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**Japanese War Memories and Sino-Japanese Relations
from 1972 to 2017: Textbooks, Museums and The
Debates over History**



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Six years ago when I began my doctoral program, an older colleague told me that writing a doctoral dissertation is like going on a long journey; it involves an enormous amount of reading and creating for oneself a well-planned schedule, yet even with much forethought and preparation, accidents still occur after one has raised the sails. The journey of writing is not like a trip in which people can relax and enjoy sightseeing. My writing journey has taken a long time, and fixing problems and overcoming obstacles has become the primary work in the journey. The most invaluable lesson on this writing journey has not come from seeing how beautiful the ‘landscape’ has been along the way, but lies in the capacity and confidence that I have built up through dealing with troubles, dilemmas, and mental stress. In this painful, arduous, but significant journey, I have received great encouragement from my main supervisor Professor Iwasaki Minoru, and my sub-supervisors Professor Lee Hyoduk, Professor Yonetani Masafumi, Professor Philip A. Seaton and Professor Hashimoto Yūichi. Without their patient guidance and supervision through the years of my doctoral research, this dissertation would never have been completed. My parent’s unwavering support, both financially and mentally, and warm encouragement from friends and family members have been the spiritual power that kept me going even during those nights when I never got to see the stars in the sky, and through those days sailing through storms, insuring that I never gave up. Thank you to all of you for standing by my side from the beginning to the end.

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Abbreviations and Glossary

AWF	Asian Women's Fund
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ECSADIZ	East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone
GHQ	General Headquarters
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
JSHTR	Japan Society for History Textbook Reform
JTU	Japan Teacher's Union
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MEXT	Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan
MOE	Ministry of Education
POW	Prisoner of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCAP	Supreme Commander of Allied Powers

Abstract

Since diplomatic relations between China and Japan were normalized in 1972, cooperation in economic and cultural spheres have grown continuously. However, the historical issues between China and Japan are yet to be resolved and still affect bilateral relations today. Trends in Sino-Japanese relations have changed between 1972 and 2017, and historical consciousness and war memories in Japan have transformed accordingly. This thesis traces the relationships between Sino-Japanese relations, Japanese historical consciousness and Japanese war memories.

The theoretical framework of this thesis is constructed based on memory studies. Memory studies theory suggests that collective memories are socially constructed notions, which can be embodied by various cultural entities. The thesis demonstrates what Japanese historical consciousness and war memories have been constructed in what social context, and how Japanese war memories are represented in various cultural forms.

This thesis is based on analysis of 117 Japanese history textbooks published between 1972 and 2017 and 37 of Japan's war-related museums. Through textual analysis of depictions of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894), the Mukden Incident (1931), the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (1937), Nanjing Massacre (1937), the 'Comfort Women', the 'Three-Alls Operation', the Battle of Okinawa and the A-Bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945), this thesis clarifies how the wars between China and Japan from 1894 to 1945 are presented in Japanese history textbooks and museums.

By conducting analysis of the historical debates in Sino-Japanese relations between 1972 to 2017, this thesis argues that although Japan's domestic environment determines Japanese war narratives and war memories, China's diplomacy toward Japan also plays an important role in shaping and re-shaping Japanese historical consciousness and war memories. Based on the textual analysis, this thesis argues that although the heterogeneity of war narratives exists throughout the post-war Japan, war narratives are observed to have shifted from 'conservative perspectives' in the 1970s to more 'progressive perspectives' in the 1980s and 1990s, and then back via 'progressive-leaning perspectives' in the 2000s 'conservative' or 'nationalist' perspectives in the 2010s.

This thesis is expected to indicate ways for improving future Sino-Japanese relations in addition to outlining the transformations in Japanese historical consciousness and war memories.

This thesis is divided into five chapters, which are:

Chapter 1. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework;

Chapter 2. Sino-Japanese Relations and Debates over History;

Chapter 3. War Narratives of Japanese History Textbooks (1972-2017);

Chapter 4. War Narratives in Japan's War-Related Museums;

Chapter 5. Conclusion.

Prologue

My first images of Japan and Japanese people were of ‘the most developed country’ and ‘the gentlest people’. I gained this image by watching a television drama titled *Red Suspicion (Akai Giwaku)* when I was in elementary school. The story is about a 17-year old girl who is diagnosed with leukemia and needs a blood transfusion as part of the treatment. But she notices that her typical blood type is different from her parents. The girl (played by Yamaguchi Momoe) and her blood donor (played by Miura Tomokazu) were in a relationship, but neither of them know that they are biological siblings born of the same father. The girl dies from leukemia, but the whole-hearted support of her parents and her half-brother constructed my original image of Japanese people as kind-hearted. When Japanese popular culture flooded into China in the first half of the 1990s, most Chinese young people like me were irresistibly attracted by Japan and called ourselves ‘*Ha Ri Zu*’ (Japanophiles).

But then, Japanese TV shows largely disappeared from Chinese television. Until the development of internet in the late 1990s, Japanese manga and animation were less available in bookstores, too. Furthermore, my positive image of Japan and the Japanese gradually changed after I started to learn Chinese history in junior high school.

During my six years of education in junior and senior high school from 1996 to 2002, the things I learned about Japan’s aggression towards China and its brutal atrocities on Chinese people started to blur the positive images that I had in my mind from when I was younger. Japan’s qualification of a problematic history textbook (produced by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, hereafter JSHTR) in 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s repeated worship at Yasukuni Shrine in an official capacity from 2001 to 2006, and some Japanese students’ provocative performance¹ in Northwest

¹ On October 29, 2003, the Foreign Language Department of Northwest China University held the Third Foreign Language Cultural Festival. At the closing ceremony, three Japanese students and one Japanese teacher acted as four Chinese people tied up with a red bra and fake genitals made out of paper cups. Their costumes and performance were interpreted as seriously discriminatory and humiliating to the Chinese people. During the performance, Chinese students started shouting at the Japanese actors and kicked them off the stage. The performance was abandoned, but it incited Chinese students’ resentment. The Japanese teacher and the three students were expelled from the school that afternoon and the performance triggered large-scale anti-Japanese protests on the following two days in Xi’an City. Thousands of Chinese students from colleges and universities were mobilized to protest. They gathered in front of the international residential halls in universities and colleges, required Japanese students to

University in 2003 (Xi'an City, Shanxi Province of China), made me doubt my previous images. Japan and Japanese people seemed less decent than I had previously thought. However, when I had witnessed the destruction and looting of Japanese businesses during the large-scale anti-Japanese protests in 2005, it seemed wrong to express resentment by destroying the property of people in the postwar generations, especially if those Japanese people were not even denying that Japan fought an aggressive war. These contradictory images of Japan and Japanese people, as well as my complicated feelings toward the irrationality of the anti-Japanese protests, inspired me to investigate more Japanese people's views regarding the wartime past. I started to learn Japanese as my second foreign language during and after my university education, and made preparations to study in Japan.

During my nine years of study in Japan, 2009-2018, I have learned that Japanese people's interpretations of Japan's aggressive wars in Asia are contested and have transformed throughout the postwar period. As the research progressed, the literature in memory studies deepened my understanding of how Japanese people remember their national past. Collective memory is a 'socially constructed notion', which is always preserved and recollected within a so-called social framework of collective memories (Halbwachs 1992, 52-53). The term cultural memory refers to memory as a part of a culture which becomes entangled with a political agenda, supplies the identity of culture, and endows the value of past (Sturken 1997, 1). By observing the rapid development of cultural technologies, Alison Landsberg has presented a modern type of sensuous memory called 'prosthetic memory' and argues that it can be created by mass-mediated representations and functions analogous to an artificial limb being attached to an individual's body (Landsberg 2004, 20). Studies of memory revolve around questions of 'who's memory' and 'why memories are represented in the way that they are', so the

apologize for the performance and Japan's aggression in China in the 1930s. In some universities in Xi'an City, Chinese student protesters rushed into international residential halls, besieged innocent Japanese students and required Japanese students to give a public apology for Japan's invasion in the war. Large scale anti-Japanese protests continued for two days until the Japanese students apologized for their behavior on November 2, 2003 (See: BBC NEWS 2003 and Zou 2012).

analysis of memory always starts from ‘story-telling’ and examining the ‘reasons’ why the stories are told in a particular style.

Within these approaches – collective memory, cultural memory, and prosthetic memory – the ‘social context’ in the process of representing memory remains significant. In other words, memories can be modified by the social context, and when the social context changes, memories and their representations may change, too.

When examining these transformations, it is important to distinguish the war memories of the wartime generations and the collective or cultural memories of the postwar generations. The memories of lived experiences of the wartime generations are classified as ‘war memories’ (Seaton 2007, 18), and the ways in which postwar generations recognize their national history and how they represent the war in their own cultural productions are defined as ‘cultural memories’, in other words, a culturally constructed notion about the national past (Sturken 1997). The former highlights how social context affects which type of testimonies are presented in public within a given social epoch. The latter, since the postwar generations did not directly experience the war, comprises war memories left by the wartime generations and their (re)adaptation in various forms of cultural production. They highlight new understandings of the national past both cognitively and mnemonically, and how the social context modifies type cultural memories. ‘War memories of the wartime generations’ and ‘cultural memories’ of both the wartime generations and post-war generations’, therefore, constitute the texture of historical memories in contemporary Japan.

In the recent memory studies, memory’s ‘exchangeability’ – as Lansberg stressed in her book *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* – reminds us that memory can be mediated by various cultural technologies under a certain social milieu, and the newly constructed memory in each social epoch then becomes the historical knowledge passed on to the wartime generations and all subsequent postwar generations. Although the idea that social context regulates war memory is the main hypothesis of this thesis, the frequent transformation of the social context deepens the inconsistency of war memories. In Japan’s case, Philip Seaton’s work on ‘Japan’s contested war memories’ presents a seismic metaphor that identifies

deep ‘memory rifts’, and he argues that these rifts have existed in postwar Japan from 1945 till now (Seaton 2007).

To conduct research into war memories, therefore, includes the analysis of the social context and analysis of memory’s representations. Similarly, to analyze the ‘contested war memories’ in post-war Japan requires analysis of the ‘contested social context’ and the ‘contested representations of war memories’. The ‘social context’, as the first object of analysis, refers to all social-related traditions which limit and allow the typical collective memory to be preserved and recollected in a certain social epoch (Halbwachs 1992). In studies of war memories in post-war Japan, the postwar era is often divided into ‘the occupational period, 1945-1952’, ‘the 1955 system of LDP rule’, ‘high speed economic development in the 1960s’, ‘embracing Asia, 1972-1993’, ‘transformation from 1994’, and ‘decline post-2001’ (cf. Yoshida 1995 and Seaton 2007). The names given to the periods highlight the distinctive characteristics of Japanese society in each episode, both politically and cognitively. The analysis of ‘social context’ in current studies of Japan’s war memories is more focused on the domestic environment and includes both the state (for example, political agendas, official statements, debates on historical issues among politicians) and civil society (for example, mass media reports, poll surveys, interviews, testimonies). Nevertheless, pressures from the international community, especially U.S. policy toward Japan, are commonly confirmed as an important external variable that affects Japan’s social context in dealing with its historical issues. China’s diplomacy toward Japan also plays a major role in shaping and reshaping Japan’s recognition of the war (cf. Rose 2005, and Takahara 2012). This thesis focuses on Sino-Japanese relations as seen in two major daily newspapers, mainly *Asahi Shinbun* (Japan) and *People’s Daily* (China), as well as in academic scholarship. Using textual analysis, the first aim of this research to unpack what diplomatic policy and newspaper reports say about Japan’s recognition of the war in Asia.

The second object of analysis, the ‘representation of war memories’, is divided into two branches: testimonies of wartime generations and cultural memories, which are held by both wartime and post-war generations. Testimonies of wartime generations are like other representations of collective memories and can be modified by the social context. People often adjust what they say, or the way they say it, according to the specific social

context. For example, in a progressive social context, it might be easier to give confessional testimonies compared to in a relatively conservative environment. In contrast to testimonies, cultural memory is a type of memory that is beyond the historical discourse, in the sense that it is not necessarily based on historically accurate renditions of history. Instead, it is re-edited and embodied by various cultural entities. Re-narrativization of history is the essence of cultural memories of both wartime generations and post-war generations (Sturken 1997, 42).

Although, testimonies of the wartime generations and cultural memories of both the wartime and post-war generations have contributed to the textures of memory in post-war Japan, on the day that the last member of the wartime generation passes away, their testimonies based on actual experience will be replaced entirely by the cultural memories of those who did not experience the war. The second aim of this research, therefore, is to trace war testimonies in each social epoch while observing their representations in various cultural entities before the last person of the wartime generation passes away.

War memories and cultural memories have a common characteristic: they can be embodied by cultural entities. Testimonies (verbalized war memories of the wartime generation) are expressed primarily in textual or oral statements. Cultural memories can also be embodied by textual and oral statements, but they are more broadly reified by other artistic forms for 're-narrativizing' and 're-creating' war memories. The desire to include both testimonies and cultural memories in this research helps set the research scope. In particular, history textbooks and museums have been chosen as two cultural forms that contain both testimonies and cultural memories. History textbooks are not written by those experienced war, but they contain historians' interpretations of the historical evidence, and the historical knowledge the textbooks disseminate contributes significantly to historical consciousness. Museums, meanwhile, have not only exhibits and testimonies, but also reveal the curators' or paymasters' stances on history. Of course, other cultural forms including literature, comic books, animations, movies, TV shows, simulation games and other cultural forms also give insights into how cultural memories are represented among post-war generations. However, textbooks and museums have been included because they have strong official involvement, too.

Textbooks often represent both a product under hegemonic control (Apple and Christian-Smith 1991, 9) and an attempt to remake and re-legitimate a culture's plausibility system (Luke 1988, 24). Since the approval of Japanese history textbooks is carried out under the government's supervision, the textbook writing and screening process offers a good vantage point from which to observe the interactions between government and historians regarding the war. The narratives within textbooks also provide a picture of the construction and transformation of views on war (*sensōkan*) as one component of cultural memories among the post-war generations. The analysis of Japanese textbooks in this thesis covers 102 junior high school history textbooks which were approved and published from 1972 to 2017, and 15 senior high school history textbooks which were adopted from 2013 to 2017.

Museums or exhibitions are defined as sites which suggest a way for us of seeing the world (Macdonald 1996, 8). Museums are recognized as contested terrains because they show how social theories and cultural elements can be embedded and performed while challenging the accepted wisdom, and they force people to rethink the meaning of modernity, nationhood, social memory, as well as the nature of material forms (ibid, 3). Similar to textbooks, museums act as veridical platforms to observe how the changes of social modes undermine authoritative traditions, and also how museums are subject to the homogenizing power of the market (Urry 1996, 61-62). In this research, eight museums that contain relatively significant exhibits about the two Sino-Japanese Wars are analyzed. They are the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial House (Yamaguchi Prefecture), the Yūshūkan Museum (Tokyo), the National Museum of Japanese History (Chiba Prefecture), the Kawasaki Peace Museum (Kanagawa Prefecture), the Noborito Laboratory Museum (Tokyo), the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (Okinawa Prefecture), the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (Hiroshima Prefecture), and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum (Nagasaki Prefecture).

Analysis of the social context and analysis of representations of war memories constitute the main objects of discussion in this research. The former is undertaken via textual analysis, which includes surveys of newspaper reports, discussions on television programs, opinion poll surveys, academic articles, and works of literature. How the Chinese government negotiated with Japan regarding the disputed historical issues in

different social epochs, and reactions within Japan's domestic discourse at the time are tackled in chapter 2. Analysis of the representation of war memory is also conducted by textual analysis, including the analysis of depictions and interpretations of historical events. By asking 1) how the in-group identity and out-group image are constructed, 2) how motivations and war conducts are interpreted, and 3) how the remorse narrative is depicted, textual analysis will enable the drawing of a map of Japan's transformation of its war consciousness.

To summarize, therefore, the aim of this thesis is to present and critically analyze war narratives in Japan in the period since the normalization of relations between Japan and China in 1972. The war narratives focus on the Sino-Japanese conflict from 1894 to 1945 rather than simply narratives of the Asia-Pacific War (1937-45). The two main objects of study are textbooks and museums. Both may be categorized as official or semi-official narratives because they are disseminated with the involvement of local or national government. Textbooks are screened by the Ministry of Education, while most of the museums discussed are public museums. The study of textbooks allows us to see transformations in narratives over time, while the study of museums allows us to see narratives in different geographical contexts and funded by different kinds of official, semi-official or private actors. The thesis, therefore, presents various processes by which narratives have developed in Japan in the past five decades. This study adds to previous research on Sino-Japanese relations and war memories in two particular ways. First, it focuses on a more longitudinal fashion on half a century of Sino-Japanese conflict (rather than just the 1930s and 1940s). And second, it uses textual analysis as the methods for analyzing the content of textbooks and museums.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework; Chapter 2 explains the establishment and transformation of war consciousness; Chapter 3 is the analysis of Japanese history textbooks from 1972 to 2017, and Chapter 4 is about Japanese museums. Finally, the conclusions are in Chapter 5.

Chapter 1. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

1.1 Between History and Memory

‘History’, according to Edward Carr, encompasses a corpus of ascertained historical facts and the works of historians (Carr 1961). Historical facts before they are found and interpreted by historians are just ‘materials’ without historical or realistic meaning. Since according to Carr the historian ‘collects them [historical facts], takes them home, and cooks and serves them in whatever style appears to him’ (Carr 1961, 6), the relationship between ‘historical facts’ and ‘historians’ are explained as ‘indispensable to each other’ because ‘the historian without his facts is rootless and futile; the facts without their historian are dead and meaningless’ (ibid, 35).

Carr emphasizes the indispensable relationship between historical fact and historian because he believes that historiography always has its own social context. Historians, as the individual writers produced by a society, are not isolated and acting in a vacuum, but rather act in the context and under the impulse of a past society (ibid, 41-42). In other words, historian’s motives to interpret the historical facts are inevitably adjusted by the social context in which they dwell. This reminds us of two necessary tasks in the analysis of ‘historical facts’ and ‘historiography’: while we must place historical facts within their social context, we also need to place historiography within the author’s social context because different social contexts produce diverse interpretations of history.

‘Memory’, in the discipline of psychology, is defined as a process to acquire information, to archive the information, and to recollect the information (Bower and Anderson 1973). In psychology, ‘memory’ particularly refers to ‘personal memory’, but in sociology, ‘memory’ is more focused on ‘collective’ and ‘public’ memory rather than ‘personal’. The definition of ‘memory’ in sociology also shares the same characteristics of ‘memory’ in psychology, namely the acquisition, archiving and recollection of historical knowledge, but in sociology the transition of memory is not limited within individuals but occurs in two other ways: from individual to collective, and from the direct experiences of individuals to the ‘memories’ of those without personal experience (Seaton 2007, 13).

In a similar manner to history, memory is modified by the social context as well. Maurice Halbwachs defined ‘collective memory’ as ‘a socially constructed notion’, in

which individuals who are located in a specific group context are able to ‘draw on that context’ and to ‘remember or recreate the past’ (Halbwachs 1992, 22). Marita Sturken stated ‘the process of cultural memory is bound up in complex political stakes and meanings’ (Sturken 1997, 1), which implies that different ‘political stakes’ are able to endow ‘personal memories’ with different cultural meanings when they are shared in the public sphere (Sturken 1997, 2-3). Alison Landsberg broadened Sturken’s ‘cultural memory’ from ‘culture interprets personal memories’ to ‘cultural technology transforms memory’ by defining a modern form of memory titled ‘prosthetic memory’ as an ‘artificial limb’. She argues that it can be placed on anyone’s body and functions as an ‘authentic memory’ (Landsberg 2004, 22). In the rationale of ‘prosthetic memory’, social modernization and the development of cultural technologies are set as two parameters which diversify representations of memories from the individual level to the public level.

From the above discussion, it can be seen that ‘memory’ and ‘social context’ are inseparable. In the process of social modernization, ‘culture’ is the product of society and can be defined as ‘the widely distributed forms of popular music, publishing, art, design and literature, or the activities of leisure-time and entertainment’ in an age of the modernization (Hall 1997, 2). Therefore, in memory studies, ‘culture’ can be seen as a container-like instrument in which memories can be preserved, represented and reshaped by giving them the certain cultural meanings.

Although the analysis of ‘history’ and ‘memory’ cannot be isolated from their social contexts, the relationship between ‘history’ and ‘memory’ needs to be clarified because what memory creates what history, how the history has been told, and how history affects the present are all able to provide angles for reconsidering the ethical relations between ‘us’ and ‘the world’.

Pierre Nora drew a dialectical relationship between history and memory as ‘essentially confronted’ but ‘realistically tangled’ (Nora 1989). Memory and history, according to Nora, are ‘far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition[...] because memory, insofar, as it is affective and magical, only accommodates those facts that suit it’, and the mission of history is ‘perpetually suspicious of memory’, ‘to suppress and destroy it’ (Nora 1989, 9). An absolute boundary between ‘history’ and ‘memory’ is set because Nora views ‘history’ as a ‘social science’ but ‘memory’ as a purely private

phenomenon. However, because organic memory will eventually fade away, people started to create archives, maintain anniversaries, and organize celebrations with the aim of ‘defend[ing] the memories’ (ibid, 12). These memorial activities are identified by Nora as *lieux de mémoire* (realms of memory). The aims of those realms are to stop time, to block the work of forgetting, to establish a state of things, and to immortalize death (ibid). The establishment of those memorial realms reminds us of the tangled relationship between history and memory, meaning that a situation in which ‘memory dictates while history writes’ has been constructed (ibid, 21). In short, the fading of memory is inevitable, but humans’ desire to stop memory’s death becomes an opportunity for the re-narrativization of history.

Others have also emphasized the indispensable relationship between ‘history’ and ‘memory’. Maurice Halbwachs argued that ‘collective memory cannot serve as a distinct prop to the prevailing historical period if the past is seen as totally alien’ (Halbwachs 1992, 26), which underlines how historical continuity in the analysis of collective memories is necessary. Marita Sturken stated that ‘histories are told through popular culture, the media, public images, and public memorials’ in which ‘cultural memory engages with historical narrative in this public sphere’ (Sturken 1997, 5). Sturken clarified that ‘personal memory, cultural memory, and history do not exist within neatly defined boundaries. [...] personal memories can sometimes be subsumed into history, and elements of cultural memory can exist in concert with historical narratives’ (ibid, 5-6). In the establishment of the concept of ‘prosthetic memory’, Alison Landsberg repeatedly stressed that ‘prosthetic memories are neither purely individual nor entirely collective [...] they blur the boundary between individual and collective memory, they also complicate the distinction between memory and history’ (Landsberg 2004, 19). Pam Cook in the analysis of memory and nostalgia in cinema claimed that ‘the distinction between nostalgia, memory, and history has become blurred [...] it is equally possible to see them as a continuum with history at one end, nostalgia at the other and memory as a bridge or transition between them’ (Cook 2005, 3). Since memory needs to be represented, it provides an opportunity for historians to record and interpret historical facts with the aim of ensuring that the memory can be recollected in the future. The interpretations of various historical facts, therefore, form a corpus of historical knowledge, and through

learning historical knowledge people are able to construct their historical consciousness for evaluating their past. Consequently, when people record today's historical consciousness, they create the possibility for tomorrow's recollections.

1.2 Reconsidering War Memory and Historical Consciousness

'War memory' in this thesis specifically refers to both 'war memories' and 'cultural memories'. In a narrow sense, 'war memory' only refers to personal memories of the war generation's experiences (Seaton 2007, 18), but in a general sense, 'war memory' also includes 'cultural memory'. The postwar generations do not have war experience and can only adopt 'war memories' via the consumption of various cultural materials. This means that for both war generations and the post-war generations, learning historical knowledge and experiencing 'historical moments' via participating in shared cultural activities leads to the construction of their 'historical consciousness' as well as their 'images of war'.

As discussed above, psychologists have defined memory as a process of acquiring, archiving, and recollecting information (Bower and Anderson 1973). War memory also follows this process. In this thesis, the 'information' is 'historical knowledge'; and war memory refers to the acquisition, preservation and recollection of war-related information. In this thesis, history textbooks are the first object of analysis because they are respected cultural forms transmitting historical knowledge, but at the same time the changes in textbook wordings allow for the observation of transformations in 'historical knowledge' over time. War and peace-related museums are the second object of analysis because they are powerful sites where the 'preservation' and 'recollection' of 'historical knowledge' may be observed. Since 'historical knowledge' provides the basis for the construction of 'historical consciousness', when the structure of 'historical knowledge' is changed, it transforms 'historical consciousness' and subsequently influence the representations of memory.

'Historical consciousness', according to Seaton, is different from war memory. It has an explicit normative dimension. Using the term 'judgemental memory', Seaton highlights how war responsibility is a critical component of war memories in Japan (Seaton 2007, 18). 'War responsibility' – as classified by Takahashi Tetsuya – does not only refer to 'war responsibility' of the war generations (*sensō sekinin*) but also includes

the ‘postwar responsibility’ (*sengō sekinin*) of the postwar generations (Takahashi 2005). Takahashi argued that the ‘war responsibility’ is the prerequisite of ‘postwar responsibility’ (Takahashi 2005, 37), in which ‘war responsibility’ refers to Japan’s war crimes in its aggressive wars in Asia which need to be taken by conducting ‘punishment to the criminals’ and ‘reparation to the victims’; and ‘postwar responsibility’ is not about asking the postwar generations to take ‘war responsibility’ for acts that they were not involved in personally, but refers to the possibility of the postwar generations to respond (*ōtō kanōsei*) to war responsibility (Takahashi 2005, 37-40). According to Takahashi’s argument, Japan’s failed to respond its postwar responsibility in the postwar era because Japan’s war responsibility has not yet been taken by the perpetrators of acts generating war responsibility (Itō 2013, 225).

Narita Ryūichi extracted two concepts from ‘war responsibility’ and ‘postwar responsibility’ and identified them as the ‘war image’ (*sensōzō*) and the ‘postwar image’ (*sengozō*) (Narita 2015, 3-4). The ‘war image’ refers to the ‘war experience’ of the war generation, and the ‘postwar image’ indicates the ‘image of war among the postwar generations’. By observing the ‘war image’, which was only passed down to the first postwar generation but was not passed down to the second postwar generation, the scholars (cf. Narita Ryūichi 2015, Furuichi Noritoshi 2013 and Shirai Satoshi 2013) uncovered a cleavage between the first and the second postwar generations. This split started from the early postwar stage, and was broadened by the current consciousness of ‘nullification of postwar’ (*seno no muka*). Historical consciousness in the current second postwar generation is represented as ‘we never changed after the war’ rather than ‘Japan has been changed because of the war’ (Narita 2015, 23). ‘Post-war responsibility’, as defined by Narita Ryūichi, is more focused on Japan’s failure to constructing the ‘war image’ among the postwar generations.

The different definitions of ‘war responsibility’ expose the current problems of Japan’s historical consciousness, and the transformation of ‘war responsibility’ has been a long and complicated process throughout the postwar. ‘War responsibility’ highlights the core of Japan’s historical consciousness, which includes debates over ‘the nature of war’, ‘recognition of war crimes’, ‘interpretations of war’ as well as ‘attitudes toward the war’. The orthodox perspective, particularly in English-speaking countries and East Asian

countries, is to claim that Japan has failed to address its war responsibility. Those countries prefer a critical view of Japan's war conduct and postwar stance because it matches their own memory needs (cf. Seaton 2007, Lind 2008 and Saitō 2017). In this orthodox perspective, the complicated conditions affecting the transformation of historical consciousness regarding Japan's war responsibility in the postwar era are easily overlooked. For example, orthodox accounts may skip over the continual efforts of Japan's progressives to acknowledge responsibility in the postwar era; and they may also ignore the interactions between the international situation and Japan's domestic environment, which keeps shaping and reshaping Japan's historical consciousness of its war responsibility. Many scholars have criticized these over-generalizations and attempted to place Japan's struggles with war history and responsibility issues in a broader historical context (cf. Buruma 1994, Yoshida 1995, Dower 1999, Seaton 2007 and Lind 2008). These scholars approach the topic in a holistic manner across different periods in the postwar and in both international and domestic contexts, thereby painting a picture of the transformations in disputes regarding history.

Ian Buruma has stated that cultural and traditional elements are important, but the policies in both wartime and postwar are the determinative elements which make the differences between Germany and Japan (Buruma 1995, xv). By observing the different circumstances between Germany and Japan, Buruma identifies the entanglement of the problematic judgment of the Tokyo Tribunal (1946-48), the continuity of nostalgia, and widespread victim consciousness as the roots of Japan's difficulties in facing its past. In Buruma's argument, the problematic Tokyo Tribunal, which did not address the war crimes of Unit 731 and exonerated Emperor Hirohito of his war responsibility, had greatly shaped Japan's ambivalent understandings of its war perpetrations and war responsibilities (Buruma 1995, 159-176). On the domestic front, opinion was divided. Some people saw the A-class war criminals as guilty of heinous crimes, but for others they were victims of 'victor's justice' and for others they were the 'scapegoats' who faced punishment while Emperor Hirohito was absolved of war responsibility (ibid, 176).

Yoshida Yutaka, meanwhile, specified three 'external circumstances', namely policies that GHQ implemented during the occupation period. First, GHQ over-emphasized American's role in the Asia-Pacific War, and excluded Asian people's resistance against

Japan's invasion. Second, GHQ place war responsibility on the militarists in Japan's army and navy, but whitewashed the images of Emperor Hirohito and ordinary soldiers to being 'opposed to the war'. And third, GHQ redefined Japanese people as innocent civilians who 'were deceived' by militarists (Yoshida 1995, 34-35).

In the early stage of the postwar (1952-1959), who should take what 'war responsibility' was mainly decided at the Tokyo Tribunal and the Treaty of San Francisco. In this period, the 'war responsibility of military leaders' (*shidōsha sekininkan*) was repeatedly emphasized while Emperor Hirohito and Japanese civilians were exonerated from 'war responsibility'. Based on the judgment of the Tokyo Tribunal, seven criminals were sentenced to death and deemed to have taken their 'war responsibility'. But other Class-A criminals and Class-B criminals who served prison sentences were gradually released under the commission of the UN (Higashino 2011, 227-228). At the international level, the inconsistency regarding judgments – both in terms of who was and was not tried and who served what punishment for their crimes – sowed the seeds of confusion regarding war responsibility. Meanwhile at the domestic level, the first government of post-war Japan – the Higashikuniomiya government – place 'responsibility for defeat' on the power differential between the U.S. and Japan. This circumvented the mention of war responsibility and revealed Japan's tolerance of the ambiguity of war responsibility in the early stages of the postwar (Yoshida 1995, 90-91). To accept the war responsibility in the judgments made at the Tokyo Tribunal on a diplomatic level, but allowing ambiguity regarding 'war responsibility' on a domestic level, had gradually become a 'double standard' in the 1950s (*ibid*).

According to Yoshida (1995), this 'double standard' remained in the 1960s and 1970s, and during this period the historical consciousness of war responsibility returned against the backdrop of the Vietnam War and diplomatic normalization with Korea in 1965 and China in 1972. Rapid economic growth in the 1960s diluted the pain of the war, and there was widespread discourse in Japanese society regarding the 'end of postwar', the discussions of war responsibility in the 1960s were replaced by a comfortable discourse of 'war is bad, but there will be no more wars in the future' (*ibid*, 128). Diplomatic normalization with China in 1972 and the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 inspired Japanese people to reconsider Japan's war responsibility towards Chinese people and the

brutality of war in general when Japanese people witnessed American bombing in Vietnam. The consciousness of war responsibility became a ‘strong underflow’ in the 1960s (ibid, 149) and it gradually rose to the surface in the 1970s when citizens’ groups became active in collecting the testimonies of people who had experienced air raids in both Tokyo and Japan’s regions.

The 1980s and 1990s are recognized as the ‘boom period’ of war memories. Many overlapping factors contributed to this phenomenon. The fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union signified the end of the Cold War, which ushered in a new era from which to look on the past. Furthermore, rapid advances in communications technology made opinions of people in other societies more accessible. Perhaps most importantly, the war generation was now elderly and many felt the need to tell of their war experiences before they died. In Japan there was one other important event, namely the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989, which triggered many retrospectives on the Shōwa Period, including the war.

The textbook crisis in 1982 and Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s official visit at Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 triggered war history as a diplomatic issue between Japan and its neighbors. However, the diplomatic crisis triggered by textbooks in 1982 was contained by the Miyazawa Statement of August 1982. The statement said that Japan is ‘keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself’; and promised that ‘Japan will revise the Guidelines of Textbook Authorization’, confirmed that Japan will ‘continue to make efforts to promote mutual understanding and develop friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries’ (MOFA, 1982). After 1985, the Yasukuni Shrine issue subsided when Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro promised to stop his official worship. At the civil society level, the publication of *The Devil’s Gluttony* (*Akuma no hōshoku*), which unpacked Unit 731’s brutal human experiments in mainland China, and meanwhile exposed the rip of ‘the double standard’ (Yoshida 1995, 188). Once again, the Japanese public faced major revelations about wartime atrocities and the issue of war responsibility became more prominent in the domestic arena.

Then in 1991, when a Korean woman named Kim Hak Sun came forward to tell the plight of the ‘comfort women’ (*ianfu*), the Japanese government was forced to conduct an

investigation into the ‘comfort women’ and the facts of the ‘comfort station’ after documents indicating Japanese military ‘involvement’ in the ‘comfort station’ system were found by university professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki in the Defense Agency Archives. The scoop published in the *Asahi* newspaper in January 1992 forced Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi to apologize to the President of South Korea Tae Woo Roh on January 17, 1992 (Gaikō Seisho 1992, 383-388).

After the eruption of the ‘comfort women’, another round of fierce debate about the nature and the extent of Japan’s war crimes occurred between leftists and rightists within Japan. In the second half of 1990s, the establishment of the Liberal View of History Study Group (*Jiyūshugishikan Kenkyukai*) and Japan Society for History Textbook Reform (*Atarashi Rekishi Kyokasho o Tsukurukai*, hereafter JSHTR) led to criticism of ‘masochistic history’ and these groups urged people to have less consideration for the victimhood of other countries and more pride in being Japanese.

A drastic transformation in historical consciousness regarding ‘war responsibility’ was observed in the second half of the 1990s. One of the important reasons for the transformation was the passing away of Emperor Hirohito in 1989. The domestic debate regarding whether Emperor Hirohito should take war responsibility was largely settled around the position that Emperor Hirohito was a pacifist who opposed the war (Yoshida 1995, 228). The establishment of a positive image of Emperor Hirohito in the 1990s revealed that the judgments of the Tokyo Tribunal were maintained, and the recognition of war as ‘aggressive’ was confirmed accordingly (ibid, 228-232).

The LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) government, which had been in power since 1955, collapsed in 1993. After a coalition government was established in August 1993, conservative members of the LDP did not give up their criticisms regarding the coalition government’s dealing with historical issues. Under pressure from the LDP and the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association (*Nihon Izokukai*), Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro changed his categorization of the war from ‘aggressive war’ (*shinryaku sensō*, a term he had used in response to a reporter’s question on taking office) to ‘aggressive behavior’ (*shinryaku kōi*) in his first speech on August 23, 1993. Although, both the Hata Tsutomu government (1994) and Murayama Tomiichi government (1994-1996) used ‘aggressive behavior’ as the government’s official stance on its wars in Asia. Debates

regarding Japan's 'aggressive history' in the Diet continued between 1993 and 1995. On May 24, 1994, in the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, Shii Kazuo – a member of Japanese Communist Party – clarified that the essential difference between 'aggressive war' and 'aggressive behavior' is on the nature of Japan's war in the Asia-Pacific. In Shii's statement, 'aggressive war' highlighted that the war had 'aggressive aims', but 'aggressive behavior' stressed the war was a result of some military groups' illegal actions (Yoshida 1995, 6). The adoption of 'aggressive behavior', therefore, revealed the Japanese government's circumvention of its war responsibilities.

The continuous debates on the nature of war had pushed the Murayama government to shift the phrase again from 'aggressive behavior' to 'aggression' in his statement on the 50th anniversary of the war's end on August 15, 1995. In the Murayama Statement, Japan's 'colonial rule' and 'aggression' was given as the reason for Asian countries' 'tremendous damage and suffering', Japan's promise never to repeat the errors of the past and to strive for further global disarmament highlighted the Murayama government's attempt to atone for Japan's past (MOFA, 1995). The three coalition governments' adoption of 'aggressive behavior' and continuous criticisms from the Diet had exposed that politicians inside the coalition government had failed to reach to a consensus. The lack of consensus regarding war responsibility among politicians was hardly likely to allow political stability in the second half of the 1990s. After the LDP re-gained power in 1996, historical disputes intensified amidst a strong backlash from Japanese conservatives. Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō's worship at Yasukuni Shrine in 1996, the establishment of JSHTTR (Japan Society for History Textbook Reform) in the same year, and voices of denial regarding the 'comfort women' issue signaled a transformation of historical consciousness began in the second half of the 1990s. This transformation mirrored previous patterns identified by Yoshida Yutaka, which he had termed the 'relativization of war responsibility' (*sensō sekinin no sōtaika*) and the 'integration of pacifism and victimhood' (*heiwa shugi to higai ishiki no ittaika*) (Yoshida 1995, 242 and 265).

The transformation of historical consciousness in Japan affected its relations with neighboring Asian countries in the 2000s. The debates regarding Japan's historical consciousness became heated from 2001 to 2006, when then Prime Minister Koizumi

Junichirō repeatedly worshipped at Yasukuni Shrine in an official capacity. Meanwhile, anti-Japanese sentiment extended in China and South Korea based on the wide-spread view that Koizumi's visits constituted a denial or aggression and glorification of Japan's past wars. The controversies regarding Japan's war responsibility became a serious diplomatic issue between China and Japan when a large-scale anti-Japanese protest was organized in 15 cities in 2005, aimed at preventing Japan's application to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The wide-spread view of Japan's denial of aggression and glorification of the war raised anti-Japanese sentiment and led to incidents from the boycott of Japanese products to violent turbulence. Koizumi Junichirō stepped down as Prime Minister of Japan in 2006, but this brought only a temporary cease in bilateral tensions between China and Japan.

From 2010, Japan's domestic debates regarding wartime aggression and war conduct gradually shifted from textbook controversies to its hardline policies in dealing with territorial disputes with China and South Korea. A drastic deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations occurred in 2010. A Chinese fishing vessel collided with a Japan Coast Guard vessel near the Senkaku Islands (which are known in China as Diaoyu and claimed by both China and Taiwan). The Japan Coast Guard (hereafter JCG) immediately detained 14 Chinese fishermen for 'obstructing justice' on September 7, 2010, and extended their detainment until the end of September. This ignited a furious response from the Chinese government as well as the Chinese people. The PRC government stopped administrative communications at all levels and pressured the Japanese government to release the Chinese captain as soon as possible. Echoed the Chinese government, large-scale anti-Japanese protests were again organized in mainland China against Japan's 'illegal detainment'. Chinese reaction did not prevent Japan from nationalizing the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. On September 11th, 2012, Japanese government announced the nationalization on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands after paying 2.5 billion yen to the private landowner, Kurihara Hiroyuki. After Japanese the nationalization, Sino-Japanese relations hit a new low point in 2012 and large-scale anti-Japanese protests were organized that September. In addition to views in China that Japan 'denies' or 'glorifies' the war, the view of Japan was greatly transformed from 'suspicion' to a conviction that

Japan is heading towards re-militarization via its hardline diplomacy in dealing with its territorial disputes.

In summary, therefore, debates regard Japan's war responsibility in both the wartime and postwar eras transformed from domestic discussions to diplomatic confrontations on numerous occasions, regarding numerous topics, and across various decades. Takahashi Tetsuya presents three characteristics of problematic historical consciousness in post-war Japan: the 'trivialization of war crimes' (*kagai ishiki no waishōka*), the 'expansion of victim consciousness' (*higaisha ishiki no kakudai*) and the 'problematic subject of apology' (*shazai no shutai*) (Ishida, et al. 2002, 18-19). The first characteristic, 'trivialization', occurs when people understand the facts about past aggression but claim that although 'we' were perpetrators, 'we' understand the pain of the perpetrators. In trivialized narratives, when the pain of perpetrators is overemphasized, 'the pain' of other victims is neutralized (*ibid*). The second characteristic of the problematic historical consciousness is the extension of victim consciousness, which refers to a delusion of persecution. Victim consciousness stresses the victimhood of the self and regards the one's own victimhood as the only one victimhood (*ibid*). In Takahashi's view, the extension of victim consciousness is more commonly observed from the tragic events of the A-bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the emphasis on one's own victimhood implies a sense of 'liberation' from 'war crimes', and 'liberation' from pain (*ibid*, 48-49).

The debate regarding the 'subject of apology' (*shazai no shutai*) occurred between Katō Norihiro and Takahashi Tetsuya. Katō explained the reason why Japan cannot apologize for war crimes is that Japan had a 'split personality' in the postwar era (Katō 2005). The 'split personality', according to Takahashi, refers to the confrontations between 'conservatives' and 'leftists'. To overcome this type of split, Katō suggests acknowledging Emperor Hirohito's war crimes, removing the contradictions between military power and the Peace Constitution, and apologizing first to the domestic war dead. This, he argues, would help Japan to overcome the traumatic past. Takahashi criticized Katō's statement as 'contradictory' and argued the apology should be first to other nations, and only then Japanese.

The debates between Takahashi and Katō are centered on the ‘subject’ and ‘prioritization’ of Japan’s war responsibility. However, to examine who should take what ‘postwar responsibility’ and who should make what apology to whom requires addressing both Takahashi Tetsuya and Narita Ryūichi’s perspectives regarding ‘wartime responsibility’ and ‘postwar responsibility’. Specifically speaking, to resolve the issue of war responsibility, both the Japanese government and Japanese people should gaze on Japan’s aggressive wars while embracing Asia’s victimhood. Some scholars may emphasize the importance of an official apology, which clarifies the government’s stance regarding past crimes. However, Jennifer Lind has criticized perspectives which over-emphasize the importance of apology, because apology easily triggers the right wing’s resistance to the government’s contrition (Lind 2008). The lack of consistency between the government and people and a lack of mutual trust between Japan and other victim countries are the main problems, in Lind’s argument.

In this thesis, the discussion of war responsibility links wartime responsibility and postwar responsibility together, and it is argued that war responsibility cannot be simply judged by the existence an official apology or official acknowledgement of war crimes. For example, if I unintentionally broke a friend’s vase, if I only say ‘sorry’ and confessed that I broke the vase, it is unlikely to be considered a sincere attitude. Rather, if I apologize for my fault by explaining the reason, expressed regret at my friend’s loss, negotiate compensation, and promise that I would not do it again, this combination of responses would be a much more sincere way of taking my responsibility. Therefore, in this thesis, ‘in-group identity’, ‘interpretation of motivations’, ‘description of the act’, ‘out-group image’ and ‘requiring apology’ are considered as the five parameters to judge if the ‘war responsibility’ can be properly taken.

1.3 Textbook Attacks and Ienaga Saburō’s Textbook Lawsuits

To analyze textbooks and their social, cultural and political contexts, it is necessary first to clarify what ‘text’ refers to. Text, according to Apple and Christian-Smith, is not simply a ‘delivery system’ of facts, but is ‘a result of political, economic, and cultural activities, battles and compromises’, which are ‘conceived, designed, and authored by real people with real interests’ (Apple and Christian-Smith 1991, 1-2). The importance of

text not only refers to its ‘meaningful messages to and about the future’, but also to its functions to ‘recreate a major reference point for what knowledge, culture, belief, and morality really are’ (Inglis 1985, 22-23). The definition of ‘text’ conveys to us that: (1) a text reflects human desires because it is produced by particular people with particular motives; and (2) a text can affect the current structure of knowledge and convey the messages to future.

Similar to text, a textbook as an officially approved text signifies its ‘particular constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and organizing that vast universe of possible knowledge’ (Apple 1991, 3). The content of textbooks, therefore, are able to embody the ‘selective tradition’, means someone’s vision of legitimate knowledge and culture (Williams 1961). According to Apple (1991), what texts and perspectives should be included in the textbook and what should be excluded are determined by the ‘market’, which means the political and economic realities in different social epochs. Domestically, since the selected texts represent the perspectives of the particular publisher, discussions concerning the selections are often revealed as the result of competitions under hegemonic control (Apple 1991, 9). The competitions refer to the situation when the publisher desires to express ‘more’, but it is suppressed under the constant pressure from the upper level; and the texts, when they are published, always receive criticisms from the civil society level (Tyson-Bernstein 1988).

In these domestic debates, texts concerning the national past frequently trigger confrontations at the diplomatic level. That is because the texts of national history do not always represent official perspectives but nevertheless need to be approved by the government. The government’s approval of a textbook implies that the government consents with the perspectives of the textbook, from which a visible trend of the government’s policy in dealing with its diplomatic confrontations can be predicted. The contents of history textbooks are able to provide a foundation of students’ historical consciousness, therefore history textbooks determine the angles from which students view their national past and identify themselves as a members of the nation. The focus of textbook studies is primarily divided into two branches: the relationships between social context and textbook publishing, and the relationships between social context and the textbook content. The analysis of textbooks in this research covers both branches, and

aims to clarify what historical consciousness the contents of history textbooks construct and under which social context.

Japanese history textbooks in the post-war era have been a battlefield between conservatives and progressives. The Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan (MEXT) is responsible for establishing 'Textbook Examination Standards' (*kyōkashoyō Toshi Kentei Kijun*) and 'Curriculum Guidelines' (*Gakushū Shido Yōryō*), 'supervising' and 'qualifying' all textbooks (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2005). The confrontations between historians' (textbook writers') willingness to write more concerning Japan's aggression and MEXT's requests to delete the depictions regarding Japan's war crimes in the screening process highlighted the first significance of the analysis of textbooks. The second significance of textbook analysis is in textual analysis, because textbook content is at the center of criticism.

The debates regarding Japanese history textbooks in the postwar era originated in the Allied Occupation (1945-1952), and intensified within the political confrontations among Liberal Party, Democratic Party and Socialist Party following the restoration of sovereignty in the 1950s. In the earlier stage of the Allied Occupation, the GHQ was inclined to use Emperor Hirohito's authority to implement demilitarization and democratization, all the while the Japanese ruling class 'intended to shift the war responsibility onto the leaders and so avoid the prosecution of the Emperor' (Nozaki 2008, 8). As a result, the first three history textbooks, which were published in 1946, 'were not [to] completely eradicate the emperor-centered view of history' (ibid). This planted a seed of the textbook controversies in the following decades.

After the Allied Occupation finished on April 28 1952, the first textbook attack in domestic Japan arose immediately from the chaotic confrontations among Liberal Party, Democratic Party, and Socialist Party in 1955 (Nozaki and Selden 2009, 2). In 1955, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō's intention to revise the 1946 Constitution was blocked by the Socialist Party after it gathered 156 votes of the Lower House Seats in February. Instead, Nakasone Yasuhiro's proposal to establish a system of textbook publishing became the main debate in the Diet (Nozaki and Inokuchi 2001, 104). Nakasone's proposal was rejected by Ishii Kazutomo, a former officer of the Japan Teacher's Union (hereafter, JTU), who claimed in Diet testimony in June that the textbook publishers had

bribed local school officials in order to get textbook adopted in schools. In the Diet testimony, Ishii Kazutomo fiercely criticized the texts of Japanese history textbooks as ‘promoting a leftwing, anti-capitalist agenda’. This was recognized as Kazutomo’s original target in launching the textbook attack, rather than just exposing the corruption issue (Nozaki 2008, 3-4). Ishii’s attack on Japanese history textbooks was not only due to political confrontations but also closely related to the development of the Cold War, which means that Japan, as a close ally of the U.S., had taken an official stance against the expansion of the communism. Nakasone Yasuhiro’s proposal of textbook screening and Ishii’s oral attack on the textbook in 1955 gained government support and promoted the merger between the Democratic Party and Liberal Party into LDP (Liberal Democratic Party, *Jiyūminshutō*, hereafter LDP) in November.

While the Ministry of Education (MOE) tightened the textbook screening process and rejected textbooks for having a ‘biased perspective’, Japanese historian Ienaga Saburō filed textbook lawsuits in 1965, 1967 and 1984. He made a great effort to construct objective historical consciousness in Japan in the post-war era. In the 1950s and 1960s, MOE had repeatedly asked Ienaga to revise his textbook *Shin Nihon Shi*. Ienaga started to notice that the textbook screening system was a form of censorship, and therefore *de facto* unconstitutional and contrary to the Fundamental Law of Education (cf. Nozaki 2008, Saburō 2001, Nozaki and Inokuchi 2001). In 1965 and 1967, Ienaga filed his first and second lawsuits and received the court decisions in 1974 and 1970 respectively. Both court decisions clarified that the textbook screening could be unconstitutional if it ordered a change in educational content, and confirmed that MOE had engaged in ‘power abuse’ in its textbook screening process (cf. Nozaki 2008, Nozaki and Inokuchi 2001).

From the second half of the 1970s, the Vietnam War evoked Japanese people’s recollections of their own experiences of air raids in wartime (Yoshida 1995). While anti-war movements were organized in Japan’s regions and Ienaga’s victories in his textbook lawsuits became a well-known issue in Japanese society, conservative members in LDP were getting more concerned (Y. Tawara 1997, 31). LDP weekly newspapers started to question the content of textbooks from the end of the 1970s. Ishii Kazutomo, who started the first textbook attack in 1955, again claimed that ‘many authors supported the JTU, the Communist Party, or various non-governmental democratic education

movements’, and started the second textbook attack. The second textbook attack in the late 1970s and early 1980s was launched by right-wingers against progressive textbook authors and passages regarding the actions of Japanese militaries during the Asia-Pacific War (Nozaki 2008). After the second textbook attack, MOE reacted similarly to the first textbook attack in 1955. It tightened the regulations regarding what would be approved, particularly in relation to Japanese atrocities. However, when MOE attempted to delete the passages regarding the Nanjing Massacre and revised it to ‘death in chaos’, various civil society organizations were established. They gathered textbook authors from different fields to hear their experiences and to oppose MOE’s revisions. After the second textbook attack, Ienaga filed his third lawsuit in 1984, aimed to prove the unlawful nature of textbook screening by disputing specific points that MOE had suggested be revised, including the depictions of the Nanjing Massacre, mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa, Unit 731, and the terminology of ‘aggression’.

According to Nozaki (2008), textbook screening from 1980 to 1982 regarding the historical facts of war crimes that Japanese troops had committed in China were frequently refused for reasons such as ‘unclear victim numbers’, ‘unconvincing’, ‘untrustworthy source’, or ‘lack of research’. The examiners’ denial of historical facts, Japanese historians’ repeated resistance to the MOE’s decisions, and MOE’s reluctant concessions shifted the textbook controversy from criticism of MOE’s ‘unconstitutionality’ in textbook screening to discussions of ‘what is historical fact’. After both quantitative and qualitative research of the reasons for MOE’s refusals, Nozaki summarized that textbook screening relied less on the examiner’s empiric perspective of historical knowledge and more on their historical view. This means that in textbook screening, if the facts cannot speak for themselves, historical data for textbooks need to be accumulated first (ibid). More specifically, only historical facts which are recognized by all historians and scholars can be selected as the content of history textbooks. Consequently, although the depictions of the Nanjing Massacre and mass suicides of Okinawan people had been recognized as undeniable historical facts, they were frequently the subjects of revision requests to state that the sources were ‘unreliable’ and there was a ‘lack of research’.

In the fierce court debates, a witness for Ienaga's legal team, Yuge Toru (a retired professor of the University of Tokyo, who was also an author of a high school World History textbook), argued that the aim of historical studies is 'not to restore it to its full picture', but to 'express some kind of truth by looking at the past from specific positions for the social good' (ibid,104). The textbook screening that MOE conducted was recognized by Yuge as 'only what the data and source speak [as] important, that is only [so-called] 'objective history', but 'exclude any methods undertaken to process data and source', which is unscientific (ibid, 105). The court's decision regarding Ienaga's third lawsuit on the specific points about the historical facts of the war was finally given in 1997. The Tokyo High Court stated that MOE 'had been excessive and thus unlawful' when it requested Ienaga to change and delete the description of the Nanjing Massacre and the mentioning of widespread rapes. However, the court employed 'the commonly accepted academic view [of 1984]' as the basis of its decision, and ruled against Ienaga on Unit 731 and all other points (ibid, 126-127).

Nozaki (2008) concludes that MOE has two views in its screening textbook: it believes history is a science and history education needs to convey historical facts, but when such empirical positions cannot be sustained, it always adopts a relativist, or pluralist position 'granting all views equal epistemological status' (Nozaki 2008, 120). However, Ienaga's three lawsuits, not only inspired Japanese citizens to keep asking about the legitimacy of textbook screening, but also greatly promoted the transformation of Japanese history textbooks and their depictions of Japan's war crimes in the Asia-Pacific War. In 23 history Japanese junior high school textbooks which were published between 1990 and 1997, 21 of them defined the war with China as 'aggressive war', and identified the atrocities in Nanjing as a 'massacre'. In these 21 textbooks, 17 of them also mentioned the casualty figures as approximately 100,000 to 200,000 during the Nanjing Massacre. Regarding wartime ideology and Japanese motivations for launching the First Sino-Japanese War, 20 out of 23 history textbooks depicted the discrimination of Chinese and Korean people in Japanese society, and 17 of the 20 history textbooks emphasized Japan's motivations for starting the First Sino-Japanese War by stating that Japan was ambitious to seek for the opportunity to stand in the continent.

The big transformations in Japanese history textbooks from the 1980s to the first half of 1990s were not only caused by Ienaga Saburō's court victory, but were also affected by the social context at that time. The collapse of the LDP regime in 1993 and the exposure of Japan's brutality in wartime allowed the coalition government (1993-1996) to adopt more 'confessional' and 'apologetic' statements in dealing with Japan's historical issues. The court decisions of Ienaga's third textbook lawsuit can also be seen as being influenced by both the domestic and international social contexts.

However, despite the collapse of LDP rule in 1993, there was a strong backlash against the Hosokawa Morihiro government's 'apologetic policy' in Japan. In 1995, a group called 'Association for the Advancement of a Liberalist View of History' (*Jiyūshugishikan Kenkyūkai*) was organized by Fujioka Nobukatsu, a professor at the University of Tokyo. This group conducted the third textbook attack by repeatedly criticizing historical education in the postwar era as 'masochistic' (*jigyakuteki*), which means the group thought history education lacked national pride in its depictions of Japanese history. Fujioka believes that only liberalism can resolve the problem of historical thinking, which was 'locked within left-right dualism', and what he encourages is that students need to debate the historical facts by taking opposite positions on the controversial issues (McCormack 2001). To strengthen the influence of 'Association for the Advancement of a Liberalistic View of History' (*jiyūshugishikan kenkyūkai*) in Japanese society, Fujioka Nobukatsu and Nishio Kanji established the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (JSHTR) in 1997, and stated their intention to publish a new history textbook for junior high schools in 2002. Fujioka fulfilled his promise in 2001, when the JSHTR's history textbook, published by Fusōsha, passed MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, replaced MOE from 2001) screening and became available for adoption in schools from April 2002.

The textbook controversies, along with the disputes surrounding Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō's repeated worship at Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006, became the core issues in Japan's diplomatic confrontations with China and South Korea in the early 2000s. The mutual understandings between ordinary Chinese and Japanese people declined drastically from 2001 due to the history textbook and Yasukuni Shrine controversies. In the 2010s, debates regarding Japanese history textbooks did not trigger

the same diplomatic crises with China and South Korea because diplomatic confrontations shifted towards territorial disputes involving the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) and Takeshima Islands (called Dokdo Islands in Korea). However, the LDP's 2006 reform of the Basic Law of Education (*Kyōikukihonhō*, which originally took effect in 1947), which urged Japanese textbooks to be more 'patriotic' by strengthening 'national pride', triggered opposition from civil society groups. After MEXT reformed the Basic Law of Education in 2006, Japanese history textbooks took on a completely different character compared to before. In Chapter 3, this analysis of Japanese history textbook content will be given in more detail.

1.4 Japanese Museums: Contestations between War Exhibits and Peace Memorials

In sociology, a museum is known as 'a process as well as a structure, a creative agency as well as a contested terrain' which plays a 'reflective role in social relations' and expresses its potentials from the social influence (Karp and Lavin 1991). Museums enable people to 'challenge the accepted theoretical wisdoms, forcing people to rethink the modernity, nationhood, social memory, consumption, structure and agency and the nature of material forms' (Macdonald 1996, 3). Nevertheless, a museum supplies a way of seeing the world. When people visit a museum, they recognize it as not just dwelling within a context but also creating its own cultural contexts (Macdonald 1996, 8).

Museums are institutions where collective memory becomes involved in the construction of national narratives. Conversely, museums are able to construct national identity and retrieve national remembrance. This is why politicians are willing to intervene in museum design and management: to be remembered, to undermine authoritative traditions, or to force museums to be subject to the homogenizing power of the market (cf. Zolberg 1996 and Urry 1996). The first focus of museum studies, therefore, revolves around the relations between the social context and the establishment of the museum. By observing the processes behind the establishment of a museum, the political agenda in a certain social context can be seen.

A museum is also a site of display and preservation for artifacts from history. The museum's interpretations of exhibits construct a memorial space. The second focus of museum studies, therefore, is analysis of the contents of exhibits. However, an artefactual

history can obscure the social relations and struggles which underlay that past (Urry 1996, 52). Although a museum is identified as a site for individuals to learn about past as well as a place to form collective memory and national or other identities, museums are fragile institutions because their establishment and exhibitions are inevitably intruded upon by different social groups with their own particular motives in a certain social context. The interpretations of exhibits can be rearranged according to shifts in social desires. The fragility of the museum, on the one hand, reveals its flexibility and changeability, and on the other hand, it makes museums a good place to tell how the past is being represented by what present requirements. In short, studying museums requires the analysis of two primary components: the social context and the content of the exhibits.

Most Japanese museums from the prewar era were destroyed during the war. On January 1946, MOE estimated that only 49 museums out of a total 146 museums were fully functioning; 93 museums were shut down, of which 34 attempted to reopen after the repairs (T. Yoshida 2014, 20). The Arts and Monuments Division of CIE (Civil Information and Education Section of GHQ) conducted a mission to decide which type of cultural properties could be preserved and how to democratize the other museums in order to further postwar Japan's demilitarization and democratization at the cultural level. However, in the end the Allied Occupation did not conduct the democratization of museums but rather assisted in laying the foundation for the emergence of a new type of Japanese museum, the peace museum (Ibid).

In post-war Japan, 'museum' (*hakubutsukan*) is defined as a place that collects and preserves documents for investigative research (*chōsa kenkyū*), display (*tenji*) and educational purposes (*kyōiku fukyū*). They are classified as 'registered museums', 'facilities equivalent to museums' and 'facility similar to museums' (MEXT 2015). The first two have to be registered by the prefectural Board of Education and are officially legitimated sites with full-time employees and regular opening days. In 2015, the number of 'registered museums' and the 'facilities equivalent to museums' was 1,256. The third type of museum, 'the facilities similar to museums', encompasses various types of exhibits without curators and regular opening days. This type of museum is unofficial, and most of them are funded by private or civil organizations. When this type of institution is included, the number of museums was 4,434 in 2015 (ibid).

Of the above-mentioned museums, there were approximately 125 war-and peace-related museums, including those which existed from before the war and those newly opened between 1945 and 2000. Of those 125 museums, there were 17 museums opened in the 1970s (13.6%), 29 museums in the 1980s (23.2%), and 45 museums in the 1990s (36%) (counted by the author from the *War and Peace Museum Guidebook* 2000). In the analysis of those war-and-peace-related museums, Seaton (2007) classified four different types: national and prefectural history museums (*hakubutsukan*), which are generic history museums focusing on wartime artifacts; the peace museums, which are either documentation centers or memorials (*shiryōkan* or *kinenkan*); military museums, which commemorate the actions of a branch of the military; and sectional interest museums, which present particular war experiences or promote a political message (Seaton 2007, 172).

Since the war- and peace-related museums are a social product which reflect and embody various social realities, their establishment and exhibitions are tightly related to the social context. After sovereignty was restored to Japan in 1952, the hatred of war among Japanese civilians fostered the expansion of pacifism in the 1950s (Y. Yoshida 1995 and T. Yoshida 2014). According to the editor of the *Outline of the History of the City of Hiroshima* (1955), Japan's unconditional surrender and the termination of the Pacific War was depicted as an unprecedented catastrophe for Japan, but meanwhile the end of the war brought an opportunity for rebirth to the Japanese people whose lives were almost ruined (Hiroshima Shakusho 1955, 198-201)

To remember the destruction caused by the atomic bomb and to speak out against nuclear weapons has been at the heart of Hiroshima's peace declaration since 1945. The inurement of the Peace Memorial City Construction Law in 1949 and the anti-nuclear bomb movements from 1945 to 1955 dragged Hiroshima into the international gaze via its calls for a worldwide awareness regarding the tremendous devastation caused by the nuclear weapons. Such groups were not the only ones active in the 1950s. There were also groups promoting acknowledgment of Japanese war crimes organized by Japanese soldiers who returned from Chinese re-education centers in 1956. After these Japanese soldiers came back from China (Liaison Society for Returnees from China, Chūgoku kikansha renrakukai), they started to share their testimonies of the Japanese military's

atrocities, including the ‘Three-Alls Policy’ (Kill all, burn all, loot all) and their participation in the biological warfare, in the Japanese public sphere. Their testimonies became the most important message of peace conveyed to the postwar generations in the 1950s.

Museums dedicated to such war memories started to be built about a decade after the war. The establishment of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum in 1955 revealed Japanese victimhood during the wartime, and the construction of Maruki Art Gallery for the Hiroshima Panels, which was established in 1967, exhibited the paintings of war victims including from the Nanjing Massacre (1975) and Auschwitz (1977) (cf. Rekishi Kyōikusha Kyōgikai 2002 and T. Yoshida 2014, 25-31). These revealed that the inspiration of pacifism and the beginning of the acknowledgment of war crimes are features of the social context in the 1950s and 1960s. Such exhibits also featured in the establishment of peace museums and their exhibitions of Japan’s war crimes in the same period.

The expansion in the number of war-related museums occurred mainly from the 1970s to the second half of the 1990s. During this period, approximately 81 war and peace museums were newly opened (counted by the author from the *War and Peace Museum Guidebook* 2000). The expansion in the number of museums during that period also corresponded to changes in both the external and internal social contexts. The unfolding Vietnam War inspired Japanese people’s recollection of similar sufferings caused by air raids and the atomic bombs. Domestically, Japanese soldiers’ testimonies of Unit 731 and human experiments in mainland China, the Nanjing Massacre, the eruption of ‘comfort women’ (*ianfu*) issue, and Ienaga Saburō’s textbook lawsuits all fostered acknowledgement of Japan’s war crimes in Asia.

In this atmosphere of self-reflection and acknowledgement of Japan’s war conduct and Asian people’s victimhood, a number of museums in the 1980s and beginning of 1990s started to trace Japan’s aggression and colonialism by organizing exhibition that featured the aggressive side of Japan’s war history (ibid, 48). For example, the Osaka Human Rights Museum (Ōsaka Jinken Hakubutsukan, established in 1985), the Ōkuno Island Poison Gas Museum (Ōkunoshima Dokugasu Shiryōkan, established in 1988), the Grassroots House Peace Museum (Heiwa Shiryōkan Kusa no Ie, established in 1989),

and the Kyoto Museum for World Peace Ritsumeikan University (Ritsumeikan Daigaku Kokusai Heiwa Miyujiamu, established in 1992) all explored Japan's aggression in Asia and Japan's war violence against Asian people by exhibiting photographs, testimonies and remnants of wartime.

From the second half of the 1990s, the battle over the 'correct history of Japan' between leftist and rightist groups was centered on criticism of the discourse that called for the elimination of masochistic historical consciousness and establishment of liberalist historical consciousness (cf. Yoshida 1995, Seaton 2007 and Takahashi 2001). During this period, the exhibitions of war-related museums were frequently attacked by revisionists, LDP politicians, local officers and right-wing extremists. For example, when a special exhibition about Chinese forced labor was held in Osaka in 1996, right-wing extremists came to the Sakai City Peace and Human Rights Museum (Sakaishi Heiwa to Ninken Shiryōkan) with loudspeakers, demanding the cancelation of the exhibition (Yoshida 2014, 94). When the Osaka International Peace Center (Ōsaka Kokusai Heiwa Senta, also called Peace Ōsaka, established in 1991) discussed Japan's 'Three-Alls Policy', atrocities in Nanjing, and biological warfare and medical experiments on human beings, a group of local politicians started to criticize Peace Osaka saying that it displayed too many artifacts about Japanese aggression and atrocities and would deprive young Japanese of their national pride (Yoshida 2014, 177). The Peace Museum of Saitama (Saitamaken Heiwa Shiryōkan, established in 1993), with its special exhibits of Japan's invasion of Manchuria, forced labor of Korean people at military facilities in Saitama, and a photograph of corpses of Nanjing Massacre, was fiercely criticized by members of the Association for Examining the Peace Museum of Saitama and LDP members in 2006 (ibid). They urged the museum to remove 'military' from the term 'military comfort women', delete the photograph of the 'great atrocities of Nanjing' and rename it as 'capture of Nanjing' because the exhibits would damage national pride (Futatsubashi 2007, 50-52).

Attacks by right-wing extremists on war-related museums continued in the 2000s. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō's repeated worship at Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006, and MEXT's resolution to approve for use in schools the history textbook of JSHTR had signaled an inclination within the Japanese government to support historical

revisionism. In the 2000s, the textbook controversy became the first battle between progressives and nationalists, and the Prime Minister's official worship at Yasukuni Shrine became the second. Both domestic campaigns triggered diplomatic crises between Japan and China, as well as between Japan and South Korea.

Alongside the revisionists' constant attacks on existing museums and the elite's requests to revise war exhibits be more 'patriotic', a new type of peace museum centered on citizen's victimhood and soldier's sacrifice was promoted and popularized in the 2000s. The National Shōwa Memorial Museum (Shōwakan established in 1999) was funded by government and run by the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association (*Nihon Izokukai*). It exhibits Japanese people's great sacrifice in the war, but the narratives and exhibits erroneously concealed that war is because Japan had to do self-defense (Yoshida 2014, 186). The Memorial Museum for Soldiers, Detainees in Siberia, and Postwar Repatriates (Heiwa Kinen Tenji Shiryōkan, established in 2000) and the Shōkei-Kan (Shōkeikan established in 2006), meanwhile, exhibited the suffering of Japanese soldiers who sacrificed their lives to the nation but offered a scant means of understanding the war from an Asian perspective (ibid, 193-197).

In their studies of Japanese war- and peace-related museums, both Seaton and Yoshida Takashi observed that each type of Japanese war and peace museum have specific problems in dealing with the past war. National museums funded by the government are inclined to take a cultural and anthropological approach to Japanese history, rather than a political or military one, with the aim of satisfying everyone (Seaton 2007, 173-174). War museums and sectional interest museums, meanwhile, prefer to emphasize a municipal stance different from national stances, in which regional coherence is stressed; and peace museums typically focus on Japanese victimhood and avoid Japanese war responsibility (ibid, 174-175).

1.5 Spectrum of Judgmental War Memory

Based on the literature regarding historical consciousness and war memory in postwar Japan, it can be concluded that the changes in historical consciousness and war memories remain a transformative process even 73 years after the war ended. In this transformative process, variations in the world situation and shifts in Japan's political situation have

rendered views of the war and war-related issues very different today compared to the early stages of the postwar. When those expressing the ‘orthodox’ perspectives in English-speaking countries and Asian countries say that ‘Japan has failed to address its past’, they are ignoring the fact that Japan has been fighting internally regarding how to address its past since the war ended in 1945 (Seaton 2007). The long process of the postwar with its complicated entanglements of political, social and cultural issues in each social epoch does not mean that the features of Japan’s war memories are untraceable. By extracting the landscapes of political and social contexts and the discussions of war-related issues both externally and domestically, Seaton (2007) proposed a ‘spectrum of judgmental war memory’ in which war discourses, specifically the discourse of ‘aggressive war’ and ‘aggressive acts’, are equated into the terms of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ within just war theory. When the term ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ follows the discourse of ‘aggressive war’ or ‘aggressive acts’, war discourses can be classified into the different perspectives of different groups. According to Seaton, the four main groups are: progressives (who criticize both Japan’s aggressive war and aggressive acts, and regard the war and war acts as ‘unjust’), the ‘progressive-leaning group’ (who criticize an aggressive war but offer watered-down versions of aggressive acts, which means the war conduct was ‘unjust’ but the war itself was ‘inevitable’); conservatives (who deny an aggressive war but acknowledge aggressive acts, meaning the war was ‘just’ but the war conduct was ‘unjust’); and nationalists (who deny both an aggressive war and aggressive acts, and regard the war and war conduct as ‘just’).

This research applies the ‘spectrum of judgmental war memory’ into the textual analysis of Japanese history textbooks (1972 - 2017) and eight museums related to Japan’s war conduct in China (1895-1945) and Okinawa (1945), as well as Japan’s victimhood caused by air raids and the atomic bombs. By inserting ‘causal interpretation’, ‘war conduct’ and ‘victimhood’ into the spectrum of judgemental war memory, it is possible to construct a theoretical link between ‘in-group identity’ and ‘out-group image’, and embody a general war discourse onto a more precise spectrum.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

Based on the literature review concerning historical consciousness and war memories in postwar Japan, it can be seen that the transformations in historical consciousness and war memories in postwar Japan are a complex process affected by the accumulation of historical knowledge, the changing domestic situation, diplomacy with other countries, the legacies of occupational policy (i.e. Allied Occupational policy and the Tokyo Trail cast a shadow on Japan's cognition of its war responsibilities), and the broader international environment. All of these reasons have combined to produce Japanese historical consciousness and contested war memories. Saito (2017) has characterized Japanese memories as 'a coexistence of nationalism and cosmopolitanism', in which nationalist discourse focuses on domestic issues in Japan, while cosmopolitanism remembers what happened to foreign others as members of humanity (Saito 2017, 8). Saito's statement of the 'coexistence of nationalism and cosmopolitanism' corresponded with Seaton's 'contested war memories'. In the explanation of transformative war memories in current Japan, progressives fighting for the construction of self-reflective historical consciousness, and resistance from conservatives calling for patriotism in order to make a stronger Japan have always coexisted in postwar Japan (Seaton 2007). While nationalism as a central organizing principle in the contemporary world (Saito 2017), victimhood mentality sutures the 'memory rifts' that exist underneath of Japan's pacifism (Seaton 2007).

