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Challenges to Liberal Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Sierra
Leone:
A Case Study of Viability of Liberal Peacebuilding in Africa

Dissertation Submitted in Fulfillment of the Requirements for

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Dedication

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This achievement is to the government and humble people of Japan, and all who have made this journey possible

I also dedicate this accomplishment to my beloved Kallon family, who provided me with all the necessary family support, particularly my mom, Katimu Kallon, and her cherished grandchildren: Grace, Andrew, and Debora.

Abstract

Why has the attempt of liberal peacebuilding not been successful in Sierra Leone? This is the main question addressed in the thesis. This thesis has observed that the difficulty in achieving the model of liberal peacebuilding is mainly situated in the society's political structure. This thesis argues that the practice of ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism, which has characterized the political structure of post-conflict Sierra Leone, can be observed in the following three areas: ethnic pluralism, economic development and social equalities.

The thesis introduces the concept of ethnoregional neopatrimonialism to examine post- conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. This thesis argues that it is difficult to implement liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone where identity salience (ethnic and regional) is extreme. The thesis then argues that the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding especially in a heterogenous post-conflict society like Sierra Leone is fundamentally conditioned by the following factors: ethnic pluralism within the political space, economic development that addresses economic inequality, and equal opportunities beyond marginalization.

These areas are germane to social stability. They are vital to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding. Successfully realizing a liberal peacebuilding

model is centered on the existence of pluralism, specifically pluralism among ethnic and regional actors in the political system.

This study argues that there has been a disintegration of pluralism within ethnic environment of the state. In addition, there has remained a deep persistent of economic underdevelopment creating inequality, as well as an unequal opportunity among the country's youths. The absence of these factors within the society's political space has made the prospect of successful liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country difficult. The study further states that the absence of these vital factors is the result of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism in the country.

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While completing my master's degree program in 2016 of the same year I commenced my doctoral course, I did note that "any successful academic outcome must have gone through some long processes along with effective guidance." Undertaking this doctoral course was not an easy decision, and the four years spent on my research have all not been that smooth, either. A doctoral course is not an easy mission, and it is indeed complex. I pursued this journey motivated by the very difficulties that have characterized such a process, why trying to situate my appreciation of the global society in which we live.

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Abbreviations

AFRC – Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

APC- All People's Congress

A U - African Union

CBC - Country Support Bases

CCSSP- Commonwealth Community and Safety Security Project

CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPDTF- Commonwealth Police Department Task Force

DDR- Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration

DFID – Department for International Development

DRC - Democratic Republic Congo

EBIM- Election Before Independence Movement

ECOMOG-Economic Community of West African States Monitory Group

ECOWAS- Economic Community of West Africa States

EU-European Union

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization

GTT- Governance Transition Team

IFAD- International Fund for Agricultural Development

IMATT- International Military Advisory Training Team

IMF- International Monetary Fund

MCC – Millennium Challenge Corporation

MoPED- Ministry of Planning and Economic Development

NCSL- National Council of Sierra Leone

NEC-National Electoral Commission

NEPAD – New partnership for Africa's Development

NPRC- National Provisional Ruling Council.

NRC- National Reformation Council

ONS- Office of National Security

PMDC- People's Movement for Democratic Change

POC – Protection of Civilian

RUF- Revolutionary United Front

SAP- Stabilization Association Approach

SLPP- Sierra Leone People's Party

TRC- Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UNCT- United Nations Country Team

UNDP- United Nations Development Programme

UNIOSIL- United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone

UNIOPSIL- United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone

UNPBC- United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution

WB – World Bank

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Chapter One

Introduction

1.0. Background

This thesis analyzes the foundational obstacle to liberal post- conflict peacebuilding framework in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone is a post-conflict country in Africa characterized by a wide salience of ethnic and regional identities. In addition, the country's political system has remained deeply characterized by a neo-patrimonial political pattern. With these deeply-rooted phenomena characterizing such a country, Sierra Leone has been conceived to be in transition from war to peace and development, particularly from 2002. This study, therefore, proposes a causal explanation to establish how the foundational obstacles to liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in such a post-conflict heterogeneous country have arisen. More significantly, the causal analyses of this study go beyond how liberal post-conflict peacebuilding obstacles have been theoretically explained in previous studies.

In Particular, using this specific case study of Sierra Leone to advance a nuanced conceptual contribution to existing discussions on the obstacles to a liberal peacebuilding model, the study focused on the country's internal domestic social factors, specially where socially constructed structures from a distal historical period and their layered practices over time re-emerged and reified to become a deeply rooted taken for

granted patterns and practices. As a result, these issues became embedded in the core of the country's political superstructure. In addition, the thesis then discussed how the dilemma engendered by these phenomena undermined, and even made it difficult, the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country. And, fundamental social change is now a major challenge, given the Sierra Leone's socially constructed social structure.

Thus, on the foundation of a case study of post-conflict Sierra Leone, this thesis addressed the question: why has the attempt of liberal peacebuilding not been successful in Sierra Leone? This thesis has observed that the difficulty in achieving the model of liberal peacebuilding is mainly situated in the society's political structure. This thesis argues that the practice of ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism, which has characterized the political structure of post-conflict Sierra Leone, can be observed in the following three areas: ethnic pluralism, economic development, and social equalities. These areas are germane to social stability. They are fundamentally vital to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in a post- conflict country, especially within the context of the heterogeneous society of Sierra Leone, transitioning from intra-state warfare. Successfully realizing a liberal peacebuilding model in a heterogeneous post-conflict context, the existence of pluralism, specifically pluralism

among ethnic and regional actors in the political system of such a post-conflict liberal peacebuilding context is fundamentally integral. Moreover, the success of liberal peacebuilding requires economic development and the existence of an equal opportunity within the societal structure of the post-war political system. These factors are paramount to the establishment of a successful liberal post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone.

This study argues that there has been a disintegration of pluralism within ethnic environment of the state. In addition, there has remained a deep persistent of economic underdevelopment creating inequality, as well as an unequal opportunity among the country's youths. The fundamental absence of these factors within the society's political space has made the prospect of successful liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country difficult.

The study further states that the absence of these vital factors, which collectively represent the main obstacle to liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, can be explained by the existence of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism in the country's political and social structure. Thus, with this idea, this study elucidates and elaborates instructive understanding of how deeply rooted and traditionalized the political system in Sierra Leone has remained due to neopatrimonialism, as well as how

neopatrimonialism's intersection with socially constructed patterns, such as ethnicity and regionalism and their manipulations, has been taken for granted, hindering liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country.

Pluralism within the political space is necessary for the realization and consolidation of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding (Paris, 2010:360). Pluralism, especially in a heterogeneous ethnic context, allows for inclusive representation. "Pluralism is an ethic of respect for diversity, and in a pluralistic society the dignity of each person is recognized and everyone feels like they belong" (Global Center for Pluralism, 2020:1). The existence of pluralism could discourage or eliminate overt existential indifferences and the feeling of exclusion among ethnic and regional actors from within the political decision- making space (Nyabira & Ayele, 2016; Sekher and Carciumaru, 2019. see Ghatak;2016; Choi & Pizza, 2014). Pluralism equally breeds and enhances a feeling of ownership and a sense of belonging that can heighten the inclination to institute peaceful relations among actors in the post-conflict context (Bollaert, 2016; World Bank, 2018;). Hence, its foundational importance to the successful realization of a liberal peacebuilding process.

In addition, for the successful realization of liberal post- conflict peacebuilding process, economic development is vital within the political structure of a post-conflict state

transitioning from war to peace (Paris, 2010: 337; Pugh, 2005; Peterson, 2014; Zaum, 2012:126). Economic development that is allowed to flourish along with inclusivity within a post-conflict context could mitigate if not entirely eliminates the existence of overt inequality or economic imbalances among the state's population (Distler et al., 2018; Portland Trust, 2009). As a result, instability within the political space could be avoided. Improvements to economic development, especially in countries emerging from the perils of wars, could also accelerate access to essential goods and services for the extremely vulnerable population (Ohiorhenuan & Stewart, 2008; Distler, Stavrevska and Vogel, 2018). Economic development will also lead to better management and advancement of these populations' participation within the economic sector, safeguarding against a reversion to a war economy that might undermine the structures installed to uphold the successful realization of a liberal peace (Ohiorhenuan & Stewart, 2008; Distler, Stavrevska and Vogel, 2018).

In addition, the realization of successful liberal peacebuilding in a post-conflict, devastated state requires equal opportunity across all categories of the state population (Aolain, 2015:87; Gutmann, 1980. see Ozerdem & Lee, 2016:40;). According to Amy Gutmann,

> ..."*The rationale for participation is by far the most crucial one from a contemporary liberal*

egalitarian perspective. By opening up opportunities

for a free and equal participation in political

life, an egalitarian society gives credence to the

ideal of an equal moral person... Only by allowing

and encouraging equal opportunities for all citizens

to participate in a variety of spheres that affect

their lives will the citizens see themselves and be

seen as possessing equal dignity" (Gutmann,

1980:181).

Thus, in a post-conflict context and especially a transition from war to peace, the existence and support of opportunity could fundamentally address a country's problem with marginalization. The presence of equal opportunity would also weaken any space that tends to breed practices of marginalization among the state population. Doing so would be important, because unequal opportunity leads to the marginalization of some categories of the population. It holds that an overt existent of unequal opportunity leads to the marginalization of some category of the population (Young, 2009: 63), in a transitioning post-conflict state. Therefore, it hinders the successful realization of a liberal peacebuilding process.

Therefore, in the context of post-conflict Sierra Leone, the thesis states that the inherent dominance of neopatrimonial association with ethnicity and regionalism in the main political

space has been undermining the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country. Such a situation implies that ethnic pluralism has disintegrated in Sierra Leone and a heterogeneous ethnic context in the political space has persisted. Inequality is also present in the country, which is caused by the excruciating underdevelopment of the economy. In addition, unequal opportunity among the youths is deeply rooted within the political structure. These factors are pertinent to the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding. Thus, their non-existence in Sierra Leone made it difficult for the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, instabilities emerged, including civil wars in Africa in particular, and the Global South in general. Darryl C. Thomas and Alie A. Mazrui (1992:159) have argued that there was an apparent absence of state capacity in these developing states during the post-Cold War period. They asserted that this absence resulted in obstacles to the pursuit of social needs, the general participatory process in politics, and the systematized way in which political leadership could be created. According to the authors, these challenges culminated in what they refer to as a "crisis of legitimacy." Thus, it became plausible that many countries were good candidates for the typical international model that has been shown to help with rebuilding, a paradigm inherent in the liberal peacebuilding.

The United Nations, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has championed in some renowned affected countries liberal peacebuilding framework. This framework has been used in establishing governance, strong state security, and what Thomas and Mazrui called "democratic capitalism" etc., (Thomas & Mazrui, 1992:157). For example, from 1992 to 1995, following the breakdown of former Yugoslavia, a war fueled primarily by nationalist inclination (Hartwell, 2019) was one of the earliest conflicts following the Cold War. However, beyond the intractable challenge of resolving such a conflict due to the nature of its complexity, particularly, from the Dayton Agreement onwards, a liberal peacebuilding process emerged in the country. It laid a road map toward democratic reforms, economic revitalization, and state institutional building that was seen as the route to return the society to stability (Fisher, 2007. see Pugh, 2002).

Similarly, following the 1992 accord to settle the approximately sixteen years of intra-state instability between the government and the rebel group RENAMO in Mozambique, a war that was caused by ideological as well as sub-regional politics (Hultman, 2009), a liberal peacebuilding paradigm model was used that began with the opening of a democratic and participatory space, allowing for the involvement of a multiplicity of political parties in the political processes (Manning, 2002). In addition, structural changes in the country's economic

sphere, especially under the canopy of neoliberalism, were also part of the process (Manning,2002). Moreover, following long-standing instability in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2006, a model of liberal peacebuilding was introduced with the notion to transform the state system. In this particular context, the decision was not only about peacebuilding but an entire state engineering process (Braithwaite, 2012).

In Rwanda, the liberal peacebuilding framework was utilized in the aftermath of the genocide, while in places such as Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and South Sudan are currently continuing with practices of a liberal peace model. Liberal peacebuilding has been taken conceivably as the only global approach to accelerate the return of stability within those countries fraught with intractable warfare. As a result, the liberal peacebuilding paradigm appears mutually exclusive with intra-state warfare and is eminent in societies-wide failure.

Evolutionary theorists have a conception that the end means of a process of transition from old to new is symbolized by advancement (see So, 1990:19). However, as noted by a classical scholar Herbert Spencer, structural transformation within a society leads to many different structures emerging, some are creating complex new considerations (Spencer, 1964:10-13). Such a pattern engulfed Sierra Leone in the post-war period, where a starkly deepened neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and

regionalism emerged within the country's political practice. The presence of this phenomenon in post-war politics has made the fundamental realization of a liberal post-conflict peacebuilding successful model, as well as general social change, difficult.

1.1. Aim and Specific Objective of this Study

Appreciating neopatrimonialism and its established association with socially constructed structures,[1] such as identities (regarding ethnicity and regionalism) and the patterns and practice on which their interactions evolves within the political space of a heterogeneous state, is instructive. This pattern is what has defined the political and societal settings of post-war Sierra Leone. In particular, how such patterns became an obstacle to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding models in the country is the broad aim of this study.

In definitively establishing how neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism systematically created obstacles to the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, this thesis concentrates on the following specific objectives. The thesis:

1. examines the challenge to ethnic social cohesion in Sierra Leone

2. analyzes the challenge of the management of development aid in Sierra Leone

3. evaluates the challenge of youth's mobilization by party politics in the country

It is notable that the foundation for the successful realization of post-conflict peacebuilding in any country transitioning from war to peace, and particularly a society characterized by heterogeneity, is strong societal social cohesion. That is particularly, social cohesion that allows for the existence of ethnic pluralism within the political space. To be successful, liberal post-conflict peacebuilding is also contingent on the availability and proper utilization of development aid in order to help encourage economic development and mitigate economic imbalances related to inequality. Furthermore, a pattern of non- marginalization in regard to political participation, especially among youths, must occur to prevent the existence of unequal opportunity. In Sierra Leone, these foundations were not fundamentally realized while the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding process was being conducted. This thesis deeply expounds on this phenomenon with the context of the existing construct of social identity in Sierra Leone, particularly, identities that came to be prevalent within the political space, such as ethnicity and regionalism, especially its manipulative interactive practices within the neopatrimonial politics that emerged over time.

The Identities and politics that became the fulcrum of Sierra Leone's evolutionary system, especially in its post-independence era, began to take shape long before this time. But, those who acted upon them within the political system followed a pattern of neopatrimonialism and became particularly emboldened in the aftermath of the conflict. These phenomena have been mutually reinforcing in the emerging post-conflict political superstructure. Identity has been made salient as a result of the patterns and characteristics of the political process, while the presence of neopatrimonialism has made politics a centrally contestable site for identity and social interest maintenance. These two mutually reinforcing phenomena have had a huge obstacle to Sierra Leone's transformation. Regarding this trend, M.A Mohamed Salih (2001: 25) noted that, unless the role of ethnicity in the country's politics is given a thoughtful consideration, "the transformation of Africa towards democracy and development will not be attainable other than an imagined nation."

With the long historic pattern of a solidified social structure in Sierra Leone, particularly ethnic and regional identities resulting from their prior interactions, and with the neopatrimonial political influence on them, their role as a social institution was taken for granted during the advent of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding. As a result, the nationalist inclination within these patterns at the general

societal level allowed social boundaries or institutions to become the defining factor for participation within the political space. Within such a system, an examination is warranted into the centrality of several factors: the prevalence of the challenges of ethnic social cohesion; the mismanagement of the development aid consigned during the peacebuilding process; and the pattern related to mobilizing youths in support of party politics.

These three evaluations as systematically outlined in chapter 4, 5 and 6, provide instructive causal explanations to understand the disintegration of pluralism and the rise of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism in the politics of Sierra Leone. In addition, these chapters cover the existence of economic inequality and poverty in the country and the violent politicization of the country's youth, leading to unequal opportunities within the national and political space. These phenomena were all made evident within the state's political structure through the emergence of neopatrimonialism, which became associated with ethnicity and regionalism. This evolution of the country's politics resulted in a façade of governance practices which were deeply incongruent within the holistic paradigm involved in the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding in the post-conflict state.

Historically, the region of Africa particularly prior to the modern state system, was governed through various governance

patterns in the form of a traditionalized system. Largely, these patterns of governance practices were renowned for their influence. These long critical junctures and historic foundation period leverage how social change has been endogenously become challenged. During these periods of traditionalized African systems, the political governance practices were far-fetched from the type Baron de Montesquieu opined in "Separation of Power Conception'' (Nugent, 1949). In general, during that period, social structures such as particularistic norms did not become conspicuous or manipulated for the most part, until several years later. This delay occurred because, within these countries, the organs of the government, such as the legislature, executive, and judiciary, were all embodied in a single individual, who was the most revered and supreme head that used to superintend the state, or in a selected group of individuals with a similar role. However, such a pattern laid the groundwork for the manipulative practices now seen in these countries, as was layered into governance systems in the region, normalizing them thereafter in many political systems and leading to what is often referred to as the "Big Man Rule" style (Hyden, 2013).

In Sierra Leone, particularly prior to the advent of a modernized form of governance system and especially at certain demarcated localities, the figurehead called chief (as in a traditional leadership) was alone conferred enormous powers.

Such powers included but not limited to "the overall economic and security decision making, developing, promulgating, and implementing laws, as well as being the chief adjudicator" (Ibrahim, 2013:155-179). In fact, Peter Albrecht (2017:161) noted that the influence of the authorities during the period that preceded colonialism was founded on "patrimonial largesse." Following the emergence of a competitive process, particularly a representative framework, these previously existed socially constructed structures, such as identity for instance, that was institutionally layered over periods, did gain centrality. The outcome was the result of a systematic manipulation of neopatrimonial political practices that had become normalized and taken for granted as a practice and culture within the political space. To this end, these deeply rooted existential social structures, patterns, and manner became associated with neopatrimonialism, and were taken for granted as normalized practices in the political superstructure in the country, resulting in an *ethnoregional-neopatrimonial* pattern within the political system.

In general, there exists apparent disagreement or perspectives in the literature about the challenges to liberal peacebuilding, and these different authors have offered unique perspectives on the overall conceptualization of liberal peacebuilding obstacles. However, the argument this thesis has developed, particularly, it's redirection to the endogenous

factors of the state, have not been adequately explored in existing literature, thus making this study distinctive. A few prior scholarly debates have explained the challenges to the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding. For example, Oliver Richmond (2009) argued that the challenges of liberal peacebuilding in the transitioning post-conflict states was caused by excessive hegemonic construction, and an operating style wherein, he argues, local agency was not recognized or was misplaced in the model operational structure.

Similarly, Roger Mac Ginty (2010) addressed the lack of a peacebuilding approach in these transitioning countries. He asserted that this hybrid approach brings together both local and the international intervenors. He also argues that the absence of this direction within the liberal peacebuilding framework was the core reason for the failure of the liberal peacebuilding model in the post-conflict countries. For his part, Roland Paris (2004) contended that the liberal peacebuilding framework is somewhat faulty, because institutionalization has not taken a predominant role in its operations in post-conflict societies. Finally, with a specific focus on Sierra Leone, Andreu Sola-Martin (2009) posited that the inadequate reintegration measures taken to return the ex-fighters into the society and the existence of "patrimonial networks" inherent within the mining industry of Sierra Leone,

which is largely operated by international actors, led to the failure of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country.

However, as this thesis states, the relational interactions of political actors at the domestic level of the nation-state has been inadequately explored in the search to understand the obstacles to liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and represents a research gap in the existing literature. This thesis has explored along this path and, therefore, its findings contribute to the existing knowledge. It is important to study the interactions that are deeply rooted and influenced by certain social structures (including ethnicity and regionalism) and their practices that are associated with neopatrimonialism, which have resulted in a clash of social interests in the country and were taken for granted as culture that became normalized within the societal political superstructure of Sierra Leone. Therefore, such phenomenon can account for the causal realization of liberal post- conflict peacebuilding challenges in Sierra Leone. In fact, this perspective somewhat provided an idea to what Osman Gbla (2013: 246-254), who noted that the challenges to post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone are visible in the "inefficiency of the state congress; in the ineffectual political system along devolution process; in the limited women capacitation; and in the lack of tenacity to uphold an uncompromised state guided by the full breadth of the law, and where everyone is subjected to the law."

1.2. Conceptual and Analytical Framework

This thesis applies the conceptual framework of ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism, which consists of three components that go together as a combined analytical framework: ethnicity, regionalism, and neopatrimonialism. The thesis adopts this framework because it is highly suitable for analyzing Sierra Leone.

Ethnicity can be defined as a characteristic of a group of people who are recognized based on their inherited social and cultural experiences (Barth, 1969: 10-11; Malesevic, 2004; Schlee, 2001). Ethnicity is also the way individuals categorize themselves communally and function relative to such identities (Jenkins, 2008; Barth,1969). The concept is further defined as an association with one or more assemblies on the basis of observed cultural differences and creeds (Diaz-Andreu, 2015, Jenkins, 2008). Regionalism represents the physical geographical demarcation between people within a country. Such a phenomenon results in particular feelings among inhabitants that differentiate them from others and were similar to those expressed in an ethnocentric context (see Chakrabarty et al., 2009; Kallon, 2020). It is often the case that a sense of identity of ethnicity overlaps with the sentiment of regionalism. In such a case, the conceptual framework of ethnoregionalism should be justifiably introduced to illustrate this particular combination of ethnicity and regionalism.

Neopatrimonialism is a political practice or a social order that creates a patron-client system, where patrons utilize state resources to secure loyalty of clients in that state (Peller, 2019, Van de Walle, 2001). Furthermore, as a political system, it tends to depose the administrative structure of the state. Only those within such clientelist associations are the holders of power within a state (Medard, 2007; Van de Walle, 2012). The concept has been used in the analysis of African politics, particularly those focused on the period of independence.

When patronage is formed in accordance with ethnicity and regionalism, a combination of ethnoregionalism and neopatrimonialism becomes apparent. In this context, the concepts of *ethnoregionalism-neopatrimonialism* go together as a set of political practices. The concept of ethnoregionalism-neopatrimonialism becomes quite an effective frame for analysis, because it allows to check the simultaneous existence of these three elements as a package within political processes of the state. Thus, this thesis adopts this concept to analyze the case of Sierra Leone, as all three phenomena have been present in the social and political structure of the country, especially after its civil war.

With that insight, this study develops a causal argument, highlighting the role of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism within the political system, to

explain how such a pattern affected the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

This explanation covers the amalgamation of ethnoregionalism and neopatrimonialism, forming what this thesis calls *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism*, in order to create a combined constitutive framework that proposes a coherent causal explanation for the interactive association of neopatrimonialism with ethnicity and regionalism within the political superstructure of Sierra Leone.

This combination contributes to showing how neopatrimonialism excessively made ethnicity and regionalism profoundly salient within the political space. More importantly, the purpose of highlighting their amalgamations is to be able to elucidate how deeply rooted ethnicity and regionalism have become the patterns of the neopatrimonial political system, especially in the aftermath of the post-conflict. This thesis argues that this relationship is stronger now than it has ever been before in the political history of the country and discusses what fundamentally can be deduced from such a phenomenon relative to the country's attempts to transform.

Within this context, the practice of *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism* and identity, (specifically, ethnic and regional affiliations) is made to become more salient. Their interactions becomes the site for political manipulation within

the political space through the systematized division of alliances or networks and the extreme exclusion of people along identity lines, leading to normalized practices that are taken for granted and regression in the broad governing structures of the given state (Bach, 2012; Cammack, 2007; Chakrabarty, 2009; Clapham, 1985; Kallon, 2020; Lemarchand, 1972; O'Neil 2007; Medard, 2007:375-401; Ngomba, 2012; Van De Walle, 2012). With such social structures, "patronage, clientelism and corruption" have become especially conspicuous state patterns (see Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009:130, Van De Walle, 2012, Medard, 2007:375-401).

In addition, the existence of neopatrimonialism within the political process serves both ruled based structures and traditionalized particularities (Gazibo, 2012). Furthermore, with a tightly ethnic and regionalized state structure, neopatrimonialism associations with these identities further result in destroying formal state governmental structures, replacing them with private structures. This pattern exists because neopatrimonial practices are generally dependent on the incorporation of informal relationships with impersonal structures of the state (Kallon, 2020; Van De Walle, 2012; Medard, 2007:375- 401).

Taken along this perspective, *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism* as an analytical framework analyzes a political practice or a created environment where ethnic and

regional identities are associated with neopatrimonialism and influence, define, inform and shape the governance structure and patterns of a country, such as Sierra Leone. In this *ethnoregional-neopatrimonial* conceptual analysis, identities and the neopatrimonial associated with them are paramount and, therefore, the unit of analysis. These identities are situated at the bottom layer of the state structure or on the periphery of a hierarchical order that does not only empower the clientele to interact with the political elites and the patrons at the top level of the hierarchical order of the heterogeneous state, but also provides a convenient space for the politics of neopatrimonialism to be tightly consolidated (see Kallon, 2020).

As a result, this analytical framework goes beyond the political alignments and favoritism, which are ordinarily contingent on patron-client relationships, and beyond mere ethnic affiliations. Instead, the framework explains where there is an incorporation of neopatrimonial practices associated with ethnic and regional identities, and where they are used as tools to firmly establish a mainstream political structure of the state that operates against ethnic and regional others and manipulations.

The analytical framework of *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism* in this perspective stresses that what informs ethnic and regional identity in the political space in an ethnoregionally defined society is the deep rooted

neopatrimonial political networks within these socially
constructed structures. This phenomenon is the foundation within
which those who emerge as political actors over time and space
are socialized. In particular, in a heterogenous state such as
Sierra Leone, it is what has largely modeled and informed the
deeply rooted political socialization and political culture of
the country.

Therefore, this pattern produces particular features in an
ethnically regionalized society that results in severe problems
along with the social boundaries of society. Over time, such
practice becomes taken for granted and recurrently forms the
basis for extreme clashes over social interest, especially in
the economically and institutionally weak state structure where
these contests become particularly intersected.

In pursuit of these contestations and with the escalating
influence of neopatrimonialism, existing social structures have
been instrumentalized. Therefore, the outcomes of this pattern
on the political governance structure of the country have
included consequences. These consequences have resulted in the
disintegration of pluralism, economic underdevelopment that
leads to inequality and poverty, and hindrance of equal
opportunity.

The practice of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity
and regionalism within the country's political system is

characterized by outcomes including political exclusion, hardening of ethnic and regional social boundary differentiation, waning national accountability and institutional legitimacy, weakening national unity and development, manipulation and political violence (Moti,2019; O'Neil,207; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Daley, 2006; Raleigh, 2014).

The cumulative effect of these trends recurrently gives rise to violent out-group and in-group mobilization and violent political confrontations. From 2002 to 2018, this pattern was common to all of the conducted electoral processes, characterized by extreme political violence and served as sites for a clash over these social interests. For example, youths in Sierra Leone have mainly remained excluded from viable political and economic spaces. Such exclusion and economic despair have accelerated their politicization and mobilization patterns for survival which have often been associated with violence (see Enria, 2018; Sanny,2020). These phenomena explain why liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict Sierra Leone has been unsuccessful, as pluralism, economic development and equal opportunity have not emerged in the post- conflict peacebuilding process. In addition, as this thesis has emphasized, its challenge has been largely due to the endogenous factors of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism that have become deeply rooted within the political superstructure defining the state.

In Sierra Leone, the systematic utilization of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism has given rise to the existence of *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism*. Therefore, patterned political manipulation schemes have systematically emerged and gripped the political space. Such practices have resulted in the destabilization of the fundamental liberal post- conflict peacebuilding models, as previously mentioned, and prevented the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding in the country (see Africa Research Institute, 2011; Batty & M'Cormack-Hale, 2019; Fridy & M'Cormack-Hale, 2011).

1.3. Background to the Conceptual Framework

The study notes that the pattern of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism within the political space of Sierra Leone explains the production of obstacles that have thwarted the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding in the country. This *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism* is derived from neopatrimonialism and ethnoregionalism, which previous scholarly sources have explained as joint characteristics of a traditionalized state system. Therefore, their joint utilization as an explanatory factor clearly gives an instructive context for appreciating the obstacles they have created for the successful realization of

liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, as well as in other countries.

When expounding on this analytical model, it is crucial to identify how previous studies have dealt separately with neopatrimonialism and ethnoregionalism. At this point, it is especially important to note that this analysis and causal explanation of the ethnoregionalism construct would be inadequate without the proper co-optation of neopatrimonialism. In particular, one aspect of effectively capturing the pattern of personalization that has occurred among the actors seeking political power in Sierra Leone is the identification of this norm. Similarly, this explanation would be inadequate if the role of identity (ethnic and regional) within the neopatrimonial political system was trivialized by merely focusing the analysis on the importance of personalization in these heterogeneous states.

Therefore, their intersection constitutes the basis for explaining why neopatrimonialism is associated with ethnicity and regionalism within the political superstructure of Sierra Leone and why this phenomenon is compelling. In particular, understanding the full picture of how social structural patterns constructed within Sierra Leone have limited social change, the reasons for the history of non-transformative social change through liberal peacebuilding in the region can be understood.

The word "Neo" in neo-patrimonialism was coined by Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt (1973) to differentiate between modern forms of regimes from previous governance patterns during the time of absolute monarchy in Europe (Bach, 2012: 24-26). Neo-patrimonialism, as asserted by Eisenstadt, is a modern type of political governance system with legal-rational authority that is more advanced than previous forms of patrimonial pattern of regimes. However, Eisenstadt noted, the modern system does tolerate some patterns of patrimonial characteristics, such as difficulty in distinguishing between public and private space in the political process (Bach, 2012: 24-26). Thus, Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt conceptualized this fusion of a government of legal-rational authority with practices marred by continued features of the patrimonial system, as the "neopatrimonial" political system (Bach, 2012: 24-25).

Neo-patrimonialism is the practice wherein legal-bureaucratic norms of the state and its pillars operate concomitantly with some characteristics of the political process largely based on traditionalized patrimonial practices (Bach, 2012: 28; Bratton &Van de Walle, 1997: 61-62). Moreover, Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle noted that neopatrimonialism is a system where the maintenance and utilization of power is informed by interpersonal relationships, as opposed to any adherence to the dictates of established jurisprudence (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994: 457- 459). Michael Bratton and Nicolas

Van de-Walle also maintained that the "relationship that runs through a neopatrimonial system of governance is contingent on loyalty and dependency (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994: 458). In addition, according to Daniel C. Bach, the difference between private and public in a neopatrimonial system is blurred, and public interest is monopolistically personalized by state actors (Bach, 2012: 25- 44). Bach also added that the political actors within such a system convert the dominant power they possess into resources mainly for establishing interpersonal relationships, such as with clients, to entrench their personal rule.

The work of Christopher Clapham (1985:45-59) on "Third World Politics" referenced neopatrimonialism as a phenomenon of developing states, where evidence of patrimonial pattern is inherent within association and permeates both political and bureaucratic settings, blurring the actual rule-based climate. Clapham (1985:49) also noted that neopatrimonialism is a feature of ethnic society, where uncompromised fidelity to the kingship is considered a strong "social value." In addition, as Clapham stated, it is through one's identity that recognition is achieved in a multicultural environment, which explains the reason for the continued practice of neopatrimonialism in societies.

The practices of neopatrimonialism and its patterns have also been clinically theorized by Diana Cammack (2007) in "The

Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What role for donors." Cammack has opined that transactions in neopatrimonial states that are habitually occasioned between the top and the established patronage structure are based not on national interest but on certain "particularistic" desires. State institutions, Cammack noted, are weak in such state practices, because major decisions are adopted in an informal structure rather than in the established bureaucratic structures.

Dianna Cammack (2007) further highlighted that transformation is always seen abhorrent in the practice of a neopatrimonial style system, especially when that transformation runs counter to the agenda of the big man. Cammack (2007) also reiterated that outside such a political system, those who yearn for change are not merely doing so because they genuinely want it to happen, but because their share of the political resources is often not forthcoming otherwise.

Neopatrimonialism, Cammack argued, breeds an atmosphere where political messages are skewed in favor of political personalities rather than on tangible policies. In addition, she noted, state security institutions in such political systems become a regime protector rather than a service to the entire state. Cammack further asserted that in neopatrimonial systems, "civil society groups are usually transformed into briefcase NGOs" and state accountability is scuttled because of the prevalence of centralized power control (Cammack,2007:605).

Cammack further pointed out that aggression against the rights of citizens is common within such a state.

Similarly, Eric Budd (2004) tested the supposition on the correlation between "patrimonialism and economic growth and democracy," in his work and concluded that a state characterized by patrimonial tendencies would undermine the country's financial decision making. This outcome would result because, according to Budd, such patrimonial states are always tailored to particularistic considerations, a process that thwarts cohesive national economic interests. In addition, Budd stated that only a few people are considered to be associates of the state and make decisions in a neopatrimonial society, and such decisions are often devoid of an integrative character. This pattern, he reiterated, is in conflict with establishing democracy for the majority of the population. Eric Budd cited Cameroon, under the post-independence political rule of "Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-1982)," as one such society that operated under such a pattern.

Tam O'Neil (2007), who analyzed public sector effectiveness in an environment engulfed by neopatrimonialism, specified that the public sector element of a state system is fundamentally important to the functioning of the state, since it oversees the daily administration of the country. In particular, O'Neil noted its importance to state development processes, where the focus

is ensuring the viability of essential public and social amenities to all citizens of the given state.

O'Neil further mentioned that those that have the task with ensuring that these resources are made available within the state system are civil servants who are the "designers of the policies, implementers and gatekeepers and distributors" (O'Neil,2007: 6). Therefore, the author echoed others in saying that within such a neopatrimonial state, in which public spaces including employment opportunities are metamorphosed into private spaces by the political actors, these civil service positions take the pattern of a personalized patronage structure. Such neopatrimonial practice, in O'Neil's viewpoint, destabilizes the overall competence of the administration to effectively devise and carry out policies and hinder the effective management of the state resources. As a result, all functions of the state relating to the public good become undermined.

With this context, Jurg Martin Gabriel (1999: 173-196) noted that the regime of Ahmadou Ahidjo was characterized by such over- centralization, where the state leader was the singular symbol of development. Under the leadership of Ahmadou Ahidjo in Cameroon, Gabriel noted that fidelity became more important than the efficient functioning of governmental activities. This neopatrimonial system, as noted by Gabriel, also produced a massive public institutional failure, in which

case, a "liberal transition occurred in the country but without engendering democracy" (Martin,1999: 173-196). Richard Snyder (1992) also stated that the practice of neopatrimonialism can actually weakens autonomy and opposition within the country and leads to the co-optation that guarantees "neopatrimonial dictatorship." Snyder cited several cases including Zaire, under Mobutu Sese Seko and Haiti, under the regime of Duvalier, that weakened the independence of the army, and other functions of the state (1992: 379-395).

Karen L. Renner (1989) referenced Chile under the leadership of Augusto Pinochet from 1973 to 1987, to explain the pattern of neopatrimonial political construction. This system, as Renner emphasized, led to the production of "exclusionary-authoritarianism" in Chile. Renner also pointed out that Pinochet unleashed neopatrimonial logic that featured largely exclusionary patterns in the army institution in his bid to entrench his power, since doing so would allow him to more easily oppose his challengers. As indicated by Renner, this practice led to an excessive politicization of several institutions and undermined their reputation.

Palestine is another example of these neopatrimonial phenomena, as specified by Rex Brynen (1995). In particular, Brynen (1995) noted that practices such as patronage and other inherent neopatrimonial patterns under the governance system of Arafat were a tool unleashed to consolidate power and to enhance

his alliance in the governing structure of the country. According to Brynen, such practices were particularly reflective of the limited economic strength that existed and challenged the huge expectations for the country. Brynen noted that Arafat's attempts to meet the needs of the few as against the majority of citizens culminated in exclusionary tactics, and the effects produced by such practices undermined the legality of the country's political leadership, which accounted for the emergence of neopatrimonialism. Thus, Brynen concluded that Palestine's neopatrimonial practices hindered Arafat's awareness of societal change and his efforts to cope with such disintegration by addressing immediate structural and administrative needs.

