

Kashmir:

A Cultural Crossroads of the Sanskrit and Persian Cosmopolises

volume 2

OGURA, Satoshi SAITO, Akane YOKOCHI, Yuko (eds.)



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Luther James Obrock, Sunil Sharma, Tomohiro Manabe

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The Making of Hindu Kashmir

SANDERSON, Alexis

Preface to Volume Two

OGURA, Satoshi

ILCAA, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (Japan)

Situated in the north-western region of the Indian subcontinent, Kashmir serves as a pivotal contact zone bridging South, Central, and West Asia. Kashmir has been a crucible of diverse knowledge systems throughout the periods in which two linguistic cosmopolises flourished, i.e., the Sanskrit Cosmopolis (c. 400–1400 CE) and the Persian Cosmopolis (c. 900–1900 CE). In terms of religious culture, Buddhism, Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and later Islam, particularly Sufism, thrived and engaged in dynamic interactions. Notably, Kashmir is distinct within Indian subcontinent for its historical chronicles composed in Sanskrit, which persisted under the patronage of various dynasties, even during Muslim rule.

This volume comprises eight scholarly articles exploring Sanskrit and Persian texts pertinent to premodern Kashmir. Most of the papers included in this collection are based on oral presentations delivered at two international workshops held at Kyoto University in September 2015 and March 2018. Additionally, there are also several papers that the editors have newly approached and added to this volume. Of the eight articles, four focus on Sanskrit textual traditions: Saito examines the historical evolution of *Sphoṭa* theory (Chapter 1), Klebanov analyzes *śleṣa* in a twelfth century Kashmiri rhetorician Ruyyaka's work, the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* (Chapter 2), Okita investigates the impact of Abhinavagupta's *rasa* theory on 16th-century Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism (Chapter 3), and Manabe explores the thoughts of Sadānanda Kāśmīraka, an Advaita Vedāntin active in 16th–17th century Kashmir, in particular the concept of *bhakti* (Chapter 8). The remaining four articles analyze Arabic and Persian texts, as well as Sanskrit translations of Persian poetry: Verdon examines descriptions of Kashmir by the 11th-century polymath Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (Chapter 4), Obrock sheds light on the *Kathākaṭuka* by Śrīvara (d. after 1505), a Sanskrit translation of 'Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī's (d. 1492) Persian love story, the *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā* (Chapter 5), Ogura examines descriptions of the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā in Srinagar found in Persian hagiographies (Chapter 6), and Sharma explores a Persian travelogue by Mullā Tughrā Mashhadī (d. before 1667–8), a lesser-known Iranian immigrant to the Mughal Empire who visited Kashmir (Chapter 7).

Sphoṭa in Medieval Kashmir

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1. Introduction

The theory of *sphoṭa* is well known as one of the most unique theories established by Sanskrit Grammarians. Ever since the ancient Grammarian Patañjali (2nd c. B.C.) used the term *sphoṭa* in his *Mahābhāṣya*, a commentary on Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, its theory has been developed not only in the works of Grammarians but also in various philosophical systems. While it was undoubtedly Bhartṛhari, the fifth-century philosopher and Grammarian, who established it as a theory and supported the later development of the classical theory of *sphoṭa*, it is not the only form of *sphoṭa* that appeared in the history of Indian philosophy. In my previous paper [Saito 2020], I discussed that the theory of *Sphoṭa* was in constant flux, not just as the result of “misunderstanding” of the Varṇavādins (‘holders of phonemes’) who criticized its existence, but even within scholars (mainly Grammarians) called “*Sphoṭavādin*” (‘holders of *sphoṭa*’). The purpose of this paper is to provide additional research on the variations of *sphoṭa* in medieval Kashmir. Usually, when we look at the history of *sphoṭa* theory, since the criticism of Kumārila (7th c.), who denied the existence of *sphoṭa* in his *Śloka-vārttika*, it has been the traditional and common scheme to talk about *sphoṭa* in the form of a debate between the *Sphoṭavādin* and Varṇavādin. In medieval Kashmir, however, we



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* It took about eight years from conception to completion of this article. I am now relieved and happy that it has finally come out. When I was studying the *Sphoṭa* theory in my PhD programme, it was Prof. Alexis Sanderson who encouraged me to challenge the vast ocean of Śaiva tradition of linguistic philosophy. Without his suggestion, I would have never realized how the concept of *Sphoṭa* was changing in its long history. I would also like to thank Prof. S. L. P. Anjaneya Sarma, Prof. Dominic Goodall, Prof. Francesco Sferra, Prof. Somdev Vasudeva, and Dr. Yohei Kawajiri, all of whom individually helped me in various situations in this research.

find a more diverse narrative that is not limited to this conflict. While it cannot easily be said that all these debates on *sphoṭa* first emerged in Kashmir, what is clear is that Kashmir, the center of intellect and culture of the time, has been a rich repository of many linguistic ideas, both old and new.

In this paper, I will discuss the *Sphoṭa* focusing on the period between the seventh and eleventh centuries. During that period, Kashmir was a center of poetics, with many poetics discussing the *sphoṭa*. Bhāmaha, Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mahima Bhaṭṭa, and Maṃmaṭa will give us how they interpreted it. The *sphoṭa* theory, as explained and criticized by the Naiyāyika philosopher Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (9th c.), clearly shows the influence of the controversy between the Sphoṭavādin and Varṇavādin, but more importantly, his *sphoṭa* theory added several new elements and had a significant impact on later discussions. Kashmir also produced some of the most eminent Grammarians of the tenth and eleventh centuries, Helārāja, Kaiyaṭa, and possibly Puṇyarāja. Let us see how they discuss the *Sphoṭa* in their works. Above all, as a peculiar phenomenon in Kashmir, there are various Śaiva thinkers who have made reference to *sphoṭa*. The diversity of their arguments deserves consideration; I will pick up Somānanda, Utpaladeva, and Abhinavagupta from the non-dualistic school, the *Parāṅkhyatantra*, Rāmakaṇṭha and Śrīkaṇṭha from the dualistic school, and the *Netratantra* and *Svacchandatantra* as a unique ancient source of *sphoṭa*. My long-standing question has been (1) the remarkable development of the theory of *sphoṭa* in Kashmir, especially in the Grammatical contexts, compared to older (“classical”) theories, and (2) the gap in understanding of the *sphoṭa* between Kashmiri Śaiva scholars and the rest of the scholars. My conclusion, which I will state in this paper, is that the *sphoṭa* was theorized as the main axis of the Grammar, particularly through the interpretations of Kashmiri Grammarians. Also, along with the transition of the concept of “permanence”(*nityatā*), it came to have a metaphysical and transcendental character, especially in the context of the Śaiva school in medieval Kashmir.

2. “Classical” Theory of *Sphoṭa*

In [Saito 2020], I classified the theories of *sphoṭa* into five categories to show the development of the concept, the fourth category of which was held by Śaiva scholars of medieval Kashmir. These five categories are numbered according to how old they are (i.e., 1 is the oldest and 5 is the newest). In this paper, more broadly, those theories of *sphoṭa* other than Śaivas’ will be referred to as “classical.” What I call the classical theory of *sphoṭa* is first of all found in the works of Patañjali, Bhartr̥hari, Maṇḍana and, to a limited extent, Vivaraṇakāra (possibly Śaṅkara).¹ As I have already mentioned in [Saito 2020], their theories are also different from each other, so much so that it is difficult to call it “theory” in the case of Patañjali, but nevertheless, there are some shared ideas that I regard as important: firstly, the concept of *sphoṭa* for them is invariably associated with direct

¹ This interesting author was out of my research in the previous papers, but he is located in an important position. The biggest problem of his identity is, as [Harimoto 1999: 71–129] discussed in detail, the difference of his attitude towards *sphoṭa* in the *Vivaraṇa* and the commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. See section 9. With Dr. Kengo Harimoto, we are preparing the critical edition of this part of the text.

perception and is closely linked to sound.² This is evident for Patañjali, Bhartṛhari, and Maṇḍana, but not for Vivaraṇakāra, for one of his main arguments is that, unlike phonemes, *sphoṭa* makes the object understood, even though the latter is manifested by the former. Second, all these thinkers separate the discussion of *sphoṭa* from the discussion of sentence (*vākya*), which, I understand, preserves the value of the original theory.³ This is most evident in Bhartṛhari and Vivaraṇakāra. The *Vivaraṇa* on *Yogasūtra* 3.17 is clearly divided into two parts in the middle,⁴ with the first half discussing the *sphoṭa* and the second half discussing the sentence. It cannot be overemphasized enough that Vivaraṇakāra never uses the term *sphoṭa* in the second half of his commentary. The exact same situation occurs in the second book of the *Vākyapadīya*, where Bhartṛhari discusses the sentence without ever mentioning *sphoṭa*.⁵

My current hypothesis is that the most classical theory of *sphoṭa* has been replaced, or at least weakened, by the developed theory in around eighth century. By that time, the *sphoṭa* theory was premised on the controversy between Varṇavādin and Sphoṭavādin, and scholars discussing the *sphoṭa* always mention the criticism from Kumārila⁶ and others. Also its relation with sound

² Brough [1951] reveals the fact that the *sphoṭa* “has unfortunately been subjected by modern writers to a great deal of unnecessary mystification” Brough [1951: 32], by being described as a mysterious entity “in which the idea corresponding to all these sounds is comprised” (quote from [De 1951]). Brough states: “with all respect, I feel that this statement hardly does justice to the grammarians’ theory” [Brough 1951: 33]. His remark “But the essential nature of the meaning-bearer was not seen by Patañjali in the same light as it was by later thinkers” [Brough 1951: 34] cannot be too emphasized. Though *sphoṭa* is usually explained by later thinkers including grammarians as the meaning-bearing unit of language, and it is in fact an important aspect of *sphoṭa*, Brough saw through that it is not the most original idea found in Patañjali. He also differentiates Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, saying that for the latter the concept of *sphoṭa* is more developed and it has no temporal and spatial limit (*tāvan eva*: ‘of such and such a size’ is no longer applied to *sphoṭa*). He says: Patañjali’s *sphoṭa* is comparable to Bhartṛhari’s “primary sound” (*prākṛtadhvani*). I have a slight doubt on this point. Since Patañjali too distinguished the aspect of speech (*śabda*) from sound (*dhvani*), and as is shown in Brough’s translation of Patañjali’s statement “the *sphoṭa* (the unchanging substratum) is the word, the sound is merely an attribute of the word” (*sphoṭaḥ śabda dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ*), *sphoṭa*, i.e., *śabda*, is considered even by Patañjali to be different from sound. In my view, even though *dhvani* is subdivided into *prākṛta*- and *vaikṛta*-*dhvani*, *sphoṭa* is still different from sound. Another slight disagreement with Brough’s investigation is how he understands Bhartṛhari’s theory of *sphoṭa*. Brough states that by Bhartṛhari *sphoṭa* is “the word considered as a single meaningful symbol” Brough [1951: 38]. I would still emphasize the close relation of *sphoṭa* with sound (*dhvani*) in his discussion as we saw in Patañjali. As Brough states, the *sphoṭa* discussed by Bhartṛhari is definitely not mysterious at all, and I further say that in Bhartṛhari connection between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* is still quite visible, which is getting less apparent in later period. The interpretation of *vaikṛta*-*dhvani* may also be different [Brough 1951: 40]. But in any case, the most significant point which I completely agree with Brough is that *sphoṭa* is “a structure consisting of a series of consonants and long and short vowels” [Brough 1951: 36], namely a phonetic form, and therefore closely connected with the discussion of sound. Brough proposes two reasons why *sphoṭa* has long been misunderstood by the western Sanskritists: (1) misinterpretation of *śabda* as ‘sound’ in *nityaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭaḥ* (‘*Sphoṭa* is the eternal sound’); (2) the fact that “on the basis of the *sphoṭa*-theory there was erected a metaphysical superstructure, in which the transcendental Word was seen as the first-principle of the universe” [Brough 1951: 41–2]. He does not give further information on this “metaphysical superstructure” but this is exactly what happened in Kashmir.

