (1995, 517)

Aside from the above electoral and direct political developments, 1993 was also notable for the increasing prominence of Human Rights discourse and its increasing official adoption. One significant event was the ratification by the state of a number of international conventions relating to human rights and opposing the use of torture¹⁹³.

¹⁹² As stated by Khalid Jamaii in his article published in *L’Opinion* on Nov. 16th 1993, reproduced in Benhlal (1995). That article was not to the liking of the state, and Jamaii was summoned to a personal meeting with Driss Basri, in which the latter proceeded to criticize his article as for its “subversion and violence” (Santucci 1995, 519). That article was quite noteworthy at the time given its direct critique of the ministry of interior and its powerful position and tremendous political influence. Jamaii argued that in practice that influence made the country’s multiparty system a mere illusion, and that “in reality, Morocco has been under a single-party regime, for more than 20 years”.

¹⁹³ International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

This ratification increased the legal and symbolic importance of the rights-related demands discourse. Further confirmation came in the form of the creation of a new delegate minister position in charge of human rights within the new government. The person appointed to the position was Omar Azziman¹⁹⁴, who previously headed the OMDH, before resigning in protest against what he viewed as the increasing influence of the USFP over the association.

3. Fluctuations towards the 1996 constitutional reform and the second *alternance* attempt

The falling-out of the monarchy and the Koutlah over the failed attempt at coming to an agreement concerning the shape of the planned *alternance* did not last for long. Faced with an increasingly tense social atmosphere unfolding over a background of continuing economic crisis¹⁹⁵, each of the two sides had its own incentives for a quick return to the negotiation table.

¹⁹⁴ Omar Azziman was a Law professor and academic for many years before that, and would later on become a royal advisor to king Mohammed 6 in 2011.

¹⁹⁵ Morocco was facing a severe long draught, leading to an increase in poverty and rural exodus, which in turn increased the pressure on urban areas and the job market. This was combined with the impact of the SAP and its “land reform” policies that forced a number of small land-owners to sell

For the Koutlah, the increasing spread of Islamism and traditional conservative values in society, combined with their official introduction on the political field through the MPDC, was a worrying development. Having already managed to wrestle many traditionally leftist university campuses and student unions from under its control, the USFP (and the PI to some extent) viewed the new political actors as a threat that could attract a number of their other electoral constituencies¹⁹⁶. At the internal level, the longer it took to reach a viable agreement with the monarchy, the more the pro-*alternance* coalition appeared brittle.

Within the USFP, the old Casablanca versus Rabat factional rift was reemerging, and pressures from the bases of the party were getting less and less tolerable as the negotiations process dragged on, particularly in light of the fraud accusations and Youssoufi's self-imposed exile that followed the 1993 elections.

In the absence of Youssoufi, some of the Rabat faction coalesced around El Yazghi and came into more direct conflicts with the Casablanca faction led by Amaoui. The two factions differed in both their composition and their aims. The Rabat faction being mainly composed of educated party cadres and some academics that would be highly likely to hold high offices within a USFP government, was most eager to reach an

their lands (a detailed account of which can be found in Hanieh 2013, chap. 4). The worsening consumption, purchasing power, and social services further complicated the situation.

¹⁹⁶ This was further highlighted by the first terrorist attack to take place in the country, targeting the Atlas Asni hotel in Marrakech.

agreement on *Alternance* with the monarchy and was willing to offer the most concessions to the palace. The Casablanca faction had a much more predominant labor union and working-class component, and it generally was less favorable to the conciliatory approach adopted by the Rabat group. The crucial point of disagreement was whether the party should accept an *alternance* that does not come as a result of electoral gains and is instead granted by the palace. At another more interpersonal level, Amaoui reportedly dislikes El Yazghi, which translated into his non-attendance of the Koutlah's interparty meeting in Rabat, aimed at drafting a common political program.

In addition to the above mentioned main groups, the expected return of Mohamed Fqih Basri from exile was also exercising some degree of influence within the USFP and the larger Koutlah field. The previously condemned to death exiled resistant was known as being the main head of the most radical armed factions of the historical UNFP and the USFP, having most recently played a leading organizational role in the March 1973 Dar Bouazza events. Upon his return, he quickly began calling for the formation of a new "Historic" Koutlah to conduct the *alternance*. His return did not, however, exercise much appeal in itself within the current USFP field¹⁹⁷, as his discourse was seemingly less in tune with the concerns of the party and the prominent issues facing

¹⁹⁷ It did however cause issues for Youssoufi, as many of his allies did not trust Fqih Basri. I was also exploited by the El Yazghi faction to mobilize its ranks against Youssoufi, by portraying the return of Basri as the first step in a process of radicalization of the party that would end with their purging from it. Finally, it also angered the monarch, as the return was decided by youssoufi without prior negotiation and explicit permission from the palace (Etayea 2014, 185).

it¹⁹⁸, and it did not have any serious consequences on the balance of power within the USFP or the interparty relations within the Koutlah.

The incompatibilities between the Casablanca and Rabat groups remained as the main issue, and they were also related to more external factors. Most notably, the struggles within the labor field amongst the various unions and their interaction with the government in light of the neoliberal labor law reforms planned by the latter.

The most illustrative conflict of the year on that level stemmed from the CDT's call for a general strike in January. As the government responded to that threat by arguing that such a call would be illegal under the current legal framework¹⁹⁹, the CDT responded by rejecting that argument, pointing out that the necessary legal modification that the government based its arguments on remained pending since 1962, adding that the constitutional guarantee for the right to strike ought to retain primacy over that concern.

The legalistic argument made by the government was counterproductive on another level, as it served to rekindle a certain degree of unity into a previously fractured and

¹⁹⁸ For instance, it is reported that a number of people were criticizing Fqih Basri for his “anachronistic” pronouncements, especially his reviving of a debate with the PI over which of the two parties had the biggest involvement in the national movement resistance under the protectorate (Benhlal 1997, 634).

¹⁹⁹ The main argument revolved around the fact that the organic laws organizing the constitutional right to strike were yet to be drafted.

competitive labor union field. When the CDT, which was the largest union in Morocco at that point, issued its general strike, it was isolated. Even the PI's associated UGTM, which supported the CDT in its previous general strikes, refrained from supporting the latest call. Yet, as the government based its reasoning on an argument that threatened the hitherto assumed legality of the right to strike, it threatened a significant source of power for the field as a whole. Along with the UGTM, even the less oppositional UMT, which dissociated itself from the two partisan unions, joined forces with the CDT in refuting and mobilizing against the government's argument. The struggle found resonance even beyond the labor field, with human rights associations such as the AMDH and the totality of the Koutlah's political parties expressing their opposition to that conditioning of the strike right by the long-postponed organic laws publication (Benhlal 1995).

Nevertheless, through the deployment of an array of repressive measures, the government managed to force the CDT to relent on its calls for a general strike. These repressive measures included the arrest of union members distributing materials, and a forceful police assault of the CDT's headquarters, accompanied by more arrests. Relenting on the issue and calling off the strike was viewed as a personal defeat for the CDT's leader, Noubir Amaoui, affecting his reputation and prestige. Overall, while the episode served to tighten the ranks of the oppositions during a period where their unity

was under stress, it did slightly weaken the growth of the CDT and its influence within the various opposition fields²⁰⁰.

At the same time, divisions and rivalries persisted within the labor union field, especially between the UMT and the CDT, and a lowering of the cooperation between the UGTM and the latter as well. The UMT, having been the largest dominant union with the most union seats in parliament, was resentful of the loss of that position to the CDT. The rivalry was also more ideological to some extent, with the UMT viewing the CDT as a mere tool of the party, in conflict with its own long-held position arguing for union autonomy²⁰¹.

The political party field was quite lively as well, even beyond the Koutlah. The majority/administrative parties saw some changes in their positioning vis-à-vis the government, their discourse, and their alliances. The UC was undergoing some internal

²⁰⁰ Illustrative of that development, various articles in the press, including by the PPS, indicated their ambivalence towards the general strike call, and expressed their relief at its cancellation, arguing that the CDT did not have any real control over the urban lumpenproletariat and the unemployed to ensure that the strike did not turn into riots. This was accompanied by accusation at the CDT faction within the USFP of having forced the hand of the party into supporting the call (cited in Benhlal 1995, 575).

²⁰¹ As covered in the early chapters, this particular issue has been a long lasting source of conflict between the union and the parties, since the early independence days. Whether, at each conflictual episode, the union's commitment to that stated belief was sincere, or merely a convenient cover for the pursuit of the UMT leadership's personal interests can be up for debate.

strife, with blame directed at its leadership for the party's relative inability to achieve the same prominence within the majority field and government as it did before, and challenges were leveled at Maati Bouabid personally for the leadership of the party (Benhlal 1995). A similar dynamic was shaking the other principal actor on the majority field, the RNI. The party was divided internally over the same issues, and challenges to Ahmed Osman's leadership were brewing and had a significant following within the party. Smaller administrative parties witnessed the same dynamics as well, such as the PND²⁰². The only exceptions within the majority camp were the MP and its splinter group, the MNP, who were somehow in a rapprochement phase by belonging to the same *Wifaq* alliance.

This internal strife trend within the majority parties can be tied to their relationship with a technocratic government that, in a way, robs them of their *raison d'être* by locking them out of ministerial positions. This was voiced by Mohand Laenser, the MP leader, who voiced a number of unexpected critiques toward the Lamrani government on a variety of economic and social issues, highlighting the lack of coordination between the government and the *Wifaq* majority alliance explicitly (Benhlal 1995, 582).

Inside the Koutlah parties, the prospects of *alternance* were the main dynamic percolating throughout its various political parties. Within the USFP, the intra-leadership rivalry and disagreements unearthed by the departure of Abderrahman

²⁰² Parti National Democrate. A splinter from the RNI, led by ex UMT leader Aarsalane el Jadidi, and whose focus was the non-berber rural constituencies.

Youssoufi between the Casablanca and Rabat groups, and exacerbated by the Yazghi-Amaoui personal disagreements and maneuvering, were swiftly put back on hold by Youssoufi's return later in 1995. The base versus leadership disagreements concerning the agreements to be struck with the palace remained, of course, but they were put into perspective by the bounty of government and bureaucratic positions that the prospects of *alternance* promised to deliver, even more so for the Rabat group given that while the USFP had a wealth of capable cadres within its ranks, that group had the most likely eligible profiles for a ministerial position.

Instead, the main struggles within the USFP were related to factions trying to position themselves to best profit from that expectation. Therefore, the main issue was the competition between the various current for domination within the party itself, with Youssoufi increasingly isolated and forced to rely on the el Yazghi faction despite their issues and his reported awareness of their insincere motivations.

In an episode of what was described as a civil war by some figures within the party, the Yazghi faction used the return of Mohamed Fqih Basri, and the support of Youssoufi for him, as a card to weaken his position inside the party. In a move to further that tactic, Mohamed el Yazghi used his position to appoint himself as editor-in-chief of the USFP's newspaper, which he used as a platform to attack his rivals, including Youssoufi.

The situation was also dynamic within the PI, as the secretary-general, Mhamed Boucetta, announced that he would be resigning from the party's leadership. The replacement was interesting in that it could be either Mhamed Douiri, a not too young

party leader, but with a relatively strong connection to the national movement generation, or Abbas el Fassi, who was more representative of the younger generation of party cadres, had prior government and official experience, and was also a member of the el-Fassi family.

Yet leadership issues aside, the main problem within the Koutlah by 1995 was the issue of *alternance* itself, and whether a granted *alternance consensuelle*²⁰³ was an acceptable option for the opposition. This was especially problematic for the USFP and the OADP, as a lot of internal opposition was forming around that issue in both parties.

This was, in part, exacerbated by the monarch's restating his openness to the prospect of an *alternance* while remaining staunchly opposed to the idea of dismissing Driss Basri from his position. The latter point was repeatedly rejected as a deal-breaker by the opposition throughout the years, which made their decision to accept its inevitability extremely problematic in terms of convincing the bases of it. The situation stayed the same for a while until the king decided to grant one of the main conditions of the Koutlah, by stating his openness to a new constitutional reform, while not budging on the Basri issue. This was a successful move, as it convinced most of the Koutlah's leadership, with a few exceptions, of supporting the royal *alternance* idea. It also diverted the debate towards the contents of the constitutional reform project.

²⁰³ As opposed to one that would be achieved by the parties through the democratic electoral process and the achievement of an electoral majority in the parliament.

The king's decision made the constitutional reform issue take a more prominent position within the various Koutlah's actors' internal debate. In doing so, it came to overshadow the other previously dominant and more divisive issues that were the nature of the *alternance* process and the presence of Basri.

Nevertheless, the offer was not enough to smooth out the internal issues of the parties and gain their agreement to the formation of a government quickly enough to the monarch's liking. As a result, following three months of negotiations, the king announced the formation of a new government²⁰⁴. While it remained predominantly composed of technocrats, the new government was officially dubbed as a Wifaq majority-led one and included members from the alliance's political parties (UC, MP, PND) (Benhlal 1997). The continuing noticeable presence of technocrats in ministerial position was widely blamed on a lack of qualified personnel within the Wifaq parties. On the discursive level as well, the new government was considered to have adopted a number of positions from the Koutlah parties, regarding a set of social issues, to which it paid lip service within its discourses (Benhlal 1997).