However, the notion of neopatrimonialism has been criticized. For example, the work of Zubairu Wai (2012) rebuffs the underpinnings of the above codification, especially in the manner and approach with which neopatrimonialism has been said to be utilized in the political climate of Africa. To start with, Zubairu Wai (2012) viewed the logic of such an explanation as largely problematic, in that it uses only one analytical approach to discuss an assortment of complex variables, which are taken for granted as compatibles. More importantly, Wai also argued that the proponents of neopatrimonialism, especially those aligned with "Eurocentric" accounts, have largely capitalized on western past knowledge as the established

standards that they assume are applicable to all societies. Wai
noted that if such a criterion were not found in a certain state,
that country would be abnormal within the explanatory variables
and would be classified as neopatrimonial in nature. Wai argued
that theorists from this perspective largely do not understand
Africa's historical relationship with Europe and fail to
properly account for the domineering historical patterns that
characterized that relationship when they draw their
conclusions.

Likewise, in their work on Botswana as a typical case, Anne
Pitcher et al. (2009) argued that scholars have misconstrued the
use of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in many countries,
especially in the context of African states. These authors
argued that the existence of patrimonialism or neopatrimonialism
produces a reciprocity between the government and the people,
and this reciprocity helps to check the excesses of government.
The authors considered Botswana as a typical example of the
practice of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism through
reciprocity, where legitimacy is cemented through legal rational
means along with the practices of a particularistic connection.
In addition, the authors indicated that a strong affiliation
exists between private and public space in the country.
Furthermore, they stated that the traditional bond with legal-
rational authority in the governing system is the fundamental

reason for the characterization of Botswana as one of Africa's success stories. (see also, Aaron deGrassi, 2008).

In another work, Gero Erdmann (2013: 68) argued that even though the concept of neopatrimonialism has retained experiential importance in showing how to explore and understand complex relationships between "formal institutions and informal behavior and or institution or politics," neopatrimonialism has been poorly executed and treated unilaterally. Erdmann noted that one of the failures of neopatrimonialism is the treatment of the concept as a causal variable rather than as a causal effect.

In his analysis of "Third World Politics," Christopher Clapham (1985:47-49) noted that those at the recipient end of a patrimonial power relationship are officially, by their role, not subsidiary. However, they are "vassals," whose situations within such power interactions are contingent on the state system with which their fidelity is aligned

In this regard, Victor T Le Vine (1980:659-662), who analyzed patrimonial regimes, outlined four thematic features of Africa patrimonialism, including "charisma, constitutionalism, zero-sum and the big man-small boy syndrome," especially as they became related attendant to the post-independent modern pattern of politics (Le Vine, 1980:659-662). Specific to the big man-small boy syndrome, Le Vine explained

that it is a normalized practice that those in public authority spaces within the political configuration of the society always strive to maintain tight contacts in order to create a strong given-and-take network structure with the members of the political establishment. According to Le Vine, such a phenomenon is accentuated by a clientelistic approach.

On the essence of network formation, Le Vine emphasized that this pattern of establishing a reciprocal network is deeply rooted within the political space, and not just a practice among the political actors in modern-day politics.

Having extensively detailed African political liberalization in conjunction with the onset of numerous armed conflicts and thoroughly characterized the African state structure, particularly in the aftermath of colonialism, Shinichi Takeuchi has traced patrimonial practices throughout the continent. While political independence was gained throughout Africa, Shinichi Takeuchi (2007) chronicled that the continent was bequeathed with profound tyrannical and manipulative features that were a part of the colonial legacy. He further noted that while these societies did not have legal nationality within that period, they were nevertheless propped up by external actors, which made these characteristics persist and become part of their inherited societal structure.

Shinichi Takeuchi further maintained that a handful of people in conjunction with the emerging state leadership commandeered and gained domination over the "economic and political powers" within the respective post-colonial states (2007:185). These powers were converted, manipulated, and defrauded upon for their personal aggrandizement (Takeuchi, 2007:185). Moreover, Shinichi Takeuchi stated that these actors, though limited in size and at the behest of state power, were able to institutionalize their political authority, centralizing the patron-client relationship within the political sphere. Takeuchi added that these practices were maintained with the involvement of associated adherents whose own power depended on this tight relationship.

As a result, noted Shinichi Takeuchi, within these African states, that personal rulership who came to obtain power devoid of a national certification were fearful of resistance from within. As Takeuchi explains, this tension further culminated in the monopolization of their positions of power with the cooperation of their respective circle of people, excluding the majority of the other people in the state population in the process. It was this structured maintenance of the patron-client relationship that advanced into informal institutions governing the states, as formal state institutions within these societies were feeble at the time. As Takeuchi concluded, these patterns

of elements characterized the African patrimonial political system in the post-independence era.

Furthermore, regionalism and the salient politicization of regional alliances create physical geographical demarcations of people within a country and often result in inhabitants developing particular feelings similar to those expressed in an ethnocentric context. For example, in the work done by Pelle Ahlerup & Ann- Sofie Isaksson (2015:145-150), the authors gauged the ethnoregional patterns and sentiments of fifteen countries. Their work showed that inhabitants belonging to the same ethnic and regional location where the political leadership of the country hailed from were less likely to express feelings of injustice and intolerance against the political regime, unlike other adherents who did not share similar socially constructed ethnic and regional alignments.

This understanding of Sierra Leone largely goes beyond the discussion of the absoluteness of identity as the dominant dictator of the political patterns that have been overemphasized in previous literature. Instead, this thesis considers how a neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism produced an obstacle to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

1.4. Research Methodology

Within this research "critical junctures" and "institutional layering" play prominent roles. A critical juncture is a "short period of time during which an event or set of events occur that has a large and enduring subsequent impact," or what Giovanni Capoccia called "distal historical causation" (Capoccia, 2016; Mahoney et al., 2016). Three critical juncture periods were observed and captured in this study, beginning with the period of time when an initial identity was constructed along ethnic and regional patterns in the prehistoric era and continuing through that identity's enduring impact within the political space in the succeeding years. The second critical juncture period was the colonial era, when identity became systematically shaped to gain salience within the political space especially between the protectorate inhabitants and colony creoles. The final critical juncture observed was the period of the country's initial reintroduction into democratic practices and the years afterwards, leading to post-conflict peacebuilding. This time was when the pattern of neopatrimonial politics associated with ethnicity and regionalism overwhelmingly re-emerged, became reified, and became centralized within the political superstructure.

In addition to critical junctures, this study focused on patterns of "institutional layering," as discussed by Kathleen Thelen (2003: 226-228). Institutional layering implies a pattern

of institutional reproduction placed in historical causation that affects future patterns of institutions. Institutional layering is the pattern where while modifications occur within institutional settings, such changes evolved while prior institutional practices remained inherent (Thelen, 2003: 226-228). In the post-conflict Sierra Leone, while there have been attempts of reforms within state institutions, these institutions have remained with practices of distal historical patterns and practices deeply rooted. These two perspectives provided the basis upon which process tracing for this study have been analyzed, systematically traced, unearthed, and connected to the patterns of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism that systematically produced obstacles to hinder the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

Furthermore, in terms of methods for data collection, this study's findings were based on the utilization of primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources focused on literature through what Andrew Abbott called "record-based analysis" (Abbott, 2004: 14), in which primarily scholarly monographs, reports, print sources, and electronic media sources were utilized. A desk review of some important government documents constituted part of the data gathering secondary sources. For the primary sources, an ethnographic research (Abbot,2004:15-17) design was used. Data from participant observations during

two consecutive field trips to the study country were used to better understand the given patterns and practices of Sierra Leone in the course of this research.

Unstructured interviews were also conducted through a random sampling selection process and included observations of political trends and activities and how engagements of political actors within the political space evolved. Through this ethnographic research design, the primary data collection occurred through participant observation and unstructured random interviews.

The utilization of process tracing of secondary data and ethnographic research is significant because it provides the basis for tracking a long historical observation of critical social phenomena. It also provides the basis for understanding how ongoing actions and interactions among actors within the political system are evolving.

1.5. Scope and Limitation of the Study

This study has mainly focused on liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, particularly factors that have made its successful realization difficult. It explains the practices of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism, which became deep and widespread within the culture

and political system of Sierra Leone in the post-conflict period.

Thus, the study backtracks through the country's historical and political evolution, from the pre-colonial era to modern times, to establish the crystallization of ethnic and regional identities with neopatrimonialism in the country's political patterns. This occurrence of neopatrimonialism that became associated with ethnicity and regionalism resurfaced to become prevalent in the 2002 post-conflict political system in the country.

As one of the limitations of this study, this thesis did not focus systematically on analyzing in-group ethnic regional patterns, but how neopatrimonialism influenced these socially constructed structures, resulting in manipulations within the political space that prevented the country's transformation through liberal post-conflict peacebuilding.

1.6. Originality of the Study

As a contribution to the existing knowledge, this study explains the pattern of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism that exists within the political practices of Sierra Leone to showcase how such a pattern enables a causal explanation of the obstacles to successful liberal peacebuilding.

This combination of neopatrimonialism and identity manipulation resulted in a practice of ethnoregional-neopatrimonial politics in Sierra Leone that made identity more salient within the political space. That political space was also characterized by a fundamental disintegration of ethnic pluralism and mismanagement of development aid that resulted in economic inequality, economic underdevelopment, poverty, and widespread politicization and manipulation that paved the way for unequal opportunity. These factors are not only pivotal to the recuperation of post-conflict countries transitioning from war to peace, but are the foundation that ensures a sustainable and successful realization of liberal peacebuilding in a country. Thus, their absence undermined the prospects of successful liberal peacebuilding.

This phenomenon is a unique and compelling approach in the scholarship, in that it advances a nuanced and comprehensive perspective on the difficulty of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. This perspective is a contribution to the gap in the existing literature, where adequate research on social structural issues and their challenges to liberal post- conflict peacebuilding have not been fundamentally and adequately explored, particularly in the context of Sierra Leone.

1.7. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organized into six thematic chapters followed by a conclusion. Chapter 1, as the introductory section, outlines the general foundational obstacles impacting the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. It has pointed out an overall pattern of political practices in Sierra Leone and the systematic nature in which socially constructed phenomena, such as ethnicity and regionalism, have become associated with neopatrimonial politics. Chapter 1 particularly has emphasized that this association is the main mechanism by which obstacles to the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone have been created. The chapter also has outlined three specific objectives through which this thesis investigated this pattern in Sierra Leone: the challenges to ethnic social cohesion, the challenges to the management of development aid, and the challenges to mobilizing youths by party politics.

Chapter 2 extensively reviews the existing literature on theoretical frameworks for liberal peacebuilding in a post-conflict context. This study unearths a wide range of conceptual arguments on liberal peacebuilding paradigms in general, but focuses specifically on how those perspectives are approached and analyzed in the literature in order to identify obstacles to liberal peacebuilding processes. In doing so, the study

identifies analytical gaps in the characterization of these obstacles to liberal peacebuilding.

Chapter 3 comprehensively analyzes the patterns and nature of international peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone. In this chapter, the aim is to showcase the patterns of peacekeeping interventions and the systematic liberal peacebuilding approaches that are adopted to reconstitute Sierra Leone from war to normalcy, including security sector reforms and other germane institutional building methods aimed at the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding and its maintenance.

Chapter 4, as one of the main substantive chapters, is where the thesis analyzes how the challenge of ethnic social cohesion led to the disintegration of pluralism in the country. These factors are traceable to the rise in salience of ethnicity within the political sphere, and especially its association with neopatrimonial practices within the political system. On the topic of identity (both ethnic and regional), this chapter traces the pre-historic construction of patterns of identity, particularly ethnic and regional identities, and showcases how these identities became significant political capital and, over time, came to be reproduced and layered in the political superstructure of the country. This chapter further explains how these patterns were taken for granted, defined the boundaries of the societal structure in Sierra Leone, and evolved to become a deeply rooted obstacle to liberal post-conflict peacebuilding.

Chapter 5 is the second-most substantive chapter of this thesis. In this chapter, the study lays out its original contributions to the existing literature. This study analyzes the challenges to the management of development aid, including how strategic interactions between the two main political parties and their actors emerged due to neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism and led to inappropriate behavioral patterns affecting the formulation of national policies, resulting in the mismanagement of development aid. These patterns further contributed to the country's economic underdevelopment, which produced deeply rooted inequality and poverty. Therefore, these patterns have undermined the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding in the country.

Finally, Chapter 6, like Chapters 4 and 5, is a core chapter. This chapter, based on the previous discussions of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism, looks at the mobilization of youths by party politics and how this phenomenon created a climate of marginalization. In particular, the thesis examines how this profound marginalization of youths has led to engendering unequal opportunity within the national and political spaces and, therefore, affected the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding. The chapter also examines the clientelist patterns involved with youth mobilization, resulting in the

displacement of these youths from meaningful political engagements.

This thesis concludes by emphasizing that transformation can be largely impracticable in a heterogeneous society such as Sierra Leone, where the practice of neopatrimonial politics has been firmly associated with identity, such as ethnicity and regionalism, in the political space. In addition, since they do not allow pluralism to flourish, any accountability over the mismanagement of development aid has waned, producing an environment of economic inequality and poverty among the vast majority of the population. Finally, such a pattern creates marginalization among the people, which leads to profoundly unequal opportunities. These factors are the core enabling factors in the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Thus, their absence has served as the fundamental obstacle to liberal peacebuilding in the country.

1.8. Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the introductory part of the entire thesis, systematically laying out the preliminary context for the primary obstacles to liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, as well as the strong association between identity (including ethnicity and regionalism) and neopatrimonialism in

the country. This chapter re-emphasizes that recognizing this deeply rooted pattern within the political system is an important contribution to current understandings of the challenges to liberal peacebuilding, which have not been adequately explored in the existing literature, particularly in the context of Sierra Leone.

Chapter Two

The Uncertain Future of Liberal Peacebuilding

2.0. Introduction

This chapter extensively reviews a broad range of publications concerning liberal peacebuilding, particularly highlighting perspectives on peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict contexts. The chapter begins with the necessary background information relative to the evolution of the concept and, in particular, lays out a number of conceptual and empirical debates that are foundational to a theoretical construction and its practical feasibility in war-torn societies. Examined in these debates, as this study uncovered, are two dominant opposing schools. On the one hand is the constructivist school, represented mainly by the problem-solving scholars; on the other hand, is the hegemonic school of the critical school scholars. In between these debates, there remains a gap within the literature on liberal post-conflict peacebuilding, especially regarding its successful realization in post-conflict countries that are transitioning from war to peace. In particular, this thesis considers countries that are heterogeneous in nature and have political systems that are deeply rooted in political manipulations through the utilization of socially constructed structures in which such practices are taken for granted within the domestic political superstructure of the country. This

thesis broadly conceptualizes the impacts of their processes within the domestic context, as well as how they create obstacles to the successful realization of liberal post- conflict peacebuilding, as seen in the case of Sierra Leone.

Before recounting these debates, this study provides a summarized perspective on Africa's evolution and an evolutionary account of liberal peacebuilding practices within the continent. In particular, this chapter analyzes how such a model was utilized in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, three contemporary and ongoing operations by the United Nations in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali at the time of this study are covered. These empirical analyses, in combination with the conceptual debates below, will provide a deep understanding of some of the broader fundamental challenges that have long been instituted against liberal peacebuilding.

2.1. Africa and its Brief Historical Context

In Africa, both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era, debates about political and economic development and their performances have abounded and remained largely unabated (Shaw, 1985; Adebanwi, 2017). Even more fundamental and phenomenally important is an appreciation of how Africa incrementally evolved into a modern state, conceptualized within

the internationally emerging notion of political and economic globalization and an international liberal peacebuilding framework.

On this topic, Todd J. Moss (2011) appeared somewhat optimistic, as he specified that the unfolding political and economic realities on the continent were certainly at the threshold of successful transformation. However, Donald Rothchild and John W. Herbeson (2000) had a somewhat different view, commenting on the seemingly pervasive flux of post-Cold War African political legitimacy. In addition, Ian Taylor and Paul Williams pointed out that Africa has remained troubled with aggressive intra-state conflicts since the end of the Cold War, but at the same time has seen greater interdependence among external actors (2004: 8-9).

This study notes that these discussions are important and significant for future conceptualization of Africa, where liberal peacebuilding social engineering remains integral and must be realized with a sensitivity to African history captured from its historical perspective in summary. In addition, the path dependence historical context approach can provide insights into the continued traditionalized elements within the practices of Sierra Leone's contemporary political systems.

Prior to the advent of the modern nation-state system on the continent, Africa was ruled by an administrative political

structure positioned along two strands, the cephalous and acephalous systems, which were simultaneously practiced across many of its societies. For example, the cephalous model was a centralized state system, through which all forms of political and administrative activities in certain geographical boundaries were carried out over their constituents. This system was inherently hierarchical in nature. Examples of these kinds of administrative practices and places they existed include, but not limited to, the Luba Kingdom of Central Africa; The Kingdom Bunyoro, Buganda and Ankole of East Africa, and the Songhai Empire of West Africa, as well as and Zulu, Ngwato, and Bemba of Southern Africa (Ohaegbulam, 1990, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Wiredu, 1995). Similarly, the other form of administration was the acephalous or stateless system, in which centralized form of administration never existed in varied societies, and the administration of those societies came to be contingent on kinship relations, homogenous liking and/or other related affinities (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940, Wiredu, 1995). The existent of these forms of administrations had fundamental impacts on identity formation and conglomeration and, over time, engendered and undergirded the patrimonial and political system that ensued, characterized by their hierarchical nature, vertical structure, and strong relational construct.

Indeed, in the course of the African political evolution, these forms of administration have been systematically

reproduced over time. The hierarchical political structure of Africa, the marked resonance of particularities associated with the structure of the political system, and the nature of its traditionalized way of politics have all remained common practices in the contemporary political spaces of Africa, and they can all be conceptualized as historical phenomena. As previously mentioned, these prior traditionalized patterns of African state systems engendered different political environments over time, within which many identities were variedly constructed and contested within neopatrimonialism. However, within this milieu characterized by a wide range of intra-state conflicts, liberal peacebuilding equally emerged to effect social change.

Unlike Europe, Africa's evolutionary pattern into the modern nation-state was largely associated with identity construction among the different nationalities. Identity came to be built on certain shared perspectives and homogeneity against well-centralized and unified state structures. The prevalence of such ethnic nationalism, which was connected to the emergence of neopatrimonialism, created an opportunity for consolidating political power. Largely, it is within this pattern, and particularly in Sierra Leone, that leaders emerged as representatives of particularistic identities, forgoing or deprioritizing a national identity.

2.2. Tracing Liberal Peacebuilding Philosophy from a Historical Context

In contemporary analyses of conflict and post-conflict interventions, conceptual thoughts on liberal peacebuilding processes have often been referenced by scholars, including Roland Paris, Michael Doyle, Francis Fukuyama, Woodrow Wilson, Oliver Richmond, and many others. In particular, liberal peacebuilding as a framework has become almost synonymous, in part, with post-conflict societies, particularly in its relationship to modern nation-states, with the dominant assumption being that domestic stability created through this international framework is the cornerstone for both national and global harmony.

Moreover, from a historical foundation, the emergence of the liberal peacebuilding conception of the nation-state is traceable in the works of many classical philosophical scholars, such as John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Owen, 1994). However, one prominent and widely discussed figure, whose work has gained dominance in this realm, is Immanuel Kant. In his work "Perpetual Peace" from 1795, Immanuel Kant envisioned and discussed the possibility for stability among the world's nation-states in his distinguished three definitive articles of perpetual peace (Kant, 1975; Beck, 1957; Trueblood, 1897; Kleingeld, 2006). In one of these definitive

articles, Kant highlighted that the existence of a "constitutional republican state system; international cooperation and state autonomy within global system; and the internationalism of cosmopolitanism among citizens of nation-states, would engender peace within domestic states, and within the international system" (Kant, 1975; Beck, 1957; Kleingeld, 2006).

In general, for Kant, the existence of a republican constitution in nation-states would safeguard citizen's equality and representation in a governance system and also would restraint nation-states from engaging into combat with another (see also Kant, 1975; Beck, 1957; Kleingeld, 2006) He further asserted that a republican constitution is the fundamental bastion upon which the rights of citizens in nation-states are guaranteed and, therefore, the basis for securing perpetual peace in those societies and among nation-states.

Of equal importance for Kant was the existence of laws that govern the states and the independent organs of the government (see Pugh, 2005). In addition, Kant advanced the idea of a nation-state conglomeration that ensures the safety of all citizens and precludes combat. At the same time, he expanded on his perpetual peace philosophy by arguing that these states within such a union should reserve their autonomy from the other nation-states, and only within these parameters would universal perpetual peace prevail. In addition, the third strand of Kant's

three perpetual peace ideas was the cosmopolitan nature of nation-states, which is what Michael Doyle has called the "universal hospitality" among citizens across state boundaries that protects them from subjugation to arbitrary repression so as to enhance, as stated by Doyle, social interactions, knowledge, and commerce. In Kant's conception, these values constituted the basis for stability (Kleingeld, 2006).

Relative to the aforementioned supposition by Kant, however, Kant's philosophy of global stability has largely been viewed as utopian in nature. Given the nature of the international system and the features of domestic nation-states, where the deposition of rational choice and maximization of interests are considered paramount to autonomy among international actors, systematic competition in pursuit of domestic interests is the norm among these actors and among societies in the world order. Thus, any conception on the existence of world peace fundamentally romanticizes it, given the nature and existence of states-oriented interests.

Beyond the aforementioned points, it is also worth noting that Kant's perpetual peace philosophy was informed by pre-existing warfare and struggles that plagued earlier nation-states of his generation. Thus, the formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations, in subsequent years, is viewed largely as a consequence of the philosophical ontology of Kant, even though it remains unclear what form of absolute stability

would be established domestically and among nation-states, as was advocated by Kant, and for which specific category and layer of people.

Subsequent to the cessation of the First World War, the notion of a post-war order dependent on the liberal interdependence of states again resurfaced as the foundation for "peace, self-independence, and free trade," which came to be known as Wilsonianism, initiated under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, the 28th president of the United States. This emerging Wilsonian philosophy laid the premise for the creation of the League of Nations after the end of the First World War (Ambrosius, 2002. see also Michael Mandelbaum, 2002) and, subsequently, the United Nations at the end of the Second World War.

The formation of the United Nations, which later became the main anchor for liberal peacebuilding, was observed by Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall (2011:39) as a "fundamental historic development in the advancement of world order."

In subsequent years, particularly during the 20th century, a multiplicity of ideologies emerged, including communism, fascism, and liberalism. However, since that moment up until the period that signaled the end of the Cold War, the triumph of liberalism over fascism and communism was witnessed across the

world. As a result, after the Cold War, liberal ideology became the new world order and defined global society.

Liberalism in international relations has three fundamental pillars. As specified by John J. Mearsheimer (2001), one of the key pillars of liberalism is the notion of economic interdependence among nation-states. This view presupposes that economic interactions among member states strengthen and solidify their economic viability. Therefore, it is believed that with interdependence, a feeling of warfare among nation-states would certainly be discouraged among the global society. In addition, the second pillar, which is equally important in liberalism, is the concept of democratic peace among nation-states, as stated by Mearsheimer. This notion states that countries bearing inherent democratic values or democratic societies should not resort to warfare with one another, because of their strongly shared ideas and the need to uphold democratic principles. In the third pillar, as noted by Mearsheimer, liberalism encourages, protects, and maintains collaboration among nation-states through the existence of international institutions with which many or all nation-states are associated.

Therefore, it has been an established notion within liberalism for a long time that the combination of these values can create stability among and within nation-states at both the international and domestic level. As a result, the international

system in the immediate aftermath of both world wars until the end of Cold war was characterized by the emergence of this ideology and its conflicts with opposing ideologies, perhaps most powerfully illustrated by the tension between the Western Bloc, represented by liberalism, and the Eastern Bloc, represented by communism.

In addition, it is very important to emphasize at this juncture that, beyond just the mere rhetoric about peace and cohesion inherent in the liberal school of thought, the underlying reality was that this rhetoric was used as a foreign instrument of the West in the containment of communist expansionism across many societies, including Africa (see Maney, 1984). Consequently, liberal thought has been at the center stage of international politics ever since and has been seen widely across the domestic politics of nation-states in the decades since the Cold War. Francis Fukuyama (1989) referenced this fact in his work "The End of History." Francis Fukuyama underscored that liberal democracy has surmounted the rival ideologies of "communism, fascism and monarchy" and has remained the dominant world order.

Upholding Kant's liberal norms, Michael Doyle (1983; see Miklian, 2014) adopted the terminology "liberal peace" in his examination of democratic peace maxims in response to finding that countries with democratic norms largely were not engaged in warfare. He noted that the "interstate wars at the time from

1917s–1980s" due to the deeply rooted liberal internal grip on those countries eventually resulted in the existence of what he termed "pacific union among these liberal states" (Doyle: 213–217). Similarly, Jason Miklian (2014), in his evaluation of liberal peace, asserted that the outcomes of Michael Doyle's research had a significant influence among policymakers and scholars due to its analysis and advancement of democracy over undemocratic regimes as a means to a sustained pacific union throughout the world.

After the Cold War and the unprecedented emergence of intra-state wars in the ensuing years, liberal peacebuilding in nation-states, such as in Africa and some societies in Asia and Latin America, has been focused on internal institutional building, democratization, and development assistance. All three concepts are pillars patterned within liberal ideology that are intended to sustain cohesion within society and mitigate the kind of economic underdevelopment that leads to inequality and unequal opportunity for all. In contemporary liberal peacebuilding operations in intra-state conflict societies, the United Nations has become the leading global institution, in addition to other international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Union (EU). The emergence of international financial institutions, specifically the World Bank with its history of post-world war reconstruction and the IMF, has led to

engagements in these intra- state war-torn societies via programs and projects that have been focused on what they call "institutional reform" and "poverty reduction strategies." These interventions have been operated with financial assistance in the form of grants and loans. However, fundamentally, the underlying goal and strategy for peacebuilding has been the promotion of an economic liberalization model, a purely capitalist geographical creation in these poorly devastated countries. Such an approach in a larger context and from a historical perspective can support the recuperation of some devastated societies, as seen following the end of the world wars, and has been conceived as integral to the future success of degenerated war-tone poverty states.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Former United Nations Secretary General) published his peacebuilding approach in 1992 in the form of "An Agenda for Peace." This document outlined a paradigm shift in the United Nations' approach to peacebuilding interventions in intra-state domestic wars, following several unsuccessful missions (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para 21) by the institution. Instead, "An Agenda for Peace" outlined a new peacebuilding approach for the United Nations that was centered on "actions to identify and support structures which would tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse of conflict" in war-torn societies. The emergence of this approach consolidated extensively liberal democratic state-building

institutions, where political reforms and marketization had become the guiding principles for peacebuilding.

In addition, several other United Nations reports and documents from the post-Cold War era have emerged in the past several years, including, but not limited to, the 2000 Brahimi report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Among its recommendations, the Brahimi report specifically called for a multidimensional peacebuilding approach in all peace engagement processes, including "security sector reform and disarmament demobilization and reintegration, elections, rule of law and the protection of the civilian population" (United Nations Document, 2000: ix). The 2003 United Nation High-Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change also noted that attention should be "focused on the identification of root causes to the threat of international peace and security" (United Nations Document, 2004:1).

In similar context, the 2005 report named "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All" concentrated focus on development, security, and human rights; and the "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine" of 2008 laid emphasis on legitimacy, credibility, and local ownership," (De-Coning et al., 2008; UN Documents, 2000, 2003, 2005).

The 2015 United Nations report regarding the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which was called "Uniting Our Strength for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People," argued for a fundamental shift in post-conflict operations if real improvement and changes were to be realized from these peacebuilding engagements (United Nations, 2015). In essence, the report itemized four areas as recommendations for immediate change, including "political solution in the design and implementation of peace operations; peace operation responsive on field context and carry the term peace operations; partnership; and field and people centric" (United Nations, 2015: 26- 30).

In all these documents liberal values like international humanitarian and human rights law, protection of civilians, rule of law, etc., are emphasized.

2.3. Contemporary Peacebuilding Operations in Three African Countries with Armed Conflict

The international peacebuilding engagements following the tragic failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have remained unending, unprecedented, and wide-ranging, particularly considering the expected reformation processes occasioned within the institutional operational framework of the liberal peacebuilding model (Bernstein, 2017). In this regard,

liberal peacebuilding operations are now undertaken with a multidimensional paradigm. This evolution epitomizes the idea that intervention has gone beyond merely keeping the peace to the task of reconstructing a modern state archetype purely along a political and economic liberalization paradigm. This section summarizes international liberal peacebuilding through the United Nations in three countries: namely, South Sudan, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It focuses on the patterns leading to the armed conflicts, as well as the context and nature of these operations.

In general, as observed by Edward Newman et al (2009:8-9), liberal peacebuilding approaches have come to constitute, among others things, four main broad categories: namely, "security, development, humanitarian assistance, and governance and the rule of law in the post-conflict transitioning societies." These four categories are, in fact, the broad elements that constitute some of the orientations of multidimensional liberal peacebuilding.

For example, security is one of the most important principles in peacebuilding approaches and international engagement in conflict and post-conflict reconstruction processes. These scholars also asserted that security provisions during peacebuilding use truces as their initial foundation. These truces then lead to the disengagement of the combatants through disarmament, demobilization, and eventually their

assimilation into the communities, which is called reintegration. Ultimately, reforms within the security apparatus of the state follow.

Furthermore, regarding governance, the scholars maintained that assistance for the establishment of governing systems based on a democratic archetype and the bolstering of legal systems that can guarantee orderliness and lay the foundation for constitutional codification is integral to the peacebuilding process in war-torn states (Newman et al (2009:8-9), especially those characterized by pluralism.

In addition, regarding humanitarian assistance and development, these scholars acknowledged that peacebuilding entails facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their original settlements. It also entails development at all societal levels, where no social inequality related to identity prevails and economic development and job creation are stabilized, forming fundamental peacebuilding structures for the recuperation of the post-conflict, war-devastated state.

Thus, with a framework established, it is crucially important to assess the three case study countries, within which contemporary peacebuilding operations have been operationalized and the outcomes are available for conceptual analysis.

South Sudan, the newest African country, emerged as the result of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The signing of this document was followed by a referendum in January 2011 that ultimately saw the country's self-determination or independence. Sudan, from a part of which South Sudan has emerged, was embroiled in an elongated conflict with the South-SPLM/A, which was probably among the longest intra-state armed conflicts in the history of the African continent (see Arnold & LeRiche, 2013; Collins, 2005; Deng, 2005; Johnson, 2003).

The conflict that ensued between the two regions had deeply rooted historical underpinnings founded on varied factors (Collins, 2005: 31-38, De Waal, 2014). However, as Douglas H. Johnson (2003:16-19) specified, beyond other distal factors, the formation of the SPLM/A was contingent on the argument of extreme "underdevelopment of the South, and also the apparently social identity issues" that reinforced the desire among Southerners for independence.

Due to the country's multiculturalism or ethnic heterogeneity and poorly dysfunctional state system, the newly independent state of South Sudan was plunged into another wave of large-scale intra-state civil war in 2013, a war that was connected to political extremism underpinned by ethnic intolerance. Exclusionary political tactics ensued between the

factions of the former vice president, Riek Machar, and the incumbent president, Salva Kiir (Gerenge, 2016). Within the fallout, given the historic struggles between the two leaders during the North-South war and the political leaders currently at the helm, an exigent consolidation of power should be a core interest for both actors. In fact, such an outcome could constitute one of the explanatory variables that underscored the reasons for their fallout.

Rational choice theory is unequivocal about this matter. It is a concept that analyzes how the strategic and calculated behavioral patterns of individuals in an institutional setting in society often play out in the quest to maximize strongest preferences.

Similarly, Mali was plunged into a large-scale violent conflict led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) against the government in Northern Mali. The conflict was domestically orchestrated and contingent on several factors that emanated principally from feelings among the northern inhabitants of systematic marginalization and exclusion from the center of political power by the country's Southerners. However, the conflict is also traceable to regional political externalities (Chauzal & Damme, 2015; Francis, 2013), which altogether conflated these feelings and generated the desire for self-determination among the Tuareg ethnic group of the North.

Tchioffo Kodjo (2015) observed that the post-independence period in the country's history could be appreciated from the viewpoint of the of Weberian notion of modern state, implying that the legitimation of violence by the state through egregious authoritarian rule generated discontent among the inhabitants, leading to emerging feelings of balkanization among the northerners. In the 2012 ousting of President Amadou Toumani Toure through a military coup, the instability that had already begun only became manifest and worsened, leading to the takeover of a large territorial metropolis in the northern part of the country called "Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal" by the MNLA and the 2012 declaration of the "Republic of Azawad" as an independent state in the north (Lotze, 2015). The case of Mali in regards to liberal peacebuilding is confronted with problems.

In a similar context, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had an intra-state war that was thoroughly convoluted and interconnected from one factor to another. The war in the DRC could be explained in part by the patterns of cross-border migration taking place in the country at the time, particularly the migration of the Hutu ethnic group from Rwanda to the eastern part of the Congo, a region that was already settled by different ethnicities including the Hutu and Tutsi (Doss, 2015: 656–668). The departure of Hutu from Rwanda to the Congo, according to Doss, was unconnected to the history of the Rwanda Genocide, as they were pursued out of the country upon their defeat by the

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and eventually found asylum as refugees in the eastern part of the Congo region in Kivu, where the RPF launched an attacked on these settlements in 1966 (Doss,2015:656- 668).

Laurent Kabila led an insurgent movement called the "Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL)," comprising local Tutsi of the DRC and other militia groups "with aid from Uganda and Rwanda, to launch a fresh wave of revolution against the state that resulted in his triumphed in 1997 (Doss, 2015; See Lemarchand, 2009). This was followed by announcing himself as president, and the war that continued which many have dubbed as the First Congo War" (see also Doss, 2015; See Lemarchand, 2009). More importantly, as president, Kabila was faced with another rebellion, this time from the Congolese Rally for Democracy, a rebel movement that was supported by his former allies from Rwanda and Uganda. Countries like Zimbabwe, Sudan, Namibia, Angola, and Chad also participated in the war to support Kabila through direct intervention (Prunier, 2009).

In a well-documented account, Filip Reyntjens (2009) noted that the foundation of the two wars in the DRC and their pre-existing wars were related to a long historical development of issues associated with the political instabilities in the region. The massive exodus of people into Zaire, the disintegration of the state structural system, the different ethnic boundaries, conflicts over land, and the question of

citizenship were some of the underlying explanatory factors that accounted for the war in the DRC, which, he noted, was a war widely known as the "African Third War" (see also Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2009). Nonetheless, liberal peacebuilding in this country has been encountering problems.

The three aforementioned case study countries—South Sudan, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—all represented "New Wars" and were intra-state wars. Their causal mechanisms were largely domestic, ranging from identity politics to governance and the challenges of independence even though not entirely without elements of external forces. International liberal peacebuilding, along with its multidimensional paradigm, has been introduced in these societies for the most part. However, whether or not the liberal peacebuilding framework has actually succeeded in these societies since the interventions occurred must still be explored.

Fundamentally, the interventions have remained challenging, and the context of these conflicts have been characterized by the recurrent eruption of violence, rendering the peace operations as something more akin to "conflict management operations" (Center on International Cooperation, 2018). Because of the recurrent nature of these conflicts, particularly in the context of South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, it should also be noted that current United Nations operations have been focused on efforts to "(a) deter

escalation (b) contain conflict (c) protect civilians and (d) resuscitate peace processes."

Beginning with South Sudan, international peacebuilding operations through the United Nations commenced following the adoption of Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1996 in 2011. This resolution created the United Nations Missions in South Sudan (UNMISS), along with the resolutions 2057 in 2012 and 2132 in 2013 (Da Costa & De Coning, 2015). Due to South Sudan's status as a newly independent state, these mandates devoted UNMISS to help strengthen peace by creating a safe environment that would enhance development processes across the country and protect the civilian population from armed violence, particularly following the outbreak of the 2013 war (Johnson, 2019).

Initially, the mission's mandates saw UNMISS tasked with undertaking two concurrent functions: first peacekeeping through the creation of safe environment and the protection of civilians from armed violence and, second, state-building through institutional reform, the rule of law, a security sector, and economic development, all of which were element of the multidimensional peace operations (Chesterman et al, 2016; Da Costa & De Coning, 2015:832; Johnson, 2018;). The establishment of UNMISS and its mobilization in South Sudan resulted in the extension of its presence in all ten states across the country through the creation of County Support Bases (CBSs). During the previous United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), such a scope

was not practicable, but with the current presence was intended to extend state authority and the legitimacy of the operation, as well as to integrate the United Nations' development activities countrywide (Da Costa & De Coning, 2013).