³ As I argued before, I understand that the theory of *sphoṭa* was originally the theory of how to perceive a word, which did not mean how to understand a word. See also section 5.3 (Punyarāja’s *sphoṭa*).

⁴ Filliozat [1984] has already pointed out the similarity between *Mahābhāṣya* and *Yogasūtra* 3.17, but he discussed *śabda* and *sphoṭa* without distinction, hence causing slight confusion in the discussion. In my view, at the time of *Sūtra* and Vyāsa’s *Bhāṣya*, *Yogasūtra* 3.17 was purely the discussion of *śabda* but not *sphoṭa* (the term *sphoṭa* is indeed never used), and it is the Vivaraṇakāra who invented the *sphoṭa* theory in it.

⁵ In the case of Bhartṛhari, this might be less visible since his statements have been continuously used to justify the *sphoṭa* in later history. For Maṇḍana, as discussed in detail in his *Brahmasiddhi*, the theory of sentence object has nothing to do with the *sphoṭa*. But this was not the case in later *sphoṭa* theories.

⁶ As stated in the opening stanza of the Sphoṭavāda of *Śloka-vārttika*, Kumārila is the one who combined the question of ‘*gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ*’ with the matter of *sphoṭa*. By this, *śabda* and *sphoṭa* became synonymous. This was succeeded by

became less and less relevant, and discussions centered on how the word or sentence meaning is revealed from the *sphoṭa*. However, I would like to emphasize that the *sphoṭa* discussed by the scholars mentioned so far have not been associated with metaphysical arguments. This is another point that distinguishes the classical *sphoṭa* theory from later ones.⁷

3. Bhāmaha

Probably one of the earliest references to the *sphoṭa* in Kashmir is found in a work of poetics, the sixth chapter of the *Kāvyaṭīkā* (“Ornamentation of Poetry”) of Bhāmaha (7th c.) [D’Avella 2018: 109–15; Bronner 2012: 80–6]. His discussion is not fully worded —the relevant verses are stanzas 7–15, and he only mentions “*Sphoṭavādin*” critically once in stanza 12 —but we may point out some features in his explanation. This chapter is dedicated to Grammar (*vyākaraṇa*). It begins with about what the word *śabda* means, whether it is something that makes us understand an object or it is a phoneme. As [D’Avella 2018] explains, Bhāmaha’s immediate criticism against the first alternative easily reminds us of Kumārila’s criticism of Grammarians’ *śabda*:

Translation by [D’Avella 2018: 111–2]: “Others say that a word is that from which there is a cognition with respect to objects. Smoke and light are (then) also taken to be a word with regard to inferring fire.”⁸

In response to this, Bhāmaha states his view from the standpoint of the *Varṇavādin* (the holder of phonemes): *śabda* is nothing but an aggregation of phonemes. However, it is immediately

Maṇḍana as I discussed elsewhere, after which the concept of *sphoṭa* morphed into semantics. *Ślokaṭīkā* Sphoṭavāda 1: *ādhārātmani vijñāte sukham ādheyabodhanam | tasyaiva tāvat prastāvād atha gaur ity ato ’bravīt ||* ‘Once the nature of the substratum (i.e., the word and its object) is known, what lies [above it] (i.e., their relationship) is easily understood. Therefore, as it (what lies above it) is the topic to be discussed, [Śabara] asked “*atha gaur ity...*”

⁷ Bronkhorst [1991] discusses Bhartṛhari’s *sphoṭa* critically referring to Brough’s article. He points out that by Brough the ontological status of *sphoṭa* is not satisfactorily unveiled, especially since he puts more value on the aspect of individual (*vyakti*) in *sphoṭa* but not of universal (*jāti*) (class: Brough, universal: Bronkhorst). I agree. The *sphoṭa* theory cannot be properly understood without the concept of *jāti*: it is clear from Maṇḍana, for example. Nevertheless, I distinguish the *sphoṭa* from all the *jāti* stories in the *Vākyapadīya*, because I attach more importance to the fact that Bhartṛhari himself used the term *sphoṭa* only in a very limited context —when discussing the pronunciation and perception of words/sounds. For this reason, I also do not agree that the issues of indivisible sentence, indivisible entity, and indivisible *Rgveda*, are exactly the same issue as the issue of *sphoṭa* (for the *Rgveda*, see 5.1: Helārāja on *sphoṭa*). As we will see in the next section, Helārāja discusses *jāti* (*śabdajāti* and *śabdavyakti*) in relation to the *sphoṭa*, but it is rather the result of Helārāja’s incorporation of the *sphoṭa* theory with all Bhartṛharian philosophy. In other words, Helārāja spread the term *sphoṭa* throughout the *Vākyapadīya*, and universalized it. Bronkhorst did close investigation of the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* in the third book of the *Vākyapadīya*, but in this paper (and also in [Saito 2020]) I take a different way: I exclude the arguments of *śabda*, *jāti*, and *brahman* from the *sphoṭa* theory. With regard to the famous opening stanza *Vākyapadīya* 1.1, I understand that it was only in the later period that “the essence of the word (*śabdātattva*), identical with *Brahman*” became associated with the *sphoṭa*. See Section 9 (Śaṅkara’s *sphoṭa*). Bronkhorst’s investigation provides an important indication that the language theory of Bhartṛhari has the potential to move towards a metaphysical analysis. The development of the *sphoṭa* theory in medieval Kashmir, which is examined in this paper, followed just such a path.

⁸ *Kāvyaṭīkā* 6.7: *pratītir artheṣu yatas taṃ śabdaṃ bruvate pare | dhūmabhāsoṛ api prāptā śabdatā’gnyanumāṇṃ prati ||* Cf. *Ślokaṭīkā* Sphoṭavāda st. 7 (I follow Omae’s edition): *agnyādin gamayanto ’pi śabdā dhūmādayo na hi | na cāpratyāyakatvāt syād ekavarṇeṣv aśabdatā ||* ‘Indeed, it makes [us] understood fire, etc., but smoke, etc., is not a word. And even though it does not make [the object] understood, it does not mean that each phoneme is not a word.’

criticized by those who consider *śabda* to be unchangeable (*kūṭastha*),⁹ imperishable, and different from mere sounds (*nāda*).¹⁰ As D’Avella suggests, this again reminds us of Kumārila’s statement in the Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa in the *Ślokaavārttika*:

Permanence of worldly interaction is [established only] because the unchanging permanence [of the word] is established. Without this unchangeability, [worldly interaction] would have no support.¹¹

The unchanging permanence (*kūṭasthanityatā*) of words, i.e., phonemes, is what Kumārila has established in this chapter. That permanence was mentioned by him to justify his views on phonemes, and does not seem to have been used early on to explain the permanence of *spṛṣṭa*. In fact, in the auto-commentary on *Vākyapadīya* 1.23, Bhartṛhari discussed the permanence of *śabda*, citing the *Mahābhāṣya* (*Anutantrabhāṣya*), which teaches the unchanging permanence of phonemes,¹² but no such permanence was mentioned in the discussion of *spṛṣṭa*.¹³ The settled view of the *Mahābhāṣya* is that phonemes are permanent in their generic form (*ākṛti*), unlike

⁹ Let me quote D’Avella’s very helpful footnote [D’Avella 2018: 113, n. 19] where he summarizes Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa on the term *kūṭastha*: “Kaiyaṭa provides the gloss *avināśin*, “non-perishing,” [MBhPr: I 60a], and Nāgeśa further explains: *kūṭam ayoghanas tadvat tiṣṭhanti ye teṣu samsargināṣe ’pi svayam anaṣṭeṣv ity arthaḥ* || “A *kūṭa* is an iron anvil; those things which stand like it (scil. *kūṭa*), they have not perished even in the destruction of the ephemeral. This is the meaning.” (loc. cit.)”

¹⁰ *Kāvyālaṃkāra* 6.14: *sa kūṭastho ’napāyī ca nādād anyas ca kathyate | mandāḥ sāṅketikān arthān manyante pāramāthikān* || “[Grammarians?] claim that the unchangeable [word] is imperishable, and different from sounds (*nāda*). Dull-witted people consider things based on convention (*sāṅketika*) to be real from the ultimate point of view. Bhāmaha discards the existence of an imaginary entity like *spṛṣṭa* in 6.12: *śapathair api cādeyaṃ vaco na spṛṣṭavādinām | nabhaḥkusumam astīti śraddadhyāt kaḥ sacetanaḥ* || “Furthermore, the words of the *Spṛṣṭavādins* must not be accepted, even by curse. Who with a rational mind would believe that a sky-flower really exists? He clearly has in mind the past criticism of *spṛṣṭa*, particularly the *varṇa* theory. This short passage suggests that he must have been aware of the severe criticism of *spṛṣṭa* by Kumārila or Dharmakīrti.