As the Koutlah parties held their national congresses, the positions of the actors within each party played out, reflecting in the open the various faultlines. Within the PI, the main issue was the presence of Driss Basri as interior minister within a potential Koutlah-led *alternance* government. It was not, however, that divisive an issue, and

²⁰⁴ The second Filali government was formed in late January 1995. The king still restated his commitment to the idea of *alternance* during a speech given approximately one month later, on March 2nd of the same year.

Boucetta made a number of declarations in which he clearly stated his position and that of his party on the issue. For the PI leader, the main issue was not of a constitutional or legal nature, but of an electoral one, stating that the electoral fraud was the main hurdle on the path towards democratization.

Tensions were more pronounced within the USFP, with the opposition to the terms of an *alternance* that did not stem from a free and fair electoral process, and was instead *consensually* granted by the monarchy being a central issue, along with the details of the constitutional reform²⁰⁵. Without the return of Yousseoufi, and the personal credit he enjoyed across the various factions of the party, the situation within the USFP would have likely been more explosive than it was, as he mediated the differences and vouched for the adoption of a *consensual alternance* as a first step within a process leading to a *democratic alternance* in a manner that addressed the concerns of the reticent party bases. For Yousseoufi, the constitutional reform proposal was to be viewed in political terms, as opposed to juridical ones; and in that sense, he argued that the focus should be on ensuring that the next legislative elections would be free and fair, opening the path towards true electoral *alternance* (M. Mossadeq 1998, 578). However, this position was not shared by the party's youth wing, which opposed the bicameral proposal, arguing that the only way to have a truly democratic government would be through the reinforcement of the popular accountability of the legislative institution by making it directly elected in totality (M. Mossadeq 1998).

²⁰⁵ Especially regarding the proposed instauration of a bicameral parliamentary system, and the balance of power within the directly elected first chamber and the indirectly elected second chamber.

The issue was more divisive and protracted within the OADP, as the party was structured along internal democracy principles, which gave more weight to the opinions of the party bases. Throughout an exceptionally elongated national congress that continued for over six months, the party ended up deciding to abstain from supporting the constitutional reform referendum proposal. The position of the OADP was based on its argument that the proposed bicameralism would not improve the democratic accountability of the parliament and government. This position, and the arguments behind it, were similar to those adopted by other actors, mainly the PADS, the new Marxist *Annahj*, and the USFP youth faction. However, it moved the OADP towards a position at odds with the rest of the Koutlah parties. One of the more direct internal consequences of that position was that it led to a scission within its leadership ranks, with a number of members leaving the OADP to form a new party, the *Parti Socialiste Démocratique* (PSD)²⁰⁶. Asked about the reasons behind his party's decision to not support the reform, Bensaid Ait Idder pointed at the lack of guarantees offered to the Koutlah parties regarding the political process of democratization that the other parties justified their supportive positions with (Daoud and Ouchelm 1996).

Overall, within the Koutlah, with the exception of the OADP, the focus of the internal debates was more on the political and electoral dynamics and guarantees of the

²⁰⁶ This short-lived party won 5 and 6 seats during the 1997 and the 2002 legislative elections. In 2007, it integrated the USFP. There are suspicions that the schism may have been at least partially motivated by the interior ministry to punish the OADP for its position regarding the 1996 constitutional reform.

group's rapprochement with the palace, and on the tactical maneuvering necessary for each party to have the most control over the *alternance*²⁰⁷ (M. Mossadeq 1998). This was accompanied by a tendency of all three parties to disregard the potential pitfall of the bicameralism reform that the OADP and other actors on the left identified.

The potential issues represented by the creation of a second chamber that would have almost the same powers as the directly elected one, and can be seen as a way for the monarchy to maintain power over the legislative organs despite the full direct election concession granted over the lower chamber. When asked about the reasons behind their support for the constitutional reform proposal, the leaders of the Koutlah reportedly justified their decision by arguing that they had received guarantees that “the government will reflect the popular vote, be responsible vis-à-vis parliament, and the lower chamber will be fully directly elected by the citizens”, and Youssoufi had stated that the only guarantee the Koutlah truly had regarding the ultimate political aims of the reforms was “the king’s word” (Daoud and Ouchelm 1996).

²⁰⁷ For obvious political weight reasons, the maneuvering for leadership was mostly a concern for the PI and the USFP.

4. Liminal Developments on the left, the Islamist, and the social and associative fields

New actors were also emerging and organizing further left from the Koutlah and the OADP. Most notably, a number of activists from the clandestine Marxist-Leninist *Ila Al Amam* regrouped to form a new leftist party of the same ideological persuasion. The new party, known as *Annahj Addimocrati*²⁰⁸, while it positioned itself as a more radical alternative to the existing leftist parties, stated its openness to cooperation with the other actors that it agreed with, especially the OADP. It also refrained from criticizing the more moderate leftist parties, with its founders clearly stating their disapproval of the fight for exclusive control over the symbolic inheritance of the Moroccan leftist movement and their rejection of isolationist ideological sort of puritanism. These statements made in an interview with *Maroc Hebdo* in March 1995 were an explicit critique of the positions of another older radical leftist party, the PADS (Interview reproduced in Benhlal 1997, 679–83).

The Islamist field was in flux as well, especially with the different actors' expectations regarding the effects of the palace-mediated introduction of the ideology onto the political field via the MPDC. This event marked the clarification and quasi-officialization of what Mohammed Darif (2010) identified as the divide between dissident/contentious and official/assimilated Islamism²⁰⁹. The integration of Abdelilah

²⁰⁸ Or *Voie Democratique* in French (Democratic Path).

²⁰⁹ “Islamisme integre” and “Islamisme contestataire” on the original French formulation.

Benkiran and his group within the official political game contributed to a further schism within the Islamist movement, with the emergence of *Al Badil Al Hadari*²¹⁰ from the ranks of the same *Chabiba Islamiya* that the former group came out of. Unlike the group that chose the path of official assimilation, *Al Badil* positions occupied a more progressive and very leftist leaning space, defending human rights and secularist values with a discourse drawing from both Islamist and leftist values and frames. This positioned it closer to actors such as the OADP or the AMDH than the other Islamist groups. The organization remained, however, quite elitist and never really tried to create much mass mobilization around it. That evolution created another line of classification/division within the Islamist field, between popular organizations and elitist ones (Darif 2010).

Islamist political organizations such as the above were not, at that point in time, the sole carriers of an Islam-based political project. The field now also included a number of alternative actors advocating for Islamist sociopolitical projects from the competing ideological starting point of Wahhabi Salafism, as opposed to the Sufi or Muslim Brotherhood inspired roots espoused by *Al Adl Wa al Ihsane* or the *Chabiba*, respectively. Though the history of Wahhabi Salafist influence in Morocco goes back

²¹⁰ Translated as Civilizational Alternative. The movement would turn into a political party later in 2002. It would not be officially recognized as such by the state until 2005, and took part in the 2007 legislative elections. This phase was to be short-lived as the party was dissolved in 2008 over alleged links between the party's leadership and a terrorist investigation case.

quite far²¹¹, its post-independence regain of prominence can be viewed as encouraged and supported by the state. One significant aspect of that support was through the Islamising educational policies implemented to counter the influence of oppositional groups on university campuses, both leftist and Islamist ones²¹². The state reportedly favored the hiring of graduates of Saudi universities, educated in the Wahhabi school of thought, by directing the deans of Islamic studies faculties to favor their hiring for faculty positions (Darif 2010, 120). Further facilitation was provided by allowing local actors to receive an influx of Saudi funding and ideological materials and allowing them to create associations aimed primarily at spreading their ideas and countering the Sufi and other theological principles upon which Abdessalam Yassine based his ideological positions. One such group was that of Mohamed Maghraoui, *Addawa lil Quran wa Assouna* (The Call to the Quran and Sunnah), who led a vast network of Wahhabi Quranic schools and associations throughout Morocco and focused his writings on the critique and ex-communication of AWI (Darif 2010). The Wahhabis also generally espoused loyalist positions vis-à-vis the monarchy and did not challenge either its

²¹¹ To the reign of Sultan Suleiman in the 18th century, who drew up on it as a counter to the more Sufi Zawiyas that challenged him politically.

²¹² Though Darif (2010) argues that the policy was primarily aimed at the Islamist opposition groups, that assessment seems unconvincing in light of the dominance of leftist groups over universities and youth organizations at the time of formulation and implementation of the policy, as well as its essential targeting of Social Scientific and Philosophy majors, which were viewed as vectors for the spread of leftist ideas on the campus and beyond.

temporal or spiritual authority, despite the fact that it did not espouse their theological or socio-political orientations.

Thus, by the end of 1995, the political Islam field in Morocco was significantly more fragmented than before, with the monarchy still playing a significant role within it through its institutions. Yet, despite that fragmentation, it was also more prominent within the wider society, and its crossing into the political game was an increasingly important reflection of that reality.

Regarding the constitutional reform of 1996, the political Islam actors championed diverse positions. AWI, unsurprisingly, did not express any support for the planned reforms. Positions were more diverse within the newly Islamist MPDC²¹³. While the official position of the party was supportive of the reform, there were some slight dissenting expressions of concerns within its ranks. A notable one was the position expressed by Mustapha Ramid, a lawyer and director of an Islamist weekly publication. He considered that the second chamber should be controlled by the directly elected first chamber: and it had to include some appointed figures, along with the indirectly elected member, representing the *Ulemas*, and other intellectual categories such as economists, sociologists, lawyers, and other academics (Ferrié 2000, 538).

²¹³ After they integrated the party 'individually', Abdelilah Benkirane and his group managed to secure 4 out of 7 seats in the MPDC's secretariat general, with the blessings of the palace and of Abdelkrim El Khatib.

Aside from their investment of the political field, the year also signaled an increasing presence of Islamists within a more fragmented labor union field. The most prominent display of that presence occurred during the Labor Day union marches, with observers noting the presence of a number of Islamist marchers alongside those of the more leftist, USFP connected, CDT specifically (Benhlal 1997). Aside from that presence, the labor field's division and weakening were more visible and were viewed as resulting from a number of factors, one of them being the structural change of the Moroccan economy. The percentage of wage-earning laborers went down from 34% in 1984 to 22% in 1996 (Benhlal 1997). The second factor was the general division of labor amongst the three main competing unions, which reflected in their control over various sectorial quasi-fiefdoms²¹⁴, a division that was seemingly facilitated by the administration. Faced with that weakening of their general strength, the three unions reportedly began contacts and efforts aimed at reducing the mutual tensions and hostilities between them, especially between the independent but previously government-friendly UMT and the opposition party-connected CDT and UGTM. As a direct result, the frequency of attacks and criticism they usually leveled at one another was reduced noticeably (Benhlal 1997). Yet, this newfound cordiality did not extend beyond that level and did not involve much in terms of actual coordination between the various unions.

²¹⁴ For instance, the CDT dominated the public sector employees, the UMT over the private sector ones (Benhlal 1997).

In parallel to the union field, and given the new economically liberal policies espoused by the Moroccan state under the impulse of global lenders and financial institutions, private sector employers and their positions became an increasingly important part of the socio-economic and political equation. Organized within the *Confédération Générale Economique Marocaine* (CGEM), the political prominence of the group was also quite established since the mid-1980s and the increasingly frequent appointment of technocratic governments²¹⁵. While most politicians affiliated with the

²¹⁵ This was tied to the emergence of the “entrepreneur” figure, and its increased political and symbolic valuation in the political discourse at the national level. That process was deeply connected to the SAPs of the World Bank and IMF, and their ideological content, as well as their practical recommendation for the favoring of the private sector in the face of the forced retreat of the public sector due to the reductions in funding forced on it. For instance, a central source of funding for both the state-owned enterprises and the private sector was the *Banque Nationale du Développement Economique* (BNDE). The BNDE funding for public sector projects decreased from 37% in the 1960-1980 period, to 25% after (Berrada and Saadi 1992). That number was then turned into a regulatory ceiling for the bank’s public sector funding under the impulse of the World Bank, leaving 75% of its funding

main administrative political parties tended to be rich employers of one kind or another, their political role had often preceded and laid the ground for their capitalist one²¹⁶. On the other hand, those like Karim Lamrani²¹⁷ or Azzedine Laraki, who entered the

available for the private sector, which was dominated by a few very wealthy and politically connected conglomerates.

²¹⁵ Given how the Moroccanization was enacted in the mid 1970s, pro-monarchy political elites, bureaucrats, and military elites all managed to significantly enrich themselves, and sometimes used their wealth to invest in various other business ventures in sectors such as commerce or the industry or finance (Berrada and Saadi 1992).

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²¹⁷ He was prime minister of 6 separate governments, between 1971 until 1994. Born into a *sherifian* family from Fes that made its fortunes in the silk trade, he made his entry into the economic field under the protectorate. After independence, he joined the public phosphates company OCP (*Office Cherifien des Phosphates*) as secretary general. During the first moroccanisation stage in the 1960s, he began his rise in the field, by acquiring shares in a bank, quickly increasing his wealth and bringing a number of strategic public company under his sway, in 1967 he returned to the OCP as

political field, supposedly in a technocratic/depoliticized fashion, after a primary involvement within the economic one²¹⁸. The rest of the Moroccan employers were mostly staying out of the political fray, and while they might be affiliated with one administrative political party or another, they tended to remain on the sides and limit themselves to the provision of financial contributions and local/regional politics. Only a minority of these actors were connected to Koutlah parties. This later form of political involvement was something that the state did not oppose much and may have even tried to encourage as a way of softening the Koutlah's positions.