In the analysis of historical consciousness in postwar Japan and the representations of Japanese war memories, therefore, a number of scholars have indicated that Japan is trapped regarding addressing its past (cf. Seaton 2007, Rose 2005, Lind 2008, Saitō 2017). Building on the extant literature discussed thus far, this thesis first sets out the development of Sino-Japanese relations (1972-2017). Chapter 2 discusses how historical issues have been discussed by both Chinese and Japanese mass media in different social epochs. By observing the transformative discourses in dealing with historical issues in different periods, Chapter 2 aims to clarify how China's diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan has influenced Japan's transformation in historical consciousness.

Then there are two case studies. The first case study is the analysis of Japanese junior high school history textbooks which were published between 1972 to 2017. In Chapter 3,

five variables are set for conducting textual analysis. They are ‘in-group identity’, the ‘interpretation of motivation’, the ‘depiction of war conducts’, the ‘out-group image’ and the ‘introspective narrative’. The textual analysis covers three historical events: the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Mukden Incident (1931), and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (1937). It also covers the depictions of six war crimes: the Nanjing Massacre, the ‘comfort women’, Unit 731, the ‘Three-Alls Operation’, the mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa, and the atomic bombs. The analysis clarifies: (1) how Japanese textbooks depict Japan’s war atrocities; (2) how Japanese textbooks depict others’ victimhood caused by the Japanese military; (3) how Japanese textbooks depict Okinawan people’s mass suicide caused by Japanese military; and (4) how Japanese textbooks depict Japanese people’s victimhood caused by A-bombs.

The second case study is war-related peace museums. Eight war-related museums are studied: the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial House (Nisshin Kōwa Kinen Kan, Yamaguchi Prefecture), the Yūshūkan Museum (Yūshūkan, Tokyo), the National Museum of Japanese History (Kokuritsu Rekishi Minzoku Hakubutsukan, Chiba Prefecture), the Kawasaki Peace Museum (Kawasakishi Heiwakan, Kanagawa Prefecture), the Defunct Imperial Japanese Army Noborito Laboratory Museum for Education in Peace (Noborito Kenkyūsho Shiryōkan, Kanagawa Prefecture), the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (Okinawaken Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan, Okinawa Prefecture), the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (Hiroshima Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan, Hiroshima Prefecture), and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum (Nagasaki Genbaku Shiryōkan, Nagasaki Prefecture). The museums provide a broad view of how wars between China and Japan are exhibited via both quantitative and qualitative analysis exhibits. The analysis of museums is similar to the analysis of history textbooks, in that it is based five variables, and concludes how memorial spaces sharing Japanese war memories in the public sphere are created.

Chapter 2. Sino-Japanese Relations and Debates over History

This chapter includes two main discussions: the trends in Sino-Japanese relations from 1972 to 2017, and the transformation of discourses regarding historical issues in each social epoch. To clarify the trends in Sino-Japanese relations reveals that different diplomatic strategies have been adopted in dealing with the same history disputes between China and Japan. Since governments' diplomatic strategies in dealing with the same historical disputes promoted various understandings among citizens over the historical issues, discourse regarding historical issues, on the one hand, is able to embody the dominant historical consciousness in a certain social epoch, and on the other hand, it enables one to draw a comprehensive configuration of Sino-Japanese relations. Via analyzing how national newspapers depicted historical disputes in different social epochs, this chapter argues that international situations, particularly China's diplomacy toward Japan, is an important element that affects the reconstruction of Japanese people's historical consciousness and their war memories.

2.1 Features of Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1970s

During the fifteen years of war between China and Japan from 1931 to 1945, approximately 35 million Chinese citizens and soldiers were officially confirmed injured or dead on the battlefield (Xinhuanet 2015). Of the 3.1 million Japanese who died in the war, approximately 800,000 victims were civilians (International Society for Educational Information 1994). The heavy civilian death toll in both countries is a significant barrier to reconciliation between the two countries.

After the war ended in 1945, diplomatic confrontations between China and Japan could not be solved immediately because of the capitalist vs communist confrontation between U.S. and USSR in the emerging Cold War. China's civil war from 1946 to 1949 and the Allied occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 meant that Sino-Japanese relations were unlikely to be normalized when both of them were in domestic chaos (Osawa 2012, 30). After the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war and established the People's Republic of China in 1949, China started its postwar recovery from the 1950s. However, in the 1960s, due to the confrontations with USSR on both economic and political level, diplomatic relations between China and USSR turned cold. When China fell into

economic recession in the 1960s due to the Great Leap Forward Policy, Chinese government started to notice that the radical establishment of socialism under the Great Leap Forward Policy was unrealistic. In order to overcome economic recession, China partially softened its diplomacy with its former wartime enemy and tried to reopen international business with Japan (Osawa 2012, 31). The U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's visit to China in 1971 and U.S. President Richard Nixon's follow-up visit in 1972 revealed that a pro-U.S. policy had paved the way for thawing the rivalry between China and U.S. This also provided a prerequisite for diplomatic normalization between China and Japan (Inoue 2012, 45).

The normalization of diplomatic ties between China and Japan in 1972 with the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China (hereafter, 'the Joint Communiqué') ended the abnormal relations between China and Japan. In the Joint Communiqué, Japan's recognition of the People's Republic of China as the 'sole legal government of China' and its recognition of Taiwan as 'an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China' interpreted Japan's compromise in dealing with the historical issues relating to Taiwan. China, for its part, renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan, and presented its resolution to 'establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries'. On the basis of the principles of 'mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity', 'mutual non-aggression', 'non-interference in each other's internal affairs', 'equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence', the Sino-Japanese relations turned to a new page in 1972.

Inoue Masaya (2012) states that the success of diplomatic normalization between China and Japan rested on three aspects: the cooperation of pro-China members of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), the 'shelving policy' both China and Japan adopted in dealing with the normalization, and the mutual concessions on the issue of Taiwan and China's renouncement of war reparations (Inoue 2012, 55-58). However, some historical issues remained, for example, the territorial disputes regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and the controversies regarding Japanese history textbooks. These were excluded from the negotiations, which planted the seeds of future diplomatic confrontations between China and Japan.

In the Joint Communiqué, China's renunciation of war reparations, on the one hand, reversed Japan's image toward China from negative to positive; but on the other hand, the renunciation of war reparations had rendered vague (*'aimaina katachi ni shite'*) Japanese people's historical consciousness (ibid, 60-61), which means that while many Japanese people equated China's 'renunciation' to China's 'forgiveness' of Japan's war crimes, China regarded 'the renunciation' as prioritizing diplomatic normalization with Japan, but not offering its 'forgiveness' of Japan's war crimes. There were considerable differences in interpretation in Japan and China regarding the relationship between the renunciation of war reparations and *hansei* [remorse] for war crimes (ibid), which planted the second seed of future problems in relations between the two countries.

The prioritization of diplomatic normalization and the shelving policy can be observed from the Japanese history textbooks which were published in the 1970s. Disputes over textbooks that would cause problems in the 1980s did not occur in the 1970s. For example, the nature of the Second Sino-Japanese War was defined as 'advance' (*shinshutsu*) in 21 of the 24 Japanese history textbooks, but they passed the textbook screening conducted by the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, the omission of the war crimes that Japanese troops had committed in China (include mass killings in Nanjing, the Unit 731 and its bacterial experiments, as well as the 'Three-Alls Operation' – loot all, burn all, kill all) were allowed by Japanese government. Such wordings and omissions would cause serious problems in the 1980s, but such textbooks were published in the 1970s and did not trigger diplomatic crisis because they were tolerated by both Japanese and Chinese governments.

2.2 Features of Sino-Japanese Relations from 1980 to 1989

The agreement of the Joint Communiqué and the diplomatic normalization between China and Japan stabilized the situation in East Asia in the 1970s (Etō 2012). However, ten years after the diplomatic normalization, the issues of history textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine became the primary disputes between China and Japan, and started to disturb the peaceful development of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s. Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s can be observed from two distinctive angles. First, the controversies regarding Japanese history textbooks and Prime Minister's Nakasone

Yasuhiro's official worship at Yasukuni Shrine are recognized as negative results of the 'shelving policy' of the 1970s. Second, in the close cooperation between the Hu Yaobang government and Nakasone Yasuhiro government, both China and Japan contained the disputes and maintained stable Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s.

The reason why historical issues became sensitive between China and Japan in the 1980s can be attributed to changes in the domestic political environments in China and Japan. In 1982, the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China identified three primary assignments to construct a socialist China: 'to speed up socialist modernization', 'to accomplish the motherland reunification' and 'to oppose hegemonies for the maintenance of world peace'. In order to achieve the reunification of the motherland, the Chinese government promoted patriotic education aimed at emphasizing the importance of 'national solidarity', 'the independence of sovereign China', and 'the cohesion of Chinese ethnic minorities' in domestic China as well as the Chinese civilians who live in abroad (Etō 2012, 143).

In Japan, confrontations between the LDP and oppositional parties, and the conflicts between the Ministry of Education (MOE) and Boards of Education turned Japanese history textbooks into a key battlefield between progressives and conservatives. The first diplomatic crisis triggered by history textbooks was in 1982, when a series of reports from June to July in both Japan and China criticized MOE for requesting Japanese history textbook editors to replace the word 'aggression' (*shinryaku*) with 'advance' (*shinshutsu*) in the depictions of the Japanese military's movements in mainland China. The Japanese government subsequently claimed that the reports were 'misleading' on July 28, and stated that some of the textbooks had changed the characterization of the war from 'aggression' to 'aggressive attack' or 'aggrieved to', but no textbook had changed to 'advance' (ibid, 136).

Even though the Japanese government clarified the reports were misleading right after China re-posted these reports, a campaign against MOE's screening was launched in China. There was continuous criticism of Japanese history textbooks for 'attempting to restore militarism' and 'distorting history' from July to the end of August. On August 26, Miyazawa Kiichi – the Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Suzuki Zenkō government – made a statement about history textbooks (the Miyazawa Statement), in which he

emphasized that ‘the Japanese government and the Japanese people are deeply aware of the fact that acts by our country in the past caused tremendous suffering and damage to the people of Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea and China’ (MOFA 1982). By reemphasizing the importance of the Japan-Korea Joint Communiqué and Japan-China Joint Communiqué, Miyazawa promised that the Japanese government would revise the Guidelines for Textbook Authorization and take quick action to the same effect on the textbooks which had been authorized (MOFA 1982). The first diplomatic crisis triggered by Japanese history textbooks was contained by the Suzuki government.

Aside from the disputes regarding Japanese history textbooks, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone’s official worship at Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 provoked resistance from ROK and PRC (Hattori 2012, 167-168). The nature of worship in an official capacity was transformed after the Class-A war criminals were enshrined along with Class-B and Class-C war criminals at the shrine in 1978. The General Secretary of China, Hu Yaobang, clarified that China did not wish to intervene Japan’s internal affairs and expressed the understanding that Class-B and Class-C war criminals were ordered to carry out war crimes and should be differentiated from the Class-A war criminals. Hu requested the Japanese government not to hurt Chinese as well as Asian people’s feelings (ibid, 178-182). Nakasone agreed not to make another visit after his official worship at Yasukuni Shrine in 1985. Friendship between China and Japan was maintained by the mutual understanding between the Nakasone government and Hu government (ibid, 182).

Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s did not proceed smoothly in the wake of the debates regarding Japanese history textbooks and the Prime Minister’s official worship at Yasukuni Shrine. The debates are recognized as negative side-effects left over from the shelving policy. Reconciliation between China and Japan was based on Japan’s compromise regarding textbooks, the Prime Minister’s suspension of official worship at Yasukuni Shrine, and China’s restraint regarding the disputes. In other words, the historical issues between China and Japan were yet to be thoroughly resolved in the 1980s, although reconciliation was achieved between the two countries. The

maintenance of bilateral peace relied more on mutual concessions rather than mutual understandings.

2.3 Features of Sino-Japanese Relations from 1990 to 1999

The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War brought a drastic change in the global structure at the end of the 1980s, which required China and Japan to rearrange their missions in regional cooperation on both economy and security issues. Against the backdrop of the tremendous changes in the international environment, the unresolved historical issues between China and Japan came to the surface along with the rising-up nationalism in both China and Japan. The rise of nationalism invalidated the shelving policy, re-visualized the problems of historical issues, and led to deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations in the latter half of the 1990s.

In the first half of 1990s, the Emperor Akihito's visit to China and Ienaga Saburō's victory in his textbook lawsuit promoted more positive diplomatic relations between China and Japan. When Emperor Akihito visited China on October 23, 1992, the Emperor gave a speech which he confessed that 'Japan had severely injured Chinese people', expressed Japan's 'deeply sorrow' for Chinese people's suffering, and stated that 'Japan would never launch war again' (Imperial Household Agency 1992). The Emperor's speech was highly praised by the Chinese government and Chinese people. Relations between China and Japan at the beginning of the 1990s were strengthened.

Domestically, Ienaga Saburō's victory in his third textbook lawsuit and the court decision had prominently encouraged recognition within Japan of its aggression in Asia. However, Ienaga Saburō's victory in the textbook lawsuits ignited a backlash by Japanese right-wing groups. The establishment of JSHTTR (Japan Society for History Textbook Reform, hereafter *tsukurukai*) in 1996, and its constant criticisms of Japan's post-war historical education as 'masochistic' and 'lacking in national pride' highlighted Japan's often acrimonious domestic war discourses. These confrontations also occurred regarding the 'comfort women' issue when, for example, politicians made statements denying the 'forced sexual slavery' of Korean 'comfort women' (*ianfu*) in the 1990s.

From the 1990s, China started its economic reforms and rapid economic growth. While national confidence grew, the central government of PRC decided to start its patriotic education campaign in 1994 aimed at promoting national cohesion and strengthening the ties between ethnic groups. As part of the campaign, patriotic education in schools and patriotic sites such as museums, memorials and monuments were established and popularized. In the patriotic education campaign, China's 'suffering' and 'bravery' in the war against Japan's 'brutal' and 'inhuman' aggression, and China's 'rise' in the postwar era were strategically linked to foment the spirit of patriotism.

Diplomatic discomfort between China and Japan increased in 1992 when China enacted the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which claimed that the Diaoyu Islands (*Senkaku Shotō* in Japanese) are affiliated islands which belong to China's Taiwan Province. Japan expressed its 'solemn resistance' against China's declaration (Takahara and Masuda 2012). The dispute regarding sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands that was 'shelved' in 1978 resurfaced in 1992.

Another discomfort in Sino-Japanese relations in the 1990s was the strengthening of the military alliance between Japan and the U.S. in 1996. Against the backdrop of China's patriotic education campaign from 1994, China became more cautious toward Japan and other western powers' interventions in regional security issues (Takahara and Masuda 2012). When the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century was signed on April 17 1996, the cooperation between U.S. and Japan was to be 'based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces of Japan (hereafter, JSDF) and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements' (The World and Japan Database - National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (IASA), The University of Tokyo 1996). China therefore recognized that the new alliance between U.S. and Japan signified Japan's national defense was transformed from a defensive to an aggressive strategy (Takahara and Masuda 2012, 300).

China's economic growth and strengthened national confidence, along with its implementation of patriotic education, encouraged China to participate in regional and

international affairs more actively. Japan, meanwhile, with its enhanced partnership with the U.S., would get more involved in international affairs. In these circumstances, the territorial disputes regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands are unlikely to be sidestepped because they have become strategically important for both countries. Additionally, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō's worship at Yasukuni Shrine in 1996, Japanese politicians' attempts to minimize the 'comfort women's' experiences from 'forced sexual slavery' to 'individual behavior', right-wing groups' constant criticisms of history textbooks, and the recession of Japanese economy after the financial crisis in 1997 all cast a shadow on Sino-Japanese relations from the second half of the 1990s.

2.4 Features of Sino-Japanese Relations from 2000 to 2009

Sino-Japanese relations in 2000s divide into two phases: drastic deterioration during the Koizumi Junichirō government from 2001 to 2006, and improvement from 2006 to 2010. The deterioration of bilateral relations from 2001 to 2006 was caused by disputes about a newly qualified history textbook written by JSHTR and published by Fusōsha in April 2002, and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō's repeated worship at Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006. Subsequent governments after the Koizumi cabinet tried to repair Sino-Japanese relations, and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's visit to China in October 2006 was dubbed an 'ice-breaking visit' (*saihyō no tabi*). PRC Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan in April 2007 was called an 'ice-melting visit' (*yūhyō no tabi*). And in December of the same year, Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo's visit to China was called a 'welcoming spring visit' (*geishun no tabi*). Finally, in May 2008, President Hu Jintao's visit to Japan was called a 'warm-spring visit' (*danshun no tabi*) (Kamo 2012, 372).

Anti-Japanese sentiment built up in mainland China during Koizumi's tenure and eventually turned into large-scale anti-Japanese protests in 2005 when Japan started its bid for UNSC. In 2005, when the Japanese government criticized China's historical education as 'anti-Japanese education', in response the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs called Japan's position 'unreasonable' and based on 'wrong assumptions' on March 8 and 9 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China 2005). In the middle of March, China expressed serious dissatisfaction and concern regarding Japan's

sovereignty declaration regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands and made a clear warning to Japan that ‘any invasion of the Diaoyu islands would be recognized as the territorial invasion of PRC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China 2005). Subsequently, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly emphasized that the revision of Japan’s historical textbooks seriously harmed the Asian people, and urged Japan to apologize and take responsibility for the atrocities perpetrated from the 1930s to the end of the Second World War (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China 2005). From March 8 to 25, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted seven press conferences, in which Japan’s bid to gain a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the controversy regarding Japanese historical textbook and the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands dispute were repeatedly mentioned in each conference. At the same time, Chinese people’s resistance against Japan’s bid for a seat on the UNSC was also repeatedly mentioned in the press conference. Negative images of Japan and Japanese people spread via Chinese mass media.

According to Weiss (2008), the large-scale anti-Japanese protests in 2005 were organized from the beginning of April to the end of the month. In mainland China, over 38 cities held anti-Japanese demonstrations including protests marches and street signature campaigns, and an estimated 280 organizations and units, 107 universities, 41 technical schools and about 28 million internet users signed the petitions against Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC (Weiss 2009, 10). At the end of April 2005, when the protests turned violent, the Chinese government declared Campus Martial Law and attempted to restrain the expansion of the protests. On April 23, a bilateral summit was held between Japanese Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi and Chinese General Secretary Hu Jintao at the Asia-Africa Summit, and PRC General Secretary Hu’s subsequent visit to Japan on May 6 signaled a thawing in bilateral relations and move towards a tentative peace.

The anti-Japanese protests in mainland China in 2005 were against Japan’s bid to gain a permanent seat on the UNSC (United Nations Security Council), but the protests were a result of the accumulated anti-Japanese sentiment caused by the Japanese government’s approval of the problematic history textbook in 2001, and Prime Minister Koizumu Junichirō’s official worship at the Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006. The

controversies over Japanese history textbooks and Prime Minister's worship at Yasukuni Shrine were not new disputes between China and Japan, but since both the governments of China and Japan had shifted their diplomatic policy from 'shelving' to 'hardline', the hardline diplomacy had instigated a growth of nationalism in both countries since 2000s. According to Shimizu (2006), the 'hardline diplomacy' results from the competition between China and Japan. When the government of Japan played hard, China would not play softly; and when Japan pushed forward, China would push further away (Shimizu 2006). Therefore, while the historical disputes became apparent from the second half of 1990s, the diplomatic confrontations could not be contained when both governments enacted 'hardline diplomacy'. Although bilateral relations between China and Japan were repaired by the frequent mutual visits at the governmental level in the second half of the 1990s, the positive mutual understanding between China and Japan at the civil level remained low. Chinese people's 'negative images toward Japan' stayed between 56.9.6% (2006) and 65.2% (2009), and Japanese people's 'negative image toward China' increased from 36.4% (2006) to 73.2% (2009) (Genron NPO 2017, 4).

2.5 Features of Sino-Japanese Relations from 2010 to 2017

In the second half of the 2000s, exchange visits between the political leaders of both China and Japan rescued the cooling Sino-Japanese relations from the period of Koizumi government. However, entering into the 2010s, bilateral relations did not follow the hoped-for direction of positiveness and stable development. Rather, the bilateral relations deteriorated again due to the territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Along with the fiercer diplomatic confrontations between China and Japan, the positive mutual understandings at the civil level declined to their lowest point in 2013,² which indicated that Sino-Japanese relations between 2010 to 2017 were driven back to freezing point.

² According to the statistics of NPO Genron, Japanese people's 'positive image toward China' in 2013 was 9.6% (the lowest point from 2005 to 2017), and Chinese people's 'positive image toward Japan' in the same year was 5.2% (the lowest point from 2005 to 2017), from NPO Genron (2017), Dai 13 Kai Nicchu Kyōdō Yoron Chōsa, *Genron NPO*, p.4.

The government of Japan stated that Japan's sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands could be traced back to 1885, when Japan conducted several rounds of field research and confirmed that the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands were deserted islands which were not under the control of China's Qing Dynasty at that time (MOFA 2016). Based on this field research, the Japanese government officially declared its sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands on January 14, 1895, and claimed that the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands were not included in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.³ Japan's exclusion of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands from the Treaty of Shimonoseki aims to stress that Japan's declaration of sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands was even before its signing of the treaty with China's Qing Dynasty in 1895 following victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (*Nisshin Sensō*).

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China declared China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands (*Senkaku Shotō* in Japanese) by presenting three pieces of evidence: 1) China was the first country to find the islands and name them; 2) China clearly included the islands into coastal defense maps, and started long term control since 1561; and 3) both domestic and foreign maps marked the islands as China's territory (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China 2004). Based on these three pieces of evidence, the PRC government denied Japan's statement regarding 'rounds of field research', and firmly asserted that the Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan as islands affiliated to Taiwan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

The disputes regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands between China and Japan were avoided when Vice Premier of PRC Deng Xiaoping visited Japan in October 1978. He suggested shelving the issue and handed down to subsequent generations to solve (Takahara and Masuda 2012, 294). However, when China enacted the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone on February 25, 1992, it clearly stipulated that the land territory of the People's Republic of China includes the Diaoyu Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China 1992), which means that the dispute regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands had been 'taken off the shelf'.

³ MOFA, Nihon Ryōdo Ō Meguru Jōsei, Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Q&A, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/senkaku/qa_1010.html#q2 (access on: 2018.04.20).

The territorial disputes regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands rose to the surface in the 1990s and triggered a diplomatic crisis between China and Japan in 2010 and 2012. On September 7, 2010 a Chinese fishing vessel collided with two Japanese patrol boats in the sea area around the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Officials of the Japan Coast Guard (hereafter, JCG) boarded the Chinese vessel and arrested Chinese Captain Zhan Qixiong for ‘obstructing justice’ on the morning of September 8. When the Ishigaki Summary Court confirmed the detainment of the Chinese Captain on September 9, and extended the detainment for another 10 days from September 19 to 29, anti-Japanese sentiment was immediately reignited in mainland China. Subsequently, a large scale anti-Japanese protests were organized from the middle of September until the end of October.

Another round of diplomatic crises concerning the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands was triggered by Japan’s nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in 2012. Ishihara Shintarō, the Governor of Tokyo, announced in a speech in the United States on April 16, 2012 that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government would buy the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands (include Uotsuri Shima, Kitakojima and Minamikojima) from the private household of Kurihara Hiroyuki. Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated further on July 7 when Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiro announced the nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in order to prevent Ishihara Shintarō’s further provocation towards China (i.e. construct a lighthouse on the islands) and to stabilize the Japanese government’s strategy and management in its dealing with the territorial dispute (Asahi Shinbun 2012). China was furious, and fiercely criticized Japan’s nationalization of the islands as ‘illegal’, ‘invalid’ and ‘ridiculous’. On September 11, the government of Japan completed the nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands by paying 2.5 billion yen to Kurihara Hiroyuki. A large scale of anti-Japanese protests was organized in mainland China from September to the end of the month.

After Sino-Japanese relations became trapped by the territorial dispute, both China and Japan started a progressive defensive strategy aimed at stabilizing regional security and strengthening national defense. In 2013, China established the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (hereafter, ECSADIZ). The following year, Japan renewed its annual National Defense White Paper and started to criticize China, asserting that it ‘infringe[d] upon the freedom of overflight over the high seas’, and criticized China for

‘frequently intruding into the territorial waters around Senkaku Islands’. PRC government later expressed its dissatisfaction and resistance, criticizing Japan’s remarks toward China’s national defensive activities as ‘spreading the discourse of China-threat’. From 2013, diplomatic confrontations between China and Japan were shifted from territorial disputes regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands to disputes over national defensive strategy, but Sino-Japanese relations started to recover from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ from 2017 after the PRC General Secretary Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō held a meeting on November 11 in Da Nang, Vietnam, and expressed their common expectations to improve Sino-Japanese relations.

2.6 Historical Controversies in the National Press in China and Japan

Thus far, the argument has focused on the broad progression of Sino-Japanese Relations. Now the discussion will shift to specific controversies relating to the controversies over Japanese history textbooks in 1980s and 2000s, the disputes regarding the Japanese Prime Minister’s official worship at Yasukuni Shrine in the 1980s and 2000s, the development of the comfort women issue in the 1990s, and the territorial debates regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the 2010s. The discourses surrounding the same dispute varied along with the different social contexts. Observation of the transformations of these discourses provides a broader understanding of how debates affect the mutual understandings on the historical issues between China and Japan.

2.6.1 Japanese History Textbooks in 1982, 1986 and 2001 in China and Japan

In the context of Sino-Japanese relations, the controversy over Japanese history textbooks emerged in the 1980s. When the Japanese Ministry of Education ran its textbook screening in 1982, the editors of history textbooks shared the screening process to the mass media and expressed their concerns that MOE was attempting to tighten the screening, including requests to revise depictions of atrocities that Japanese military had committed in China. The Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shinbun* published a serial of articles from June in which it conveyed its criticisms of MOE’s ‘compulsory request’ (*kyōyō*) to revise the depiction of the war with China from ‘aggression’ (*shinryaku*) to ‘advance’ (*shinshutsu*). These reports were immediately re-posted by China’s national newspaper, *People’s Daily*, in July, and ‘MOE’s request to make a revision’ were misunderstood as

‘MOE is distorting historical facts’. Subsequently, a campaign to criticize MOE was organized from July to the end of the September in China.

When China started its criticism of MOE, MOE explained their suggested revisions were not compulsory, but merely suggestions to choose another word like ‘invade’ (*shinnyū*) or ‘attack’ (*shinkō*) to describe the war with China from the angles of ‘consistency’ and ‘neutrality’ (Asahi Shinbun 1982). On July 28, 1982, *Asahi Shinbun* published another article titled ‘Government, trying its best to explain the diplomatic route to China, and following the spirit of peace agreement’ (*Seifu, chinseika ni zenryoku tai Chūgoku gaikō rūto de setsumeï he heiwa jōyaku no seishin junshū*), expressed the Japanese government’s ‘humble attitude’ in accepting the criticisms from PRC and ROK, and claimed the government’s determination to deal with the textbook issue by ‘imperturbable principle’ (Asahi Shinbun 1982).

China, after Japan’s official stance was declared in the end of July, continued its criticisms of MOE in August, inserted the testimonial photographs of Japan’s aggression in *People’s Daily*, and argued that ‘to distort history is embodied the shadow of the revival of militarism’ (People’s Daily 1982). On August 14, the criticism of MOE was shifted to ‘a small group of right-wing members’, the newspaper proclaimed that the rightist’s distortion of history always exists (Chen 1982). On the same day, a newspaper article introduced the war crimes that Japanese militarists Matsui Iwane and Tani Hisao had committed in Nanjing, and insisted that ‘although history is pitiless, the debts must be paid by blood’ (Ma 1982).

Under fierce criticism from China, Japanese government felt threatened. On August 8, *Asahi Shinbun* posted a comic picture in which a trembling person (representing MOE) was stepping on the tails of two tigers (representing China and South Korea) and stated that the Japanese government’s failure in dealing with the textbook issue would possibly trigger a backlash from the hawks (Asahi Shinbun 1982). After the Miyazawa Statement was released on August 26, China rejected the statement and claimed that China disagreed with the statement because the Japanese government ‘did not give satisfactory and specific measurements for the correction’ (People’s Daily 1982). At the end of September, the textbook controversy was contained after Japan’s Prime Minister Suzuki

Zenkō visited China for the celebration of the anniversary of diplomatic normalization, re-emphasized the importance of Sino-Japanese relations.

Another round of diplomatic discomfort triggered by a Japanese history textbook took place in 1986, but was effectively contained by both Chinese and Japanese governments within a month. The textbook controversy in 1986 was caused by a history textbook for Japanese senior high students which was edited by Harashobō (publisher). PRC spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed China's concern regarding the content of the textbook which distorted many historical facts, and urged the Japanese government to adhere to the Joint Communiqué (Hattori 2012, 186). Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro subsequently asked the Minister of Education, Kaifu Toshiki, to revise the screening, and cooperated with PRC and ROK in revising another 38 places in the textbook (ibid). Following the revisions, China expressed its high praise for Prime Minister Nakasone's effective response in dealing with the textbook controversy. The diplomatic discomfort triggered by the textbook was contained in July (ibid, 187).

In contrast with the textbook controversies in 1982 and 1986, the history textbook disputes in 2001 were fiercer and broader. China's criticism was not only regarding the revision of the textbook, but also the Japanese government's failure to take war responsibility.

When the JSHTTR (Japan Society for History Textbook Reform, *tsukurukai*) was established in 1996, its chairman Nishio Kanji said that JSHTTR would publish a new history textbook in 2002 for Japanese junior high school use. The textbook was submitted to MOE on April, 2000, and later Nishio as well as the publisher Fusōsha started a series of promotional activities including appearing on TV programs and distributing leaflets to introduce the textbook. The *Fusōsha* history textbook soon became widespread public knowledge. According to Nozaki (2008), to strengthen the influence of the textbook, the publisher *Fusōsha* cooperated with Japan's rightists, started a series of campaigns to clear the obstacles in the way of textbook publication, including pressure on LDP hawks to dismiss a member of Textbook Screening Council, Noda Eijiro, from his position when Noda began to discuss rejecting this textbook with other members of the Council in the Autumn 2000 (ibid). In the same year, when

Nonaka Hiromu – the secretary of the LDP – responded to China’s criticism and implied that government of Japan would revise the text during the screening, but LDP hawks and JSHTTR asked Nonaka to retract his statement (ibid). After a series of campaigns in which the publisher *Fusōsha* cooperated with the political elites, the history textbook was published after being revised in 137 places based on MOE recommendations and passed the textbook screening process in the spring of 2001 (Nozaki 2008, 146).

After MEXT declared the screening results of *Fusōsha*’s history textbook on April 3, a large scale movement to fight against MEXT’s decision and to oppose the adoption of the textbook was organized by Japanese local organizations. Searching the digital database of *Asahi Shinbun* between April and October 2001 reveals that there were 23 prefectures⁴ which expressed their ‘refusal’ of the textbook to the Prefectural Board of Education, and criticized the textbook for ‘glorifying war crimes’. The wide range of criticism and resistance against MEXT’s approval of the problematic history textbook revealed how far distrust had spread in domestic Japan in 2001.

Before MOE approved *Fusōsha*’s textbook, China’s criticisms were more focused on the nature of the textbook. On March 4, the *People’s Daily* indicated that the ‘denial’ and ‘glorified’ war depictions in the history textbook were ‘shameless behavior to fabricate history’ (Zhang and Li 2001). On March 16, the *People’s Daily* published another report regarding a statement by eight organizations of history education in Japan against *Fusōsha*’s textbook being adopted in schools. The report indicated that ‘the textbook completely ignored the sincere introspection toward the past colonization and aggressive war’ (Yu 2001).

When MEXT approved *Fusōsha*’s history textbook on April 3, the discourse in China shifted to express the Chinese government’s indignation while criticizing Japanese government’s approval of the textbook. A PRC spokesmen of the Ministry of Education claimed the PRC Government was ‘deeply indignant of Japan’s ignorance of China’s as well as other Asian countries’ appeals’, and urged the Japanese government ‘to face up

⁴ 23 prefectures are Ishikawa Prefecture, Kyoto, Toyama Prefecture, Fukui Prefecture, Kanagawa Prefecture, Shiga Prefecture, Shizuoka Prefecture, Kumamoto Prefecture, Tokushima Prefecture, Kagoshima Prefecture, Oita Prefecture, Nagasaki Prefecture, Aichi Prefecture, Hokkaido, Tochigi Prefecture, Ibaraki Prefecture, Kagawa Prefecture, Tokyo, Fukuoka Prefecture, Saga Prefecture, Aomori Prefecture, Gifu Prefecture and Ehime Prefecture.

to history’, and ‘to correct the wrong depiction of the rightist history textbook and their absurd argumentation’ on April 3 (The State Council of People's Republic of China 2001). On April 4, 5 and 6, the *People's Daily* published several articles continuously criticizing Japan's approval of the problematic history textbook. The report on April 4 was the statement of Chen Jian, Ambassador of PRC to Japan, who expressed China's ‘shock’ and ‘regret’ at the result of the textbook screening, and said the textbook is ‘an insult to Chinese citizens' rights to resist external invasions’, ‘a provocation regarding world-wide acknowledged historical facts and human morality’, and urged the Japanese government ‘to take the responsibility for the textbook approval’ (People's Daily 2001). On April 5, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan expressed China's ‘solemn resistance against Japan's approval of the history textbook’ by emphasizing China's ‘strong dissatisfaction and indignation at the Japanese government's ignorance of China's position’, and expressed that PRC government and Chinese people ‘are suspicious and distrustful toward the Japanese government's position in dealing with historical issues’ (People's Daily 2001). On the same day, the *People's Daily* published another statement by the spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China's National People's Congress, stressing that the Japanese government's approval of the history textbook ‘severely hurt the emotions of Chinese people’, and urged the Japanese government to ‘use authentic history to educate young generations while considering Japan's national benefit [cooperating with China], as well as the considerations of peace and development in Asia and the world’ (People's Daily 2001).

After such official statements were made in China, editorials critical of Japan's rightwing activities and analysis of the content of the history textbook followed on April 6. In the editorial titled *Li Shi Yin Ying Xia De You Yi Xin Tai* (the Rightist's Minds under the Shadow of History), the author Sun Dongming fiercely blamed the Japanese rightists as ‘narrow-minded but extremely arrogant’ and as people who ‘bear a grudge against being identified as the perpetrators of the war’, and aimed to ‘evoke national pride by fabricating history and glorifying aggressive war’ (Sun 2001). In this editorial, the rightist textbook approved by MEXT was recognized as ‘the trend of the rightists’ revolt about which we need to be highly concerned’ (ibid). On the same page, Gao Mingyan confirmed the positive depiction of Japanese war conduct in history textbooks

in the 1970s and 1980s, but strongly criticized Fusōsha's textbook by stating that the textbook 'play[ed] word games and obliterate[ed] the historical facts of aggressive war', which 'completely betrayed the essence of historiography' (Gao 2001).