¹¹ *Ślokaavārttika* Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa 6: *stṛite kūṭasthanityatve vyavahārasya nityatā | kūṭasthena vinaitena na tasyālabhaṇaṃ bhavet* ||

¹² Auto-commentary on *Vākyapadīya* 1.23 [62, l. 12–63, l. 3]: *anutantrabhāṣye ’py uktam —“nityeṣu kūṭasthair varṇair avicālibhir bhavitavyam” ityevamādi* | “It has been taught in the *Bhāṣya* that follows the scripture [of Pāṇini] that “If [words] are permanent, phonemes must be unchanging and immovable.”

Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* on Śivasūtra a i uṇ [I 18, ll. 14–16]: *nityās ca śabdāḥ | nityeṣu ca śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālibhir varṇair bhavitavyam anapāyopajanavikāribhiḥ | yadi cāyaṃ “da” ity atra dṛṣṭaḥ “ṇḍa” ity atra dṛṣṭeṭa, nāyaṃ kūṭasthaḥ syāt* | “But words (*śabdāḥ*) are permanent. And if words are permanent, then phonemes (*varṇāḥ*) must be unchanging, immovable, free from omission (*apāya*), addition (*upajana*) and substitution (*vikāra*). The debate here is whether the permanence of the word is as an individual or as the universal. Although Kaiyaṭa (and Nāgeśa) here argues for the adequacy of *jātispṛṣṭa* in comparison with *vyaktispṛṣṭa*, this question was not originally related to the *spṛṣṭa* (neither Patañjali nor Bhartṛhari in *Vākyapadīya* 1.23 mentioned *spṛṣṭa*). As I discussed in [Saito 2020], we should not apply this to the original context of Patañjali. See also [Mahābhāṣya: I 18., 136.12–3].

¹³ [D’Avella 2018: 113–4]: “Within the *Mahābhāṣya*, *kūṭastha*, “immovable, indestructible,” occurs in a few contexts. After its initial introduction as one of the meanings of *siddha* and hence a synonym for *nitya* (MBh 1.7.3), five of its other occurrences are in the set phrase *nityeṣu śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālibhir varṇair bhavitavyam anapāyopajanavikāribhiḥ* | “Among permanent words there must be indestructible, inseparable letters that are neither subtracted, added, or modified,” which comes up as an objection when it seems that part of word is in one way or another impermanent as, for example, when an *āgama*, “augment,” is added. Bhāmaha appears to be mocking the reasoning that the letters themselves are eternal and to support the non-eternality of sound, a tenant of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist philosophies and repeatedly upheld in their texts. Still, it is not entirely clear to me why he chose the term *kūṭastha* which does not feature very prominently in later grammatical —there is not even a single occurrence in the *kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya* —or Nyāya literature. Although Patañjali uses *kūṭastha* only in reference to letters, its transference to *śabda* does not seem unwarranted. (It does however feature in Kumārila’s *Ślokaavārttika* in the Śabdānityatā section.)”

the Mīmāṃsakas, who hold that the individual phonemes are single and eternal. So Bhāmaha's argument on *kūṭastha* can be read as a critique of such a view of phonemes as unchangeable, as he declares at the end that he is not really concerned with whether words are permanent or not.¹⁴

At this point I would like to draw some attention to the discussion of permanence by Maṇḍana (who must have been later than Bhāmaha), which is a little off topic. This is because the discussion of permanence will come up again and again in the next sections. Maṇḍana mentions “permanence” twice in the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, in stanzas 8 and 34:

- In his criticism of the Varṇavādin in stanza 8, Maṇḍana says that phonemes (*varṇāḥ*) are permanent and all-pervading, no doubt following the *Mahābhāṣya* and Kumārila.¹⁵
- In stanza 34, Maṇḍana argues that just as the class (*jāti*) is undoubtedly permanent once its existence (*sattva*) is acknowledged, so too the *sphoṭa* is necessarily permanent once its existence has been established.¹⁶

What does “existence”(*sattva*) mean here? It must not be an ordinary existence, such as the existence of a cat. Otherwise, the cat would have a permanent existence. Existence here is equivalent to not being delimited by time or space (**deśakālaparicchedarāhityam*), and by being so, it also includes being permanent. This permanence of *sphoṭa* in the sense of being free from time and space does not guarantee the supremacy, purity, and transcendence of the *sphoṭa*, as can be seen from the fact that it is a property of the class.¹⁷ The reason why I say this is because in

¹⁴ We might be able to understand as follows: (1) First of all, the Grammarians claim *śabda* as a meaningful unit, which Bhāmaha immediately refutes (6.7). (2) Second, the Varṇavādins claim that *śabda* is a collection of phonemes by “*nanu*,” against which Bhāmaha answers by “*ity abhidhiyate*” (6.8). (3) Then Bhāmaha raises the problems caused by holding “unchangeable phonemes” (6.9–11). The word *ca* in st. 12 might indicate that this is an additional remark to another—and much more stupid—theory based on an imaginary entity. In that case, we might be able to understand stanza 6.12 alone to be the reference to the *sphoṭa* theory.

¹⁵ Auto-commentary on *Sphoṭasiddhi* 8 [66–7]: *tathā hi svato varṇā nityatayā vibhutayā ca na deśanibandhanam nāpi kālanibandhanam parāparabhāvam anupatantīti prakhyānanibandhana eṣa samupāśrīyate | tac cedam advayam akramam, yadviparivartinā te 'rthapratyayaḥ etavaḥ |* ‘To explain, phonemes do not come to have an anterior-posterior relation due to space and time, since [they] are themselves permanent and all-pervading. Therefore, [even you, Varṇavādins,] admit that this [anterior-posterior relation] is caused by cognition. But this [cognition] in which they—the cause of the understanding of the object—are transformed is non-dual and without sequence.’

¹⁶ Auto-commentary on *Sphoṭasiddhi* 34 [256–8]: *yas tu vikalpaḥ —sad api tad anityam syāt nityam vā śabdarūpam iti, so 'navakāśa eva, sattvād eva nityatvasiddheḥ jātivat | yathaiva jāter yaḥ sattāvagamānibandhanam anvitāvabhāsaḥ pratyayaḥ sa nityatayaiva sattvam avagamayati | vināśīnīṭve hi vyakter iva tasyā abhāvāt | ato na tatra nityānityavikalpāvataraṇam bhavati —tathārthādhigamaphalavyavasthāpyamānasattvaḥ sphoṭātmā nitya evāvatiṣṭhate | anityatve pūrvadarśanābhāvād arthapratyayayogāt kuto nityānityavikalpāvakāśa ity alam ativimardena ||* ‘On the other hand, whether the nature of the word is permanent or not is not open to debate, since, as in the case of the class, [its] permanence is established by [its] mere existence. For example—the cognition of class, which is the cause of understanding [its] existence and to which [its] image/concept has been linked, makes the existence [of class] understood precisely with [its] permanence. This is because if [it] were perishable, like an individual, it [would] not exist. Therefore, it is not [possible] to introduce a choice as to whether [the class] is permanent or not. In the same way, the *sphoṭa*, whose existence is to be established by [its] result, i.e., the understanding of the object, exists precisely as something permanent. If [it were] not permanent, then it is illogical to have a cognition of the object, since it is impossible to perceive [it] beforehand. Therefore why is there room for the possibility of it being permanent or not? So, enough of further investigation.’

¹⁷ As [Iyer 1966: 91] pointed out, the same idea of permanence is found in Kumārila: *Ślokaavartika Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa* 311: *atrocyate sthiraḥ śabda dhūmagotvādhijātivat | sambandhānubhavāpekṣasāmānyārthābodbodhanāt ||* ‘In this we formulate [a syllogism]: the word is immovable (*sthira*: permanent), just like the class such as the class of smoke (*dhūmatva*) and of cow (*gotva*), because [it] makes understood a

later times it has not been the case.¹⁸ In addition, it might be noteworthy that neither Bhartṛhari nor Maṇḍana (and perhaps not even Bhāmaha) said that the *sphoṭa* is “unchangeably permanent and all-pervading.” The adjective *kūṭastha* was always qualifying phonemes.

4. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta

The ninth century has come in Kashmir with Bhaṭṭa Jayanta,¹⁹ better known especially as a Naiyāyika, who was active during the reign of king Śaṅkaravarman (r. 883–902). As far as we can see from the material available today, his lengthy discussion and criticism of the *sphoṭa* contributed greatly to firmly inculcating what the *sphoṭa* is in Kashmir and had a significant impact on later generations. The Sphoṭavāda chapter of his *Nyāyamañjarī* was recently re-edited by [Graheli 2015]²⁰ and translated by [Bronkhorst 2019: 100–29],²¹ which beautifully paved the way to the quintessence of that philosophy. From this work, we can point out some important features. First of all, the Sphoṭavādin in the *Nyāyamañjarī* raises two possibilities, whether the *sphoṭa* is manifested by sounds (*dhvani/nāda*) [*Nyāyamañjarī* 8.2.1.4.4.; Bronkhorst 2019: 106], as discussed by Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana, or manifested by phonemes (*varṇa*) [*Nyāyamañjarī* 8.2.1.4.1–3.; Bronkhorst 2019: 105–6], as in the *Vivaraṇa*, a commentary on the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, whose authorship is suspected to Śaṅkara (eighth c.) [Harimoto 2006]. These two options have already been implied by Kumārila in stanzas 131 of the Sphoṭavāda chapter of the *Śloka-vārttika*, but not in sufficient detail.²² The *Vivaraṇa* on *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* 3.17 is full of deep insight into *śabda* and has a very important parallel discussion with the *Vākyapadīya*.²³ And one of its most striking features is that the *sphoṭa* is manifested by phonemes, but not by sounds. In my knowledge the author of the *Vivaraṇa* is the first Sphoṭavādin among the existent texts who claimed this. Even though his *sphoṭa* is no doubt under the influence of Bhartṛhari, and possibly even of Maṇḍana, he does not follow them on this account. Turning our eyes back to Jayanta’s exposition of *sphoṭa*, it is of course possible that he himself fleshed out Kumārila’s brief remarks, but it is also possible that in his time they were both equally well-known as the way how the Sphoṭavādin explains the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. And I also suspect that Jayanta’s conception of phonemes has been passed on to later Grammarians, as we see for example in Helārāja.

Another thing to be worth noting is that there is a classification of *sphoṭa*, word-*sphoṭa* (*padasphoṭa*) and sentence-*sphoṭa* (*vākyasphoṭa*) [*Nyāyamañjarī* 8.2.2.1–8.2.3.1.; Bronkhorst 2019:

common object, while relying on the apprehension of the relation.’

¹⁸ See Section 7.

¹⁹ For his life and works, see [Graheli: 2015: 3–16].