The encouragement of economic actors' political involvement by the state was taking place in a context of increasing social instability stemming from the austerity measures imposed by the IMF's SAP. It came in parallel to the support and organization by the Ministry of Interior for the creation of a number of new administrative, political parties on the majority field. Some came out as a result of schisms within preexisting parties, while others were newly organized. Within the first schismatic category, we

CEO, appointed by the king, an office that he would hold until 1990. In parallel, he also occupied a number of political positions, such as head of the Casablanca chamber of commerce in 1961, and finance minister in 1967, as his first entry point in the government (Catusse 2008). He was very close to the palace and trusted by the monarch, as confirmed by his appointment as prime minister for the first time after the Skhirat failed coup attempt.

²¹⁸ It is important to note that a primary successful involvement in the economic field in Morocco often implied a certain closeness to the palace, and often was due to the actor benefitting from the advantages and opportunities that such a closeness provided.

find the *Mouvement National Démocrate*²¹⁹, which was heavily centered around the figure of its leader, and espoused vaguely leftist populist positions in its discourse. The parties in the second category were mostly mobilized around regionalist positions. While they were newcomers on the field, those parties were not totally new in the strict sense of the term. A number of those parties were created at an earlier date but went dormant or inactive for over a decade. One example is the PDI, one of the oldest Moroccan political parties²²⁰, which reemerged on the scene headed by an academic figure. Other parties (re)emerged on the scene, with a clearer regionalist positioning, such as the *Parti de l'Action* and the *Parti de la Reforme et de l'Unité*, which targeted the southern Souss province and the country's northern provinces, respectively. Both parties were headed by figures with significant personal clout and support in their respective regions. By positioning themselves in a position often critical of the central government and majority policies, especially regarding the regions, these new actors are trying to ensure that the Koutlah would face competition in capitalizing over the feelings of regional resentment vis-à-vis the neglect in terms of public investments and development that these regions have suffered from for decades.

²¹⁹ The MND seceded from Mahjoubi Aherdane's MNP, and was centered around and led by Mahmoud Archane, a former high officer in the National Security apparatus (Ferrié 2000).

²²⁰ The PDI was more of an elitist party historically, mostly targeted at urban elites. See the first chapter for an overview of the PDI and its post-independence conflict with the PI and positioning with the monarchy.

5. The campagne d'assainissement²²¹ and its effects:

Partially motivated by political imperatives, along with economic ones, the government engaged in a campaign officially aiming to stamp out smuggling and clampdown on corruption. The campaign's heavy-handed targeting of the private business sector for its previously tolerated transgressions of the law came as a surprise to many actors. It was seemingly triggered by the criticism targeted at the country from the World Bank in a report where it problematized the contraband issues of the country, and an investigative article about the narcotic productions and exports from Morocco to Europe, and the involvement of various high state officials in it.

Aside from that immediate trigger, the campaign was preceded by different processes that laid the groundwork for it. The most important process was the reform of business-related "modern" laws aimed at rationalizing a sector that was operating under old and scarcely enforced laws and regulations²²². These changes were requested for

²²¹ Can be translated as sanitation campaign.

²²² According to Myriam Catusse (2008) the business world was criticized a lot in those years, privately and publically, for its lack of clear and fairly enforced regulations. The lack of clarity left a lot of power to individual bureaucrats and to exercise their authority selectively, and to often extract bribes in the process. The judiciary was also problematic in that it was viewed as subservient to the executive branch. It also concerned the relations between private businesses and their employees, as the legally required social rights of the workers, such as registration in the *Caisse Nationale de la*

many years by a number of actors in the Moroccan economy, both national and international ones. The uncertainty regarding the lack of regulatory clarity and the high degree of arbitrariness characterizing their enforcement was a significant issue for investors. For instance, the previous decisions are taken by the judiciary, the jurisprudence was not publically available, and court decisions on seemingly similar cases were often quite different (Catusse 2008). Aside from the laws, the change also concerned the introduction of new institutions, such as the creation of commercial courts, and the transformation of the limited liability corporate form and the distribution of power among the various positions within it. This latter reform was viewed quite negatively by the country's business actors, who resented what they reportedly viewed as the excessively formal nature of the text and the increase of penal liabilities for the business owners (Catusse 2008).

The powerful minister of interior, Driss Basri, was appointed by the king to lead and coordinate the campaign, which involved the creation of a special economic police force for its enforcement²²³. Officially speaking, the campaign was carried by an inter-ministerial commission, which also included the minister of justice. The official goal was the “sanitation” of the public administration and of the economic field, in reference principally to those involved in the drug trade and contraband. Thus, the first phase of

Securite Social (CNSS), were rarely applied. The same sort of lax enforcement was also the norm regarding taxation and tariff related matters.

²²³ The *Brigade économique et financière*.

the campaign targeted a number of high ranking customs officers, including some at the director level²²⁴, a member of parliament, and business figures who were all swiftly arrested and sentenced to jail terms in relation to their alleged involvement in tax evasion and smuggling (Catusse 2008).

The campaign quickly expanded its scope and targeted private businessmen and industrialists and for the very sort of offenses that were tolerated, if not encouraged, prior to its launch. This widening of scope led to a number of reactions in the field and outside of it. For instance, the recently appointed Minister of Human Rights, Mohammed Ziane, was forced to resign after he made a statement protesting what he viewed as the campaign's excessive zeal and its questionable legality (Benhlal 1997). A number of newspapers published articles critical of the campaign and of the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty that it created (Benhlal 1997; Catusse 2008).

As the campaign unfolded, it took on a more pronounced political turn. The big economic actors united behind the CGEM and its president Abderrahim Lahjouji who reputedly stood up to the decrees of the Ministry of Interior. At the political level, the CGEM could count on the backing of Driss Jettou, the minister of finance and former head of the CGEM's textile federation. The arguments of Lahjouji were at their core concerned with the renegotiation of the relationship between the state and the business elites. Smaller businesses non-affiliated with the CGEM were also reacting to their targeting by the campaign, and they relied on more practical measures to signify their

²²⁴ Such as the then Customs General Director, Ali Amor, and his predecessor (Benhlal 1997).

discontent to the authorities. For instance, a number of wholesale traders intendedly slowed the reception of their imported containers from the port of Casablanca, which led to significant blockage in that strategic infrastructure (Catusse 2008).

Another set of struggles was also at play in the campaign, as figures connected with the various rivals of Driss Basri within the royal court were also placed under arrest. Such were the cases of a prominent member of the RNI, and the chief of staff of its secretary-general Ahmed Osman, and of relatives of Abdelhak Laraki, a prominent businessman²²⁵ and ally of two royal councilors Ahmed Reda Guedira and Driss Slaoui (Catusse 2008).

A few months after its launch, the campaign began slowing down. The primary reason was the opening of negotiation between the interministerial commission headed by Driss Basri, and the CGEM, aimed at reaching an agreement. The negotiations were at the impulse of the king, who repositioned himself in an arbitration position. In August 1996, a “Gentlemen’s Agreement”²²⁶ was reached between the two parties. The signature of the deal took place in a highly symbolic ceremony, in the throne hall, in presence of the king and all the governors and prefects of the country (Catusse 2008). The agreement was more focused on the codification and clarification of the rules and

²²⁵ One of the richest individuals in the country, and president of one of its biggest banks.

²²⁶ The agreement was referred to using that English-language formula officially and in the press.

procedures regulating the interactions between, and the responsibility of the economic actors and the state administration towards one another²²⁷.

In terms of its political results, on the one hand, the agreement could be viewed as having ended to the disadvantage of the ministry of interior, as the administration had to walk back some of the powers it asserted over the economic field at the beginning of the campaign, and it also politicized the CGEM, making it more active in pursuing its own members' interests in a more autonomous fashion from the state. The critiques of the CGEM held more weight and power as they were aligned and supported by the discourse and demands of the international funding organisms and of the international investors, on which Morocco's finances were heavily reliant in that period. On the other hand, the campaign also served as a show of force by the state towards the economic field, to remind the Moroccan capitalist class of its dependence on the goodwill of the monarchy, and that despite all the liberalization discourse, the resources of the state could be deployed to take down uncooperative actors when needed. That latter verdict becomes more credible when, a year later, the CGEM agree to a fiscal amnesty wherein companies in all sectors had to pay a share of their annual turnover to the state²²⁸. Hibou

²²⁷ The main points of the agreements concerned specific technical issues, for instance the creation of a Code of Customs and Indirect Taxes and the reform of import procedures, and relaxation of the billing regulations (problematic in a highly illiterate society) (F. Mossadeq and Arif 1997).

²²⁸ The companies had to pay from 0.16 to 0.65 percent for a period extending from 1994 until 1997. This taxing will not be fully or equally enforced over the coming years, especially on actors with close ties to the palace.

(2004, 204) describes the contractual nature and terms of the deal, and shows how they indicated an assertion of political power over the field by the state:

Two characteristics of this compromise clearly reveal its political character. First, the compromise was reached on issues of fiscal policy, the most political and symbolic of economic domains. Second, all the sectors of the economy, even those that were not *a priori* affected by massive fraud (e.g., large banks or groups such as Omnium Nord Africain or Societe Nationale d'Investissement) were covered by this law. Apart from that, in order to make clear the contractual nature of the amnesty as a bargain between business and the government, Moroccan business leaders promised to create employment for 1,200 young postgraduates and to apply the "civic enterprise charter" in accordance with directives from the ethical committee of the CGEM. (2004, 204)

Thus, the main achievement of the campaign was that the state managed to coopt the CGEM's leadership preemptively to serve as an intermediary with the field, directly connected to the palace, and to control and channel the autonomization perspectives and intentions that the liberalization processes of the SAP might have created in the Moroccan business class. The operation must therefore be viewed as profitable for the monarchy in the political sense as a way of making sure that the politicization of the capitalist class remains under its control.

6. From the Opposition to the Government: The Alternance and its effects

While the “*Assainissement*” was at the center stage for some time, the negotiations and maneuvers surrounding the elections and the prospect of a Koutlah government quickly re-imposed itself as the main topic. By early 1997, the specifics of the transition of the Koutlah from the opposition to the government were still not clearly laid out, especially regarding whether it would be the PI or the USFP that would lead the government, and in what setup. The fact that the Koutlah would be required to rule along with one of the administrative majority party was quite clear and expected, however, with many observers having pointed out the drift leftwards in the RNI discourse to single it out as the most likely to be tasked with that role.

The Communal elections of June 1997 were viewed as the occasion for the parties to test out the personal commitment of the monarch, guaranteeing the fairness of the upcoming elections. Following that statement, the Interior Ministry and the political parties held a meeting, which resulted in an engagement of the ministry to ensure the neutrality of the administration and to not “intervene” in the electoral process, while the Koutlah parties engaged themselves to not contest the electoral results. That agreement also resulted in the creation of a national commission tasked with following the unfolding of the electoral process.

The results of the 1997 communal elections did not hold many surprises and were somewhat disappointing for the opposition, in that they reflected that it was very far able to secure a majority on its own. Instead, the results showed that each of the three

principal alliances (Koutlah, Wifaq, and “center”) received a third of the votes (Ferrié 2000). The PI came in first overall with 17.58% of the votes, followed by the USFP at 12% (fifth position overall), and the PPS with 3%. The remaining parties of the opposition, the OADP, and the PSD received 1 and 0,6 percent of the votes, respectively.

The communal elections had significant repercussions on the internal dynamics of the Koutlah. As the USFP appeared to have lost a lot of terrain compared to the PI, significant contestation reignited inside the party. For many within the more radical factions, the disappointing electoral results were due to the strategy of concessions followed by the party leadership, as well as its alliance with the PI. The fact that the negotiations with the palace and the decisions that were made in the process were taken at the higher levels of the party without much consultations with the bases of the party was another cause of resentment that was amplified by the electoral disappointment. The issue was internally playing out along the usual Casa vs. Rabat axis of course, but also and more particularly along a quasi-generational divide, with the youth organization of the party, headed by Mohammed Sassi, demanding the organization of an overdue party congress to discuss the party’s strategy, and others within the party insisting that the congress should not take place until consensus was first reached within the party. Youssoufi reportedly rejected the pressures of the more radical wings of the party, and with the support of other factions, he managed to maintain the USFP’s participation within the legislative elections, announcing the opening of the party’s candidacy lists soon after as a way of both moving past the issue, and making the party’s participation in the legislative elections appear as unavoidable.

Following the communal elections, and in preparation for the legislative ones, the monarch changed the composition of the government in August, replacing 20 ministers with party affiliations with technocrats, as a way of supposedly ensuring the neutrality of the government, and more importantly, in his view, to allow the parties to focus on the development of “true socio-economic programs” (Ferrié 2000).

As a background to these developments, the social situation was increasingly tenser, with the many observers noting the emergence of the “jobless graduates’ movement”. The movement brought into the limelight the failures of the educational system and the inability of the Moroccan economy to create enough positions to ensure a job for all those that graduate with a higher education degree, demanding employment in the public sector. By organizing into a movement and holding a high profile collective action campaign²²⁹, this new collective actor imposed itself on the political agenda and managed to extract some concessions from the authorities²³⁰.

²²⁹ Many members of the movement had received relatively high value degrees. One of their main actions was a 72 people hunger strike, backed by a number of regular protests in different cities. The movement would structure itself and become a constant feature on the Moroccan political scene to the time of writing. For a detailed overview of the movement, see the studies of Monserrat Emperador Badimon regarding it (2007; 2013).

²³⁰ While concessions were granted with Driss Basri promising to find jobs for the hunger strikers, it is important to note that a number of those that took part in the protests were arrested and 6 of them received jail sentences (Ferrié 2000).

