

# The Spread of “Made in China” Islamic Goods in the Era of “Sinicization of Religions” and Globalization

Masumi Matsumoto

## Introduction

China and the United States (US), the two major global powers, have been competing for both economic and military supremacy for some time. In particular, China’s overwhelming economic power and foreign investments have made the world economy dependent on it. As part of the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” railroads that cross the Eurasian continent and reach Europe have dramatically lowered transportation costs and greatly increased its volume. This complete transportation network, together with the development of apps and payment methods, such as AliExpress, Amazon, and Wish, has played a role in expanding the range of “Made in China” products worldwide. Many of these products include Islamic religious goods and clothing (Islamic goods) for the Islamic world.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, however, China has placed religion under the strict control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under its policy of “Sinicization of Religions” for the domestic arena. Openness to the outside world and the control of the inside, at a glance, contradict each other. How was the massive outward diffusion of goods under globalization reconciled, if ever, with the strengthening of people’s spiritual control in China in the Xi Jinping (1953–, Chairman 2013–) administration? In this paper, I will examine cases of Islamic goods by exploring data from fieldwork and interviews, as well as analyzing data on the purchase history of the Alibaba app.

## 1. The Tangled Relationship Between the CCP and Religion

### 1.1. A Brief History up to the Hu Jintao Era (Chairman 2003–2013)

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been a socialist regime since it seized



power in 1949. Since then, it has maintained its advocacy of atheism and materialism.

In the concept of a people’s democratic dictatorship, the judiciary, executive, and legislature are under the “leadership” of the CCP, which controls everything. Based on the legal theory that there are no rights for enemies of the people, the concept of the “natural rights of human beings” is also not accepted (Wang 2002: 11–12). It should be noted that although universal values, such as human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and freedom are essentially the same, their meanings are different in China.

Next, we will consider the Constitution’s “religion” section, which is relevant to this discussion. In Article 36, freedom of religious belief is declared as follows:

**Article 36:** Citizens of the People’s Republic of China shall enjoy freedom of religious belief.

No state organ, social organization, or individual shall coerce citizens to believe in or not to believe in any religion, nor shall they discriminate against citizens who believe in or do not believe in any religion<sup>2</sup>.

The state shall protect normal religious activities. No one shall use religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the state’s education system.

Religious groups and religious affairs shall not be subject to control by foreign forces (underlined by the author for emphasis).

It is possible for religious beliefs to be manipulated or influenced by foreign forces, resulting in religions and their adherents being regarded as “potentially dangerous” to the regime. The state only permits “normal” religious activities. Since the establishment of the PRC, religious forces have always been under the supervision and guidance of the atheist CCP. In general, religious practices have been placed under severe restrictions since 1949 (Marsh 2011: 148–182).

The marginalization of religious was justified based on the social evolutionary theory that “atheism is scientific, civilized, and progressive, while religion is opium, superstitious, and irrational, and should be extinguished” (Zhu 2018:7). This is, of course, a continuation of Marx’s statement that “religion is opium.” In China, during the anti-religion campaign of the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, religions were considered a part of class struggle, and their followers were regarded as anti-revolutionary. As a result, the accumulation and transmission of religious

knowledge has stagnated for approximately 20 years.

After the initiation of the Reform and Open Policy in 1979, the restrictions on religion were gradually relaxed. Religious institutions were rebuilt in various communities, and worship and participation in religious events became more frequent during the Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao administrations. People began attending religious schools and developing religious identities.

## 1.2. The Xi Jinping Administration and Its Policy Toward Religions

This has changed drastically with the current Xi Jinping administration (2012 to present). President Xi has inherited the fundamentalist ideology of the Maoist era, which viewed religious forces as foreign conspiracies or hostile to the principle of a one-party dictatorship. Since 2015, his administration has been pushing the policy of “Sinicization of Religion” since approximately the same time as the beginning of the BRI. Thus, religions became regarded as “risks” to the national security of CCP’s dominance because they might lead to extremism and terrorism, which will destroy societal stability (Vermander 2019: 6–23, Matsumoto 2020: 45–49).

Religion is recognized as a solitary value outside the CCP’s recommended values, which include nationalism, party dictatorship, loyalty to the top, blind obedience to a recommended historical view, morality, and respect for economic values.