²⁰ The numbering of the *Nyāyamañjarī* quoted in this paper follows Graheli’s edition.

²¹ See [Saito 2021], a review of [Bronkhorst 2019].

²² *Śloka-vārttika* Sphoṭavāda 131: *varṇā vā dhvanayo vāpi sphoṭam na padavākyaayoḥ | vyañjanti vyañjakatvena yathā dīpaprabhādayaḥ ||* ‘Phonemes and sounds do not manifest the *sphoṭa* of a word or sentence, because [they] make manifest [the meaning/object], just like smoke, light, and so forth, [which make manifest the object].’

²³ We should be careful that the *sphoṭa* only appears in the *Vivaraṇa*. After the *Vivaraṇa*, all the later commentaries connect *Yogasūtra* 3.17 to the *sphoṭa* theory.

107–8].²⁴ This too is not a complete invention, for Kumārila has already suggested *sphoṭa* for a word and that for a sentence,²⁵ and he has actually used the term *padasphoṭa* twice [Sphoṭavāda 92; Vākyādhikaraṇa 52].²⁶ Nevertheless, Jayanta, probably for the first time in the history of *sphoṭa*, enumerated word-*sphoṭa* and sentence-*sphoṭa* and explained them separately. In my opinion, this classification bridged the discussion of *sphoṭa* in the first book of the *Vākyapadīya* with the discussion of sentence (*vākya*) in the second book, and changed the direction of subsequent development of *sphoṭa*, as we shall see later in Puṇyārāja.²⁷ In relation to this, I note here that for Jayanta, the *sphoṭa* was always a *śabda* and never *artha*. The chapter of Sphoṭavāda is a survey of *śabda* from beginning till end.

A final and very important point to make is that at the end of the exposition of the *sphoṭa*, Jayanta explains the language absolute (*śabdabrahman*) and three famous planes of speech, *vaikhari*, *madhyamā*, and *paśyanti*, which were originally discussed in the first book of the *Vākyapadīya*.²⁸ In later times, this association of the *sphoṭa* with such planes of speech became a given fact and a very standard idea among pre-modern Grammarians, but I would say that it was not found before Jayanta. Jayanta argues as if the “one real and unitary sentence-*sphoṭa*” leads us to the language absolute, called *paśyanti* or *śabdabrahman*, but in fact Bhartṛhari never speaks of them in the same breath. Rather, more strictly speaking, the *sphoṭa* is only mentioned in the situations where the pronunciation of words and how they are perceived are discussed.²⁹ The first book of the *Vākyapadīya* is a book on *śabda*, but that does not mean that it is entirely a book on *sphoṭa*, just as the second book was not originally a book on *sphoṭa* at all.³⁰ By relating the *sphoṭa* with the language absolute, the *sphoṭa* theory was transformed into a metaphysics pregnant with the possibility of direct access to the supreme reality. And it began with Jayanta. Whenever I see a discussion of *sphoṭa* in relation to the planes of speech, I interpret it as a later, modified version derived from Jayanta.³¹

²⁴ As discussed in [Saito 2020] and as many other previous studies have shown, there are various sub-categories of *sphoṭa* in the pre-modern period.

²⁵ *Śloka-vārttika* Sphoṭavāda 131 (see fn. 28). But it should be noted that neither Maṇḍana nor Vivaraṇakāra, commenting on this stanza, used the terms *padasphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa*. Maṇḍana even discussed how to interpret *padavākya* in the auto-commentary on stanza 27, suggesting that he did not understand them as fixed technical terms.

²⁶ *Śloka-vārttika* Sphoṭavāda 92: *tatrāpi pratīvarṇam hi padasphoṭa na gamyate | na cāvayavaśo vyaktis tadabhāvān na cātra dhīḥ* (EU; śrīḥ EP) || ‘For, even in that case, the word-*sphoṭa* is not cognized in each phoneme. Nor is [it] manifested in each part, since there is no [part]. There is also no cognition of [part].’

Vākyādhikaraṇa 52: *svatanreṣu hi vākyatvaṃ katham* (em.; *katha* EP) *cin nopalakṣitam | sphoṭajātiniṣedhaś ca syāt padasphoṭajātivat* || ‘For, the property of being a sentence cannot in any way observed in each independent [word]. And [the existence of] a class as the *sphoṭa* should be denied, just as the class as word-*sphoṭa* [is denied].’

²⁷ Abhinavagupta’s reference to the *vākyasphoṭa* in his *Īśvarapratyabhijñānavivṛtīvimarśinī* discusses is no doubt based on Jayanta’s discussion.

²⁸ See section 7 for a more detailed explanation.

²⁹ See [Saito 2020: 79–82].

³⁰ See the coming section of Puṇyārāja.

³¹ For example, another *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Bhārata Mīśra studied by [Pinchard 2011] is undated, but I strongly suspect that it was written after Jayanta, at least not before Maṇḍana.

5. Grammarians —Helārāja, Kaiyaṭa, and Puṇyarāja

5.1. Helārāja on *sphoṭa*

After Jayanta, we know at least two prominent Kashmiri Grammarians who discussed *sphoṭa*, Helārāja and Kaiyaṭa. Let us look at how they defended and developed the concept of *sphoṭa*. Helārāja is a Grammarian in tenth century.³² His commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* is available only for the third book, which prevents us from examining his opinion on the discussion of *sphoṭa* in the first book. But in the various places of the third book Helārāja discusses the *sphoṭa* from different aspects. His reference to the *sphoṭa* appears in the four chapters, Jātisamuddeśa, Kriyāsamuddeśa, Kālasamuddeśa, and Vṛttisamuddeśa. I shall note here some of the important features of each chapter which seem to me to be different from those of Bhartṛhari:

- Jātisamuddeśa: Helārāja makes no distinction between the words *dhvani*, *akṣara*, and *varṇa*. This suggests that there is no distinction between the discussion of perception of a word and the discussion of how the meaning of a word is to be understood. The *sphoṭa* is the nature of the word (*śabdatattva*) and is distinguished from both specific classes and individuals. Since phonemes cannot exist simultaneously, they cannot be candidates for the substratum of *śabdajāti*. Therefore we have to accept the individual *śabda* (*śabdavyakti*), which we can call *vyaktisphoṭa*, and the universal *śabda* (*śabdajāti*), which is inherent in the former and can be called *jātisphoṭa*.³³
- Kriyāsamuddeśa: A collection of moments of action is analogous to a complex (*saṃghāta*) of phonemes, which cannot be perceived in the sense that the individual moments or phonemes that make up the whole can only be perceived, but the *sphoṭa* is not like that; it is in the realm of perception. If action is a class (*jāti*), then it can be compared to the *sphoṭa* manifested by momentary phonemes.³⁴
- Kālasamuddeśa: As *śabda*, or *sphoṭa*, is permanent, it is not delimited by time. Here Helārāja says that the phonetic form of the word (*śabdasvarūpa*) is equipped with the distinction of time, without which worldly intercourse would be impossible, but the nature of the word (*śabdatattva*) is never affected by time.³⁵
- Vṛttisamuddeśa: The indivisible word *vṛkṣaḥ*, i.e., the *sphoṭa*, expresses its object 'tree' that is also indivisible and without parts.³⁶

Helārāja brilliantly integrates the *sphoṭa* theory with Bhartṛhari's main argument about language and its understanding, and it is almost impossible to separate them. In fact,

³² [Potter 1990: 193] places him around 980. See [Vergiani 2015] which proposes the possibility that Helārāja appropriates Bhartṛhari's ideas on the part of Śaiva Pratyabhijñā philosophers.

³³ On *Vākyapadīya* III Jātisamuddeśa 6, 7. Cf. [Bronkhorst 1999].

³⁴ On *Vākyapadīya* III Kriyāsamuddeśa 6, 7, 20.

³⁵ On *Vākyapadīya* III Kālasamuddeśa 65–7.

³⁶ On *Vākyapadīya* III Vṛttisamuddeśa 53.

Kālasamuddeśa 65–7 is important in considering the difficulty of distinguishing between the *sphoṭa* (the phonetic form) and the nature of the word. There Bhartṛhari stated that there is no delimitation of time in the nature of the word (*śabdātman*) and thus there is no distinction between a single phoneme and the whole collection of the *Ṛgveda*. I must confess that I cannot make a strong statement here, especially as there is no commentary by Bhartṛhari himself, but I understand that Bhartṛhari has opened the door a little to the *sphoṭa*, which is interpreted in a more metaphysical sense. Bhartṛhari does not actually use the word *sphoṭa* (at least in the stanzas available to us), but since it is discussing the manifestation of the word, it would be impossible not to involve the *sphoṭa* theory in this part of the discussion. Helārāja convincingly elaborates on the *sphoṭa*, relating A 1.1.70, where Patañjali had originally discussed the *sphoṭa*. In the first book, Bhartṛhari, as Maṇḍana later did, discussed indivisibility as the main issue of the *sphoṭa*. Indivisibility results in permanence (i.e., non-delimitation by time), since sequence brings a sense of time in pronunciation and perception. So the indistinction between a single phoneme and the whole collection of the *Ṛgveda* is not theoretically impossible. But if one claims this, it is no longer the discussion of pronunciation and perception. Now permanence has acquired a value of its own, and Helārāja's explanation makes perfectly sense as linguistic metaphysics.

In the commentary on stanza 484 of *Vṛttisamuddeśa*, the last chapter of the third book, Helārāja critically refers to Maṇḍana's *Sphoṭasiddhi* stanza 9.³⁷ In that stanza Maṇḍana claimed that the word *śabda* (in *gośabdād arthaṃ pratipadyāmahe*) is a word referring to a class (*jātiśabda*) and therefore it does not express the aggregation (*samudāya*) of phonemes (i.e., *g au ḥ*). Helārāja replies that it is not the case for other words such as *taila* in *tailam bhuktam* where according to the context *taila* can express the aggregate of oil drops. Though he does not mention the issue of *śabda* there, his criticism might be extended to *śabda* too: Helārāja is more tolerant of the existence of phonemes. In *Jātisamuddeśa* he uses the word *varṇa* and *aḥṣara* almost in the sense of *dhvani* which manifests a *sphoṭa*. Also he repeats the necessity of dividing a word into phonemes for the purpose of grammatical analysis. As a Grammarian, there is no hostility towards *varṇa* in his arguments.