Before and after MEXT's declaration of the screening result, the government of Japan faced fierce resistance and criticism both domestically and internationally. Although MEXT qualified Fusōsha's history textbook on April 3, 2001, under the continuous resistance to prevent the textbook from entering into junior high schools, the adoption rate of the textbook was only 0.039% (Chūō Nippō 2006).

From the diplomatic crises triggered by Japanese history textbooks in 1982, 1986 and 2001, it can be observed that after diplomatic normalization with Japan, China watched Japanese history textbooks closely. In 1982, China's gaze on Japanese history textbooks was sensitive and suspicious. This can be seen when Japan clarified that the previous reports about 'invasion' being changed to 'advanced into' were 'misleading', but the Chinese government did not give up its hardline policies. In 1986, the textbook controversies were less discussed in China because of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's pro-China diplomacy. In the 1980s, although China was dissatisfied with MOE's screening and rightwing revisionism, China limited its criticism of MOE and avoided directly criticizing the Japanese government. However, the debates on the history textbook were fiercer in 2001. It is not only because the problematic textbook was officially approved by MEXT, but also because negative images of Japan had increased in China due to Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō's official worship at Yasukuni Shrine. China displayed indignation regarding the problematic textbook and its dissatisfaction toward the Japanese government. However, it was less concerned about the other publishers' textbooks which were qualified by MEXT at the same time, which might have misled Chinese people into thinking that all Japanese history textbook were uniformly problematic.

2.6.2 Japanese Prime Ministerial Worship at Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 and the 2000s

After the history textbook controversies died down in September 1982, the head of the LDP, Nakasone Yasuhiro, was elected as the new Japanese Prime Minister in November. Nakasone Yasuhiro was a pro-China politician, and with his stable and

positive understanding of the historical disputes between China and Japan, Sino-Japanese relations improved (Hattori 2012, 191).

Bilateral relations were kept stable during the period of the Nakasone government, but disputes over the Prime Minister's official worship at the Yasukuni Shrine triggered uncomfortableness between China and Japan. Before Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's official worship at the Yasukuni Shrine, on August 15, 1985, *Asahi Shinbun* interviewed several politicians and scholars and revealed there were diverse perspectives in Japanese society regarding the issue. In one article, professor Ōe Shinobu from Ibaraki University and scholar Nishikawa Shigenori indicated that the personality of Yasukuni Shrine is different from other shrines because it is a symbolism of 'honor' and 'reputation'. They argued that official worship at the shrine would betray the principle of the 'separation of religion from politics', but other political elites like Itagaki Tadashi and Itō Taikō – expressed support for the official worship (*Asahi Shinbun* 1985). On August 11, *Asahi Shinbun* stressed that official worship at Yasukuni Shrine should not be 'enforced' by 'political judgement' because there was a lack of consensus among government and civilians, but this article avoided discussion on the legality of the official worship (*Asahi Shinbun* 1985).

After Prime Minister Nakasone decided to worship in an official capacity at Yasukuni Shrine, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its resistance on August 11 and 14, arguing that the worship in an official capacity would hurt Asian people's feelings (see *People's Daily* August 11: page 6 and August 15: page 4). On August 15 and 16, 1985, the *People's Daily* published only three short articles depicting the worship and the atmosphere in Japan on the war end anniversary (see *People's Daily* August 15: page 6, and August 16: page 6). From the end of August, criticism of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's official worship did not frequently appear in the *People's Daily*, and there were repeated articles emphasizing the importance of the friendship between China and Japan from September, 1985, the Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese Anti-Japanese War.

The discussions regarding the Yasukuni dispute in 1985 did not trigger a diplomatic crisis between China and Japan because of Prime Minister Nakasone's consideration of his pro-China policy and China's restraint on the dispute. Prime Minister Nakasone had

sent Noda Takeshi – the Chairman of the Japan-China Society (*Nicchū kyōkai*) – to China one month before the worship and he had negotiated with Chinese representatives regarding the official worship, which revealed that Prime Minister Nakasone prioritized Japan's bilateral relations with China over his worship (Hattori 2012, 175). Nevertheless, after the official worship, the *People's Daily* had said the official worship would 'hurt Asian people's feelings', China's restraint on the Yasukuni Shrine dispute in 1985 was visible. In October 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro visited China with the aim of repairing Sino-Japanese relations, and PRC General Secretary Hu Yaobang's 'four principles'⁵ at his meeting with members of the 21st Century Committee for Japan-China Friendship on October 18, 1985 had strengthened China's relations with Japan.

In contrast with the 1980s, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō's repeated worship at Yasukuni Shrine between 2001 to 2006 became a crucial diplomatic obstacle between China and Japan. Before Koizumi Junichirō became the Prime Minister of Japan on April 26, 2001, he had expressed his determination to worship at Yasukuni Shrine during his presidential election campaign (*Asahi Shinbun* 2001). After Koizumi won the election and became Prime Minister, Koizumi stressed his determination to worship at the shrine in the capacity of Prime Minister at the National Budget Committee on May 14 by re-emphasizing his resolution to 'never again to take the path to war', but 'with high respect to Japanese citizens who had to take part in the war for the nation' (*Asahi Shinbun* 2001). Subsequently, *Asahi Shinbun* published an editorial on May 24 that criticized Prime Minister Koizumi's insistence on worship at Yasukuni Shrine as 'extremely naive' and showing his 'lack of concern for Japan's diplomacy'. The editorial urged Prime Minister Koizumi 'take responsibility in domestic politics, and never to forget that diplomatic failure can trigger a crisis' (*Asahi Shinbun* 2001).

In June, when Japan's domestic discourse began to criticize Prime Minister Koizumi's determination to worship, China selected the same position as the *Asahi Shinbun* and clarified the PRC government's 'consistently opposes Japanese officials

⁵ The four principles are: to emphasize China-Japan friendship is an essential benefit for both Chinese and Japanese people; to recognize the history of confrontation objectively; to make effort regarding China-Japan friendship; and to set permanent peace between China and Japan in future generations as the highest aim (Hattori 2012, 177).

worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine'. It urged the Japanese government to 'keep the principles of the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and make positive efforts to maintain the development of Sino-Japanese relations' (Furuya 2001). On June 9, the Vice Premier of China Qian Qichen said that PRC Government policy toward Japan 'is not changed' in a meeting with Noda Takeshi (the Chairman of Japan-China Friendship Association), but Qian emphasized that 'many Chinese people are extremely sensitive about the worship', and stressed that China hopes the government of Japan would 'take sincere attitude' on the issue of the worship (Furuya 2001).

In July 2001, China repeatedly emphasized the importance of Sino-Japanese relations and expressed its understanding of Japanese citizens' worship at Yasukuni Shrine (Akiyama 2001), stated that 'China does not want to break diplomatic relations with Japan' (Furuya 2001), and revealed the PRC government's intense worries of Chinese citizens' strong resistance regarding Prime Minister Koizumi's worship (Tanaka, Tanaka Gaishō Ni Yasukuni Sanpai No Saikō Wo Yōkyū Chūgoku Gaishō 'Yūkō No Kiban Kuzureru' 2001). Meanwhile, *Asahi Shinbun* published an editorial on July 28 which expressed domestic resistance against the Prime Minister's worship on August 15, and indicated that 'political leaders should hold mature and balanced views and consider reality' (Tanaka 2001). The mass media of China and Japan kept constantly pressuring the government of Japan and forced Prime Minister Koizumi to alter his official worship at Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 to August 13, 2001.

When Prime Minister Koizumi decided to visit the Shrine on August 13, Koizumi expressed his 'profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of the war', and explained that his wish to visit Yasukuni Shrine was because he 'had thought that the people of Japan and those in neighboring countries would understand'. 'However', Koizumi stated, 'opinions requesting the cancellation of my visit to Yasukuni Shrine were voiced not only within Japan but also from other countries' (MOFA 2001). To avoid people in neighboring countries casting doubts on the fundamental policy of Japan of rejecting war and desiring peace, Koizumi confirmed his cancellation of the visit on August 15, but changed the day on August 13 (ibid).

Koizumi's change of the worship date to August 13 did not receive a positive response in China. From August 14 to August 17, the *People's Daily* published a series of articles and complained that the official visit 'prevented the political base of Sino-Japanese relations', 'severely hurt Chinese and other Asian victims, and 'obstructed the healthy development of Sino-Japanese relations' (Guan 2001). On August 14, an editorial titled 'The Act to Provoke Justice' (*Tiao Xin Zheng Yi De Ju Dong*) emphasized that the changes of the worship date 'cannot change the essence of the problem', criticized Koizumi's worship in his capacity as Prime Minister as 'betraying the Japanese government's promise' and 'breaking his word to Asian countries and people', and stressed that Chinese people's strong indignity and resistance are 'rational' (People's Daily 2001).

In the following years, Koizumi Junichirō repeatedly worshiped at Yasukuni Shrine in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. All of his official visits from 2001 to 2006 were in the capacity of Prime Minister. Since 14 Class-A war criminals were enshrined at the shrine in 1978, Koizumi's repeated visits were recognized as the Japanese government's lack of introspection regarding the past aggressive wars. While sections of the Japanese mass media criticized the worship by continuously stressing worries about Koizumi's 'dangerous diplomacy', China started looking for the implied meanings of the worship, and argued that official worship at Yasukuni Shrine revealed 'rising rightist nationalism', which was 'were caused by Japan's continuous economic recession since the second half of the 1990s' (Liu 2001).

The discourse in China, therefore, shifted from criticism of the worship itself to the rebuke of Japanese rightists. On August 17, 2001, Jin Xide indicated that 'purify Yasukuni Shrine is the primary target for the rightists and conservatives to wanting to revise history' (Jin 2001). After Prime Minister Koizumi's official worship at the shrine on April 21, 2002, the editorial 'Why Koizumi Worships at Yasukuni Shrine' (*Xiao Quan Wei He Can Bai Jing Guo Shen She*) stressed the aim of the Prime Minister's worship was to maintain the Koizumi regime amidst economic depression and a series of political scandals (Guan 2002). In the editorial 'The Utmost Problem Cannot Be Minimized' (*Da Shi Qi Rong Hua Xiao*), Prime Minister Koizumi's worship at the

Yasukuni Shrine was criticized as ‘the encouragement and the catering for Japanese rightism’ (Gu 2003).

When Koizumi worshiped at the Yasukuni Shrine on January 1, 2004, the *People’s Daily* reported a Japanese civil organization’s statement against the official worship at the Yasukuni Shrine as ‘a misdeed’ which ‘violated the Constitution of Japan regarding the separation of religion from politics’ (H. Zhang 2004). The discussions of Yasukuni Shrine in mainland China gradually shifted from criticizing the Prime Minister’s official worship to looking for support from Japanese society in 2006. On August 21, 2006, the *People’s Daily* interviewed Japanese scholar Takahashi Tetsuya (a professor at the University of Tokyo) regarding seeking a resolution of the Yasukuni dispute. In the interview, professor Takahashi Tetsuya expressed his understanding of China and Korea’s resistance, but emphasized that the essential problem of Yasukuni Shrine is not regarding the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals, but how to follow strictly the principle of the separation between religion and politics in the Constitution of Japan (Cao 2006). The editorial changed the direction of the discussions of the disputes regarding Yasukuni Shrine, and constrained the escalation of the criticism of the Koizumi’s worship at the shrine in the 2000s.

After Koizumi Junichirō stepped down as prime minister on September 26, 2006, Abe Shinzō (2006.9.26 - 2007.9.26), Fukuda Yasuo (2007.09.26 - 2008.09.24), Asō Tarō (2008.09.24 - 2009.09.16), Hatoyama Yukio (2009.09.16-2010.06.08), and Kan Naoto (2010.06.08-2011.09.02) became prime minister. In order to repair the relationship with China, all of them avoided worship at Yasukuni Shrine during their tenure as prime minister. The disputes of prime ministerial worship at Yasukuni Shrine were avoided from 2007 to 2012.

By observing the transformation in discourse in China, when the mass media started to look for support from Japanese society rather than criticizing the historical dispute, it became clear that historical disputes between China and Japan are not an unresolvable deadlock. Either the Nakasone Yasuhiro government’s ‘prioritization of diplomatic policy’, or cooperation with Japanese society and open discussions would provide a prerequisite as well as the conditions for repairing Sino-Japanese relations.

2.6.3 The 'Comfort Women' Issue in the 1990s

The discourse transformation was able to provide a positive and constructive approach for dealing with the Yasukuni disputes between China and Japan between 1985 and 2006, but it exacerbated the historical disputes between China and Japan in a negative direction in dealings regarding the 'comfort women' (*ianfu*) in the 1990s and the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands territorial dispute in the 2010s.

The changes in historical consciousness in 1990s can be observed via changes in discourse regarding the 'comfort women' in Japan and China. The issue of the 'comfort women' emerged on June 6, 1990 when Motooka Shōji, a member of Japanese House of Councilors, submitted an interpellation in the national budgetary committee to ask whether the comfort women were forcibly recruited in wartime Japan. The interpellation was denied by Shimizu Tsutao, the Director of the Employment Security Bureau, who stated that 'the comfort women had been recruited by private-sector entrepreneurs and that is therefore beyond our capacity to investigate the matter'. In response to this statement by the Japanese government, Korean professor Yun Chong Ok joined 37 women's organization together into the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan in November 1990 and demanded that Japanese government take its responsibilities in the matter of the 'comfort women'. In August 1991, Kim Hak Sun went public and declared herself as a former 'comfort women', and testified to the brutal war crimes that the Japanese military had committed in wartime. Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi ordered his government to investigate the issue, and the Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kōno on the Result of the Study on the Issue of Comfort Women was made on August 4 1993. The Kōno Statement clarified that Japanese government: 1) confirmed the existence of comfort women; 2) confessed that the comfort women were recruited 'against their own will, through coaxing and coercion'; 3) admitted that the origin of those comfort women who 'were transferred from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part'; and 4) expressed that Japan 'would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse' (MOFA 1993). Additionally, the statement promised that the government of Japan would 'take them to heart as lessons of history' and would 'reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history'. Later, the Asian Women's Fund (hereafter, AWF) was

established in 1995 and aimed to deal with the issue of compensation to the former comfort women. The negative discourse toward the issue of comfort women was successfully contained by Miyazawa government in the first half of 1990s.

Although, the issue of comfort women was not commonly recognized as a factor influencing Sino-Japanese relation in the 1990s, China's concern regarding Japan's policy in its dealing with the issue of the comfort women meant China followed the issue closely. From 1990 to 1994, ten reports regarding comfort women were published by China's national newspaper the *People's Daily*, but all of them avoided direct criticism on this issue. On July 10, 1992, the *People's Daily* reported the statement of spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 9, in which China's official position toward the comfort women was settled as, 'China had noted the results of the Japanese government's investigation into military prostitution, and the Japanese government's apology and introspection' (People's Daily 1992).

The transformation of discourses regarding the comfort women in both Japan and China was instigated by controversial statements by Okuno Seisuke (the former Minister of Justice), debates regarding whether the comfort women should be removed from history textbooks, and critical discourses of the problematic atonement money paid by AWF to the former comfort women in Korea in 1996. According to the database of the *People's Daily*, 92 results with the keyword 'comfort women' were revealed in the database of the *People's Daily* from 1990 to 1999. In 1996, there were 33 reports that included the keyword 'comfort women', which was the highest rate of any year in the 1990s. In these 33 reports, 13 articles directly criticized Japan's problematic statements on the comfort women issue, 11 articles quoted criticism from Korea and other countries, 8 articles were marked as positive statements regarding Japan's apologies on the issue of comfort women, and one article revealed no direct relation to the discussion of comfort women. The year 1996, therefore, can be regarded as the turning point for discourses in both Japan and China. In this year, China took the same position within the discourses as ROK, and their concerns regarding the comfort women centered on three aspects: 1) the debates of the 'facts' of the comfort women, 2) the debates on whether the depiction of comfort women should be deleted from Japan's junior high school history textbooks, and 3) the atonement money paid by AWF.

On June 4, 1996, Okuno Seisuke, the former Minister of Justice (also the Chairman of *Akarui Nihon Kokkai Giin Renmei* – a parliamentary group), stated at a press conference that the comfort women were paid prostitutes, and emphasized that the comfort women ‘were not forced (by government of Japan)’. This triggered fierce criticism in ROK and PRC. On June 6, 1996, the *People’s Daily* criticized Okuno Seisuke’s statement saying it ‘splashed filthy water on the victims’, and criticized Okuno Seisuke who ‘always defended Japan’s aggressive crimes’ and who ‘attempted to twist history’ (People’s Daily 1996). On June 7, the *People’s Daily* published an official editorial which affirmed the effort of AWF and Japanese citizen’s efforts in their donations to AWF for compensation to be paid to the comfort women, but it severely criticized ‘some Japanese politicians’ who ‘publicly twisted and concealed Japan’s historical war crimes’ and ‘rubbed salt in the wound of victims’ (People’s Daily 1996).

On June 27, 1996, when seven Japanese junior high school history textbooks with mentions of the comfort women were approved by MOE, the Liberal View of History Study Group (*Jiyūshugishikan Kenkyūkai*) decided to launch a national campaign to remove depictions of the comfort women in Japanese history textbooks. On September 22, the *Nihon O Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi* (a rightist group) connected with the Liberal View of History Study Group, asked textbook editors to delete the depictions of the comfort women in the history textbooks. On December 11, 1996, LDP Senator Itagaki Tadashi questioned the depiction of the military comfort women in junior high school history textbooks in the national budgetary committee, and urged the Japanese government to remove the mentions of the comfort women from history textbooks. Kosugi Takashi, the former Minister of Education, denied Itagaki’s request and said that students should know the historical facts of comfort women through history textbooks. When Itagaki Tadashi repeatedly asked the Japanese government to revise the depictions of the comfort women in history textbooks, his statements and denial of a national war crime generated close attention in China. China’s emphasized former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei’s statement regarding the importance of ‘historical facts in education’ and his criticism of requests to ‘delete depictions of the comfort women

from textbooks' were repeatedly reported by the *People's Daily* on December 13, December 28 and December 31 (People's Daily 1996).

Another debate regarding the comfort women followed the discussions of the atonement money paid by AWF. After AWF started its payments to comfort women in the Philippines in 1996, resistance to Japan's scheme was launched in ROK on October 18 (Kim and Nakano 2008, 396). According to Jeong Hyun Baek (2008), ROK opposed the AWF's atonement money for four reasons: 1) AWF had forced the reparations on former Korean comfort women which betrayed what Korean victims expected; 2) the government of Japan did not admit its war crimes towards the comfort women; 3) AWF neglected the fierce criticism from international society; and 4) AWF shifted the war responsibility of the Japanese government to Japanese citizens (Jeong 2008, 58-60).

The main criticism from ROK centered on the money which AWF had collected from Japanese citizens rather than the government of Japan. Ostensibly, the discussions of the atonement money centered on the source of the money because how the money was paid to the victims indicated the Japanese government's responsibilities for past war crimes. Therefore, the discussions of AWF and its atonement money to the former comfort women were essentially discussions regarding Japan's 'reparations for its war crimes' and Japan's 'responsibility in post-war era'.

From 1995 to January 1997, China's discourse regarding the payments made by AWF shifted from 'positive' to 'negative'. On July 20, 1995, the *People's Daily* introduced the establishment of AWF, conveyed Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi's 'deep apology to the former comfort women', and reposted Prime Minister Murayama's emphasis of 'Japan's responsibility to pay reparations' and stated the 'Prime Minister's apology letter has been sent to each of the comfort women' (G. Zhang 1995). On June 7, 1996, when the *People's Daily* fiercely criticized Okuno's problematic statement on the comfort women, the report at the same time confirmed AWF's atonement money and stated that 'the reparations were based on the decision of the Murayama government in 1995 which revealed an important step that Japanese government worked for the final solution of the comfort women issue' (G. Zhang 1996). However, on December 24, 1996, the discourse in domestic China adopted the position of the ROK government, started to criticize the Japanese government's 'stubborn' insistence that atonement

money must be paid from a ‘private fund’ and not from a ‘governmental fund’, and indicated that the atonement money of AWF was ‘aimed at avoiding the government’s responsibility’ and a ‘refusal to commit to national reparations’ (Xin Hua She 1996). On January 13, 1997, the *People’s Daily* again reported AWF’s atonement money ‘did not get the approval of the ROK government’, and stated ROK’s response to AWF’s payment of two million Japanese Yen for each Korean comfort women indicated that the Japanese government ‘despised the ROK government’ and ‘betrayed the principle that ROK government insisted upon’ (People’s Daily 1997). From the end of 1996, China’s discourse regarding the atonement money of AWF shifted from positive to negative.

China’s discourse transformation regarding the debates about the ‘comfort women’ were affected by both Japanese politicians’ problematic statements and the ROK government’s fierce criticisms. The discourse transformation in China in the second half of the 1990s signaled a decline in Sino-Japanese relations, and revealed that China’s trust toward Japan in its dealing with historical disputes was not strong and stable, especially in China’s dealing with AWF’s atonement money. This transformation exposed the fragility of Sino-Japanese relations, and highlighted that mutual trust, or the lack of it, in bilateral relations would be the primary parameter in repairing and strengthening the bilateral relations in the future.

2.6.4 The Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and National Defense Policy in the 2010s

The territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands between China and Japan triggered two major diplomatic confrontations in the 2010s. The first one was the collision incident between a Chinese fishing vessel and the Japan Coast Guard in the territorial waters of the islands in September, 2010. The second one was triggered by Japan’s nationalization of the islands in 2012. Territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands have become the fiercest current diplomatic confrontation between China and Japan.

From when the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands collision incident occurred on September 7 until October 1, 2010, *Asahi Shinbun* published 254 reports including the keyword ‘*senkaku shōtotsu*’ (Senkaku Collision). In all 254 reports, *Asahi Shinbun* took the same position as the Japanese government, expressed dissatisfaction at China’s frequent

advancement into Japan's territorial waters, and revealed its worries over Japan's diplomacy with China after the Ishigaki Summary Court announced the detainment of the Chinese Captain (Asahi Shinbun 2010). On September 9, *Asahi Shinbun* recorded the witnesses of China's fishing vessels' frequent advancement into Japan's territorial waters from August 2010, and criticized China and Taiwan's intention to declare sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands as down to 'petroleum resources found in that area' (Asahi Shinbun 2010). During the same period, the PRC Embassy in Japan presented 'solemn resistance' to the government of Japan, urged Japan to release the Chinese fishermen and the fishing vessel as soon as possible, criticized Japan's detainment as 'ridiculous', and emphasized China's determination to protect the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands.

Under the pressure of China's criticism, Japan released the 14 Chinese fishermen on September 13, but said that the detainment of the Chinese Captain would be extended until September 20 (Asahi Shinbun 2010). On September 19, one day before the release date of the Chinese Captain, Ishigaki Summary Court (*Ishigaki Kansai*) suddenly said the detainment of the Captain would be extended for another 10 days till September 29. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately said that China would take strict counter-measures toward Japan. On September 19, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to suspend all communication activities above provincial-level, stopped the negotiations regarding increased flights between China and Japan, and postponed a meeting about coal issues with Japan (People's Daily 2010). In accordance with China's strict counter-measures toward Japan, large-scale anti-Japanese protests were organized in mainland China from September to the end of October.

After the anti-Japanese protests spread in mainland China, *Asahi Shinbun* shifted its discourses from criticizing China's intentions to get petroleum resources in the territorial waters of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands to blaming China's 'patriotic education' and the 'restraints of propaganda'. On September 20, a report titled 'China has Stopped the Communicative Activities on an Administrative Level, Protest Call by the Ambassador, Caused by the Senkaku Collision and the Extension of Detainment of the Captain' (*Chūgoku 'Kakuryō Kōryū O Teishi' Taishi Ni Denwa De Kōgi Senkaku · Gyosen Shōtotsu, Senchō No Kōryū Enchō*) fiercely criticized China's reports about the

‘illegality’ of Japan’s detainment and China’s patriotic education that ‘strengthened anti-Japanese sentiment’. From September 20 to 23, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly stated that Japan had to change its wrongdoings, and urged Japan to release the Chinese Captain as soon as possible. After Japan released Chinese Captain Zhan Qixiong on September 25, four days before the court decision, the *People’s Daily* published an editorial indicating that the Diaoyu Collision (Senkaku Collision) issue ‘has exposed Japan’s dishonored ruse in dealing with disputes with China’. It criticized some Japanese groups who ‘have suspicious, precautious, and even hostile attitude towards China’s development’ and urged Japan to ‘avoid damaging China’s benefit’ (Zhong 2010).

The second round of diplomatic confrontations between China and Japan on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands took place in 2012. Japan’s Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko announced the Japanese government’s determination to nationalize the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands on July 7, 2012. *Asahi Shinbun* took the same position as the government, predicted that ‘the Japanese government’s determination to nationalize the Senkaku Islands would moderate the tension between Japan and China, as well as the tension between Japan and Taiwan’, and supported the idea that the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands would be able to ‘prevent provocation’ and avoid ‘the occurrence of unpredictable incident’ (Asahi Shinbun 2012). On July 11, *Asahi Shinbun* interviewed two Japanese scholars, Magosaki Ukeru (Japanese Diplomat) and Takahara Akio (Professor of University of Tokyo), and discussed the nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. In the interview, Mr. Magosaki stated that Japan should recognize the territory of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands as ‘disputed territory’ and suggested that the ‘shelving policy’ would be the most beneficial policy for Japan to adopt. Professor Takahara stated a different opinion who firmly convinced that the Senkaku Islands are territory of Japan, both historically and legally, and predicted that China would react in the same way no matter the purchase been paid by the Tokyo Metropolitan government or the government of Japan (Asahi Shinbun 2012).

After Noda government issued the payment to the private householder Kurihara Hiroyuki and completed the nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands on September 11, *Asahi Shinbun* published an editorial on September 13. It emphasized

that Japan's declaration of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands was in 1895, and called for China to be calm (Asahi Shinbun 2012). After the Noda government's nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, China's national newspaper agency the *People's Daily* published a serial of editorials from September 11 to the end of the month that fiercely criticized Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands as 'a serious infringement of China's territory'. The PRC government, as well as Chinese people, were 'strongly against and condemn [these actions]', and said Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku Islands was 'rooted in the absence of introspection toward militarism and war crimes among some Japanese groups' (Guo 2012). On September 18, the *People's Daily* published editorials saying that Japan's 'unjustified occupation' of the Senkaku Islands 'derived from the similar thinking as the Mukden Incident in 1931', and asserted that Japanese militarism and right wing groups were increasing in Japanese society (Zhou, et al. 2012). Regarding Japan's criticism of anti-Japanese protests in mainland China, the *People's Daily* on September 18 expressed that Chinese people's street protests against Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku Islands were 'understandable'. The people's demonstrations, according to the editorial, indicated 'Chinese people's justified position and patriotic spirit' (People's Daily 2012).

On September 27, the PRC government published a White Paper titled 'The Diaoyu Islands are the Inherent Territory of the People's Republic of China' (*Diao Yu Dao Shi Zhong Guo De Gu You Ling Tu*), and the *People's Daily* subsequently endorsed the White Paper by stating the publishing of the White Paper 'is aiming to tell the truth of Diaoyu Islands to international society as well as Japanese people who were blinded'. It called for 'attention regarding Japanese rightists activities that stir up trouble', and for the first time criticized the Japanese mass media's 'despicably fabricated news to create the false image that Japan gets support from other countries' (People's Daily 2012).

The diplomatic confrontations between China and Japan triggered by the territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands continued and turned to debates over national defense strategies. On November 7, 2012, Yachi Shōtarō, the Chairman of the National Security Secretariat of Japan, held a meeting with Yang Jiechi – the State Councilor of the People's Republic of China, and together they reached an agreement

for dealing with the territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. In the discussions over improving Japan-China relations, both China and Japan shared different views regarding the waters of the East China Sea, but both sides expressed their wish to prevent a deterioration in the situation by gradually resuming dialogue in political, diplomatic and security fields and making an effort to build a political relationship of mutual trust (MOFA 2012).

However, Japan's suspicions toward China's national defense strategy never eased up. In Japan's Annual White Paper of National Defense of 2013, Japan more than once criticized China's 'training exercises', 'information gathering activities' and 'monitoring activities for the protection of its maritime rights and interests' by stating that these activities 'had violated Japan's airspace' (Ministry of Defense 2013, 39). In 2014, the White Paper criticized China for 'infringe[ing] upon the freedom of overflight over the high seas, such as, the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone' (Ministry of Defense 2014, 40). In 2015, the White Paper specified that China 'has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected situations at sea' (Ministry of Defense 2015, 48), but it was soon converted in the White Paper of 2016 which noted that 'China's process with land reclamation work on the features and utilize them for military purposes' and said there 'may be negative security consequences including further heightening of tension with neighboring countries as well as increasing risks to stable use of sea lanes' (Ministry of Defense 2016, 58).

Each year after Japan published its White Paper of Annual Defense, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with dissatisfaction and 'solemn resistance' toward Japan's White Paper, repeatedly emphasizing that China's naval activities 'had followed international laws as well as domestic regulations' which 'should not be criticized by Japan'. Meanwhile, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized Japan's remarks on China's naval and military activities as 'spreading the discourse of China-threat', and urged Japan to 'put effort into improving bilateral relations from the view of mutual benefits and regional security'. Although, the discussion contained any further diplomatic confrontations over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, the bilateral negotiations did not provide a solution for improving Sino-Japanese relations with regard to the disputes over the islands.

In the discourse analysis of the territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in 2010 and 2012, it can be observed that the mutual criticisms of each others' handling of the territorial disputes did not pave way for a resolution but have contracted the negotiating space and made a compromise hard to achieve. In this discourse battlefield, Japan lost its chance to rebuild mutual trust with China, and China, meanwhile, lost its opportunity to gain support from Japanese society.

Chapter 3. War Narratives of Japanese History Textbooks (1972 – 2017)⁶

Each historical event encompasses various historical moments, and each historical moment is sutured by various causalities. In other words, the background of a historical event can be one of the reasons for the occurrence, the process of a historical event contains both evitable and inextricable factors, and the unique result is always led by direct or indirect motivations. Therefore, to depict a historical event the historian has to include the reasons of the event, the process of the event, and the result of the event, as well as the evaluation of the event. Within those depictions, what historical knowledge and historical consciousness are conveyed to the readers contribute the academic value of the textual analysis of history textbooks.

This chapter is aiming to classify the types of Japanese history textbooks by examining Japanese war narratives in 117 history textbooks which were published between 1972 and 2017; to explore the relations between war narratives of textbooks and the social context in each social epoch; and to trace the changes of Japanese war narratives in different social epochs. The classification of the war narratives of Japanese history textbooks is based on the spectrum of judgemental war memory proposed by Philip. A Seaton.

In order to classify war memories of different groups, Seaton (2007) bases his arguments on just war theory and sets 'aggressive war' and the 'aggressive acts' as the two variables of the spectrum of judgemental war memory. He hypothesizes that different war memories of different groups comprise the 'contested war memories' in post-war Japan. In Seaton's classification, four typical perspectives correspond with four groups. The first group, 'progressives', believe that Japan fought an aggressive war

⁶ This Chapter has been published on *Foreign Language Research in Northeast Asia* (Dong Bei Ya Wai Yu Yan Jiu), No.3, Da Lian Wai Guo Yu Da Xue (Dalian: 2017), 90-97.

and committed many aggressive acts in Asia. The second group, ‘progressive-leaning’ group, agree that the war was aggressive, but give a comparatively watered-down version of war responsibility, for example, by considering that Japan’s actions in the 1930s were an inevitable result of its situation. The third group, ‘conservatives’, adopt the perspectives that ‘war was just’ but there were some aspects of war conduct that were unjust; and the fourth group, ‘nationalists’, deny the war was ‘aggressive’ and disagree the war acts were ‘aggressive’. Using these definitions from progressive and nationalist, the war narratives of the textbooks will be analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively.

This chapter examines 102 history textbooks for junior high school use which were screened and qualified by MEXT (Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan) between 1972 and 2017 as the main object of analysis, and added 15 history textbooks which were adopted for Japanese senior high school education in 2017 as a supplementary data set. The aims were to (1) trace the relations between historical consciousness and war narratives in the same social epoch, and (2) reveal the dynamic changes of war narratives in different social periods.

The textbooks used for both junior high school and senior high school must pass the screening process of the Textbook Authorization Research Council (*kyōkasho yō tosho kentei chōsa shingikai*) and be qualified by MEXT (Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan) before they are published. However, history textbooks used in high school are different to junior high school textbooks in both of the school-teaching system and the classification of textbooks. First, in junior high school education, the subject ‘History’ is a compulsory course which belongs to the subject ‘Society’; however in high school education, the subject ‘History’ is an optional course. Second, the classification of history textbooks has only one classification in junior high school education called ‘Branch of History’ (*rekishi no bunya*) belonging to the subject ‘Society’. However, in high school education, the history textbooks are divided into ‘World History A’ (*sekaishi A*), ‘World History B’ (*sekaishi B*), ‘Japanese History A’ (*nihonshi A*) and ‘Japanese History B’ (*nihonshi B*). Textbook A is simpler than textbook B, and textbook B has more detailed content and is thicker than textbook A. Before the National University Entrance Examination (*sentā shiken*), students are able

to select their subjects in high school by reviewing the requirements of their candidate universities. For example, if the university needs a score in World History B, students applying to this university need to select the World History B course in their high school, and take the national examination for 'World History B'.

In the textual analysis of Japanese history textbooks, the reasons for going to war on three occasions and six specific forms of war conduct during the Asia-Pacific War are analyzed: the three wars are the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Mukden Incident (September 18, 1931), and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937) which triggered the Second Sino-Japanese War. The six incidents are the Nanjing Massacre (December, 1937), the 'comfort women', Unit 731's activities, the 'Three-Alls Operation', the mass suicides in the battle of Okinawa (1945), and the droppings of A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945). These were selected because (1) they are subjects of historical controversy between Japan and other Asian countries; (2) they are subjects of historical controversy among Japanese historians; and (3) they indicate what statements the Japanese government's textbook screeners will allow in screened textbooks about the national past. The textual analysis of war narratives of Japanese history textbooks encompasses (1) the nature of the war, (2) the causal interpretation, (3) responsibility for the expansion of the war, (4) narratives of Chinese victimhood, (5) narratives of Japanese victimhood, and (6) the introspective narrative. Each narrative of the selected historical events is coded by alphanumeric characters (See Appendix 1), therefore, the content of a narrative is interpreted by the codes.