The CCP has strengthened surveillance over religious groups and places of activity. Since around 2018, there has been a ban on Islamic and Arabic schools, children entering mosque premises, summer camps for learning Arabic, kindergartens teaching Arabic, hijabs in public spaces, the destruction and “modification” of Arab-style onion-shaped domes, and the installation of multiple surveillance cameras in mosques.<sup>3</sup>

There have been multiple orders to install multiple surveillance cameras in mosques and ban outsiders from entering, and to remove Arabic script from public view (including halal-certified Arabic script) under the claim that it could be misinterpreted as a “terrorist” script. As such, halal certification is no longer in effect. This led to the destruction of mosques and Arabic ornaments in the northwest. Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the capitol city of Yinchuan, had been “uplifting” Arabic and Islamic characters. For example, Middle Eastern-style monuments in the center of

Yinchuan called "Zhong'A zhi zhou" (the Axis of China and Arab cultures) used to be famous for their exotic character and attracted tourists not only from China but also from the Middle East. However, it was destroyed for reconstruction in 2018.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, clerics were forced to become more patriotic, and those who stood against the Sinicization policy were subject to observation or arrest as "terrorist" reservists.

The interpretation of socialism with Chinese characteristics is that those who believe in religion are "uncivilized" and "unpatriotic," and such people must become atheists and patriots. According to their discourse, the long struggle toward atheism will last forever, like a perpetual revolution.

## **2. The Reform and Open Policy and the Construction of the Transcontinental Railroad**

Since Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Open Policy (1979), the state capitalist system has spread in the name of socialism. In 2010, China surpassed Japan's gross domestic product (GDP), which is now about three times that of Japan. Furthermore, China has begun to change its course from its traditional export-oriented style as the "world's factory" to a country capable of manufacturing high-end products through high-tech improvements and huge budgets.

The BRI Initiative as a global economic strategy has also been formulated in 2013.<sup>5</sup> In fact, the transcontinental railroad between China and Western Europe has been in operation since 2017 (Lim 2016: 113–131). In the same year, railroad containers operated from Yiwu in Zhejiang to Madrid, Milan, and London, including Central Asian countries along the route. This has given China a dominant global position with respect to product supply. In July 2020, even amid the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, 11,220 containers and 133 flights<sup>6</sup> were dispatched to Madrid in six months.<sup>6</sup>

Considering that the entire world complained of shortages of medical masks and disinfectant hygiene products in the spring of 2020, Chinese products quickly dominated the global market. It can be said that this transcontinental railroad was the Green Line that beat COVID-19. The presence of a dedicated line for China Post makes purchases easier for individual customers worldwide through applications such as AliExpress. This is discussed in greater depth below.

Because of China's innovation in railway transportation, it now only takes 12 days to reach Warsaw, 15 to Hamburg, 23–24 to London via Duisburg, and 18 to

Moscow. Furthermore, the cost is about twice that of shipping and about half the price of air transportation, roughly halfway between shipping and air transportation. Time is also reduced by 40–50% compared to the sea route. This is a route that will be welcomed by customers who want to quickly purchase inexpensive but relatively high-quality goods from China. Hence, some commentators say that the transcontinental railroad is becoming a political weapon to assist China.<sup>7</sup>

It is interesting to note that the inland port, Yiwu in Zhejiang Province, is the starting point for the transcontinental railroad. Yiwu is a major center of so-called “small goods,” or commodities made in China. The city began to develop around 2000 and has grown rapidly, attracting many people from across the globe.

### 3. Yiwu, a City of Islamic Goods in the 2000s

#### 3.1. The City of Muslims, Yiwu

I visited the City of Yiwu three times in 2007, 2009, and 2010, and interviewed Muslims from China as well as the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. The reason for this visit was that in 2005 and 2006, when I visited an Islamic school in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and talked to the staff, I overheard them say, “Nowadays, everyone goes to Yiwu as an Arabic interpreter to earn money.”

Many Arabic or Islamic schools in Ningxia were built after the Reform and Open policy to revive Muslim traditions and beliefs that had been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, funded by the donations of local pious Muslims. Most of the schools taught boys and girls separately, and the curricula focused on the Arabic language, Qur’an recitation, theology, faith, and Arabic calligraphy. Many students entered them after graduating from primary or secondary schools. These schools were originally established to train religious leaders (*ahong*) and teachers for this type of school, but instead, the students were going to Yiwu to work as interpreters for Arabic-speaking Middle Eastern merchants buying Chinese products. This was a time when there were no interpreter apps, no Alibaba, and no transcontinental railroad.