Finally, let us have a look at Helārāja's commentary on *Dravyasamuddeśa* stanza 11. It is a little long, but I would like to quote the paragraph here:

As for the invariability (*nityatva*) of a class and the like in the mundane world, it is taught to be relative. To explain, a class such as cowness is invariable [in the sense that it] remains [even] after the individuals have gone. In that case too, when distinction from [other classes such as] horseness is lost, only the earth is real (*satya*). In that case too, when distinction from [properties of the other substances such as] being water is lost, only mere entity (*vastu*), which is understood by the pronoun [*tad*], is real. In that case too, since the imperishable nature of awareness (*saṃvid*) remains, if one distinguishes [it] from

³⁷ *Sphoṭasiddhi* 9: *neṣitā jātiśabdānām samudāyānupātītā | jātim ācakṣate te hi vyaktīr (vyaktiḥ in the Vṛttisamuddeśa) vā jātisāṅgatāḥ (jātisamāśrayā in the Vṛttisamuddeśa) ||* 'It is not observed that the words [that stand for] the class express the collection [of individual entities]. This is because they express either the class or individuals connected with the class.'

[variable] forms of objects, only that [awareness] is real from the viewpoint of the ultimate reality.

Thus, [scripture] enjoins that “One should meditate on neither [this] nor [that]” in order to contemplate [the absolute reality].³⁸ And [that] awareness is the supreme speech (*parā vāk*) in the form of *paśyantī*, which consists of *śabdabrahman*.³⁹ So the nature of *brahman* is not distinguished from the word on the ultimate level. But in the state of illusory manifestation, there is distinction/diversity in the form of *vaikhari*. In that case [also], there is [brahman] that is invariable, which is expressed by the words by taking the nature of a class and so forth.⁴⁰

Helārāja’s description of *paśyantī* and *śabdabrahman* is an important trace of how Bhartṛhari’s remarks were inherited and developed by Kashmiri Grammarians. However, I would like to discuss this subject by comparing it with the arguments of the Śaiva school of thinkers who were the prime movers in its ideological development, but as I need a few more pages to introduce them,⁴¹ here I just note that it is significant that Helārāja mentions *paśyantī* in this chapter, *Dravyasamuddeśa* (‘Exposition of Substance’),⁴² and not with the *sphoṭa*. Even though his *sphoṭa* sometimes seem more metaphysical than those of the past, apparently he does not identify with the *paśyantī*, the ultimate speech. Another thing to note is that here the word *nitya*, like *kūṭastha*, is used in the sense of “unchangeable, invariable.” The nuances of this word are different from those found in *Kālasamuddeśa*. That is, the *sphoṭa* is *nitya* in the sense that it is not delimited by time, while *paśyantī/śabdabrahman* is *nitya* in the sense that it is invariable.

The last, which may be important to distinguish it from the *sphoṭa* etc., is the inexpressibility of the ultimate reality. While the class, substance and mere entity are straightforwardly expressible by words, *brahman*, whether said to be the supreme speech or *paśyantī*, cannot be reached directly by words even though it is inherent in all beings in the world, and can only be expressed indirectly by excluding what is not the essence. This famous argument is rooted in the Upaniṣads, and a similar and highly detailed discussion can be found in Maṇḍana’s *Brahmasiddhi*.⁴³ In the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, it never is. At least for Maṇḍana, and for Helārāja, it is not related to the discussion of *sphoṭa* at all.

³⁸ A famous passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, but the word *upāsita* is usually not present.

³⁹ [Iyer 1971: 70]: “And this consciousness is nothing more than *paśyantī* or *parā vāk*, or *śabdabrahman*.” See [Ogawa 2016] for the interpretation of the word *śabdātattva*.

⁴⁰ Helārāja’s commentary on *Dravyasamuddeśa* 11 [114, l. 15–115, l. 4]: *āpekṣikaṃ tu jātyādinām vyavahāre nityatvam ucyate | tathā hi vyaktyapāye jātir avatiṣṭhamānā gotvādikā nityā | tatrāpy aśvatvādbhedatyāge prthivīty eva satyam | tatrāpy aptvādbhedapāye vastv ity eva satyam sarvanāmapratyāyām | tatrāpi saṃvidrūpasyānapāyino ’nugamād viṣayākāraviveke tad eva pāramārthikaṃ satyam iti neti nety upāsīteti bhāvanāya codyate | saṃvic ca paśyantirūpā parā vāk śabdabrahmamayiti brahmatattvaṃ śabdāt pāramārthikān na bhidyate | vivartadaśāyām tu vaikharyātmanā bhedaḥ | tatra ca tad eva nityam jātyādirūpeṇa śabdavācyam |*

⁴¹ See Section 7 onwards.

⁴² As the discussion immediately preceding the quoted paragraph suggests, this *dravya* is connected with Patañjali’s discussion in the *Pāśasāhnikā* of the *Mahābhāṣya*.

⁴³ See the second and fourth chapters (Tarkakāṇḍa and Siddhikāṇḍa, according to the division made by Kuppuswami Sastri) of the *Brahmasiddhi*.

5.2. Kaiyaṭa and Puṇyarāja

When we turn our eyes towards another Kashmiri Grammarian Kaiyaṭa (11th c.?), who is probably slightly later than Helārāja,⁴⁴ we see another different aspect. In his commentary on Paspasāhnikā, the introduction of the *Mahābhāṣya*, he immediately equates *śabda* (from which the meaning/object is understood) with *sphoṭa*, which no doubt fixed the interpretation of this part of discussion.⁴⁵ Just as Helārāja integrated the *sphoṭa* theory with the various arguments of Bhartṛhari, Kaiyaṭa did the same in the *Mahābhāṣya*.⁴⁶ What we could emphasize more is his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.70. This is one of the few places where Patañjali mentions the *sphoṭa*. As is shown in [Brough 1951], Patañjali explained here that the *sphoṭa* is the *śabda*, while sound (*dhvani*) is the property of *śabda*, and he exemplifies it by a striker of a kettle-drum who produces various sounds in accordance with his strike but the *sphoṭa*, i.e., the base of those sounds is always of exactly the same extent. As far as I understand, however, this is not how Kaiyaṭa (and 18th century grammarian Nāgeśa who follows Kaiyaṭa's view on this account) interprets this passage. He divides the issue of striking of a kettle-drum and that of *sphoṭa* into an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) and the subject of example (*dārṣṭāntika*), and does not think that even the sound of a kettle-drum has a *sphoṭa*.⁴⁷ This means that the *sphoṭa* by this period is precisely the entity from which a certain meaning is understood, and therefore it only exists in “speech.”

Probably in Kashmir, and probably in medieval times, there existed another important Grammarian, Puṇyarāja (11th c.?), who wrote a commentary on the second book of the *Vākyapadīya*. However, as the chronology of this person (and the place where he lived) is rather dubious and shaky, it might be dangerous to argue in favour of the possible dates suggested by the previous studies. Let me, therefore, point out just one thing: his commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* requires sharp attention:

- Bhartṛhari never mentioned the *sphoṭa* in the second book, which contains his auto-commentary. In his mind there is a clear distinction between the two subjects, *sphoṭa*

⁴⁴ See [Potter 1990: 203; Sarma 2012: 6]. According to [Sarma 2016: 160], Nārāyaṇa, the author of the *Ṇeraṇausūtravyākhyāna*, quotes Kaiyaṭa (and Haradatta, the author of the *Padamañjarī*) criticizing a scholar, whose comments are found in Helārāja's commentary on the *Sādhanaśamuddeśa* in the third book of the *Vākyapadīya*. [Vergiani 2015: 207–12] also discusses the relation between Helārāja and Kaiyaṭa. He says that “the issue had better be considered still open,” but he is also favourably inclined to the possibility that Helārāja's commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* influenced and was reused by Kaiyaṭa.

⁴⁵ See [Saito 2020].

⁴⁶ For example, we see the classification of *jātisphoṭa* and *vyaktisphoṭa* in his commentary on Śivasūtra, which was also seen in Helārāja. See footnote 14.

⁴⁷ Pradīpa on *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.70 [564, ll. 17–22]: *bheryāghāta itī | bherīm āhantīti bheryāghātaḥ | upalabdhisāmānyē dṛṣṭāntaḥ | yathā —prayatnavasād utpanno bherīśabdaḥ kaś cid alpakālam upalabhyate, kaś cic ciram, kaś cic cirataram | evaṃ vṛttiśūpalabdhīnām kālabhedāḥ, viśayasya tv abheda eva || sphoṭas tāvān eveti | dārṣṭāntikopanyāsaḥ ||* ‘Regarding “bheryāghātaḥ”: it means “one who strikes a kettle-drum.” This is an example of perception in general. For example, [among] the sounds of the kettle-drum, by forth of the effort [of striking it], one is perceived for a short time, another for a very long time. In the same way, there is distinction of time of the perceptions in different tempos, but there is no distinction of the object (*viśaya*: sound) at all. “*Sphoṭas tāvān eva*” is the statement of the subject of the example.’

and *vākya*, and this distinction is supported by the *Vivaraṇa*.⁴⁸

- Puṇyarāja's commentary is literally full of remarks about the *sphoṭa*, including references to Kumārila's criticism of *sphoṭa*, several subdivisions of *sphoṭa* such as *jāṭisphoṭa* and *vyaktisphoṭa* (the same as *Helārāja* and *Kaiyaṭa*), and clear identification of *vākya* with the *sphoṭa*.

This discrepancy should be considered seriously. Puṇyarāja took a far more advanced method of presenting the *sphoṭa* than Jayanta did, and integrated it into the *Vākyaṭīkā*. He changed how the second book should be understood by his commentary, which is an almost complete reinterpretation of the text. And he has created a strong impression in the minds of his later readers that Bhartṛhari also discussed the *sphoṭa* in the second book.

6. *Dhvani* Theory and *Sphoṭa*

In discussing the *sphoṭa* in Kashmir, we cannot ignore the fact that Ānandavardhana, who was active during the reign of king Avantivarman (r. 855/6–883), i.e., the period just before Jayanta's success, had invented the theory of *dhvani*, which decisively oriented the subsequent history of Indian poetics. As numerous previous studies have taught us,⁴⁹ Ānandavardhana, in his *Dhvanyāloka* (Light on Suggestion), proposed a new linguistic function called *dhvani* "suggestion,"⁵⁰ which follows the well-established primary and secondary functions of language, i.e., *abhidhā* "denotation" and *lakṣaṇā* "indication." This purely linguistic operation communicates to the reader/listener the poetic beauty/emotion (*rasa*) —which is not directly expressed but only suggested (*dhvanyate*, *vyajyate*) —of a literary work. This theory caused a great controversy among scholars of the time. Although the *dhvani* theory came to dominate later poetic theories, there were many severe and strong criticisms of this new theory at that time. The purpose of this paper is not to elaborate on the entire *dhvani* theory, but to see from Abhinavagupta's words why the term *dhvani* is used to describe this "new" linguistic function and how the theory of *sphoṭa* and the *Sphoṭavādins*, i.e., the Grammarians, are explained, since Ānandavardhana himself was silent on these issues.