Combining the initial mandates of UNMISS and the recurrent outbreak of war in 2013 showcases clearly the fundamental paradoxes sometimes found in the mission, in concept and reality. Prevention is one key phase specified in the 2015 protection of civilian policy guidelines of all UN peacekeeping missions (United Nations Document, 2015:19- 20). This policy was somewhat seen as abstract and even negligible during the early stages of the UNMISS mission in South Sudan.

Even though a recent peace agreement for a consociational form of government system has been reached between the incumbent president Salva Kiir and former vice president and opposition leader Riek Machar, the outlook for durable stability given the deeply rooted existential distrust among the different factions, particularly between the Dinka and the Nuer, is tenuous at best. This state of affairs is particularly so because the institution of liberal peace through an electoral process will lead to agonizing contestations in such a society. As such, the situation would continue to be marred by unending instability among the identically differential actors. The effects of such phenomena would undermine the success of the liberal post-

conflict peacebuilding in the country, where economic and social parity will be non-existent.

Within the context of Mali, peace operations started with an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) through the joint efforts and support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). The mission was succeeded by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was established through Security Council Resolution 2100 in 2013, with an initial expected deployment of 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 police staff (Lotze, 2015). The initial operation under AFISMA was mainly concerned with peace enforcement. MINUSMA's mandate, on the other hand, concentrated on security provisions to stabilize the country, support the political process to ensure the transitional roadmap was fulfilled, and help in the facilitation of humanitarian operations (Lotze, 2015).

In 2014, Security Council Resolution 2164 specifically mandated that the mission should focus on "security, where it's focused on building the security sector; assisting in the restoration of state legitimacy, protection of civilian; initiates national and political dialogue; reconciliation and safeguarding the rights of humans" (UN Security Council, 2014). This resolution was also a prototype of multidimensional peacebuilding.

With the assistance of the French, enacting the African-led mission and MINUSMA for peacekeeping in the troubled region of northern Mali where the Tuareg separatists had conquered many of the major cities led to the establishment of state authority and an initial restoration of stability in the northern region. A peace agreement was reached between the government and the separatist group in 2015 that paved the way for elections in 2018. Nevertheless, even though the presence of MINUSMA was intended to stabilize the security situation across the country and the peace agreement of 2015 provided many pillars with which stability could be anchored, the implementation of these measures remained challenging.

As internally orchestrated violence continues unabated, perpetrated mainly by certain Islamist jihadist groups and ethnic groups, farmers and herders have protested the new land boundaries, which expanded in both the north and center regions of Mali, and a huge number of displaced persons and refugees resulted (Boucher & Bekoe, 2018; Reeve, 2018). In fact, since 2018, the violence in Mali has become more pervasive and devastating than in 2012–2013, and the state's authority is yet to be fully established across the country (Reeve, 2018).

MINUSMA operations, despite their initial successes in the early peace agreement process and subsequent elections of 2018, showed that the mandate of the mission was far-fetched, as liberal peacebuilding encountered a problem.

As another example of the problems of liberal peacebuilding, the Democratic Republic of Congo is a country with one of the longest serving United Nations peace operation missions in Africa. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1258 in 1999 to move United Nations personnel, mainly military, into the Congo to work as liaison officers and to superintend the peace agreement, and Resolution 1279 resulted in the creation of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) with the mandate to monitor and commit all actors to the armistice (Doss, 2015:656–657).

Through the deployment of personnel across the country with the aim of creating a safe environment, the initial responsibilities of MONUC were actualized: executing the peace pact among the Congolese domestic factions; ensuring DDR; power sharing, adopting constitutional codification with the actors; and holding elections, with Joseph Kabila, who succeeded his assassinated father Laurent Kabila assuming the presidency. However, serious violence in many parts of the country by the "Lord Resistance Army (LRA), the Bundu dia Congo," continued unabated, which directly affected the civilian population (Doss, 2015).

To curtail the violence and threats, Security Council Resolution 1794 was adopted in 2007 to reorient the mandate of MONUC specifically towards the "protection of civilians,"

especially during the war that broke out in 2008 between the government forces and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) against the "National Congress for the defense of the People" (CNDP) militia led by Laurent Nkunda, who had opposed the deployment of 17,000 United Nations personnel.

Believing that MONUC was able to restore stability in major parts of the country, Security Council Resolution 1925 was adopted in 2010, which renamed MONUC as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) (UN Document, 2010).

With MONUSCO, the operational concentration has focused on the maintenance and strengthening of the apparent peace with a focus on (a) the protection of civilians, (b) the promotion of democratic institutional governance ideals, (c) security sector reforms, (d) the rule of law, and (e) the establishment of state authority and a revitalized economy. However, violent attacks across major sections of the country continued, indicating that the creation of a stable, functioning state authority in those regions and the institution of civilian protection measures would be deeply challenging.

Thus, as a general conclusion to this section, remarkable evidence can be drawn from these international peacebuilding operations that liberal peacebuilding to date has remained

challenged, particularly when its context is closely examined alongside everyday societal realities.

2.4. Conceptual and Empirical Debates on Liberal Peacebuilding

Liberal peacebuilding is an internationally designed social engineering strategy used in post-conflict reconstruction and state- building processes in societies devastated by intra-state wars. In the wake of the Cold War, post-conflict countries have come to be considered a particular kind of an environment, requiring a special kind of approach to their management. Therefore, the establishment of a liberalized democracy has been assumed to be an appropriate approach in the restoration of peace and development within such a state. However, fundamental puzzles remain around this international liberal peace model such as why systemic waves of instability continue to recur in countries that have experienced a liberal institutionalized form of peacebuilding and why its successful realization is fraught with a challenge in countries characterized by features of heterogeneity?

Thus, the liberal peacebuilding framework, the patterns of its interventions, and the levels of its outcomes have engendered intense scholarly debates in response to questions such as this. Mostly, these debates have appeared among or between perspectives firmly established within the

constructivist school and the hegemonic school, otherwise widely known as the problem solving and critical schools (Lemay-Hebert, 2013).

On the foundation of these debates, this study begins with Wilsonianism as the integral basis for the onset of the debates. Following the world wars, the idea for peace at both the domestic and international level was visualized within the thinking of liberal democracy and advanced by Woodrow Wilson. Wilsonianism, deciphered as liberal democracy, constituted three foundational elements: namely, "the limit of armament, free trade, and government of citizens' participation and representation," which created the context within which peace could be engendered in and among societies (Mandelbaum, 2002).

Taking into account the notion of the government as a representative of the people and specifically underscoring the undemocratic regimes that were in existence in some parts of Europe and elsewhere, Wilson felt that peace would only prevail within those regions of the world if their instabilities did not resume and the citizens who were the governed secured their individual desired self- determinations. In addition, he reiterated that approaches aimed at formulating consolidations of peace would remain fragile and untenable until and unless the legitimacy of each government was sanctioned by the consent of the people and their political rights were guaranteed (Knock, 1992; Paris, 2004; Pomerance, 1976; Wilson, 1968).

Informed by these beliefs, peacebuilding processes for societies affected by protracted intra-state wars in the aftermath of the Cold War have been anchored by this liberal school of thought. Foundationally, the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the aftermath of an intra-state war would be determined by the existence of space for pluralism to thrive among all actors, which would be an important safeguard for the sustainability of such a created state, and elections, rational regulatory mechanisms, and inclusiveness. Similarly, economic development that forestalls feelings of inequality and creates equal opportunities for all within the state, especially within the political space, has been integral to the establishment and maintenance of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding.

Overall, this study builds on the case study of Sierra Leone to address the following question: Is liberal peacebuilding viable in Sierra Leone? In answering this question and placing Sierra Leone within Africa context that is fraught with myriad internal dilemmas, Roland Paris (2004), as one of the proponents of the liberal peacebuilding concept, argued that the significance of liberal peacebuilding is that such an approach can not only restore peace, but also fundamentally ensure the stability of post-war societies emerging from devastating intra-state wars. Within this context, Roland Paris introduced the concept of the "institutionalization" of post-

war societies, a model which is part of the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding process and is the most integral element for a successful initial intervention into a post-war state for the peacebuilding process. Roland Paris advanced the argument that the institutionalization of post-war devastated states with institutions characterized by liberalized ideas is fundamental, in the sense that doing so focuses mainly on rebuilding institutions that provide a safe environment for the resumption and maintenance of effective governance systems that collapsed during the instabilities or previously.

As democratic processes and, in many instances, economic revitalization are the core underpinnings for liberal post-conflict peacebuilding, Roland Paris specified that strong institutions are imperative in these post-war countries, since they can serve as insulating pillars to be responsive to the challenges that may arise from within these countries during the process of rebuilding.

While elections and economic liberalization are all elements for the resumption and revitalization of war-torn states, Roland Paris also insisted that these elements, as part of peacebuilding process, would be able to function effectively when strong institutions have been created that could ensure the security of these principles and, therefore, peace. On the economic aspect of the peacebuilding process he added that the "market economy" could only be steadily standardized when

appropriate jurisprudence has been institutionally established in post-war countries to protect against the disproportionate circulation of such an economy.

Furthermore, as countries in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War were afflicted with the symptoms of fragility and a proclivity to relapse into wars, Roland Paris indicated that liberal post- conflict peacebuilding in such an environment focuses on institutional building as an imperative and integral element that could set up solid institutional fortification and frameworks built to be suitable for the state and sustainable after the war. Such an approach, he stated, would provide a prevailing environment where "(a) It allows for a moderate political party to be created and mechanism that ensures their operations within a regulated and respected guidelines exist; (b) rules and guidelines of electoral process for fairness would be in existence; (c) civil society would emerge and play by the rules; (d) inflammable speeches are controlled; and the creation of efficient and impartial security forces and favorable rules on economic modification would be cemented" (Paris,2004:188-199).

In addition, when reconstituting a governance system within the domestic state of a post-war country, elections within which every membership is allowed to exercise participation and consent and feel that they are part of the peace settlement must always be at the core of peacebuilding efforts. Thus, Roland

Paris argued that liberal post-conflict institutional building in such environments should provide regulated environments, as well as moderate the behavioral patterns of both political parties and their actors so that they play within the rules. Such an environment, Paris reiterated, would ensure that the institutions of government are efficient and professional and have the requisite regulations to respond to any emerging conflict that might emanate from the electioneering process.

Roland Paris also stated that peacebuilding through institutional building provides a basis upon which professionals can emerge through training processes and institutional mechanisms, such as the court and police, can be formed and trained professionally enough to enforce the rules of the state without obligation to any set of groups, all of which would restrain the emergence of any form of despotic leadership or dissension. Therefore, he noted, an environment for peace could be created in a post-war society, one that is capable enough to surmount any possible relapse back into war.

Peacebuilding through institutional building is also essential, as stated by Roland Paris, in that it can curtail the emergence of media that excessively and purely engage in hate messages. He stated that such peacebuilding institutional building should be able to establish workable rules for both print and electronic media in the form of a "code of conduct" that could be operationalized to ensure that the content of the

news does not incite members of the population against each other and that could be enforceable in instances where the media broke the code of conduct and rules, leading to punishments for culprits to ensure the safety of the state.

In addition, as argued by Dominik Zaum (2007), liberal peacebuilding can be seen as a legitimate and appropriate aspect of rebuilding the state, particularly in states whose capacity has been degenerated. Focusing on authority and statehood, Zaum argued that all states have sovereignty, which presupposes that they have authority and independence over their territories, as well as the capacity to protect their people, therefore ensuring the autonomy of such states and their freedom from intervention by another state.

As such, Zaum further argued that a state losing its authority and statehood as part of its obligations should warrant intervention from an international community that is concerned about the appropriateness and usefulness of state institutions, based on their shared responsibility to the such a state, with the aim of ensuring that their state-building intervention serves as a standard for regulation, the rules that should be in existence, and ultimately the kind of administrative governance system that should be created within such societies. These actions should be taken in a bid, he argued, to regain the legitimacy and authority of a statehood. Zaum added that responsibility is the integral pillar of state

sovereignty. Thus, to be considered within this philosophy of sovereignty, a state should be able to adhere to its task of responsibility, especially in respect to its citizens.

Arguing from a state centric position, and concerned with state weakness and the threat those weaknesses pose to both domestic and international peace and security, particularly in instances where the weakness could help to proliferate terrorism across many societies in the post-Cold War era, Francis Fukuyama (2004) argued from the perspective of the importance of state-building within these weak and degenerated states that enhancing the capacity of such societies would result in engendering domestic and international stability and economic development worldwide.

Francis Fukuyama opined that institutional building is contingent on the demand that warrants its creation. The scholar further added that it is commonplace for many third world countries to show a lack of interest in institutional transformation, as in many cases demand for such reforms are only warranted in the form of a fire brigade approach as an outgrowth of disaster or other related occurrences. Therefore, he added, in order to prevent such fire brigade interventions, an international commitment to institutional reform must be occasioned within states during state-building as a proactive approach for rehabilitating such states in spite of any domestic internal disinterest (Fukuyama, 2004: 35).

The issue of managing domestic local agencies to ensure a total buy-in for the successful implementation of post-conflict liberal peacebuilding has been extremely integral to arguments in the peacebuilding industry over modifications to current approaches, especially following the unfavorable outcomes of early missions. How this mechanism becomes workable alongside or in the presence of international actors has been discussed by Roger Mac-Ginty in the form of a hybrid peace approach (2010:391–412; see Mac-Ginty, 2011).

Roger Mac-Ginty argued that this liberal peacebuilding conundrum (regarding local and external actors) could be surmounted in post conflict countries by consolidating the power of local and external actors at the level of peacebuilding interventions. This practice, he asserted, would consequently provide a plausible space for external intervenors' engagement in peacebuilding to exercise and apply pressure to ensure agreement, or apply inducement strategies to pursue compliance. On the other hand, local actors, he argued, could be at liberty to choose to comply with specific principles of peacebuilding paradigms and can also voluntarily oppose and choose alternative options. Roger Mac-Ginty further emphasized that the element of this local-international hybrid understanding of peace in a post-conflict situation provides reasonable interactions (Mac-Ginty, 2011: 222-223).

Consistent with discussions on the importance of locals in the fortification and creation of tangible outcomes that could create peace in post-conflict states, Hideaki Shinoda (2008) viewed local ownership as an "intermediary" between international interveners and domestic actors. With local ownership positioned as intermediaries, he argued that all practices from local and international perspectives that were implicitly deemed to be appropriate could be implemented. Thus, this approach, he maintained, would forestall or significantly mitigate any potential fallout in the peacebuilding process that might, otherwise, be seen as purely Westernized or a locally infused agenda.

In addition, Michael Mandelbaum (2002: 1-56) pointed out that no other world order has emerged in the post-war-era that has remained globally widespread with governmental, financial, and institutional liberalism. Because liberal internationalism is the rule of the world where contemporary societies have to follow it as a blueprint and because no alternative has emerged to rival this international system within the world order, Mandelbaum argued this phenomenon is hegemonic in nature. As a result, he added that liberalism in the post-Cold War era, within which liberal peacebuilding is contingent, has become like the "Eiffel Tower of the twenty-first century" (Mandelbaum,2002:51).

Additional opposing and intense perspectives on liberal peacebuilding have also emerged. Liberal peacebuilding is argued

as a hegemonic construct, as proposed and advanced by Oliver Richmond (2005). This author, in viewing the underpinnings of peacebuilding, underscored that participants who invariably appear to be involved as interveners in conflicting situations often create the impression of understanding the context of the situation when establishing what peacebuilding approach should be adopted for those conflict societies. The involved actors, as asserted by Oliver Richmond, are often seen in the eyes of these interveners as being "inferior, deluded, or even obsessed by violence...," which creates a dynamic in which the interveners are thought of as the people who are best suited to create peace in the direct interests of these conflicting actors.

With this approach, Richmond emphasized that the triggers of the conflict would only be underscored by the interveners as a deviation of human behavior and, therefore, only a "political, social, economic and development" approach would be seen as the panacea. Therefore, he described this feature of peacebuilding efforts as hegemonic, though camouflaged in the form of kindness; as a causal factor in peacebuilding efforts becoming grotesque; and as a practice characteristic of the Western conceptualization of peace (see also Adam Quinn & Michael Cox, 2009; David Chandler, 2006; David Chandler, 2009; Tim Jacoby, 2009).

Moreover, Oliver Richmond stated that conflict has become a bedrock on which international communities engage in the notion of liberal peacebuilding, creating and extending the crystallization of what a peace model should constitute. In this implied understanding of peace, the scholar added that anything which operates within the international system that seems to be inconsistent with this implied international model would result in intervention by the United Nations or its ancillary bodies, which is an approach that is consistent with hegemonic practices (Richmond, 2005:12).

Similarly, Oliver Richmond (2011) argued that peacebuilding processes are inherent in particular policies or patterned approaches to state-building, are taken for granted as universal, and are imported and imposed on the intervened countries in the name of post- conflict reconstruction processes. Thus, Richmond viewed this underpinning pattern of liberal peacebuilding as a particular kind of construct that is characterized by a "neoliberal" notion, one that is contingent on a free market and individual rights. Thus, he argued that practices of this form of peacebuilding would only culminate in engendering an atmosphere that resembles peace, that is an illusion of peace, but is far below the expectation of what genuine peace could be and what is needed in a post-war country.

The conceptualization and administration of hegemonic dominance is simplified by David Chandler (2009), employing a

classic case of Western Europe through the eyes of the European Union and the state- building mechanism situated in South East Europe (SSE). Chandler argued that the engagement in South East Europe regarding capacity enhancement and the proposed empowerment through the Stabilization Association Approach (SAP) that was seen by the European Union as a form of "democratization, assistance in revitalizing the economic based, appeasement, development of the infrastructure and institutions, governance and the creation of space for private sector viability" were instead guided by the advancement and concentration of hegemonic interests.

He also added that the focus of the European Union within that region is not a mere expansion policy approach, but one that is fundamentally guided by entrenching its power base. Further discussing the conceptualization of the state-building paradigm in societies considered to be peripheral or emerging from conflicts, David Chandler underscored the problems of these approaches by employing the terminology "Empire in Denial" (Chandler, 2006).

David Chandler asserted that these practices, which are described as "state-building," are intrusive and derive from outside directives to perpetuate hegemonic interests. Therefore, they are showcasing an empire in denial, epitomized by scrupulously withdrawing from embarking broadly in any sincere commitment in those territories, other than to create a façade

for their own asymmetrical power, and remaining unaccountable for their actions.

In a similar context, using the case of the post-Second World War reconstruction led by the United States and its current attempts at reconstruction in Iraq, Tim Jacoby (2009) concluded that the terminology of reconstruction in the aftermath of war in societies is hinged on nothing more than hegemonic extensions over peripheral states, typical of the case study country mentioned.

Carefully underscoring the extensive details involved in post- conflict reconstruction and its evolution, especially those with impacts spanning several decades, David Roberts (2011) viewed liberal peacebuilding as nothing more than a "governmentality" approach, effected through a "Weberian" construct, weakening or eliminating the intervened countries' or societies' position as stakeholders and beneficiaries of the project, as well as making the path to becoming stakeholders or beneficiaries elusive.

From this hegemonic perspective, David Roberts notes that interventions handed down to these states are often accompanied by a particular goal-oriented policy that is strictly followed and monitored by the intervenors and sternly requires the intervened states to comply, at the risk of being abandoned, ignored, or penalized for noncompliance. Roberts described this

kind of peacebuilding style as representative of a Weberian state governance construct. Such peacebuilding practices, the scholar asserted, have degenerated into what he referred to as "bureaucratic technocratic managerialism," a practice with which actual discussions of peace and its production remain elusive.

David Roberts further asserted that the terminology often associated with liberal peacebuilding, such as "institutionalization," are a mere camouflage in order to advance the intervenors' broader agenda, and is part of a process and pattern dispossesses the intervened nation-states of their participations and leaves with the beneficiaries, the citizens, with no alternative claim to challenge the intervenors, who supposedly possess the remedy to the problem. For example, the aspects of democratization and human rights that are imposed might be taken for granted despite being potential options to heal the instabilities in the war-torn states.

Therefore, Roberts argued that the so-called "participation and stakeholder" terminology often used as a means to incorporate the citizens mere presence. This pattern, he argued, has engendered a platform for the triumph of a categorized and asymmetric relationship as opposed to a symbiotic interaction between the intervenors and citizens. As a result, he opined, such liberal peacebuilding practices deprive the beneficiaries of the actual kind of peace that could have been domestically generated and was required. Roberts also added that such

peacebuilding practices, as long as they satisfy the intervenors' security and development goals within the global governance paradigm, are seen as peacekeeping, when, in actuality, they only create the appearance of peace.

Michael Pugh (2005), specifically in his analysis of the political economy in the context of liberal peacebuilding, highlighted the systemic top-down suppression of such policies in war-torn states. For example, Pugh asserted that the economic liberation mantra that has formed the core of liberal peacebuilding processes has dwindled not only the public good, but also the public space of a majority of citizens situated on the bottom of war-torn recovering states, especially with the mantra's rationalization policies handed down to the states as conditionalities. In addition, Michael Pugh maintained that the character inherent within the capitalist intrusion into these state-building societies has resulted in engendering poverty and shadow financial systems. In this context, he emphasized that the "political economy of the ordinary people," which constitutes the critical pillar of sustainable peace, has been ignored.

In addition, Campbell (2011: 89-102) underscored the organizational paradox of liberal peacebuilding, especially the dilemmas created by the combination of its antiquated modus operandi alongside with its latest paradigms that are jointly implemented and expected to achieve a nuanced outcome. Campbell

further explained that liberal peacebuilding institutions have been engrossed with adaptability challenges, due to the complex institutional traditions or procedural patterns inherent within the implementing organizations, making the challenges complex and the organizations unable to confront and adapt to newly emerging realities in peacebuilding processes or even meet the fundamental needs of the war-torn societies they are tasked with helping.

In addition, as Campbell clearly stated, organizations that are involved in peacebuilding activities are founded on values that are authoritatively ordered from the donor organizations' countries. Therefore, Campbell stated, it is these "normative" procedures that inform the organizations' behavioral patterns in the field, and such strict adherence constitutes an adaptability challenge, since the realities in the field might be inconsistent with the normative procedures. In Summary, Campbell wanted to explore whether domestic solutions can actually initiate peace in war-torn societies even when they are inconsistent with the assumption imposed by external actors and if they can become compatible and accepted by external actors for the realization of peace.

For his part, Michael N. Barnett (2016: 23-40) characterized liberal peacebuilding as paternalistic in nature in the sense that liberal post-conflict peacebuilding is locked in a particular hegemonic ideological construction with an

established and tailored approach that completely compromises the values in the intervened states, such as "legitimacy, consent, and therefore, is largely undemocratic, ineffective, commanding and coercive in nature."

Beyond the constructivist and hegemonic analysis, Ole Jacob Sending (2011:55-66) uncovered what viewpoint could be deduced from the domestic local actors' perspective of post-conflict nation-states. In other words, Sending described how local actors impact liberal peacebuilding processes from the domestic level: either positively or negatively. Sending specified that the power of local actors in peacebuilding starts with the very existence of the "sovereignty" of the state. External intervenors would have to seek consent of a sovereign state before intervening in the domestic affairs of the nation-states to effect peacebuilding and. Upon intervention, they would have to solely rely on the local actors to operationalize their activities.

In this context, Sending affirmed that these local actors would have their localized internal belief systems. In the process of their interactions with the external actors, they could be assumed in theory to accept and implement the policies handed down to them by the external actors to gain access to economic support. In turn, the external actors could utilize these monies in their best interests as opposed to what is

entailed, in many instances, in the rubrics of actual peacebuilding implementation guidelines (Sending, 2011:55-66).

Thus, Sending noted, these conditions are one of the manifestations with which local actors have wielded power and control over the operations of external peacebuilding intervenors in post-conflict societies. In addition, Sending added that intervenors should realize that reforms instituted during a period of state-building are the mechanism that renders their interests defunct or threatening, given the internal power of the local political elites at the domestic level. Such reforms will be undermined by these local actors from the perspectives of buy-in and local ownership in the absence of efforts to secure local cooperation (Sending, 2011:55-66).

Likewise, Lederach (2005) underscored that contemporary social engineering attempts aimed at resolving violent conflicts have been characterized by practices invariably considered as inappropriate and lacking in moral imagination. In particular, given the context within which these violent episodic conflicts emerge, Lederach expounded on the importance of an inward-looking approach based on "Moral Imagination." This is more appropriate for resolving the contemporary societal challenges associated with conflicts.

The author asserted that this approach, though somewhat connected to the existing pillars of violence in society, would

be able to exceed and overwhelm the existential intractable drivers of conflict. He mentioned that the moral imagination toolkit does not fall within the current ephemeral political, social, and economic guidelines that are situated in the peacebuilding mantra. But he tries to appreciate how a breakaway from these causal factors can be materialized. He added that such moral imagination would be a new approach to peacebuilding, characterized by what he referred to as an "artistic process," without which any contemporary peacebuilding process will remain unfocused.

2.5. Conceptual Gap

The dilemma of liberal peacebuilding has been discussed by many commentators. An appreciation of the brand of neopatrimonialism practiced in Sierra Leone, which is associated with social structures such as ethnicity and regionalism and occurs in other heterogeneous post-conflict peacebuilding states as well, and the outcomes produced by this phenomenon, as argued in this thesis, is the critical perspective to examine liberal peacebuilding attempts in the country.

In particular, in the context of post-conflict Sierra Leone, this conceptual perspective is relevant and instructive for analyzing and situating these concrete fundamental obstacles. From this perspective, this thesis addresses the

question: why has the attempt of liberal peacebuilding not been successful in Sierra Leone?

Notably, liberal post-conflict peacebuilding is characterized mainly by the promotion of democracy, marketized economic enhancement, and state institutional restructuring (Newman, et al., 2009: 1). Fundamentally, these are the auxiliary pillars upon which the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding is established.

Successful liberal peacebuilding requires sound pluralism. Equally important to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding is the presence of economic development that prevents and fundamentally mitigates overt inequalities and poverty. In addition, equal opportunity should also be present within a post- conflict country as a condition for the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding.

In the case study of Sierra Leone, due to the country's neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism, ethnic pluralism has disintegrated in the political system, the mismanagement of development aid meant to enhance the country's economic development has exacerbated pre-existing problems with inequality and poverty, and the marginalization within the state political system has resulted in the nonexistence of equal opportunity. The politics of neopatrimonialism in Sierra Leone that have become associated with identity (particularly ethnic

and regional identity) have also resulted in the increased salience of ethnic and regional identity within the mainstream political superstructure. This has led to a deterioration of the fundamental pillars upon which the successful realization of liberal post- conflict peacebuilding depends.

2.6. Notion of Identity

Countries in Africa, in which liberal peacebuilding efforts are largely situated, are often built from phenomena linked to social identity, ranging from tribes, geography, political attachment, and culture. As noted by Byron G. Adams and Fons J. R. Van de Vijver (2017), "social group association nurtures the sense of belonging and is a demonstrative attachment to something greater than self... and as a result, individuals get themselves located into a certain group of people with whom they share similarities and distinguish them as a group from others" (see also Jean S. Phinney, 2000). This form of superficial social construction and attachment is commonplace in many countries located in Africa.

Francis M. Deng (1997:28-31) noted that African societies operate on intricate patterns founded on "tribes, lineage, and family from within which notion of culture, ethnicity, and linguistics became visible and these have been the basis through which political, social and economic interactions were built."

Moreover, Deng mentioned that the over-centralization that was experienced during the colonial era uprooted the original patterns of the indigenous people.

Thus, such centrality, through which a means of survival came to be built, resulted in severe competition between different groups of people that obstructed identity relations in Africa, where, for example, competition for scarce resources has become commonplace. Deng (1997:28) added that ethnic salience and regional identity both provide instructive factors to explain the instabilities in Africa.

Elliott Green (2017) used data from some Sub-Saharan Africa countries to argue that the manifestation of a national identity in many African states is contingent on a particular group at a time controlling the state power. Green added that the group that controls the state power often associates itself with a feeling of national identity and belonging; however, once the group is out of power, such allegiances wane and are repositioned toward the ethnic group.

While political power remains integral to this identity formation phenomenon, ethnoregional identity becomes salient in many African states where the regional actors have a vastly disproportionate access to power and resources in their territory. Its ramifications of which have invariably become

sources of instability and calls for secession and self-rule as an independent state (Mozaffar & Scarritt, 2013).

According to Catherine Boone (2007), across the history of Africa, networks of ethnic and political relations have been firmly established in the organizational setups and governance practices of many countries. These practices, Boone argues, gave rise to the emergence and salience of an ethnoregionalized political pattern, and that pattern controlled many struggles within different localities. Nevertheless, as Catherine Boone argued, those prior approaches of amalgamation have waned in the wake of new trends of economic growth. And regional political struggles geared toward strengthening power at a sub-group level have consequently arisen within these countries. For Anders Sjogren (2015:163), the "concurrent contestation over sub-national differentiation, political identities and the locus of authority has also stimulated regional politics" (See also Walter G. NKWI, 2006).

In this discussion of identity, it can be observed that identity has been a part of societal formation and is important in societal analysis. However, even more importantly, identity's association with patterns of neopatrimonialism in many political systems has intensified its salience in political action. This fact has been intensely felt within and around the state political superstructure. Therefore, this thesis maintains that the ascendancy of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity

and regionalism made liberal post-conflict peacebuilding efforts largely difficult in countries like Sierra Leone.

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter has examined some of the conceptual debates surrounding liberal post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, particularly those debates that have focused on analyzing the concept of liberal peacebuilding and the obstacles related to it in countries emerging from intra-state wars. Building on the case of Africa and particularly the specific case of Sierra Leone, this study notes that there was a need for the research on liberal peacebuilding in post- post-conflict states. These patterns demonstrate that understanding this national context explicitly helps locate the obstacles that are related to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding.

Building on the case of post-conflict liberal peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone, this study identifies neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism within the political practices as the major reason for the patterns that lead to the difficulty of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in the country. These patterns resulted in the disintegration of ethnic pluralism; the mismanagement of development aid, creating inequality and poverty; and the widespread marginalization of citizens that prevented the establishment of equal opportunity.

These factors, along with the neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism that remains a nationally constructed and patterned phenomenon situated within the political structure, made the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country difficult.

Chapter Three

International Liberal Peacebuilding Intervention in Sierra Leone

3.0. Introduction

Sierra Leone experienced one of the most significant international peacebuilding operations in the aftermath of its eleven years of civil war. The civil war was typical of the contemporary conflicts in Africa that proliferated during the post-Cold War. Thus, liberal peacebuilding intervention emerged in the country that was desired as a paradigm to establish stability through a modern state creation. The outbreak of the civil war in the country saw the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, with several missions and mandates. The civil war ended in 2002 under the supervision of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The change of focus from peacekeeping to peacebuilding led to the establishment of the United Nations Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) to collaborate with the state to enhance peace. In 2006, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) was established with the primacy to consolidate the peace process. In 2008, through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1829, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone came into existence. These United Nations missions and mandates were an integrated approach intended to establish

a liberal peace in post- war Sierra Leone to strengthen stability and development.

In the 1990s, international peacebuilding approaches were more refocused toward the liberal peacebuilding paradigm in countries that became affected by these intra-state conflicts. Sierra Leone, like many other countries that were affected by this pattern of warfare, the model of international liberal peacebuilding became attractive.

Therefore, this chapter explicitly analyzes Sierra Leone's case study of the international approach to liberal peacebuilding that was operationalized through a multidimensional focus. In particular, the chapter focuses on the United Nations Peacekeeping and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission with particular attention to the security sector reform, which is the critical juncture of liberal peacebuilding policies. The chapter also examines other foundational development frameworks of liberal peacebuilding. More importantly, this chapter explains the road-map that degenerated Sierra Leone into civil war and how the patterns of the revolution were systematized.

Furthermore, the chapter explains the design of the multidimensional approach during the liberal peacebuilding process in the country, which began with peacekeeping, peacemaking, and post- conflict peacebuilding.

In addition, the chapter also examines the difficulties at the beginning of the peacemaking process, and the general characteristics of the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country. Lastly, the chapter assesses the multidimensional liberal peacebuilding consolidation approach.

One essential characteristic associated with the mainstream liberal peacebuilding discourse is the wide-ranging scholarly debates. In the constructivist school, for example, the international liberal peacebuilding model in conflict and post-conflict states is a socially constructed idea. Such an idea is predicated on the belief that countries devastated by agonizing warfare will become stabilized through reforms in the form of liberal peacebuilding. This normative understanding of peace in a post-conflict state has been faced with challenges for decades. Such challenges are domestically inherent within the intervened states.

Traditionally, international intervention in conflict situations during the era of inter-state wars was more focused on peacekeeping and peacebuilding as the main dominant approaches. In the post-Cold War era, with the widespread intra-state wars, the liberal peacebuilding component emerged within the operational peacebuilding architecture.

The integration of peace-making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, gave rise to the notion of multidimensional peace

operation in post- conflict states, as experienced in Sierra Leone.

3.1. Post-Independence Roadmap to the 1991 Civil War in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone is a country located in the West Coast of Africa neighboring Liberia to the south-east, and Guinea to the north- west, north-north-east, and with the size of about 27,925 square miles.

This began with a struggle for political power among the emerged elites, mainly from the protectorate enclave. This scuttled the post- independence aspirations of a prosperous nation-state, and resulted in the production of what Antonio Gramsci named as "Subaltern." a type of state system characterized by an elite captured (see Gramsci, 1971 & Louai, 2012) and the creation of what William Reno referred to as a "Shadow State" (Reno, 1995). A Shadow state was created through collusion between a few domestic actors and foreign business tycoons that resulted in the formation of 'the powerful' within the state through which state resources were controlled (Reno, 1995).

Began as a so-called multi-party pluralist state during the post- independence era, relative pluralism existed from 1961-1964. During these periods, regular political party engagements

existed and were in the form of strategic interactions mostly dependent on the survival of the fittest struggle. In this early period, the political opportunity structure was widened, and the actors' political competition was relatively at a low scale. From 1964 to 1967 political nepotism and neopatrimonialism along ethnic and regional lines resurfaced in the political space under the administration of Sir Albert Margai of the SLPP led government (TRC report, 2014).

Sir Albert Margai's administration was characterized by the purging of ethnic and regional others, which led to the accusation of his regime as a "Mende ethnic government" (TRC report, 2004). It became apparent that ethnic and regional identities were connected to the political superstructure that became crystallized in post- independence politics (TRC report, 2004). It was also a period characterized by the suppression of opponents' political space. It was instrumentalized as a gimmick not only to consolidate the political power but to limit the space for political opportunity structure to the political opponents (for political opportunity structure, see also Eisinger, 1973 & Kriesi, 2004, 1995).

In addition, with the change of the political regime in 1967-8, and the introduction of the 1978 one-party constitution, political party pluralism became intolerable and was sternly prohibited (Alie, 1990; Gberie, 2005; Harris, 2013). This was under the political regime of the All People's Congress party,

led by a former trade unionist, Siaka Probyn Stevens (Alie, 1990; Gberie, 2005; Harris, 2013).

The political climate under President Siaka P. Stevens became characterized by repressive practices, as referenced in the works of Gberie (2005), Harris (2013), Kargbo (2006), Kpundeh (1995), Reno (1995), and the TRC report (2004). The prominent and overriding feature of the regime was its neopatrimonial pattern of government that overtly eclipsed the corridors of politics, and corruption became institutionalized. This occurrence became a culture taken for granted as a pattern that undermined the social fabric of the state capacity of the country.

Michael S. Kargbo (2006) noted that the prevailing political climate that emerged at that time led to the institutionalization of elites. He added that prevalence of such practices rendered state institutions inescapable from the "corrosive effect of presidential interference and patronage" (Kargbo, 2006:30). The cruelty and extensive nature of such a pattern blurred the space between what is public and private. Overt political ostracization and elimination of political rivals were features of the regime (TRC Report, 2004). In a situation where political opponents survived, they were subjected to marginalization under the whims and caprices of the "Big Man," the president, Siaka P. Stevens.

Under Stevens's administration, the regime sanctioned both economic and institutional corruption as a legitimate pattern of his government. This was made manifest in one of his statements in the local lingua franca, where he maintained that-"Usai den tie cow nar de e go it, which implies that "a cow grazes where they are tethered" (Berewa,2011:68; Kargbo, 2006:29. see also Reno, 1995). This practice widely became normalized and accepted across and within state institutions and among civil servants.

In addition, with the institutional 1evel of corruption, job offers were contingent on a patronage network structure, which eroded impersonal prerequisites for gaining entrance in a public office. For example, the police and military leadership were unilaterally appointed to parliament to represent their joint political interests (Gbla,2007:68).