A significant event of the symbolic sort also marked the year, as the then crown prince Mohamed gave a speech in homage to Abderrahim Bouabid, which was viewed as signaling his personal preference and adoption of democratic values by a number of political actors. This was especially significant as the health of King Hassan was deteriorating, and talk of royal succession was increasingly gaining in prominence²³¹.

The year 1997 was a heavily electoral one, and soon after the municipals, the parties had to engage in their final preparations and maneuvers for the legislative elections. The most significant hurdle was reportedly the lack of interest of the population, which was a problem for all the involved actors, be they the opposition or the palace. Though it was for different reasons, both sides had an interest in mobilizing the population around the *alternance* project and its electoral component. Yet, for many voters, the programs of the parties, and the candidates running, did not appear to generate much enthusiasm (Ferrié 2000). A contrast was emerging between the stalling mobilizational capacities of the Koutlah and those of the Islamist actors.

This lack of popular engagement in the electoral campaign was confirmed on election day. The turnout rate for the legislative elections was quite low, at 58.3% of registered voters, compounded by a high number of invalid votes, bringing the rate further down to 44% of registered voters. Prior to the elections, both the PI and the USFP had been aware of that issue and expressed their concern and positions in relation

²³¹ Since his hospitalization in the USA in 1996, the health of the then 67 year old king Hassan was generally viewed as frail. His potential death, and succession, became an important factor for most political actors, including for the monarch himself.

to it. For M'hamed Boucetta, the PI leader, the authorities were to blame for that situation, and he also implied that the issue was "created by the public authorities to tarnish the image of political actors" (Ferrié 2000)

The results remained nevertheless similar to those of the municipal elections, with the Koutlah parties getting a third of the parliament's lower chambers' seats. Inside the opposition, the USFP came out in a much more prominent position compared to the PI, as it won 57 seats with 17% of the vote. The PI dropped significantly in comparison, only receiving 10% of the votes and 32 parliamentary seats. Given these results, the Koutlah was not in any way able to claim a majority that would allow it to govern by itself, unsurprisingly. Taken together, the non-opposition parties held two-thirds of the seats.

In some cases, the authorities were accused of favoring the election of Koutlah candidates, especially from the USFP. A notable case was recorded in Casablanca, where two successful USFP candidates²³² refused the results, accusing the authorities of having favored their victory over their Islamist opponents (Ferrié 2000). Similarly, Mustapha Karchaoui, a prominent member of the USFP's political bureau, resigned from his position over the same issue. Within the PI, the disappointing results of the party were causing a number of high profile cadres to suggest that the party should stick

²³² It is worth noting that the two were reportedly affiliated with the USFP Youth Organization, which was known to be one of the main groups that refused supporting the 1996 constitution, and was relatively on edge regarding the whole prospect of the *Alternance*, as well as regarding the leadership of Youssoufi.

get a more oppositional positioning as a way of increasing its appeal, as opposed to participating in the expected *alternance* (Ferrié 2000). The party, aside from its unease vis-à-vis the recent success of the USFP, was also increasingly worried about the potential competition that the newly allowed Islamist actors would make it face on the electoral level.

Following the results, a number of options were brought concerning the potential government. While the most likely and expected option was an RNI-Koutlah coalition, there was also talk of a national unity government. And regarding the first option, there was still uncertainty over which of the PI or the USFP would be chosen to lead the government. The USFP was still internally divided over the prospect of an alliance with those parties and of accepting the charge of governing without having a clear majority for the Koutlah.

While the general mood in the political field was one of consensus between the bigger actors, be it on the need for *alternance* or on the general policies to be followed by the government²³³, repression was still present and targeted a number of actors on the margin. Particularly affected were the PADS, Annahj, and to some extent, the OADP and the AMDH as well. The common denominator was the general positioning of these actors on the left of the USFP and their general rejection of the newly established consensus.

²³³ These policy directions were stated by the monarch in a speech earlier in March 1997, which emphasized the need to upgrade and reform Morocco's infrastructures and education sector, and calling for an improvement in social protections.

The values of the new consensus were also spreading to the labor field, with the unions, CGEM, and the government agreeing to dialogue as a way of settling economic and social issues within a National Commission. Observers also noted the toned down frames and slogans of the labor unions during the 1st of May parades and speeches (Ferrié 2000). This was facilitated by the conciliatory overtures provided by the authorities, which satisfied some of the demands of the unions²³⁴. Yet, especially for the CDT, the need for moderation in its demands and discourse was not something that convinced everyone in its ranks. And while its leader, Noubir Amaoui, was insisting on the gains realized within the Social Dialogue framework and highlighting the benefits of the ability to get some demands satisfied without the need to withstand violent repression from the authorities; his second in command, Abdelmajid Bouzoubaa, toned it down by stressing that the delays in the implementation of the government's engagements remained problematic (Ferrié 2000). The rank and file of the union were not as taken by the consensual approach towards the government of the leadership, which mainly appeared to be playing along as a way of supporting, and in preparation for the prospect of a USFP government. More problematically, Amaoui had reportedly taken the decision of signing the agreement with the government and the CGEM unilaterally, without consulting the union's national council or asking for its approval. This looked even less flattering as the government was not delivering much in terms of

²³⁴ Mainly, the concession consisted of promises to improve salaries, reactivate internal promotion mechanisms for teachers, increasing public investment, and to provide more jobs (Ferrié 2000).

concessions, and that the CDT position was contrasted to that of the UMT which did not sign the final agreement.

7. Composition of the Alternance government:

Four months after the legislative elections, the king appointed Abderrahmane Youssoufi as prime minister in on February 4th, 1998. Thus, the USFP was leading the government, but it did not control it. It had to share power with other parties within it, including the PI and other non-Koutlah politicians from the RNI and MNP. Furthermore, the palace kept direct control over politically important ministries, which were labeled as Sovereignty ministries, which consisted of the ministries of interior, Islamic affairs, foreign affairs, justice, and the administration of national defense.

The new government took a few weeks of negotiations in order to reach a settlement that satisfied all concerned parties. The USFP received the largest amount of ministries in the larger than usual 41 ministries government. The most important ministries that the party received control over were the finance, agriculture, and housing/environment/territorial planning ministries. The latter sector used to be formally under the jurisdiction of the ministry of interior, and it was recombined into a large ministry headed by Mohamed El Yazghi. Driss Basri remained at the helm of the Interior ministry.

The PI received six ministries, which it resented to some extent, but ended up accepting as its electoral results²³⁵ made it difficult for it to extract more positions from the USFP. It did, however, take some time to convince them to accept that deal and take part in the government, as the PI argued that it could not give a final response until after its 13th congress takes place and appoints a new secretary-general to succeed M'hamed Boucetta.

The congress of the PI was a heated and disputed one. Even the decision to call for its holding was harshly divisive within the party. M'Hammed Douiri (1997)²³⁶, the assistant secretary-general of the PI's Executive Council, took the unprecedented step of publishing an open letter informing the public of the internal opposition he encountered on the part of M'hamed Boucetta and Abbas el Fassi²³⁷ to his call for a council vote for the organization of an extraordinary congress to discuss the electoral results. Knowing that he would be in a minority position, Boucetta argued that he was the only one, as secretary-general, habilitated to call for such a vote; he denied Douiri's attempt at holding a vote during that meeting. In reaction, in his public letter, Douiri accused the

²³⁵ It is worth noting that the PI strongly contested the results and even threatened to withdraw from all institutions in protest against what it considered to be general electoral fraud against its candidates.

²³⁶ Douiri was a longtime figure in the party, and was the one with the most control over its bureaucracy and internal control apparatus, including the large body of inspectors employed by the PI to control and keep track of its cells throughout Morocco.

²³⁷ Known as the "Marrakchi Clan", this faction was the dominant one within the party at that period.

secretary-general of violating the internal rules of the PI and of using a flawed interpretation of the statutes to curtail the executive council's will.

Faced with that publicizing of the issue and with Douiri's threat to resign from the party's direction²³⁸, Boucetta agreed to hold the extraordinary congress of the party. While it could be viewed as a victory for Douiri, the press viewed it as a potential cunning move from Boucetta, to allow for the bases' anger to be expressed and vented in a non-threatening way for his faction's control over the party. The final statement of the extraordinary congress was of a radicalism that reflected that intention, calling for the dissolution of the parliament and the holding of new legislative elections. The fact that such demands would not be met must have been clear to the PI's leadership, meaning that it was mostly intended for internal consumption²³⁹. The motions of the congress did, nevertheless, put the participation of the party in the *alternance* along with the USFP in question.

That latter question would be further delayed until the 13th national congress. This was made necessary, as only a congress could rescind the decisions taken during the previous extraordinary congress. Further compounding the atmosphere of uncertainty was the decision of M'hamed Boucetta to resign from his position at the helm of the

²³⁸ Such a resignation would have likely precipitated a crisis and a potential schism within the PI.

²³⁹ It was also likely a way to leverage that expression of internal radical rejection of the results to make the party's participation in the government appear far from granted, and to push for more position in exchange for its participation.

party. This opened the way to a race for his succession pitting M'hamed Douiri against Abbas El Fassi. The former spent a longer period in the party as second in command and had a lot of supporters and loyalists within the party's organizational apparatus, while the latter had more support from the younger generations in the party and was closely aligned with Boucetta and the so-called "Marrakchi" clan. Douiri's support base was weakened by his previous actions regarding the extraordinary congress, and many resented him for having, in a way, opened the way to what was viewed as an untimely radical repositioning of the party (Chankou 1998). El Fassi, on the other hand, was viewed as a conciliatory and more centrist figure. Both had served previously as ministers, and El Fassi also had served for a period as ambassador in Paris. Thus both were not outsiders to the state and were acceptable figures for the palace.

The mode of election was the crux of the dispute between the two candidates. Douiri was arguing for electing the secretary-general through a general vote of all the thousands of congress attendees. This would have allowed him more chances of victory, as he had more support in the lower ranks than El Fassi. To support his proposal, he argued that the larger electorate would strengthen the party by increasing the legitimacy of its leadership. The proposal was, however, rejected by Boucetta, and the election was limited to the 600 members composing the national council of the party.

The congress ended up with the victory of Abbas El Fassi. His victory was, in a way, the "conservative" choice, as he was the previous leader's favorite. It was, however, accompanied by some interesting internal changes, such as the rejuvenation of the party's demographics and the implementation of a two four-year terms limitation on

the secretary-general position. In order to maintain a space within the institution for the older elites of the party, a new internal institution, the council of the presidency, was created. Along with M'hamed Boucetta, Douiri was also allotted a seat within the new council, satisfying him and his allies, who remained a significant faction within the PI. The congress also decided to rescind the resolutions of the previous extraordinary congress, thus opening the way forwards to a participation of the PI in the *alternance* government. This was, however, conditioned on the party being valued in light of its "real" political significance, and not on the basis of its results at the previous legislative elections, which were still considered to be flawed by the party.

Following the congress, the PI, along with the RNI from outside the Koutlah, engaged in negotiation with the Youssoufi over the allocation of ministries and other positions within the new government. Both parties reportedly demanded a high number of positions. Finally, the new government was appointed on March 14th 1998. As a side effect of the balancing act that Youssoufi had to engage in as a way of satisfying and ensuring the participation of the main parties and actors, the new government had a very high number of ministerial positions.

At the programmatic level, the speech of Youssoufi presenting the general policies of his government was not revolutionary or innovative in relation to the previously established principles highlighted by the king in his above-mentioned speech to the parliament. These principles were the core basis of the consensus within the political field, shared by the main actors on both sides of the now reversed opposition/majority divide. Crucially, the USFP leader accepted to integrate adopted the liberal economic

discourse and policies that were pursued by the previous governments, championing private entrepreneurship and its encouragement through deregulation as the main motor of economic growth, the fruits of which would then be hopefully redistributed through other social-welfare oriented policies.

The new government was also limited by the budgetary constraints imposed upon him by external fund providers. These limitations were not situated only at the level of the significant amount of resources that had to be directed towards the repayment of debts²⁴⁰, but also in terms of what sort of policy approaches should the remaining resources be invested towards. Insistence on favoring the private sector, increasing privatization of public sectors, and curtailing government spending, including reducing the number of state employees, were crucial aspects that limited Youssoufi's room for maneuver severely, and would have serious political consequences for the *alternance* experience.

As part of the process, the previous governmental majority found itself in the odd situation of having to act as an opposition in the parliament. The oddness of the situation was not just a matter of the old majority parties being mostly so-called administrative parties that were centered on an assemblage of various notables and elites, from various levels, or their tendency to be delegating their strategic decision making to the services of the Interior Ministry. It was also due to the fact that the USFP-led government was not deviating much from the policy line that the administration parties

²⁴⁰ About one third of Morocco's total budget for 1998, 34 billion dirhams

had argued for in their electoral programs and, often, participated in implementing either through their participation in the government or their support in parliament.

For the UC, the search for a new oppositional identity was on display during a meeting of its National Commission, when its Secretary-General declared that the Youssoufi government was failing to correctly implement the liberalization policies as it lacked the skills to do so in a correct manner (Ferrié 2000). A similar soul-searching was predominant within the Wifaq alliance, as its parties were also trying to adapt their discourse and find a new *raison d'être*. As those parties prime purpose was more to mobilize various notables and constituents in support of monarchic projects and serve as an electoral counterweight to the Koutlah parties, they faced a complex repositioning process in order to adopt an oppositional posture.