As [Ingalls 1990: 9, 13] tells us, *dhvani* in this special sense is not an innovation of Ānandavardhana, and the opening stanza of the *Dhvanyāloka* shows that in his time there was already a dispute among scholars about the existence of *dhvani*.⁵¹ It means that there was a

⁴⁸ See Section 2. It will be investigated more in detail in future.

⁴⁹ For example, see [Ingalls 1990], a full English translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* and *Locana*, [Kamimura 1999], a Japanese translation of the same book, [Pollock 2016: 87–97] and [Reich 2021]. From the viewpoint of the opponent, see [McCrea 2008]. For more studies, see [Bronner 2016; Ollet 2020; Cuneo 2020].

⁵⁰ For a more detailed investigation of the word *dhvani* and those derived from the verbal root *vyaj*, see [Reich 2021: 26–7]. For its translation, see [Pollock 2016: 352, fn. 261; Reich 2021: 30, fn. 14]. Among the various translations of *dhvani*, in this paper I follow Ingalls's translation "suggestion" since I quote his translation.

⁵¹ *Dhvanyāloka* 1.1: *kāvyaśātmā dhvanir iti budhair yaḥ samāmnātapūrvas tasyābhāvaṃ jagadur apare bhāktam āhus tam anye | ke cid vācām sthitam aviśaye tattvaṃ ūcus tadīyaṃ tena brūmaḥ saḥṛdayamaṇāḥ prīṭhaye tatsvarūpam ||* [Ingalls 1990: 47]: 'Some have said that the soul of poetry, which has been handed down from the past by wise men as "suggestion" (*dhvani*), does

tradition about *dhvani* different from that of the Grammarians and Mīmāṃsakas, even if we do not know exactly how old that idea was. But it would be difficult to deviate from the *Dhātupāṭha*-given meaning of *dhvan* “to sound” (I 854: *dhvanā śabde*) and have the meaning of “to make manifest” by itself without assuming Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of language, for he is the very one who established how *dhvanis*, ‘sounds’ for Bhartṛhari, play a role in “revealing” a *sphoṭa* in the process of pronouncing and hearing words. Therefore, although Ānandavardhana did not mention the *sphoṭa*, we may be able to consider that the concept of *dhvani* was transformed in the process of transmission and development of the *sphoṭa* theory after the fifth century.⁵²

Ānandavardhana was silent,⁵³ but Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025), who wrote a commentary, *Locana*, on the *Dhvanyāloka*, gives us more information about his understanding of *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. This point was discussed by [Ingalls 1990: 169–73] and [Kamimura 1999: 99–103, 368–9], which are very helpful in grasping the contents and problems.⁵⁴ With reference to them, I summarize briefly the points made by Abhinavagupta. His first short remark on the *sphoṭa* in the beginning of the *Locana*, “Those too who claim that both sentence and sentence meaning are an indivisible entity called the *sphoṭa*, when they descend into the world of communication, follow our system in all respects”⁵⁵ indicates that the *sphoṭa* is understood as the signifier (*śabda*, *vācaka*) on the one hand and as the signified (*artha*, *vācya*) on the other. Integration of *sphoṭa* and *vākya* was a line established by his time, but this duality is quite unique and has never been seen before him. Of course, he is right in saying this in the sense that the *sphoṭa*, i.e., the word’s phonetic form, is first of all what is signified by the word. And since he is after Jayanta, it is also natural that being a *śabda*, the word, it is also on the side of the signifier.⁵⁶ Abhinavagupta also suggests that the

not exist; others, that it is an associated meaning (*bhākta*); while some have said that its nature lies outside the scope of speech: of this [suggestion] we shall here state the true nature in order to delight the hearts of sensitive readers.’ According to [Ingalls 1990: 9, 13], the theory of *dhvani* is theoretically established by Ānandavardhana, but its original form is found in Udbhaṭa’s work, and his contemporary *Manoratha* criticizes the term *dhvani*.

⁵² As I mentioned in [Saito 2020: 81–2], it is possible that Bhartṛhari also accumulated various theories of sound and *sphoṭa* that existed in his time. So, we do not necessarily need to connect Bhartṛhari’s *dhvani* directly to the *dhvani* of Ānandavardhana; nevertheless, I would say that it is thanks to Bhartṛhari that the word *dhvani* has come to have a special power to make something manifest, as Abhinavagupta uses several quotations from the *Vākyapadīya* as support for *dhvani* (though of course the *sphoṭa* cannot be comparable to *rasa*).

⁵³ [Reich 2021: 46–57] presents a deeper look into the relationship between Bhartṛhari and Ānandavardhana. I like his statement: “It is important to be aware that for Bhartṛhari this is not a semantic issue. It is distinct from the question of how the word “antelope” relates to its meaning. With the theory of *sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari addresses only the relationship between the separate sounds and the unified, meaning-bearing symbol that they comprise” [Reich 2021: 48]. This is absolutely right.

⁵⁴ [Kamimura 1974a; Kamimura 1974b] are probably one of the earliest studies on this topic, revised in [Kamimura 1999: 99–103]. [Ingalls 1999: 169–73], a translation and notes of the related texts, is also quite informative. According to it, the purpose of his commentary in this part of the book is to justify the *dhvani* of the poetic theory raised by Ānandavardhana by the words about *dhvani* of great scholars in the past.

⁵⁵ *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka* 1.4 [67, ll. 5–8]: *ye ’py avibhaktaṃ sphoṭaṃ vākyam tadārthaṃ cāhuḥ, tair apy avidyāpadapatitaiḥ sarveyam anusaraṇīyā prakriyā | tadutīrṇatve tu sarvaṃ parameśvarādvayaṃ brahmeti asmacchāstrakāreṇa na na viditāṃ tattvālokanāthaṃ viracyatety āstām* | [Ingalls 1999: 90]: ‘Those too who claim that both sentence and sentence meaning are an indivisible entity called the *sphoṭa*, when they descend into the world of communication, follow our system in all respects. Above that world, of course, everything is *brahma*, which is identical with God Supreme: a point of view not unknown to our author, who also wrote a work called *Tattvāloka*. So now enough.’

⁵⁶ The reference to duality reminds us of *paśyanti* or language absolute, in which there is no distinction of *vācya* and *vācaka*. See section 7.

Grammarians's view of language is extreme insofar as it does not admit of any analytical process in language understanding, and that the *sphoṭa* is representative of this.⁵⁷

In the long commentary on *Dhvanyāloka* 1.13,⁵⁸ Abhinavagupta classifies *dhvani* into five.⁵⁹ The five *dhvanis* are: (1) the one as a subsequent resonance manifested (*vyāṅgya*) by the initial sound, (2) the one (*śabda*) that manifests (*vyāñjaka*) the *sphoṭa*, (3) the one (*artha*) that manifests something, (4) the one that produces a difference in intonation or timbre, known in Bhartṛhari's terminology as the "secondary sound" (*vaiṛtadhvani*), and (5) the poetry (*kāvya*) that contains those *dhvanis*.⁶⁰ And for the first four *dhvanis*, he refers to Bhartṛhari's stanzas as support for his argument:

1. *dhvani* as *vyāṅgyārtha*: this is supported by *Vākyapadīya* 1.105.⁶¹ There, as the views of other scholars, Bhartṛhari introduced two possibilities for whether *sphoṭa* is permanent or not. (1) If we adopt the theory that *sphoṭa* is impermanent, it is the initial sharp sound form (*śabda*) produced by the mouth or instrument, and it is followed by *dhvani*, which fills the entire space so that everyone in the audible range can grasp the sound (at the same time, it fades away as it gets further way from the sound source).⁶² This *dhvani* means the continuation of sound (*śabdasantāna*)⁶³ or resonance (*anuraṇana*) manifested by the initial sound.⁶⁴ (2) If we adopt that *sphoṭa* is permanent, it is the unchangeable phonetic form manifested by sounds, either *dhvani* or *nāda*. This permanent *sphoṭa* is also followed by its resonance.⁶⁵ In both cases, *dhvani* is described as "produced" by *śabda*,⁶⁶ which Abhinavagupta understands as "manifested" (*vyāṅgya*).⁶⁷

⁵⁷ Ingalls says in his note on [Ingalls 1999: 97]: "Abhinava is not fair here to the *sphoṭavāda*. The grammarians conceived of *sphoṭa* in the world of ordinary communication (*vyavahāra*, *avidyā*) as well as in the rarified metaphysical world of param brahma." But, to me, the statement seems fair enough.

⁵⁸ In the auto-commentary on 1.13, Ānandavardhana explains that for the Grammarians *dhvani* means **śrūyamāṇaḥ varṇāḥ* 'phonemes that are heard' (here I translate *varṇa* as 'phoneme' not following Ingalls's translation 'sounds of speech').

⁵⁹ According to Ingalls and Kamimura, the first four *dhvanis* are asserted by Grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas, and Nyāyavaiśeṣika scholars. But since Bhartṛhari himself presented them in the *Vākyapadīya*, my impression is that all four views are grounded in Bhartṛhari's discussion. See *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka* 1.13 [133, l. 4–135, l. 5], [Ingalls 1999: 169–73], and [Kamimura 1999: 99–103].

⁶⁰ In each case, Abhinavagupta interprets slightly differently Ānandavardhana's *mūla* text "*te ca śrūyamāṇeṣu varṇeṣu dhvanir iti vyavaharanti*."

⁶¹ *Vākyapadīya* 1.105 (1.102 in [Ingalls 1990]): *yaḥ saṃyogaviyogābhyāṃ karaṇair upajanyate | sa sphoṭaḥ śabdajāś śabdā dhvanayo 'nyair udāhṛtāḥ ||* 'Others argue that what arises through conjunction and disjunction with the sense-organs is the *sphoṭa*, and the sounds (*śabdāḥ*) produced by that [initial] sound [that is the *sphoṭa*] are *dhvanis*.'

⁶² See the auto-commentary on *Vākyapadīya* 1.105 [167, l. 3–168, l. 3].