Sahr Kpundeh (1995:90) explained corruption in three phases at the state level, including "personalistic, institutional, and systemic corruption." With the personalistic pattern of corruption, Kpundeh noted that it was where corruption became an accepted norm within the country's social fabric. According to Kpundeh, corruption was operated from the top-down through state officials and the bottom-up through civil servants. More specifically, at the bottom-up level, he noted, civil servants with designated job roles would demand gifts in the form of bribes.

In addition, at the institutional level of corruption, Sahr Kpundeh added that it ranged from a high level of interference to mere ineptitude, institutional lapses, and standards flouted. For example, government payrolls were flooded with names of ghost workers who would appear to the offices in the morning to sign up their names and immediately vacate the office space. Such officials were assured of their constant remunerations paid at the end of each month (Kpundeh, 1995: 93-94).

He noted that corruption became a normalized collaboration between the government and some sections of the population on a systematic pattern of corruption. For example, he indicated that government procurements and contracts processes were awarded to cronies for kickbacks, and only a handful of people were eligible for control over such state resources. This systematized pattern of the regime caused the majority of the population to become unconnected to the state resources.

It was these practices that deviated Sierra Leone from the standard norms of a well-functioning society, a phenomenon that subjected the country as one of the failed states in Africa. Because of these occurrences, on March 23, 1991, the eleven years of brutal civil war began, followed by a military coup in 1992 that ended the twenty- four-year of the authoritarian regime (Kabia, 2016).

3.2. The 1991 War in Sierra Leone

The 1991 civil war in Sierra Leone was an outcome of the approximately three decades of abnormal political governance climate that operated under repressive post-independence political systems. The preliminary context of the revolution began with a series of civil and violent claim-making processes between political parties, trade unionists, ordinary workers, and student youth groups.

Analyzing "Contentious Politics," Dough McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001:27-180) asserted that contentious politics has fundamental characteristics of claim-making processes in society. The authors indicated that contentious politics emerge where a group of actors make a claim against other actors, and such claims directly affect the interest of the opponent. Moreover, the authors maintained that such a claim-making process has specific mechanisms that support its formulation. These mechanisms, noted by these authors, include "brokerage making, identity shift, co-optation, diffusion," and "mobilization" as core pillars to contentious engagement.

Before the 1991 civil war began in Sierra Leone, two incidents occurred, the 1977 student demonstration, and the 1982 Ndorgboyosoi (Evil Spirit) confrontation in Pujehun (TRC Report, 2004). These were broad-based claim-making processes that

confronted the political regime in the earliest period before the emergence of the war. It laid the foundation through which brokerage making, identity diffusion, and mobilization among the dissenting actors became consolidated and resonated with the majority of the people across the country.

In addition, demonstrations in the form of violence were used as one of the contentious repertoires by the citizens, mainly against the government. In the vein, the government utilized repression as a performance approach in their interactive response approach with the population (see also Tilly & Tarrow, 2007:1-12).

The first significant claim-making process that later expanded to the 1991 revolution occurred in 1977 at Fourah Bay College, one of the national university campuses. The president, who also occupied the position as chancellor of the University of Sierra Leone, was invited to Fourah Bay College at a convocation ceremony. While delivering the keynote address, students staged a demonstration with posters and banners, jeering and bellowing with words such as: "No more one-party, Free and Fair Elections, and accountability, is what we want" (Press, 2015:43).

The ceremony suddenly ended following the president's narrow escape from the scene, which resulted in a repressive response by state security apparatus against the students (Luke,

1985). The students' ringleaders were identified, hounded, arrested, and placed under detention, culminating in the expulsion of many of these students from the university (Luke, 1985). In addition, in 1982, in the Soro- Gbeima Chiefdom, Pujehun District, aggrieved citizens crystallized themselves into an insurrectionary group, "Ndorgboyosoi" as a form of a demonstration against the regime (Francis, 2005). Through this Ndorgboyosoi movement, the group revealed their anger against the political regime over, for example, electoral fraud. This Ndorgboyosoi movement in one of their disputes against the regime resulted in mass killing (Francis, 2005). The dispute caused many of the inhabitants in the vicinity to flee to the neighboring country Liberia (Francis, 2005).

Anti-government sentiments spread across the country and resonated with many unemployed youths and ordinary people. The claim-making process continued at various levels by many actors against the regime. The government succeeded in co-opting leadership of some pressure groups such as the Sierra Leone Labour Congress and the Sierra Leone Teachers' union with parliamentary appointments (Harris, 2013:69). The student group and the ordinary populace escaped the government's co-optation. The magnitude of the 1977 strike actions and the 1982 Ndorgboyosoi revolt which resonated with the majority of the citizens across regional and ethnic lines, served as the foundation for the 1991 revolution.

It could be assumed that the war was caused by the prevalence of relative deprivation and the pattern of horizontal inequality that was inherent in the societal structure of Sierra Leone. The work of Ted Robert Gurr (2020, 1970), "Why Men Rebel," for example, introduced the concept of "relative deprivation." Ted Robert Gurr explains that societal pressure germinates from peoples' feelings of disparity from what is expected.

Gurr asserted that the relative deprivation concept is a "perception of discrepancy between actors' valued expectations and their valued abilities" (1970:24). According to Gurr, value is the expected aim of human motivation in the quest for needed satisfaction.

In addition, Gurr opined that valued expectations are what individuals in society believe are their legitimate entitlements. While the valued capabilities, he added, are the opportunities in society in which members believe are capable of achieving. Therefore, Gurr asserted that the discrepancy between valued expectations and valued capabilities among individuals was the basis for the emergence of violence in society.

The feeling of relative deprivation in Sierra Leone was evident in the state structure, both within the political structure and among the general citizens. Particularly beginning from post-independence, there was a socially constructed pattern

of vertical relationships that privileged the political actors at the top (see Abdullah. 2004). In addition, such a system left the general population subjected to a systemic poverty circle (see Abdullah,2004).

This systemic vertical relationship resulted in a complete constriction of the political space, especially for women and youths whose economic status was in dependency. Such political atmosphere rendered their political participation at both the local and national level limited. For example, significant political decision making was reserved for chiefs at the local level (see Acemoglu et al., 2014). This excluded the youth from major political decision-making processes, a phenomenon that was similar to the national political space.

Beyond political decision making, access to social amenities was asymmetrically patterned in society. For example, disparity in access to public goods such as health facilities, electricity, clean water, and quality education between administrative towns and the peripheral regions were glaring (Riddell, 1985). Those limited facilities at the urban centers were asymmetrically accessed by people with the economic advantage. Rural-urban migration grew (see Byerlee et al., 1976; Levi, 1971), while vast agricultural land fields in the rural areas were abandoned (Camara 2020:87. see Binns, 1982; Byerlee,1974). This migration made slum-dwellings expanded across the capital city.

These rural and urban migrations across communities resulted in frustrations, which became an inevitable opportunity for youth's revolutionary mobilization in Sierra Leone. These collective frustrations were characterized by their despondency.

In addition, another internal factor was the disintegration of state institutions. Because of the decline in institutions, the state could not translate viable economic potentials to national development. For example, the availability of agricultural and mineral wealth opportunities did not result in national economic growth. This miscalculated management by the regime relegated the state in rent-seeking and racketeering in collusion with foreign actors, mostly Lebanese merchants. A prominent foreign figure Jamil Said Mohammed, a Lebanese business tycoon, and his associates (Fanthorpe & Gabelle, 2013; Luke & Riley, 1989). With such patronage structure, state resources were navigated through these patterns of informal networks, which nearly left the entire state in an economic bankruptcy (Fanthorpe & Gabelle, 2013; Luke & Riley, 1989).

In particular, because of this pattern, Sierra Leone became heavily dependent on external aid from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank under stiff conditionalities (Luke & Riley, 1989). Its continued poor economic management resulted in the prevalence of distress economic "inflation, high external debt settlement, the problem of balance of payment, and undue expenditure challenge" (Luke & Riley, 1989:136). The weak

institutional decadence also created the challenge of poor national economic management. Government financial outflow was far more than the income, and the country was unable to meet its national financial obligation, which led to the widespread debilitating condition of the civil servants (Zack-Williams, 2009). Recurrent strikes against the regime by civil servants also became normalized (Zack-Williams, 2009).

Another major factor that contributed to the cause of the war in 1991 was external assistance. During this period, as noted by Cornelia Nuxoll, urban and rural communities were flooded with a flurry of foreign Rastafarian songs, including:

> ...*"Redemption," Emancipate Yourself from Mental Slavery," "Get up Stand up for Your Rights," "It is not a Crime," "Identity," "In a Time like Now, I Stand Strong," "Lion Rock," "Culture at Work," and "War and the Real Situation" by renowned artists including "Bob Marley, Luke Dube, Burning Spear, and Joseph Hill" (Nuxoll, 2015:9-13; TRC Report, 2014).*

These musical lyrics resonated with the consciousness of the majority of the socioeconomically ostracized youth groups who spent most of their valuable times in "Ghettos." These heavily convincing musical messages derived from those popular Rasta cultural songs helped to awaken the mental consciousness of these deprived youth groups. It significantly constituted

part of the foundational bloc through which many recruitments into the revolutionary movement occurred (Nuxoll, 2015:9-13; TRC Report, 2014).

At the University, radical associations were established among students such as the "Green Book Study Club, Pan African Union (PANAFU) and Socialist Club" (TRC Report,2004, Gberie, 2005). They focused mostly on orientating colleagues on the ideology of Gadhafi's revolutionary vision, popular movement, and the apartheid situation in South Africa (TRC report, 2004). These interactions using repertoires of the popular uprising were part of the strategic approaches used for the mobilization process in the period leading to the war.

Another external influence was through the country's direct external aid, such as Libya. It was stated that "Libya's Foreign Policy for West Africa for the most of the 1980s was a revolution" (Abdullah, 1998:213-214). In addition, there was a strong affiliation between the Libya policy makers under former president Colonel Muhammed Gaddafi and some radical students in Sierra Leone (Abdullah, 1998). Following the expulsion of these students in the aftermath of the 1977 strikes from Fourah Bay College, revolutionary training in Benghazi, Libya, became the alternative (Abdullah, 1998). Between 1987-1988, many other disillusioned youths, including Foday Sankoh, traveled to Libya for training (Abdullah, 1998). Foday Sankoh, who was resentful from the prison and part of the training in Libya, became the

leader of the Revolutionary United Front Rebel (RUF) Movement
(see Gberie, 2005).

The Libya training, and the contact with Charles Taylor in
Liberia, who provided support, actualized the commencement of
the war in Sierra Leone, which started from March 23, 1991.

3.3. Peacekeeping as Foundational Search for Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

International peace operations introduced in Sierra Leone
in the 1990s had its main task of eradicating the root-causes
of the war in Sierra Leone as described in the previous section.
For the purpose, peacebuilding engagements were patterned along
with a multidimensional approach of liberal peacebuilding. A
multidimensional approach to peacebuilding is characterized by
the integration of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding
with a complementarity role to each other.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2086 emphasized
that multidimensional peacekeeping is exercised with a
particular focus on, but not limited to:

> "...*providing strategic assistance to intervened
> states to develop security sector reform and capacity
> to build the military, police, and law enforcement
> organs...; assistance to the national government with*

DDR...; and assist in strengthening the rule of law...protection of civilians... and security to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance..." (United Nations Document, 2013:3).

This was an integrative approach meant to respond to the existential challenges faced with international peacebuilding operations.

This chapter notes that this combined framework only succeeded in ending the physical war. In addition, the aspect of fostering a successful realization of the liberal process and its consolidation produces a different result.

The post-Cold War peacebuilding pattern in intra-state conflicts has been focused on a sustainability approach beyond a mere creation of a buffer zone in the form of peacekeeping and peacemaking (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Galtung, 1976; Lederach, 1997).

Approximately about a year following the commencement of the 1991 revolution, Sierra Leone experienced another military coup on April 29, 1992. This time it was led by a segment of peeved junior military officers who immediately constituted a military government, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). The NPRC military government professed to end the ongoing revolution, address the wanton state corruption, and to

restore sanity in the deteriorated public institutions (Keen, 2005; Wai, 2015: 236).

In 1996, the regime, unable to translate these overall policy statements to a positive outcome, returned the country to a multiparty governance system through organizing a national election (Riley,1996). Before the election, there was an extensive negotiation between the NPRC military regime and many civil society groups in a conference named "Bintumani I and Bintumani II." In this conference, "Peace before Elections or Elections before Peace," was the main contenting factor between the NPRC regime and the civil society groups (Kandeh, 1998:95; Mansaray, 2006). The NPRC military regime advocated for "Peace before Election" as against the position of the civil society groups, who proposed the "Election before Peace" argument (Kandeh, 1998:95; Mansaray, 2006). In the end, the election before peace was adopted that led to the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections.

The 1996 democratic engagement was a signal intended to return the country from decades of corrupt governance to a modern state system. However, one year after the election was held, it was interrupted by a military coup on May 25, 1997. The aftermath of the military coup led to the formation of a government, the "Armed Forces Revolutionary Council'' (AFRC), led by Johnny Paul Koroma (Gberie, 2003, 1997; Utas & Jorgel, 2008).

The AFRC Junta regime was characteristic of a strategic calculation seen in their hasty extension of "olive branch" to the insurgent RUF rebel group to form the new military regime. This was purely a strategic calculation employed by the AFRC junta regime to gimmick the external actors from understanding the stark intensity of the terrible situation that was ravaging within the society.

An official military intervention led by the Economic Community of West African State Monitory Group (ECOMOG), was launched in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone was the second neighboring country in the region where the ECOWAS regional institutional framework was tested for its military intervention. The peacekeeping in Sierra Leone under the ECOMOG was mandated to remove the AFRC military regime and to restate the deposed President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who was ousted from power after he was elected president.

The ECOMOG military intervention, which turned out as a peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, laid a remarkable foundation for peace maintenance within the sub-regional approach. ECOMOG intervention was conceived both for peacekeeping and peace enforcement that began with 3000-armed military officers on May 31, 1997. The months of ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone resulted in the reinstatement of the deposed president in March 1998 (Dumbuya, 2008).

ECOWAS became recognized as a robust sub-regional security institutional power. For example, the sanction against the AFRC regime by ECOWAS was supported by the UN Security Council for its implementation against the de facto military regime (UNSCR Document, 1997; Olonisakin, 2015).

However, ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone was propped by General Sani Abacha, who himself was not a democratically elected president. General Sani Abacha was a military head of state in Nigeria who became motivated in the West African region seeking to reinstate democracy in a neighboring country, like Sierra Leone. Although General Sani Abacha's action has a humanitarian undertone, it can be conceptualized as a presentation of Nigeria as a strong sub-regional hegemonic leader. In addition, it can also be seen as an attempt to distract international focus from the internal happenings in Nigeria and the rivalry within the region (See Dumbuya, 2008).

In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG intervention contributed to laying the initial foundation for the United Nations Peacekeeping missions to commence.

Before the establishment of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, in 1995, the UN special envoy Berhanu Dinka engaged with the NPRC military regime to negotiate peace with the RUF rebel.

In 1998, the United Nations, through security council resolution 1181, established United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor the peace process. In monitoring the peace, UNOMSIL four fundamental mandates were:

...*"to monitor the military and security situation of the country; to monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants; to assist in monitoring respect for International Humanitarian law; and to monitor the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of Civil Defense Force" (UNSCR Document, 1998; Olonisakin, 2015:599).*

UNOMSIL was mainly engaged in an observatory role (Olonisakin, 2015:600) while ECOMOG handled the country's security management component.

The context of these two concurrent missions was largely inherent in a security and military approach instead of a political approach. Such security dilemma resulted in the infamous January 6, 1999, incident (Glenn, 2015; Olonisakin, 2015: 601). Through "Operation No Living Thing," the RUF rebel invaded Freetown on January 6, 1999 which resulted in the civilian massacre and ECOMOG peacekeeping personnel (Glenn, 2015; Olonisakin, 2015: 601).

Russell W. Glenn (2015:117) noted that ECOMOG encountered a devastating security dilemma upon the death of General Sani

Abacha. It became apparent that his death created a hollow gap that resulted in the decline of troop contribution and the emergence of rancor over leadership among alliance members. This phenomenon undermined the observatory role of UNOMSIL mission, as they were solely dependent on ECOMOG for internal security provision.

The incidence of January 1999 facilitated the reshaping of the international dimension and approach of peacebuilding from a traditional military settlement to a political settlement approach. This resulted in a ceasefire agreement on May 18, 1999. On July 7, 1999, the "Lome Peace Accord" was signed in Togo through the facilitation by Francis Okello (the former United Nations Envoy to Sierra Leone) (see Sadat,2014). In the Lome Peace Accord, Article IX mentioned "pardon and amnesty" to the belligerent (Sadat,2014 312:)

In operationalizing the Lome Peace Agreement, the UNSC Resolution 1270 was adopted on October 22, 1999, which authorized the formation of United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (UNSCR Document, 1999). UNAMSIL as a peacekeeping mission deployed about 260 military observers and 6,000 military personnel" (UNSC Document, 1999; Woods & Reese, 2008). The establishment of UNAMSIL led to the dissolution of UNOSMIL (UNSC Document, 1999; Woods & Reese, 2008). UNAMSIL operational mandates in Sierra Leone were focused on the following:

...“(a) to work with the government of Sierra Leone and all parties to implement the Lome Peace Agreement; (b) to assist the government to undertake disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; (c) to facilitate humanitarian assistance, monitoring adherence to ceasefire, and the security and freedom of movement of personnel and the protection of civilian” (Olonisakin, 2015:630; Woods & Reese, 2008).

The Execution of the DDR program was one principal mandate outlined in the Lome Peace Accord. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270 indicated the primary UNAMSIL's role was to create a safe environment for peace. In 2000, the ECOMOG mission in Sierra Leone ended, and its security task was transferred to UNAMSIL as a lead international peacekeeping actor through Security Council Resolution 1289. UNAMSIL personnel capacity was increased from 6,000 to 11,000. With the end of the ECOMOG mission, the country experienced a chaotic security situation on account of the offensive resurgence approach advanced by the RUF rebel contingent. This prompted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1299 and Resolution 1346 to be adopted to enhance the use of force approach by the UNAMSIL contingent (UNSCR Document, 2000a; 2000b, 2001).

The effect of this RUF offensive pattern resulted in 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers detained as hostages. However, the United

Kingdom intervention in the form of "Operation Palliser under the Commonwealth command," settled the situation and the hostages were released (Olivier et al.,2013). In 2001, with Security Council Resolution 1346 in particular, UNAMSIL contingent was increased to 17,500 (Data Shows that 17,368 was materialized) became the largest UN Peacekeeping mission within the sub-region (Berman & Labonte, 2006: 141-192, Olonisakin, 2015:632-633; UNSCR Document, 2001; Woods & Reese, 2008).

The Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Program was the primary responsibility of UNAMSIL in rehabilitating the peace. Significant progress was realized in the collection of arms from various actors connected to the conflict with "72, 500 combatants disarmed, where 4,370 were children" (Berman & Labonte, 2006:141- 192). The DDR process that commenced in 1999 was completed in 2002 (Berman & Labonte, 2006:141-192). The table below highlights the excerpt of the data documented by Eric G. Berman and Melisa T. Labonte.

Table:3.1: Data on Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone, 1999-2002

Period	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	Civil Defense Force (CDF)	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)	Others	Total
1999-2000	4130	8,800	4495	1473	18,898
2000-2001	768	524	1038	298	2,628

2001-2002	19,267	28,051	0	463	47,781
Total	24,165	37,375	5,533	2,234	69,307

Source: (Berman & Labonte, 2006:141-192)

Although minimal success was realized during the armed collection, demobilization and integration aspects produced insignificant outcomes (Gislesen,2006; Solomon & Ginifer,2008). For example, its activity was characterized by temporary measures of a six-month training and an unsustainable start-off toolkit, which was insignificant for long term integration (Solomon & Ginifer, 2008).

The civil war in Sierra Leone officially ended on January 18, 2002. A nationwide general election, mainly presidential and parliamentary, was conducted that saw the population across the country participating in the first post-conflict democratic process (Kandeh,2003). UNAMSIL supervised the conduct of the 2002 elections through the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1389. It empowered the mission to make available logistical assistance, particularly to the electoral management body, such as the national electoral commission and security support to the state police. UNAMSIL also supervised the electoral process and training (Atuobi, 2009:24).

The peaceful conduct of the 2002 general elections was a necessary integral take-off of peace consolidation and a

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foundation for post- conflict liberal peacebuilding institutionalization in Sierra Leone. For example, security sector reform, democratization, and economic revitalization as integral transformative agendas to address pluralism, inequality, and poverty, and marginalization began in Sierra Leone. However, its successful realization was confronted with difficulties because of the prevalence of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism. This became an obstacle to liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country.

Between 2002-2005, UNAMSIL developed its exit strategy mechanism, which captured the long-term security of the country. This exit strategy specifically focused on:

> ...*"(a) rebuilding the country's security institutions for national stability; (b) full integration of ex-combatants; (c) consolidation of state authority; (d) restoration of government control over mining areas; and (e) dealing with insecurity arising from the regional block"* (Bah, 2012:110).

In 2005, UNAMSIL's mission ended in Sierra Leone as a peacekeeping force and, through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1620, was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). UNIOSIL was to superintend and support the weak government structure in the

form of "enhancement of political and economic governance" (Atuobi, 2009:26). Thus, UNIOSIL's broad support to Sierra Leone was captured in the following: "capacity building of state institutions, governance, transparency, and accountability; the rule of law" (Atuobi, 2009:26). In addition, it also focused on security sector reform and the capacity of the national electoral commission" (Atuobi, 2009:26).

As a post-conflict country, the entire national security structure rudimentary capacity and trust were compromised because of its politicization, which led to the disintegration of public trust and confidence (Gbla, 2007:67-80; Horn, Olonisakin & Peake, 2006:110-111; Smith-Hohn, 2010:82).

Primordial loyalty was the norm of the security institution like the police in Sierra Leone (Peters, 2011). It has its history from the colonial past, where the institution, for example, was created to seek the British's safety and to advert any potential defiance against the colonial government in the country(Ebo, 2006; see also Cullen & McDonald, 2008:123). This institutional pattern was inherited in the post-independence security patterns and operations, along with a similar approach (Gbla, 2007; Smith-Horn, 2010:83).

The establishment of state authority, like the police institution across Sierra Leone, was a necessary condition for the initial internal security stabilization for development.

Besides, the Lome Peace Accord article XVII categorically indicated that the security sector institutional reform was paramount for the stability of the peace process (Document on Lome Peace Accord, 1999).

Thus, the Sierra Leone Police, the national army, judiciary, and other subsidiary security components such as prisons, customs, intelligence services were integral for institutional reform for peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. As an essential for long-term peace, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) recognized security transformation as fundamental for poverty reduction (Gbla, 2007). This security conceptualization in post-war states and its link to development was a foundation of the reforms that unfolded during the liberal peacebuilding process.

The security sector reform concept in a post-conflict context is believed to have emerged after the post-Cold War in the context of development in the conflict countries (Brzoska, 2003).

In addition, Brzoska noted that the object of security sector reform in post-conflict settings is to ensure:

..."*the protection and prevention of political violence by state or non-state actors; respect for governance and the rule of law- transparency, accountability and professionalism and; and*

institutions should be effective and efficient..."
(Brzoska, 2007: ii-iii).

Thus, Thus, it was believed that an effective reform within the security sector environment could be achieved through "...the strengthening of civilian democratic participation and control; re-allocating military resources to civilian needs ... and; reform in military, police, and the development of the judiciary and its penal system..." (Brzoska: 2007: iii). Security sector reform in post-conflict countries is, therefore, essential for liberal peacebuilding as it forms the basis for which reform and reconstruction is anchored (Brzoska, 2003).

In the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, various security components were vital toward stabilizing the country. This informed the broad nature of the security sector process (SSR). This chapter examines three of these security institutions because of their roles in enhancing the successful realization of liberal post- conflict peacebuilding in any post-conflict states. They include the police, military, and judiciary.

Police Reform

The security sector reform in Sierra Leone had significant involvement of the United Kingdom government, during the war and in the post-war period. The Lome Peace accord provided a

comprehensive foundation from which extensive external security engagement in Sierra Leone was designed. Led mainly by the United Kingdom, the police reform process was initially controlled by the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF). It was later replaced by the Commonwealth Community and Safety Security Project (CCSSP) (Albrecht, 2010; Gbla, 2007). It began with a confidence-building approach that primarily targeted the internal challenges especially, from members within the institution who were reluctant to the reforms (Horn et al., 2006:113-114).

A policy document on "the Policing Charter" was approved on the vision of the new police institution that distinguished it from the previous operational, institutional patterns (Horn et al., 2006:113- 114). Comprehensive institutional overhaul on the institution was introduced, which mainly captured restructuring at the management level. In 1999, Keith Biddle, a retired British assistant chief constable, was appointed as the Inspector General of the Sierra Leone police to superintend the entire institutional reform process (Albrecht & Jackson, 2014).

The initial reform process targeted the institution's capacity shortfalls, because of the years of institutional and capacity gap factors that undermined the operational capability of the police institution (Horn et al., 2006:114). The provision of emergency operational and logistical assistance such as bicycles, radio communication systems, vehicles, and medications

worth US$ 900,000 were vital for their initial operations (Horn et al., 2006:114). Scaling up the operational capability could enhance the ability of the institution to establish preliminary internal security across the different regions of the country. This was to ensure the institution fit within the "local need policing" principle, and importantly, to ensure its decentralization (Horn et al., 2006:114-116).

This reform process culminated in a recruitment process with professional training to increase the standard of the institution. In 2004, the personnel strength increased from 6,500 to 9,500. This was followed by a yearly recruitment process that amplified the personnel capacity to 12,000 (Albrecht, 2010, Albrecht & Jackson, 2014; Baker, 2010).

To enhance collaboration between communities and the police in responding to quick security threats within localities, "community policing" was introduced as part of the reform process. The community policing collaboration was to augment joint information sharing about security challenges within the different communities and an immediate response was to be provided to frequent security incidences, and importantly, to build community confidence and trust. Ensuring the accountability of the police institution, a Complaint, Discipline, and Internal Investigation Department (CDIID) was established (Albrecht, 2010; Baker, 2010). This department was

to handle complaints from the public against police personnel (Albrecht, 2010; Baker, 2010).

In addition, the Family Support Unit (FSU) within the police system was created responsible for handling cases related to "sexual and domestic violence (Horn, 2006:117). These human rights-based components that had never existed within the institution was part of the reform that accompanied the institutional restoration of the Sierra Leone Police. Its establishment orientated the institution's linkage with human rights protection, which was considered as pivotal in the liberal peacebuilding processes.

The reform process had a severe sustainability challenge. From the beginning of the reform to the post-conflict period, it was entirely dependent and guided by the United Kingdom's external assistance in collaboration with the United Nations (Bangura, 2018). This pattern weakened direct governmental incentive for large-scale investment in the security structure with the required internally generated resource. Such occurrence has made national actors unable to fully appreciate the consequences of a weak security structure in the post- war Sierra Leone. Government support for the security institution has remained infinitesimal for several years (Bangura,2018).

In addition, the political pattern has not helped to sustain the effectiveness of some of these reformed policies,

particularly where local and external policy interests intersect. For example, during the reform process, a component of the police wing, "Operations Support Division," previously used to pursue and repress dissenting views, was maintained. Thus, after the reform process, this OSD police component has remained notorious for its politicization and violence (See Jingushi,2015:56). Such persistent patterns have weakened and compromised the institution's professionalism and efficiency and are a threat to the successful emergence of liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

In addition, the national Constitution of Sierra Leone, particularly section 156-158 and several sub-sections, explicitly provided a space for politicization of the police institution. Such a section, during the years of the reform process, was not central in the reform process. This section of the Constitution allows for the existence of a "Police Council" headed by the Vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone (Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991:118- 120). This section gives enormous power to the Police Council including recommendations for appointments to all senior management positions within the police institution (Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991:119-120). Also, it has the power to regulate and overhaul the institution's entire management (Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991:119-120). Thus, Sierra Leone, characterized by a high prevalence of a neopatrimonial practice associated

with ethnic and regional salience, the operational autonomy and professionalism of the police force, remained challenged (Kabia,2012:57-58). For example, Ibrahim Bangura (2018:7) noted that Sierra Leone police amid years of its reform signs of politicization remained prevalent, which 57% of his respondents affirmed. This pattern has compromised the successful realization of the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

Military Reform

The military institution of Sierra Leone before the civil war inept with the required skills (Gbla, 2007, Horn et al., 2006:111). Section 5(2b) of the 1991 Constitution noted that... "it shall be the duty of the Armed Forces and police...to protect and safeguard the people of Sierra Leone..." (Sierra Leone Constitution, 1991:2). In addition, section 165 (2) stated that...'' the role of the Armed Forces shall be to guard and secure the Republic of Sierra Leone and preserve the safety and territorial integrity of the state..." (Sierra Leone Constitution, 1991:125). Regaining this traditional role of the military was vital to the security stabilization of the country. This was referenced in the 1999 Lome Peace Accord, article XVII of which indicated a reform of the military to ensure "a truly national armed force, bearing loyalty solely to the state of

Sierra Leone, and able and willing to perform their constitutional role" (Lome Peace Agreement, 1999:13).

According to Horn et al. (2006:120), US$ 37 Million were initially provided for the procurement of additional military equipment to enhance the professionalism and effective operation of their work. This military reform culminated in bringing military accountability under civilian control, which is a paramount feature of a security sector reform framework. However, there is no adequate budgetary provision for the institution's operational autonomy.

Judicial Sector Reform

In Sierra Leone, the establishment of a security climate during the post-war environment was considered incomplete without a competent judicial component. Its existence catalyzes long term arbitration, resilience, and stabilization through the enforcement of the rule of law (UN Document, 2004). Thus, the justice sector reform was a significant component in consolidating the security sector reform in post-conflict Sierra Leone.

The reform started with a law development project in 2001 that focused on "logistics and infrastructural support targeting the renovation of physical structures, equipment, and training"

(Albrecht, 2010, Albrecht & Jackson, 2014:46). In addition, the reform targeted "formal legal procedure" as an essential component for standardization within the legal system.

In 2005, a broad approach through the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) replaced the law development project, which incorporated into its scheme of operation the local court systems. It supported the "drafting of the local court bills and the revitalization of the customary law" in one of the districts, Moyamba, as a pilot phase for the JSDP implementation initiative (Albrecht, 2010; Also, see Varisco, 2014). The JSDP activity was to make justice accessible across the country, which was also integral in the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

The local focus of the justice system and the need for sustainability through community ownership were part of the Access to Justice Development Programme (ASJP), which began in 2011.

In particular, the accessibility of justice was a significant reason for the reform process. This was fundamentally important in order to enhance the assurance and confidence of the citizens, who, for several decades, have lost confidence in the state's judicial system.

Thus, the reform process saw the existence of subsidiary judicial components, such as the law reform commission, the

judicial and legal service commission, and the office of the Ombudsman (Wiafe-Amoako, 2014). This was considered necessary for the existence of the rule of law to enhance the relative accessibility of justice.

3.4. Holistic Multidimensional Liberal Peacebuilding Consolidation Approach

Regarding the post-conflict development agenda, poverty reduction was considered a catalytic factor in attaining peace. Thus, the Government of Sierra Leone, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, formulated in the formation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2005. The PRSP outlined three thematic Pillars, which included "Promoting good governance, Security and Peace; Promoting Pro-poor sustainable growth for food security and job creation; and promoting human development" (Shinoda, 2012:13; Sierra Leone Human Development Report, 2007).

In 2006, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established in Sierra Leone to facilitate peacebuilding. The operations of PBC in addition to the recommendations of the 2004 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the PRSP II, prioritized support for peacebuilding on significant thematic areas. These thematic areas include "youth employment and empowerment; capacity building; justice and security sector reform;

consolidation of democracy and good governance; and energy sector" (Iro, 2009: 50; Shinoda, 2012: 12).

In 2008, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding (UNIPSIL), through resolution 1829, was established. While UNIPSIL was to assist the government in enhancing its democratic space and good governance with collaborated United Nations institutions, it identified significant areas of interventions. The four areas include: "economic integration of local rural; the economic integration of youths; equitable access to health services; and accessible and credible public service" (Shinoda, 2012:15).

Moreover, UNIPSIL identified "the facilitation of political dialogue and support to the government for constitutional review; security sector reform; strengthening of human rights institutions; and conflict prevention (United Nations Document, 2013:6). These interventions were assumed to be the integrated pillars with which Sierra Leone was to transition from the state of war to a modern state through a liberal peacebuilding paradigm. In order words, they were meant to ensure the successful realization of liberal post- conflict peacebuilding in the country.

3.5. Conclusion

International intervention in Sierra Leone was one of the significant external engagements the country experienced since its independence. The reform within the liberal peacebuilding

helped respond to some of the intractable challenges of the one-party authoritarian features that affected the country. During the post- reform process, these institutions have been able to restore relative state authority. The reform process, especially within the police and judiciary, which are vital components for the peace, has remained challenged by the political landscape of a genuine local buy-in. The three succeeding chapters will analyze these obstacles to liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone in detail.

Chapter Four

Challenge of Ethnic Social Cohesion

4.0. Introduction

Pluralism, particularly within the political democratic process, is a foundational pillar for the survival of a state. In particular, no state is completely homogenous in nature and "pluralism is appreciated as a product of modernization" (Dahl, 1974; see Blokland, 2011:3-4).

Thus, in any heterogeneous state characterized by ethnocultural particularities, such as identity, where ethnicity and regionalism have become profound, pluralism serves as a foundation for that state's stability. Likewise, a post-conflict heterogeneous country that is transitioning to peace, particularly under the model of liberal peacebuilding, needs pluralism within its democratic processes. The absence of pluralism would pose a crucial obstacle to the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding within such a societal structure.

Therefore, this chapter analyzes how the disintegration of ethnic pluralism, within the political spectrum of Sierra Leone, has created a major obstacle to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country. These liberal post-conflict peacebuilding efforts were intended to not

only end the war, but engender peace and social cohesion within the state population.

The chapter argues that the country's practices of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism created a severely existential conundrum within the country. This culminated in the disintegration of ethnic pluralism in the politics of Sierra Leone. Ethnic pluralism enhances social cohesion through "social justice where all groups feel equally treated, and cohesion emerges from the acceptance of common values" (Jenson,2019:10; MacIver,1999:14). Diversity, it is noted, has a phenomenal influence on "intergroup contact, which reduces perceived threats" (McKenne, 2018:1).

Over the decades, the absence of ethnic pluralism within the political system has significantly challenged the ethnic, social cohesion within the state, especially in post-conflict political spaces. Such has hindered the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding within Sierra Leone, which, as a heterogeneous state, requires ethnic pluralism for these efforts to be successful. After the engagement of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, why did the country turn out to be divided along ethnic and regional lines? This question will be discussed with a special focus on the practice of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism in the country and its relationship to these issues.

Within these discussions, this chapter focuses on two major ethnic tribes, the Mende and Temne ethnic tribes, particularly drawing on the history of their ethno-regional identity construction. The chapter also examines how and why ethno-regional and political differences appeared between the protectorate and the colonial inhabitants during the colonial period in the country. Moreover, the chapter assesses how the Mende and Temne ethnic and regional identities became solidified in the post-independence national politics of 1961 to 1992 and remained to be an obstacle to peacebuilding. In addition, this chapter looks at the use of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism in the post-conflict political system, as well as the obstacles that have been created by its use.

In conclusion, the chapter stresses that the disintegration of ethnic pluralism within the political space was a result of the overt spread of ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism. This occurrence has created a significant obstacle to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country.

4.1. Construction of Mende & Temne Ethno-Regional Identity in Historical Context

The spread of neopatrimonialism in association with ethnoregional identity in the politics of Sierra Leone is

related strongly to the ethnic divisions of the Mende and Temne tribes, and regional boundaries. While other subsidiary ethnic groups are relevant to the discussion, this thesis is focused specifically on the Mende and Temne. This is because of their long and important historic institutional practices, their layering within the national politics, and their national demographic patterns.

The ethnic and regional boundary construction, formation, and differentiation of the Mende and Temne tribes was a profound phenomenon within the mainstream body politics of Sierra Leone. It is related to widely held feelings of attachment, activation, utilization, and practice from the historical past. It was a socially constructed phenomenon situated beyond a mere primordial conception of identity. It began within a specific context at a particular point during the country's political evolution and war. In particular, it was where conquest, through strategic interactions, led to a conglomeration of shared thinking that produced a strong and uncompromising feeling of identities.