The fundamental flaws of the *alternance* government began quickly emerging within the first year of the Youssoufi government. The lack of homogeneity of the government and the non-electoral basis of the *alternance* project increasingly appeared as fundamental flaws that affected its capacity for reform at the government level, and the foundations for that reform at the inter-party and intra-party organizational levels.

However, those flaws were only flaws if assessed from a democratization perspective. In terms of transition to democracy, those flaws were imposing crucial hurdles by changing the internal dynamics of the actors, and their positioning within the political field, in a way that led to their weakening and even dislocation. For the monarchy, however, the goal was arguably different. Rather than a successful

democratic transition, the goal may have been instead of the insurance of a smooth dynastic transition, which took place after the death of King Hassan in 1999.

Chapter 6: Analysis

1. The Political field under the state of exception period (1965-1971)

In 1965, the state of exception and the suspension of parliamentary and normal political life in Morocco signaled an apparent breaking point of the previously agreed upon rules of the game on the political field, and a questioning of its whole position within the larger meta-field of power. As the monarchy gained in strength following its successful imposition of a favorable sociodicy on the political field, and subsequent domination of state institutions and means of physical coercion, it began resenting some of the constraints it had imposed on its autonomy through the 1962 constitution and the parliamentary system that it enabled. As the power of opposition actors was self-limited by their lack of access to the state apparatus after 1962, the monarchy began deploying the latter against. The attacks targeted the opposition on many levels, eroding their

logistical and organizational capacity, as well as weakening their unity by targeting their leadership and promoting further schisms.

The aforementioned developments had significant impacts on the whole Moroccan social space, affecting it at all levels. Nevertheless, this analysis will focus on the political field, as a point of entry towards the analysis of the wider impacts, especially the changes relating to the nascent state institutions, and those occurring within the meta-field of power. At that latter level, the positions of the various fields and their dynamic interactions are also brought into the picture, both as explanatory factors and as outcomes of the developments that took place during that period.

At the objective level of analysis, the political field experienced drastic change after the instauration of the state of exception. As parliamentary activity was suspended and replaced by royal decrees and appointments, the political field had significantly shrunk in size. The large majority of actors that were included within the field, and foundational to its emergence, be they on the opposition side or monarchic supporters, were now effectively situated outside the new boundaries. This was exemplified by the repression that targeted all of the PI and USFP, as well as the exclusion of the MP and FDIC actors from the official political field.

Aside from the size aspect, the permeability of the field's boundaries was also radically changed. At the emergence of the field, nationalist symbolic capital was highly valued, if not essential, as a condition of access to the field and as a currency within it. The form of political capital that emerged was highly tied to that type of symbolic capital, and the national movement actors (PI and USFP mainly), held significant levels

of that form of capital, both as a collective actor and as a network of individuals that included key figures of the fight for independence within its ranks. Even actors that played a comparatively minor role in the events made sure to assert claims to that form of symbolic capital in order to secure or improve their standing on the field²⁴¹. Under the state of exception, the value of those types of capital dropped significantly in their ability to grant access to the official political field and to state institutions. Instead, it became more of a hurdle unless the actor's portfolio included enough social capital or royal favor to be allowed into the field.

This loss of value and negotiability of the political field's native form of capital indicates significant changes in the field's degree of relative autonomy, as well as an increase in terms of its level of heteronomy. Thus, for autonomy, the political field experienced quite a seismic transformation of its internal rules, which were suspended in a sudden and almost complete fashion but the monarchy. While the legitimacy of opposition actors remained considerable, their ability to voice and share their opinions on the political field was severely reduced. The recently established, yet somewhat codified rules of the political field, be they formal or informal, were mostly replaced by the more arbitrary principle of monarchic fiat. This principle slowly expanded throughout the social space, affecting several previously autonomous fields, which had

²⁴¹ The case of Mahjoubi Aherdane, the MP leader, and his exaggerated claims of prominence within the AL exemplifies that.

a certain degree of politicization²⁴², and reducing the value of political capital across the board. The subsuming of the political field by the monarchy was achieved through the cooperation and support of the military and security services, as well as that of the state administration. Nonetheless, the military field was more prominently placed within the meta-field of power, in alliance with the monarchy. Its relative autonomy was preserved and quite high, and its heteronomy levels were relatively low. Internal military affairs were generally settled within the field and with very limited external intervention.

This quasi-complete domination of the political field by the monarchic institution was also reflected at the objective level in the political field's forms of capital and their respective values and diffusion. As previously mentioned, having the ruler's favor, or connections to his court, and a reputation for loyalty to the monarchy's interests, was increasingly becoming a necessary condition for actor's to be allowed a favorable standing within the official political field. This combination of royal favor, displays of loyalty to the palace and its interests, and/or connections to the royal court and individuals within it, which will be referred to as royal capital²⁴³, was increasingly making its way throughout Morocco's social space.

²⁴² Politicization in the sense that political capital had a somewhat high value within their boundaries. The education/cultural field or the labor union field are good illustration of such fields.

²⁴³ There is nothing essentially monarchic about this form of capital or the field it originates within. Arguably, it is quite homologous to any form of capital related to a ruler's favor, which gains in value within highly personalistic authoritarian regime, irrelevant of their formal regime type.

In several other fields as well, politicized or otherwise, closeness to the palace, and thus holdings of royal capital, was a significant determinant of actors' positions and an important principle of distinction between them and the rest of their respective fields. That form of capital was, in a way, politicized in that period, as it was implying an outright opposition to those holding native forms of capital and advocating for more autonomy and a curtailment of monarchic influence across the social space. Conversely, actors holding that latter form were facing varying degrees of exclusion and repressions, especially if they voiced their opposition in outright political terms, critiquing monarchic prominence in and of itself.

Alongside that royal form of capital, there was also a more notable presence of military capital within the state institutions, with many military officers holding influential positions within the state apparatus, be they technical or political in nature. The military and security apparatus being central components of the state apparatus, and the main pillar supporting the monarchy's strategy of dominance, the field encompassing trained officer level security personnel in an elevated position within the meta-field of power. While it was technically subservient to the monarchy and to its interests, and while positions within the military/security fields, as well as progressions through their ranks hierarchy, were ultimately dependent on the monarch's approval; in practice, the decisions were done within the field and in accordance with its internal rules and practice, by fellow members of the military/security apparatuses. The influence accumulated of Mohammed Oufkir or Ahmed Dlimi within the field and the

state as a whole at the time, only outranked by the king, illustrates the situation convincingly.

Thus, both types of capital, along with the more usual forms, came to gain a higher purchase power within the political field and the social space as a whole, at the expense of the national liberation struggles associated type of symbolic capital, and especially the for on political capital associated with the national movement parties. Membership in the UNFP or the PI was increasingly a handicap to actors on several fields. The threat of arrests for trumped up charges of one sort of the other was a constant worry for those holding it.

At the habitus level, state positions, and positions within the official political field were now attributed to a diverse set of non-politician or non-partisan actors. Thus, along with the above mentioned military officers and the specific sort of mindset they embody and have drilled into them through their training and careers, a number of actors on the post-1965 political field embodied what could be referred to as a “courtesan” habitus. This was the habitus characteristics of those that were better endowed in terms of royal capital, and had a specific set of mannerisms and mindset that they acquired/developed through a long period of time spent attending and navigating the intricacies of the royal field, its events, and internal rules and games. Finally, there was also a more noticeable presence of “notable” types, be they rural or urban. These actors tended to be well endowed in terms of economic capital or other resources that acquired them a significant prominence in their local fields of origin and could be converted into

substantial social capital in the form of patronage networks and friendly supportive contacts within the state administration.

On the other hand, the set of habituses associated with the national movement parties was almost purged out in totality. This applied more accurately to the party cadres types, and those whose legitimacy and loyalty lay with the party first and foremost. Labor union activists and other ex-resistance member profiles were also repressed and kept out of the political field, only occasionally allowed to express themselves on political and social topics occasionally.

The intellectual field and the university field were also generally repressed within that period. Political position--taking carrying a significant personal and professional risk for the actors daring to do so. Students, especially those politically active within the UNFP connected UNEM student union, were particularly targeted. Aside from the more traditional repressive approaches, the monarch also resorted to the instauration of military service as a way of punishing and, potentially, transforming their habitus.

As can be expected, these abovementioned objective transformations at the field, capital, and habitus levels involved significant symbolic level transformations as well. At the field level, starting in 1964, the monarchic discourse gradually changed from the one held in the earlier years following the adoption of the 1962 constitution. It increasingly asserted a more active role for the monarch, claiming that other political actors were failing to fulfill their duties and that it was the role of the monarch to intervene and save the nation and ensure that the country's development would not be held back by their alleged failure. In making these arguments, the monarch appealed to

values that were already successfully imposed on the political field and large swaths of social space during the previous foundational post-independence period. Thus, the discourse appealed to the needs of modernization and progress, as well as national traditions and religions as sources of legitimacy for the monarchic institution to take over and monopolize the political.

The reduction in the size of the field and its boundaries' permeability were noticeable at the symbolic level as well. Throughout that period, talking about politics and interest in the political was increasingly and actively discouraged. Resistance to that trend was harshly repressed by the security apparatus. In parallel, the monarchic discourse about supremacy and its custodianship role and quasi-equivalence of its interests with those of the nation and its population was actively promoted throughout the social space. Development in telecommunication technologies enhanced the reach of that discourse, especially as the country established its first national television in 1962. Through the media and the dominance over cultural production fields, the royal discourse and its appeals to traditional and religious legitimation frames were diffused through a variety of media coverage of speeches and ritualistic ceremonies that symbolized the monarch's centrality and prominence within the political field. In parallel, the educational system, which was at the root of the massive 1965 protests that shook the monarchy and partially motivated the adoption of the state of emergency, were also targeted. Educational programs were transformed, and more weight was given to religious and traditionalist values at the expense of more critical-thinking enhancing disciplines.

At the same time, the monarchy was also targeting the symbolic bases of the forms of capital held by its national movement rivals. A concrete illustration of that approach is provided in the monarchy's changing of the officially celebrated national independence day, moving it to make it coincide with the Mohammed V's date of return to the country, as opposed to the date that the proclamation of independence was signed on before the return of the royal family to the country. This development, along with the above ones, highlights the efforts of the young Hassan II to institutionalize the monarchy's symbolic victory achieved during the post-independence foundational struggle, which was in no small part tied to the symbolic capital embodied by Mohammed V and his relations with the national movement leaders. Lacking these forms of capital, the new king had to try and quickly convert that capital in a more enduring and disembodied form, especially that he did not enjoy the same level of trust on the part of the national movement actors, and had very inimical relations with some of them. This approach was resisted and opposed by the national movement actors in various manners, but it was nevertheless successfully backed by the monarchy and its allied actors.

The contestation was noticeable in the criticism that the actors depending on royal capital faced in terms of legitimacy from the rest of the original political field. The convertibility of their forms of capital was questioned, and their legitimacy was denied by the opposition. The contestation took the form of various discourses and arguments that were carried by the press and inside the structures of the parties, unions, and other oppositional politicized social spaces. The contestation also took the more concrete

form of forming secret networks trained to provide an armed backing for a revolutionary option, that actors such as the UNFP were still considering as a valid alternative around that time.

In terms of the production of that symbolic capital, the royal form was characterized by a very high rate of exploitation. The legitimating discourses that produced and expanded its influence were largely centered on a narrative constructed around the allegedly exceptionally gifted and skilled person of the monarch, who was portrayed as being actively behind all the achievements of the country. In a way, the monarch was increasingly becoming the face and embodiment of the state, opening a personalization phase that paralleled, in many ways, that established by Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia. The national movement opposition parties' symbolic capital production processes were characterized by a much lower rate of exploitation. While it was already low before, it was even more so now that the repressive stakes were higher and that elite figures were particularly targeted.

The high rate of exploitation within the newly monarchically subsumed political field, at the symbolic level, went hand in hand with the furthering of a process of dispossession targeted at competing actors and fields that had already started symbolically at a lower intensity following the monarchy's foundational victory. Leveraging the control it had over the state apparatus and the newly developed communication technologies, the monarchy ensured that only its narrative would be diffused at a large scale. The national movement actors and political parties had, in theory, the ability to use their network of party cells and newspapers to diffuse their

counter-narratives. However, in practice, that was no easy feat, as their activities and gatherings were under surveillance and repressed, and their publications were seized if deemed dangerous by the authorities. The education system was also reframed in a way designed to enhance the receptivity of the graduates towards more traditionalist and conservative discourses and to make them more likely to not react positively to leftist frames. The effects of that intervention were not limited to the political field but throughout the social space and targeting the various fields that had the capacity to produce politicized or politically-relevant discourse and their legitimacy.

The dispossession process was also unfolding at other levels, targeting other forms of capital. Via its control over the state institutions and consequently on the resources of the state in terms of public sector and administration employment positions, the monarchy had taken over a significant component that was central to the reproduction or advancement strategies of many actors. Thus, it could control the ability of various groups to reproduce their capital and social positions. Those opposing the monarchy would risk losing their jobs or endanger their career perspectives. As for the parties, their printing presses were often targeted along with their offices by the authorities, and their newspapers were often seized for the slightest offense. This, in other terms, was the objective manifestation of the symbolic discursive attacks they faced.