⁶³ *Vākyapadīya* 1.106: *alpe mahati vā śabde sphoṭakālo na bhidyate | paras tu śabdasamāntāṇaḥ pracayāpacayātmakāḥ ||* 'Whether the sound is small or big [in its size], the time [required for existence] of the *sphoṭa* remains the same. What consists of an increase or decrease is a continuation of the sound, which is different [from *sphoṭa*].'

⁶⁴ Therefore, in *Vākyapadīya* 1.105 the word *śabda* should not be taken as a 'word.' The stanza speaks only of the auditory aspect.

⁶⁵ See the auto-commentary on *Vākyapadīya* 1.105 [168, ll. 3–6].

⁶⁶ Neither Bhartṛhari nor the commentator, Vṛṣabhadeva, says that the *sphoṭa* manifests *dhvani*. They do not find the function of manifesting anything in the *sphoṭa*.

⁶⁷ *Locana* [133, ll. 4–6]: *śrotraśaṣkuliṃ santānenāgatā antyāḥ śabdāḥ śrūyanta iti prakriyāyāṃ śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ śrūyamāṇā ity uktam | teṣāṃ ghaṭtānuraṇanarūpatvaṃ tāvad asti; te ca dhvaniśabdenoktāḥ ||* [Ingalls 1990: 169–70]: 'According to the process [described in the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika] it is the last sound of a chain of sounds that enters the orifice of the ear, so the heard sounds are sounds born of sounds, [not the original sounds produced by the organs of speech]. These sounds in form are

2. *dhvani* as *vyañjakāśabda*: this is supported by the famous *Vākyapadīya* 1.85.⁶⁸ In this case Abhinavagupta understands *dhvanis* to be the phonemes (*varṇāḥ*) that are grasped by the auditory faculty (*śrūyamāṇa*), and its synonym is *nāda*.⁶⁹

3. *dhvani* as *vyañjakārtha*: this is explained by Abhinavagupta, collectively with 2. According to him, the above statement of Bhartṛhari justifies the use of the word *dhvani* in the sense of “*śabda* and *artha*, which make something manifest.”⁷⁰ But it is impossible to understand *dhvani* as *vyañjaka-artha* ‘object/meaning that manifests [something]’ simply from the context in the *Vākyapadīya*.

4. *dhvani* as *atiriktavyāpāra*: in this case, *varṇa* in the sense of the primary sound (*prākṛtadhvani*) is supported by *Śloka-vārttika* Sphoṭavāda 10,⁷¹ while *dhvani* in the sense of the secondary sound is supported by *Vākyapadīya* 1.77.⁷² In Bhartṛhari, *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* are in a different relation in *Vākyapadīya* 1.105 and 1.77. *Dhvani* in the former was produced/manifested by the *sphoṭa*, while in the latter the [*vaikṛta*]-*dhvani* is produced from the *prākṛtadhvani* (‘primary sound’). Here, however, Abhinavagupta interprets *Vākyapadīya* 1.77 quite differently. He understands *dhvani* as the function (*vyāpāra*) that is beyond ordinary ones. The term *vaikṛta* is interpreted not as ‘secondary’ but as ‘derivative,’ i.e., as something beyond ordinary things, like suggestion beyond primary and secondary function.⁷³

Aside from Abhinavagupta’s far-fetched argument (I do not believe that he was not aware of this fact)[Kamimura 1999: 102–3], we can see that the most important character of *dhvani* is its function

like the reverberations of a bell, and it is these sounds that are called *dhvani*.’

⁶⁸ *Vākyapadīya* 1.85: *pratyayair anupākyeyair grahaṇānugūṇais tathā | dhvaniṣprakāśite śabde svarūpam avadhāryate ||* ‘In the same way (just as the memory of a vedic verse is strengthened by its repetition), through the unanalysable cognitions dependent on the grasping (perception), the [word’s] own form is ascertained when the word is manifested by the sounds (*dhvani*).’

⁶⁹ *Locana* [133, ll. 10–11]: *tathā śrūyamāṇā ye varṇā nādaśabdavācya antyabuddhīnirgrāhyasphoṭābhivyāñjakās te dhvaniśabdenoktāḥ |* [Ingalls 1990: 70]: ‘Again, the phonemes as heard, technically called *nādaśabdas*, manifest the semantic unit, which we comprehend as soon as we cognize the final phoneme. These phoneme-manifestors are called *dhvanis*.’

⁷⁰ *Locana* [134, l. 3]: *tena vyañjakau śabdārthāu apīha dhvaniśabdenoktau |* [Ingalls 1990: 170]: ‘So we too use the term *dhvani* for the word and the [literal] sense which manifest [the suggested meaning].’

⁷¹ *Śloka-vārttika* Sphoṭavāda 10: *alpīyasāpi yatnena śabdām uccāritam matih | yadi vā naiva grhṇāti varṇam vā sakalam sphuṭam ||* ‘Even though a word [i.e.,] phoneme is uttered with little effort, cognition either does not grasp [it] at all or [grasps it] completely and clearly.’ For more detailed context in this part of the ŚV, see [Omae 2000].

⁷² *Vākyapadīya* 1.77: *śabdasyordhvam abhivyakter vṛttibhede tu vaikṛtāḥ | dhvanayaḥ samupohante sphoṭātmā tair na bhidyate ||* ‘After the manifestation of the word, the secondary sounds bring about a distinction in modality. The *sphoṭa* itself is not distinguished by them.’

⁷³ *Locana* [134, ll. 3–12]: *kiñ ca varṇeṣu tāvanmātraparimāṇev api satsu | ... teṣu tāvatśv eva śrūyamāṇeṣu vaktur yo ’nyo drutāvilambitādīvṛttibhedātmā prasiddhā uccāraṇavyāpārād abhyadhikāḥ sa dhvanir uktaḥ | ... | asmābhir api prasiddhebhyaḥ śabdavyāpārebhyaḥ | bhīdhātātparyalakṣaṇārūpebhyaḥ | tirikto vyāpāro dhvanir ity uktaḥ |* [Ingalls 1990: 170]: ‘Furthermore, it is in the *varṇas* (the phonemes produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the vocal organs) that the differences of prosodical length (e.g., a. and ā, i and ī) reside, ... As these same differences are heard in the secondary sound, [or *dhvani*, that reaches the ear], it is only such other elements of the speaker’s speech, such as its slow or rapid delivery, dements over and above the well-defined operations of articulation [e.g., prosodical length, aspiration, closure, etc.] that are more particularly called *dhvani*.’ This interpretation too cannot be understood simply from the original context of the *Vākyapadīya*.

of manifesting. And to that point, I would say that the concept of *sphoṭa* was not distorted. We do not see a strange new addition to that.

What about the scholars on poetics after Abhinavagupta? The eleventh century Kashmiri scholar Mahima Bhaṭṭa (c. 1025) [Pollock 2016: 106] criticized the existence of *dhvani* in his *Vyaktiviveka* ('Examination of Suggestion'). In its first chapter, he discusses what the word *vyakti* or *abhivvyakti* ('manifestation') means. And he very briefly mentions *sphoṭa*:

For this reason, it is impossible [to claim] the relationship of manifesting and manifested between sounds (*śabdānām*), which are perceived and called *dhvani*, and the object that fills [sounds] and is considered the *sphoṭa*.⁷⁴

Although Mahima rejects the idea that the *sphoṭa* is manifested by *dhvani*, the *sphoṭa* is straightforwardly understood by him. Probably it is the same for another poetician Maṃmaṭa (c. 1100) [Pollock 2016: 224]. In his *Kāvyaṇṇakāśa* 1.4, which again gives only one line to the *sphoṭa*, Maṃmaṭa explains that for the Grammarians, *dhvani* is what makes the *sphoṭa* manifest.⁷⁵

After all, despite the *dhvani* theory being quite unique, the poeticians' view of *sphoṭa* seems to be very basic and no further development has been added to it (i.e., no significant attention has been paid to the *sphoṭa*). However, as is well known about Abhinavagupta, it is important to note that another important character of his is that of a Śaiva theologian and philosopher. When the *sphoṭa* is viewed in the Śaiva context, its dualistic nature, the signifier and the signified, becomes an important factor. Let us return to Abhinava's predecessors of the Pratyabhijñā school, Somānanda and Utpaladeva.

7. Somānanda and Utpaladeva

How Somānanda (fl. c. 900–50),⁷⁶ the founder of the Śaiva Pratyabhijñā school, and his disciple Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–75), who was the teacher of Abhinavagupta's teacher Lakṣmaṇagupta, encountered and reacted to the philosophy of Bhartṛhari (or the Grammarians) —especially his monistic worldview —has been studied in detail by excellent previous studies such as [Gnoli 1959; Torella 2004; Torella 2008; Torella 2013b; Nemec 2011], and so forth.⁷⁷ In the *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari introduced three planes of speech: *vaikharī* ('concrete'), *madhyamā* ('middle'), and *paśyantī* ('what is seeing'), which are the modalities of speech: audible, internal murmur, and pure consciousness. This verbal ontology, so to speak, cannot be traced back to before Bhartṛhari, but it can be considered that there existed a cosmology that regarded the sonic power as the

⁷⁴ *Vyaktiviveka* [11, ll. 8–9]: *ata eva śrūyamāṇānām śabdānām dhvanivyapadeśyānām antaḥ saṃniveśināś ca sphoṭābhimatasyārthasya vyaṅgyavyaṅjakabhāvo na sambhavatīti* ...

⁷⁵ Auto-commentary on *Kāvyaṇṇakāśa* 1.4 [15, ll. 2–3]: *budhair vaiyākaraṇaiḥ pradhānabhūtasphoṭarūpavyaṅgyavyaṅjakasya śabdasya dhvanir iti vyavahārah kṛtaḥ* | 'By learned Grammarians, sounds (*śabda*) that manifest the principal object to be manifested, i.e., the *sphoṭa*, is called *dhvani*.'

⁷⁶ For the dates of Somānanda and Utpaladeva, see [Sanderson 2007: 411].

⁷⁷ [Nemec 2011] is an immensely useful work, nonetheless it should be carefully read with the review and corrections proposed by [Torella 2013a; Torella 2014].

ultimate cause of the universe, and that Bhartṛhari summarized such a tradition in his book.⁷⁸ No philosopher since Bhartṛhari, as far as I know, has discussed these three planes of speech in the medieval period outside Kashmir region. In Kashmir, on the other hand, probably from Jayanta onwards, many thinkers of different standpoints have referred to them in the discussion of speech, often together with *sphoṭa*.