This phenomenon, as their behavioral patterns have suggested, intensely reflected the ethnic and geographic or regional dimensions and patterns of the country. Thus, over time, it incrementally grew to become an accepted social structural and cultural pattern, not only within the political system but within the overall national character. Therefore,

such occurrence has emerged to gain salience within the political space as well. In addition, these identities became further solidified following the pre-colonial war, when inhabitants began settling at different geographical locations and limiting their interactions with others across social boundaries.

It accounted for the solidification of both the linguistic and regional differences between these inhabitants, which in the years that followed became important political capital. This became a tool used as a political strategy to pit the two tribes against one another, creating social distance between them. It should be noted that there have been several instances of fluid ethnic boundary crossings into integrative settlements for socio-cultural engagements. However, in those social boundary crossings, the differences between the tribes were maintained strictly and uncompromisingly. It operated in accordance with the preferences of the neopatrimonial political system governing them.

In Sierra Leone, nearly all of the ethnic groups currently inhabiting the country migrated from neighboring countries several decades ago. It is estimated that there are currently "sixteen ethnic groups" inhabiting present-day Sierra Leone, as specified in the latest National Census figures of 2015(Statistics Sierra Leone, 2017: 8). Each of these ethnic groups has distinct linguistic and behavioral patterns and is

geographically situated at a well-known demarcated location distinguished for its characteristics and patterns (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2017).

As previously mentioned, this chapter is focused mainly on two of the tribes, the Mende and Temne ethnic group, and for two fundamental reasons. First, these tribes are currently the two major leading ethnic groups in the country. Second, these two ethnic groups are currently the tribes most deeply associated with the two main political parties, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) and the All People's Congress (APC) party. Thus, over time, their ethnic and regional alliances have influenced the actions of these political parties in concrete ways, due to the neopatrimonial pattern of politics within the country, especially during the post- war period.

During the prehistoric period, Sierra Leone was filled with numerous invaders inciting violent warfare driven by socio-economic motives, including the desire to find land for settlements. Notoriously known as the "Mane Invasion," its occurrence in Sierra Leone is traceable approximately from the 16th Century or 1545 onwards. It was an invasion characterized by violent militarism and conquest, and it led to significant consequences on the earlier settlers of Sierra Leone, the "SAPES" (Binns & Binns, 1992). The SAPES, as accounted for in different analyses, was historically characterized as the country's original inhabitants (Rodney, 1967).

It is believed that the outcome of the Mane invasion in Sierra Leone negatively impacted these original inhabitants. This was largely because of the military prowess of the invaders and the militancy they employed during the invasion. Phenomenologically, the Mane invasion impaired prior communal integration and cultural homogeneity and produced a warlike consciousness among the inhabitants at a far larger scale than before its advent.

Historic accounts hold that the "SAPES group," from which ethnic groups such as the Temne, Bullom, and Limba emerged (Binns & Binns, 1992; Fyfe, 1962; Rodney, 1967: 219), was defeated during the battle that ensued when the Mane invasion occurred. This defeat did not only reduce the prominence of the SAPES as the original inhabitants, but it resulted in their subjugation. This included their exchange to the Europeans for cash, the disruption of their commercial activities, their forced labor, and the general disintegration of their original creative enterprises. Thus, the invasion, the conquest, and their defeat profoundly impacted the geographical alignment of these ethnic tribes (Rodney, 1967: 235- 240; Glennerster et al, 2013: 296). These events led to the systematic construction, modeling, and the crystallization of these tribes through the development of shared languages and geographical positions.

The invasion and conquest led to an internal migration where the SAPES, mainly the Temne and Limba ethnic groups,

repositioned further inland in what is known today as the northern region. In addition, historical accounts maintain that the Mende ethnic group emerged from the Mane invasion (Rodney, 1967:236). This group systematically repositioned themselves in conquered regions known today as the southern and eastern parts of the country.

These events represent the earliest and most profound critical juncture of the country's ethnic and demographic shaping and arrangement, particularly in regards to the country-wide ethnic and regional composition and differentiation. Prior to the advent of the invasion, the SAPES group had existed and cohabited in mostly traditionalized and communal ways, free of large-scale, recurrent warfare. With the advent of the Mane invasion, asymmetrical power distribution between the Manes and the original settlers resulted, with the Manes in a dominant position over the original inhabitants. A typical example was King Farma, who became the first Mane King of Port Loko and ruled over the Temne inhabitants (in an area that is now a northern district) for many years (Massing, 1985; Rodney,1967, 1970).

As the SAPES are considered to be an entity from which the Temne tribe emerged or was associated, it is vital to note that the Mane invasion in Sierra Leone most profoundly shaped the earliest ethnoregional identity. The Mane invasion contributed to shaping the Temne ethnic tribe as a distinctive ethnic group

from the Mende ethnic group, whose origins also traced back to the Mane invaders. However, many superficial arguments have persisted about how the Temne ethnic group emerged in Sierra Leone, with many researchers referencing their migration from Fouta Djallon, Guinea to northern Sierra Leone, where they settled. While such accounts cannot be entirely ignored, they can be viewed as simplistic and romanticized in their historical inquiry. Such accounts overlook the deeply rooted history of Sierra Leone's systemic ethnic codification patterns.

In conclusion, this historical context of the Mende and Temne tribes shows that their regional identity constructions became ethnically and regionally differentiated along two blocs. It was within which their different internal social and political organizations were independently practiced in the pre-colonial era. During the colonial period, the prominence of these two ethnic and regional differences was largely reduced. However, in the decolonization period, it rose again.

The next section describes how tensions over ethnic and regional identity played out between the colony of Creoles, the Protectorate Mende, and the Temne ethnic groups. The Mende and Temne of the protectorate specifically were seen crossing over their prior socially constructed boundaries to become integrated into one political entity. Established under one political entity, it resulted in a solid political foothold over the Creole inhabitants, leading to various consequences. Of particular

note, the stark differentiation that later became profound between the Mende and Temne was influenced by the neopatrimonial politics arising from these historical events.

4.2. How Ethnic, Regional and Political Differentiation appeared between the Protectorate and the Colony inhabitants during Colonial Context

The protectorate and colony were separated by an artificial borderline constructed between the new settlers and the original settlers. The new settlers migrated from various origins to resettle in Sierra Leone following the abolition of the slave trade who mainly resided along the coastal region that came to be referred to as the "colony" (Alie, 1990; Harris, 2013). In addition, the original settlers, who had inhabited Sierra Leone, resided at the far inland of the country that came to be known as the protectorate (Alie, 1990; Harris, 2013). Beyond the physical borderline, the social differences that manifested between these regions were a direct reification of their distinct identities, causing a frontier line to emerge and characterize the region.

This boundary was particularly relevant when residents of the colony came to be referred to as "British subjects," symbolizing them as inhabitants under the direct administration of the British colonial power. Concurrently, those inhabitants

of the protectorate were conceived as "British protected persons," who were pre-supposed to be residents under an indirect form of rule. Indirect rule was merely another term for a joint political administration sanctioned by the British. This was where existing traditional local administrative rulers were allowed to rule in their respective localities as local chiefs, but with directives from the colonial authority. Thus, the Creole perception of the protectorate inhabitants as being different is incompatible with the shared consciousness and understanding that existed between the citizens of the country.

Castells (2004:6) characterized identity as a "person's source of meaning and experience." The reification of the protectorate and colony at the time significantly emboldened this notion. It encouraged both the inhabitants of the protectorate and the colony to reinterpret their past formative evolutionary stages and see themselves as a different entity or group of people. This event also illustrates how they came to be administered politically as a country. As Fredrik Barth (1998) maintained, social boundaries endure irrespective of actors journeying across them, in the sense that ethnic differentiation is not contingent on border crossing, interactions, or any knowledge gained. This differentiation was exactly what occurred as a result of the separate identities that had evolved, despite the amalgamation of the two regions

and the historical relationship between the Mende and Temne ethnic groups.

Serving as a critical juncture period, these events between the protectorate and colony brought a new wave of political-administrative problems, particularly ones that led to the exclusion practices. In particular, even though the protectorate and colony were amalgamated in 1896 until the emergence of the 1924 constitution, the protectorate had nearly no representation in the legislative branch or the national government at any level (Gberie, 2005: 19-20).

While those periods served to consolidate the colony inhabitants and gave rise to a new language, "Krio," in the protectorate, those periods also saw significant and repeated social boundary crossings. These social boundary crossings were among the different ethnic groups, but particularly between the Mende and Temne of the protectorate, as they constituted the largest ethnic social groups. It led to the formation of political identity in favor of a common protectorate against the colony inhabitants. This feeling developed from a sense of cultural superiority projected by the colony inhabitants into national politics.

During this period, a phenomenon Fredrik Barth (1969) called "social border crossing or incorporation," arose and such was manifested in the formulation of the 1924 Constitution. The

1924 constitution demanded the legislative council's expansion and a call for protectorate representation (specifically, three local paramount chiefs) in the legislative council for the first time (Gberie, 2005; Wyse,1990). This demand was vehemently opposed by the Creoles, who had already commanded an appreciable representation for several years in the legislative council, referring to the protectorate as "alien" (Kargbo, 2006:40-46). However, as previously mentioned, such actions by the colonial authority during the time could have been viewed as a calculated move, signifying a formal commencement to the downsizing of Creoles within the political space.

Under such circumstances, identity differentiation and social border consolidation appeared to increase. Particularly following the introduction of the 1947 Stevenson Constitution, led to an increase of protectorate representation in the legislative council against the wishes of the colony inhabitants. More importantly, the Creoles in the colony were quick to design a strategy to maximize further and consolidate their political aspirations and intensify their already socially constructed identity. This was not unconnected to the protectorate's overt advancement and challenges to the existing political structure. The Creole's actions resulted in the formation of the National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL) as a political party, headed by Bankole-Bright (Lahai, 2019; Wyse, 1990), a strong Creole colony advocate.

As opportunities loomed for the protectorate, and particularly advancement in education that were hitherto unavailable with only a few receiving an education, a radical identity began appealing among their broader constituents. For example, an organization called the Protectorate Educated Progressive Union (PEPU) was formed mainly by the protectorate's inhabitants. In addition, the Sierra Leone Organization Society (SOS) was later joined by the People's Party, which resulted in the formation of a broad-based protectorate political party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, in 1951 (Kandeh, 1998:97; Wyse 1990). The stated purpose of this political entity was to act as a springboard for advancing the protectorate's interests by challenging the "Creole's political supremacy" (Paracka,2003:166). More importantly, the actual purpose was mainly to position themselves and their interests within the main political space of the country, giving them access to the state economy, which they could use for their own needs. At this juncture, a crystal-clear political and ethnic identity line was drawn between the inhabitants of the colony and the protectorate, pitting each group against one another in their pursuits of political power. As detailed by Akintola Wyse, the Creoles had earlier thought that they would directly be the successors of the political leadership of the country upon the immediate departure of the British colonial authority (Wyse, 1989: 115). However, this dream has remained unrealized.

Both the 1951 and 1957 elections conducted under the colonial authority were between the SLPP, led by the protectorate inhabitants, and the NCSL, led by the colony inhabitants. Both elections were won by the protectorate party (the SLPP), which subsequently took over the highest seats of the political administration in both the colony and the protectorate (Harris,2014). Toward the eve of independence in 1961, the ruling party of the main protectorate inhabitants, SLPP, engaged members across the political party and ethnoregional lines that led to the formation of a National Unity Front to advocate for independence (Keifala, 2017).

It is fundamentally significant to state that before the attainment of independence, the healthy ethnic political integration that had been ongoing between the Mende and Temne of the protectorate was weakened. This resulted in a hostile or divisive feeling between the two tribes in the political space. The outcome of this tension was a salient ethnic and regional bifurcation between the two tribes, particularly in response to their political interests and dominance, in which each group sought to control the other.

This ethnic and regional bifurcation, which resulted between these two ethnic groups in the period of political independence, was connected to the neopatrimonial feelings. But, before the independence, the Mende and Temne ethnic groups had a strong protectorate regional political alliance under the SLPP

against the Creoles of the Colony, represented by the NCSL. This phenomenon began to take on a steadfast association with ethnicity and regionalism within the political space, which became pronounced in post-independence. The next section explains how the pre-colonial ethnic and regional identity differences between the Mende and Temne within the country became solidified in the post-independence political pattern.

4.3. How Mende-Temne Ethnic and Regional Identity Construction Solidified in the Post-independence National Politics, 1961-1992.

The flurry of euphoria that gripped the newly independent African state, Sierra Leone, almost immediately turned out to be short-lived. This was due to the hotly contested and deep ethnic and regional identity attachments that resurfaced in the national politics. This was particularly between the Mende ethnic tribe occupying the southeastern part of the country and the Temne ethnic tribe of the north and western parts of Sierra Leone. In her research, Jennifer L. Hochschild (2006: 293) observed that history is an accumulated, established belief that nurtures thought, which in turn ignites action. This pattern became visible between these two tribes.

The pre-colonial Mende-Temne ethnic and regional identity was relatively integrated and peaceful during the colonial era.

However, it was divided and poisoned under a well-organized and regulated structure in the post-colonial period and then incrementally escalated by the neopatrimonial pattern of politics that emerged. This period was characterized by the constant reproduction and layering of these socially constructed institutions to further the dominant party's political objectives. This pattern could be viewed in a similar light to what James Mahoney (2000), Kathleen Thelen (2003), and Paul Pierson (2002) discussed in their works on "increasing returns" and the" "concept of institutional layering."

In addition, during the colonial administration from 1808 to 1961, the SLPP Party was formed in 1951 and consisted mainly of a combined Mende and Temne ethnic group, along with other minor ethnic groups. The SLPP platform was used to challenge the hegemonic power of the minority Creoles in the political sphere at the colony to directly participate in the political administration of the country (Mustapha & Bangura, 2016: 30-31).

During this struggle, ethnic and regional identity differentiation became almost insignificant as large social boundary crossings occurred, especially among the ethnic groups, the Mende and Temne. More importantly, these crossings occurred between the Mende and Temne ethnic groups, leading to the formation of the SLPP as a dominant protectorate political party. Nevertheless, toward the eve of political independence,

political rifts emerged between the protectorate political actors of the SLPP (Mustapha and Bangura, 2016). The nature of the rift became partially reflected in the negotiations for the country's political independence at Lancaster House in London. Representatives from Sierra Leone who attended the meeting were divided according to certain allegiances and interests (Kargbo,2006).

Before attaining political independence, the political leadership struggle that had existed among the political actors and a disagreement over "defense pact" within the independence agreement, became the turning point (Kargbo,2006). Thus, Siaka P. Stevens, one of the Sierra Leonean delegates who traveled to London to abandon the meeting, returned to Sierra Leone without signing the independence agreement.

However, led by Sir Milton Margai, a Southeasterner from the protectorate region under the SLPP, the country gained political independence in 1961 from the British Colonial Administration.

In particular, the outcome of these disagreements, and the ethnic and regional disenchantment that had been growing, led to the formation of the All People's Congress party in 1960. With the formation of the APC party, Siaka P. Stevens became its first leader. Siaka P. Stevens, who abandoned the signing of the independence document returned from London before the APC party

formation, mobilized the "Election Before Independence Movement" (EBIM). This movement informed the foundation of the APC as a political party, with its adherents mainly drawn from the northwestern part of the country.

The ongoing political bickering among the main actors of the SLPP, involving some actors from the north who felt relatively detached, became a bankable opportunity for Siaka P. Stevens to gain support. The formation of the APC dominated by the northern-western region with its broad constituency of Temne ethnic group, and the SLPP by south-easterners of the Mende ethnic group, ended the prior political ethnoregional integration among the two tribes. In response to these events, ethnoregional political differences and identity boundaries became deeply established, which separated these ethnic tribes within the political parties. In addition, neopatrimonialism became primarily associated with these divisions, especially in the ensuing years.

In his analysis of "regimes and repertoires," Charles Tilly (2006; 2005) analyzed repertoires since they are the tools and actions most often used by actors in claims-making processes. One vital aspect mentioned by Charles Tilly about repertoires is that they are derived from relationships, social connections, and institutional arrangements. These inform the daily ways of life, and their particularities formed the basis that actors employ to advance their shared contentious engagements.

The APC as a political party was built on these resources, particularly given that it emerged to become a strong northern-based political party dominated mainly by the Temne ethnicity. This locality has other minor regional ethnic groups, such as the Limba, which became staunch ally, especially when it became apparent that the SLPP party leadership was constituted mostly of the Mende ethnic group of the southeast region (Wyse, 1989: 109; Kandeh, 1998: 92). All of these occurred through the incremental utilization of tight neopatrimonial connections between the actors in the regions.

The ostracization and marginalization of ethnic and regional others between the two groups gradually made its way into mainstream politics in the post-independence era. This became instrumentalized when inhabitants of the northern regions and certain tribes adopted the APC party as their political ally, while inhabitants of the southeastern regions adopted the SLPP. During the colonial period, when the Mende and Temne had unidirectional political integration, the SLPP was formed in the northern part of the country. However, with the sharp rift that occurred, the two political parties, the SLPP and the APC, therefore, began to engage in clashes of social interest over the ensuing years. This emboldened their political support constituencies through the incremental political practices of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism.

A few years after independence, in 1964, what appeared to be a "Mende party of the SLPP" manifested in the leadership of Sir Albert Margai, a South-easterner who succeeded his elder brother, Sir Milton Margai, as Prime Minister (Dumbuya, 2008). Detailed accounts from the time show that Sir Albert Margai, as a Southeasterner with the power of a Prime Minister, removed many Northerners (Temne politicians) from the SLPP-led cabinet. He replaced them with Southeasterners, a trend and pattern that became replicated in the military institution (Dumbuya, 2008; Harris, 2014).

The resentment that emerged along regional and ethnic social alliances from such political exclusion continued unabated across many institutions until 1967 when general elections were held. The APC party won all of the seats in the northern and western regions, while the SLPP won almost all of the seats in the southeast regions (Alie, 1990). Eventually, the APC party of the north-western based led by Siaka P. Stevens, filled with acute indignation, defeated the SLPP party in the 1967 elections.

However, after the swearing-in ceremony of Siaka P. Stevens as president and preparing to compose his cabinet, Stevens was overthrown in a military coup staged by Brigadier David Lansana, on March 21, 1967. Brigadier David Lansana was a Mende Southeasterner. Lansana defended his action by asserting that the election results were unconstitutional, as other elections

for local chiefs were ongoing (Alie, 1990; Harris, 2013). Lansana also emphasized that his actions were intended to institute state orderliness and to avert ethnic conflict (Alie, 1990; Harris, 2013; Kaplan et al., 1976). Shortly afterward, A.C. Blake and Major B.I. Kai-Samba, who were young military officers, staged another military coup and detained both Brigadier Lansana and Sir Albert Margai on March 23, 1967 (Kaplan et al., 1976). They immediately instituted a military government that they named the "National Reformation Council (NRC)" with Lieutenant Colonel Juxon-Smith as their chairman (Kaplan et al., 1976; Keifala, 2017). In 1968, the deposed Siaka P. Stevens was reinstated as the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone (see Tom Lansford, 2017:1335).

In the new administration under president Siaka P. Stevens, widespread practices of political exclusion continued at an alarming scale. It was followed by the introduction of a one-party constitution adopted in 1978 that prohibited opposition political parties on the premise that doing so would allow national unity to thrive (Dumbuya, 2008). In a calculated political strategy, neopatrimonial political patronage was firmly established, where only one political party was sanctioned to exist. Members of other political parties or groups of other regions were subsequently co- opted into the APC party or phased out from active politics.

Neopatrimonialism, especially under the regime of Siaka P. Stevens, was less associated with ethnic identity, as only one political party was allowed to rule. However, practices of patronage profoundly flourished within the political and state structure. The entire era was marred by vicious political, ethnic, and regionalized ostracization alongside practices of patronage, though not necessarily based on ethnicity. The southeast region, in particular, became marginalized from active mainstream political participation. In addition, state corruption permeated throughout the country, leading to the degeneration of state institutions.

This egregious political philosophy continued under his successor, Joseph Saidu Momoh, a former head of the military institution which he handpicked in 1985 as his successor. Under Momoh's leadership, the threatening economic climate led him to declare an "economic emergency," which further deteriorated any sense of unity within the country (Dumbuya, 2008: 81-122; Luke, 1988). During his administration, Momoh coordinated neopatrimonial alliances based on ethnicity through the incremental recruitment of his ethnic tribesmen. This was especially under a pattern that came to be known as "Ekutay" membership (Kpundeh, 1994: 150-151) until he was overthrown in 1992.

The outcome of these events was the civil war that began in 1991. In 1992, the regime witnessed a military coup from

disenchanted young military officers. Such a military coup in the history of the country was widely acclaimed to have ended decades of the authoritarian regime in the country (Alie, 1990; Gberie, 2005; Kpundeh, 1995; Reno, 1995). The next section summaries how neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism resulted in the disintegration of ethnic pluralism within the main party politics. Such a pattern became embedded and prominent within the country's mainstream politics, particularly in the post- conflict peace. This occurrence has ultimately become an obstacle to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

4.4. The Contemporary Trend of Ethnoregional-Neopatrimonial Practice in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone

Practices of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism in Sierra Leone, especially during the post-conflict liberal peacebuilding process, disintegrated ethnic pluralism.

One of the key features associated with this practice within the political landscape of Sierra Leone was the intensity of political exclusion, particularly along ethnic and regional lines. The type of political exclusion explained in this study is what occurs in an environment where (i) politics are seen as the sole determinant of the economic life of the people. In

other words, this type of political exclusion emerges in an environment where the country's national economic resource distribution largely hinges on affiliations within political structures through neopatrimonial patronage. In this patronage system, survival and access to the national wealth are largely dependent on the identity, either ethnic or regional or both, and whether that identity is supported by the governing political structure.

Additionally, this type of political exclusion occurs in an environment (ii) relevance within the environment of the political actors is contingent on patronage and ties with the political establishment in existence at that given time. Beyond the economic sphere, this is particularly based on one's regional and ethnic group. With this steadfast practice of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism, the pluralistic participation within the political space appeared to wane. Thus, its outcome is an exclusion of a major political ethnic group, as well as a whole region within the country, from mainstream governance within every given political sphere. Liberal peacebuilding could not be successfully realized without the possibility of pluralism within the political space in Sierra Leone. This pattern has been the characteristics of Sierra Leone during the country's post-conflict political history between 2002 and 2018.

At the beginning of the 2007 general elections and the period leading to the 2018 nationwide elections, ethnoregional-neopatrimonial attitudes were fully reawakened and re-established. This was prominent in the main political superstructure of Sierra Leone, especially under the reigns of the APC political party in the post-conflict period, which was dominated mainly by northwestern representation from 2007-2018. Widely viewed as an informal institution, this practice was primarily motivated by an ethnoregional-centric point of view. This view was underpinned by the patterns and attitudes of the neopatrimonial association with these identities. This led to distrust and prejudices toward segments of the ethnic and regional others in the political space.

In the tenure of this regime, practices of one-way political exclusion were conceptualized through the formation of ministries as one of the organs of the government. In Sierra Leone, the executive arm of the government is considered the "supremo," which means it is the most powerful organ in comparison to the legislative and judicial branches. As data indicated, 90% of the 44 ministerial positions of the government, which began in 2007, were held by people chosen from the northwestern region of the country (Patriotic Vanguard Newspaper, 2007). This pattern was unlike the previous regime from 2002 to 2007 that had a semblance of national representation across the ethnic and regional spectrum.

Later, following the victory of the SLPP party in the 2018 general elections, a committee referred to as the "Governance Transition Team" was formed to undertake "scooping" examinations of the previous regime. The report by the Governance Transition Team showcased a detailed ethnic and regional composition from 2007 to 2018 of some key government agencies and parastatals under the erstwhile APC regime.

The report revealed patterns of extreme political exclusion, mainly along ethnic and regional lines, within these institutions. This systemic practice of exclusion was fostered by the practices of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism within the political system, which led to the disintegration of ethnic pluralism. The table below presents a summary of this exclusionary political pattern. As stated in the report, 784 of 868 employment positions from these five key government institutions were filled by people from the northwest region. This constituted 90% of the workforce within these institutions, while only 84 were from the southeast region, making up 10% of the workforce.

Table 4.1: Ethnoregional Dimension of Employees in Key Agencies and Parastatals in Sierra Leone, 2007-2018

Parastatals	Northwest	Southeast
National Telecommunications Commission (NATCOM)	95	7
National Social Security and Insurance Trust (NASSIT)	357	36

National Revenue Authority (NRA)	15	1
Road Maintenance Fund Administration (RMFA)	23	5
National Public Procurement Authority (NPPA)	38	8
Maritime	172	11
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	84	16
Average Percentage	**90%**	**10%**

Source: (Governance Transition Team Report, 2018:116)

The practices of exclusionary ethnoregional politics that resulted from the country's neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism were also visible with other state institutions. It resulted in the removal of the Head of the Anti- Corruption Commission, the Head of the National Commission for Social Action (NACSA), and the Central Bank Governor. These government staff were mainly suspected of hailing from the southeast regions and were replaced with Northwesterners. As stated in this study, these patterns have been systemic, calculated, and taken for granted, as they have become just another part of the politics in Sierra Leone.

Equally important, such patterns have undermined the human rights of the country's citizens, and the spirit of the rule of law has been weakened. Institutional effectiveness in such a political system was apparent only at the pleasure of the regime that operates it at a given period, not as an established legal-rational pattern that universally works for all at all times.

For example, the bank governor's removal was an apparent contravention of the appointment regulations of his tenure of office.

Apparently, these practices are not unique or limited to the APC political system. They are systemic practices that have consolidated within the political system and forced regimes to operate within such practices to satisfy the ethnoregional-neopatrimonial conditionalities. For example, reports from the 2018 elections indicated that the SLPP regime removed many sympathizers and members of the northwestern region, who were associated mainly with the erstwhile APC regime. Their removal from many government institutions was under the pretext of an institutional restructuring initiative (Mansaray, 2018).

Furthermore, the neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism in the political system also resulted in the hardening of some ethnic and regional boundary differences. This practice was made manifest through recent electoral voting patterns that were particularly observable in 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2018. In between these elections, extreme alignments solidified. Thus, the most fragmented periods in the country's post-conflict history have occurred between 2007, 2012, and 2018, ongoing beyond that seen in 2002.

These elections are a direct representation of the social boundary differentiation caused by the salient neopatrimonial

influence on ethnicity and regionalism in Sierra Leone. The works of Frederick Barth "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" (1969) and Charles Tilly "Social Boundary Mechanism" (2005) have explained the manner of social boundary activation, maintenance, and intensification. These works have also explained how these social boundaries are reproduced and sustained in social settings. Their arguments are particularly relevant to the 2007 and 2012 elections in Sierra Leone, as indicated in the table below. The data captured below showcases how the mobilization of ethnoregional identity along electoral voting behavioral patterns occurred and solidified.

This pattern of electoral voting was between the southeast SLPP party, led mostly by the Mende, and the northwest APC party, led mostly by the Temne and Limba ethnic groups.

Table 4.2: Presidential Voting Pattern in 2007 Run-off Elections along Ethnic and regional Support

Major Parties	Western Area	Northern Region	Southern Region	Eastern Region
SLPP	138,613	82,421	221,765	346,852
APC	304,388	462,430	86,384	97,205

Source: (Sierra Leone Web, 2007)

The table above shows the total votes scored by both the SLPP and APC parties, according to regions in the 2007 general presidential elections. While the SLPP scored 789,651 votes (45.38% of the votes), mainly from the southeast regions, the

APC scored 950,407 votes (54.62% of the votes) in their victory from the northwest (Sierra Leone Web, 2007). In addition to this data, more divisions revealed themselves in the results of the parliamentary elections. Of the 52 seats in the southeast regions, APC secured only two seats in the 2007 general elections, and SLPP secured only three seats of the 60 seats in the northwest regions (Parliament of Sierra Leone, 2008; National Democratic Institute Report, 2007).

Similarly, the table below shows the data from the 2012 general elections, where the incumbent APC secured 1,314,881 votes (58.7% of the votes), and the SLPP secured 837,517 votes (37.4% of the votes) (National Electoral Commission Report, 2012).

Table 4.3: Presidential Voting Pattern in 2012 Elections along Ethnic and Regional Support

Major Parties	Western Area	Northern Region	Southern Region	Eastern Region
SLPP	152,520	48,856	344,399	291,740
APC	416,840	682,142	85,510	132,749

Source: (National Electoral Commission Report, 2012)

In the same vein, during the parliamentary elections, the SLPP party secured not a single parliamentary seat in the northwest region. The APC party secured all of the seats in the northwest regions and a few seats in the southeast regions, mainly in locations that appeared to be mainly non-typically-

Mende speaking zones (see National Electoral Commission Report, 2012). This phenomenon of extreme ethnoregional voting pattern has been taken for granted in the social practices of the country's politics and is embedded deeply in the political culture of Sierra Leone. In particular, these patterns can be seen in competitions between ethnic and regional actors in the post-conflict era to gain prominence in the ethnic political space.

In addition, the practice of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism has undermined national accountability, institutional legitimacy, and national unity. Political accountability is a dominant concept in the analysis of liberal democratic theory. In his general definition of democracy, Philippe C. Schmitter (2007:2) characterized democracy as a "system of administration where leaders are answerable for their public stewardship and to the governed." Political exclusion as a practice of *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism*, undermines political accountability and risks state institution's independence. The system becomes a conglomeration of actors with ethnic and regional political ties. As a result, legal-rational rules become compromised and ineffective. This pattern reflects what has occurred in the last fifteen years of post-conflict Sierra Leone, from 2002 to 2018.

A typical example of the country's political accountability problem can be found in the yearly reports of the Audit Service

Sierra Leone. For fifteen years, the Audit Service Sierra Leone has undertaken annual audits across all government-owned institutions. The reports have produced revelations of widespread, systemic, and unabated corruption across many state institutions and offered lengthy recommendations for urgent reforms. Nevertheless, the patterns have remained, and the recommendations have been treated with profound indifference and levity (see Auditor General's Report, 2003, 2004-2005;2008, 2008). Because of the entrenched nature of neopatrimonial practices associated with these socially constructed identities in the political system, legal-rational actions in addressing some of these recurrent political unaccountability issues have been ineffective (Brown et al., 2005, Mcleod & Ganson, 2018). This is because individuals of ethnoregional identity relations have occupied these government institutions due to neopatrimonialism.

The published the Transparency International Afrobarometer report (2019:52) also indicated that in 2015, there was deep-rooted institutional corruption evident across vital state institutions. According to a Transparency International Afrobarometer report, the table captured an excerpt of the perception of people on these institutions on corruption.

Table 4.4.: Perception of People who think these Institutions are corrupt

State Institutions	Level
President's Office	48%
Members of Parliament	50%
Government Officials	55%
Local Government Officials	49%
Police Institutions	59%
Judges and Magistrates	47%

Source:(Transparency InternationalAfrobarometer Report,2019:52)

In 2014, an Audit Service Sierra Leone report on funds generated to fight the Ebola scourge, also revealed in the Ministry of Health and Sanitation alone that:

"Le 15,815,495,120 from the Health Emergency Response account and Le 453,571,500 from the Miscellaneous Account of the Ministry" were suspiciously used. The report "after thorough auditing, indicated that only Le 1,964,950,000 that was withdrawn had supporting documents, but the sum of Le 14,304,116,620 was unaccounted for as stated in the report" (Sierra Leone Audit Service Report, 2014: 6-7).

In Sierra Leone, the formation of attitude tied to ethnoregional centric notion within the politics has also resulted increasingly in negative perceptions of institutional legitimacy perception and performance competency (see Albrecht,

2018; Aning & Edu- Afful,2013). This has been visible particularly for core state institutions such as the Sierra Leone Judiciary, the Sierra Leone Police, and the National Electoral Commission (NEC) within this post- conflict setting. These issues are all connected to the practices of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism within the politics of the country.

For example, when the SLPP party is in the reign of governance, public institutions, like the police force, the judiciary, and the National Electoral Commission, have been perceived by the APC and its adherents as not independent institutions of the state. Likewise, when the APC party is in the government, SLPP and its adherents will correspondingly consider these state institutions as largely compromised and non-autonomous (see IRIN, 2012; VOA Publication, 2009). This pattern of state institutional perceptions is systemically shaped by the force of each party's ethnoregional-neopatrimonial practices, which are built into these institutions.

As recently as 2019, two opposition parties, the All People's Congress and the National Grand Coalition (NGC), released press statements threatening not to participate in any electioneering across the country. These political party positions were based on the assertions of distrust, incompetence, and collusion between the National Electoral Commission and the government. In the press statements

announcing their withdrawal, the APC party mentioned that: "We in the APC have lost faith, trust, and confidence in the National Electoral Commission as currently constituted to be an impartial, competent, and credible institution to conduct any other elections in Sierra Leone" (Nyallay,2019).

Similarly, the NGC party stated the following: "Consistent with our conclusion that the National Electoral Commission under the current leadership is untrustworthy, incompetent, and unfit to handle elections in our fragile democracy, the NGC will not take part in forthcoming local bye-elections" (Nyallay, 2019). These statements resulted in their withdrawal from participating in two of the local council by-elections conducted in Ward 257 in the Pork Loko District and Ward 099 in the Kono District (National Electoral Commission, 2019). Principally, these established notions have undermined the public perception of the professionalism of many national state institutions across the country. This occurrence has rendered the country vulnerable to an increased frequency of violent eruption, and also reinforced the country's practices of neopatrimonial association with ethnicity and regionalism.

In addition, the presence of these established structural challenges, such as political exclusion along ethnic and regional lines as a result of neopatrimonialism, has caused severe ethnic and regional boundary differentiation. Thus, political accountability, institutional legitimacy problems,

and disintegration of ethnic pluralism within the political superstructure have emerged.

In addition to this disintegration, political violence has become widespread between the SLPP supporters and the APC and sometimes is manifested by other auxiliary minor political parties in the country. The word "strongholds" is used locally to refer to sites where people share bigoted ideas and practices based on regional and ethnic identities and grow strong with the support of one political party. These locations are defined, identified, and made salient through the neopatrimonial style of politics in the country and associated with ethnicity and regionalism.

These sites are considered to be dangerous flashpoints for political conflicts, mainly when opponent political parties intrude to stage campaign rallies, and have become part of the accepted political culture. During the eve of the 2007 election, violence erupted between the supporters of the APC and the SLPP in the Kailahun District (European Union, 2007). Many supporters were wounded, and the attack was extended to the motorcade of Ernest Bai Koroma, the then leader and presidential standard-bearer of the APC party and now former president (European Union, 2007). As a result, he was prevented from campaigning in the district, since it was considered an SLPP-based Mende stronghold (European Union, 2007).

Similar political clashes and violence occurred in Kono, Freetown, Kambia, Moyamba, and Kenema (European Union Elections Observation Mission, report, 2007). Each of these conflicts was a manifestation of the People's underlying resistance to ethnic pluralism within the country's political space. For example, in a town called "Tongo in Kenema district, the political clash that was occasioned between the SLPP and APC-PDMC led to three people injured, and another district of Kono supporters fired slingshots at each other" (Atuobi, 2009). Between March 9 and 12, 2009, in what appeared to be an orchestrated political attack, serious political violence erupted between the SLPP's supporters and the APC. This was a by-election related activity in the Pujehun District, resulting in major injuries to some supporters (United Nations, 2010). This election was delayed, and, for security reasons, some inhabitants residing within the location immigrated to Liberia, a neighboring country (United Nations, 2010).

Between March 13 and 14, 2009, the "vehicle of the resident minister of the eastern region of the incumbent APC party was set on fire during a violent eruption in Kenema" (United Nations, 2010:5). In addition, from March 13 to 16, 2009, at the ceremony during the unveiling of the newly refurbished clock tower in Freetown, serious violence occurred between the supporters of the opposition SLPP party and the incumbent APC (Shinoda, 2012). It resulted in APC supporters setting ablaze the national

headquarters of the SLPP and two cars, as well as alleged rape of women at the party office (Denney, 2009; Shinoda, 2012; United Nations, 2009).

This event led to a Joint Communiqué signed between the SLPP and APC on April 2, 2009, that was organized by the United Nations Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, Michael Von De Schulenburg (Shinoda, 2012). In the Joint Communiqué, both parties committed themselves to uphold the rule of law and maintain democracy (Shinoda, 2012).

Clearly, in the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding democratization process in Sierra Leone, has been markedly characterized by obstacles created by the country's accepted practices of neopatrimonialism. This is associated with ethnicity and regionalism, and volatile political violence has become a systemic pattern established within such a pattern taken as part of the culture. This occurrence has been visible in all of the elections since 2002, even including local council elections.