3.1 The Nature of War

In the history textbooks of the 1970s,⁷ there were total 24 textbooks which were qualified and published for junior high school use. 21 of 24 defined the war between China and Japan from 1931 to 1945 as 'advance' (*shinshutsu*), two described the war as 'aggressive attack' (*shinkō*) and only one defined the war as 'aggression' (*shinryaku*). In

⁷ Since there was no new textbook published in the years 1973 - 1974, 1976 - 1977, 1979 - 1980, 1982 - 1983, 1985 - 1986, 1988 - 1989, 1991 - 1992, 1994 - 1996, 1998 - 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 - 2008, 2011 and 2017, the period of each decade in the figures is marked as the publishing years from 1972 to 1978, from 1982 to 1989, from 1990 to 1997, from 2002 to 2010, and from 2012 to 2016.

the 21 history textbooks which were qualified in the 1980s, the textbooks which defined the war as ‘aggression’ increased to 14 (66.7%), only four textbooks described the war as an ‘advance’ and three defined the war as ‘occupation’ (*senryō*). The textbooks which identified the war as ‘aggression’ kept increasing in the 1990s, in which 21 of 23 textbooks (91.3%) described the war as ‘aggression’, only one defined the nature of the war as ‘occupation’, and the other defined the war as an ‘advance’. During the years between 2002 and 2010, 13 textbooks of 19 defined the war as ‘aggression’ (68.4%), and six defined it as ‘occupation’. From 2012 to 2017, only four of 15 textbooks defined the war as ‘aggression’ (26.7%), but nine defined the war as the ‘occupation’ (60%), and two defined it as an ‘aggressive attack’. From Figure 1, it can be seen that from the beginning of diplomatic normalization in 1972 to the diplomatic stabilization of 1980s, the nature of the war as depicted in these textbooks gradually shifted from ‘advance’ to ‘aggression’. After ‘aggression’ was adopted by most of the history textbooks in the 1990s, the nature of war as ‘aggression’ declined from the 2000s. In the meantime, the adoption of ‘occupation’ started to increase. Between 2012 to 2017, the definition of the war as the ‘occupation’ in current history textbooks reached to the 50% of the all published history textbooks (Figure 1).




Figure 1

3.2 The Causal Interpretations

In the analysis of the causal interpretation, the textual analysis of history textbooks focuses on three historical moments as the main case studies: the First Sino-Japanese War (*Nisshin sensō*, 1895), the Mukden Incident (*Manshū jihen*, September 18, 1931), and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (*Rokōkyō jihen*, July 7, 1937).

In the history textbooks which were published in the 1970s, 19 of 24 (79%) mentioned that the First Sino-Japanese War started from Japan’s attempt to open the door of the Korean Peninsula and seek a foothold on the continent after the Treaty Revisions.⁸ Japan’s motivations, namely its ambition to expand its power to the Korean Peninsula and China, were mentioned and stressed in all 21 history textbooks of 1980s (100%), and this number slightly declined to 74% in 1990s, in other words 17 of 23 textbooks. However, in the 19 textbooks published in the 2000s, this number sharply declined to 37%, which means that only seven of 19 textbooks mentioned the motivation. This number kept decreasing from 2012, and only five of 15 qualified textbooks between 2012 and 2017 mentioned this motivation, i.e. the rate had declined to 33% (Figure 2).




Figure 2

After the First Sino-Japanese War, mentioning that prejudice and discriminatory ideology toward Chinese and Korean was widespread in Japanese society is set as

⁸ The Treaty Revisions refers to the revision of the commercial treaties which the Tokugawa Shogunate had signed with other foreign countries from 1854 to 1859. The Meiji government revised the commercial treaty with Britain first in 1894, and completed the revisions with other countries by 1911.

another variable of motivation analysis. The mention of discriminatory ideology indicated one of the reasons why Japan expanded its subsequent military movements from the Korean Peninsula to China. In the 24 textbooks of the 1970s, there were three textbooks (12.5%) which mentioned the discrimination of Chinese and Koreans. In the 1980s and 1990s, 13 of 21 textbooks (61.9%) and 20 of 23 textbooks (87%) mentioned this narrative. From 2002 to 2010, this number declined to five in all published 19 textbooks (26.3%) and four of 15 textbooks (26.7%) from 2012 to 2017 (Figure 2).

In the narratives of the Mukden Incident, the Kwangtung Army, who blew up the railway and blamed the explosion on the Chinese side, are identified as the instigators of the incident in all 24 textbooks which were published in the 1970s. Out of these 24 textbooks, 18 textbooks (75%) twice emphasized Japan's motivation for triggering this incident as 'the Military Headquarters (*gunbu*) attempted to solve the continuous recession in domestic Japan and stabilize the living conditions of Japanese people by expanding military movement to the North of China'. In the 21 textbooks of the 1980s, all of them (100%) mentioned this motivation and 14 of 21 textbooks twice emphasized the motivation in the same chapter. In the 1990s, all of the 23 textbooks (100%) mentioned the motivation and seven of them twice emphasized the motivation of the military's aggression. In the 2000s, 17 of 19 textbooks (89%) mentioned the motivation. However, in the 15 history textbooks which were qualified and published from 2012 to 2017, only eight textbooks (53%) mentioned this motivation, and the other seven textbooks did not mention it in the text (Figure 2).

In the textual analysis of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 10 of 24 history textbooks (41.7%) which were published in the 1970s depicted two motivations of Japan's aggressive acts. In the narratives, 'the power strengthening of the Japanese Military Headquarters', and 'the industry which Japan had established in the Manchuria area was gradually expanded to Mongolia and the North of China' are regarded as the first causal interpretations. Japan's power expansion in Manchuria triggered fierce conflicts with the Chinese local military leading to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and subsequently the Second Sino-Japanese War are referred to as the second causal interpretation. In the 21 textbooks of the 1980s, six (29%) depicted the above two interpretations. In the 23 textbooks of the 1990s, 11 (47.8%) mentioned the causal interpretations, and 15 of 19

textbooks (79%) in the 2000s mentioned the same interpretations. However, in the 15 history textbooks which were newly published from 2012 to 2017, the number declined to eight (53%) (Figure 2).

3.3 The Responsibility for the Expansion of the War

In the textual analysis of the expansion of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Konoe Fumimaro government's attempts to stop the war, although the war flames still expanded to the North of China, were shown differently in the history textbooks. In the 24 history textbooks of the 1970s, the depiction that the Konoe government declared a 'Non-expansion Policy' at first but the Military Headquarters still sent troops and expanded the war to the North of China conveyed the weakness of the Konoe government and suggested that the Military Headquarters and their growing influence were responsible for the expansion of the Second Sino-Japanese War. This type of narrative is used by 10 of 24 textbooks (41.7%) from the 1970s, five of 21 textbooks (23.8%) in the 1980s, and five of 23 textbooks (21.7%) in the 1990s. In the other 34 history textbooks published from 2002 to 2017, the mutual responsibilities of both Konoe government and the Military Headquarters were erased from the textbooks.

The responsibility for the expansion of the war attributed to the Military Headquarters is not mentioned in the 24 textbooks of the 1970s, but three of the 21 textbooks which were published in the 1980s clearly identified that the war responsibility belonged to the Military Headquarters. They clearly depicted that the Military Headquarters sent troops to the North of China and expanded the battlefield after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The responsibility of the Military Headquarters is stressed in four of 23 textbooks in the 1990s, one of the 19 textbooks in the 2000s, and one of the 15 textbooks published from 2012 to 2017.

Narratives placing the responsibility of the war's expansion on the Konoe government is also stressed in a minority of the textbooks: in eight of 24 textbooks (33.3%) which were published in the 1970s, two of 21 textbooks from the 1980s, one from the 1990s, six of 19 textbooks published from 2002 to 2010, and three of 15 textbooks published between 2012 to 2017. In these textbooks, the Konoe government declared its 'non-expansion policy' at first but later claimed that 'the battlefield had

expanded' without mentioning who decided upon the troop deployment and who finally sent the troops to the North of China. This is the characteristic of this type of narrative.

From another angle for viewing responsibility for the war's expansion, the narratives that mention neither the responsibility of the Konoe government nor the Military Headquarters kept growing after the 1980s. In this type of text, a flat narrative that only depicted the explosion of the Second Sino-Japanese War without mentioning the contradictions between the government and the Military Headquarters is observed. This type of narrative revealed that the responsibility for war expansion was gradually erased from the textbooks. In the 24 history textbooks published in the 1970s, there were six textbooks (25%) which avoided mentioning responsibility for the war's expansion. The number increased to 11 (52.4%) and 13 (56.5%) in 1980s and 1990s respectively, and kept growing in the 2000s and 2010s, in which 12 of 19 textbooks (63.2%) in 2000s, and 11 of 15 textbooks (73.3%) which were published between 2012 and 2017 erased the responsibility for battlefield expansion in mainland China from 1937 to 1945 (Figure 3).




Figure 3

3.4 The Narratives of Chinese Victimhood

The analysis of victimhood narratives is excluded from just war theory and the spectrum of judgemental war memory, but will be included in this research because this research considers (1) narratives of Japanese victimhood in the war typically underpin Japanese post-war pacifism, and (2) narratives of Chinese victimhood in wartime

typically provide evidence of Japanese atrocities and therefore a progressive (or progressive-leaning) rendition of the war. Narrative analysis of victimhood in both wartime Japan and China reveals the tension between Japanese people's national identity as both an aggressor and victim in the war. In this section, there is textual analysis regarding the Nanjing Massacre, 'comfort woman', war crimes of the Unit 731, 'Three-Alls Operation', and resistance activities by Chinese people against Japan.

Nanjing Massacre

In the 24 textbooks of the 1970s, there were nine textbooks depicted 'massive injuries' of Chinese people when the Japanese military occupied Nanjing in 1937, but only one textbook (4.2%) defined the war crime as 'Nanjing Massacre' (*nankin gyakusatsu*). In 19 of 21 textbooks of 1980s, 'massive injuries' to Chinese people during the Japanese military occupation of Nanjing were mentioned, and of these, 12 textbooks (57.1%) used the term 'Nanjing Massacre'. In the 23 textbooks from the 1990s, 21 of 23 textbooks (91.3%) defined the massive killings as 'Nanjing Massacre'. From 2002 to 2010, seven of 19 textbooks (36.8%) called the massive killings 'Nanjing Massacre', and another 10 textbooks (52.6%) called the massive killings 'Nanjing Incident' (*nankin jiken*). In the 15 textbooks which were published from 2012 to 2017, nine of them (60%) adopted 'Nanjing Incident' as the definition of the massive killings in Nanjing, but only three textbooks used 'Nanjing Massacre' (20%). From Figure 4, it is clear to see that calling the massive killings in Nanjing a 'massacre' was the standard in textbooks which were published in both the 1980s and 1990s. This number reached a peak in the 1990s and declined drastically from the 2000s. At the same time, the number of the textbooks which called the massive killings an 'incident' began to increase. Even though most of the textbooks which were published after the 2000s depicted the historical facts of 'massive injuries included women and children in Nanjing', the term 'Nanjing massacre' was gradually replaced by 'Nanjing incident'. This reveals the textbooks' preferences regarding what to call the massive killings in Nanjing has changed (Figure 4).

In the depiction of the massive killings in Nanjing, the books mentioning the numbers of Chinese victims changed accordingly, too. In the 24 textbooks of 1970s, two of them

confirmed the number of the Chinese victims were around 42,000; in the 21 textbooks of the 1980s, two textbooks confirmed the victims were ‘over 100,000’ and another four textbooks confirmed the victims were approximately 200,000 to 300,000. In the 1990s, one of 23 textbooks said the Chinese believed the number of victims reached to 300,000, and the other 17 textbooks confirmed the number of victims was over 100,000. In the 19 textbooks which were published in the 2000s, only two textbooks mentioned the number of the victims were around 200,000, while another seven textbooks questioned the number of Chinese victims in a footnote. In the 15 textbooks which were published from 2012 to 2017, seven textbooks questioned the number of victims, and all 15 history textbooks erased the precise number of Chinese victims. From this analysis, it can be seen that in the 1980s and 1990s, most of the textbooks preferred to give detailed numbers of Chinese victims from the time when the Japanese military occupied Nanjing in December of 1937. However, after 2000s, the numbers of Chinese victims given using the vocabulary of ‘many’ (Figure 4).

The mentions of the number of Chinese people killed when the Japanese military occupied Nanjing highlights how the Japanese military’s movements in China were unjust. Meanwhile, the erasure of the number reveals a reduction in the level of critical judgement towards the Japanese military’s war acts in China.




Figure 4

The ‘Comfort Women’

The treatment of the ‘comfort women’ (*ianfu*) was first mentioned in history textbooks in 1997. In the history textbooks which were approved in 1997, there were seven textbooks⁹ which mentioned the facts of the ‘comfort women’ in a column or text by saying that the Japanese military forced Korean and Taiwanese women to serve the military and they worked in comfort stations or military factories, or did civil work etc., to make up for labor shortages in the war. In the 19 history textbooks which were published between 2002 to 2010, the mentions of the comfort women drastically declined to three, and only one of the 15 textbooks which were published from 2012 to 2017 mentioned the ‘comfort women’ (Figure 5).

The Unit 731 and the ‘Three-Alls Operation’

The war crimes of Unit 731 and the ‘Three-Alls Operation’ (burn all, kill all and loot all) the Japanese military had committed in China in wartime have been mentioned in textbooks, but changes in these narratives are observed as well. Of the 102 history textbooks which were published from 1972 to 2017, only two history textbooks mentioned the Japanese military’s gas warfare in mainland China (Osaka Shoseki 1993 No.753 and Osaka Shoseki 2002 No.703), and one textbook mentioned the human experiments of the Unit 731 (Kyōiku Shuppan 1997 No.762). The narratives of the ‘Three-Alls Operation’ are mentioned in five textbooks in the 1980s, 12 textbooks in the 1990s, three textbooks in 2000s, and one of the 15 textbooks published from 2012 to 2016 (Figure 5).

China’s Resistance against Japan

In the 24 history textbooks from the 1970s, four textbooks said that when the Japanese military occupied the major cities and railways in mainland China, their occupation of ‘points and lines’ faced fierce resistance from Chinese people. In this

⁹ The seven textbooks which were qualified and published in 1997 and being used till 2001 mentioned the perpetrations on the comfort women. The seven textbooks were: No.759 of Nihon Shoseki, No.764 of Teikoku Shoin, No.763 of Shimizu Shoin, No.762 of Kyōiku Shuppan, No.761 of Osaka Shoseki, No.760 of Tokyo Shoseki, and No.765 of Nihon Shoseki. Details see Appendix 1.

narrative, the main armed resistance was organized by Kuomintang and Communist Party of China guerillas. They forced Japan to send massive numbers of troops into China to quell the violence. This can be seen as an indicator that the Japanese military’s movements in mainland China were unjust and China’s resistance to against Japan was just. In the textbooks which were published in the 1980s and 1990s, narratives stressing China’s resistance against the Japanese occupation were mentioned in 13 of 21 textbooks (61.9%) in the 1980s and 11 of 23 textbooks (47.8%) in the 1990s. The number declined to five out of the 19 textbooks (26.3%) which were published in the 2000s and four of the 15 textbooks (26.7%) which were published from 2012 to 2016 (Figure 5). The decline in the number of narratives regarding Chinese people’s resistance against Japan constitutes a dilution of the image of the Japanese military’s war crimes in mainland China.




Figure 5

According to the qualitative research, it was observed that while the definition of ‘aggressive war’ and depictions of ‘aggressive movitaions’ were emphasized in most of the textbooks which were approved and published in the 1980s and 1990s, depictions of the Japanese military’s ‘war conduct’ in China increased accordingly. While the depiction of ‘the nature of the war’ shifted from ‘aggression’ to ‘occupation’ from the 2000s, mentions of the Japanese military’s ‘war conduct’ accordingly declined from 2000s as well.

3.5 The Narratives of Japanese Victimhood

Japanese people's victimhood narratives are an important object of analysis in this thesis. This section details (1) how Japanese victim consciousness is represented in history textbooks, (2) how pacifism is constructed in post-war Japan, and (3) what tensions are expressed between victim mentality and Japanese war acts. It looks specifically at Okinawan people's mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa and the droppings of the A-bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Mass Suicide in the Battle of Okinawa

The mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa were tragic events in which the Japanese militarists forced its citizens into committing suicide by threatening and horrifying them with explanations that they would be tortured when the American soldiers landed on Okinawa. The mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa are treated as an indicator of the brutality of the Japanese military towards not only people in other countries, but also on its own citizens as well. The mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa constitute a considerable trauma for Okinawan people, and influence the construction of their unique Okinawan identity as different from national identity as Japanese.

The narratives of the mass suicide are commonly set in the chapter about the Pacific War in history textbooks. In the 24 textbooks which were published in 1970s, none of them mentioned the mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa. While seven of 24 textbooks briefly mentioned that Okinawans died in battle in either the text or a footnote, the other 17 textbooks had no explanations regarding Okinawan victimhood in the war. The mass suicide of Okinawan residents in the Battle of Okinawa was first depicted in two textbooks (9.5%) which were published in the 1980s, and 18 of 21 textbooks which were published in the 1980s mentioned the victimhood of Okinawan people during the war. The mentions of mass suicides greatly increased in the 1990s, in which 17 of 23 textbooks (73.9%) introduced the mass suicides either in the text or in a column. In the 19 history textbooks in the 2000s, 13 of them (68.4%) described Okinawan people's mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa. In the 15 history textbooks which were published between 2012 and 2017, 11 of 15 (91.7%) depicted the mass suicides in either the text or a footnote. The increase in the mentions of Okinawan people's mass suicides

in the Battle of Okinawa and the reduction in the mentions of Chinese people's victimhood in wartime since the 2000s reveals a trend that the Japanese military's war crimes against Okinawan people have been gradually acknowledged in Japan, but the Japanese military's war crimes in China and other Asian countries in wartime are increasingly eclipsed.

Narrative Analysis of Japanese Victimhood in the Droppings of the A-Bombs

The droppings of the A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the dominant victimhood narrative in all 102 history textbooks which were published from 1972 to 2017. The A-bombs caused tremendous trauma and continue to impact on today's Japan. The traumatic memory of the A-bombs dropping are prominently preserved in history textbooks, museums, documentaries, animations as well as various cinematic works.

In the 24 history textbooks from the 1970s, all of the history textbooks gave a brief introduction of how and why the bombs were dropped. In the 21 textbooks from the 1980s, there are seven textbooks which inserted a column to introduce the A-bombs and the miserable situation of wartime children. In the 23 textbooks from the 1990s, six textbooks adopted the narratives of both the Tokyo air raids and the A-bombs, showed the damage of war via pictures of the destroyed cities, and called for future peace and introspection on the past. In the 19 history textbooks which were published from 2002 to 2010, 13 of them depicted how and why the bombs were dropped, in which the letters of survivors and witness testimonies were added at the end of the chapter. In the 15 history textbooks which were published from 2012 to 2017, three of them used pictures, texts, letters of survivors, and witness accounts as the main content. This depicted the A-bombs in more specific detail. From 2002, the common characteristics of the A-bomb narrative were the memories of survivors, letters and witness testimonies. The narrative, which is often combined with an introduction to the peace memorial parks in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, emphasizes the abolishment of nuclear weapons as the basis for a permanent human peace. The A-bomb narrative in history textbooks in the 2000s reached to a consensus built on descriptions of the peace memorial parks and constructed Japan's pacifism in post-war era as being based on the abolition of nuclear weapons.

3.6 The Introspective Narratives

Introspective narratives of the past war (in Japanese, *hansei*, which has the nuance of ‘learning from the past’ and is often translated in English as ‘remorse’) are often set at the end of the Second World War chapter or the chapter concerning the post-war era, where it mentions diplomatic normalization between China and Japan in 1972. In the 24 history textbooks from the 1970s, nine textbooks (37.5%) clearly expressed introspection regarding Japanese actions against Asian countries, confessed to war crimes, and apologized to Asian people for their suffering in the war. In the 1980s, 15 of 21 textbooks (71.4%) presented an introspective narrative in the chapter about the postwar era. The mentions of introspection reached a peak in the 1990s, when 18 of 23 textbooks (78.3%) depicted that Japan had apologized to China and Chinese people and emphasized the importance of peace and development between China and Japan. However, entering the 2000s, only seven textbooks out of 19 (36.8%) mentioned the apologies and principles of peaceful development between China and Japan, and in the 15 textbooks which were published between 2012 and 2017, only eight of them (53.3%) mentioned introspection.

According to the textual analysis of history textbooks from 1972 to 2017, it is clear that a turning point comes in 2002. From this year onwards, the war narratives in Japanese history textbooks changed drastically. First, the nature of war was shifted from ‘aggression’ to ‘occupation’, and second, the narratives of war acts – including the causal interpretations of the wars and depictions of Japanese military’s war crimes – were gradually removed from the Japanese history textbooks. In all of the 34 Japanese history textbooks published between 2002 to 2017, the Japanese military’s motivations to invade China were gradually removed from the textbooks. The mutual responsibility of the Konoe Fumimaro government and Military Headquarters for the expansion of the war between China and Japan after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was dropped from the textbooks. Meanwhile, the Japanese military’s war acts in China, for example, the narratives regarding the massive killings when the Japanese military occupied Nanjing in 1937 were strategically defined as ‘Nanjing Incident’ rather than the ‘Nanjing Massacre’; the depictions of the ‘comfort women’ and the human experiments that Unit

731 committed on Chinese people were entirely removed from the textbooks which were published from 2002. Although, the Japanese military's war crimes of forcing Okinawan people to commit suicide in the Battle of Okinawa were gradually acknowledged in textbooks, the Japanese government's apologetic statements – including its remorse for the Asia-Pacific War and its introspections regarding past war crimes – were reduced in the 34 history textbooks which were published between 2002 and 2017.

3.7 The Narrative Analysis of Japanese History Textbooks in High School (2013 to 2017)

Japanese junior high school history textbooks are frequently made the primary research objects in academic studies because in junior high school education, history is a compulsory course that all students have to take. Problems found in junior high school education raise more attention due to its universality. History education in high school is optional, and although high school textbooks contain more detailed descriptions of the past, there are considered less important in studies of Japanese textbooks. The analysis of high school history textbooks is included as supplementary analysis in this chapter, which aims first, to fill the gap in current studies of Japanese history textbooks; and second, to provide another angle from which to understand Japanese history textbooks.

During the period April 2014 to March 2017, there were a total of 15 history textbooks of Japanese History used in Japanese high schools. The 15 history textbooks were published by six publishers, and include seven textbooks for 'Japanese History A' and eight textbooks for 'Japanese History B'. The six publishers are Yamakawa Shuppan (five textbooks), Jikkyō Shuppan (four textbooks), Shimizu Shoin (two textbooks), Tokyo Shoseki (two textbooks), Meiseisha (one textbook) and Daiichi Gakushūsha (one textbook).¹⁰

In the analysis of the nature of the war, eight of the 15 history textbooks (53.3%) defined the Second Sino-Japanese War as 'aggression', four adopted the term 'advance', two used 'occupation' and one defined the war as 'getting back Japan's benefit'. In the

¹⁰ See Appendix 2.

analysis of the massive killings in Nanjing, seven of 15 defined it as a ‘massacre’ (46.7%), and the other eight textbooks defined it as an ‘incident’. Eight of the 15 textbooks (53.3%) mentioned the war crimes of Unit 731 in China, and nine of the 15 textbooks (60%) mentioned the ‘Three-Alls Operation’. Additionally, 10 textbooks out of 15 (66.7%) mentioned the ‘comfort women’, and 11 of 15 textbooks (73.3%) described to the suicides in the Battle of Okinawa.

Regarding the motivations behind the First Sino-Japanese War, six of 15 textbooks (40%) clearly indicated that the outbreak of the war was because Japan was trying to retrieve power in the Korean Peninsula and thus decided to confront China’s Qing Dynasty. Three textbooks mentioned that the war started when Japan attacked the battleships of the Chinese fleet. And in the narrative of the Mukden Incident, 13 textbooks (86.7%) admitted that Japan’s ambition was to separate China’s Northeast region from China, and 14 textbooks (93.3%) claimed that the Mukden Incident was organized by the Kwantung Army.

Regarding the expansion of the Second Sino-Japanese War, there are two textbooks (Jikkyō Shuppan A305 and B305) which indicated that the Japanese government’s real motivation in sending massive amounts of troops to mainland China was because ‘Japan wanted to get more natural resources from the north of China’, ‘to suppress Chinese anti-Japanese protests and force Chinese people yield to Japanese military’, and because ‘the Japanese government believed that the war would end soon after massive numbers of troops were sent to China’. This type of narrative explicitly reveals the motivations and ambitions of Japan to invade China. The emphasis of the motivations of Japan’s aggression towards China, from another point of view, explained why large-scale anti-Japanese resistance was organized by Chinese people.

In comparison to the textbook B302 (the textbook published by Jikkyō Shuppan), the textbook which was published by Meiseisha adopted a different narrative to explain the motivation of the troops’ deployment to China. The reason for the deployment was, ‘there was a marine lieutenant named Ōyama was killed in Shanghai’. To ‘protect Japanese people’s safety in Shanghai’, the Japanese government decided to ‘give up the non-expansion policy’, and to ‘send massive numbers of troops to China to stabilize the situation’. Regarding this same historical event, the two different narratives show

opposite reasoning in their interpretations of Japan's motivations. In the Meiseisha textbook, the war based on the confrontation between Japan and China, and Japan wanted to gain resources before they were taken by other countries first. However, if the narrative only selects a historical moment, Ōyama's death, without explaining why the lieutenant was killed in Shanghai or explaining why large-scale anti-Japanese resistance was organized by Chinese people, the narrative becomes a typical narrative of 'glorification' and 'rationalization'.

Compared to the other publishers, the textbooks published by Yamakawa Shuppan have a higher adoption rate than the others. However, in the five textbooks published by Yamakawa Shuppan, the explanations of why the war between China and Japan spread after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident lack consistency. It says that the expansion was forced by the Military Headquarters in textbooks A307, B301 and B308. Meanwhile, textbook A303 says that expansion was committed by the Konoe government after 'China provoked Japan'. The war did not expand until the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident, and then the Konoe Cabinet had to defend sending a massive number of troops in textbook B307. Three different types of narrative regarding the motivations for the expansion reveal an inconsistency in the history textbooks of Yamakawa Shuppan, in which the responsibility for the expansion of the war is kept obfuscated. In the 15 high school history textbooks, the interpretations of why the war between China and Japan spread was guided by a rationalized logic in which the confrontations between the Konoe government and the Military Headquarters was unavoidable; the Konoe government attempted to stop the war but due to the fierce resistance of Chinese people, the Military Headquarters had to deploy a massive number of soldiers to China, therefore the war spread unexpectedly.¹¹

Based on the analysis of the high school history textbooks, there are three primary distinctions with junior high school textbooks. First, 53% of high school textbooks defined the Second Sino-Japanese War as 'aggression' (junior high school 2012-2017: 26.7%). Second, aggressive acts are described more clearly in high school textbooks. Unit 731 was mentioned by 53% (junior high school 2012-2017: 0%), the 'Three-Alls

¹¹ Zou Yi, *Historical Narration of the Second Sino-Japanese War in Current Japanese High School History Textbooks: The Logic of its Causal Interpretations* (Tokyo, Quadrante, 2015), 209-225.

Operation' by 60% (junior high school 2012-2017: 13%), and the 'comfort women' was mentioned by 67.7% (junior high school 2012-2017: 0%). Third, when the nationalist textbook produced by Meiseisha was refused by all of Tokyo's high schools in 2014, the adoption of the leftist textbooks (published by Jikkyō Shuppan) was refused as well. Rather, textbook B301 by Yamakawa Shuppan had the highest adoption rate at 36% and was adopted by 111 high schools of Tokyo. It described the war as an 'advance', obfuscated war responsibility, called the massive killings in Nanjing an 'incident', and did not mention the mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa.

3.8 Spectrum of Judgemental War Narrative and Conclusion

Based on the statistical data, this chapter concludes that the content of Japanese history textbooks shares the features of the social context in the same period. In the 1970s, when both the PRC and Japanese governments adopted their 'diplomatic prioritization policy' to promote diplomatic normalizations, Japanese history textbooks in the 1970s added depictions of the Japanese military's motivations to launch the wars with China. In the junior high school history textbooks from the 1970s, 19 of 24 textbooks (79%) mentioned Japan's ambitions to expand its power to China and the Korean Peninsula before the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, and 24 textbooks (100%) emphasized that Japan blew up the Manchurian railway and launched the Mukden Incident to strengthen Japanese military's control in China's Northeast region. However, when both the PRC and Japanese governments adopted the 'shelving policy' in dealing with the historical disputes between two countries in the 1970s, 21 of the 24 history textbooks which defined the nature of the Second Sino-Japanese War as an 'advance' (*shinshutsu*) were tolerated by both governments. Japan's 'motivation' and 'intention' in launching the war with China was depicted as aggressive in most of the history textbooks of 1970s. This type of depiction corresponds with the 'conservative' perspective on the spectrum of judgemental war memory.

The 1980s and 1990s were recognized as a period of 'memory boom'. Japanese historian Ienaga Saburō's textbook lawsuits from 1965 to 1997 had modified the confrontations between the Japanese government and highlighted domestic Japanese resistance to the government's screening. The textbook lawsuits, therefore, greatly

promoted the postwar generations' acknowledgement of the Japanese military's war crimes in Asia. The textbooks which were approved and published in the 1980s and 1990s gained support from both the Japanese government and Japanese historians, and started to present a broader view of Japan's national history by providing more details of the war. In 21 history textbooks which were published in the 1980s, 14 textbooks (67%) defined the Second Sino-Japanese War as 'aggression'. This number grew up to 91.3% when 21 of 23 history textbooks of the 1990s adopted the term 'aggression' to define the war. Meanwhile, Japanese military's motivations to launch the First Sino-Japanese War and the Mukden Incident with China were mentioned by 21 textbooks (100%) which were published in the 1980s. This percentage was the same for the 23 textbooks which were published in the 1990s. Additionally, the mass killings in Nanjing in 1937 were commonly called a 'massacre' in 12 textbooks (57.1%) in the 1980s and 21 textbooks (91.3%) in the 1990s. The Japanese military's 'Three-Alls Operation' in mainland China and mass suicides in the Battle of Okinawa were included in over 50 % of history textbooks in the 1990s. The depictions of Chinese people's resistance against the Japanese military in China reflect the 'unjust war acts' that the Japanese military committed in mainland China, and the inclusion of resistance in history textbooks which were published in the 1980s and 1990s reflects this feature. In the 21 history textbooks which were published in the 1980s, 13 textbooks (61.9%) depicted Chinese people's resistance. 11 out of 23 history textbooks (47.8%) which were published in the 1990s also showed Japanese military's 'unjust war acts' by depicting Chinese people's resistance. The textbooks' use of the term 'aggressive war' to describe the Second Sino-Japanese War, and a number of the depictions regarding the Japanese military's 'aggressive acts' classify the Japanese history textbooks which were published in the 1980s and 1990s as 'progressive'.

The second half of the 1990s is regarded as the start of the transformation of historical consciousness in Japanese society. When the LDP regained power in 1996, nationalism was more frequently used as political strategy aiming to rescue the Japanese economy from recession. This led the Japanese social environment in a relatively radical direction. In this period, a similar transformation of war narratives was observed in history textbooks published in the 2000s. In the 19 history textbooks which were

published from 2002 to 2010, 13 of the 19 history textbooks (68.4%) used ‘aggression’ to describe the Second Sino-Japanese War. While 17 of 19 history textbooks (89%) stressed the Japanese military’s intentions to launch the Mukden Incident, and 15 of 19 (78.9%) history textbooks said that the Second Sino-Japanese War was aimed at strengthening the Japanese military’s control in China, depictions of the Japanese military’s motivations in launching the First Sino-Japanese War drastically declined from 74% (1990s) to 37% (2000s). Additionally, the depictions of Japanese society’s discrimination against Chinese and Koreans before the First Sino-Japanese War declined from 87% (1990s) to 26.3% (2000s). The adoption of ‘Nanjing Massacre’ and the depictions of the mass killings in Nanjing fell from 91.3% (1990s) to 36.8%, which means that only 7 of 19 history textbooks mentioned the Japanese military’s mass killings in Nanjing. Chinese people’s resistance against the Japanese military’s ‘unjust war acts’ declined from 47.8% in the 1990s to 26.3% in the 2000s, when only 5 of 19 textbooks depicted Chinese people’s resistance. Moreover, the narratives regarding the mutual responsibilities that both the Japanese government and Military Headquarters needed to take for the expansion of the Second Sino-Japanese War were removed from all of the textbooks which were published in 2000s and 2010s. In the history textbooks of the 2000s, when over half of the history textbooks retained the depiction of the war as ‘aggression’, the depictions of the Japanese military’s aggressive acts in mainland China drastically declined. This type of narrative corresponds to a ‘progressive-leaning’ narrative because the war is regarded as ‘aggressive’, but the narratives regarding ‘war acts’ are watered down.

Entering into the 2010s, Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated due to the territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Rising nationalism in both China and Japan, and more active participation in regional security affairs, constantly triggered trust issues between the two countries. The ‘shelving policy’ that both the Chinese and Japanese governments had adopted in the 1970s temporarily contained the historical disputes in peace, but along with the transformations caused by globalization, those disputes were unlikely to be shelved. On the way to seeking a resolution, various perspectives were discussed in people’s daily lives, and history textbooks at this period revealed similar diversity and inconsistency. 15 history textbooks which were approved

and published between 2012 to 2017 have similar features to the textbooks published in the 1970s. In the 15 history textbooks, only 4 (26.7%) of them described the nature of war as ‘aggression’, and meanwhile 9 textbooks (60%) selected ‘occupation’ as the war situation between China and Japan. Depictions of the Japanese military’s motivations and intentions in starting the Mukden Incident declined from 89% (2000s) to 53% (2010s), and interpretations of the expansion of the Second Sino-Japanese War declined from 78.9% (2000s) to 53% (2010s). With the erasure of the ‘comfort women’ and the war crimes of the Unit 731 from all 15 textbooks, the removal of depictions of the Nanjing Massacre from 12 textbooks and the deletion of the ‘Three-Alls Operation’ from 14 textbooks all revealed that the history textbooks published in the 2010s attempted to reduce the depictions of the Japanese military’s aggressive acts in wartime. When ‘occupation’ was adopted as the nature of the Second Sino-Japanese war, plus there was a large reduction in descriptions of the Japanese military’s aggressive acts in Asia, the war narratives in the history textbooks moved to between ‘conservative’ and ‘nationalist’ in the judgemental war memory spectrum.

While the depictions of ‘aggressive war’ and ‘aggressive acts’ in Japanese history textbooks have declined, the depictions of Japanese people’s victimhood in the same textbooks are growing. This means that the space between the acknowledgement of Japanese military’s aggressive acts and the acknowledgement of Japanese people’s victimhood were broadened. For example, when the depictions of innocent Japanese people’s sufferings caused by the A-bombs are overemphasized under the slogan of extinguishing nuclear weapons rather than remorse for aggressive acts, the acknowledgement of Japanese victimhood covers over the differences within Japanese society regarding Japanese war actions (Seaton 2007, 28).

In summary, when we review the problems of Japanese history textbooks, we have to admit that the problematic narratives of history which gain most attention in the international media are not the standard way in which Japanese textbooks depict the war. In the textbooks which were published in the 1980s and 1990s, war narratives stating the Japanese military’s aggression and war crimes were repeatedly given in most of the history textbooks. In the research regarding the recent history textbooks at senior high schools, apart from the studies of problematic history textbooks, we also need to discuss

the efforts that leftist organizations have made to establish an ‘authentic history’ in Japan’s history education, as well as their continuous fight against the conservative parties.