A similar dynamic was also at work in the economic field regarding access to state-backed cheap loans, public contracts, or the assets and agricultural lands recovered from the colons or through the privatization of previously communal ones. Access to those benefits was limited to actors deemed supportive and well-endowed in terms of royal

capital. On the other hand, actors viewed as non-supportive were generally disadvantaged and risked a variety of repressive measures, be they financial or more physical. The ministry of finance, in charge of budgeting and taxation, was, therefore, along with the security apparatus and the judiciary, another repressive tool in the state apparatus available to the monarchy.

Yet, the opposition was not defenseless, and it had inherited and maintained a capacity for underground work that it had developed during the struggle against the French Protectorate, and that it turned back to during that period of severe repression. This included secretive organization maintained around the country, cells armed or with the capacity to procure and deploy armed violence if required, international support networks for guerilla training in a number of countries²⁴⁴. And this was also reflected at the level of the generational habitus of a majority of the party cadres in that period, who were highly devoted and accepting of the likely repression and other costs that their political activities might make them face.

Instead, the main issue that faced the Moroccan opposition actors in that period was the increasingly salient conflicts pitting them against one another. These internal divisions, while arguably stoked and exploited by the monarchy, were principally due to internal dynamics, including personal and ideological incompatibilities. As was established in the previous chapters, the divisions were more significant and prominent within the UNFP. The main one was related to the competition between the political

²⁴⁴ Mostly in Algeria, Syria, and later on Libya, along with various Warsaw Pact countries.

party and the labor union fields over issues of autonomy, heteronomy, and boundaries at the objective level. At the symbolic level, these reflected concerns over the right approach to be adopted in the struggle for democracy. For the UMT, the Labor union field had to prioritize the interests of its affiliated workers, maintain its independence from the political field and not sacrifice its constituents' interests for the sake of the political field and its struggles. This position was rejected by many within the leftist UNFP, with the issue creating salient divisions within the Moroccan left and the party itself, despite a number of actors being involved in both fields at once. These divisions created a lot of interpersonal and faction rivalries within the party, which the monarchy was able to play on by granting concessions and adopting a generally more lenient attitude towards the syndical actors. The permission granted for a reemergence of the previously banned Communist party is part of that general strategy of dislocating and dividing the leftist and general national movement opposition. The labor union field was also witnessing more divisions, both internally within the UMT and its federations, and otherwise, as the PI created its own affiliated union. These dynamics weakened the labor movement as well as the political parties in their attempts at facing the monarchy's hegemony while preventing the erosion of their oppositional mobilization capacities.

Interpersonal rivalries were also prominent within the pro-monarchic party field. Both the PSD and the MP suffered schisms and self-sabotage as a result of the rivalries pitting their leadership and members. The difference was that their rivalries were of a less ideological nature and more rooted in the actors' prioritization of their personal

interests. Many of the notables that formed those parties were mostly participating as a way of gaining political and social capital, and maybe royal favor, which would improve their positions within the field they were primarily invested in. The fact that the national movement parties generally advocated a redistributive program that threatened their interests was yet another source of motivation for their mobilization on the electoral arena. With that threat forcefully adjourned, their reasons for adopting a more-or-less united front quickly followed suit.

Despite the lack of parliamentary elections or of an electoral path to central state positions, municipal elections were held in that period. The most significant element highlighted by these elections was the centrality and importance of the ministry of interior's administrative and territorial control apparatus, built along the lines of the French protectorate' organizational lines and logics²⁴⁵, within the independent Moroccan state. After having gone for a more liberal approach to the mobilization of popular support, through the creation of the FDIC party/alliance to contest the elections of 1963 in a less interventionist fashion, the monarchy now had relied on the ministry of interior and heavy-handed administrative approach to ensure favorable electoral results. Thus, the network cultivated by the ministry of interior came to become the backbone infrastructure through which royal capital flew and slowly seeped into most sectors of

²⁴⁵ As was noted in the relevant section, ex-protectorate officers remained in the country as consultants in various sections of the independent state apparatus. The interior ministry was no exception on that level, and it acquired significant technical skills and knowledge in the techniques of power carefully developed by the French protectorate over the years.

the Moroccan social space. The administration's efficiency at the organization of pro-monarchic notables and at electoral fraud techniques improved with time and quickly became the prominent channel through which electoral gains were gained, further decreasing the political field's autonomy and acting as the channel keeping it subsumed and heteronomized under the monarchic field.

2. The Attempted Coups of 1971 and 1972 and their consequences

The return to constitutionality and the reestablishment of a unicameral assembly with limited universal suffrage was the main difference that occurred in 1970 and signaled the end of the state of exception. Though it enshrined the superiority of the monarchy as the dominant institution within the Moroccan state and social space, the image of confident stability it projected was quickly shattered by the two coups.

The short-lived constitution of 1970 is nevertheless useful in that it signals a break with the principles enshrined in the earlier 1962 version. The fact that the constitutional revision was enacted without respecting the process outlined for such an undertaking by the previous constitution²⁴⁶ indicated that the previous one was considered abrogated and obsolete politically. The new order enshrined by the new constitution thus reflected

²⁴⁶ Most notably, the procedures prescribed by the 1962 under Title XI Articles 104, 105, and 106.

These are the procedures relating to the role of the parliament and government in starting and debating any constitutional reform proposal.

the changed balance of power between the monarchic and the political field at that level as well.

The political parties had their role redefined and equalized symbolically and legally with a number of other organizations. Thus, their specific political function and their legitimacy as actors on the political field was divided and shared with a variety of other actors, such as labor unions, professional chambers, and communal councils. The latter two were usually aligned with the monarchy and often controlled by the administration.

In terms of the political field, its shape, and boundaries, the 1970 constitution brought several changes to light. In terms of size, the political field was much smaller, with direct suffrage playing an even more limited role, thus reflecting a lower value for forms of capital that could influence elections. That value was further lowered via the capacity and likelihood of administrative interventions in elections. Indirect elections, on the other hand, indicated an increased permeability of the field's boundaries. By easing the path of entry for non-partisan actors into the political arena, who had different types of habitus and forms of capital, the new constitution was increasing the level of heterodoxy and heteronomy of the political field. It was making it subdivided along various interest lines, with each of the overlapping networks of actors involved within it championing a different and sometimes competing vision of the field and its purpose.

Faced with these developments, the national movement opposition agreed to pool its resources in an attempt to improve their capacities and chances of resisting the hegemonic moves of the monarchy. Rightly viewing the developments as part of the

process of ineluctable dispossession of accumulated forms of capital and means of producing political capital that the monarchy was pursuing as an existential threat, the PI and the UNFP created the Koutlah alliance in 1970.

The attempted coups of 1971 and 1972 had a momentous impact on that new arrangement. The supremacy of the monarchy, along with its confident reliance on the military field and its capacities to safeguard and carry out its interests, was upended by the events. The principal and most direct consequence of the events was their radical reshaping of the meta-field of power. The military field was actively booted out of the assemblage that composed the State. Military officers were purged out of the state positions that they were allowed into throughout the earlier period. The ministry of defense was abolished and replaced by an administrative position directly attached to the royal cabinet and control over logistical matters, and some armaments were transferred under the jurisdiction of the ministry of interior's civilian actors. The military field was thus stripped off the relative independence it previously enjoyed and became characterized by high levels of heteronomy vis-à-vis the monarchic and civilian administrative fields and a low degree of autonomy.

The prospect of a successful coup and subsequent takeover of the state by the military field was not appealing to the opposition as well, despite the alleged cooperation and plans of some actors within the UNFP with others inside the military field aimed at ensuring a potentially profitable outcome. Given the significant enmity and gaps between the opposition actors and most of those within the more dominant positions inside the military field, their connections were mostly tying them to mid-level

officers that were allegedly supposed to eliminate the higher-ranked ones such as Oufkir if the coups were to succeed. Nevertheless, it seems that many within the opposition believed that the prospect of a coup was a risky scenario, with consequences as negative as those they faced under monarchic hegemony.

For the monarchic field, the coups signaled the danger of allowing too much convertibility for military capital within the state institutions. After its forceful tightening of the boundaries of the political field, it launched a similar process in relation to the military field. Royal capital became the most dominant form of capital on the military field, and holding the latter along with the field's native military capital allowed for a favorable conversion into economic capital. Military officers were then allowed significant material concessions, in a way defusing their potential critiques of the ambient corruption and nepotism by having them partake in it²⁴⁷.

A similar approach was increasingly adopted towards most relatively highly situated fields. Dominant actors were granted the ability to easily convert their accumulated capital into financial capital²⁴⁸. On the one hand, this satisfied the natural urge and need for capital for circulation and growth within the social space. Left to themselves, native forms of capital would strive to get a higher value across the social

²⁴⁷ That was done through the granting of various resources, such as lands, mining rights, fishing and transport licenses, etc.

²⁴⁸ The “Moroccanization:” was a core mechanism in that process for the higher situated elites, “Aggrements” or Licences for all sorts of businesses were used for lower ranks.

space, in relation to any improvement of their field's position within the meta-field of power and/or State institutions. Thus, the provision of paths for these expanding forms of capital into other fields, in an exchange that also required accumulation of royal capital, was a way to ensure the elites' support and investment in the survival of a monarchy dominated power arrangement.

The monarchy also appeared to have felt an urge to improve the relative position of the political field within the meta-field of power, as a way to ensure that it would be acquiring a share of the symbolic capital it granted, and as a way to make up for the exclusion of the military actors and their influence from the political field. The constitution of 1972 was an attempt at that. By increasing the size of the political field and allowing the Koutlah actors through its boundaries, it aimed to entice them into the ruling coalition. That entailed the enticement of the symbolic capital held by actors from the Koutla back into the official political field, and agree to put aside radical contestation of the legitimacy of royal capital on the political field.

While the general outward position of the Koutla was to reject the project on offer through the 1972 constitution, internal developments within the parties were telling a different story. Increasing divides appeared within the parties, pitting those wanting to reach a compromise with the monarchy for reintegration in the political game, and those opposing it. While there were valid ideological and practical political reasons explaining that difference of opinion within the party elites and bases, there was a very prominent division along capital and habitus lines in practice. The UNFP Casablanca versus Rabat division, and the further factionalisation within each of the two groups, illustrates that

point. The Casablanca Group, with significant ties to the labor field and its interests, had less incentive in engaging in what it viewed as a compromise for the sake of reintegration within a fundamentally heteronomous official political field, dominated by the monarchic field. A hasty compromise would not only be less appealing in terms of gains but could also threaten their general positions within a fluctuating labor field.

Aside from the attempt at regaining the support of the political field's native actors, and reintegrating the field at a higher position within the ruling assemblage, the Monarchy had also increased its efforts on the religious field, increasingly mobilizing its resources as a more central element in its general strategy for controlling the social space and countering more "secular" narratives.

3. Religious Field and Islamism

After its disinvestment and disaffection from the military field, the monarchy increased its appeals to religious legitimacy based on a more prominent assertion of its claims over the field's produce in terms of religious symbolic capital. The process of appropriation of the religious capital means of production by the monarchic field began not too long after the independence, especially given the previously political position of the religious field institutions during the precolonial era, and the protectorate period to some extent, when Ulemas had a crucial role in the monarchic succession process.

The appropriation by the monarchic field did not necessarily affect the size of the field, as happened with the political field. Rather, in this case, it focused on controlling the autonomy of the field and the ability of its actors to acquire, reproduce, and potentially convert their positions and forms of capital into alternative and more negotiable ones. The bureaucratization of the field and the integration of the Ulema within the state administration as salaried employees, replacing their previously independent access to economic capital, was a significant step in reducing the autonomy and increasing the heteronomy of the field in relation to the monarchy and the state.

The creation of religious learning institutions and the integration of Islamic studies programs, while simultaneously reducing the role of the previously dominant Qarawiyin was a central part of the process of dislocation and reduction of the field's autonomy. Reducing the role of the venerable institution and its potential to reproduce its position and potentially resist the subordinated role imposed upon it was a key element of the process. It was also aimed at the habitus of the field's actors, which was transformed and made more diverse, as the religious students were spread geographically within many campuses, often in a dominated, isolated position within the campus vis-à-vis the generally secular students, and were less able to associate with the previous ways of thinking about their positions and social roles associated with the field historically.

The emergence of Islamist actors happened within that context, as a reaction to the impacts that the monarchic monopolistic approach to the religious, and its deployment

of religious capital as a pillar for its political dominance²⁴⁹. These reactions took different forms; on the one hand, some actors challenged the monarchic claim to monopoly over the religious field as illegitimate, while others focused their critique principally on the need to Islamize society and a targeting of left wing political actors. Abdessalam Yassine and his movement belonged to that first category, challenging the king in a public fashion appealing to older forms of resistance historically deployed within the religious field, and deploying a variety of traditional sources of embodied charisma in the process. By asserting loudly the generally unspeakable at the time position critiquing the monarch's claim to supremacy over the religious field and monopoly over the right to use it within the political field, Yassine had drawn the wrath of the king and essentially automatically imposed himself within the political field as an actor along with his group later on²⁵⁰. As for the other category of groups, such as the *Chabiba*, their targeting of the left and efforts at spreading conservative norms within society, made them more tolerable and even useful for the monarchy's plans at a time. Despite that relation deteriorating following the Benjelloun assassination, groups that situated themselves within that general tradition, while still rejecting violence, were able

²⁴⁹ The impact of the 1967 Arab Defeat, and a general disappointment with Panarabist ideas was also crucial, as was noted regarding the background of the movements' main figures.