For example, as recently as 2018, there was a horrifying outburst of electoral political violence between the APC and SLPP during an ordinary local council by-election in Ward 196 in the Kambia District (Thomas, 2018). This event led to the death of a 14-year-old boy (Thomas,2018). This systemic and unabated electoral political violence led to a joint press

statement released by foreign diplomats of the United States Ambassador, British High Commissioner, Irish Ambassador, European Union Ambassador, and German Ambassador-Designate. In their press statement they "condemned such incident and entreated for the perpetrators to be brought to justice, as well as demanding all Sierra Leoneans to remain peaceful and respectful to the democratic process, non-violent, and adherent to the rule of law in the country" (Statement on Electoral Violence in Sierra Leone, 2018). The unceasing pattern of political exclusion has stifled the space for ethnic political pluralism and the opportunities to enhance social cohesion. The systemic nature and patterns of political electoral violence in the country are also connected to the existence of neopatrimonialism. The practice of neopatrimonialism is associated with socially constructed feelings of attachment to one's ethnicity and regionalism within the political space. This has created obstacles to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country. These practices have also led to the disintegration of ethnic pluralism, which is badly needed to enhance ethnic, social cohesion in the country's political system. This is important, particularly when the political environment has become accustomed to the overt exclusion of those who are ethnically and regionally different from the political party in power.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on one of the core elements that leads to the successful realization of post-conflict liberal peacebuilding. Specifically, the chapter has emphasized the importance of pluralism in a heterogeneous society. Particularly, societies transitioning from war to peace and heterogeneous, the attainment of ethnic pluralism is primarily a strong pillar to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in such a state.

This chapter advanced the argument that in the context of the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone, pluralism has not been allowed to thrive within the political space. The absence of this pluralism along ethnic and regional lines was caused by the flagrant practice of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism in the political system rooted in history. These processes led to the disintegration of ethnic pluralism, which created one of the biggest obstacles to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country.

Chapter Five

The Challenge of the Management of Development Aid

5.0. Introduction

Several decades since its emergence, the practice of development assistance has been widely debated across diverse development- oriented disciplines (see Hakima Abbas & Yves Niyiragira,2009; Iain Watson,2014; Lindsay Whitfield, 2009; Thorbecke; 2000). This is particularly so about its implementation in developing countries, where its engagement during both the post-independence and post-Cold War eras has been expansively remarkable (see Carlson et al.,1997).

With the contemporary context of development assistance programs for post-Cold War countries transitioning from intra-state conflicts, development assistance has been proposed as an integral pillar. Development assistance in these post-conflict countries or countries struggling with significant development problems is noted to effect social change to combat social structural challenges (Ndikumana, 2016:148-151). In addition, particularly those challenges that are related to underdevelopment and economic stagnation, which can cause issues of inequality and poverty. Post- conflict countries are challenged by the "effect of economic destruction and the deterioration of state capacity" (Ndikumana,2016:141) bequeathed by the war. These post-conflict

phenomena make development assistance valuable within these societies because solving these issues preserve both national and global stability.

This chapter analyzes how the pattern of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism during the liberal post- conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone destabilized development assistance in the country. Through the neopatrimonial political system associated with ethnicity and regionalism, it caused the two major political parties in the country to resort to strategic political interactions within the main political space. This led to the mismanagement of development aid that was intended for the country's economic and social development (Grech, 2017; Ravichandran,2011). Particularly in the post-conflict period of Sierra Leone, the country's economy was dependent on foreign aid, which was the primary source of economic recovery and to enhance the post-conflict development (Kandeh,208; Kargbo,2012; Pickering,2009). However, the dependence on this foreign aid became the hotbed of ethnoregional-neopatrimonial politics within the country, which resulted in the mismanagement of the development aid and economic underdevelopment emboldened. These practices created an atmosphere of overt inequality and poverty in Sierra Leone, both of which became further obstacles to the successful

realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country (Fagernas & Wallace, 2007, UNDP Sierra Leone, 2019).

In the post-conflict era in Sierra Leone, the two main political parties, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) and the All People's Congress (APC), were the ruling parties from 2002 to 2018 post-war governments. Development assistance was given to supports the country's national and economic development in the hopes that this development could help the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding efforts succeed. Through these political party policy frameworks, the "political manifestos," development assistance was offered to promote national and economic development (see Kanyako, 2016; OECD, 2020; United Nations, 2010).

However, these political parties resorted to politics of strategic interactions through the practice of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism. Political party manifestos or policy formulations were developed, which appeared to be national agendas but were merely agendas to promote political party's electoral interests as against a cohesive post-war development. As a result, the economic development of the country was undermined. This resulted in underdevelopment, high level of inequality, and poverty among the population because such practice created an atmosphere for the mismanagement of economic development and development

assistance, as its utilization was the hotbed for the severely ethnoregional-neopatrimonial politics that characterized it.

This obstacle prevented the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, because the flagrant inequality within the post-conflict state was in blatant contrast to the goals of the liberal peacebuilding efforts.

Beyond the inequality perspective among countries, inequality within the nation-states undermines the state's internal development structure. Inequality is a potential for the generation of underdevelopment among its population that could fundamentally serve as a social, societal threat to stability within a state (Easterly, 2007; Langer et al., 2014; Also see Atkinson, 2015).

In the implementation of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, it has become essential to address the inequality inherent within a societal structure, since inequality's existence affects the peacebuilding model (Richmond, 2015). As a result, and as firmly established within the global development discourse, development assistance has become an embodiment of the United Nations system. Its importance was noted clearly during the United Nations World Summit in 2005, where it was observed that "peace and security and development and human rights, in particular, are

interconnected elements and therefore, reciprocally reinforcing" (Gisselquist, 2018; United Nations, 2018; Wennmann,2009:83).

Its Importance has been made perceptible through the outcome of the United Nations World Summit in 2005, where it became exposed that "peace and security and development and human rights, in particular, are cogitated as interconnected elements and therefore reciprocally reinforcing" (Gisselquist, 2018; United Nations, 2018; Wennmann, 2009:83).

Recognizing the role development assistance could play in liberal post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, the United Nations established a Peacebuilding Commission in 2005. Through the Peacebuilding Funding with the recommendation of United Nations Peacebuilding Commission countries in transition from war to stability could be financially assisted to prevent a post-conflict degeneration (Jenkins,2013:50; Iro,2009:24). This assistance has also been a part of the efforts of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and has come through bilateral and regional means (Boyce & Pastor, 1998; Boyce,2004; Stevenson, 2008).

Thus, development assistance can be considered one of the most critical post-Cold War development approaches in both post-conflict and underdeveloped countries characterized by harsh socio-economic difficulties. Development assistance offered

during the post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone was considered integral to restoring the country. It was conceived as a vital pillar to enhance the successful realization of the liberal peacebuilding process.

However, as aforementioned the country's practices of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism reinforced a negative strategic interactive pattern within the political space. It was within this practice that overwhelmingly resulted in the mismanagement of the development assistance that was intended to go toward the country's national and economic development. Thus, inequality within the country's societal structure deepened.

The Sociologist Erving Goffman conceptualizes strategic interaction as:

"... *a situation of two or more parties find themselves in a well-structured condition of mutual impingement where each party must take a move and where every possible move carries fateful implications for all the parties. In this situation, each player must influence his own decision by knowing that the other players are likely to try to dope out his decision in advance, and may even appreciate that he knows this is likely. Courses of action or moves will then be made in light of one's thoughts about the*

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other's thoughts about oneself. An exchange of moves
made on the basis of this kind of orientation to self
and others can be called strategic interaction...
Strategic interaction also involves decision making-
decision made by directly orienting oneself to the
other parties and giving weight to their situation as
they would seem to see it, including their giving
weight to one's own. The special possibilities that
result from this mutually assessed mutual assessment,
as these affect the fate of the parties, provide
reason and grounds for employing the special
perspectives of strategic interaction" (Goffman,
1969: 100-101

In the post-conflict political system, the SLPP and APC engagements through strategic interactions as political parties were institutionalized. Institutions, as noted by Karol Soltan (2008:60), are an outcome of politics. As an outcome of such complex interactions, they can be destabilizing, in the sense that they tend to scuttle "social order." As institutions of the state, political parties are an outgrowth of human interactions, a fact reflected by the policies they adopt. Institutional policies and political party campaign promises are the embodiments and outcomes of the individual interactions occurring within the party. They are what metamorphoses into state government policies at the national level. At this level

of state policies, development assistance is concentrated, and the country primarily operates within it, often under the assumption that this structure allows for the accelerations of societal transformation. Aid provided to states may be used within the current political agenda or policies of the political regime.

In many countries, the incumbent government demands that the development aid donors align their aid projects or assistance with current governmental policies (OECD,2020:27). This has become the accepted modus operandi in Sierra Leone. In particular, such an approach has been established with aid assistance architecture with the advent of the "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness" (OECD,2005). Post-war Sierra Leone, patterned by its political party alignments, policies are largely influenced by the practices of *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism*.

In addition, as a post-conflict polarized environment, an increased penchant for particularities has become deeply rooted within the political space. Political party policies adopted through strategic interactions within the political structure informed the governance style within the society. They act as a conduit through which actors within the political space gain access to state economic opportunities over other ethnic and regional adherents. This illustrates how the country's neopatrimonial political system manifests in strategic

interactive engagements and is reflected in the policy formulation process.

Particularly in the context of the post-war period, between 2002 and 2018, political parties adopted policies that were used as government tools to attract development assistance intended to generate social, economic, and national development. However, this post-conflict development aid approach degenerated into overt mismanagement of the assistance resulting from the country's post- war patterned political practices. This phenomenon has remained prevalent. It gave rise to an atmosphere of inequality and poverty.

In the next sections, this chapter will discuss the following concepts. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the historical context of development assistance. It then evaluates the current contextual debates over the efficacy of development assistance. This is followed by a short synopsis that places the situation in Sierra Leone within the current debates. This chapter also examines the development assistance provided to Sierra Leone in the post-conflict era, as well as the country's practices of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism. This is specifically concerning its relationship with post-conflict political governance policy frameworks.

In addition, in light of these salient practices of *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism*, the chapter looks at how certain patterns of strategic interactions in the post-conflict politics played out. In addition, with a focus on the challenges of aid management in the country. With a detailed historical understanding of development assistance in the remaining sections, it also looks at the political economy in Sierra Leone before becoming dependent on aid, the history of development aid in Sierra Leone, and the 1980-1987 structural adjustment programs. This chapter ends with a conclusion.

5.1. Overview of Development Assistance in Historical Context

From the historical perspective, development assistance became extremely notable following the end of World War II. This was when Western Europe had to deal with widespread devastation, and the "Marshall Plan" emerged to accelerate reconstruction in the form of massive economic assistance (see Geselbracht,2015).

While development assistance programs, in many respects, were perceived as having undisguised ideological undertones from their onset, they did also make significant contributions. In the less developed countries, their contributions responded to a severe underdevelopment crisis that many considered a threat to global stability and peace. These realities led to the need for more development assistance-oriented toward structural

transformation in the economic and political spheres of those less developed states where "modernization" became a catchphrase (Picard & Karasia, 2015). On the African continent, though, such patterns and advocacy efforts did not yield results in earnest until after the end of the Cold War in 1989.

The history of development assistance in Africa can be traced back to many centuries. However, at the bilateral level, the process tracing of this phenomenon has come to center on the Cold War Era. This was when the East and West Blocs intervened by propping up different political regimes during periods of political and ideological conflict (Ball & Johnson, 1996; Boschini & Olofsgård, 2007; Schraeder et al., 1998).

Of equal importance within this era, an economic theme emerged that was considered a strong underpinning factor in attracting the earliest foreign aid operations in Africa. This idea is noted by the work of Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor (1998). The authors argued that the intensification of foreign aid, for example, from Japan to Africa, especially in the 1980s, was driven mainly by economic interests. They maintained that such interest was predicated on the need for "raw materials like copper, uranium, and chromium from Zambia, Niger and Madagascar, and market" (Schraeder, 1988:311-312). At the same time, foreign assistance from France, as noted by the authors, was directed toward its former colonized states to consolidate "French cultural nationalism" (Schraeder,

1988:17). From the perspective of the rational choice argument, it is apparent that these authors, among others, believe the underlying motivation of these development assistance programs. This is especially regarding their historical context and evolution, to the formation of interdependent relationships.

At the multinational level, the development assistance efforts that began in Africa in the 1980s were primarily linked to structural adjustment programs instituted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Heidhues & Obara,2011). However, the structural conditionalities accompanying these programs became the main cause of the devolution of development assistance in Africa.

In post-conflict countries, particularly those emerging from intra-state wars that are characterized by complex emergencies in the era of post-Cold War in Africa, their reconstructions are integrated within the development assistance model. This notion was advanced by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2007: 731-736), who noted that such intervention efforts have led to poverty reduction and the acceleration of growth in certain countries. In addition, these scholars further stated that the sustainability of a country at war's end depends mostly on effective policy development and development assistance. These together, the scholars asserted, can diminish the danger of relapsing into war in these post-conflict countries (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; see also Collier et al., 2003).

While such a model tends to yield results, existing works have yet focused too much on the standard uses of policy and development aid. However, there has remained too little focused on the effective implementation of those mechanisms. Many post-conflict countries, including Sierra Leone, have received aid and instituted various policies following the end of their wars. However, aid implementation in the country has been considered ineffective on account of its impacts, and has resulted in what Stephen Kandeh Called "Elite Accumulation" (2008:328). These results could be considered a demonstration of poor institutional reform, where the operational ability of the domestic state is not harnessed sufficiently. This is mainly to enact the long-term successful realization of the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding process.

5.1.1. Contextual Debates on the Efficacy of Development Assistance

Official Development Assistance (ODA), also known as aid or foreign assistance, is characterized by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2016: 194) as:

> "*Government aid to developing countries aimed to promote economic development and welfare of recipient countries.... It further stated that aid may be provided bilaterally from donor to recipient or*

channeled through multilateral development agencies
such as the World Bank or United Nations. In addition,
it also asserted that aid comprises grants, soft
loans, and provision of technical assistance" (see
also Lancaster, 1999)

On account of this characterization, ODA is conceived to be engrossed in a binary fusion along two continua in an asymmetric power relation, binding together on negotiated institutional power conditionalities. In development assistance discourse, the strategic power relations between donors and recipient countries are visible through conditionalities. In this context, as described by Phillip Dann (2013:360), conditionalities are "any regulations that a donor attaches unilaterally to an official development assistance payment or any sanction that it attaches to non-fulfillment."

Therefore, development assistance and conditionalities are compatible and inseparable components of international intervention efforts that are intended to help advance the growth of the Global South. In response, scholarly debates have emerged regarding what epistemological relationship illustrates the reality of development assistance and its conditionalities.

Gordon Crawford (1997) opined that the donors determining these conditionalities have been blatantly "inconsistent" and "ineffective" in their attempts to reform the donor-dependent

states. Gordon Crawford surveyed a few countries on how their aid conditionalities were dispensed on the issues of consistency.

Crawford noted that even though human rights issues and governance challenges were alarmingly common in such societies, the application of conditionalities was inconsistent because of the economic interest. For example, as Gordon Crawford indicated, Nigeria, Turkey, and China suffered aid sanctions related to conditionalities. At the same time, countries such as Indonesia, Algeria, Colombia, and Egypt saw inconsistent conditionalities applied to their states despite their reputations for human rights and governance-related issues. On the issue of effectiveness, Gordon Crawford further specified that many conditionalities that are applied in certain countries are weak in nature. Finally, Gordon Crawford pointed out that such a pattern comprises the legitimacy in development assistance conditionalities.

Furthermore, Tobias Hagmann and Filip Reyntjens (2016) argued that development assistance that is meant to promote reforms and development have instead produced strong, sustained authoritarian regimes in countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The authors emphasized that such development assistance has aided the consolidation of authoritarian regimes instead of fostering democracy, and cited the cases of Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in particular.

Hagmann and Reyntjens specified that these four countries were the biggest recipients of development aid in 2013. However, all were under a single-party political system, where political pluralism and dissension, which are considered fundamental pillars of democratic consolidation, were utterly prohibited. In addition, the authors noted that development assistance from the 1990s to 2013 was more often given to sub-Saharan African states with minimal support of political rights compared to those with improved fundamental rights records. Thus, the authors emphasized that development assistance has systematically consolidated authoritarian regimes instead of democracy. They also argued that certain sub-Saharan African countries who had received aid showed "development but without democracy" (Hagmann & Reyntjens,2016:1).

Stephen Knack (2004) proposed a correlation between aid and democratization. The author argued that development assistance has no fundamental mechanism that leads to democratization in a recipient state. Instead, the author continued, aid merely builds upon the pre-existing efforts toward democracy already in existence in those recipient states. Thus, external aid contributes to the promotion of democracy relatively and is not necessarily the source of its emergence.

Using a Large-N cross-country approach, he advanced this argument with a multivariate test examining the political and civil liberties demonstrated in a Freedom House data set

covering 1975 to 2000. Stephen Knack specified that from 1975 to 1989, development assistance efforts did not establish democracy as well as they did in the period from 1990 to 1999. Therefore, he noted, the places where development assistance appeared to be successful relied on prior democratic advances, not necessarily development aid, to realize that success.

Deborah A. Brautigam and Stephen Knack (2004) also underscores the fundamental impact that development assistance can have on general governance patterns in sub-Saharan African states. They characterized aid dependency as a "condition in which the state is far more powerless to undertake and administer major responsibilities of governance within their states devoid of external financial assistance" (Brautigam & Knack,2004:257). According to the authors, this phenomenon is what the states in Africa have experienced. They have been given aid, yet poor governance and institutional dilemmas remain, which, according to the authors, implies that the aid further damaged the recipient state's governance structure.

The scholars added that aid engenders "institutional feebleness and tenacious inducements" within a state (Brautigam & Knack, 2004:277). As further explanation, they stated that development assistance generates a space in the recipient state where the limited number of qualified staff members in the government structures are poached. As a result, the aid produces an accountability dilemma and makes the dependent government

reluctant to focus on sustainable internal income generation. For example, through taxation of its inhabitants, which reduces the incentive of the citizens to hold their respective governments accountable. Thus, there is a breakdown of critical democratic norms.

The ongoing aid debates have also concerned the impact of sustained development assistance on local industries within the broader context of development in the recipient states. The work of Ehizuelen Michael Mitchell Omoruyi, Sheng Zhibin, Gao Jun, Sidi Yaya Sidi, and Ye Pianran (2016) reflects this debate well. These authors pointed out that food aid, which is often provided as development assistance, undermines the local food production industries in recipient countries. They opined that it tends to reduce the country's local food production value and, thus, enhances the chances of an employability dilemma. In this case, aid might be one of the drivers of conflict in certain contexts, in direct contrast to the conventional paradigm propounded by conflict analyst scholars.

In making their point, the authors specifically cited the case of Zambia, where the textile industry, which used to be the leading producer of cotton clothes and created employment for large sections of the population, has become almost defunct. It is now rare to see cotton clothes being produced by the local cotton industry, they asserted. The authors affirmed this

situation was the result of the extreme concentration of clothing development assistance.

In her examination of the general development assistance network in Africa, Dambisa Moyo (2009) argued that aid efforts in the region had been an "unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster" (Moyo,2009:1). She asserted that in the last sixty years, Africa had accrued about US$1 trillion in aid assistance. However, as she pointed out, the real per capita income across the recipient countries is much lower than in the 1970s. Considering that nearly 50% of the population barely survives on less than US$1 per day, Africa has remained extremely poor (Moyo,2009:2). Its annual repayment of this debt has cost about US$ 20 billion.

Ngaire Woods (2005) argued that these phenomena had stunted the operationalization of development assistance programs globally along with three themes. Firstly, he noted that development assistance actors, as a result of the recent global security changes, have taken advantage of aid ambivalence in the pursuit of their security interests. This, Woods stated, has led development actors abandoning the fight against collective action problems, like global poverty reduction. Secondly, the author noted that the emerging war on terror appears to be extremely capital-intensive, implying that the expenditures that directly go to development assistance projects shrink. Finally, donors are no longer synchronizing their resources through

multilateral organs and instead have resolved to seek new approaches through which they can pursue their interests, Woods opined.

In contrast to the aforementioned critical school, Arthur A Goldsmith (2001) noted that development assistance had played a more significant role. According to Goldsmith, these significant roles are visible in the development, democratization, and economic liberation of the recipient states (Goldsmith,2001:123- 124). Goldsmith affirmed that any attempt to either withhold or reduce development assistance in these societies might have a deleterious effect. This he noted could degenerate the country into a completely failed state that could become a great threat to the neighboring countries and the world.

Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (2000) argued that it is true that development assistance has been patterned along with some colonial ties. However, they argued aid had been concentrated disproportionately more in countries that have begun a democratization process. At the same time, the authors pointed out that aid donors have been demotivated when providing substantial development assistance to the countries that have misused the funds or produced insignificant progress in their democratization. Equally important to their argument is that the amount of aid given to the recipient countries has depended on how liberalized these countries' trades and economic space have

become. This incentivizes the promotion of democracy and the inflow of aid in such settings.

In addition, Sam Jones and Finn Tarp (2015) extensively examined the behavioral patterns of aid inflows from 1983 to 2010 using a Large-N data set. These authors established a strong association between development assistance and institutional improvement over twenty-five years. They particularly emphasized that, in recipient states where "government aid" has been directed toward institutional reform, such interactions have produced a strong and positive relational effect.

5.1.2. Beyond the Debates, Placing the Context of Sierra Leone in Perspective

As outlined in the above debates, a wide range of perspectives with different conceptual understandings of development assistance are available. This is mainly related to the roles it can play in the revitalization of a state. However, as Narayani Sritharan (2018:1) opined, aid effectiveness is also connected to the patterns of the "government and the institutional" arrangement, which are especially relevant in post-conflict peacebuilding states. Thus, the domestic political parties' undermining policies are particularly relevant to consider, as these policies will eventually inform the government and governance of the state.

At the political party level, policy development or adoption is the outcome of the political actors' behavioral patterns. The behavioral patterns of political actors within a mainstream political environment are guided by strategic actions and the nature of the state's political system and orientation.

Thus, the governance style, institutional structure, and policies of a state largely determine the impact development aid can have on that post-conflict states' advancement (Sritharan,2018). In the post-conflict Sierra Leone, these foundational principles became disintegrated by the practices of the political patterns. This constituted an obstacle to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country. In a multi-ethnic developing society, in particular, electoral competitions between the political parties are not undertaken on national plans. Instead, they are often decided by ethnic consensus along with identity.

5.2. Sierra Leone Post-Conflict Development Assistance in Context

After the devastating civil war, the devastating civil war, foreign aid was conceptualized within the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding framework as paramount to the restoration of Sierra Leone's development (see Grant, 2005; Kanyako,2016, Kandeh,2008). This situation was primarily due to the complex

emergency from which the country was transitioning (IMF,2005). Generally, the sub-Saharan African economy had a history of negative fiscal performances, and, within its developing countries, it was further characterized by large- scale poverty (Broadberry & Gardner, 2019). This almost made the possibility of economic development seem far-fetched.

Chenery and Strout (1966) noted that, within a chain of economic performance, it is through savings that investments in society become materialized. The authors added that this pattern is absent in developing countries. Therefore, development assistance could be viewed as integral to such societies, as it revamps their economic status (Chenery & Strout, 1966) in response to social problems.

Under the tutelage of the United Nations, International Financial Institutions, and through bilateral relationship, development assistance was engaged in Sierra Leone. The engagement was in hopes that the country could overcome its complex development challenges. In particular, these measures were designed to support poverty mitigation and socio-economic development.

International actors, specifically the United Nations, made a global effort in 2005 under an institutional framework titled the "Peacebuilding Commission" to mobilize and superintend

development assistance for post-conflict transitioning countries (United Nations, 2005:2). Explicitly, the role of Peacebuilding commission in the post-conflict situation as spelled out in the resolution adopted by the Security Council includes the following:

> "-*To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.*"

> "-*To focus attention on the reconstruction and institutional building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development.*"

> "-*To provide recommendation and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery*" (United Nations:2005:2).

In 2006, Sierra Leone became one of the countries with Burundi in Africa in which this framework was introduced (Iro,2009). The post-conflict peacebuilding agenda was meant to

support social changes. The development assistance offered was multidimensional, ranging from direct support to the government's running to budget funding. It also includes other financial support within the government that could help the country undertake macro-development programs.

For example, as part of the external budgetary aid given between 2002 and 2014, the government received a sum of "US$886 million, wherein each year it approximately received US$68 million in average," respectively (2016:16). As indicated in the summary tracking data from a few key development actors who gave direct development assistance to Sierra Leone for budget support in line with the country's post-conflict development, it stated that within these periods, "the United Kingdom paid out approximately US$ 248 million, the EU US$248 million, the World Bank US$ 161 million, the African Development Bank US$ 141 million, in addition to US$ 52 million provided by IMF for stabilization and the Global Fund to address remunerations in the Health Ministry" (DFID Budget Support Evaluation Report, 2016).

Moreover, beyond budget support, the development assistance consigned to Sierra Leone included support to roads, the water sector, poverty reduction, employment, governance, both public and private institutional support, and the financial sector. After its civil war, Sierra Leone lacked functional and results-oriented institutions and domestic income generation platforms,

but also, and incredibly, access to basic social amenities. These dilemmas informed the reasons as to why aid was considered remarkably crucial in the peacebuilding processes and the inducement of fundamental social change. This framework was meant to uplift the country from all existing threats to state security, including underdevelopment, inequality, and poverty, to a relatively modern state structure.

The data collected from the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MoPED) under the Official Development Assistance Department, obtained specifically for this study during field research in Sierra Leone in March 2019, is delineated below. The following sections give a detailed summary of the organizations committed to development assistance during the country's peacebuilding process.

5.2.1. World Bank Development Aid

The World Bank was and has been one of the main multilateral institutions through which development assistance for Sierra Leone has been generated. The institution conducted varied support interventions. The brief samples of the data collected include institutional support between 2009 and 2017 in four thematic areas. It indicated that substantial resources were consigned as development assistance by the World Bank for the country's post-conflict development. For example, in regards to

institutional reform and capacity building, the World Bank committed US$17,479,623 in aid from 2009 to 2012. Regarding youth employment support, the institution committed a sum of US$20,832,032 from 2010 to 2015. Similarly, for access to the energy sector alone, it committed US$ 12,292,949 from 2015 to 2017. Regarding agribusiness development, the institution devoted US$ 8,676,891 from 2016 to 2017.

5.2.2 United Nations Development Programme

The United Nations development programme supported the government during the post-conflict peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone in multifaceted areas. A few of these areas were as follows: in regards to public sector reform and capacity building, it dedicated US$3,909,780 from 2009 to 2014, while the sum of US$5,063,329 was committed to supporting access to justice from 2009 to 2016.

The United Nations Development Programme also provided development assistance for youth employment and empowerment for seven years from 2011 to 2017, totaling US$7,098,333. In addition, within the six-year period from 2012 to 2017, US$3,080,275 was provided for local government and economic empowerment. In 2015, it supported the national constitutional review process with an amount totaling US$252,114 and security sector reform with US$1,622,885.

5.2.3. Department for International Development (DFID)

DFID is the United Kingdom's overseas development assistance institution. In Sierra Leone, it has been the leading bilateral development assistance organ for the post-conflict peacebuilding process since 1999. Among a range of thematic support areas, DFID provided aid for poverty reduction in Sierra Leone in 2009 that totaled US$19,221,642. Then, in 2010, US$15,810,277 was committed. For civil service reform programs in the same year, US$852,288 and US$245,193 were committed. For public sector reform programs, DFID provided US$142,205 in 2009 and US$594,717 in 2010. For rural electrification projects, the data collected stated that DFID gave US$19,135,910 as aid from 2016 to 2017.

5.2.4. Food and Agricultural Organization and International Fund for Agricultural Development (FAO & IFAD)

For Agriculture, in the five-year period from 2011 to 2016, an approximately committed sum of US$ 13,853,233 was provided as development assistance from the Food and Agricultural Organization. At the same time, the International Fund for Agricultural Development from 2009 to 2017 committed to the rehabilitation and community-based poverty reduction project as an aid in the approximate amount of US$ 41,355,391.

5.2.5. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (Implement projects through UN agencies like the UNDP)

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund has provided a wide range of aid to key thematic areas. One such area was the energy sector, which provided US$5,040,813 in 2009. Japan offered aid to the same sector in 2010 in the amount of US$469,134. In addition, to support decentralization, the European Union committed US$8,557,659.

5.2.6. International Monetary Fund (IMF)

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also contributed to post-conflict development support through financing. For example, in 2001, a sum of US$164 million was approved for a three-year development assistance project spanning 2001 to 2004 that aided the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Facility. By 2002, a total of US$59 million was committed (IMF Press Release, 2002, para. 2). In addition, in 2013, the IMF Extended Credit Facility for Sierra Leone approved a disbursement of US$95.9 million over three years, for which US$13.7 million was given during the start-up phase (IMF Press Release, 2013, para. 1).

Furthermore, beyond these examples of aid donation to Sierra Leone, other extensive bilateral aid supports were provided by the United States of America, China, Germany. In addition, development assistance to Sierra Leone was also provided by other institutions, such as the African Development

Bank and the Islamic Development Bank (see AfDB,2015; IsDB,2017). These entities were key development assistance actors to Sierra Leone during the post- conflict peacebuilding processes to collectively enhance fundamental socio-economic transformation and political, social change within the country.

However, as previously mentioned, the political patterns within key governmental policies were informed by practices of neopatrimonialism firmly associated with ethnicity and regionalism. The outcome of the development aid efforts was further underdevelopment that produced deep inequality and poverty within the societal structure, as its utilization became the hotbed for ethnoregional-neopatrimonial political practices.

5.3. Instrumentalization of Post-Conflict Political Party Governance and Policy Frameworks

After the war ended in 2002, it was apparent that the sustainability of each political party in the emerging post-war governance system was dependent on the policy framework operated by each respective political party.

Informed mainly by a neopatrimonial political governance system associated with ethnicity and regionalism, the emerging political direction was viewed as somewhat different from the previous political practices. However, the emerging political

context supported the resurgence of intense neopatrimonial politics within the political system. This practice became firmly aligned with ethnicity and regionalism. The political parties and their socially created support structures (ethnicity and regionalism) became codified and saliently situated in the political realm.

These practices of neopatrimonialism with ethnoregionalism resulted in widespread strategic interactions as a strategy through which the political parties could remain within the mainstream political system, particularly with the arrival of international actors.

The two political parties that governed the state during the post-conflict peacebuilding from 2002-2018, the SLPP and APC, were the primary agents of this phenomenon. Such strategic interactions characterized policy implementations adopted at the political party level.

These party policies became the foundational agenda upon which grander pursuits of socio-economic and political post-conflict development and social change were funded. The two subsections below present a desk review of two of the political parties, especially the patterns of their superficial policy codifications to suit the emerging political climate at the time.

5.3.1. Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), 2002-2007

The first post-conflict political party to govern Sierra Leone was the SLPP. In the post-war elections of 2002, the SLPP party was given a second mandate of five years to govern. Its political party's manifestos or policies automatically became the first post-conflict national working document for peacebuilding and development.

The party's policies and manifestos professed a wide range of goals that served as the working foundation for the country's governance between 2002 and 2007. The SLPP party policies were laid out as measures for the post-conflict peace and development, which included:

> ...‟The adoption of *democracy and good governance considered the bedrock for the attainment of economic and political development; agricultural investment to ensure food security; economic control and fiscal management to improve on the quality of lives; poverty reduction; youth empowerment through training and employments; reformation within the judiciary to render it credible, effective and efficient; to pursue zero corruption and finally, economic, institutional decentralization"* (*Presidential Inaugural Speech, 2002) etc.*

These party policies became the government's directives, and international actors supported the government, particularly in discussing the quest for stability and recuperation of the country. Therefore, Sierra Leone attracted a massive concentration of aid supports.

These policies fell under the canopy of what the regime called the "New Coalition for National Development." However, they were examples of instrumentalized political buzzwords whose substantive goals were largely unattainable. This was because the political parties were bifurcated along differentiated policy orientations underpinned by flagrant practices of ethnoregional-neopatrimonial politics. These practices undermined any attempts to form a cohesive national development framework that could pursue these goals in the initial post-conflict context.

In addition, though the internal political party policy that became a governmental tool was not informed by inclusivity, the SLPP embarked on a poverty reduction approach under the paradigm of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The PRSP document outlined the approaches needed to transition the country from a war state to a post-war development state. On the foundation of this document, development assistance was committed in huge amounts.

These adopted PRSP sectoral policies were reflected in three thematically focused areas: "promoting good governance, security and peace; promotion of pro-poor sustainable growth for food security and job creation, and promoting human development" (Shinoda, 2012). As outlined above, these policies, though fundamental for the transformation and development of Sierra Leone as a post-conflict country state, merely ended up being political manipulation tools. At the same time, the country's issues with poverty, underdevelopment, and youth employment, considered critical macroeconomic pillars for transformation, have remained largely unaddressed. The majority of the citizens, particularly during the periods in which Sierra Leone received tremendous financial assistance in the form of development assistance, have remained displaced from sustainable state economic support.

For example, at the end of SLPP's five-year regime in 2007, food security efforts were a massive failure. In addition, state institutions intended to champion economic and national development, which could have addressed inequality-related issues became politicized. Sierra Leone has remained to be a country where issues of "basic social amenities, inequality, employment, inadequate empowerment have remained widespread," and is one of the poorest countries in the world (see UNDP-Sierra Leone, 2007: xi-xiv).

5.3.2. All People's Congress (APC), 2007-2018

The 2007 general election was particularly crucial in light of the extreme political fragility and weak state institutions that characterized the country. The All People's Congress political party emerged victorious defeating the SLPP.

The political manifestos of the APC eventually became the policy framework upon which the state was governed from 2007 to 2012. The policies were termed "An Agenda for Change," which was supposed RSRP II. Excerpts of three of the APC policies focused on economy, agriculture, and decentralization. As noted by Sierra Herald :

"On the economy, the party indicated that it should practice judicious economic management, design large-scale economic opportunities, eliminate barriers to trade, embolden strong microeconomic policies, and ensure that the average living standard of the population is improved. With agriculture, the party indicated that it should rejuvenate the agricultural sector to become an anchor for financial growth and decreased poverty. In addition, it shall transform Sierra Leone into food self-security and ensure the sector becomes the fulcrum for job creation. With decentralization, the party indicated that it should embark on the devolution of political, legislative,

administrative as a means to moderate widespread rural
poverty" (Sierra Herald,2007).

However, in the first term of the APC regime, these policies did not lead to substantive social changes across the vast majority of communities. Similarly, in 2012, was elected for another second term of five years, on a campaign manifesto of "Agenda for Prosperity," which was supposed as PRSP III. Even though the "Agenda for Change" did not produce the transformation the country needed, the "Agenda for Prosperity," on which the party was re- elected, immediately metamorphosed into a working policy framework for the government. The ten years of administration under the two political manifestos did not reflect immensely in enhancing the development and transforming the socio-economic lives of the people (see IMF, 2019).

The "Agenda for Prosperity" of the APC outlined many major themes: A few highlights can be seen in the following excerpts of the presidential inaugural speech:

"On the economy, the party stressed the need to
broaden the economic sector at both the micro- and
macro-levels to stabilize the economy. In addition,
it would reduce expenditures over revenue, and
transform the sector to serve as a source for job
creation. On energy and power, the party professed

that all cities and major communities would have access to functional electricity to enhance the promotion of their local economies. On jobs for youths, the party promised to dedicate their entire five-year term to improving the status of youths and enhancing their employment opportunities. In the agricultural sector, the party manifesto emphatically declared the importance of reducing the subsistence farming system and replacing it with mechanized agriculture. This was to increase the national food production and ensure food security (Presidential Inaugural Speech, 2012).

These promoted political party policies, which were considered the foundation through which post-conflict peacebuilding and national development could be attained, were primarily overridden by the political party's widespread practices of elite capture. According to Melissa T Labonte (2012:94), "elites capture occurs when elites control, shape or manipulate decision making processes, institutions or structures in ways that serve their self-interest and priorities." In addition, Melissa noted that such a pattern "results in personal gain at the expense of non-elite and community interests and priorities." This pattern has remained inherent in the post-conflict political governance system in Sierra Leone since 2002 (Larizza et al.,2014).

In essence, these policies merely served as conduits for the political class to access power and opportunity, instead of building a national development agenda that could help with the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding.

5.4. Neopatrimonial Patterns of Strategic Interactions in the Post-Conflict Politics of Sierra Leone & the Challenge for Aid Management

During the post-conflict period, the political transformation was absolutely imperative and inherently the goal of the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding process. It was in the hope that the political space would be opened to more of the population.