Chapter 4. War Narratives in Japan's War-Related Museums

There are many institutions with exhibits about the war in Japan. In a Japanese-English dictionary, the translation of 'museum' is usually given as *hakubutsukan*. However, *hakubutsukan* is an institution with a specific mission. The Japanese museum (*hakubutsukan*) is defined according to Museum Law (*hakubutsukan hō*) as a facility where 'materials of historical, art, traditional, industrial and natural science are collected and preserved' and as an organization 'for running public education' and 'for conducting research' (MEXT 2015). The museum (*hakubutsukan*) in Japan therefore has the functions of both an 'exhibition' and 'research center'. According to official statistics, in October 2015 there were approximately 5,600 museums or museum-related organizations are under the management of Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan (MEXT 2015). However, most of these museums and museum-related institutions were established to preserve Japanese cultural properties rather than exhibit Japan's war history.

Nevertheless, war-related museums founded in the postwar era are key sites for exhibiting Japan's war history. Seaton (2007, 172) classifies war-related displays into four types: (1) the national and prefectural history museums (*hakubutsukan*); (2) municipal peace museums, typically 'documentation centres' (*shiryōkan*), or 'memorials' (*kinenkan*); (3) military museums, which commemorate the actions of a branch of the Japanese military; and (4) sectional interest museums, about a particular war experience or promoting a political message. Seaton argued that the difficulties of presenting national war responsibility debates in publicly funded museums has resulted in the proliferation of museums presenting sectional narratives and local war memories (Seaton 2007, 174).

Karl Gustafsson (2011), meanwhile, compares how China and Japan deal with the same war-related issues with a focus on museums. Through analysis of context, topics and historical narratives, Gustafsson examines similarities and differences in historical narratives in Chinese and Japanese museums. Gustafsson uses the terms 'actor', 'hero' and 'patient' to classify protagonists in the selected narratives and through calculating the frequencies that each actor appears in the selected narratives, Gustafsson draws conclusions about how 'in group members' view themselves (as 'actors' or 'patients'),

and how the images of ‘out group members’ are formed (as ‘actors’ or ‘patients’), and consequently it is possible to predict the narrative trend.

In the research of both Chinese and Japanese museums, Gustafsson found that in the narratives of tragic events, such as the Nanjing Massacre and the droppings of the A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the ‘patient’ (i.e. victim) emplotment dominates the narratives in both Chinese and Japanese museums. However, regarding the narratives of the ‘actors’ in the tragic events (who caused victimhood), China and Japan show different tendencies. In China, a nationalist message focusing on Japan’s aggression is presented with the aim of constructing a victim identity in the Memorial Hall of the Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders. In contrast to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the ‘actor’ of the tragic event in Hiroshima is deemed to be an object – the atomic bomb (Gustafsson 2011, 286). Moreover, Gustafsson argues that the peace message is conveyed in different ways in the two countries. While the peace message is muted by the nationalist message, ‘peace’ in Chinese museums is as something that ‘a stronger China can contribute to, perhaps through the use of force’. However, the peace message in Japanese museums appears as ‘compatible and credible’ with many people’s memories despite being the memories of only minority group, such as citizens in a particular town (Gustafsson 2011, 287-288). In conclusion, Gustafsson states that even if the Japanese government has made apologies and is understood to be demonstrating sincere introspection, with different interpretations of history continuously being constructed in China and Japan, the problems will not disappear and Sino-Japanese relations are unlikely to be improved soon (ibid, 293).

Gustafsson’s method for analyzing narratives is creative. The classification of the protagonists as ‘actor’, ‘hero’ and ‘patient’ may be effective for analyzing a type of museum which exhibits a specific historical event, but it is less functional for analyzing other types of war-related museums where ‘actor’, ‘hero’ and ‘patient’ may appear with the same frequency. In the war narratives of most Japanese history textbooks (discussed in the previous chapter), depictions of the Japanese military as ‘actor’, ‘hero’ and ‘patient’ often appear in the same text, which means that the aggression of the Japanese military in China and Japanese soldiers’ victimhood in wartime are both commonly

adopted by history textbooks. When the frequency of ‘actor’, ‘hero’ and ‘patient’ are evenly balanced in a historical narrative, the narrative inclination is difficult to captured.

In a recent study of Japanese museums, Yoshida Takashi (2014) did a quantitative and qualitative research of the war-related museums in Japan, including the history of each museum as well as the exhibits in each of them. Yoshida categorized the types of war-related museum and put each type of museum into four periods. These are the democratization of war museums in the Allied Occupation Period from 1945 to 1952, the establishment of peace museums from the 1950s to 1990s, the acknowledgement of Japanese aggression in the period from the 1980s to 1990s, and the revival of military museums from the second half of the 1990s to 2000s. This classification based on the typology of museums highlights that the establishment of war-related museums corresponds with the social context. Specifically speaking, when the ‘memory boom’ came in the 1980s and 1990s, newly established or renovated war-related museums in Japan increased accordingly; and along with the rise of nationalism from the 2000s, the revival of military museums echoed the social context as well.

To classify museums first and then to put them into a timeline can provide a way of understanding the history of war-related museums. However, to classify the social periods first, and then to put all types of war-related museum into each social epoch will provide a more comprehensive way of understanding what features of those war-related museums are reflected in each social period. Using qualitative research into Japan’s war-related museums which were established in the postwar era, this chapter argues that although an increase in one type of museum may correspond to the social context, the other war-related museums which display the Japanese military’s war conduct in Asia (museums and memorials), commemorate the Japanese military and Japanese people’s victimhood (sectional interest museums), and exhibit Japanese military history and war facilities (military museums) have coexisted throughout Japan’s postwar period. This means that the war-related museums which were established in the 1980s and 1990s containing many exhibits regarding Japan’s aggressive history continued to exist into the 2000s, even though other types of war-related museums which exhibit military facilities and call for commemorating the sacrifice of dead soldiers (*eirei*) were also established in the same period.

This chapter is centered on the analysis of war narratives in eight war-related museums. The aim is to clarify what war narratives are depicted in different museums. The eight museums selected are: the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial House (Nisshin Kōwa Kinenkan, funded by the Shimonoseki municipal government, opened in 1937), the Yūshūkan Museum (Yūshūkan, within the grounds of Yasukuni Shrine, opened in 1882 and funded by the Army and Navy Ministry prewar, and reopened/renewed in 1986/2002 by the religious organization Yasukuni Shrine), the National Museum of Japanese History (Kokuritsu Rekishi Minzoku Hakubutsukan, funded by the Japanese government, established in 1983 and renewed in 2010), the Kawasaki Peace Museum (Kawasakishi Heiwakan, funded by the municipal government, opened in 1992 and renewed in 2013), the Defunct Imperial Japanese Army Noborito Laboratory Museum (Noborito Kenkyūsho Shiryōkan, funded by Meiji University, opened in 2010), the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (Okinawaken Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan, funded by the prefectural government, opened in 1975, renewed in 2000), the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (Hiroshima Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan, funded by the prefectural government, opened in 1955, renewed in 1994 and 2017), and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum (Nagasaki Genbaku Shiryōkan, funded by the prefectural government, opened in 1955, renewed in 2016). The eight war-related museums were selected not only because they play key roles in presenting Japanese war history by exhibiting testimonies and wartime artefacts, but also because they contain clear statements regarding the events discussed in the textbook analysis in the previous chapter regarding the causes of wars between China and Japan.

Analysis of war and peace museums is important also because war-related museums are often selected as destinations during school trips (*shūgaku ryokō*) which are undertaken in Japan's elementary schools (*shōgakkō*), junior high schools (*chūgakkō*) and senior high schools (*kōtōgakkō*) at the end of the school year. Students in public schools can only visit museums that are approved by the local board of education. Hence, there are many private museums that are 'off limits' to children in public schools. Conversely, children in private schools can visit any museum. School trips that take students to war-related museums presenting a narrative contradictory to the message within their school textbook can confuse or change students' understanding of the war.

Furthermore, the diversity of messages within different museums makes it difficult to generalize about the ideological effects of museum visits. For example, students who visit the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial House (Nisshin Kōwa Kinenkan) in Yamaguchi Prefecture might get the impression that the First Sino-Japanese War occurred randomly without specific reasons between China and Japan. However, if they are taken to the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (Okinawaken Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan), they would hear a narrative of the First Sino-Japanese War in which Japan had ambitions to expand its influence in the Korea Peninsula.

This chapter examines the narratives of war museums, particular with regard to the topics discussed in the analysis of textbooks in the previous chapter: (1) the development of war-related museums in post-war Japan; (2) war narratives in the eight museums and (3) victimhood narratives in the eight museums.

4.1 The Development of War-Related Museums in Post-War Japan

In the Allied Occupation Era (1945-1952), GHQ's policy to democratize military museums forced the closure of many military museums in Japan. Meanwhile, Japanese pacifist movements for the restoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki promoted the Peace Memorial City Construction Law, which took into effect in 1949. Since that point, the conception of 'peace museums' guided the future establishment of Japan's war-related museums (T. Yoshida 2014, 20). After the 1,064 Japanese soldiers who were imprisoned in Fushun and Taiyuan were repatriated by the PRC government in 1956 (except 45 leading war criminals who faced extraordinary tribunals), they established the Liaison Society for Returnees from China (Chūgoku Kikansha Renrakukai, hereafter Chikuren) in 1957 and started to share their testimonies of Japanese military's war atrocities and their own war crimes against Chinese people in wartime. This gradually expanded Japanese people's acknowledgement of the Japanese military's war conduct from the 1960s to 1990s. In the same period, the establishment of peace museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki exposed the wider Japanese public to nuclear victimhood in those cities (cf. Hiroshima Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan 2017 and Nagasaki Genbaku Shiryōkan 2011), and meanwhile, Japanese military's war crimes – like the Nanjing

Massacre – was exhibited in some private museums like the Maruki Art Gallery for the Hiroshima Panels (Maruki Bijutsukan 1975).

The 1970s is the decade in which Sino-Japanese relations turned to a new page along with the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972. Of the museums introduced in the *Peace and War Museum Guidebook*, around 17 war-related museums were newly opened or re-opened in the 1970s. The Ibaraki Local Military's Museum (Ibaraki Kyōdo Butai Shiryōkan, Ibaraki Prefecture, 1970), the Yokaren Peace Memorial Museum (Yokaren Shiryōkan, Ōita Prefecture, 1978), and the Documentation Centres of War: Soldiers and Civilians (Heishi, Shomin no Sensō Shiryōkan, Fukuōka Prefecture, 1979) exhibited the sacrifice of Japanese servicemen via exhibits of their artefacts, diaries, and personal possessions. In this type of museum, the cruelty of war is conveyed by presenting Japanese soldiers' sad stories in wartime, while the Japanese military's atrocities in wartime were barely presented (Ibaraki Prefectural Library, n.d.; Yokaren Peace Memorial Museum, n.d.; Rekishi Kyōikusha Gyōgikai 2000, 47, 48 and 173).

In the same period, local civilians' victimhood became a key theme in museums. For example, the Nagoya City Museum (Nagoyashi Hakubutsukan, Aichi Prefecture, 1977) and Gunma Prefectural Museums of History (Gunma Kenritsu Rekishi Hakubutsukan, Gunma Prefecture, 1979) presented local residents' victimhood in the air raids using photographs, artifacts and personal belongings. However, in a similar manner to the museums that exhibit the military's victimhood in the war, broader war history and the Japanese military's atrocities on Asian people are untouched (cf. *Peace and War Museum Guidebook* 2000, 124), and local people's victimhood in the air raids was depicted as the result of Japan's 'advance' (*shinshutsu*) into China (Rekishi Kyōikusha Gyōgikai 2000, 166).

Military museums exhibiting the history of one branch of the Japanese military while commemorating Japanese soldiers' 'great sacrifice' include the Chiran Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots (Chiran Tokkō Heiwa Kaikan, Kagoshima Prefecture, 1975) and Aichi Peace Memorial (Aichi Heiwa Kinenkan, Aichi Prefecture, 1976). In this type of military museums, the sacrifice of Japanese soldiers was depicted as 'honorable' and 'miserable' (Rekishi Kyōikusha Gyōgikai 2000, 119). The peace message conveyed to

visitors is based on an emphasis of the spirit of the *eirei* and their patriotic consciousness (Chiran Tokkō Heiwa Kaikan n.d.).

When the ‘boom period of war memories’ came in the 1980s, Japan’s war-related museums received support from both government and civilians. In the 1980s, there were 29 museums were re-opened and newly founded (counted by the author based on those listed in the Peace and War Museum Guidebook, 2000). The focus of the war-related museums in this period was on the museums which had more exhibits regarding the Japanese military’s war crimes. The Ōsaka Human Rights Museum (Ōsaka Jinken Hakubutsukan, Ōsaka, 1985) displayed the Japanese military’s sexual violence against Asian women and emphasized that women’s rights need to be protected (T. Yoshida 2014, 48-50). The Ōkuno Island Poison Gas Museum (Ōkunoshima Dokugasu Shiryōkan, Hiroshima Prefecture, 1988) explicitly portrayed the production of poison gas and the chemical weapons that Japanese military had used in mainland China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (Ōkunoshima Kara Heiwa to Kankyō Wo Kangaeru Kai n.d.). The Grassroots House Peace Museum (Kusa no Ie, Kōchi Prefecture, 1989) exhibited the Japanese military’s atrocities in China and Korea, including photographs of the Nanjing Massacre and Korean women who were forced into sexual slavery (T. Yoshida 2014, 57). In this type of museum, the Japanese military’s atrocities in Asia corresponded with Asian people’s victimhood, which constructed pacifism based on remorse for the past war and a vow to promote future peace.

While exhibits regarding the Japanese military’s atrocities in wartime increased in the 1980s, a number of memorials (*kinenkan*) and museums (*hakubutsukan*) displaying local civilians’ suffering in air raids were also constructed in the same period. The Sendai City War Reconstruction Memorial Hall (Sendaishi Sensai Fukkō Kinenkan, Miyagi Prefecture, 1981), the Tochigi Prefectural Museum (Tochigi Kenritsu Hakubutsukan, 1982) and the Hamamatsu Reconstruction Memorial (Hamamatsu Fukkō Kinenkan, Shizuōka Prefecture, 1988) were all in ‘military towns’ (*gunto*), which produced various military materials to support the Asia-Pacific War from the 1930s to 1945 (Rekishī Kyōikusha Gyōgikai 2000, 125, 169 and 181). In this type of museum, local people’s victimhood in the air raids was attributed more to the nature of

the ‘military town’, where civilian victimhood was predicted to be higher than other regions.

Japanese people’s experiences in specific historical events also gained public attention in the 1980s. For example, when the Okinawan people’s group suicides in the Battle of Okinawa were exposed again by Japanese historian Ienaga Saburō’s third textbook lawsuit in 1984, the Himeyuri Alumnae Incorporated Foundation collected testimonies and historical evidence regarding Okinawan students’ deaths in the Battle of Okinawa, and subsequently established the Himeyuri Peace Memorial Museum (Himeyuri Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan) in 1989. The exhibitions of the Himeyuri Peace Memorial Museum focus on the 240 students and teachers from the female division of the Okinawa Normal School and the Okinawa First Girl’s High School who were mobilized to serve in the Okinawa Army Field Hospital. Their peaceful school life before the war is compared with their unbearable sufferings during the Battle of Okinawa. The exhibits are critical of the war itself and also the Japanese military. Through their irresponsible military acts and forcing students to commit suicide, they are blamed for the 136 students’ death in the Battle of Okinawa.

While museums regarding the Japanese military’s war atrocities in Asia and in Okinawa were newly opened in the 1980s, military museums which exhibited the history of Imperial Japanese Army and their actions in China were also displayed in the Wakayama Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (Wakayamaken Heiwa Kinenkan, Wakayama Prefecture, 1981) and Chikuzen Machi Tachiarai Peace Memorial Museum (Chikuzenmachi Tachiarai Heiwa Kinenkan, 1987, Fukuōka Prefecture). In the Chikuzen Machi Tachiarai Peace Memorial Museum, the Japanese soldiers’ deaths were presented as ‘honorable sacrifice’ via exhibitions about various military facilities, artifacts and documents (Chikuzenmachi Tachiarai Peace Memorial Museum n.d.). And in the Wakayama Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, which stands next to the Churei Pagoda (a monument for the dead soldiers which was removed in 1945 but rebuilt in 1981, which commemorates 37,500 *eirei* (Wakayamaken Chūreitō n.d.), re-constructed the conception of peace as it came from the Japanese soldiers’ courageous sacrifice in wartime (cf. Seaton 2007, T. Gustafsson 2011 and Yoshida 2014).

With the exhibition of the Japanese military's aggression presented in more museums by the first half of the 1990s, Japanese right-wingers started to attack those exhibitions from the second half of the 1990s. They often requested the museums to cancel exhibitions or pressured the museums to remove the photographs relating to the Japanese military's war crimes in China (T. Yoshida 2014, 94-95). In the 1990s, the development of Japan's war-related museums saw two trends: first, war-related museums depicting the Japanese military's atrocities in Asia increased in the first half of the 1990s, but were frequently attacked by rightist groups in the second half of the 1990s; and second, national military museums funded by the Japan Self-Defense Forces (hereafter, JSDF) from the second half of the 1990s started to display the history of Japan's military forces, in which the Asia-Pacific War was generally portrayed as 'just' and 'honorable' (T. Yoshida 2014, 144).

The definition of the Second Sino-Japanese War as the '15-year war' and an 'aggressive war' was adopted by many war-related museums established in the 1990s. The Ōsaka International Peace Center (Ōsaka Kokusai Heiwa Sentā, or Peace Ōsaka, 1991), Saitama Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (Saitamaken Heiwa Shiryōkan, Saitama Prefecture, 1993), and the Oka Masaharu Memorial Peace Museum (Oka Masaharu Kinen Nagasaki Heiwa Shiryōkan, Nagasaki Prefecture, 1995) maintained the exhibitions of the '15-year War' till 2000. Content regarding the Japanese military's war atrocities in Asia, including Chinese people's suffering and Japanese people's suffering under Japanese militarism, were displayed (cf. Peace and War Museum Guidebook 2000, 83, 130 and 156, T. Yoshida 2014, 84-90, 172-186). However, in 2018 those exhibitions regarding aggressive war and the Japanese military's war acts in Asia only remain in the Oka Masaharu Memorial Peace Museum. The other two museums have shifted their exhibitions after renewal programs in the 2000s and 2010s. In today's exhibitions at the Oka Masaharu Memorial Peace Museum, there are explicit depictions of the Mukden Incident in 1931 (which is depicted as being caused by the Japanese Kwantung Army when they blew up the South Manchurian Railways and blamed the explosion on China), and corpses of Chinese people killed by the Japanese army (Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum n.d.).

There have been instances in which conservative politicians in local government have placed pressure on museums to alter their exhibits (cf. T. Yoshida 2014 and Seaton 2015). Renewal programs converted the progressive Saitama Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum and Peace Ōsaka to be more conservative in 2013 and 2015, respectively. The Saitama Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum was re-opened after its renewal in 2013. In the new exhibitions, depictions of the Japanese military's war atrocities were cut by 1/3, and depictions of the comfort women and Nanjing massacre were all removed from the exhibition (Japanese Communist Party Saitama 2013). Peace Ōsaka, meanwhile, was funded by the local government and opened in 1991. It was a progressive museum that exhibited the Japanese military's atrocities in wartime via specific panels in the 'China Corner' and 'Korea Corner' (T. Yoshida 2014, 175). In the original exhibitions, the Japanese military's Three-Alls Operation – 'loot all, kill all and burn all', the atrocities in Nanjing, as well as Unit 731's human experiments in Manchuria were displayed via both photographs and wartime items (cf. T. Yoshida 2014, 175-176, Peace and War Museum 2000, 83-84, Seaton 2015). However, when Peace Osaka re-opened in April, 2015, the exhibitions regarding the Japanese military's war acts in Asia were all removed, ostensibly because the aim of the renewal was to make the contents more appropriate for children (Seaton 2015).

The second trend in war-related museums in the 1990s is on the revival of national military museums funded by JSDF (Japan Self-Defense Forces). Between 1993 and 2007, there were five military museums/public relations centers newly established in Kagoshima Prefecture, Nagasaki Prefecture, Shizuōka Prefecture, Hiroshima Prefecture and Saitama Prefecture. The Kanoya Air Base Museum (Kanoya Kōkūkichi Shiryōkan, Kagoshima Prefecture, 1993), Sail Tower (Sasebo Shiryōkan, Nagasaki Prefecture, 1997) and Maritime Self-Defense Force Historical Museum (Kaijōjietai Kure Shiryōkan, also titled Tetsuno Kujirakan, Hiroshima Prefecture, 2007) are funded by JMSDF (Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force). The Hamamatsu Air Self-Defense Force Public Relations Center (Kōkū Jietai Hamamatsu Kōhōkan, 1997) is funded by JASDF (Japan Air Self-Defense Force), and the Ground Self-Defense Force Public Relations Center (Rikujō Jietai Kōhō Sentā, Saitama Prefecture, 2002) is funded by JGSDF (Japan Ground Self-Defense Force). The displays of these newly established national

military museums present the history of a branch of Japanese military, exhibitions of military facilities, models/dioramas, weaponry, simulators, and video exhibitions about JSDF's daily training and their rescue activities both domestically and abroad. By exhibiting various military equipment from the past, the military museums contribute to visitor's understandings of Japanese military's history. The military-related public relations centers are different from the military museums funded by JSDF. By displaying the newest military equipment while presenting the JSDF's positive contributions in the world, the military-related public relations centers aim to invoke pride in Japan's contemporary armed forces. Since these military museums are funded by JSDF, they are all under the management of the Ministry of Defense Japan, hence their exhibitions represent the official stance regarding Japan's national history.

When the development of military museums gained support from Japanese government in the 2000s, the development of local military museums for exhibiting local history were also supported by local governments in the same period. The Kure Maritime Museum (Kure Kaiji Rekishi Kagakukan, also known as the Yamato Museum) was funded by the Kure municipal government in 2005 and aimed 'to present a fascinating part of modern Japanese history', 'to raise people's awareness of the tragedy of war', 'to pass on some of the most important technology to children', and 'to contribute to regional education, culture and sightseeing' (Kure Maritime Museum n.d.). Similar to the Chiran Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots (1975) and the Chikuzen Machi Tachiarai Peace Memorial Museum (1987), the Kure Maritime Museum as the military museum attempted to connect Kure city's past as a military town to Kure city's present as a peaceful city. However, the displays about the history of Kure as a military town for shipbuilding and steelmaking, as well as the exhibits of the various military facilities like Battleship Yamato, Japan's Zero Fighter type 62 and torpedoes, are strategically connected with Japanese soldiers' sacrifice in wartime. The Japanese military's war history is prioritized less, while the peace message is conveyed to visitors based on the introduction of the development of the current shipbuilding technologies.

Another type of museum – for commemorating Japanese civilians' victimhood and/or a specific form of Japanese military victimhood in the postwar era – gained support from the Japanese government as well. The National Shōwa Memorial Museum

(*Shōwakan*, Tokyo, 1999) presents war artefacts and photographs that depict ordinary Japanese people's experiences and suffering during the war and postwar years. The Memorial Museum for Soldiers, Detainees in Siberia and Post-War Repatriates (Heiwa Kinen Tenji Shiryōkan, Tokyo, 2000) is funded and managed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan (Sōmushō). The exhibitions of the museum include a number of personal belongings, official documents, photographs and replica models which are aim to 'help ensure that the memory of the suffering of Japan's World War II soldiers, detainees in Siberia, and postwar repatriates is passed down to future generations who have never experienced war' (Memorial Museum for Soldiers, Detainees in Siberia, and Postwar Repatriates n.d.). Soldiers, detainees and postwar repatriates were constructed as 'heroes', who 'risk[ed] their lives to fulfil their duties', as 'victims', who 'endured brutal forced labor', and as 'brave people', who 'endured terrible conditions and physical danger in making their way back to their homeland' (ibid). Similar to the above two museums, the Shōkeikan – Historical Materials Hall for Sick and Wounded Soldiers (Senshō Byōsha Shiryōkan, Tokyo, 2006) is under the management of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan (Kōsei Rōdōshō), exhibits Japanese soldiers' war experience on the battlefield and their lives after they came back to Japan, and aims to convey 'the hardships endured by sick and wounded servicemen, as well as their families' and convey the veteran's peace messages to the world (Shōkeikan n.d.).

The newly-established military museums and the military-victimhood museums which are funded by Japanese government and opened in the 1990s and 2000s reveal not only that the official stance regarding the past war has gradually shifted from 'the Japanese military's aggression' to 'Japanese victimhood', but it also indicates that the Japanese government has not achieved a reconciliation with its own citizens (T. Yoshida 2014, 198). In the 2000s, victim narratives are still observed as the favorable narrative style in the construction of Japan's collective war memories at the national level.

The qualitative research regarding the development of Japan's war-related museums from the 1970s to 2017 provides a comprehensive view for understanding the relations between social context and museum exhibits. However, how the wars between China

and Japan from 1894 to 1945 are depicted in Japan's war-related museums have not been the focus of much attention. The remainder of this chapter addresses this issue. The war narratives and the victimhood narratives regarding the wars between China and Japan, the depictions of war and Japanese victimhood in Okinawa, Hiroshima and Nagasaki will be analyzed qualitatively in the eight museums selected for close analysis.

4.2 The First Sino-Japanese War

After the First Sino-Japanese War, the representatives of both China and Japan gathered in Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi Prefecture, to convene a peace conference. The peace conference was held at the local restaurant Shunpanrō from March 20 to April 17, 1895.¹² The Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial House (Nisshin Kōwa Kinen Kan) was funded by the Shimonoseki municipal government and was constructed as an independent building next to the Shunpanrō. The construction of the memorial house was started in 1935 and it opened in 1937. On January 26, 2011, this memorial house was certified by Japanese government as a Registered Tangible Cultural Property not only because of its particular architectural style, but also because of its preservation of artefacts from a century ago. In 2017, this museum received 73,303 visitors, and visitors from China and Korea have gradually increased in recent years.¹³

The exhibits in the museum divided into two parts, the glass room in the center and the surrounding corridor exhibition. Inside the glass room, there are the round table, chairs and stationary that were used at the peace conference in 1895. The corridor surrounding the glass room is an exhibition area where the pictures of the conference, calligraphy and a copy of the Treaty of Shimonoseki are hanging on the wall. To evoke 'the heated negotiations that took place at the conference over 100 years ago', the items which were used for the peace conference are kept as its original displays in the glass room.

In the introduction of the First Sino-Japanese War, the museum simply explains that the First Sino-Japanese War was triggered by 'the Donghak Peasant Revolution of

¹² Written on the introduction board of Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial House in Japanese, English, Chinese and Korean.

¹³ All visitor numbers to the museums have been confirmed by telephone calls to the museum.

1894', and since Japan 'gained the upper hand on the battlefield', the Qing Dynasty started to seek negotiations with Japan. Shimonoseki was selected as the site for the peace conference from March to April, and after the conference, both countries signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki in which 'China recognize[d] the independence of Korea, and cede[d] land, surrender[ed] rights and interests, and pay[aid] an indemnity to Japan'. The exhibits regarding the First Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki in this museum did not mention why the Qing Dynasty and Japan sent troops together to the Korean Peninsula in 1894, and neither did it mention the negotiating details regarding the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

The history of the First Sino-Japanese War is explicitly interpreted in the Yūshūkan Museum (Yūshūkan). Yūshūkan was established in 1882, but was closed after Japan's defeat in 1945 and it only reopened in 1986. Yūshūkan is part of Yasukuni Shrine and also a war memorial museum containing a vast amount of wartime exhibits and records. The Yūshūkan museum comprises two floors: the first floor exhibits include 'the history of Japanese military traditions', 'the Meiji Restoration', 'the Seinan War', 'the Sino-Japanese War' and 'the China Incident'. The second floor houses the exhibits of 'the Greater East Asia War' and 'the Mementos of the Noble Spirits Enshrined at Yasukuni Jinja'. It has the same stance of Yasukuni Shrine, in other words the Yūshūkan Museum was established to 'honor the courageous soldiers who laid the foundation for modern Japan, and to pray for the repose of their souls'. The Yūshūkan museum received over 300,000 visitors in 2017.¹⁴

The background to the First Sino-Japanese War in Yūshūkan starts from the emphasis of the 'samurai spirits', who constructed the identity of Japanese people as 'brave' and 'honorable' people and who protected the 'peaceful state of Japan' from the ancient times. When the western powers started their colonization in Asia in the 19th century, Japan started its restoration and established a modern state with modern armed forces in order to defend the homeland. In the background to the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan's military expansion is stressed as being for 'homeland defense'.

¹⁴ The staff of Yūshūkan told me that they have not compiled the statistics for annual visitors in 2017. The staff also told me that visitor numbers have gradually declined since 2013, but still the museum received around 300,000 visitors on average.

The introduction to the First Sino-Japanese War starts from the explanation of the ‘Korean Problem’. When the Qing Dynasty still claimed suzerainty over Korea in the 19th century, ‘pro-China conservatives’ in Korea clashed with ‘pro-Japan reformists’. The outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War is attributed to the Korean conservatives, who ‘desired to expel the Japanese from Korea’ and ‘launched a coup d’état’ in 1894. When the Qing Dynasty sent troops to quell the Donghak Rebellion, Japan ‘followed suit, dispatching the Ōshima Mixed Brigade’, which directly led the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese army ‘gained control of the sea by defeating the China’s Beiyang Fleet at the Battle of the Yellow Sea’ and Japan won the First Sino-Japanese War. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was signed between the Qing Dynasty and Japan’s Meiji government, was declared as a ‘liberation’ because ‘Korea became an independent state as Japan had long hoped for’.

Based on the museum’s depictions of the First Sino-Japanese War, China’s suzerainty over Korea is regarded as the main reason for Chinese-Japanese confrontation. Japan attempted to liberate Korea from China’s control, and the Donghak Peasant Revolution is recognized as the trigger of the First Sino-Japanese War. The museum attributes the Qing Dynasty’s intervention in Korea’s domestic politics as the first reason for the war, and Korea’s pro-China conservatives who ‘desired to expel the Japanese from Korea’ as the second reason of the war. Consequently, Japan’s victory in the war is portrayed as ‘a good result’ of Japan’s modernization which liberated Korea from the Qing Dynasty. While Yūshūkan museum presents the Japanese government as the ‘winner’ and the ‘savior’, Japan’s attempts to gain a foothold on the continent and thereby their role in launching the First Sino-Japanese War is entirely erased from the museum. The Japanese military’s war conduct in the First Sino-Japanese War is regarded as just in Yūshūkan museum.

In contrast with the depictions regarding the First Sino-Japanese War in the two museums mentioned above, the National Museum of Japanese History (Kokuritsu Rekishi Minzoku Hakubutsukan, hereafter Rekihaku) gives more progressive depictions regarding the First Sino-Japanese War. Rekihaku is funded by the Japanese government and opened in 1983. With a large number of historical and cultural artefacts displayed in the six exhibition galleries, this museum is recognized as ‘the only Japanese museum

and the national center for study[ing] concerning history, archaeology and folklore in the country'. The museum aims to provide 'a fuller knowledge of the history and culture of our country [Japan]', and in 2017, the museum received 180,917 visitors.¹⁵

In the six exhibition galleries, the sixth gallery 'the Modern Age' (*gendai*) newly opened in 2010. According to the introduction board in the sixth gallery, the opening of 'the Modern Age' section is to promote a mutual understanding among different historical consciousnesses, to remember the past and to convey history to the next generations. The sixth gallery is divided into two sections, 'War and Peace' and 'Postwar Lifestyle Revolution'.

Depictions of the First Sino-Japanese War begin with the introduction of Japan's modern history. On the wall exhibits, the original aim of Japan's modernization is given as 'to be a rich nation, a strong army', but panels add: 'Not only were its own citizens sacrificed for the sake of this goal but people belonging to other countries and ethnic groups as well. Peace in itself held little value'. In the table exhibits next to the wall display, it explains that the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War was caused by the Meiji government, which called for the policy of 'rich country, strong army' (*fukoku kyōhei*). This prompted Japan to shift its policy from 'homeland defense' (*kokunai bōei*) to 'armed advances into foreign countries' (*gaikoku he no buryoku shinshutsu*). Although, the First Sino-Japanese War is simply identified as a confrontation centered on Korea between the Qing Dynasty and Meiji Japan, it can be argued that the depictions of Japan's acquisition of Taiwan as its new territory, Japan's further expansion into Manchuria to acquire the rights to construct railways in China after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and Japan's annexation of Korea as its colony in 1910 indicate that Japan's war conduct in and after the First Sino-Japanese War were unjust.

The Kawasaki Peace Museum (Kawasakishi Heiwakan) is a municipal museum that shares the same stance for viewing Japanese war memories as Rekihaku. The Kawasaki Peace Museum was established in 1992. It combines Kawasaki Prefecture's local victimhood in air raids and the Japanese military's war history. The museum aims to connect war and peace issues for the post-war generations and received 51,185 visitors

¹⁵ According to the museum staff, interviewed by phone call.

in 2017. According to the museum staff, the Kawasaki Peace Museum kept its original exhibitions from its opening until 2013. The renovations in 2013 were primarily centered on a new video display of the Japanese military's war conducts in China and Asia-Pacific War. Other original exhibits, including the artefacts and photographs, were all kept the same after the renovation.

In the section 'Japan and War' (*Nihon to sensō*), the background to the First Sino-Japanese War, the Mukden Incident and the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are explicitly explained in both panel exhibits and video displays. The introduction of the First Sino-Japanese War starts with the 'Out of Asia and Into Europe' (*datsua nyūō*), and continues with the 'Modern State and Military' (*kindaikokka to guntai*) and the Ganghwa Island Incident (*kōkatō jiken*). In the depictions of the Ganghwa Island Incident, the Japanese navy's 'aggression' (*shinryaku*) towards Korean coastal defenses at Ganghwa Island in 1875 and the Treaty of Ganghwa in 1876, which 'was forced by Japanese government', are selected as the prelude of Japan's attempt to expand its military power to Asia in the 19th century. In the next panel, the First Sino-Japanese War is depicted as a result of Japan's refusal to withdraw from Korea when the Qing Dynasty was asked by Korean government to quell the Donghak Peasant Revolution. The panels say 'Japan's intervention in Korea's internal affairs in the name of reform was aimed to merge Korea into Japan', 'Japan's attack on China's navy at first', and 'Korean people's resistance against Japan's annexation' reveal that the Japanese military's war conduct in the First Sino-Japanese War are recognized as unjust in the Kawasaki Peace Museum.

Other local museums also concisely mention the causes of the First Sino-Japanese War. The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (Okinawaken Heiwa Kinenkan Shiryōkan) is another museum which has a progressive stance on the war. The museum depicts Japan's ambitions to expand its influence in Korea and how Japan launched the First Sino-Japanese War. In the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (Hiroshima Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan), Hiroshima is depicted as a military base and military harbor which was used to transfer troops and equipment during the First Sino-Japanese War. This highlights that Hiroshima played a role as a military city before it became the peace city that it is today. In the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum (*Nagasaki Genbaku Shiryōkan*),

although the background of the First Sino-Japanese War is not mentioned in the exhibits, it does mention that the Yawata Steel Works were established using war reparations paid by China after the First Sino-Japanese War.