At that time, cheap and mass-produced Chinese commodities were taking over the world, overwhelming small-scale cottage industries around the world in terms of price and quantity. The Islamic world was no exception, and in the 2000s, many international Muslim merchants took the high-speed train from Shanghai’s Pudong Airport to Yiwu. In particular, the emerging inland port of Yiwu, where rents were

cheaper than in the special economic zones of Shenzhen and Guangzhou, became a place where Muslim merchants from China and the rest of the world gathered to do business (Simphendorpher 2009: 111–112; Belguidoum and Pliez 2015).<sup>8</sup> The Yiwu International Trade City (*Futian Market*) was then, and still is, the largest wholesale market and the permanent trade center in the world.

Muslim merchants from all over the world purchased a wide range of daily commodities in Yiwu. In addition to diapers, mosquito nets, tableware, spoons, and other utensils, socks, and shoes, there were also many products for Muslims (Islamic goods in this paper). Aside from electronic Qur’ans, prayer mats, appliances that point out the direction of Makkah, Arabic tea sets, Arabic electronic bulletin boards, wall hangings with Qur’anic verses, decorative clocks with the face of Ali for Shiites, belly dancing costumes, and an overwhelming selection of Muslim costumes and accessories can also be found in the city. There were also a variety of hijabs, headscarves, burqa, long-dresses, and Muslim caps. The city had several thousand Arab merchants from Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Algeria. Some had permanent residential permits, while others stayed for a limited time. In the city, there were trilingual road signs in English, Chinese, and Arabic.

The domestic apparel manufacturers run by Hui-Muslims showed overwhelming strength in planning, manufacturing, and exporting clothing to Muslim customers around the world. They were sincerely involved in manufacturing and export trade as an expression of their faith. Muslim merchants also tended to buy from Hui-Muslim merchants rather than Han Chinese merchants, because of the commercial ethic of sincerity and credibility expressed in the phrase “Muslims do not lie because they will see each other in heaven after death” (Matsumoto 2010b). At the time, Hui-Muslims used to be perceived as “model minority” in Chinese society (Gonul and Rogenhofer 2019: 29–64).

There were also many Hui-Muslim migrants among the emerging business owners in Yiwu. Such Muslims from Ningxia, Shaanxi, Xinjiang, Yunnan, and Henan, among others, aimed to conduct “Muslim-like” business. They were fluent in Han Chinese and Arabic, and many had high professional ethics based on religious faith. Another important factor was that global manufacturing was dependent on China, which was able to meet the increasing needs of Muslim countries.

For example, at the “A” International Trading Corporation, the president was Mr. X – a cleric and senior CCP cadre. His company exported clothing and kitchen

utensils. Its customers included 30 countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, including the US, Brazil, Tunisia, and Algeria.<sup>9</sup> CCTV even aired a documentary on him,<sup>10</sup> focusing on his background of Islamic education and his trustworthy personality based on Islamic faith.

“B” Clothing Co., Ltd. was manufacturing and selling Islamic clothing for the Islamic world.<sup>11</sup> This company was founded in Yiwu in 2005 when its president, Mr. Y from Henan Province, started the business from scratch. He set up the first factory in Yiwu when he was only 23 years old. His company ran a good business and built clothing factories in his hometown in Henan. As of 2021, his company employed more than 300 workers in the countryside of Henan.<sup>12</sup> According to the company website, it has a registered capital of 10 million RMB (about US \$1.5 million) and sells clothing to Europe, the US, Malaysia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and others.<sup>13</sup> Because of the construction of the clothing factories and the contribution of the improvement of the economic situation in the Muslim areas in Henan, Mr. Y was elected as one of the Henan delegates of the People’s Congress<sup>14</sup>.

The Hui-Muslim businesspeople I met in Yiwu confessed that the pious faith in Islam was the main reason for their commercial success prior to 2010. They believed their economic success to have been achieved through honesty and integrity rooted in religious beliefs (Matsumoto 2010a: 22–27).

There were several thousand Arabic interpreters in the Yiwu International Trade City, who were either graduates of Arabic or Islamic schools in Ningxia, Henan, Yunnan, or Qinghai, among others, or had studied in the Arabic or Islamic world. In mid-2000–2010, the Ningxia regional government initiated the activity to send such interpreters to major international commercial cities in the coastal regions as a measure to combat and eliminate poverty. Ningxia used to be notorious for its high poverty and illiteracy rate linked to its dry weather, barren land, lack of industries, and people living in remote mountainous areas.