However, with the governance system that became inherent in neopatrimonial practice and associated with ethnicity and regionalism, overt strategic interactions emerged within the political space.

It was within this pattern that the evidence of a deeply-rooted threat to general societal development and social change occurred in all of its complexity in Sierra Leone. One phenomenon informed by this pattern of political interactions that became glaringly obvious was the adoption of governance policies to superficially appeal to international actors, from whom resources could be obtained. This cyclical pattern was taken for

granted and normalized by the political parties in their policy formulations.

This practice, which reflected the strategic interactions at the heart of the political party activities, resulted in policy frameworks that merely served to meet international donor's entrance requirements. For example, in one of the 2002 speeches by the SLPP, the leadership stated the following:

> "We must not allow the electorates to be hoodwinked by those who erroneously believe that they can walk and talk their way to parliament or state house through a patchwork of recycled ideas.... The principle of democracy recognizes the rights of anyone or any group of persons who meet the appropriate constitutional requirements to contest elections for public office. However, we should let the electorates be forewarned that there are many out there who see the electoral process as an open and free-for-all picnic.... National elections are a serious business based on public trust and public responsibility. They should not be taken for granted, especially by those who are sincerely committed to be servants of the people..." (Speech by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 2002).

The policies adopted by these political parties became the mainstream governance framework through which post-conflict liberal peacebuilding efforts were concentrated.

Another fundamental factor in which the lack of a national development framework in these party policies can be recognized is the non-successive political party policies used from one regime to another. As soon as one political party's term of office ends, established policies of that regime automatically come to a halt. This is followed by the new regime beginning with a completely new policy agenda relatively unconnected to the previous regime's policy. This cycle is the direct result of the absence of a synergized national development framework adopted by the state for a cohesive national strategy to transition the country from war to peace.

In addition, such a trend implies that within each regime, development efforts have to be started new instead of followed based on the work of the previous regime's development agenda.

From 2002 to 2018, Sierra Leone experienced a huge influx of development assistance, both through bilateral and multilateral means for liberal post-conflict peacebuilding (see DFID, 2012; Kanyoko,2016, Kandeh, 2008). At the time, the survival of Sierra Leone as a nation-state was at stake, as its domestic sovereignty was battered through intervention from the international community.

The transformation through liberal peacebuilding was expected to have addressed the country's large-scale underdevelopment issues, which had produced inequality and poverty within the state.

In Sierra Leone, the persistent economic inaccessibility across all sectors has rendered the environment gullible and susceptible to preventable misdemeanors committed by the state institutions. Corruption, for example, has become both the means and end to worsening service delivery processes within the civil service structure, and institutional corruption remained widespread and observable in the country's practices of patronage (Mahony,2006; UNDP,2010). According to Francis Wiafe-Amoako (2015:145), an opinion survey in 2000 indicated that about 94% of Sierra Leoneans believed corruption to be extensive in the state institutions.

Corruption is the most common means through which consigned resources for development assistance are mismanaged in many African countries, as noted in several publications (Hope, 2000; 17-35; Hope & Chikulo, 2000:1-15; World Bank, 2010). Samuel Mondays Atuobi (2007:10-11) work on Corruption in West Africa, pointed out Sierra Leone was among one of the most corrupt states, as shown by its high values for corruption especially in West African country rankings. With the exception of Ivory Coast and Guinea, the author noted that the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for Sierra Leone was ranked at 6, much

higher compared to Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Benin, Togo, Gambia, Niger. According to Atuobi, Sierra Leone is identified among those countries in the region considered as the most corrupt during the 2006 CPI.

5.5. Sierra Leone Political Economy Prior to Aid Dependency in Historical Context

Before becoming overly dependent on external development assistance, Sierra Leone's political economy was mainly made up of two micro-economic sectors: namely, mining and agriculture. Together, they constituted the economic bastion of the state, primarily through their contributions to the gross domestic product (Bangura, 2014; Swindell, 1975).

As far back as the 1920s, an economic policy emerged that was mainly predicated on transforming the general economic landscape of Sierra Leone beyond merely agricultural production. The approach that emerged from such policy thinking was economic diversification, which was an attempt to go beyond agricultural production and exportation, the primary revenue sources at the time, and focus on mining at a large commercial scale. Through this development, it was hoped that the economic base of the country would be strengthened.

This calculated economic approach culminated in a nationwide geological survey, where strategic and potential

mineral resources and their specific locations and deposits were identified countrywide (Junner, 2011: 82-85; Kaniki, 1973). The conducted survey indicated that Sierra Leone sat on substantial deposits of mineral resource reserves, in commercial quantities. It included diamonds, iron ore, chromite, rutile, gold, and platinum Mining, which began almost immediately and continued from the 1920s onwards. These mineral resources became the largest source of foreign earnings in the state (see Kargbo,2012).

For example, iron ore mining operations began around 1933. By 1938, just five years into operations, the production level amounted to exports of "861955 tons of mineral and with direct foreign earnings of £646,421" (Kaniki, 1973: 79). Similarly, in 1952, the exports exceeded "2,228,685 pounds" (Jarrett, 1956: 159-160). Economic fortune was also realized in the gold mining sector.

Gold mining was said to be one of the leading sectors before experiencing a sudden collapse that it was unable to recover. In "1937, gold exportation value was noted to have amounted to 40,828- ounce and with its concomitant foreign earnings to the tune of 269,465 pounds, though in 1952 it dropped down to about 24,352 pounds" (Jarrett, 1956:159-160; Kaniki, 1973). In 1935, the gold mining sector alone contributed £19,681 to the national gross domestic product of the state, which was more than what

was realized from the iron ore and diamond sectors (Kaniki, 1973; see also Junner, 2011: 82-83).

These periods of economic contribution were also correct for the diamond mining sector, which was initially the most lucrative enterprise and almost disintegrated the agricultural sector's labor force. This was because of its widespread nature, easy accessibility, and instant wealth creation. Diamond mining was carried out on a large scale and fell under the oversight of the Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST) and the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), which later became the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) in 1971. At the same time, alluvial diamond mining was being conducted, though on a very nominal scale and in conjunction with excessive smuggling and a lack of regulation.

On the whole, in the 1930s, diamond mining went from humble beginnings in 1932 to exports. By 1937, data indicates that its exportation amounted to 913,401 carats with a return of foreign earnings worth "1,070,384 pounds, while in 1952, with a slight increase of 1.217,059 pounds" (Jarrett, 1956: 159-160; Kaniki, 1973: 81. see also Greenhalgh, 1985;152-155). During this mining period, diamonds were noted to have been responsible for "70-80%" (Harris, 2014:73; Reno, 1996:12) of export earnings to the national gross domestic product. In 1960 alone, diamonds contributed £1,139 million to the national economy (Wilson, 2013:1000). As a result of the mining sector's success during

the colonial era and decolonization, Sierra Leone's economic needs were met by its domestic economy, through which the socio-economic development of the state was administered.

Another viable source of Sierra Leone's political economy was the agricultural sector. The agricultural sector, especially during the pre-independence era until the mineral sector's sporadic progress, was a viable economic bastion for the country. As early as 1935, a clear policy roadmap for agricultural production was designed. It was primarily underpinned by a focus on self-sufficiency and increased exportation to bolster the foreign reserves of the national economy. In addition, specific premiums were applied to rice production, ginger, piassava, palm kernel, palm oil, and other large-scale, non- food cash crop products grown for home consumption and export, including coffee, cocoa, and kola nuts (Sekgoma, 1988).

Of particular note, large cash crop products, like palm oil, coffee, cocoa, piassava, palm kernel, and rice, became exportable items. Until the advent of mining on a vast scale, the exportation of these agricultural products was fundamental to the national economic growth. In 1949, the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board was established (Spencer,1977). Its responsibilities included facilitating purchases of agricultural products domestically on a large scale to ensure

their exportation in return for substantial foreign earnings, which impacted the growth of the GDP (see Spencer, 1977:71).

As noted, within the post-independence period, the agricultural sector's contributions to the national "gross domestic product in 1964 stood at US$79.3 million, while in 1970 amounted to US$94.1 million" (Johnson et al., 2013; Ikenze, 2016: 101-102; see World Bank Report, 2016). The table below shows details of Sierra Leone's export patterns and returns from the mining and agricultural sectors from 1948 to 1953.

Table 5.1: Excerpt of Mineral and Agricultural Exports from Sierra Leone,1949-1953

Year	Total Exports (Value, Ibs, Sterling)	Minerals (%)	Palm-Product (%)	Others, Chiefly Agricultural (%)
1968	4,249,167	41.5	43.8	14.7
1949	5,340.915	41.3	46.8	11.9
1950	6,661,232	44.3	35.8	19.9
1951	10,068,449	29.6	47.5	22.9
1952	9,924,799	37.7	48.1	14.2
9153	11,738,768	50.1	36.5	13.4

Source: (Jarrett, 1956:160)

Thus, the production and exportation of mining and agricultural products formed the foundation of Sierra Leone's political economy and continued unabated for years into the decolonization era. This fact was observed by Alimamy Bangura

(one of the directors of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Sierra Leone) who recounted that between 1960 to 1969, the success in both the mining and agricultural sectors were the primary reason for the growth in the national economy up to its zenith of "4.0 %" (Bangura, n/d).

However, despite this economic progress, independence brought unpleasant consequences to both the mining and agricultural sectors, their economic efficacy soon was decimated, a phenomenon that has continued for almost all of the years since (Binns, 1982; Clapham, 2003). This decimation of Sierra Leone's viable microeconomic sectors was largely caused by a severe manipulation of the political system.

The nature of these political practices created an atmosphere of weak managerial control over these two economic sectors, which directly undermined the requisite institutional framework needed to sustain them. This lack of management also worked in conjunction with the problem of poor economic mismanagement. Examining the state's resource spending provides a typical paradigmatic example of how this mismanagement manifested. As noted by Peter A. Dumbuya, for several years, beginning in 1975 to 1976, the national expenditure ratio constantly remained at a higher rate than the generated income.

This income and expenditure phenomenon undermined the strength of the economy, led to its demise, and was followed by

excessive external debt burdens that were accrued by the state (Dumbuya, 2008:49; Luke & Riley, 1989). In the mining sector, in particular, exogenous factors somewhat contributed to compounding the already complicated economic situation. The recurrent global oil crises in the 1970s severely affected Sierra Leone's mining sector, as oil importation was integral to accelerating the mining operations. These crises were also followed by the challenges of economic "terms of trade" among others, which impaired the economic foundation of Sierra Leone (Luke & Riley, 1989).

Due to its continued economic failures prior to the 1991 war, which was particularly apparent in its mining sector, Sierra Leone became known as a "resource-cursed" country. In addition, the country was marked by poverty, underdevelopment, weak institutions, and weak governance despite the abundant, all-natural resource reserves.

Despite being a country with vast land and ideal temperatures to grow and export rice, Sierra Leone was no longer able to produce its main staple food. The resulting large-scale importation of rice accelerated the outflow of its limited economic reserves. The imported rice began to fall short of the quantity needed to respond to their internal needs. Therefore, within this historical context, Sierra Leone was a paradox: a resource-rich country stuck in poverty. This characterization affirmed the argument of Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner

(1995) that natural-resource rich countries are underdeveloped countries.

The ghastly economic decline amid these national development challenges explains why Sierra Leone's overly dependent on external development assistance. From this historical context, development assistance has since become the basis for the country's political economy. External development assistance became vital to pursuing the country's development priorities, a philosophy that has long been cemented within the internal mainstream political system.

As evidence of the country's fragile institutional structure, and subjugation of national interests for personal aggrandizement, led to the decline of the country. The speech of one of the former leaders, President Siaka P. Stevens, can be illustrative:

> "*The priorities of the first 20 years of our state the consolidation of independence, the unification and integration of the country, the creation of national consciousness ... were mainly political ... those of the next few decades are more likely to be of an economic and organizational nature.... This will call for bias in those particular directions on the part of whoever may succeed me as president in the same way as, I think, the past 15 years or so-called for bias*

in the direction of politics" (Luke & Riley,
1989:137).

Even though economic progress was the primary goal of his successor, the data shows that all of the political regimes and leadership that succeeded him never realized this economic progress. Instead, the primary outcome of those post-independence years was Sierra Leone becoming one of the world's poorest countries. For example, in 1986, the "Gross National Product per capita stood at US$310," and preventable child morbidity and death rates increased (Luke & Riley, 1989:137).

5.6. Historical Overview of Development Aid in Sierra Leone

The need for aid to revamp the country's sustainability began following the marked decline of its economy, particularly in the extractive sectors of mining and agriculture. Development assistance was offered in response to these phenomena and became widely celebrated and taken for granted as a part of the national political economy. In addition, the celebrated ethos of development assistance was reflected in the state's highest political leadership. This was called upon in many of these leaders' speeches. George O. Roberts summarized some examples of the principles mentioned by these government functionaries in their statements on development assistance in the following quotes:

Minister of Trade and Industry:

> *"Sierra Leone will need a lot of new capital investment to enable it to achieve the rate of economic expansion, which is essential to the development of the country as a whole. Some of that capital investment we can find from savings but much of it must come from abroad..." (Roberts, 1975:340).*

Colonel Juxon-Smith, Chairman of the National Reformation Council during the military regime:

> *"I should like to record our sincere debt of gratitude to the I.M.F for coming to our rescue... I must also take this opportunity to repeat our special thanks for the personal and friendly advice and active assistance given by the past missions for the fund... I wish to reassure my countrymen that fund visitation is neither a sign of national failure nor an abrogation of national sovereignty. Rather, it is a sign of our determination to seek and implement sound economic policies. It is an indication to interested observers that we recognize our difficulties and that with international support, we are resolved to overcome them" (Roberts, 1975: 346).*

Siaka P. Stevens, former president of Sierra Leone, presidential address 1972-

> *"We will continue to do our utmost to improve the ties between ourselves and other African states as well as with countries in the Eastern and Western blocs in an effort to help foster international peace and understanding.... Technical and financial assistance from the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the World Bank and its affiliates also from foreign governments, have continued to make an important contribution to our economic development programmes. The government is grateful for this... Government continues to recognize the importance of technical assistance within the framework of development, especially in the agricultural sector, and reiterates its gratitude to various governments... For the liberal assistance in various forms, they have provided it to the country in the past. The government hopes that assistance on a larger scale will continue to be provided to help accelerate this country's rate of agricultural progress"* (Roberts, 1975: 346-347).

What stands out most clearly in the above speeches is the apparent overreliance of the state leadership on development assistance from this historical period. They believed

development assistance was the medium through which the country's development could be realized. In this context, these statements imply that development assistance was meant to cushion the nationally-driven effort to attain sustainable development or social transformation within the country. However, with a little acknowledgment that development assistance itself is only a means to an end and not the end in its entirety, particularly if the internal political structure of the country was not modified.

As showcased in the above speeches, as soon as independence was secured, development assistance in Sierra Leone was readily available to the different political regimes. As detailed by George O.Roberts, "estimated foreign aid in millions of dollars received from 1961 to 1971 from grants and gifts, loans, investments, and technical assistance by Sierra Leone People's party from 1961 to 1971 amounted to US$ 92.70, National reformation Council regime US$ 13.00 from 1967 to 1968, and US$ 48.88 by All People's Congress regime from 1968 to 1971" respectively (1975:345).

Development assistance continued to find fertile ground in Sierra Leone in the years that followed. For example, the next table below gives an excerpt of typical examples of the nature and level of aid inflow to Sierra Leone from 1979 to 1988, mainly provided through bilateral and multilateral means.

Table 5.2: Official Net Receipts from DAC Countries,

Multilateral Institutions and OPEC, 1979-1988

DAC Countries	1979	1980	1981	1982	1985	1986	1987	1988
France	-0.2	5.0	3.4	2.2	0.5	1.3	5.3	5.7
Germany	5.2	16.2	12.4	16.3	8.5	8.2	20.5	20.4
Japan	0.2	18.0	3.0	10.1	2.2	3.9	3.4	4.0
Netherlands	11.6	4.4	1.8	1.5	1.4	2.1	0.9	1.7
United Kingdom	4.5	5.0	5.3	5.4	-1.9	5.0	7.6	6.0
United States	5.0	9.0	6.0	7.0	10.0	12.0	11.0	9.0
Multilateral	23.2	33.1	27.6	26.5	34.8	27.1	20.9	35.7
OPEC Countries	4.0	6.3	1.0	0.3				
EEC + Members	24.6	43.3	37.4	44.3	17.0	39.8	57.7	70.0
Total Aid Captured US$ Millions	78.5	140.3	97.9	113.6	72.5	99.4	127.3	152.5

Source: (Olaniyan, 1966, 61)

From this excerpt, it clearly showcases how deepened and concentrated was the development assistance within the political system of the country.

Even though enormous amounts of development assistance were required to bail out the economy of Sierra Leone from 1961 to the 1980s, fundamental challenges, particularly those associated with development, were evident in the country. This situation prepared the space to the point that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund had to institute the SAP.

5.7. Sierra Leone & the Structural Adjustment Programme, 1980-1987

Sierra Leone experienced years of complex socio-economic dilemmas, including but not limited to the challenges of meaningful

> "*domestic capital investment with a resultant positive outcome, the severe macroeconomic climate especially the apparent over inflationary pattern, fiscal deficits, over capital expenditure, over-concentration on recurrent undertakings, problem of excessive debt burden, the exchange rate, degeneration of terms of trades and the thievery of potential exportable products through trafficking" (Luke & Riley, 1989:136; Longhurst et al., 1988:25).*

These challenges almost brought the country into a state of total collapse. Access to essential public goods caused distress, especially among ordinary people, which explains the upsurge in poverty within the country. In response to the emerging economic debacle, the country's multilateral partners, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, deemed conditionalities imperative. These conditionalities were consequently imposed through the SAPs.

The SAP framework focused on the economic structural reformation of the state for monetary assistance. These

reformations contained conditionalities related to the devaluing of the state's national currency, the removal of government subventions to state-owned parastatals (Riddell, 1992). The conditionalities also contained the reduction of state involvement in the economic sector by accelerating privatization and the liberalization of trade (Riddell, 1992).

In Sierra Leone, especially during President Siaka P. Stevens' attempts to address the country's economic challenges, the IMF and the government entered into a preliminary and provisional stabilization scheme (Luke,1988). This scheme covered several one- year disbursements of monetary support to Sierra Leone's balance, with the payments conditional on the country following structural adjustment policies (Luke,1988), though within this initial period, these policies had not yet been entirely conceived as the SAP, as noted by Sarai-Ikenze (2016).

The circumstances were intense because of the nature of the policies. As noted, the policies included reductions of state public spending, enhancements of fiscal control, guarantees that the foreign accounts of the country were devoid of imbalances, and conditions for the devaluation of the state currency (Luke & Riley, 1989: 136-137). The IMF advanced these conditionalities within this preliminary economic bailout engagement.

However, this first phase was interfaced with challenges as President Siaka P. Stevens did not appear to develop any interest in adhering to these regulatory measures (Luke,1988). Moreover, while the state's economic sector dissipation continued, loan repayments by the country's meager exportation earnings ranged from "55-66% from 1984 to 1985 and from 1985 to 1986, and the entire external debt for 1985 was at 300%" (Longhurst et al., 1988:25-26). At the same time, social challenges, such as the widening poverty gap and the mortality rate of children from preventable ailments, rose to astronomical levels.

Joseph Saidu Momoh, the successor to President Stevens, and the IMF conceded and resolved Sierra Leone's entrance into the SAP in 1986 (Zack-Williams,1999). The agreement was on a platform of capital investment bailouts designed to recuperate the domestic economic sector if the country adhered to certain conditionalities. The conditionalities comprised the elimination of government subventions, price regulations, denationalization, and retrenchment of the labor force remunerations in some public institutions (Longhurst et al., 1988:26).

This "New Order Regime" of President Joseph Saidu Momoh, as it came to be called, went into effect with the SAPs serving as the macroeconomic regulatory prerequisites, and received IMF provision as a standby credit to Sierra Leone. The sum of SDR

40.43 million was provided intended to help the country quickly recover from its crushing economic situation (Zack-Williams, 1999:146). In addition, while this agreement gave Sierra Leone some leeway to seek other external economic financiers, the Sierra Leone SAPs were eventually expanded into a three-year economic bailout to the tune of US$335 million, accompanied by significant economic structural modifications by the state (Longhurst et al., 1988:26).

However, the unwillingness on the part of the political regime to consistently and unreservedly stick to these policies resulted in the annulment of the SAPs in Sierra Leone in 1990 (Zack-Williams, 1999:146). This was immediately followed by a public declaration by President Momoh that Sierra Leone had entered a national economic emergency (Zack-Williams, 1999), the first time such a national emergency announcement was ever made.

Thus, the lack of transformative changes in the country's political superstructure, which would have enhanced a new economic recovery, contributed to the failure of the SAPs in the country.

5.8. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the mechanisms through which the challenges of managing development aid in Sierra Leone could be viewed.

This chapter showed that the political environment in Sierra Leone allowed for the mismanagement of enormous amounts of development assistance. This development assistance was consigned to the country during the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding process for the purposes of rebuilding the country's economy and supporting its development. It became the primary source of Sierra Leone's economic dependency and a hotbed for ethnoregional- neopatrimonial practices.

Such a political atmosphere arose out of excessive dependence on foreign aid, where policies for national development were instrumentalized without any cohesive national development agenda. The country's practices of this political system led to the intense mismanagement of development assistance, the dissolution of accountability, and the general acceptance of corruption within the political space. In addition, these practices deepened underdevelopment within the societal structure and produced massive inequality and poverty among the state population.

These factors are all relevant to the difficulty of the establishment of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding programs.

Chapter Six

The Challenge of Youth Mobilization by Party Politics

6.0. Introduction

According to a 2018 United Nations report, there are 1.2 billion youths in the world population (United Nations report, 2018; see African Economic Outlook report, 2016:41). As specifically noted in the African Economic Outlook Report, the population from "2000 to 2015 accelerated by 370 million from 814 million to approximately 1.2. billion" (African Economic Outlook Report, 2016:41).

As indicated in these reports, this exponential rise has impacted Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, while other regions of the world have begun experiencing sharp declines in their number of youths (United Nations Report, 2018). Fundamentally, regarding government transitions in many African countries (Seely, 2009; Vengroft, 1993; Wiseman,1995), youths have remained alienated from the political systems. In addition, implementations of practical and appropriate measures to better support these youths have fundamentally remained a challenge, especially within national countries (see Gyimah-Brempong & Kimenyi, 2013). This is despite the various adopted policies in Africa at the continental level, such as the African Youth Charter; the African Youth Declaration on the post-2015 Development Agenda; and Agenda 2063.

In Sierra Leone, during the period leading to the end of the war and in the peacebuilding process, the political system has insignificantly treated its population of youths within mainstream politics (Mcintyre & Thusi,2003. see Bangura, 2016). Instead, it has used them as an auxiliary support system. These mobilized youths are primarily composed of ex-combatants and non-combatant constituents. They become subservient to various political purposes, either as a task force, as a paramilitary security wing, or as bodyguards to the political party leaders, while others remain mere spectators.

Building on this case study of post-conflict Sierra Leone, this chapter analyzes how the youths were manipulated by political parties formed in line with the ethnoregional-neopatrimonial system. This manipulation hinders the development of equal participation in politics. This manipulation became an obstacle to liberal peacebuilding. This chapter explains that the deeply rooted ethnoregional-neopatrimonial political system created an atmosphere of violent politicization of these youths. This pattern has diminished youth prospects for equal opportunity within the governing political structure.

Equal opportunity within a population plays a significant role in the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding. Taiwo A Olaiya (2014) noted that the existence of a marginalized sect of people like the youths in West Africa has provided a veritable opportunity utilized by political party structures.

This fact has remained very evident in the post-conflict peacebuilding atmosphere of Sierra Leone (see Enria,2015). This chapter emphasizes that *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism* in this political system has resulted in the violent politicization of the country's youths through clientelism. For many citizens and particularly for the youth, this practice eliminated any prospects of equal opportunity or meaningful participation within the political space. Thus, this chapter analyzes this phenomenon by exploring the patterns through which party politics in the country have mobilized youths.

The clientelistic mobilization of youths by party politics has been an inherent and long-held pattern in the country's political practices that became more pronounced in the post-conflict era. Such a pattern has eroded any opportunity for the youths to seek meaningful placement within the mainstream political system, other than as an instrument for the benefit of others.

Because of the country's neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism, which has become a vital characteristic of the political practices, the mobilization of youths within the political system has been oriented along with social and cultural patterns. These post-war vulnerabilities informed the social mobilization patterns of the youths in Sierra Leone (Mitton,2013; Peters,2011).

As a result, the outcome of this systemic pattern has been a struggle for survival that is institutionally layered across the country and has been marred by recurrent political clashes. These clashes have been recurrent both within and between the political parties, sometimes leading to large-scale political unrest among the youths in various parts of the country. Sierra Leone has been of this pattern, particularly evident within the political system.

In the next sections, this chapter first briefly summarizes conceptual debate on youths in African politics. Then, this chapter delineates the sociology of youths in Sierra Leone and their demographic composition. The chapter furthermore proceeds to explain the context within which the country's youths have been marginalized and subjected to poverty. More importantly, the chapter explains the social and cultural patterns within a neopatrimonial clientelist system by which the youth are being mobilized. The chapter also points out that the dilemmas mobilizing these youths along party politics have created the dilemma for the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country. The chapter ends with a conclusion.

6.1. Conceptual Discussions of Youths and Politics in Africa

The extant literature on the participation of youths in African politics has been categorized into three argumentative scholarly perspectives. First, a wide range of scholars have focused on socially created structural barriers. Second, another category of scholarly works has been more attentive to the violence that is associated with youths and its outcomes within African politics. Third, other scholarly inquiries on the participation of youths in African politics have focused on the contributing role played by African youths in political processes.

Perspectives on socially created structural barriers or limitations have been pronounced in discussions of the youths in Africa. For example, in contemporary African society, it is argued that politics have become the mainstream platform through which economic and social well-being can be guaranteed to adherents. In addition, particularly for African youths, current political practices have not generated meaningful dividends for them (Goldin, 2014).

In her examination of political party systems in Africa in the aftermath of the "Third Wave," Carrie Manning (2016) noted that these political parties are different from organizations that appear to be advancing progressive democratic practices.

Conceptually, as noted by Joakim Ekman and Erik Amna (2012:289), political participation involves "actions directed towards influencing governmental decision and political outcomes."

In addition, Jan Teorell, Mariano Torcal, and Jose Ramon Montero (2007:340-343) described political participation as "voting, party activity, consumer participation, contacting and protest activity." These characterizations appear essential to understanding political participation and partly reflect on African youths. However, many of the engagements of African youths in the political process have been contested by long historical and complex societal institutional layering (see Gympo & Anyidoho, 2019).

Gerontocracy is a style of politics widely noted in the African system as a long-established barrier to youth participation in mainstream politics. Jon Abbink (2005:13-16), while discussing African youths and politics from the post-independence period to the decline of the Soviet Union, referenced this perspective. He specifically focused on the patterns of elite capture in Africa's Political landscape as a long-running historical phenomenon that had hindered meaningful participation by the country's youths in the political system.

Similarly, Joseph Olusegun Adebayo (2018) argued that the absence of youths in African politics could be understood by

looking at the period after political independence. Adebayo affirmed that, in the bid to consolidate and entrench power, political actors instituted many exclusionary political practices to discourage meaningful youth participation in the political system (see also Aguilar, 1998; Bangura, 2018). In addition, Ransford Edward Van Gyampo and Nana Akua Anyidoho (2019) argued that African youths had been fundamentally blocked from participating in mainstream politics, especially since involvement in African politics depends on strong determinant factors that are out of the control of these youths. The authors specifically pointed out that age, education, and economy matter a lot in African politics, and many young Africans lack the requirements to make a meaningful political contribution. The authors also added that the African patriarchal structure had diminished the political participation of young African women.

In many aspects, a post-conflict peacebuilding process faces deeply rooted challenges. In Africa, these challenges are largely due to the marginalization of the young populace, as argued by Siobhan McEvoy-Ley (n.d.). In Particular, Siobhan McEvoy-Ley argued that the widespread unemployment among these youths is the consequence of their marginalization. McEvoy-Ley stated that the nomenclature commonly associated with young people makes the effects of their participation in the peacebuilding process negligible. McEvoy-Ley regarded these

patterns as a dilemma for peacebuilding in the post-conflict states.

McEvoy-Ley further argued that the political transition to peacebuilding itself has been full of denial. McEvoy-Ley specified that the actors who actively participated as front-liners during the war had been neglected from playing a meaningful role in the post-conflict transition period. McEvoy-Ley reiterated that the political power had been seized by adults, and a limited viable institutional mechanism has been implemented to safeguard this vulnerable category of people within the state (McEvoy, n.d.).

Moreover, McEvoy explained that the adults within the political class have not exhibited much zest or interest in sharing their powers with young people. McEvoy also maintained that these sects of the political class are not interested in incorporating ideas contributed by youths into their governance processes. In addition, McEvoy pointed out that even the young people who do appear to be within the system are merely being used to meet the interests of the well-established political class.

Discussing the transition period for African youths, Alcinda Honwana (2012) employed the concept of "waithood" to characterize Africa's youths structural and social dilemmas. She opined that many contemporary African youths have not made the

transition to adulthood, since entering a readily available job market is not guaranteed. As such, a large portion of the continent's young populace has struggled to obtain the symbols of adulthood, which are usually responsibility, independence, and societal acknowledgment.

Honwana also indicated that the waithood concept embodies other elements of the transition to adulthood, such as a "civic participatory role, household formation, and education" (Honwana,2012:4). Honwana opined that youths who identify themselves within the waithood bracket appear to see themselves as somewhat alien within their societies, largely because they are unable to meet these socially constructed requirements.

Beyond these established notions of the barriers to youth participation in politics, the perpetuation of violence in the political space has equally and widely been used.

One such perspective is presented by Luisa Enria (2015). Enria argued that the association between the marginalization of labor market actors, largely youths, and the use of violence as a strategy to establish favor from political actors, may exist because it leads to job opportunities. In the case of post-war Sierra Leone, Enria explained that the participation of youths in violence was merely a ploy undertaken by some of the vulnerable young populace to nurture allegiances with the political class. Enria further stated that such an act does not

end after building this allegiance and is an expected part of membership within the political class that impacts the youths' prospects for employment and commitment.

Regarding youth violence in African politics, Obediah Dodo (2018) specifically cited Zimbabwe as a classic example. Through approximately three consecutive months of ethnographic research using interviews, Dodo indicated that political violence attributed to youths is largely accounted for by the "level of resistance and psychological influence" (Dodo,2018:119).

Donnas Ojok and Tony Acol (2017) linked African youths, especially from the 1990s to 2015, to statistics for about sixty incidences of election-related political violence. Ojok and Acol argued that this was caused by underlying structural factors that have remained inherent within African political systems. The authors argued that the "demographic dominance" of the youth category has been taken for granted by elite political actors who act out of political motives. Thus, the authors argued that the youths have been manipulated and used to secure the respective political aspirations of these actors (Ojok & Acol, 2017:95).

In addition, based on this data, the authors asserted that these repressed and despondent youths are attracted by election-related violence. It represents one of their last hopes to attain political relevance within the African political system, they

opined. The authors stated that, on account of the long historical and structural neglect of African youths in politics, they have resolved to use violence to establish their political niche.

Ismail Rashid (1997) comprehensively demonstrated how the disconnect of youths in African society has tended to lead to the dismantling of state governance systems. Using the specific case of Sierra Leone, Rashid referenced what he called "Lumpen Youths," or youths who feel a societal disconnect, whose only remaining agency was violence. In addition, Rashid noted that some of the causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone that began in 1991 were related to the displacement of these youths within society.

Rashid also argued that the emergence of the Lumpen youths was due to the inability of the state political economy to cater appropriately to this large section of the populace. He stated that this resulted in a radically sensitive and politically charged group conglomeration, along with some university student caucuses. According to Rashid, this phenomenon, combined with several other factors, transformed this established group, which was aware of the barriers between its members and the political powers, and made the members dispirited with the political establishment. According to the author, this process culminated in varied acts of political violence and the subsequent civil war.

In general, it has been noted that political violence has many severe consequences. Political violence may lead to an untold number of deaths, may undermine the legality of elections, scuttle the entire democratization process, weaken the state economy, and lead to a spillover effect into other societies (Nordic Africa Institute, 2012. See Bodea & Elbadawi,2008).

Viewing this subject somewhat differently, Abosede Omowumi Babatunde (2015), on the notion of a "youth uprising," discussed the contributions of youths in decades-long political reformation processes using the much reputed "Arab Spring" as an example. Babatunde stated that the uprising undertaken by these youths to demand political reform resulted in a significant democratic shift in the political superstructure of several societies. Babatunde indicated that these societies were permeated with long- held, historic political establishments. Still with the Arab Spring, particularly in Africa and elsewhere, he noted that it contributes to the development of democracy.

In addition, Babatunde argued that the Arab Spring served as an essential indicator that political gerontocracy could no longer be considered absolute within the continent. The author specified that youth uprising was a remarkable example of the political relevance that could be obtained despite the forces

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that had remained vigorously established within the African political system for so long.

As the above conceptual analysis has shown, the perspectives on youths and politics in Africa are diverse. In addition, these youths have waited a long time for the opportunity to meaningfully participate in politics. In post-conflict Sierra Leone, the political atmosphere has been characterized by practices of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism. This situation has unfolded through clientelistic manipulations of these youths, along with social and cultural patterns of mobilization, through which unequal opportunity for the youths became permeated.

6.2. The Sociology of Youths in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone

After eleven years of civil war, the youths in Sierra Leone occupied one of the country's largest demographic constituencies (see Weeks & Bah,2017). Moreover, in the past fifteen years, this section of the nation's population has steadily grown at an exponential rate. In addition, the youth population in Sierra Leone, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), through The World Factbook, has a dependency ratio of 71% (2020). Sierra Leone has remained notable among the four Mano River Union countries with the highest youth unemployment ratio. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency through The World

Factbook indicated that Sierra Leone's young population between the age of 15 and 24 unemployment rate is 9.4 %, Liberia 2.3%, Guinea 1%, and Cote D'Ivoire 5.5% (The World Factbook-CIA,2020).

This kind of upsurge, which should lead to a new and immense labor force for buoyant youths, as has been noted in other countries as a distinctive indicator of national development (Kimenyi et al., 2016; African Development Outlook Report, 2016). In a 1973 publication, James Pickett mentioned that Africa's population increase appeared to work antithetical to population surges in the industrialized world. In the industrialized world, it typically became the catalyst for economic progression (Pickett, 1973). Indeed, beyond the role of nationalism in African political independence efforts, it was widely supposed that young people were motivated by the economic development that could have emerged within the continent. However, in the years that followed, young people remained largely and virtually outside the continent's economic and political structures, an argument that is in line with James Pickett's reasoning.

In Sierra Leone, and especially in the aftermath of the civil war, a marked increase in the young population has had a direct impact on the labor force. This is despite the slight reduction it caused in the fertility rates from "2008 standing at 5.8 to 5.1 in 2019" (Statistic Sierra Leone Report, 2019:12). This perspective is useful as it is significant to note what

particular labor force constituted this increased youth population.

This perspective is essential when considering the infrastructure and political environment for these youths, especially when they are manipulated and instrumentalized. These factors are the underlying pillars that have created an obstacle to the successful realization of post-conflict liberal peacebuilding. The subsequent sub-sections elaborate on these complexities in detail.

6.2.1. Overview of the Composition of the Post-Conflict Youth Demography

In post-conflict Sierra Leone, youths can be defined as the young, energetic segment of the population within the age bracket of 15-35 years (Chipika, 2012:1; Government of Sierra Leone, 2003; Peeters, 2009). This age bracket entails many of those who acted as paramilitary civil defense forces and eventually became ex- combatants; and those who were young ex-military officers. The youth also comprised the majority of those who grew up before and during the war, either as victims with a plethora of lived experiences who never actively participated or others. Many of these groups have been placed within this definition of youths, and majority are in the dilemma of waithood phenomenon (see Honwana, 2012). This succinct

categorization constitutes what the post-conflict youth configuration entails.

Going beyond this concise outline is an approach warranting a thorough and more in-depth profiling. Within post-conflict Sierra Leone, a group of exasperated youths, who spent almost a decade of their lives in an uncertain environment in the forest waging warfare, also emerged and proliferated. Paul Richards characterized this conflict as "Fighting for the Forest," Robert Kaplan described it as "New Barbarism," and Lansana Gberie consciously named it "A Dirty War in West Africa" (Gberie, 2005; Kaplan, 1994; Richards, 1996).