4.3 The Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident

The Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are mentioned in seven of eight museums (all except the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial House). However, the two incidents are only mentioned in one sentence in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. In both museums, the war between China and Japan from 1931 is called ‘the Fifteen-Year War’. In the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the relevance of Hiroshima to the two incidents is only mentioned in a wall panel saying that Hiroshima was a military base and produced military materials for Japan’s military expansion into China from 1931. In the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, the Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident is only mentioned in a wall panel giving the timeline of Japan’s modern history. The more specific depictions regarding the Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are given in Yūshūkan, Rekihaku, the Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Defunct Imperial Japanese Army Noborito Laboratory Museum for Education in Peace (Noborito Kenkyūsho Shiryōkan) and the Okinawa Prefecture Peace Memorial Museum.

In Yūshūkan, the chaotic division in domestic China is set as the background before the Mukden Incident. The murder of the Captain Nakamura Shintarō on June 1931 and the Wanbaoshan Incident¹⁶ in July are the triggers. Consequently, the Mukden Incident is attributed to 1) Japanese resentment ‘toward the overtly anti-Japanese policies of Zhang Xueliang’s government, and 2) the Japanese military’s dissatisfaction with the Japanese government’s conciliatory policy to China. Without mentioning any details of the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, the narrative skips to the establishment of the Manchukuo: ‘the Kwantung Army helped establish Manchukuo, installing Pu-Yi, the last emperor of the Manchurian Dynasty, as head of state’.

¹⁶ On the exhibition panel, it says, ‘when a dispute between Korean and Chinese farmers over irrigation ditches arose in Wanbaoshan, a small village in southern Changchun, police arrived on the scene. Exaggerated reports of the incident were disseminated, resulting in anti-Chinese uprisings in Korea during which one hundred Chinese were killed, which in turn triggered anti-Japanese movements in China’.

Regarding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, similarly, the ‘revival of terrorism incited by the anti-Japanese policy under the instruction of the Comintern’ was attributed as the primary cause of the incident. The bullets that were fired at Japanese troops are blamed upon ‘Chinese terrorists’. The exhibits described the Japanese government’s declaration of a ‘Policy of Preventing an Extension of the Conflict’, and say that both China and Japan signed the truce, but due to the ‘direct attacks on Japanese soldiers in Langfang (July 25) and Guanganmen (July 26)’, the headquarters of the General Staff ‘had issued orders to sweep the Pingjin district’. Similar to the narrative of the Mukden Incident, China’s ‘attacks’ and ‘provocations’ are presented as the primary cause of Japan’s later attacks. Japan’s retaliation and the battlefield expansion after the large deployment of troops sent to mainland China stresses that the Japan’s military movements in the Second Sino-Japanese War are just.

In Rekihaku, the Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are described in the panels ‘An Expanding Empire’ and ‘The Reality of War on the Battle Field’. In these panels, the Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are concisely attributed to the ‘Shōwa Depression’ (*shōwa kyōkō*), in which Japan started to call for the Manmō area (Manchuria and Inner Mongolian area) of China as Japan’s lifeline (*manmō wa seimeisen de aru*) because the rich natural and food resources in Manchuria could help Japan to overcome its domestic depression. Therefore, ‘Japan launched the Mukden Incident in 1931’, ‘occupied the whole of Manchuria’, ‘established Manchukuo in 1932’ and subsequently ‘confronted China’s military in the suburbs of Beijing in 1937’ (the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) in order to ‘strengthen Japanese military’s advance into North of China’. The exhibits highlight that Japan’s motivations for ‘advancing’ into China were Japan’s desire to loot (*ryakudatsu*) the natural resources from Manmō area. This suggests Rekihaku’s stance is to view the wars between Japan and China from 1931 to 1945 as unjust.

In the Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are defined as ‘aggression’ (*shinryaku*), in which ‘Japan’s Kwantung Army blew up a part of the South Manchuria Railway’, ‘blamed the explosion on the Chinese army’ and then ‘started the Mukden Incident’. In the depiction of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Konoe Fumimaro government’s forecast that the war would end

quickly if massive forces were sent to China after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident is identified as the essential reason for the battlefield expansion. The Japanese military's subsequent movements in Shanghai and the Kwantung Army's movements in Inner Mongolia are depicted as 'aggressive attacks' by the panels. The Kawasaki Peace Museum depicts Japan's war with China from 1931 to 1945 as an unjust war. Meanwhile, the Japanese government and the Japanese military's war conduct in China are regarded as unjust.

Similar to the Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are identified as 'aggression' in the Defunct Imperial Japanese Army Noborito Laboratory Museum for Education in Peace (*Noborito Kenkyūsho Shiryōkan*, hereafter Noborito Laboratory Museum). The Noborito Laboratory Museum used to be a military laboratory 'that focused on "clandestine warfare" – counter intelligence, espionage activities, clandestine strategy and propaganda'. Meiji University bought the demolished building of the laboratory in 1950 and used it as a research building for the Department of Agriculture until 2009. The Noborito Laboratory Museum is funded by Meiji University and opened in 2010. It aims to convey a peace message to the postwar generations by presenting exhibits about the bacterial and chemical weapons that the Japanese Army used in the Asia-Pacific War. According to the 2017 Annual Report of the Noborito Laboratory Museum, 8,314 visitors came to the museum in 2017, which included 1,220 students from 32 schools who conducted their school trips in the museum (The Defunct Imperial Japanese Army Noborito Laboratory Museum for Education in Peace, Meiji University 2018, 129).

The Noborito Laboratory Museum has five exhibition rooms: 'Introduction of Noborito Laboratory' (*Noborito Kenkyūsho no Zenyō*), 'Balloon Bombs and No.1 Department' (*Fūsenbakudan to Daiichika*), 'Clandestine Warfare Weapons and No.2 Department' (*Himitsusen Heiki to Dainika*), 'Counterfeit Currency and No.3 Department' (*Nisesatsu to Daisanka*), and 'Noborito Laboratory after Defeat' (*Haisen to Sonoato no Noborito Kenkyūsho*). The displays about the Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are on wall panels in the rest space of 'Wartime Period' (*Sensō Jidai*). However, different from Rekihaku and Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Mukden Incident and the battlefield expansion after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are

attributed to the Japanese Imperial Army (*rikugun*), who led Japan into an aggressive war, and the Japanese government's war responsibility is less emphasized. Based on the narratives and exhibits of the Japanese military's research of bacterial and chemical weapons in wartime, the depictions of the Noborito Laboratory Museum regard Japan's war with China as unjust, and criticizes Japanese military's war conduct in China as unjust as well.

The Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are also mentioned in the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum. The war between China and Japan is called 'the fifteen-year war' in the museum. Japan's motivation for launching the Mukden Incident and the Second Sino-Japanese War are given as: 'in order to break out of economic crisis in the 1920s and early 1930s, Japan planned an invasion of China'. Japan's domestic 'attempted coup' on February 26, 1936 is recognized as the domestic reason that the 'military started to control the government', which quickened the nation 'sliding deeper into the quagmire of full-scale war with China'. The war narratives in the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum are progressive as in the Kawasaki Peace Museum, in which Japanese military war conduct in China is recognized as unjust.

4.4 Chinese Victimhood and Japanese Victimhood

Since the depictions of Chinese victimhood and Japanese victimhood shed light on whether the Japanese military's war conduct was just or unjust, this section analyzes victimhood narratives in seven museums (the Sino-Japanese Peace Memorial House is excluded), and classifies two types of victimhood narratives. The first type is victimhood narratives based on criticism of the Japanese military's unjust war conduct. Regarding this type of victimhood narrative, Rekihaku, the Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Noborito Laboratory Museum and the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum are analyzed because they depict both Chinese victimhood and Japanese victimhood based on criticism of the Japanese military's unjust war conduct. The second type is victimhood narratives which criticize other countries' war conduct more than the Japanese military's wrongdoing. In this type of narrative, Yūshūkan, the

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum are analyzed.

In depictions of Chinese victimhood, Rekihaku has a table display that exhibits the Japanese military's mass killings when they occupied Nanjing in 1937. The Nanjing atrocity in Rekihaku is defined as the 'Nanjing Incident' (*nankin jiken*), in which the Chinese military and Chinese people are identified as victims of the Japanese military's repeated looting (*ryakudatsu*) and rapes (*bōkō*). In the depictions of the Battle of Okinawa, *Rekihaku* discussed the Japanese military's war crimes against Okinawan people, including the Japanese military's killing of the local people after calling them as 'spies'. The museum uses critical terminology, such as the military's 'manipulation' of local people, (*jumin no ishiki kettei ō sayūsuru*), and mentions the military's suggestions that civilians should commit suicide when the U.S military landed on Okinawa. Consequently, Chinese people's resistance against the Japanese military's advance into Manchuria, Chinese people's distresses under Japanese looting, and Chinese civilian's sacrifice in wartime, combined with Okinawan people's innocent sacrifice in wartime constructed an image of the war that Japan had fought with China and U.S. as unjust. The Japanese military is identified as a 'perpetrator' via repeated mentions of Chinese victimhood and Okinawan people's victimhood in wartime.

Chinese victimhood is exhibited in even more detail in the Kawasaki Peace Museum. In the museum, Japanese military's atrocities in Nanjing are called the 'Nanjing Incident' (*nankin jiken*) and 'Nanjing Massacre' (*nankin dai gyakusatsu*). In the displays about the atrocity, there is a photo of Chinese people's corpses beside the Yangtze River, and the Japanese military's looting and mass killings in Nanjing city are displayed using both panel and video exhibits. Moreover, Unit 731's human experiments in Manchuria in order to develop bacterial weapons and start gas warfare in mainland China, the Japanese Army's 'Three-Alls Operation' in Northern China, and Japanese Army's establishment of 'comfort stations' where women were forced to provide sexual service to Japanese soldiers are all presented and reveal Kawasaki Peace Museum's stance regarding the Japanese military's aggressive acts in China as unjust. Depictions of Chinese people's resistance against the Japanese military's aggression in China, and Chinese people's victimhood in wartime implies that both the Japanese

government and Japanese military are the two main wrongdoers who should take war responsibility in postwar era.

Depictions of Chinese victimhood and Japanese victimhood are also included in the Noborito Laboratory Museum. However, different from Rekihaku and Kawasaki Peace Museum, Chinese victimhood and Japanese victimhood in the Noborito Laboratory Museum are demonstrated by exhibiting the Japanese military's research into various bacterial and chemical weapons used for Japan's clandestine warfare in China.

The Noborito Laboratory Museum is a private museum displays the war artefacts of the Noborito Laboratory (Noborito Kenkyūsho). The Noborito Laboratory's official name is the 9th Army Technical Research Laboratory (Daikyū Rikugun Gijutsu Kenkyūsho). It was funded by Japanese Imperial Army (*rikugun*) and was established in 1919. In 1936, the Laboratory started to provide experimental materials to the military, and joined the human experiments of Unit 731 in 1941 (Meiji Daigaku Heiwa Kyōiku Noborito Kenkyūsho Shiryōkan 2010). After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japanese military was dragged into guerilla warfare with Chinese fighters. This promoted the research and development of Japan's counter intelligence technology, espionage equipment, and clandestine strategy inside the military in order to win the war in the short term (*ibid*). According to the exhibits, researchers and assistants who were employed by the Laboratory were from Japanese universities who had biology and chemistry backgrounds. Other ordinary workers were either students who were recruited from local military schools or girls who were mobilized to work for military facilities. The development of new weapons required the Laboratory to conduct biochemical experiments. The Laboratory, therefore, paid higher salaries to the young workers because they had to be exposed to a toxic environment. Japanese schoolchildren, especially the Japanese girls who were mobilized to work in the Laboratory, are set as the first victims. Their complaints and sufferings during their work in the Laboratory are conveyed in the Noborito Laboratory Museum.

Chinese people are established as the second victims of the Japanese military, but their victimhood is implied in the testimonies of the former employees, who confessed that the bacterial weapons they had created were 'inhuman', and the acts they committed when they were recruited for Unit 731 are displayed in the panel titled 'What

We Learn Now from Noborito Laboratory’. In the exhibits of Noborito Laboratory Museum, the victimhood of Chinese people and the victimhood of Japanese people are conveyed based on the exhibits of the Laboratory’s research. Japan’s war with China is recognized as ‘aggression’, and the Japanese military’s war conduct in China is acknowledged as unjust.

While remorse to Chinese people is expressed in the three museums mentioned above, the Japanese military’s war conduct is presented more explicitly in the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum. The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum was established to ‘mourn for those who perished in the war, pass on to future generations the historic lessons of the Battle of Okinawa, convey our message to the peoples of the world and thereby contribute to establishing permanent peace’ (Okinawaken Heiwa Kinen Shiryōkan 2017). In 2017, the museum received 475,062 visitors, of whom 260,990 were schoolchildren. The exhibitions are divided into five sections, which are ‘The Road to the Battle of Okinawa’, ‘The Typhoon of Steel’, ‘A Hell on Earth’, ‘Testimony’ and ‘Keystone of the Pacific’. The second, third and fourth section are subtitled as ‘Testimony by local residents’. In this museum, both Chinese victimhood and Japanese victimhood are attributed to the Japanese military’s unjust war conduct in wartime.

In ‘Typhoon of Steel’, Okinawan people are portrayed as victims of ‘the Allied forces’, ‘friends’ and ‘foes’. ‘The Allied forces’ refer to the U.S. and British armies who ‘did indiscriminate shelling’ and ‘[took] thousands of lives of local people’. The ‘friends’ are identified as the ‘fellow residents’ who killed other Okinawan civilians under the stress of starvation. The ‘foes’ in the narrative indicate to the Japanese military – who tortured and murdered local residents, seized food from civilians, killed infants, ordered deaths for those said to be an encumbrance in combat, massacred Okinawan civilians claiming they were spies, and killed others who, appealing to reason, called for surrender. Okinawan civilians who were recruited to build military installations were ‘ordered or coerced to kill each other in large groups’ (*shūdan jiketsu*), and were forced to fight so as ‘never to surrender to U.S. forces’. They were told that ‘civilians and soldiers must live and die together’.

The victimhood of Okinawan civilians is not only presented in ‘Typhoon of Steel’, but also in the third section, ‘Hell on Earth’. Using numerous testimonies, the horrors of the Battle of Okinawa are conveyed to the visitors. There are three Gama Cave Exhibits for visitors to see a reconstruction of events and living conditions. To convey the horrors of the brutal killings that Japanese soldiers had inflicted on the Okinawan people, the three caves tell three narratives: the killing of infants because they were crying, the poisoning of wounded soldiers, and a scene of final preparations before a suicide squad operation. Although, these waxworks figure reconstructions are based on the testimony of Shizuko Oshiro¹⁷ and Yūko Tamaki.¹⁸ The images of Okinawan people as victims of the war are created by their treatment at the hands of the ‘double perpetrators’ of the U.S. and Japanese militaries, in which, U.S. and Japanese military’s war conducts are identified as unjust.

The view of the Battle of Okinawa in the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum is seen from the perspective of Okinawan people. The narratives of the victimhood of Okinawan people are built on actions of the ‘double perpetrators’ of both the U.S. and the Japanese militaries. Although the motivations of why Japan launched the war with China and what crimes the Japanese military committed in China are mentioned in the museum, the details of Japan’s domestic politics, including how the confrontations between the government and the military headquarters became fierce, are not depicted in this museum. The erasure of Japan’s domestic politics in the museum’s narrative is an example of Okinawan ‘self-alienation’. By distancing themselves from

¹⁷ According to the witness, Shizuko Oshiro wrote, ‘During the two or three days I was in the cave, about ten refuges came rushing inside. It was a military shelter so civilians were not supposed to be there. I cried and begged, telling them I would only stay for a while until the fierce shelling stopped, and they finally let me in. Among the others was one woman with a baby boy of about two who was screaming and crying. The soldiers got angry and yelled at her to shut him up, but he kept crying. Then the mother took him out of the cave and, a little while later, came back alone. I do not know what happened to that boy. She never told us, and no one wanted to ask’ - from *Okinawa Ken Heiwa Kinen Shiryo Kan Sougo Annai*, p. 84.

¹⁸ According to the witness, Yūko Tamami wrote ‘...another soldier from Okinawa was desperate for water. He kept saying in Okinawa dialect that he would pay anyone 10 yen for some water. I told one soldier with a canteen that, since the poor guy was going to die anyway, why not let him have a drink. He poured me a teacupful of water that I gave the guy. “You know how badly I’ve wanted water since yesterday”, he said. “You might have given me some then”. I asked him if he wanted more, but he said that was enough. In less than five minutes, he was dead. The soldiers died in many different ways’. - from *Okinawa Ken Heiwa Kinen Shiryo Kan Sougo Annai*, p. 85.

mainland Japan, it is possible to feel closer to other victim countries of Asia. When the museum mentions ‘comfort stations’ and the victimhood of Korean women who were forced to work in the ‘comfort stations’ in Okinawa, the empathy towards Korean and Chinese victimhood becomes possible because Okinawa had the same perpetrator: the Japanese military.¹⁹

In the last section, ‘Keystone of the Pacific’, the continued victimhood of Okinawa people under U.S. military occupation are depicted. The ‘suppression of human rights’ included ‘restrictions on travel to and from Okinawa’ and ‘the suppression of freedom of speech’. The narrative of the victimhood of the Okinawan people in the postwar era caused by the existence of the U.S. military bases has created another memorial space of ‘continuous victimhood’ of Okinawa.

In contrast to all the above mentioned museums, which construct Chinese and Japanese civilians’ victimhood by blaming the Japanese military for its unjust war conduct, the Yūshūkan inverts the war narratives and regards the Japanese military as ‘victim’ and other countries as ‘perpetrators’.

In the depiction of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the image of Japan changes from being a ‘follower’ of the historical tide – when Japan dispatched the Ōshima Mixed Brigade to ‘quell the Tong-hak Rebellion’ in Korea – to being a ‘winner’ – who ‘gained control of the sea by defeating the China’s Beiyang Fleet at the Battle of the Yellow Sea’. After the war, Japan’s is depicted as a ‘supporter’ of Korean liberation by signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki with China. The museum claims that ‘Korea became an independent state as Japan had long hoped for’, but turned to ‘victim’ after Russia, Germany and France forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China ‘six days after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki’.

In the following exhibition, Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War and its annexation of Korea are argued to have ‘resolved concerns about national security which had been festering for years’. In the following years, Japan cooperated with the

¹⁹ The museum states: ‘as in other parts of Asia, so-called ‘comfort stations’ were set up for Japanese soldiers in Okinawa. The ‘stations’ were built as rows of sheds, but civilian homes were also appropriated for this purpose. Most of the so-called ‘comfort women’ working inside as sex slaves had been abducted from Korea. Forced to travel with the troops to the front, many of them died in the fighting. *Okinawa Ken Heiwa Kinen Shiryō Kan Sōgō Annai*, p. 43.

Allies in the World War I and ‘captured German possessions’. Meanwhile, the Chinese are portrayed as ‘radical nationalists’ who ‘focused their animosity on the existing international agreements’. China’s anti-Japanese movement is given as the trigger which ‘promoted the action by the Kwantung Army’ and encouraged ‘the establishment of Manchukuo’. In this type of narrative, the national identity of Japan is constructed an ally of Britain and America in World War I, which helped the war effort by capturing German possessions in Asia. By contrast, China and Chinese people are portrayed as ‘nationalistic’ and ‘xenophobic’ nationalists who organized anti-Japanese movements and made Japan take actions to fight back. In *Yūshūkan*, the ‘in-group identity’ of Japan and the ‘out-group image’ of China are set as a pair, in which Japan was a ‘positive cooperator’ challenged by ‘xenophobic Chinese’, China and Chinese people, who are no longer identified as the ‘victim’ of war but the ‘irrational zealots’ who took revenge on Japan.

Regarding Chinese victimhood in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the war crimes that the Japanese military committed on Chinese people are absent in *Yūshūkan*. The war crimes of the Unit 731, the ‘Three-Alls Operation’ of ‘loot all, burn all and kill all’ when the Japanese military invaded Northern China, and the ‘comfort women’ are all omitted. In the narrative of massive killings in Nanjing on December 1937, the Nanjing Massacre is called the ‘Nanjing Incident’ and ‘the defeated Chinese rushed to Xiaguan, and they were completely destroyed’.

In the depictions of the Battle of Okinawa, Japanese civilians and Japanese military commanders are recognized as ‘communal victims’. By setting the ‘bad guy’ as the U.S., the Japanese commander Ushijima Mitsuru who issued orders to Japanese soldiers and civilians to fight with to the last is recognized as the ‘hero’. The students who were mobilized to the Japanese army for nursing and medical care were identified as ‘cooperators of Japanese soldiers’. The students’ sacrifice in the Battle of Okinawa is attributed to the ‘fierce attack’ of American militaries. The narratives regarding the massive killings in the Battle of Okinawa committed by the Japanese commanders are absent in the museum.

Moreover, in comparison with the detailed narratives in current junior high school history textbooks, the A-bombs narratives are brief in *Yūshūkan*. A newspaper headline

‘Hiroshima Attacked by Enemy’s New Bomb Carried by a Special B29’ hung beside exhibits about the dropping of the A-bomb on Hiroshima. Without mentioning more details about civilian victims of the bombings, it simply says ‘the bomb, released by the Enola Gay, exploded in the skies over Hiroshima, annihilating a large number of civilians instantaneously’, which ‘enlarged the number of the victims to 200,000 and 80,000 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively’. In sum, along with the erasure of Japan’s aggressive war conduct, the depictions regarding the Chinese victimhood and Japanese victimhood in *Yūshūkan* are removed accordingly. War narratives in *Yūshūkan* are regarded as just, both the war is just and the war conduct is just.

Memories of Japanese victimhood in wartime focus on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 6 and 9, 1945, when the A-bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, everything within the hypocenter was destroyed at the moment of the explosion. In the years following the war, Hiroshima city government planned to reconstruct the hypocenter as a memorial park, and with the enactment of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law on August 1949, the Peace Memorial Park was established. It aims for permanent world peace. Both the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum were established in 1955. The two museums exhibit artifacts and photographs of the devastation of the A-bomb, inform visitors about the horror of war, the threat of nuclear weapons and the importance of peace. In 2017, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum received 1,680,923 visitors (with 321,931 students), and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum received 705,315 visitors in the same year (with 218,221 students).

The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum is the main site for preserving materials relating to the A-bomb. It was established in 1955 and reconstructed in 1994, when a new Main building and the East building were opened. Twenty years later, another renewal of the East Building started in 2014 and was finished in April 2017. Following that, reconstruction of the Main Building started in April 2017 and is scheduled to be complete in the spring of 2019. Therefore, fieldwork in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum was conducted twice. The Main Building was visited on August 8, 2015, and the East Building was visited on January 29, 2018. The analysis of the Hiroshima Peace

Memorial Museum will combine the narratives of the two buildings, clarify what narrative is promoted in the museum, and how the narratives explain the reasons for the A-bomb attacks. Although the museum is divided into two buildings, both the Main Building and the East Building present similar topics regarding the A-bomb attacks on Hiroshima.

In the museum, the identities of Hiroshima civilians are promoted as ‘Japanese citizens of a military city’, ‘victims of A-bombs’, and ‘pacifists wanting to reduce nuclear experiments and prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons’. The museum depicted the development of modern Hiroshima from the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, when Hiroshima ‘suddenly entered the limelight as the primary port of embarkation to mainland China for soldiers and materials’. After the Mukden Incident and outbreak of the Pacific War, Hiroshima’s importance as ‘a military base’ was enhanced by the continuous constructions of military industry and establishment of the Second General Army Headquarters (Hiroshima Heiwa Kinen Shiryō Kan 1999, 12-14). The citizens of Hiroshima are stressed as the citizens of ‘military town’.

The second identity of Hiroshima citizen is ‘A-bomb victim’. A-bomb victims are divided into two groups in the museum: those who were killed as a result of the A-bomb, and survivors called *hibakusha*. The victimhood of the dead people is reconstructed via the physical remnants they left. The victimhood of the *hibakusha* is constructed as a double victimhood: first from their direct experience of the A-bomb explosion, both in the damage to their bodies and their witnessing of death; and second from their suffering of the after effects of the A-bomb, including discrimination experienced as *hibakusha* in the postwar era.

The third identity of Hiroshima citizens promoted is ‘pacifist’, both among survivors of the A-bomb and the generations born in post-war era. They are recognized as pacifist through endeavors to reducing nuclear experiments and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

After the 2017 renewal program, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum expanded its exhibitions and not only focused on the tragic events of the A-bomb, but also the history of Hiroshima and the national past covering the First Sino-Japanese War, the Mukden Incident, the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan’s war crimes (Nanjing

Massacre/Incident), and the forced labor of Koreans. In the depiction of Japanese war crimes in Nanjing, the museum stated ‘Chinese were being slaughtered by the Japanese army’, and the victim number is estimated ‘in the tens of thousands’ are mentioned on the wall exhibition.²⁰ The Chinese victims included ‘soldiers, POWs, civilians, and even children’. Chinese people are portrayed as victims of the unjust war conduct of the Japanese military.

In addition to the impressive exhibits of the ruins of Hiroshima, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum places significance on the establishment of permanent peace in a nuclear-free world. The development of A-bomb, how was it dropped on Hiroshima, what damage it can release, and how to establish permanent peace in the world are the contents of the second part of the museum.

The exhibits about the development of the A-bomb started with the Manhattan Project in 1942. The U.S. government is presented as the main perpetrator who knew the Germans ‘had abandoned their A-bomb project’, but concealed this information from scientists and ‘continued pushing development of the bomb’ (Hiroshima Heiwa Kinen Shiryō Kan 1999, 22). After the U.S. successfully conducted the world’s first A-bomb test in 1945, both the U.S. and U.K. considered that the bomb would be used against Japan. After the U.S. decoded a Japanese radio message and knew that ‘Japan had been negotiating with the USSR to offer a framework for peace’, the U.S. confirmed that ‘if the A-bomb ended the war, the U.S. would limit Soviet influence in East Asia after the war’. With consideration of both military and political strategies, the dropping of the A-bomb on Japan was decided by the U.S. and U.K.

Concerning why the A-bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the museum provides an official American document, *Summary of the Second Meeting of the Target Committee* (May 12, 1945), which clarifies that Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama and Kokura were the candidate cities based on ‘the city size and topography that would magnify the effects of the blast’. Later, Kyoto was removed from the list ‘because it had been for centuries the seat of the Imperial Court’, and on August 2, Hiroshima, Kokura and Nagasaki were determined as the target cities of the A-bombs.

²⁰ The description also added the different perspectives regarding the victim number was ‘over 100,000’ and estimated to ‘300,000’.

The victimhood narrative in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum is created by repeated emphasis on the victimhood of the innocent citizens in the explosion of A-bomb and their continuous sufferings of discrimination as *hibakusha* in the postwar era. The U.S. government is set as the main perpetrator. Although in the newly constructed East Building, the crimes of the Japanese military in China are slightly mentioned, this is insufficient to place any major responsibility on the Japanese military for their role in bringing about the A-bombing via their actions. The repeated emphasis on the U.S. as the perpetrator of the tragedy and avoidance of discussion regarding who should take responsibility for the war and Japan's defeat encourage visitors to shift their thinking from 'remorse' for the war to the 'hatred' of nuclear weapons.

Three days after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Nagasaki became the second city attacked with nuclear weapons. In the exhibits of Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, Nagasaki is depicted as 'a shipbuilding center' which 'was surrounded on three sides by mountains and boasting a colorful history of 374 years'. The museum panel 'Nagasaki Before the Atomic Bombing' says that the hypocenter of the A-bomb explosion was in an area of schools, universities, a train station and Urakami Cathedral. After the A-bomb was dropped on August 9, 1945, at 11:02 a.m., the firestorms, the wind blast and the radiation destroyed the Urakami area of the city. As in Hiroshima, the exhibits are hard-hitting. One impressive photograph is of a 'shadow': a person who was leaning against a wall was burned to death and left their 'shadow' on the wall. In a glass closet, a hand bone stuck to a clump of glass tells visitors of the extreme heat released by the explosion that was able to evaporate human flesh and melt glass. All of the exhibits, including the replica of the ruins of Urakami Cathedral, a helmet with the remains of a skull, melted coins and cider bottles, the deformed fragments and photographs of dead bodies convey the power of the A-bomb and the inhuman disaster that Nagasaki suffered. Similar to Hiroshima, Nagasaki's civilians who were killed in the explosion are portrayed as the first victims, and the survivors who experienced the explosion and suffered the after effects of radiation are the second victims.

The museum explains that four Japanese cities, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama and Kokura Arsenal, were selected as the original target, but Nagasaki was chosen by

chance as the target later because of primary target, the Kokura area, was covered by cloud that morning. Considering their dwindling fuel, the B29 crew changed the target to Nagasaki, and on the morning of August 9, 1945, when the clouds over Nagasaki dispersed briefly, the A-bomb was released over the city. The reasons why the U.S. dropped two A-bombs on Japan are not mentioned in the panel exhibits, but in the museum pamphlet three considerations are given: to test the power of the A-bomb, to persuade Japan give up the war, and to gain an advantage over the Soviet Union in the emerging Cold War. Although Nagasaki was chosen as the primary target, it was on the list of potential targets because of its concentration of factories and relatively little damage from previous air raids. These were considered good conditions to test the power of the A-bomb.

In contrast to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the victimhood of Nagasaki's local people is not only attributed in the museum to the Allied military who dropped the A-bomb in Nagasaki. The Japanese military is also portrayed as culpable for having caused the victimhood of both Chinese and Japanese civilians. In the corridor outside the main hall, the panel exhibition 'The War Between China and Japan and the Pacific War' gives a timeline of the Sino-Japanese wars from 1894 to 1945. The introduction of the war concisely lists historical events and turning points, and Japan's aggression and war crimes are recorded on panels. A panel exhibition mentions that Yawata Steel Works was constructed using reparations from the Qing Dynasty after the First Sino-Japanese War, a massacre occurred following Japan's occupation in Nanjing in December of 1937, the Japanese air force bombed Chongqing in February 1938, and Japan carried out the 'Three-Alls Operation' in the North of China in 1940. The war with China is depicted as the '15 years war' from the Mukden Incident of 1931 to the end of the Pacific War in 1945. After Japan started its southern expansion, 'the people of other Asian nations were also dragged into the conflict and victimized in various ways'. In the panel exhibitions, Japan's war conduct in China is recognized as unjust.

The narrative of Japan's nuclear victimhood on the one hand, with Japan's war conduct in China, and on the one hand, suggests that the museum's stance is that pacifism in Nagasaki should rely on a comprehensive understanding of the war, not just a narrative of Nagasaki's nuclear victimhood.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the establishment of various war-related museums was allowed in each social epoch from the 1970s to 2010s. This is because war-related museums in Japan can be established and funded by various actors. The different priorities of the funders determine the content of war exhibits and war narratives presented. While the Japanese government funded the National Museum of Japanese History, the war exhibits and the war narratives in the museum represent Japanese government's official stance. They acknowledge some Japanese war conduct was unjust, but avoid discussing the Japanese government's war responsibility. However, if a war-related museum is funded by a private organization, the war exhibits and the war narratives are determined by its stance and particular interests regarding Japan's war history. For example, Yūshūkan is a part of Yasukuni Shrine, and the shrine's historical role as site for the commemoration of fallen soldiers determines that its war exhibits and war narratives are patriotic and nationalistic. However, as a part of a private university (Meiji University), the Noborito Laboratory Museum displays war exhibits and war narratives from the viewpoint of the university. The Japanese military's war conduct and war responsibility are conveyed to visitors. War-related museum which are funded by prefectural and municipal government, meanwhile, prefer to view war history from a local stance. Local civilians' victimhood in wartime is often portrayed in local war-related museums, and the mutual war responsibilities of Japanese government and Japanese military can be conveyed to visitors on occasions. Since the funders of museums influence museums' war narratives, it maintained the establishments and exhibits of war-related museums are contested and heterogeneous.

Secondly, this chapter concludes that the establishment of war-related museums and war exhibits in the museums correspond with Japan's social context. This chapter has demonstrated that when the Japanese military's war crimes were more acknowledged in both domestic and international environments in the 1980s (triggered by events such as the Ienaga trials and the novel *The Devil's Gluttony* about Unit 731), critical exhibits regarding the Japanese military's war conduct were more likely in Japan's war-related museums. However, the narratives of the Japanese military's war conduct were

repeatedly challenged by nationalist groups, and the renovation of war-related museums could be forced through domestic political pressure. For the new war-related museums, a contested social context led to a variety of stances appearing in museums.

Lastly, current war narratives in Japan's war-related museums reflect the characteristics of current Japanese history textbooks. While the four of 15 junior high school textbooks published between 2012 and 2017 defined Japan's war with China as 'aggression', a small number of local museums, such as the Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Noborito Laboratory Museum and the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum also adopted 'aggression' to define the nature of war. Depictions of the Japanese military's war conduct – including the Nanjing Massacre, the 'comfort women', Unit 731, the Three-Alls Operation, and China's resistance to against Japan – have declined in the 2000s compared to the textbooks published in the 1990s. Mirroring this, current war-related museums in Japan are also seeing a decline in depictions of aggression (Peace Osaka is the particularly clear example) and now only a small number of local war-related museums recognize the Japanese military's war conduct in China are unjust. Moreover, a Japanese high school textbook B304 (published by Jikkyō Shuppan) with more detailed descriptions regarding the Japanese military's war crimes in China had an adoption rate (2015) in the Tokyo area of zero. Similarly, the Kawasaki Peace Museum, which exhibits a number of depictions regarding Japanese military's war conduct in China, had no school tours in 2017. While the uptake and visitor figures of this textbook and museum may not in themselves prove that Japan has shifted towards nationalism in the 2010s, it seems emblematic of the broader shift away from progressive narratives in school textbooks and museums.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

5.1 Arguments and Structure of the Dissertation

Textbook controversies, debates regarding Yasukuni Shrine worship, and the territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands are the core historical issues that have affected Sino-Japanese relations in recent decades. The large-scale anti-Japanese protests which were organized in mainland China from 2003 to 2012 signaled that bilateral relations between China and Japan had dropped to freezing point; but the anti-Japanese protests also highlighted that historical controversies are still sensitive in China because for most of Chinese people, China's national history from the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century is regarded as a 'humiliating and sorrowful past'. While 'never forget the humiliating national history' became a slogan memorized by China's post-war generations, how Japanese people remember their national history, and what war memories Japan's post-war generations embrace are the two questions that inspired me to come to Japan. I have sought to answer them via my academic study and this thesis.

This research started with a theoretical discussion of memory studies. Based on theories of 'collective memory', 'cultural memory' and 'prosthetic memory', all theories of memory studies can be said to share two common arguments: (1) collective memories are socially constructed notions, and (2) collective memories are embodied by cultural entities. Furthermore, collective memory can be modified by the social context, and when the social context changes, collective memory and its cultural representations change accordingly. The analysis in this research, therefore, focuses on two areas: the analysis of social context and the analysis of memory's representations.