### **3.2. A Brief History of Arabic and Islamic Schools and Their Conversion to Vocational Schools**

Many of the Muslim interpreters studied at Arabic and Islamic schools that were established in northwest China (Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, etc.) where many Hui Muslims live. One representative schools was Linxia Zhong’a School in Gansu,



which was also known as the “Little Mecca of China.” In Linxia, where half of the population was Muslim, mosques and tombs of *Sufi* saints had been destroyed during the anti-religious campaign and the Cultural Revolution, and Arabic and Islamic schools remained closed for 20 years. In order to revive Islam, Hui-Muslims in Linxia joined hands to establish an Arabic and Islamic school, the Linxia Zhong’a School, in the 1980s, which made great progress in the 1990s and trained many male and female Islamic scholars, religious leaders, and teachers of Islamic schools. Many of them went abroad to study Islamic institutes after graduation.

Linxia Zhong’a School changed its name to Linxia Foreign Language School and became secularized in the late 2000s under the curriculum controlled by the CCP. For some years, male teachers and students could wear Muslim caps, and female teachers and students could wear hijabs. However, with the implementation of the Sinicization policy, Islamic dress was marginalized, and the school was converted to a vocational training school in the late 2010s.

All of the entrance examinees are required to be patriotic, law-abiding men with no criminal record.<sup>15</sup> Religious education, including the study of the Qur’an and the *Hadith*, has been transformed into vocational education and entrepreneurship education. “Improving the qualities of Hui-Muslims” has become not a matter of being religiously devout, but of increasing one’s productive capacity and boasting of one’s wealth, which will contribute to China’s economic growth and power.

In such an environment, even though commercial activities are encouraged, Hui-Muslims are discouraged from expressing their religious beliefs through their activities.

#### **4. Alibaba, Exporting Islamic Goods with a Big Breakthrough in AI Translation, Transcontinental Railway, and IT Transactions**

In 2020–2021, China was minimizing COVID-19 deaths through polymerase chain reaction testing, quarantine, lockdown, vaccines, closing the country borders, and other measures. International mail order systems using smartphone apps, such as AliExpress and Banggood, attracted attention in this time. The transcontinental railroad continues to send large quantities of goods westward. What is relevant to this paper is the large amount of Islamic goods brought about by the railway. It is a fact that Islamic goods made in China dominate the world market. The representative was Yiwu



International Trade City, where manufacturers all over China sell large quantities of commodities wholesale.<sup>16</sup> According to Nara, Yiwu’s economic supremacy over China’s wholesale market declined gradually after the 2008 global financial crisis (Nara 2020: 107). Moreover, the pandemic in 2020 and 2021 affected the face-to-face commercial services in Yiwu. As an alternative, online shopping platforms such as AliExpress and Banggood send products to individual customers worldwide. Let us analyze the trends of several Islamic clothes for women which are on sale on the AliEpress App.

A product called “Women’s Muslim Hijab, Jersey, Solid Color, Adjustable” (Item No. 1), which costs only US 2.99 dollars, had 1347 purchases (August 20, 2021) and 244 reviews.<sup>17</sup>





Figure 1-1. Country chart of consumers who bought a US \$2.99 hijab.



Figure 1-2. A sample of Item No.1.

Figure 1-1 shows where the viewers were from and how many people wrote reviews for the US \$2.99 hijab with fourteen color variations which was sold at AliExpress. This shows that the item (Figure 1-2) is mostly targeted at Muslim women in “Western” countries such as France, the United Kingdom (UK), the US, and Spain.

Another headband long hijab (Item No. 2, Figure 2-2) covers the chest and has 11 color variations. It priced at US \$2.55 and modeled by a mannequin. It is supposed to be related to fashion trends from the Islamic world but has 225 reviews and is favored by nearly half of French customers.<sup>18</sup>



**Figure 2-1.** Country chart of consumers who bought an inexpensive headband hijab which covers the chest (Item No.2).




**Figure 2-2.** A sample of the Item No. 2.

Figure 2-1 shows that the countries and numbers of reviewers who bought the US \$2.55 headband hijab (Item No.2), which covers the chest.