²⁵⁰ On that note, Bourdieu stated "One way of entering and affirming one's entry in a field, heresy for instance, is to produce within it the effects by which we reach existence- that is very important in fields where capital is essentially symbolic; being the object of a holder of high symbolic capital's retaliation, is already reaching existence (within the field)

to reach a more advanced agreement with the monarchy and even be allowed to play a role within the official political and associative fields. Economic capital was more accessible to these groups and the more conservative ones that did not contest the field's heteronomy relative to the monarchy but instead focused their demands on increasing the size of the field and its reach in relation to the political field and the larger social space. At the capital level, both types of Islamist actors were trying to gain a better valuation and negotiability for religious capital across the social space; they also tried to increase the symbolic importance of religious elements within the sociodicy of core fields. In general, the monarchy tolerated their approach as long as it did not contest the position of the monarch as the dominant actor within the religious field, and the control of the monarchic field over it.

4. The 1975 Truce

As previously noted, the post-coup attempts by the monarch to shore up its position and maintain its dominance despite the symbolic and organizational losses and constraints imposed by the loss of an independent supportive military field, varied in their results. The religious field was successfully neutralized and rendered subservient, but it also led to the emergence of heterodox actors that took their challenge to the political level. In the political field as well, the monarchy was not able to secure a reengagement with the field's important oppositional actors on the basis of the 1972 constitution and its limited concessions. In reaction, the monarch increasingly involved

himself personally in the political field by actively asserting his presence at different levels through his activities across the country. This personal attempt at acquiring and securing a sort of “performance” legitimacy form of personal political capital and a direct connection to constituents that bypasses the official institutional channels was quite successful.

The king’s predominance was further solidified when he engaged himself in a field previously dominated by the opposition parties and other national movement actors. The nationalist credentials of the monarchy until then where, as previously shown, resulting from a partial reconversion and institutionalization of the symbolic capital previously embodied by Mohammed V. That accumulated capital was, despite the successful establishment of a sociodicy that tied the monarchy to a centrally prominent role in national liberation and as a symbol of the nation, was severely eroded after years of unpopular repressive policies.

Within that context, the 1975 Green March was an emblematic event in repositioning the monarchy in a more compatible position with the reinforcement of the processes of nationalist symbolic capital production. More importantly, it also situated king Hassan II, personally, as a central element of that actor that thus acquired very significant amounts of embodied symbolic capital, situating him in a position equivalent to that of occupied by his father at the symbolic level. Previous attempts at acquiring that sort of position were also attempted via the increased personal foreign policy involvement of Hassan II, especially regarding Pan-Arab and Islamic issues. The sending of a military detachment to take part in the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict can be

read in that light. It also reflected an increasing concern, in light of the coups with giving the military field a different purpose and outlet. The Green March reflected that concern as well, and it provided an outlet for military actors to focus their interest on, with the conflict against Algeria and the Polisario front becoming their dominant concern²⁵¹.

Nevertheless, the most significant impact of that event was in relation to the political field and opposition actors. The appeal succeeded in securing a significant amount of support within the PI and the USFP, in proportion to the importance of nationalist values within their ideology and narratives. The agreement of the Koutlah actors to put aside their demands regarding the political field and the monarchy's dominance over the field, and regarding the social and economic policies it adopted and their pauperizing impacts, had consequences on many levels, and it accelerated the process of differentiation within a number of fields and collective actors.

Within the opposition field, it increased the distance separating prominent actors such as the PI and the newly emerged USFP from other actors, especially the more leftist oriented smaller ones. The need to put social struggles on hold while austerity measures increased as a result of the economic costs of the conflict was a significant element on the labor union field as well, in that it increased the divergence between the

²⁵¹ Returns in terms of economic capital were also increased across the military field, including the rank and file in connection to service in the conflict.

dominant and the dominated elements within it. The convergence of these processes²⁵² increased the willingness of opposition actors to drop their previous critiques for the symbolic bases of monarchic hegemony, and in a rally around the flag sort of dynamic, they increasingly viewed the negotiability of royal capital on the political field as a legitimate situation. Actors that opposed that, refused their support for the monarchy in this project, or even worse, contested its whole the legitimacy, were isolated and repressed severely, with little to no sympathy from the rest of the opposition field. This dislocation played significantly in opening some politicized and usually more radical fields, such as student unionism, for an increasing presence of Islamist actors, profiting from the leftist infighting on campuses surrounding the Sahara issue and its implications.

Changes in individual actors were also significant in that some principal figures were getting older and/or dying of natural causes or otherwise. The death of Allal el Fassi was significant for the PI²⁵³. New elites often did not have the embodied symbolic capital that previous leaders could draw upon to maintain their organization's discipline through difficult contexts, and to keep schismatic factionalism and the careerist impacts of increased internal bureaucratization from getting prioritized over the requirements of their political project. In combination with this internal change, the increasing disconnect with the constituents, that were increasingly mobilized by other actors and

²⁵² See chapter 4 for the empirical tracing of these processes and their complex details.

²⁵³ The same applies to the death of Mehdi Ben Barka or Abderrahim Bouabid within the UNFP/USFP cases.

on different bases, created a sense of urgency on the Koutlah parties. The more pronounced presence and increased reach of the monarchy through its affiliated organisms, be they political parties or civil society actors, and through the state apparatus, was one of those competing dynamics. The other dynamic was the emergence of the Islamist actors, be they the more oppositional ones like AWI, or the less radically positioned against the monarchic dominance, like the MUR. Islamist ideas and the fertile environment they encountered following decades of traditionalized educational policy were a significant threat to the old national movement opposition parties. Their discourse was increasingly devalued as it lost in radicality, and as it increasingly adopted some of the dominant frames of analysis that were imposed on the country in that context, by international monetary institutions. This, in turn, affected the value of their political capital across the social space and within the political field.

5. Leftist radical groups:

As indicated above, the “sacred union” between the Koutlah actors and the monarchy regarding the Sahara issue significantly reshaped the opposition field at the symbolic level. Especially as the UNFP’s revolutionary faction faced ultimate failure after the 1973 events led to the destruction of its network of secretive armed cells, and the relations between the more revolutionary and reformist actors within the party became tenser, the Sahara events signaled the ultimate separation between the UNFP/USFP reformist leftist opposition and the more revolutionary-minded

organizations of the Marxist-Leninist left. Those in between those two poles were represented within the OADP, which was at a midway point between the two groups, critical of the overtly conciliatory approach of the Koutlah towards the *alternance* without actual guarantees, while also partaking in the electoral game to some extent and not actively seeking a revolutionary option.

Thus, the previously united opposition field as a whole was increasingly dislocated and competing for legitimacy in a way that was felt across a number of other fields. Organizational and factional boundaries became less permeable, and the field in itself became increasingly balkanized. The simultaneous involvement of actors in many organizations at the same time, especially between the labor/student unions and leftist partisan fields, became less likely. The USFP-UMT opposition was a significant hurdle, and the struggle mutual purges and attacks dislocated the field and eroded its actors' symbolic capital. The multiplication of actors then followed, with the creation of the CDT, which would then also split away from the USFP as it increasingly softened its positions through the *alternance* process.

The emergence of the associative field, first under the impulse of the state through the regional associations that it encouraged, and then through the emergence of more independent and oppositional civil society organizations, was a significant development in relation to the development of the political field. The former type was organized by the ministry of interior in parallel to the administrative political parties, in a sort of supplemental way that would give them more reach and capacity to mobilize people around development issues. Actors that involved themselves in those organizations

could then acquire access to more social and economic capital, as well as symbolic capital that could then be reconverted within the political field through elections²⁵⁴.

The second type of association, while was not necessarily aimed at securing electoral gains per se, was politicized in that it focused on essentially political issues. Human rights and women's rights figured prominently in that category. The connections between these associations and the political opposition parties were noticeable in that many of the core actors had been involved previously or simultaneously in the political field. Though many organizations had officially proclaimed their independence and non-political nature, their critiques and campaigning were highly political in that they aimed at the introduction of normative concepts that would have weakened the existing normative arrangements in place. The resonance of these themes with dominant international liberal norms, in a period when the Moroccan state was increasingly dependent on the financial and diplomatic support of Western allies and international financial institutions, amplified their influence.

6. The Neoliberal Turn and its Effects

The turn to neoliberalism symbolized by the adoption of the IMF Structural Adjustment Program was a significant development, and its constraints reshaped the balance between several fields within the Moroccan social space. The privatization

²⁵⁴ This happened in connection with a significant increase in the numbers of "independent" candidates in elections after 1976.

process, accompanied by the increasing austerity measures that the country had to implement, increased the prominence of the economic field within the meta-field of power, as economic actors with closeness to the palace and significant capital holdings rose to prominence.

The prominence of technocrats in government positions and within the political field was the most notable objective marker of that change. Usually, these actors came from within the economic field and generally held high amounts of economic and cultural capital. The advanced degrees and usually managerial or entrepreneurial habitus of technocratic actors was holding a higher value symbolically in light of the newly dominant neoliberal discourse advanced by the international financial institutions. The apolitical, technically focused mindset characteristic of technocratic actors was the most compatible with the requirements and new orthodoxies imposed by the SAP's goals in terms of marketization and withdrawal of the state from various sectors to the advantage of the private sector²⁵⁵.

Repercussions extended inside the opposition field as well. The value of technocratic credentials rose within these fields as well. This was in part due to the alleged unavoidability of compliance with the IMF's requests if the state was to avoid bankruptcy, and to some other extent, to the increasing softening by opposition actors of the economic views they previously-held as a result of the ambient paradigm-shift from

²⁵⁵ Apolitical technocratic actors were present on the field to some extent even before the imposition of the SAPs, as they were a common fixture within the administrative parties and state institutions, but they did not occupy as dominant a role within them at the time.

Keynesian interventionism or planned economic approaches towards the emerging market orthodoxies. That process was also furthered via the support that the monarchy offered to such actors within the opposition parties and labor field's internal games²⁵⁶.

In parallel to that increased negotiability and wider diffusion of the discourse legitimating it across the social space, especially among the relatively dominant actors within each field, the deepening crisis and increasing withdrawal of the state was increasing social tensions in the country. Having since independence played a crucial role in the provision of employment, the public sector was now forced to severely reduce its hiring of new employees, creating a number of social tensions that increased pressure on both the monarchy and the opposition actors.

The apparent lack of alternatives to the policies of economic liberalization and privatization was in itself exercising a form of symbolic domination on many actors. Its adoption, despite early resistance, restricted the capacity of the Koutlah actors to maintain a coherent set of ideological positions articulated to a socio-economic program that could clearly distinguish them on the objective level from the rest of the political field. The adoption of seemingly similar discursive frames by some of the administrative parties further reduced the opposition's distinctiveness in terms of social and economic reform propositions. Instead, the Koutlah actors increasingly focused on constructing a discourse connecting the process of economic liberalization with political

²⁵⁶ Support was either direct or indirect, but was often known and recognized by others within the opposition, and reaction to it was mediated by the internal struggles unfolding within them.

liberalization requirement, abandoning any pretense of commitment to radical redistribution and state developmentalist projects they previously advocated²⁵⁷. Mainly, during that early phase, that meant the establishment of free and fair elections, separation of powers, and the rationalization and depoliticization of the state administrative apparatus.

For the monarchy, that imposed withdrawal of the state was not as much of a problem given the variety of forms of capital that it had accumulated by then. Its control over the social space was more diffused through the social networks and patronage practices that it deployed in most fields, either with the hegemonic or surveillance aims. The main state apparatus institution in charge of maintaining these networks and the flow of resources through them was the increasingly prominent, and almost-omnipresent, Ministry of Interior. The Judiciary was, as well, totally subsumed within that network.

The independence velleities entertained by some actors within the economic field vis-à-vis the hegemonic position of the monarchy was to be read within that context of exogenous flux within the field. Emboldened by a rhetoric that emphasized the autonomy of the economic field, they attempted to reduce their heteronomy towards the monarchic field. Given the crucial role of the state and monarchic patronage in ensuring

²⁵⁷ This remark applies more specifically to the official USFP and PPS positions. The PI had already engaged on that path through its pre-*Alternance* governmental participation phase; while the OADP still maintained a set of radical reformist demands within its program.

the rise to prominence and the unfettered accumulation of economic capital through privileged positioning within the monarchy field, this attempt was quickly repressed.

In response to the increasing rationalization and independence claims made by the economic field's actors on the state, a moralizing anti-corruption narrative was produced. The ministry of interior, representing the securitarian faction within the monarchic field, championed and conducted the campaign. A direct result was the reaching of a new equilibrium within the meta-field of power, wherein the economic field would be repositioned at a higher position within the dominating assemblage, interconnected to the more politicized and political fields. The economic field would remain, as with other parts of the assemblage, accepting of the monarchy's hegemony, after the campaign ended and a settlement between the CGEM and the state was reached. In no small part, the settlement was a result of the presence that the economic field had in the royal court.

The labor movement field, split between three main organizations, was severely affected by these developments as well. The measures that it conceded for "patriotic" reasons as a way to support the war effort in the Sahara were never meant to extend as long. Faced with a dislocation in the positioning, with the much younger party-affiliated CDT adopting a more contestatory position, the previously dominant UMT was increasingly finding itself at odds with the rest of the field and closer to the government. The field was increasingly facing a fundamental questioning of its positioning. While the CDT, with its deep connection, was arguing for a convergence of struggles with those of the Koutlah in the political field, the UMT was maintaining its historical

syndical autonomy discourse. The concern, objectively speaking, for both organizations was to mobilize the highest numbers of adherents, and to protect and appear to be advancing their interests. Thus, the disagreement was over determining the strategy best suited to improve the position of the labor field within the meta-field of power and increase the value of its capital, for the CDT, that went through the mobilization of workers in support of the political agenda of the opposition, in opposition to the monarchic hegemony over the social space. For the UMT, this went through a claim of independence from political struggles and a rapprochement with the monarchic field, not contesting its dominance, and using that standing to secure better gains for the workers.