Before the civil war, a large constituency of disconnected youths already existed and was categorized broadly under the name "Lumpen youths" (Abdullah, 1997). "Lumpen" is a label that epitomizes a section of young people with largely informal education and skills, who considered themselves rejected by society. This population had disengaged from both the social and economic sphere of the state apparatus and who had lost all trust in the political establishment (Abdullah, 1997; see Peters, 2011).

Moreover, during the war, conscription was practiced and used as a weapon of the war. As a result, children and women were scouted and enrolled in belligerent movements and became part of the population segment that eventually surged in numbers

and strength for the rebel movement (Coulter, 2008; Denov, 2010). In addition, young male children were recruited into the civil defense paramilitary force, the Kamajors. For the most part, these young children who participated in the war were never given adequate access to formal education or meaningful professional training. The only education they received was through their exposure to "killing, robbery, thuggery, and violent practice" for eleven consecutive years (Betancourt et al., 2010; Betancourt et al., 2010; Rosen, 2005:59).

In addition to both the previously described youths and children, another considerable segment of the population who participated in the war were the young people from rural communities who formed the "Civil Defense Force." This group comprised many constituencies across the country as a paramilitary institution to defend their local communities and beyond during the war, and also, a large crop of young Sierra Leone military who fought on the side of the state (Peters, 2011).

In the aftermath of the war, these huge constituencies of the country's population, who had spent several years in combat, formed a "youth bulge" of ex-combatants. This group proliferated across the country as they were confronted with numerous grim realities at the end of the war, where no immediate solutions to their anticipated needs were readily available. This situation further deteriorated their hopes, particularly in the

wake of the emerging era of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding (Peeters et al., 2009).

Moreover, within this complicated post-conflict climate, another category of youths, those at a tender age during the war but continued in school intermittently to acquire formal education, became part of the enlightened class. This category was challenged by the absence of opportunities to integrate directly and meaningfully into the workforce or the political system, which would represent their transition into adulthood in an atmosphere of equal opportunity. In the past several years, there have been consistent increases in such youths produced by different colleges, training institutes, and universities.

In Sierra Leone, there has been an absence of impactful micro- and macroeconomic policies (African Economic Outlook,2020) or bold and practicable political responses by the state structure to address this fundamental dilemma. In addition, a viable private sector role that could encourage rapid development within the economy has remained unrealizable (see Brian & M'cleod,2019). As noted by Andrew Keili and Bocar Thiam, "pervasive corruption limited the growth of the formal private sector and deprived many young people of gainful employment" (2015:236). Thus, this phenomenon has been a favorable foundation in which the political establishment further enhanced ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism and, therefore, emboldened the clientelistic political lines. This

provided leverage within the political system that resulted in the violent politicization, manipulation, and mobilization of this youth category across social and cultural patterns. It was subsequently taken for granted within the political system, further contributing to the marginalization of youths.

Thus, these youth experiences in a post-conflict Sierra Leone can be equated to the initial post-independence euphoria. Post- independence euphoria that erupted generated expectations of economic transformation, development, and political stability across the continent, only to result in a mere façade of meaningful change (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2008). Experiences of youth in a post- conflict Sierra Leone produced this outcome.

6.2.2. Post-War Social Integration of the Youths

The Lome Peace Accord in 1999 was anticipated to be a mechanism for creating a durable and sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. As has been discussed in post-conflict settlements, the disarmament and reintegration of belligerents are among some of the critical characteristics of policy frameworks that help countries transition from war to peace (Patel,2009:248).

In post-conflict Sierra Leone, and particularly about the youths during and after the war, the mechanism purported to offer stability was categorized into two measures. They included the framework of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

(DDR) and the Youth Policy. Both were conceived as essential measures to establish a youth infrastructure that could ensure an overall stabilization and consolidation of the post-war peace. The DDR was the direct intervention as a preliminary post-conflict peacebuilding stabilization mechanism. Therefore, both were undertaken in Sierra Leone. However, their outcomes were largely inconsequential.

6.2.2.1 Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration

As a blueprint laying the foundation for the cessation of hostilities toward the end of the war was something noticeable in the Lome Peace Accord. In the Lome Peace Accord of July 7, 1999, Part 4 of Article XVI suggested that the government, in conjunction with international assistance, begin the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of all combatants (Lome Peace Agreement Act, 1999), many of whom were youths.

DDR is an instrument within the contemporary peacebuilding process to encourage a return to stability. In addition, it is viewed from a policy perspective as an institutional arrangement for providing and ensuring mitigation checks at the end of the conflict for young people who might be extremely unfamiliar with their new environment as they reintegrated.

DDR, as a peacebuilding infrastructure in Sierra Leone, was not exclusively limited for the collection of arms. It also served as an initial response mechanism to the issues experienced by combatants for appropriate reintegration. The combatants were mainly warring actors from all of the endogenous parties who participated in the war, and particularly included the youth, and served as the initial foundation for peace. This measure led to the establishment of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR), as purely nationally led with assistance from development partners, in which reintegration cost "US$ 100 million" (McMullin,2013). An assistance scheme designed for all of the ex-combatants was specifically attentive to the "mobilization and reintegration process, and for training and employment" (McMullin, 2013; Sesay & Suma, 2009).

Primarily, people within the age bracket of eighteen and above were accepted for the process and were provided US$150 per person for what was referred to as a "reinsertion package" (McMullin,2013:164, Govier, 2006; Sesay & Suma, 2009; World Bank, 2002). In addition, the reintegration benefits were to be paid to ex-combatant in their localities (McMullin,2013:164). This program entailed a few training sessions for different skill sets, followed by tools that the participants could bring back to their communities during resettlement (Govier, 2006; Sesay & Suma, 2009; World Ban, 2002).

Within a short period of time in 2002, a total of 51,122 ex- combatants were approximately recorded (Sesay & Suma, 2009:13). According to a World Bank document, as early as January 23, 2002, under the "Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project," the DDR training and employment program for ex-combatants recorded the numbers indicated in the table below.

Table 6.1: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Training and Employment Program for Ex-Combatants, January 23,2002

Sectors	Registered	In Program
Vocational Training	14,488	2955
Formal training	6,946	2,027
Apprenticeships	2,470	1,722
Public Work	169	407
Agriculture	5,022	3,717
Awaiting Trade Test	206	–
Total	29,301	10,828

Source: (World Bank Document, 2002)

In 2005, according to a United Nations document, a total of 75,490 ex-combatants were recorded to have completed disarmament. The report stated that, among these 75,490 ex-combatants, 6,845 were children and 4,651 women respectively, while it stated that 55,000 ex-combatants had reintegration benefits, and 12,000 opted for formal educational assistance" (United Nations Document, 2005:1). However, Jeremy R. McMullin

noted that the "projected three-year planned reintegration scheme was reduced to a six-month training and support process" (2013:166).

On a broad scale, this DDR infrastructure, which was intended to serve as an initial buffer for the meaningful preliminary engagement of these youths, experienced setbacks within the institutional structure itself. Both the DDR and the NCDDR schemes were ephemeral, which became a potential challenge.

After spending almost, a decade in the jungle, living within a "survival of the fittest paradigm," these youths were provided brief and insufficient training from national state authorities. With such temporary support and training were told to reintegrate into a society that they had not been acclimatized to for almost a decade. There were no available and plausible job markets through which these youths could use their temporary training to seek employment and impact those reintegrated communities. Therefore, these shortcomings in the reintegration process resulted in challenges to the youths' acceptance within local communities, as they were still viewed as a threat. This phenomenon eventually escalated large-scale rural-urban migration of these youths toward what they hoped were greener pastures.

While the DDR succeeded in removing a relative number of arms and ammunition, the conditions of existence for former militants, particularly youths, remained challenging due to the inappropriate reintegration process.

6.2.2.2. National Youth Policy

In the aftermath of the civil war in Sierra Leone, youth-related issues gained widespread attention nationally and internationally. This attention necessitated a review of all of the prior youth documents culminating in the 2003 Sierra Leone National Youth Policy formulation and launch. These documents include "the national youth development policy (1995); the recommendation of the national youth forum (2000); and the recommendation of the national youth forum (2001)" (Kargbo,2014:164).

As a policy infrastructure, the 2003 Sierra Leone National Youth Policy was designed to tackle youth issues, with "empowerment and responsible citizenship" as the underlying aims (National Youth Policy, 2003). Among its specific objectives, the policy for programmatic intervention wanted:

> *"to mobilize youths of all ages to replace the culture of violence with a culture of peace, dialogue, and responsible citizenry."*

"to guarantee healthy and useful productive lives of youth through sensitization of health issues, recreation, and anti-drug abuse."

"to ensure the provision of an enabling environment with the necessary wherewithal to actualize youth potential" (National Youth Policy,2003:2) etc.

Youths constituted a large pool of energetic constituents in the labor force. Kargbo (2014:164) opined that, their "socioeconomic and physiological aspirations was fundamentally germane to the post-war progress of the country." As a result, the initial youth policy infrastructure was considered suitable, had its implementation adhered to its foundational core, and not merely political rhetoric. In an attempt to show political will, a national commission for youth was created in 2011, and an independent ministry exclusively for youth affairs was established in 2013. These institutions were to serve as overarching infrastructures to manage the operational activities, integration processes, and job opportunities for youth (Lawrence, 2014; Alemu, 2016).

The review draft of the 2012 youth policy, clearly stated that "unemployment and underemployment, and high incidence of drug and substance abuse," were inherent challenges that were widespread within the youth constituency (Sierra Leone National

Youth Policy,2012:1-2). This statement clearly shows that the prior policy infrastructure, which attracted huge international support for youth-related issues, yielded insignificant results. The 2014 review of the youth policy stated that the vision was to create a:

> *"nationally conscious and patriotic youth empowered to contribute to the development of Sierra Leone, while the policy's goal was to contribute in creating a conducive environment to ensure youth development and empowerment intervention sustainably to achieve their desired objectives..." (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2014).*

The reality of these youth policy interventions is that they have been deeply rooted in political deceptions. While empowerment, employment, and increased political participation across all genders have been the mantras for these policies, yet, there is no clear political will to enact them. This, for example, is shown by the fact that approximately 60% of the country's youths have remained unemployed or meaningfully disengaged (see Keili & Thiam,2015). As noted by Andrew Keili and Bocar Thiam, "employment in Sierra Leone is limited by a stagnated economy, state corruption, and lack of accountability" (2015:236). In addition, attempts to develop realistic skill

sets among those who are unemployable have remained insufficient.

In sum, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's post-war recommendation was that proper youth governance under an appropriate policy infrastructure needed to take place for peace to be sustainable (TRC, 2004). Despite these various policy interventions, Sierra Leone has remained home to one of the most vulnerable work climates, where the minimum wage paid per month is less than US$100 (Vamboi, 2019). In addition, the youth population has remained to be meaningfully engaged within the political system.

The annual budget allocations were a typical example of this inadequacy. For the financial years of 2012 to 2016, the youth ministry received one of the lowest yearly budgets compared to the other ministries (Government of Sierra Leone Budget Profile, 2016). Thus, this institutional gap was a testament to the political rhetoric that had surrounded the so-called youth infrastructural transformation in the country. The failure to create a working youth policy framework that serves the interests of all of the country's youths has also contributed to the marginalization of these youths, diminishing their prospects for equal opportunity. While politics are integral to institutional progress, the patterns of ethnoregional-neopatrimonial patterns within Sierra Leone have made a youth institutional building and commitment fundamentally

unrealizable, as youth politicization, instead became prioritized by party politics. Such practices scuttled any meaningful infrastructure plans to advance the country's youths between 2002 and 2018.

6.3. Youth Migration Trends and Politics

Migration has been part and parcel of the youth experience in Sierra Leone, either in the form of rural-rural migration, as was evident during the boom period in the mining sector (Reno, 2003), or rural-urban migration. However, the underlying incentive of these exoduses has always been the search for greener pastures. In this context, as has been the case in Sierra Leone, rural-urban migration is implicitly the movement of youths from a remotely deprived and rural location to an urban center. This was where they hoped to settle and establish a better way of life by enhancing their socio-economic and political interconnectedness. In Sierra Leone, the disparities in the circulation of both socio- economic opportunities and political power across all regions have remained deeply rooted. The possibility of their discontinuation, given the established patterns of political and social structures, has remained bleak.

In particular, during the post-conflict attempts at development, rural communities, which were the hardest hit, were mostly abandoned. The abandonment of rural communities had a direct impact on the young population that constituted the

majority of the inhabitants. The effect has been a feeling of systemic abandonment shared by many youths across a large mass of rural communities.

Another factor is the state-wide abandonment of mechanized agricultural cultivation, where through agribusiness enterprises could have retained the young populations in rural communities. Rural dwellers who have remained deeply ingrained in agricultural activities for decades, constituting approximating 57.9% of the workforce, have been mostly limited to subsistence farming and extreme poverty (World Bank, 2018; Gboku et al., 2017).

In Sierra Leone, attempts at general development have also been challenged by the increase in the overall population in the country. According to the Sierra Leone Statistics Report of 2015, the country recorded a population increase of about 3.2% between 2004 and 2015, which was much higher than what was seen from 1985 to 2004, which was 1.8% increased (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2016; see World Bank, 2018).

In the rural areas, these challenges of abandonment, along with the over-centralization of major social amenities, have had a direct correlation with the rural-urban migration of these youths. It was explicit that most ex-combatants who spent nearly eleven years in the forest were hurriedly rushed into resettlements and reintegrated into rural settings. With

insufficient and unsustainable skill sets to realize and manage their expectations found these rural locations to be utterly antithetical to their contemporary lifestyles. This group has in high quantity, left for urban centers to search for greener pastures.

In urban areas, quantities of these migrated youth are mostly engaged in fleeting, self-employed menial projects for daily sustenance, such as motorcycle transportation enterprises. Others do the work of a porter around market areas. Thus, living such a lifestyle shows the social vulnerability experienced by these youths in an environment where the political patterns have resulted in their marginalization and created widespread unequal opportunity.

In the 2018 World Bank report on Sierra Leone relating to "Systematic Country Diagnostic: Priorities for Sustainable Growth and Poverty Reduction," urbanization was revealed to be on the rise in the country. The report indicated that from "1967, the urbanization rate was 27%, but the pattern accelerated to 40% in 2015" (World Bank, 2018: 3). The report also noted that the population in the capital city of "Freetown was 127,000 in 1963 but had increased to one million in 2015 due to urbanization" (World Bank, 2018: 3). In addition, according to a publication by H. Plecher (2020), a steady migration pattern toward urban centers has occurred since 2008, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 6.1: Sierra Leone: Urbanization from 2008 to 2018

6.4. The Context of Youth Marginalization and Poverty in Sierra Leone

Presenting one viewpoint to explain the causes of poverty within society culturally, Philip N. Jefferson (2018) highlighted the importance of structural stratification. According to Jefferson, stratification within this context occurs when the "status quo" in a society is maintained and remains immutable (Jefferson, 2018:10- 12). This implies that when the stakeholders, mostly the political elites at the upper continuum of power, remain entrenched, that renders it cumbersome for those at the lower continuum to progress upwardly.

Moreover, in his discussion of poverty, Jeffrey D. Sachs (2005) opined that poverty, which has remained a global threat, is an outcome of poverty, implying that poverty begets poverty within society. According to Sachs, in contexts where people are already deprived of social amenities, facilities, and the economic ability to make ends meet and to invest with the expectation of future gains, poverty will prove inescapable.

Demographic factors, as stated by Jeffrey D. Sacks and Thomas Malthus (Sacks,2005:64-66; Malthus,1798), undermine a developing country's ability to advance. Building on the "social organization of society," classical scholars Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argued against the Malthusian theory of population growth relative to societal development (see Velkoff, 2015: 68-70; Wiltgen, 1998).

The idea of the "social organization of society" plays a substantial role in the marginalization of youths, a perspective that can explain the poverty in Sierra Leone. This perspective can also enhance understanding to indicate that the unequal opportunity and poverty in Sierra Leone are not only on the increase, but it is a social, organizational pattern. This social organization of the country, in part, has characteristic patterns of systemic manipulation that have remained rooted and layered over time and are shaped by the political landscape.

A cursory inspection of the prehistoric political setting of Sierra Leone and the general structure of the contemporary political environment will show that the country's youths generally have been separated from the mainstream political system. Historically, youths were mainly conceived of as errand-boys and emissaries of state security provisions under the absolute authority of local state elders, and their age was of fundamental importance in such societal stratifications (Little 1965; see Brown, 1951). Such patterns engendered an increased dependency level among these youths and thereby constricted this category of people's autonomous rights in the political system, where economic and social decision-making power was integral to society.

This phenomenon continued into the colonial and post-colonial governance systems, where youths could be banished from certain communities by local chiefs who considered their actions to be insubordinate. Political authority was firmly entrenched in the local authorities, mostly people of old age holding supreme power (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Albrecht, 2017; Little, 1965).

This prehistoric societal stratification and framing of the youths in Sierra Leone affected the political and economic environment for their independence. This pattern became pervasive to the extent that they became marginalized and estranged in the post-independence era, which scholars have

noted as motivating factors for their participation in the 1991 revolution (Clapham, 2003; Richards, 2005).

In the 1980s, during the boom in the mining sector, particularly for diamonds, many energetic youths abandoned the agricultural sectors in search of quick wealth in these mining localities (Richards, 1996). While such dreams were left unrealized, a majority of these mining migrants also found that they would be mere laborers in the mining sector, not large-scale financiers to the enterprise. This community outflow to the mining regions, in part, undermined agricultural productivity in the country, and many never returned to their home regions as expectations were plunged until the war broke out in 1991 (see Peters, 2011; Reno, 2003).

This widespread and long history of youth's dislocation within the country's political and economic system perpetuated their marginalization within the societal structure. This became glaring, especially within the political system, where economic advancement could be attained.

Therefore, in the post-conflict political system, this continued social vulnerability has led to the extensive mobilization of youths by political parties through clientelistic political tactics. Such practice has been emboldened largely by the country's practices of politicization and manipulation formed in line with ethnoregional-

neopatrimonial systems. The manipulation of these youths was especially possible due to their social vulnerability, and the country's cultural construction of identity, which has become embedded in Sierra Leone's political practices (see Christensen & Utas,2008; Enria,2018; Kandeh, 1992). The next section explains how the youths have been mobilized along social and cultural clientelistic lines by party politics.

6.5. The Mobilization of Youths by Social and Cultural Clientelistic Party Politics.

The pattern of social vulnerability, especially among the youths, is institutionalized within the political system that then enhances the political actor's ability to establish a firm political constituency among these vulnerable youths. This practice has formed the core of the clientelist practices through which youths have been mobilized within and between the country's political parties. This practice has been taken for granted within the post-conflict political arrangement.

Since the end of the eleven-year civil war in 2002, participation as a political actor for the state has been a contested means of accessing alternative socio-economic advancement. These opportunities encompass political appointments, employment, and work in public goods provisions. Within such a pattern, survival within the political climate is

only achieved through patronage participation. As noted in the world Bank research document, one of the youths interviewed in Sierra Leone recounted:

> ..."*you might be highly educated, but if you do not have money to bribe those who offer the job and do not know any member on the board or interviewing committee, your chances of gaining the employment are very minute*"(WorldBank,2013:23:24).

Thus, for the majority of youths, mobilization within a political party is the only means through which survival is possible within the political system. Over the years, such an opportunity has been available through the socially created asymmetrical form of relationship, imposed within the political system. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999:141-160) noted what they called "Political instrumentalization." This phenomenon, the authors argued, has become commonplace within African politics, where political actors in a bid to amplify their wealth, resort to creating an atmosphere of "confusion, uncertainty and sometimes chaos."

Post-conflict political party mobilization of youths within the political process has been instrumentalized by their social vulnerability of poverty structure in which the majority of youths have remained located (see Cubitt,2012). Physical

violence has also become a commonplace orchestrated by these mobilized unengaged youths in support of one political party or opponents (Enria,2015, 2018). Underlined within the violent politicization of youths by party politics is political violence. This has remained a common practice associated with the post-war political system Sierra Leone.

This pattern of social mobilization via clientelism informed by neopatrimonialism has caused the country's youths to be framed as mere instruments within the political environment. This pattern has not only disintegrated the youth's prospects for meaningful political participation, but that represents a conscious attempt to marginalize them. This has caused the youth category to remain at the lower end of the continuum in a political climate of a severely unequal opportunity.

For example, owing to the unequal opportunity youths within and between the political parties have remained socially and recurrently mobilized by political elites on various political inducements or pledges. Such mobilization efforts have driven these youths to constant and repeated politically motivated violence against the opponent's political party or actors. In addition, this pattern has caused most of these vulnerable youths to end up in correctional centers or prisons. This fact was supported by the Director of the Office of National Security,

who stated during a television discussion that 90% of the inmates in detention centers across the country were youths.

In addition, Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Alexander H. Montgomery, and Mark Lubell (2018) noted that "politics is about relationships. Relationships form network structures that shape, enable, and constrains political actions." This factor is significant, as it has a direct impact on the behavioral patterns within a clientelistic social network. Such networks in post-conflict Sierra Leone have often led to recurrent, violent acts against political opponents.

Most importantly, the promises of employment, cash, or what is famously known in the local parlance of Sierra Leone as "connections or lane," epitomize clientelistic practices within the political system. This has characterized an uncompromising political process within which opposing political adherents and youths commonly clash, leading to violence within and between the political parties.

In addition to the vulnerability felt by youths, is the abandonment of the agricultural sector by youth, a sector with vast potential for economic gain, to become associated with politics. Michael D. Ward, Katherine Stove, and Audrey Sacks (2011) argued that "proximity" is fundamentally important to understanding the interactions associated with a network. The

authors imply that an actor's nearness creates greater possibilities for influencing their relationship.

In Sierra Leone, the social vulnerability has made the ready availability of youths to be pronounced. This is especially in the case of youths without jobs who often roam around "Ataya Base" (a popular place where unemployed and unengaged youths socially gather daily and rendezvous to drink tea from locally prepared herbs, talk, share relational feelings about politics, and form associations). Such social gathering places of diverse youths serve as epicenters of mobilization that are closed to the socially negotiated political class, and attract large segments of these unengaged youths. Across Sierra Leone, especially in districts and regional headquarters known for active political party activities, many such "Ataya" base locations are established and visible.

Furthermore, a more rooted factor associated with political party politicization and mobilization of youths is party leadership. Unlike the general recruitment process where youths of diverse backgrounds are taken in, famous ex-combatants are specifically targeted for recruitment or mobilization by political party standard-bearers or presidential candidates. They are mainly used as bodyguards. This practice has become a systemic pattern in the political environment.

In March 2019, a field visit to Sierra Leone for an observational data collection conducted an open-ended interview. The interview was conducted with fifty randomly sampled youths from both the Sierra Leone People's Party and the All People's Congress Party at their party's headquarters. In response to the question "How did you become associated with your party of choice?" the majority of youths could not explain fundamentally or clearly what specific ideology motivated them to join their party. Instead, the majority gave responses such as "if mi party and candidate win, I go get better," meaning that "with the victory of my political party and my candidate, my life and status will be improved." However, during follow-up questions regarding how sure they were that such an outcome would happen, the interviewees' answers focused on providence.

Youths mobilization within and by political parties have also been evident through cultural aspects. As opined by Crawford Young and Thomas Edwin Turner (1985), the:

> ... "patron-client relationship is based not only on reciprocal advantage but on some principle of affinity which supplies a social logic to the network... kinship and ethnic affinity are the most frequent bases for network formation" (1985:158).

In the post-conflict political engagements in Sierra Leone, such patterns have been reawakened, primarily where the political system uses neopatrimonial practices firmly associated with ethnicity and regionalism. A conflict more related to particularistic trends than politically transformative patterns has emerged. As a result, the majority of youths have become prey to politically manipulative patterns.

The political behavior of the majority of the country's youths shows a continued reservation toward boundary-crossing. Such social attachments to constructed identities have impacted the youth's political orientations during their selection of and participation in political party membership. Because of this deterministic particularistic pattern of the alliance, it is also important to note the emergence of "US versus Them" politics in the country. This has been where in-growth and out-growth acts of violence have become common in body politic. In addition, the survival within the political process has been contingent on what socially constructed identity one belongs within the political system.

Having become merely an economic enterprise, the country's political parties possess offices and other establishments where youth support groups mobilize and align within and between the political parties along manipulated particularistic interests. Within these networks formation, they propagate and advance their special interests, often resulting in menial employment

opportunities as rewards. In many instances, the personal and professional relationships gained from these opportunities compromise the institutional stability of post-conflict statebuilding processes.

6.6. Contemporary Environment of Youth in Post-War Sierra Leone

In the aftermath of the civil war, the poverty among the country's youths in both rural and urban areas, which was an outcome of their marginalization within the political and societal structure, increased exponentially. A joint 2019 published report on the Sierra Leone National Multidimensional Poverty Index indicated that, as of 2017, the poverty rate among youths between the age bracket from 15 to 35 was at 57.0 % across the country, 60.8% in rural areas, and 51.6% in urban areas (UNDP-Sierra Leone, 2019). In the post-conflict period, this "employment gap" has often been considered the foundation for the poverty rates among the youth population in Sierra Leone.

Using research on the youth labor markets in Sierra Leone provided by the International Labour Organization, the International Labour Office reported that, as of 2015, only 4.2% of the total youth population were in regular employment, including 6.3% of the males and 2.1% of the females (ILO, 2017). Similarly, the report indicated that 48.5% of the total youth population had irregular employment, including 44.0% of the

males and 53.2% of the females, respectively (see ILO, 2017:1-5).

In 2015, the Sierra Leone Population and Housing Census report by Statistics Sierra Leone on the general employment sector in the country showed that 83.9% of the population were self-employed; (Statistics Sierra Leone Census Report, 2016). In general, the 83% who were self-employed relied on small engagements and were mostly locked in a daily subsistence pattern. This group was largely made up of young people whose exploitation only required strategic, politically manipulative tactics built on their ethnoregional attachments or their overt societal vulnerability with lofty promises.

The second pillar of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2005 referenced job creation for youths as an essential goal for the consolidation of the peacebuilding process. However, this document did not lead to a meaningful outcome. Similarly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's recommendation of 2004 called for youths to have an active and meaningful role in politics. While efforts in such a direction have remained in a piecemeal implementation fashion, the majority of the country's youths have remained mere political tools in the fifteen years of the post- conflict era.

Moreover, the World Bank report of 2009, which referenced the Sierra Leone Statistics on Population and Housing Census of

2004, classified the head of a household by age, gender, and proportionate responsibility. It found that males within the youth age category who had been heads of household constituted the following percentage of the population: "65 %, and at age 35" (Peeters et al., 2009:21-22).

6.7. The Political Mobilization of Youths and the Dilemma for Liberal Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

In general, with the end of the eleven years of revolution, pockets of recurrent violence have remained evident both within and outside the mainstream political environment of Sierra Leone (see Enria,2018). In his summary work on Sierra Leone, Kars de Bruijne (2019) noted violence as one of the recurrent patterns in Sierra Leone, especially from 2002 onwards. From between 2013 and 2014, for example, Bruijne indicated that incidences of recurrent violence perpetrated by youths and mobilized youth gangs substantially increased with the societal structure. Bruijne noted that these incidences of violence were mostly associated with in- group and out-group political parties, and other types of related violence. In addition, Bruijne further indicated that most of these violent acts were staged by former combatants and other political party paramilitary task forces mainly under the influence of the political actors within representative political parties (Bruijne, 2019).

Patterns of recurrent political violence led mainly by opposing youth groups have become a characteristic of party politics. Many ex-combatants who did not undergo a proper reintegration process following the end of the war in 2002 and who have remained gainfully unengaged by the state, are often vibrant actors. These ex-combatants, mostly youths, are now instruments politicized and mobilized by political actors and their parties to intimidate their political opponents, often acting as paramilitary security for their party's candidates (Mitton, 2008; Small Arms Survey, 2010).

Political party offices have become the main bases where these mobilized youth groups are stationed to protect their offices, within which they are assigned to accompany campaign rallies. The composition of these youth groups includes members who participated actively during the war and were recruited and mobilized by a party or candidates for political activities. According to the 2010 Small Arms Survey, a substantial number of youths (mainly ex-combatants) were recruited to serve as the task force for the All People's Congress party in 2007, following its victory were awarded dividends for constituting part of the "presidential bodyguards" (Small Arms Survey, 2010).

In addition, hardcore criminals, mostly youths in their prime, have been galvanized into town cliques visible across urban locations and have also been some of the primary sources of politicization and mobilization through meager political

handouts. Because the political environment is characterized by violence, it has often generated political apathy, undermining fundamental liberal principles, such as participation within the political space. In this context, for example, women have been considered the most vulnerable section of society. Because of the violent nature characterizing the political system and other factors, women have found it challenging to navigate their political interests or to participate in electoral processes for fear of systemic structural and physical violence (Oxfam,2008, Denney & Ibrahim, 2012). Of the 124 parliamentarians for the political cycle from 2007 to 2012, 16 women were parliamentarians, while out of 370 local councilors, only 86 were female (Manson & Knight,2012:28).

Given this recurrent nature of political violence, the competitive role of women and other unprotected candidates in the political system in Sierra Leone has remained remarkably minimal (Kellow, 2010). This fact has undermined United Nations Resolution 1325, a framework that advocated for the increased political representation of women in governance as an essential pillar for societal peace (United Nations Resolution Document, 2000). In addition to political violence, the state stratification in Sierra Leone, which has remained built on a patriarchal system, leads to structural violence and has disengaged young females within the youth category from the political participation (McFerson, 2012).

Political violence orchestrated by political parties and related operatives has become a pattern across the society, as both incumbent and opposition parties are centrally placed within the same political structures. Such activities have undermined the stability of various political processes at all levels of society. For example, a typical case in point occurred during the 2007 general elections. The massive scale of institutionalized political violence enacted by state actors both between the opposing parties and the incumbent government nearly resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency (Milton,2008).

This example illustrates the magnitude of the situation since such a phenomenon could have degenerated society into unbridled violence and subsequent warfare. However, among large segments of the political parties, as similar examples have occurred in all the electoral processes. These practices were especially pronounced from 2012 to 2018, leading to the displacement and physical harm of people from most of the political-administrative regions in Kono, Kailahun, and Port Loko.

According to Kaplan (2000:45), in societies marked by widespread poverty, which results from the marginalization of youths and produces this unequal opportunity, citizens often seek deliverance through violence. In the past fifteen years,

this phenomenon has become particularly commonplace in Sierra Leone.

6.8. Conclusion

This chapter focused on Sierra Leone and looked at how the politicization and manipulation of youths in the political system resulted in widespread unequal opportunity within the societal political structure. This phenomenon, as deliberated in this chapter, created a fundamental obstacle to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding.

This chapter has argued that the politicization and manipulation of the youth by party politics formed in line with the practice of ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism resulted in youth mobilization. This created an atmosphere of marginalization among the youth population, where their mobilization culminated in their use as political instruments instead of as meaningful participants within the post-conflict political structure. As argued in this chapter, such patterns eliminated the prospects for equal opportunity within the societal structure. Given that the existence of equal opportunity is a fundamental pillar in enhancing liberal post-conflict peacebuilding, its non-existence in Sierra Leone consequently became an obstacle to liberal peacebuilding.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

The impact of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding across
many societies, particularly in the developing world, has been
overwhelming. The notion of social change has remained
importantly situated at the core of the liberal peacebuilding
conception. It is believed that social transformation within
developing countries, especially those with inherent structural
factors that challenge societal development, can stabilize these
societies for both national and global interests (see
Mahalanobis,1963).

After the Cold War, some countries in Africa were beset by
deepening structural challenges. In their transition toward
social change, they experienced fundamental intra-state
conflicts. In the last several decades, such conflicts have led
to extensive engagements built on the liberal peacebuilding
model that was conceived as an effort to stabilize these
societies. Sierra Leone, a post-conflict country within Africa,
experienced extensive engagements with liberal post-conflict
peacebuilding efforts. Such a model was designed to recuperate
Sierra Leone from its despair and give it a modern state
structure.

However, as argued, the engagement of liberal post-conflict
peacebuilding in the aftermath of the war in Sierra Leone did

not yield the successful realization of such a model. This thesis thus posed a question, why has the attempt of liberal peacebuilding not been successful in Sierra Leone? The thesis has then observed that the difficulty in achieving the model of liberal peacebuilding is mainly situated in the society's political superstructure. This thesis has argued that the practice of ethnoregional- neopatrimonialism, which has characterized the political structure of post-conflict Sierra Leone, disintegrated three core pillars. These pillars are vital to societal stability. They are fundamentally germane to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in a post-conflict country, especially within the context of the heterogeneous society of Sierra Leone, transitioning from intra-state warfare. This thesis structured these arguments across three chapters. In chapter 1, the thesis provided an overview that outlined the aim, scope, and methodology of this study and the conceptual framework. Chapter 2 provided a literature review within the scope of liberal peacebuilding, while chapter 3 specifically examined the engagement of liberal post- conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

In Chapter 4, the thesis argued that a neopatrimonial political system that became inherently associated with ethnicity and regionalism is hindering ethnic pluralism from the country's political processes. Ethnic pluralism is particularly pertinent in a heterogeneous state, due to the multidimensional

power of freedom, inclusivity, and political participation. This foundation is a fundamental pillar that enhances the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in a post-war state.

Within the societal structure of Sierra Leone, the prevalence of neopatrimonial politics associated with ethnicity and regionalism keeps identity intensely salient within the political system. This process culminated in systematic, large-scale, coordinated political exclusionary tactics and ethnic and regional patterns in the country. It also resulted in the weakening of liberal institutions, particularly those related to the rule of law and human rights. Given the centrality of ethnic pluralism in societal stability, and its contributions in the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in a heterogeneous post-war country, this thesis notes that the absence of ethnic pluralism in the political system of Sierra Leone constituted a major obstacle that deters the successful liberal peacebuilding in the country.

In addition, in Chapter 5, this thesis argued that inequality was another prevalent factor that has remained in the societal structure of Sierra Leone. During the post-conflict peacebuilding, development aid was a key component of the country's intervention efforts and could have helped address the country's problems with economic development. Sierra Leone's economy became entirely dependent on foreign aid intended to

enhance transformation within the post-conflict societal structure. However, as this thesis has argued, the inability to manage this development aid resulted in alarming economic underdevelopment across Sierra Leone, leading to inequality and poverty on a huge scale.

The overdependence of the country's economy on foreign aid, became the hotbed for the ethnoregional-neopatrimonial political system that led to its mismanagement. This culminated in the disintegration of the country's economic development. This trend created an atmosphere of inequality and overt poverty within the societal structure. Consequently, it became an obstacle to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding in the country. Because, economic progress and development help alleviate systemic inequality and poverty, and these are germane for post-conflict environments to prevent country relapse into war. Its absence in Sierra Leone made the successful realization of liberal peacebuilding difficult.

Moreover, in Chapter 6, this thesis analyzed how the persistence of neopatrimonialism associated with ethnicity and regionalism caused violent politicization and manipulation of the country's youths. This persistent pattern resulted in marginalization and made equal opportunity nonexistent within the country. This thesis argues in this chapter that the mobilization of youths was manipulated by political parties formed in line with *ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism*. This

manipulation hinders the development of equal participation in politics. This organized   political pattern emboldened by the ethnoregional-neopatrimonial system is the obstacle to liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.

This thesis has argued that within the political system of post- conflict Sierra Leone, the existence of ethnic pluralism within the political system has remained impracticable. In addition, inequality and unequal opportunity have remained severely widespread affecting the majority of the country's population. These factors are outcomes characterized by the political system and practices of ethnoregionalism associated with ethnicity and regionalism. Thus, the implication of this political structure and practices characterized the society's challenge to the successful realization of liberal post-conflict peacebuilding. Heterogeneous and transitioning post-conflict states from war to peace requires ethnic pluralism, economic development that addresses inequality, and equal opportunity. These characteristics are fundamental and paramount for peace, stability, and development. In the post-war political system of Sierra Leone, the practice of *ethnoregional- neopatrimonialism* became a systematized pattern through which the political system became manipulated. Such a practice has not only deterred all attempts at societal transformation, but also subjected the majority of the citizens to anguish. Guenther Roth (1968:195) indicated that "the basic problem of political stability must

be solved before all others—or everything else may be in vain."
The fundamental debacle in Sierra Leone has been the intractable
persistence of neopatrimonialism, which has been worsened by its
association with ethnicity and regionalism. This practice has
hampered all post-conflict liberal peacebuilding efforts in the
country.

Finally, this thesis concludes that any future research on
liberal post-conflict peacebuilding should systematically
examine how to overcome obstacles rooted in local society like
ethnoregional-neopatrimonialism in the case of Sierra Leone.

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