The countries of buyers vary depending on fashion trends, but these Islamic costumes are generally favored in Europe, Central Asia, the US, and Australia. Figures 1 and 2 show that France has the most frequent buyers of inexpensive hijabs sold at AliExpress. In general, it takes approximately three weeks from the time of order for the product to be delivered. They are sent to customers via transcontinental railroads and mail services. The delivery fee is always reasonable (either free of charge or US\$7). It is common for comments showing a high level of satisfaction to appear at the top of the list on the product due to the nature of AI, but the design, price, speed of arrival, packaging, and other considerations are generally satisfactory as shown by the customers' posting of selfies.

The third case is an Islamic dress in the abaya style with a price of US \$25.25 (Item No.3). This product had 1162 orders and 375 reviews. France accounted for 49% of all reviewers.<sup>19</sup>



**Figure 3-1.** Country chart of consumers who bought a mid-range long abaya dress.



**Figure 3-2.** A sample of a mid-range long Abaya dress (Item No.3).

This mid-range long Abaya dress is also popular in France, the US, and the UK. The reasons for this popularity and competitiveness may include not only low prices, rapid delivery, ease of searching, acceptance of payment by credit cards, and catching up with the latest trends, but also the ability to receive goods by mail to a private home without having to go out. In most of the places where the customers exist Muslims in Europe, the UK, and Australia are descendants of immigrants and remain as a minority in their societies. For these vulnerable Muslim communities, which are sometimes the target of intense Islamophobia from the majority, this method of ordering at home by smartphones and receiving the goods a few weeks later at the door seems to be ideal and easy, since it allows young women to ensure their security. Avoiding going out and lockdowns during the pandemic period affected customers’ desires to purchase inexpensive goods at home.

Not only Hui-Muslim-owned textile companies but also Han Chinese-owned companies produce Islamic goods. The share of textile and apparel products made in China reached a global average of 31.6% in 2020.<sup>20</sup>

Even though China restricts the use of religious goods for domestic use, it continues to take the position of supremacy in exporting commodities in terms of the share in the world. For example, 83% of Christmas ornaments and 70% of Christmas tree lighting in the world are also made in China.<sup>21</sup> It is natural to think that

manufacturers' beliefs and faith are irrelevant to the products they sell.

However, exceptionally, Hui-Muslim entrepreneurs are still planning, producing, and exporting Islamic goods. For example, "the China Islam and National Series of Articles Company" was established by a Hui-Muslim in Yiwu in 1999 and is a relatively small company with less than 500 employees dealing with goods for the Islamic world. The annual sales amount ranges from US \$10 to 50 million.<sup>22</sup> "Luohe Tasmiah Muslim Fashion Co., Ltd," located in Luohe, Henan, whose company motto is "Serve Muslim Ummah,"<sup>23</sup> exports clothes relating to Muslim fashion to 24 countries. Products include hijab, abaya, shawl and so on. Its manager is Mr. Yusof Guo Shutao, a graduate of the International Islamic University in Malaysia.

In fact, Han Chinese managers who tend to have prejudice toward Muslims do not seem to actively handle Islamic goods. The religious prohibition on Muslims' consumption of pork has not been understood by the Han Chinese. Muslims in China have often experienced prejudice from the Han Chinese, who have no dietary restrictions and sometimes believe that Muslims do not eat pork because pigs are their ancestors.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, Islamophobia was intentionally spread in China after September 11, 2001, and the Sinicization of Religions of the Xi Jinping administration affect Han Chinese, who tend to think that religions are "dangerous" and taboo in Chinese society. In fact, Han Chinese people's fear of religion will work in the Hui-Muslim entrepreneurs' favor, as they have priority in terms of planning, producing, and exporting Islamic goods to Islamic countries and Muslim customers across the world, taking advantage of the BRI. Some Hui-Muslim entrepreneurs wish to develop Islamic culture by producing and selling Islamic clothes (Matsumoto 2010a: 22–26, Nara 2020: 116).

## 5. The God of Materialism Blesses Islamic Goods

Encouraging "capitalism" as a part of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the CCP and local CCP committees continue a business pattern that encourages international Muslim merchants to do business in China and promote the production and export of Islamic goods by the joint venture by international and domestic Muslims. Apparently, the oppression of religion and the COVID-19 pandemic has made it difficult for many of them to show their faith and conduct face-to-face business based on trust in human relations as they used to do.