Yet, the field was irremediably shrinking in size, and the unions were competing over shares of an increasingly small pie. The spread of joblessness and the increased significance of the irregular economy, along with the lower mobilisational capacities and reticence of unions to call for general strikes²⁵⁸ were significant indicators of that reduction in field size and comparatively lower negotiability of its form of capital. The last stand of the field's actors in opposition to the increased austerity and its impacts on

²⁵⁸ This reticence stemmed primarily from their increasing realization that they did not have the necessary reach and presence to prevent the strikes from turning into violent riots, harming their reputation and exposing the organization to state repression.

the workers²⁵⁹, highlighted the routinization and deradicalization of its political demands as well, and the reduced base it could connect to.

²⁵⁹ The series of strikes and negotiations process that ended in the adoption of the tripartite Social Dialogue Framework is that endpoint within the scope of this dissertation. Arguably, the latter creation by the CDT of a leftist political party (the *Congres National Ittihadi*) that it controlled provides further evidence of the labor field's resignation to a much lower general position within the meta-field of Power.

Conclusions:

An institution that has been successful, that is therefore capable of existing both in the objectivity of regulations and in the subjectivity of mental structures in tune with these regulations, disappears as an institution. People no longer conceive of it as being ex instituto. [...] A successful institution is forgotten, and makes people forget the fact of its having had a birth or a beginning.

Pierre Bourdieu, *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*

The principal empirical object of analysis of this dissertation is the political field, used as a point of entry, through a tracing of its emergence and transformations, to attempt a sociogenesis of the State. Reassessing these historical processes through the analytical prism of Bourdieusian field theory and its conceptual apparatus, the analysis was able to unearth several theoretical contributions of relevance to the topic.

As illustrated in Part I, the struggles that erupted soon into the post-colonial era, along with the emergence of the political field, were highly complex processes. These

struggles involved a varied set of elite actors, each often rooted in several pre-existing fields, endowed with various forms of capital, against one another in a struggle unfolding simultaneously on both the symbolic and material levels. All of it, in turn, is embedded in a context lacking informational clarity and clear rules of engagement, be they on the political field and its struggles or across the remainder of the social space.

The comparative approach adopted in analyzing the emergence of the political field highlights that in Morocco and Tunisia, the dominant element in the symbolic struggle was actors' ability to claim legitimacy based on participation in the fight for national independence. While constrained in a path-dependent manner by previous historical developments, this particular element's importance was not predetermined by the objective empirical details. Though important, it appears that the symbolic level, wherein the struggle for the successful imposition of a given narrative and sociodicy on the nascent political field, telling the story in a manner that emphasizes one set of elements over the other, was a more crucial factor. Once a sociodicy was established convincingly enough, even when it remained contested on the surface by other important actors that still maintained significant amounts of symbolic capital despite being slightly disadvantaged within its new parameters. In other words, it sets a conception of the legitimate principles along which the new field's internal logics and connections to the rest of the social space that is simultaneously rooted in pre-existing arrangements and reconceptualizing them for legitimization purposes. The discourse, by naturalizing unequal distributions of resources, be they old or new, makes the division principle more durable and hard to unearth and contest after enough time has passed.

The conception of power in a disaggregated manner that can be represented by the various forms of capital is another essential analytical tool. It highlights the importance of the competition amongst holders of various forms of capital to secure the best return that they can for their personal portfolios. Integrated into the analysis, along with a historicization of the production processes through which these actors acquire and accumulate these forms of capital, and the specificities of their reproduction processes; these dimensions help clarify and make sense of the actors' logics, goals, and fears. It also grants a better understanding of the homology effects that often play a determinant role in shaping inter-field connection and capital flows, and at times spread wide enough to create critical junctures, windows of high fluidity wherein significant aspects of the status-quo are put into question across the social space.

At the capital level, parallels with dynamics identified with more orthodox Marxian conceptions of capital are noticeable. More specifically, be it symbolically or objectively, the struggle during the foundational period of the political field's emergence can be seen accurately as paralleling the phase of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession theorized within Marxian analysis. For both the objective and the symbolic levels of analysis, the accumulation is accompanied by the growth imperative of capital. When conceptualized as taking different forms rooted in an endless number of relatively autonomous fields, that expansion tends to be mediated through the various constraints associated with each form in terms of reproduction, transferability, and negotiability. The struggle for growth then takes the forms of the constant struggle for a better position within the political field and secures a better

exchange rate, especially with forms whose reproduction and transferability constraints are high.

To secure a more favorable exchange rate, the field, through its actors, needs to secure a more dominant position within the meta-field of power. This is often tied to, in material terms, a more significant influence on, control over, and presence within the official political field and State institutions. At any given point in history, a given number of fields are connected and form an assemblage that controls the State and gives rise to the particular form that it takes, and the modes through which it is instituted and its power deployed within the social space. These last elements do not just vary only in relation to which fields are included in the assemblage, but also to the specificities of the inter-field relations connecting them, the flows of various forms of capital and their directionality, and the levels of relative autonomy/heteronomy that they have with one another.

These findings relate to several aspects relating to the literature on state emergence. First, they indicate the transferability of, and give credence to, conceptualizations of the issue that argue that the material and the cultural are two inseparable sides of the same coin when it comes to state emergence. The impossibility of separating the two is visible both during the emergence as well as throughout the subsequent evolution of the State.

Second, they also highlight the pitfalls associated with conceptualizing the State merely in terms of its institutional processes and their conceptualization as variables. Consequently, the crucial mutually constitutive, at times divergent and at others

converging/colliding, processes that give rise to the categories that are subsequently institutionalized and often reified by many analytical accounts are buried out of view. As a result, variable-based accounts, be they materially or symbolically focused, end up conflating causes and outcomes and imbuing emergent aspects such as the type of “regime” with explanatory value.

Third, and regarding the “regime” category, this dissertation argues that it obscures more than it explains and that the air of parsimonious categorization that it provides is not a valuable trade-off if explanatory power is the measure. On the one hand, the existing typologies that focus on different factors, be they mode of ruler succession, formal institutional setup, or ideological variables, are not very sound unless a more problematic unitary and autonomous conception of the State is adopted. The cases analyzed in this study, which would be viewed as two distinct regime types, would have had the parallels and homologies that they shared at the material and symbolic levels, in terms of social space and political field per se, disregarded or explained away. This would usually be done by focusing the analysis on formal differences in terms of the game's institutional rules, obscuring the fact that those rules were yet to be established and uncontested enough to acquire explanatory value²⁶⁰[\[1\]](#). Moreover, even in cases where the rules are relatively better established, they are rarely interpreted in a single

²⁶⁰ “To detrialize and overcome the amnesia of origins inherent to institutionalization, it is important to return to the original debates which show that where we are left with only one ‘possible’, there were many ‘possibles’ with different factions attached to them” (Bourdieu 2012, 199)

way from one field to the next, and from one actor to the other. Monarchic norms in Morocco and Tunisia were well established and supported nominally by their respective treaties, and both experienced a period of fluidity as the French withdrew. Nevertheless, the outcomes differed, and they did so as the emergent result of the convergence of several struggle processes unfolding at different levels of analyses, and not because of any single essential, institutional, ideological, or geopolitical variable.

Instead of insisting on either a discrete or continuous regime category that is mostly constructed in a top-down analytical fashion, which suffers from the issues mentioned above, it could be feasible to adopt a typology based on the interplay of fields and forms of capital within the meta-field of power. As each sufficiently developed and long-lasting field can arguably be viewed as a regime in itself, a reasonable approach could be to focus on the inter-field dimension. A potentially fruitful alternative could be through tracking the flows of various forms of capital across the assemblage of fields composing the State, their directionality and strength, both in objective and symbolic terms. Such an approach would be sensitive to the realities of power and the topological fashion through which it permeates the State, its actors, and the social space, which could lay the foundation for the development of more discerning typologies and conceptions of regimes than the currently dominant ones.

This, in turn, demonstrates the methodological advantages of adopting a more holistic approach, combining both the objective and symbolic levels of analysis, and

embedding them in a historicized framework²⁶¹. The latter point is further empowered by the adoption of heuristic devices such as the Bourdieusian conceptual toolbox to guide the analysis without centering it on contested categories that are in themselves tools and objects of conscious contestation for the involved actors. Adopting the “epistemological break” argued for by Bourdieu by abandoning the use of categories of practice in the explanation, and instead situating them as objects to be analyzed and questioned in and of themselves, especially when these categories are constitutive of the State and of its power.

The choice of the political field as an entry point is not fortuitous. Being the organized, relatively autonomous part of the social space where the struggle over visions of the social world and how it should be organized are expressed and struggled over, it is by its very nature always included within the assemblage of fields shaping the form of the State.

The work of Bourdieu on the State, though significant and rich, is viewed as a generally incomplete project. One of the aspects warranting that characterization is the empirical scope upon which it was based. The main case used in his analyses of the

²⁶¹ “If the genetic approach imposes itself, it is because, in this particular case, it is, let’s say, (while) not the only one, but one of the major instruments of rupture. Taking the well-known indications of Gaston Bachelard for whom the scientific fact is necessarily “conquered” and then “constructed”, I think that the conquest of facts phase, against preconceptions and common sense, in the framework of an institution like the State, implies necessarily the adoption of historical analysis” (Bourdieu 2012, 183)

topic is that of the emergence of the French State. At times, that example is compared, to some extent, mostly with other European/Western cases²⁶². Thus, one of the limitations of his work on the topic is that Eurocentricity, reducing its potential generalizability. For instance, Bourdieu considered that the political field emerges as a result of the struggle between a newly secularized judicial field and the monarchic field, and he documented that using evidence from the French case and tying the official emergence of the political field with the occurrence of the French Revolution (Bourdieu 2014, 2015, 2016).

These insights, for obvious reasons, are not transferable to a large number of post-colonial cases. In those settings, the pre-colonial State was not left to its own devices to allow the testing of that theory. Additionally, pre-modern States were characterized by significant variation in the levels and directionality of the process of emergence of relatively autonomous fields. For instance, in the Moroccan case, the judiciary field did not exist as an autonomous field across the social space; instead, there was a multiplicity of judiciary orders with different actors, rules, and sociodicies. The political field, if that original dynamic were not interrupted by the Protectorate, would have arguably emerged from an alliance between a politicized tribal and religious field, with a very different set of sociodicies and conceptions of what the State ought to be than those that obtained in European contexts. The colonial intrusion interrupted those processes and their possibilities, and directed a profound reshaping of the social

²⁶² Bourdieu did, in a somewhat unstructured fashion, illustrate some points using the cases of China and Japan during his College de France lectures.

space(s) that were contained and simultaneously constituted as the territorial foundation of the new and forcefully standardized State was established. Therefore, the analysis of the process through which a political field is reconstituted contributes empirically to the development of this approach by deploying it in a context that constitutes a blind spot in its process of conceptualization. That in itself is a very Bourdieusian move, in that the refinement and reformulation of concepts in dialogue with empirical data is a core trait of the approach.

The same applies in relation to the specifically authoritarian categorization of the modern States analyzed in this dissertation. Bourdieu's studies on the State having been mostly focused on cases that ended up taking a 'liberal democratic' state form. Though he does touch upon the situation in Eastern-European communist States, he does not delve too much into the intricacies of their politics, and the analysis remains mostly a surface level one mainly aimed at highlighting, via contrasting, some point of relevance to his more usual cases.

That being said, the analysis of the cases covered by this dissertations provide the basis for a way of conceptualizing authoritarianism that focuses on the meta-field of power and fluctuations in the flows of capital and the assemblage of fields constituting the State. On that particular point, the sequencing and temporality aspect matters greatly, in that it shapes the manner in which various fields articulate their sociodicies to the dominant ones, and how that is reflected in the evolution of the discourses of the dominant actors and in their symbolic and objective efforts at ensuring the continuance

of their domination, in the face of constant endogenous and exogenous change processes.

A potential mid-range insight can be stated regarding the political field's degrees of autonomy/heteronomy, and the exchange rate of political capital, along with the general position of its holders within the meta-field of power. The less valued and determinant political capital is, or becomes, within the political field and the social space as a whole, the higher the degree of authoritarianism of the concerned society. Whether the political field is losing its autonomy and becoming heteronomous in relation to the military field, a personal hegemonic actor's court, or the financial field, the degree of authoritarianism of the resulting State form increases proportionally. Of course, that authoritarianism is not limited to manifesting itself only as crude physical violence, but it can also take subtler symbolic and material forms. The post-1990s dominance of free-market neoliberal ideologies and its tacit acceptance of its norms as the only alternative within most prominent fields, accompanied by the adoption of managerial practices and discourses, and the prioritization of specific economic indicators over others as a matter of common sense, nicely illustrates the point. The social disengagement of the State, along with a tendency towards more pervasive disciplining and surveillance approaches, while also coopting previously oppositional actors through its universalizing techno-managerial solutionist and developmental discourse, has increasingly led to the emergence of homologies all across the planet, with comparable forms of mobilization and contentious claim-making. Thus, authoritarianism can be viewed as taking a variety

of forms that change along with the shape of the assemblage and the flows of different forms of capital between the fields composing it.

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