Social context, according to Halbwachs (1992), refers to social-related traditions which limit and allow a typical collective memory to be preserved and recollected in a certain social epoch. War memory's representations, according to Seaton (2007), refer to testimonies of the wartime generations and cultural memories of both the wartime and post-war generations. Since the social context contains both Japan's domestic environment and international situation, I have argued that although Japan's domestic environment determines war narratives and war memories, China's diplomacy toward Japan also plays an important role in shaping and re-shaping Japanese people's

historical consciousness. According to the textual analysis of the *People's Daily* (China) and *Asahi Shinbun* (Japan), the first research aim of this dissertation was to unpack what diplomatic policy and newspaper reports say about Japan's historical consciousness of the war.

The second research aim of this dissertation was to clarify the relationships between social context and war memory by tracing the transformation of war narratives. The relationships between social context and testimonies (organic war memories) are considered that testimonies of war conduct and war experience are more easily shared when the testimonies are broadly accordance with the pervasive social context. Progressive testimony is easier in a progressive environment; conservative testimony is easier in a conservative environment. The relationships between social context and cultural memories are focused on how cultural entities are adapted to match the social needs in a certain social epoch. Since the essence of both testimonies (organic war memories) and cultural memories is the 're-narrativization of history', in this research I undertook textual analysis of war narratives as the primary method.

Since both war memories and cultural memories can be represented in textual statements, textbooks and museums were selected as the two subjects for analysis. They are able to embody both 'testimonies' and 'cultural memories' via presenting war narratives. Japan's history textbooks are the first subject of analysis because they contain historians' interpretations of historical evidence, and meanwhile contribute to the receiver's historical consciousness. War-related museums were selected as the second subject of analysis because they are the most suitable site to observe how the financial backers of history at state, local official and private levels view Japan's war history and share those narratives in a memorial space with the visitors. Both history textbooks and museums were also selected because their war narratives involve mostly a significant degree of official involvement.

Consequently, in this dissertation 117 history textbooks which were qualified and published by MEXT between 1972 to 2017 were analyzed. The aim was to trace the transformation over time of war narratives in textbooks and compare the transformation with trends in Sino-Japanese relations. Furthermore, a general survey of 29 war-related museums and a detailed survey based on fieldwork of another eight war-related

museums were undertaken. Similarly, the aim was to trace the transformation of war-related museum exhibits and link the transformation with different social epochs. Based on the analysis of history textbooks and war-related museum, this thesis substantiates some key theoretical elements of memory studies, namely that international situation – especially China’s diplomacy with Japan – acts as an important external force which influences the transformation of Japanese people’s views regarding the war in each social epoch.

In the textbook analysis, this dissertation adopts the spectrum of judgemental war memory (Seaton, 2007) to classify war narratives in different social epochs. In this spectrum, just war theory and the concepts of ‘just/unjust war’ and ‘just/unjust war acts’ are combined to represent the key positions within Japanese war discourses. Progressives assert an ‘unjust war’ and ‘unjust war acts’; people in the progressive-leaning group use the same combination, but give a watered down interpretation of Japanese war responsibility or focus primarily on Japanese victimhood. Conservatives assert a ‘just’ (or justifiable) war but recognized certain acts as ‘unjust’. Nationalists argue both Japan’s aims and war conduct were just. By setting five parameters to judge war narratives, this research argues that ‘the nature of war’ is the first parameter to identify if the war is defined as just or unjust. When ‘aggression’ (*shinryaku*), ‘aggressive attacks’ and ‘aggrieved to’ are used in depictions of the war, the narrative is recognized as progressive or progressive-leaning because the war is depicted as unjust. Similarly, when the other terms (i.e. “advance” or “occupation”) are used to describe Japanese actions, the narrative is identified as more just (justifiable), namely more conservative or progressive.

‘Motivations’, ‘perpetrations’ and ‘Chinese and Japanese victimhood’ are set as the second, third and fourth parameters to identify whether the Japanese military’s war conduct was just or unjust. Specifically speaking, if the Japanese military’s war conduct, including why the Japanese military launched the war, what the Japanese military did in wartime, and what victimhood it caused, are explicitly mentioned in war narratives, the narratives are identified as more progressive because they depict the war conduct as unjust.

5.2 Sino-Japanese Relations and the Results of the Textbook Analysis (1972 to 2017)

Sino-Japanese relations turned to a new page when the Joint Communiqué was signed in 1972. However, in order to give the priority to normalize diplomatic relations, both governments adopted a ‘shelving policy’ in their dealings with historical controversies, including textbook disputes and territorial disputes regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. The ‘shelving policy’ functioned like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it promoted reconciliation between the two countries, but on the other hand, it planted the potential risk of diplomatic confrontations in the future. The ‘shelving policy’ can also be interpreted as a ‘tolerant policy’, in which both countries avoided touching historical controversies with the aim of maintaining the peaceful development of diplomatic relations. During the 1970s, Japanese history textbooks provide the best example of the ‘shelving policy’. When 21 of 24 Japanese junior high school history textbooks defined Japan’s war with China between 1931 and 1945 as an ‘advance’ (*shinshutsu*), the textbooks did not trigger diplomatic confrontations. Rather, they were allowed by the Japanese government and tolerated by the PRC government during that decade. According to the content analysis of the textbooks which were qualified and published in the 1970s, although 87.5% textbooks described the war as an ‘advance’, the depictions of Japanese military’s motivations in launching the Mukden Incident reached 100%. This indicates that war narratives in the 1970s textbooks were more conservative.

The ‘shelving policy’ started to reveal its negative results in the 1980s, but both governments maintained close cooperation to restrict the effects of the textbook controversies in 1982 and 1986, and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s worship at Yasukuni Shrine in 1985. The ‘shelved’ historical controversies came to the surface for various international and domestic reasons. Internationally, the Vietnam War encouraged Japanese civilians to organize anti-war movements. Acknowledgement of the Japanese military’s war conduct broadened in Japanese society, and the Japanese government as well as Japanese citizens started to recognize that the Japanese military’s war conduct in Asia was unjust. Japanese history textbook in the 1980s corresponded to this social context. In 14 of 21 Japanese junior high school history textbooks, Japan’s war with China from 1931 to 1945 was depicted as ‘aggression’, the Japanese military’s

motivations for invading China by causing the Mukden Incident were covered in all 21 textbooks, and 12 textbooks described the atrocities in Nanjing as the ‘Nanjing Massacre’. Narratives of an ‘unjust war’ reached to 66.7%, and narratives of ‘unjust war conduct’ – including depictions of Japanese military’s motivations and Nanjing Massacre – reached 100% and 57.1% respectively. Consequently, war narratives in textbooks from the 1980s can be described as more ‘progressive’.

The transformation of bilateral relations started from the 1990s, when the global structure changed drastically after the end of the Cold War. Both China and Japan started redefined their missions in regional cooperation on both economy and security issues. China enacted the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1992 and claimed that the disputed islands – Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Shotō in Japanese) – belong to China’s Taiwan Province. This ignited Japan’s resistance. In the second half of the 1990s, when the LDP regained power in the Diet, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō’s worship at Yasukuni Shrine, and Tsukurukai’s repeated attacks on Japanese history textbooks as ‘masochistic’ significantly shook the friendly base of Sino-Japanese relations, which were well maintained in the 1970s and 1980s. Although, Japanese historian Ienaga Saburō’s three textbook lawsuits from 1965 to 1997 contributed to textbook editors’ re-consideration of the war, the war narratives regarding the Japanese military’s war conduct in China changed drastically after the 23 junior high school history textbooks that were published between 1990 to 1997. In the 23 textbooks, 21 textbooks (91.3%) defined Japan’s war with China as ‘aggression’. Mentions of the Japanese military’s war conduct in Asia – including the Japanese military’s motivations to launch the Mukden Incident (91.3%), the Nanjing Massacre (91.3%), the Japanese military’s ‘Three-Alls Operation’ in China (52.2%), and the ‘comfort women’ in seven history textbooks – highlighted that the war narratives of history textbooks in the 1990s were more ‘progressive’. Narratives depicting an ‘unjust war’ and ‘unjust war conducts’ were common in the textbooks.

Into the 2000s, Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated following the Ministry of Education’s qualification of the textbook of the JSHTTR in 2001, and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s repeated official worship at Yasukuni Shrine between 2001 and 2006. Along with the large-scale anti-Japanese protests which were organized

in many Chinese cities in 2005, Japanese people's 'positive image toward China' dropped to 15.1% in 2005, while Chinese people's positive image toward Japan dropped to 11.6% (Genron NPO 2017). Japanese politicians' hardline policy in dealing with historical issues and Japanese rightists' targeting of historical education instigated furious resentment in China and considerable debate in Japan. In the 2000s, both the *People's Daily* and *Asahi Shinbun* criticized the Koizumi government's 'irresponsible diplomacy', and Japanese citizens' movements were organized against junior high schools' adoption of the JSHTTR's history textbook. As a result, the adoption rate of the Fusōsha history textbook was only 0.039% in 2001 (Chūō Nippō 2006). Japanese history textbooks during this period saw a decline in progressive content alongside a deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. In 19 junior high school history textbooks, 13 textbooks defined Japan's fought with China as 'aggression', a decline from 91.3% in the 1990s to 68.4% in the 2000s. Depictions of the Japanese military's motivations in launching the Mukden Incident remained at 89.4%, but the Japanese military's other war actions in China declined. Depictions of the Nanjing Massacre dropped from 91.3% in the 1990s to 36.8% in the 2000s, and the depictions of the 'Three-Alls Operation' are declined from 52.2% to 15.8%. In short, war narratives in textbooks in the 2000s were closer to the 'progressive-leaning group'. Narratives regarding Japan's war with China that depicted the wars as 'unjust' were still adopted by most of the textbooks, but the narratives to depict Japan's 'unjust war conduct' declined.

The obstacles between China and Japan in the 2010s focused on the territorial disputes regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. There was a collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese coastguard vessels in September 2010, and the Japanese government's nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in 2012 triggered furious anger among both the PRC government and Chinese civilians. The Chinese government committed diplomatic counter-measures for the first time since the diplomatic normalization in 1972. They suspended all communication above the provincial level in response to the Japanese government's hardline diplomacy in dealing with the territorial disputes. The diplomatic confrontations over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the 2010s not only reflected a collapse of the 'shelving policy', but also revealed both governments' strategies in dealing with the national defense had been

converted. After the diplomatic confrontations in 2012, China announced its ECSADIZ (East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone) in 2013. Japan's Ministry of Defense started to criticize China's maritime activities as the PRC government's 'provocations' to challenge regional security. Accordingly, Japan's Annual White Paper of National Defense from 2013 to 2017 more than once criticized Chinese maritime activities in the waters off the Senkaku Islands saying that they 'infringe upon the freedom of overflight over the high seas' and 'violated Japan's airspace'. While the historical debates over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands expanded into ongoing confrontations between China and Japan regarding their national defensive strategies, mutual understandings between Chinese and Japanese citizens dropped to their lowest point. In 2013, Japanese citizens' with a positive image of China dropped to 9.6%, and Chinese citizens' with a positive image toward Japan dropped to 5.2%. Along with the constant deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations in the 2010s, war narratives in Japanese history textbooks became more nationalistic. In the 15 junior high school history textbooks which were qualified and published between 2012 and 2017, Japan's war with China was defined as an 'occupation' (*senryō*) in nine textbooks (60%), and there were only four textbooks which described the war as 'aggression' (*shinryaku*) (26.7%). The depictions regarding the Japanese military's war conduct in China and Asia, including the motivations of the Mukden Incident, the Nanjing Massacre and the 'Three-Alls Operation', dropped to 53.3%, 20%, and 6.7% respectively. War narratives in history textbooks published between 2012 and 2017 were between 'conservative' and 'nationalist'.

5.3 Results of Museum Analysis

The heterogeneity of war narratives is the first feature observed in the research about war museums. This is because Japanese war-related memories can be funded by either private organizations, local governments or national government. The financial backers of war-related museums greatly influence the stances of the museum regarding national history. While national museums avoided directly criticizing the government's war responsibility, local museums prefer to view Japan's war history from the perspective of local victimhood, although the Japanese military's war responsibility and Japanese

government's war responsibility are also more frequently displayed in local war-related museums.

Secondly, the research confirms that all types of war-related museum were able to be established in each social epoch. Exhibits regarding the Japanese military's war conduct were more encouraged in war-related museums in the 1980s and 1990s, but Japanese civilians' victimhood as well as Japanese soldiers' victimhood were also exhibited in the same period.

Thirdly, along with changes in the social context, the exhibits of already established war-related museums could be adapted accordingly. Conservative politicians exerted pressure on museums with exhibits regarding the Japanese military's war conduct in Asia, and on multiple occasions (particularly in Osaka and Saitama), exhibits were changed during museum renewals. Accordingly, it may be seen that war-related museums in a certain social epoch may be directly affected by the social context.

Although, the establishment of war-related museums and the museum exhibits reflect the diversity of views in Japan, the number of students visiting private and local museums on school trips are quite low. For example, the Noborito Laboratory Museum, with its exhibits regarding the Japanese military's intelligence warfare, only received around 1,200 students in 2017. In the same year, the Kawasaki Peace Museum with its exhibits about the Japanese military's war crimes in the war did not receive any school tours. Japanese schools' avoidance of those museums reflects a similarity with textbooks, namely that while they introduce war narratives that detail the Japanese military's war conducts in Asia, their adoption rates are quite low. This suggests that while nationalist perspectives towards Japan's war history are commonly criticized within Japanese society, progressive perspectives and a focus on the Japanese military's war crimes in Asia can also be avoided in Japanese society as well.

5.4 Conclusion

Historians say that history is a mirror from which we can see the past, learn about the present and predict future. When memory studies become a bridge that connects history on the one side and sociology on the other side, crossing over the bridge between history and sociology is regarded as the primary mission of researchers who are trying

to figure out how the missing parts of history can be reconstructed via collecting the fragments of memories. In the years of study into how Japanese war memories are constructed in post-war era, I have learnt that Japanese war memories and their transformations are entangled with various elements from both domestic politics and international situations. While observing that Japanese war memories are contested, I have tried to extract one or two of those complicated entanglements and through analysis of textbooks and museum contribute to the current academic discourse on war memories in East Asia and Sino-Japanese relations. This study has inevitably excluded other important angles which may provide a different viewpoint for understanding Japanese war memories. Those topics excluded this time will be the subject of future research, and hopefully in the near future I can work towards a more comprehensive survey based on this dissertation that will contribute our understanding of Japanese war memories and Sino-Japanese relations.

Appendix 1. Coding the War Narratives in History Textbooks

A	Aggression, Perpetration (Shinryaku)	V	Domestic Victimhood	F-A	Footnote Mentions 'Attacks'
F	Mentioned in Footnote	x	Not Mentioned	F-A-V	Footnote mentions 'Attacks' and 'Victimhood'
G	Glorified Narrative	Attack	Attack (Kōgeki)	F-N	Footnote Flat Narrative
I	Incident (Jihen/Jiken)	Column	Mentioned in Column	K-M	Konoe government's responsibility prior to Military
K	Konoe Fumimaro government takes responsibility	Ma	Massacre	M-K	Military's responsibility prior to Konoe government
M	Military Headquarters takes responsibility	R1	Narrative of Domestic Japan	R1-C	Japan's Domestic Criticism
N	Flat Narrative	R2	Other Countries	R1-M	Japan's Domestic Motivation
O	Occupation (Senryō)	ReA	Introspective for War Crimes	R2-M	Other's Motivation
Q	Questioned to Victims	ReV	Introspection for Domestic Victimhood	R2-V	Other's Victimhood
S	Shinshutsu (Advance)	A-D	'Attacks' are Diluted	Numbers	Victim Numbers

Appendix 2. Junior High School History Textbooks (1972-2017)

No.	Book Code	Publisher	Nature	Year of Use	the First Sino-Japanese War	The Mukden Incident	The Marco Polo Bridge Incident	Nanjing	Comfort Women	Unit 731	Three Alls Policy	Mass Suicide	A-Bombs	Introspection
1	706	Kyoiku Shuppan	S	1972-1974	R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	K A	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
2	704	Nihon Shoseki	S	1972-1974	R1-M	R1-M R1-M F-A A	N F-A A	x	x/A	x	x	x	V	ReV ReA
3	708	Shimizu Shoin	A	1972-1974	R1-M	R1-M A F-A	A R1-M K A	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
4	701	Gakko Toshio	S	1972-1974	N	R1-M A	K-M	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
5	705	Chukyo Shuppan	S	1972-1974	R1-M	R1-M R1-M A R1-M A	R1-M R1 K-M A	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
6	707	Osaka Shoseki	S/A	1972-1974	R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	K-M A	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
7	703	Tokyo Shoseki	S	1972-1974	N	R1-M A	K A	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
8	702	Teikoku Shoin	S	1972-1974	R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	R1-M R1-M K-M A	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
9	710	Osaka Shoseki	S	1975-1977	R1-M R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	R1-M N A	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV ReA
10	709	Gakko Toshio	S	1975-1977	N	R1-M A	K-M A	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
11	714	Kyoiku Shuppan	S	1975-1977	R1-M	R1-M A R1-M A	R1-M K A	A F-A 42000	x/A	x	x	x	V	ReV ReA
12	712	Nihon Shoseki	S	1975-1977	R1-C R1-M	R1-M R1-M A R1-M A	R1-M N F-N A	F-A 42000	x	x	x	x	V	ReV ReA
13	711	Tokyo Shoseki	S	1975-1977	R1-M	R1-M A	K A	x/A	x/A	x	x	V	V	ReA ReV
14	716	Shimizu Shoin	S	1975-1977	R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	R1-M A K A	x	x/A	x	x	F-V	V	HR ReV
15	713	Chukyo Shuppan	S	1975-1977	R1-M R1-M	R1-M A R1-M A	K-M A	x	x	x	x	x	V	HR ReV
16	715	Teikoku Shoin	S	1975-1977	R1-M R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	M-K A A-D	x	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
17	718	Teikoku Shoin	S	1978-1980	R1-M	R1-M R1-M A R1-M A R1-M A	R1-M K-M A A-D A	x	x	x	x	x	N	ReV
18	719	Kyoiku Shuppan	S	1978-1980	R1-M R1-M R1-M	R1-M A F-A	R1-M R1-M A A-D K	F-A	x/A	x	x	x	F-V	ReV
19	723	Gakko Toshio	S/A	1978-1980	A	R1-M A R1-M A	N A	A	x/A	x	x	V	V	ReV ReA
20	720	Shimizu Shoin	S	1978-1980	R1-M R1-C	R1-M R1-M A	A M-K A	x/A	x	x	x	F-V	V	ReA ReV
21	721	Chukyo Shuppan	S	1978-1980	N	R1-M R1-M A R1-M A	R1-M A K-M A	x/A	x	x	x	x	V	ReV
22	724	Osaka Shoseki	S	1978-1980	R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	A N A	x	x	x	x	V	V	ReV
23	717	Tokyo Shoseki	S	1978-1980	R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	K A A-D	F-A Ma	x/A	x	x	F-V	V	ReA ReV
24	722	Nihon Shoseki	S	1978-1980	R1-M R1-C	R1-M F-A R1-M A	A N F-N A	F-A	x/A	x	x	V	V F-V	ReA ReV

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1	707	Shimizu Shoin	A	1981-1983	R1-M R1-M	R1-M R2 R1-M A	A M A	x	x/A	x	x	x/F-V	V Column	ReV
2	701	Nihon Shoseki	A	1981-1983	R1-M A R1-M R1-C	R1-M R1-M	A N F-N A A-D	x/F-A	x/A	x	x	x/V	F-V	ReA ReV
3	706	Kyoiku Shuppan	S	1981-1983	R1-M R1-M R1-C	R1-M A R1-M A F-N	R1-M F-N A K A-D	A Ma	x/A	x	x	x/V	V	ReV
4	703	Osaka Shoseki	S	1981-1983	R1-M R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	A M A	x	x/A	x	x	x/V	V	ReA
5	704	Chukyo Shuppan	S	1981-1983	R1-M	R1-M A	R1-M A K-M A-D	x/A	x/A	x	x	x	V Column	ReV
6	702	Tokyo Shoseki	S	1981-1983	R1-C R1-M	R1-M A	N A A-D	F-A Ma	x/A	x	x	x/V	V	ReV ReA
7	705	Gakko Toshō	A	1981-1983	R1-M A	R1-M A R1-M A	N A	x/A	x/A	x	A	x/V	V	ReA
8	723	Gakko Toshō	A	1984-1986	R1-M A	R1-M A R1-M A	N A	A Ma 100,000	x/A	x	A	x/V	V	ReA ReV
9	724	Kyoiku Shuppan	A	1984-1986	R1-M R1-M N R1-C R1-M	R1-M N F-A A	R1-M F-N A K	A Ma	x	x	x	F-A	V	ReA ReV
10	719	Nihon Shoseki	A	1984-1986	R1-M R1-C	R1-M R1-M N D A	R1-M A N F-N A A-D	x/F-A	x/A	x	x	x/V	V Column	ReA ReV
11	722	Chukyo Shuppan	A	1984-1986	R1-M R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	A K-M A A-D	x/A	x/A	x	x	x/V	V	ReA ReV
12	720	Tokyo Shoseki	A	1984-1986	R1-C R1-M A R1-C	R1-M A	N A A-D	F-A Ma 200,000-300,000	x/A	x	x	x/V	V	ReV ReA
13	721	Osaka Shoseki	A	1984-1986	R1-M R1-M A R1-C R1-C	R1-M R2 R1-M A	A F-N M-K	F-A Ma	x/A	x	x	x/V	F-V	ReA ReV
14	725	Shimizu Shoin	A	1984-1986	R1-M R1-M A	R1-M R1-M A F-N	R1-M A N	A Column	x/A	x	x	x/V	V Column	ReV ReA
15	728	Tokyo Shoseki	A	1987-1989	R1-C R1-M A R1-C R1-C R1-M R1-M	R1-M A	N A A-D	A F-A Ma 200,000	x/A	x	x	x/A V	V	ReV ReA
16	727	Nihon Shoseki	O	1987-1989	R1-C R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	A F-A M A-D	F-A Ma	x/A	x	F-A	A-V	F-V	ReV
17	729	Osaka Shoseki	A	1987-1989	R1-C R1-C R1-M R1-C	R1-M R1-M A R1-M	A N A A-D	F-A Ma 200,000	x/A	x	F-A	x/V	V Column	ReV ReA
18	730	Chukyo Shuppan	A	1987-1989	R1-M R1-M R1-C	R1-M A	A K-M A-D	F-A Ma 100,000	x/A	x	x	x/V	V Column	ReV
19	731	Gakko Toshō	O	1987-1989	R1-M R1-M R1-M A	R1-M R1-M A	K-M A A	F-A	x/A	x	x	x/V	V Column	ReV
20	732	Kyoiku Shuppan	O	1987-1989	R1-M R1-C R1-M	R1-M A N	R1-M F-A A N A-D	A F-A Ma 200,000-300,000	x	x	x	A	V	ReV ReA
21	733	Shimizu Shoin	A	1987-1989	R1-M A R1-M R1-C R1-M A	R1-M R1-M A	A N A A-D	A Ma	x/A	x	A	x/V	v	ReV ReA

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1	736	Tokyo Shoseki	A	1990-1992	R1-C R1-M A R1-C R1-C	R1-M A	N A A-D	A F-A Ma 200,000	x/A	x	x	A V	V	ReA ReV
2	738	Chukyo Shuppan	A	1990-1992	R1-M R1-C	R1-M A	A M-K A A-D R1-M	A F-A over 100,000	x	x	x	V	V	ReV
3	739	Gakko Toshō	O	1990-1992	R1-C R1-M	R1-M R1-M A	R1-M K-M A	F-A	x/A	x	x	V	V	ReV ReA
4	740	Kyoiku Shuppan	A	1990-1992	R1-M R1-C	R1-M A	R1-M N A A-D	A F-A Ma 200,000	x/A	x	x	A V	V	ReV ReA
5	742	Teikoku Shoin	A	1990-1992	R1-C R1-C	R1-M R1-M A	A R1-M N A	A Ma	x/A	x	x	A V Column	V Column	ReV ReA
6	737	Osaka Shoseki	A	1990-1992	R1-C R1-C R1-M	R1-M R1-M A R1-M	A N	A F-A Ma 200,000	x/A	x	F-A	A V	V Column	ReA ReV
7	741	Shimizu Shoin	A	1990-1992	R1-M R1-C	R1-M R1-M A	R1-M N A	A Ma 100,000	x/A	x	A	V	V Column	ReA ReV
8	735	Nihon Shoseki	A	1990-1992	N A R1-C	R1-M A	A M A-D	F-A Ma 100,000	x/A	x	F-A	A V	F-V	ReV
9	758	Teikoku Shoin	A	1990-1992	R1-C R1-M R1-C	R1-M A	R1-C R1-M A N A-D	A Ma	x/A	x	x	A V Column	V Column	ReA ReV
10	752	Tokyo Shoseki	A	1993-1996	R1-M R1-N R1-C	R1-M A R1-M	R1-M R1-M A A M-K A-D	A Ma 200,000	x/A	x	x	A V	V	ReV ReA
11	751	Nihon Shoseki	A	1993-1996	NA	R1-M A	A M A	A F-A Ma 100,000	x/A	x	F-A	A V	V Column	ReV
12	753	Osaka Shoseki	A	1993-1996	R1-C R1-C R1-M	R1-M A Column	R1-M N A	A F-A Ma 200,000	x/A	x/Gas p.264	F-A	A V	V	ReV ReA
13	754	Chukyo Shuppan	A	1993-1996	A R1-M R1-C	R1-M A A	A M-K A A-D	A F-A 100,000- 200,000	x/A	x	A	A V	R2-M V	ReV
14	755	Gakko Toshō	S	1993-1996	R1-M N V	R1-M A	R1-M M-K A	F/A	x/A	x	x	V	R2 R1 R2 R1	ReV
15	756	Kyoiku Shuppan	A	1993-1996	R1-C R2-V	R1-M M A	F-A A N A-D	A F-A Ma 200,000- 300,000	x/A	x	x	A V	V	ReV ReA
16	757	Shimizu Shoin	A	1993-1996	A R1-M R1-C	R1-M R1-M A	A N A A-D	A Ma 100,000	x/A	x	A	V	V	ReV ReA
17	759	Nihon Shoseki	A	1997-2001	A N	R1-M A	A K	A F-A Ma 200,000	A	x	F-A	A V	V Column	ReA
18	764	Teikoku Shoin	A	1997-2001	R1-C N R1-C	R1-M R1-M A	R1-C R1-M A M	A Ma	A Column	x	x	A V	V	ReA
19	763	Shimizu Shoin	A	1997-2001	R1-M R1-C	R1-M A	A N A	A Ma 100,000	A	x	A	x	V	ReA ReV
20	762	Kyoiku Shuppan	A	1997-2001	R1-M R1-C	A R1-M M	R1-M A N A A-D	A F-A Ma 200,000	A	F-A	F-A	A V	V	ReV ReA
21	761	Osaka Shoseki	A	1997-2001	R1-C R1-C R1-M	A R1-M A Column	A M A	A F-A Ma 200,000	A	x	F-A	A V	V	ReV ReA
22	760	Tokyo Shoseki	A	1997-2001	R1-M R1-M R1-C R1-C	R1-M A	A N A	A Ma 200,000	A	x	x	A V	V	ReA ReV
23	765	Nihon Shoseki	A	1997-2001	R1-C A R1-M R1-C	R1-M A	N A A-D	A F-A Ma 200,000	A	x	F-A	A V	V	ReV ReA

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1	702	Tokyo Shoseki	A	2002-2005	N A V	R1-MA	A N A N	A F-A I and Ma	x/A	x	x	V F-V	F-V	ReV
2	708	Fuso Sha	O	2002-2005	NR2-M	R1-M A R1-M NA	R1-M R1-V N A-R2 N R1-V	I	x/A/G	x	x	V	N	ReV
3	707	Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan	A	2002-2005	N R1-M R1-M R1-C	R1-MA	R1-M R2 N A A A-D	A Ma	x/A	x	x	A V	V	ReV
4	706	Teikoku Shoin	O	2002-2005	N	R1-M A N	R1-M N A A-D	A Ma	R2-V p.206 x/A	x	x	A V Column	V Column	ReV ReA
5	705	Shimizu Shoin	A	2002-2005	N V	R1-MA	A N A	A Column Ma	A Column	x	x	A V F-A	V	ReV
6	704	Kyoiku Shuppan	A	2002-2005	R1-M N R1-C	A R1-MA	R1-M A K A-D	A Ma	x/A	x	x	A V	V	ReV ReA
7	703	Osaka Shoseki	A	2002-2005	R1-M N R1-C	A R1-M R1-MA	R1-M Column K A	A F-A I	x/A	x/Gas p.176	x	A V	V	ReV ReA
8	701	Nihon Shoseki	A	2002-2003	A N	R1-MA	R1-M N A	A F-N I	A Column R2-V	x	F-A	A V	V	ReV ReA
9	701	Nishin Shuppan	A	2004-2005	A N	N A	R1-M N A	A F-N I 200,000	A Column	x	F-A	A V	F-V	ReV
10	710	Osaka Shoseki	A	2006-2008	N	A R2 A F-N R1-MA	R1-M A K	A F-N I	x/A	x	x	A V	V	ReV
11	711	Kyoiku Shuppan	O	2006-2011	R1-M N R1-C A	A F-R1-C	A M A	A F-N I	x/A	x	x	V	V	ReV
12	713	Teikoku Shoin	A	2006-2011	R1-M N	R1-MA	A N R1-M A A-D	A Ma	x/A	x	x	A V Column	F-V	ReV ReA
13	715	Fuso Sha	O	2006-2011	R1-G N R2-A R1-V	R1-MA	R2-A R1-M R1-V N R1-MA	F-N I	G	x	x	V	V	ReV
14	716	Nishin Shuppan	A	2006-2011	R1-M A N	R1-M A K-M	R1-M N A	A I 200,000	R2-V Column x/A	x	F-A	F-A	V	ReV ReA
15	714	Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan	A	2006-2011	R1-M N A R1-C	R1-MA	R1-M N A A-D	A Ma	x/A	x	x	A V	V	ReV
16	709	Tokyo Shoseki	A	2006-2011	N	R1-MA	R1-M A N A	A F-A Ma and I	x/A	x	x	V	F-V	ReV
17	712	Shimizu Shoin	A	2006-2011	N V	R1-MA	A K A	A-Column Ma	x/A	x	x	F-A V	V	ReV
18	710	Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan	O	2009-2011	R1 R2 R1 N R2 LC R2 R1	A R1-M R1-M A	R1-M K A	A F-N I	x/A	x	x	A V F-V	V	ReV ReA
19	717	Jiyu Sha	O	2010-2011	R1-G N V	R1-M R2-A R1-V R2-A R1-MA	R1-M R1-V R1-V A K	F-N I	x/A	x	x	V	V	ReV

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No.	Book Code	Publisher	Nature	Year of Use	the First Sino-Japanese War	The Mukden Incident	The Marco Polo Bridge Incident	Nanjing	Comfort Women	Unit 731	Three Alls Policy	Mass Suicide	A-Bombs	Introspection
1	723	Shimizu Shoin	A	2012-2015	NV	R2-M A	R1-M N A R2-V R1-M A A-D	A F-A Ma	x/A	x	x	V F-A-V	V	ReV ReA
2	724	Teikoku Shoin	O	2012-2015	R1-M A N F-A	A R1-M M	A N A N A-D	A Ma	x/A	x	x	A-V Column	V	ReV ReA
3	728	Ikuho Sha	O	2012-2015	R1-M N	R2-M R1-M A N R1-M A	R1-V R1-V A K	F-A I	x/A/G	x	x	V	V	ReV
4	727	Jiyu Sha	O	2012-2015	R1-G R2 N V	A K-M R2-C	R1-M R2 K V-R1- M A	F-A I	x/A	x	x	V	V	ReV
5	721	Tokyo Shosoki	A	2012-2015	NV	R1-M A	R1-M A N A	A F-A Column p.227 I and Ma	x/A	x	x	A V	R1 R2 R1	ReV
6	725	Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan	O	2012-2015	N R1-C	A R1-M A	F-R1-M N R1-M A	A F-A I	x/A	x	x	A V F-V	F-V	ReV ReA
7	722	Kyoiku Shuppan	O	2012-2015	N V R1-C	R1-M A A	N A A	F-A I	x/A	x	x	A V	V	ReV ReA
8	730	Kyoiku Shuppan	O	2016-	R1-M N V R1- C R1-M M	R1-M A R1-M A V	R1-M N A F-A M	A F-A I	x/A	x	x	A F-A	V-Column	Senkaku ReV ReA
9	738	Gakushu Sha	A	2016-	A N R1-C	A R1-C Column	A N V A	A M-R1-A I	A	x	A-Column	A	Column V	ReV Senkaku Re
10	729	Tokyo Shosoki	Attack	2016-	R1-M N V	A	A F-A M A	A F-A I and Ma	x/A	x	x	A	V-Column	ReA-Bomb p.230- 233
11	731	Shimizu Shoin	A	2016-	R1-M N	A	R1-M N A A-DA	A F-A Ma	x/A/G	x	x	F-A	V	ReV ReA
12	732	Teikoku Shoin	Attack	2016-	N R2 V	A R1-M	A N A A-D	A F-A I	x/A/	x	x	A-V- Column	V	ReV Senkaku
13	733	Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan	O	2016-	NV	R1-M A	R1-M N A	A F-A I	x/A	x	x	A F-V Column	V	Re ReV ReA
14	735	Ikuho Sha	O	2016-	G N V	A R1 A	N V A	F-A I	x/A	x	x	x	V	Re ReV
15	737	Jiyu Sha	O	2016-	G N V	V A N A	R1-M V K F-R2-V A	x	x/A	x	x	x	N	Re-V

Appendix 3. Senior High School History Textbooks (2014-2017)

No	Publisher	Date of Publishing	Nature of War	Atrocities in Nanjing	Comfort Women	Unit 731	Three-Alls Operation	Mass Suicide Okinawa	Adoption Rate 2015
1	Tokyo Shoseki A301	20140210	A	I	o	o	o	o	34
2	Jikkyō Shuppan A302	20140125	A	M	o	o	o	o	0
3	Yamakawa Shuppan A303	20140305	O	I	o	x	x	x	14
4	Daiichi Gakushūsha A304	20140210	A	M	x	o	o	o	52
5	Jikkyō Shuppan A305	20140125	A	M	o	o	o	o	13
6	Shumizu Shoin A306	20140125	A	M	o	x	o	o	19
7	Yamakawa Shuppan A307	20140305	S	I	o	x	x	o	19
8	Yamakawa Shuppan B301	20140305	S	I	o	o	o	x	111
9	Meiseisha B302	20140303	Benefit	I	x	x	x	x	0
10	Tokyo Shoseki B303	20140210	A	I	o	o	o	o	25
11	Jikkyō Shuppan B304	20140125	A	M	o	o	o	o	0

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No	Publisher	Date of Publishing	Nature of War	Atrocities in Nanjing	Comfort Women	Unit 731	Three-Alls Operation	Mass Suicide Okinawa	Adoption Rate 2015
12	Jikkyō Shuppan B305	20140125	A	M	x	o	o	o	7
13	Shimizu Shoin B306	20140125	S	I	x	x	x	o	8
14	Yamakawa Shuppan B307	20140305	S	M	o	x	x	o	3
15	Yamakawa Shuppan B308	20140305	O	I	x	x	x	x	7

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