The BRI has been established for economic prosperity within the area (Bianchi 2019: 150–158). For developed and developing countries, China has established an economic interdependence that says “China-free is unthinkable” and is unable to speak out against China’s “human rights violation.” This means that the BRI allowed countries to turn a blind eye to what is happening in China (Doğan 2021: 111–115).

China, which advocates atheism and dominates the world’s manufacturing of goods with its inexpensive labor cost, will lead the world. Hui-Muslim merchants will also dominate the production and export of Islamic goods to the outer world, even though it is difficult to express faith due to pressure from the government. The behavior of trading and producing Islamic goods depends on transnational/transethnic human relations in Yiwu, which includes Arab merchants, Hui-Muslim migrants, and Han Chinese migrants who work as low-cost workers (Nara 2020: 107–108).

Except for the fact that the demand for Islamic goods is expected to increase in the future due to the growing Muslim population, the material dominance of China, with its abundant capital power and inexpensive labor cost, will be strengthened for some time to come in the era of neoliberalism, where the rule of the weak and the strong will prevail. In this sense, the Anthropocene is coming, where Islamic goods produced in an atheistic country will cover the world and Muslims will have no doubts about using Islamic goods manufactured by unbelievers.

## **Conclusion**

In this paper, I have shown that China has been tightening restrictions on religion domestically since 2015 under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. A socialist country, such as China, never allows freedom of religion due to the principle of atheism. In contrast, it has been planning, manufacturing, and exporting many Islamic goods externally since the 2000s from coastal cities such as Yiwu and Guangzhou. Yiwu attracted many Muslim merchants from all over the world, including the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. I have also shown that the development of apps such as AliExpress and the transcontinental railroad has accelerated the trend of exporting commodities for Muslims all over the world. Inexpensive prices, fast delivery, and the ease of receiving goods at home by mail are predictive of this trend’s future growth.

At present, the suppression of religions in the name of Sinicization has put a

strain on the promotion of Islam in China, but Hui-Muslims' commercial activities with Muslims all over the world will not stop if there is supply and demand and the supremacy of the Chinese economy in the world.

There are limitations to this study, as I was not able to visit China and conduct face-to-face interviews with Hui-Muslim merchants, partly because of the COVID-19 pandemic and partly because of the increasing sensitivity around the study of religion and religious identity in China. Furthermore, taking questionnaires on religion by foreign scholars is not allowed for the moment. Not only the author but also others outside China fear that Hui-Muslims' contacts with foreign scholars might affect the people concerned. In this regard, there is no doubt that the contradiction between religion and materialism is putting Muslims in China under severe strain in this globalized society where affordable products made in China dominate the Muslim-oriented global market.

## Notes

- 1 "China's share of global apparel export value reached 31.6% in 2020." In *Statista* (<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1204141/china-share-of-global-clothing-exports/>, accessed Oct 7, 2021).
- 2 "Constitution" in *The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China* ([http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node\\_2825.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm), accessed Oct 2, 2021).
- 3 "China is removing domes from mosques as part of a push to make them more 'Chinese' ." In *npr* (<https://www.npr.org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization?fbclid=IwAR2aDQWmAdh26Ng8aSfCD3OzaOuGMd7HrxswULPiQR9t6SxaWKfT2LFx2og>, accessed Oct. 26, 2021).
- 4 The following statement is on the following website as the reason for this reconstruction:  
 "The reconstruction of China-Arab Axis is only the first step to block the de-Sinicization movement in provinces in the Northwest. We know that the road ahead will not be an easy one and there will be bumps and storms. But the Northwest is the place where our ancestors lived and the Yellow Emperor, the founder of the Chinese civilization, was born. Meng Tian 蒙恬 stopped the barbarians, and Wei Qing 卫青 and Huo Qubing 霍去病 led the troops to the north to conquer the Xiongnu 匈奴. Countless sons of the Han family blood stained this land to protect the land. Loyal souls linger, and a history of a thousand years never die! We must tell that our Chinese homeland shouldn't be polluted! We will not let aliens say something! And we will never allow doves to occupy the nests of magpies!"  
 This statement, which shows that the destruction was authorized by intense Han Chinese



ethno-nationalism based on blood relations and so-called hate speech toward alien Muslims, appeared on the website on March 20, 2018. The site has not been erased so far (Jan. 6 2022), even though it is very common for websites to be erased by the order of the authorities. The word "polluted" implies that the existence of Muslims in this country causes great trouble and the representation of Arab style is anti-Chinese culture.

"Ningxia zhenggai 'Zhong-a zhi zhou' ! Zheshi Zhongguo de tudi, jingamen, gun!" (Ningxia reconstructed (and destructed) the Axis of China and Arab cultures! This is China's land. Get out from here, those followers of Arabic cultures!) (「寧夏整改「中阿之軸」！這是中國的土地、精阿們、滾！」) *Zhonghua zhi ying* 001 (<http://read01.com/5Mo0Ljz.html>, accessed Oct.7, 2021).

- 5 Andrew Chaszky and James McBride. "China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative." In Council on Foreign Relations (<https://www.cfr.org/background/chnas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>, accessed on August 20, 2021).
- 6 "China Post Special Train—A New Route of Madrid-Yiwu Train Has Launched." In *MySourceify.com* (<https://mysourceify.com/china-post-special-train-a-new-route-of-madrid-yiwu-trainfrom-yiwu-to-vilnius-has-launched/>, accessed Oct.7, 2021).
- 7 "In the China-Europe Express becoming a political weapon in the hands of China?" In *RailFreight.com* (<https://www.railfreight.com/beltandroad/2021/08/25/is-the-china-europe-express-becoming-a-political-weapon-in-the-hands-of-china/>, accessed Oct.7, 2021).
- 8 "Kyodai oroshiuri ichiba Yiwu shin shirukuroodo no kitenni" (Yiwu, a big wholesale market, became a starting point of the New Silk Road) (「巨大卸売り市場義烏 新シルクロードの起点に」). In *Renmin Zhongguo* ([http://www.peopleschina.com/jingji/2008-04/29/content\\_113439.htm](http://www.peopleschina.com/jingji/2008-04/29/content_113439.htm), accessed on August 27, 2021).
- 9 "Haocheng Xiaolianheguo de Yiwu, Alaboyu dui qiyouhe yingxiang?" (Yiwu is called a small United Nations. What is the influence of Arabic language there?) (号称小聯合國的義烏、阿拉伯語對其有何影響?) In *Aichide Senlin*, 2018 (<https://page.om.qq.com/page/O6qMY5pmltKjAiVmgOCGPoVA0>, accessed on August 27, 2021).
- 10 Ma Junhai zai Yiwu (Ma Junhai in Yiwu 馬俊海在義烏, <https://v.qq.com/x/page/r0531q128t0.html>, accessed on August 27, 2021).
- 11 *Ansarer guoji maoyi youxian gongsi* (安薩爾國際貿易有限公司, <http://www.11467.com/yiwu/co/13555.htm#contact>, accessed on August 27, 2021).
- 12 *Ansarer guoji maoyi youxian gongsi* (安薩爾國際貿易有限公司, <http://www.11467.com/yiwu/co/13555.htm#contact> accessed on August 27, 2021).
- 13 *Zhejiang Yijiang Fushi youxian gongsi* (浙江義江服飾有限公司, <http://1688yijiang.cn.gongxuku.com/introduce/>, accessed on August 27, 2021).
- 14 "Henan lianghui weifanwentan, Henansheng renda daibiao Wang Chaoyin: Cun jitiqiantou fupin chejian zhenzheng chengwei nongmin qiandaizi." (During the People's Representative Council of Henan, we met Henan's representative Wang Chaoyin. He led the whole village people, built factories for poverty alleviation and gave farmers big purses with money 河南兩會、微訪問談、河南省人大代表王朝印、村集体牽頭 扶貧車間 真正成為農民“錢袋子”。" In *Dahewang* (<https://news.dahe.cn/2020/01-13/578559.html?fbclid=>

IwAR29FGyBfKPH7TPrUd85vJQz2TibLKom09oLHC7kHaUei-LmmgC0HEmS2oM, accessed on August 27, 2021).

Be00cause of the sensitiveness of the word “Islam” under the Xi Jinping regime, his ethnicity and religion are not emphasized in the article above.

- 15 “Linxia Waiguoyu xuexiao 2021nian booming tiaojian, zhaoshengyaoqiu, zhaosheng duixiang”(Student recruitment information of Linxia Foreign Language School) (臨夏外國語學校 2021 年報名條件、招生要求、招生對象). In *Bangboer zhijiaowang* (<http://www.bangboer.com.cn/zhongzhuan/s31897.html>, accessed on August 27, 2021).
- 16 “Made-in-China Supplier Discovery” (<https://www.made-in-china.com/manufacturers/muslim-islamic-clothing.html>, accessed on August 30, 2021).
- 17 See the website below. “Shop910326185 Store” in *AliExpress* ([https://ja.aliexpress.com/item/1005002789838610.html?spm=a2g0o.detail.1000014.45.55f96b78bhDB2D&gps-id=pcDetailBottomMoreOtherSeller&scm=1007.33416.213724.0&scm\\_id=1007.33416.213724.0&scm-url=1007.33416.213724.0&pvid=0c41c9a1-043c-4a6d-8269-7cf2eafb3d&t=pcDetailBottomMoreOtherSeller,scm-url:1007.33416.213724.0,pvid:0c41c9a1-043c-4a6d-8269-7cf2eafb3d,tpp\\_buckets:668%230%23131923%2313\\_668%23888%233325%233\\_23416%230%23213724%230\\_23416%236336%2330489%235\\_23416%234721%2321967%23227\\_23416%234722%2321972%233\\_668%232846%238113%231998\\_668%235811%2327175%2324\\_668%236421%2330827%23687\\_668%232717%237566%23890\\_668%231000022185%231000066058%230\\_668%236808%2332776%23752\\_668%233422%2315392%2334\\_4452%230%23226710%230\\_4452%233474%2316498%23778\\_4452%234862%2324463%23128\\_4452%233098%239599%23742\\_4452%235108%2323442%2381\\_4452%233564%2316062%23228&pdp\\_ext\\_f=%7B%22sceneId%22:%2223416%22%7D](https://ja.aliexpress.com/item/1005002789838610.html?spm=a2g0o.detail.1000014.45.55f96b78bhDB2D&gps-id=pcDetailBottomMoreOtherSeller&scm=1007.33416.213724.0&scm_id=1007.33416.213724.0&scm-url=1007.33416.213724.0&pvid=0c41c9a1-043c-4a6d-8269-7cf2eafb3d&t=pcDetailBottomMoreOtherSeller,scm-url:1007.33416.213724.0,pvid:0c41c9a1-043c-4a6d-8269-7cf2eafb3d,tpp_buckets:668%230%23131923%2313_668%23888%233325%233_23416%230%23213724%230_23416%236336%2330489%235_23416%234721%2321967%23227_23416%234722%2321972%233_668%232846%238113%231998_668%235811%2327175%2324_668%236421%2330827%23687_668%232717%237566%23890_668%231000022185%231000066058%230_668%236808%2332776%23752_668%233422%2315392%2334_4452%230%23226710%230_4452%233474%2316498%23778_4452%234862%2324463%23128_4452%233098%239599%23742_4452%235108%2323442%2381_4452%233564%2316062%23228&pdp_ext_f=%7B%22sceneId%22:%2223416%22%7D), accessed on August 20, 2021).
- 18 “Modest Beauty Official Store” in *AliExpress* ([https://ja.aliexpress.com/item/10000009742871.html?spm=a2g0o.productlist.0.0.58224b482ymj6l&algo\\_pvid=64bbe019-ec22-4182-915a-fbf2d281ef4d&algo\\_exp\\_id=64bbe019-ec22-4182-915a-fbf2d281ef4d-47](https://ja.aliexpress.com/item/10000009742871.html?spm=a2g0o.productlist.0.0.58224b482ymj6l&algo_pvid=64bbe019-ec22-4182-915a-fbf2d281ef4d&algo_exp_id=64bbe019-ec22-4182-915a-fbf2d281ef4d-47), accessed Oct.7, 2021).
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- 24 The prejudicial belief that "Muslims are offspring of pigs" was also widespread in 1930s. Muslims stood up for their human dignity and ethnic pride to fight the prejudice. See Zhenjiang Huijiao Hujiao Weiyuanhui 1932. "Zhenjiang Huijiao hujiao weiyuanhui dian Guomin zhengfu you guan Shanghai Nanhua shuju ji Beixin shuju wuru Huijiao qi mingling yu chafeng deng" (The Committee for the Protection of Islam in Zhenjiang sent telegram to the Nationalist government about the denouncing of Islam by the publications of Shanghai Nanhua Bookstore and the Beixin Bookstore and asked for an explicit order to seal them). In the file of "Beixin shuju chuban wuru huijiao buliang kanwu qudi chengban" (Beixin Bookstore publishes undesirable publications that denounce Islam. Punishment is required). *Academia Historica* digital collection no. 001-090084-00001-007.

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