Somānanda's lengthy critique of the "Grammarians" (*vaiyākaraṇa*) *paśyanti* in the entire second chapter of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* is well-known, and there are several scholarly works that serve as guides to understanding the text.⁷⁹ To summarize very briefly, the problem with the Grammarians that Somānanda found unacceptable is that they take *paśyanti*, according to [Torella 2001: 861] "the plane where awareness is exempt from mental constructs (*vikalpa*), thus making indistinct the succession which, however, persists both in the signifier and the signified pertaining to the sphere of the perceiver subject and the perceived object respectively," to be the highest plane of speech in the form of supreme consciousness. It is "the very first 'verbalization', still enclosed but potentially about to unfold" (ibid.), and is understood by the Śaiva thinkers, beginning with Somānanda, as still having some sequence in itself, and therefore not suitable for the ultimate plane.⁸⁰ In the middle of the discussion, there is a reference to the *sphoṭa* in stanzas 58–61ab:⁸¹

Translation by [Nemec 2001: 191–3]: "*Paśyanti* is either the same as *sphoṭa* or is different from it. If she is different from it, that would produce dualism. On the other hand, if she is the same as it, then truthfulness would be obtained here by understanding a sentence in the form "(one hundred herds of elephants reside) on the tip of my finger": there would be no distinction (of true from false statements). Even the deliberation on (whether something is conveyed by) reliable or unreliable persons would come to a complete halt.

⁷⁸ As many previous scholarly works point out, when this concept of triadic speech was developed in Kashmir Śaivism, the fourth plane *parā* ('highest') has been put on the top of the other three through the reinterpretation of Bhartṛhari's statement. The word *parā* is actually present in the original Bhartṛhari's passage, but it qualifies the word *paśyanti*. As [Torella 2001; Torella 2013b] points out, the word *madhyamā* clearly indicates that the original classification is three. Though Torella states that there is still possibility that Bhartṛhari excludes the ultimate *śabdātattva* (*śabdabrahman*) from this triadic speech and it might be actually four levels for Bhartṛhari too, Helārāja (see section 5.1) identifies the *paśyanti* as the *śabdabrahman*.

⁷⁹ [Gnoli 1959] provides an Italian translation of this chapter. See [Torella 2001] for a discussion of the planes of speech that was adopted in Śaivism. [Torella 2008] provides a very useful summary of this chapter, and teaches us an important change of attitude towards Bhartṛhari in the Pratyabhijñā school in which Somānanda fiercely criticized Bhartṛhari ("total lack of fair play in his attitude to Bhartṛhari"), while Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta tried to understand Bhartṛhari's text in a more favorable light. However, for the theory of *sphoṭa*, Utpaladeva is quite critical, as is Somānanda.

⁸⁰ *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* 2.1 [305, ll. 3–5]: *athāsmākaṃ jñānaśaktir yā sadāśivārūpatā | vaiyākaraṇasādhūnām paśyanti sā parā sthitiḥ ||* Translation by [Nemec 2011: 146]: 'Now, what for us is the power of cognition in the form of Sadāśiva is for the honorable grammarians *paśyanti*, the supreme state.' If we look at the dualistic Śaivism (Śaiva Siddhānta), the monism based on the language absolute (*śabdabrahmavāda*) is criticized from a different perspective.

⁸¹ Note that in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, a commentary on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāsūtra* by Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta discusses the planes of speech such as *paśyanti*, but does not the *sphoṭa* at all (except for one use of *sphoṭa* in the sense of 'pimple, boil'). As [Torella 2004] says, *sphoṭa* is hardly discussed by Abhinavagupta, [Torella 2004: 173–4]: "At a certain point of my study of Abhinavagupta's work I was struck by the fact that he hardly ever mentions *sphoṭa*. Acceptance of *sphoṭa* would seem the natural outcome of the central place that Abhinavagupta assigns to the whole of Bhartṛharian teaching in the *Trika* philosophy, since in Bhartṛhari's conception the *sphoṭa* theory plays an essential role. On the contrary, the rare occurrences of the term *sphoṭa* in Abhinavagupta's works all show that he considers this doctrine as belonging to 'others', that is, the Vaiyākaraṇas towards whom he never fails to exhibit a certain coldness."

Indeed, how can *sphoṭa* be made perceptible by words, etc., that are unreal? Nor can *paśyantī*, which is real, be made perceptible by that which is unreal. Depending on such manifestation, she becomes nothing at all.”⁸²

In the footnote [Nemec 2011: 191, fn. 290] says that *sphoṭa* in the above passage is “the denotative power of speech” or “the meaning of speech” that is manifested by sounds (*dhvani*). Both are not so precise (*sphoṭa* is not a *śakti*; what is manifested by sounds is not the meaning), and this explanation creates needless confusion. As Abhinavagupta stated in the *Locana* of the *Dhvanyāloka*, I suspect that the *sphoṭa* for Somānanda is also both the signifier (i.e., word, sentence, etc.) and the signified (i.e., object). The reason of my speculation is because Somānanda questions if *paśyantī*, which, as Torella explained, has no distinction of the signifier and the signified, is the same as *sphoṭa*. This equation makes sense if the *sphoṭa* is of a dualistic nature. Non-distinction of these two aspects in the ultimate language absolute, which is equal to *paśyantī*, has been stated by Helārāja (almost contemporary with Somānanda) in *Dravyasamuddeśa* 11:

In that case, too, since by resting (i.e., purely concentrating) on the inmost cause, the property of being a signifier is established [in *śabdabrahman*], [and] since [all the] objects that exist within [*śabdabrahman*] itself have the property of being expressed, a non-distinction between the signifier and the signified is established [in *śabdabrahman*].⁸³

In considering how Somānanda understood the *sphoṭa*, his question is quite suggestive: it implies that the ontological status of *sphoṭa* is ambiguous for him. His first option, “if *paśyantī* is different from *sphoṭa*, that would produce dualism,” makes no sense unless one places a much higher status on the *sphoṭa* than ordinary entities and also understands it to be different from *vaikhari* and *madhyamā*. If it is nothing more than a linguistic entity such as a word or a sentence, or what is expressed by it, i.e., a word object or a sentence object, then how can we ask such a question? What is the point of asking whether a meaningless or ridiculous statement can be true? Utpaladeva, commenting on stanzas 60–61ab, says that the *sphoṭa* is “supremely/unchangingly eternal” (*kūṭasthanitya*).⁸⁴ Even if this argument were based on the premise that the *sphoṭa* is identical with *paśyantī*, this eternity is quite different from that which we have seen in Bhāmaha for example. Bhāmaha’s account does not imply an ontological status for *sphoṭa* (or phonemes, as I mentioned). But Utpaladeva’s supreme eternity, or the word *satya* (‘real’),⁸⁵ indicates an

⁸² Śivadr̥ṣṭi 2.58–61ab [334, l. 10–335, l. 13]: *sphoṭa eva hi paśyanti tadanyā vā dvayaṃ bhavet | vākyagatyātra satyatvaṃ labhyate na viśeṣatā || tadanyatve tadaikye vā tadaṅgulyagrārūpayā | āptānāptavicāro vā sarvathaiva nivartate || sphoṭasyāsatyārūpair hi padādyaṃ vyaṅgyatā katham | paśyantyāḥ satyarūpāyā asatyair vyaṅgyatā na ca || tādr̥gvyahjanasāpekṣā sā na kiṃ cana jāyate |*

⁸³ Helārāja’s commentary on *Dravyasamuddeśa* 11 [115, ll. 4–6]: *tatrāpy āntaropādānaviśrāntyā vācakatvasya vyavasthāpanāt svarūpāntartagatasyārthasya vācyatvād vācyavācakayor avibhāgaḥ siddhaḥ |*

⁸⁴ Śivadr̥ṣṭivrtti [335, ll. 442–4]: *sphoṭasya ca kūṭasthanityasya satyasya padavarṇadhvanibhir upaplutair akimcitsvarūpair aśaktair atyantavijātiyaiḥ katham vyaṅgyatā satyaprakāśanasāmarthyhe teṣāṃ satyatāpatteḥ |* Translation by [Nemec 2011: 193]: “How, moreover, can the supremely eternal, real *sphoṭa* be made perceptible by words, phonemes, and sounds that are impure, have no nature whatsoever, (and) are powerless and absolutely different [from *sphoṭa*] (correction by [Torella 2014] which I follow; “of many different kinds” in Nemec); for if they were capable of illuminating the real [*sphoṭa*], they would (also) be real.”

⁸⁵ The word *satya* reminds us of Helārāja’s statement in *Dravyasamuddeśa* 11. See Section 5.1.

ontological supremacy. His reasoning that “the pure thing cannot be manifested by the impure” is backed up by the pure/impure (*śuddha/aśuddha*) division of the universe made by Śaivas, although the word *upapluta* was taken from Bhartṛhari.

Here, we can dig a little deeper and say that in Śaivism, as seen in the Six Paths of the universe consisting of three (Varṇa, Pada, Mantra) for the signifier (*vācaka*) and three (Kalā, Tattva, Bhuvana) for the signified (*vācya*),⁸⁶ the realm of speech and the realm of the object are strictly separated, so that the *sphoṭa*, with its dualistic nature of the signifier and the signified at the mundane level, can never fit into their system. There is nothing strange about the Grammarians’ *sphoṭa* theory if we look purely at worldly linguistic phenomena. But if we try to give it an ontological status, the *sphoṭa* is indeed an ambiguous entity, and if it is identical with *paśyantī*, as in Somānanda’s second option, then the Śaiva thinkers, who consider Śiva to be pure consciousness at the apex of the universe, cannot recognize it as the ultimate reality.

There is clearly Jayanta’s discussion of *sphoṭa* behind this argument. Jayanta concluded in the *Sphoṭavāda* chapter that the Grammarians’ philosophy of language, i.e., *sphoṭa* theory, boils down to a metaphysics of three planes which finally leads to *paśyantī*. This synthesis, as I said before, had not been seen before Jayanta. The *sphoṭa* theory combined with ontological arguments was probably Jayanta’s original, and has since formed the “Grammarians’ philosophy” in medieval Kashmir.

[Torella 2014: 182–3] proposed the hypothesis that the reason why Abhinavagupta hardly mentions the *sphoṭa* theory is because he was a Varṇavādin in a different sense from the Mīmāṃsakas.⁸⁷ Yes, indeed, he was a Varṇavādin, and I totally agree with Torella’s view. But on a very small point, as to whether Abhinavagupta understood the *sphoṭa* as transcendental, I have a different hypothesis which may also explain the lack of reference to the *sphoṭa*. It may be that, unlike Somānanda and Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta understood the concept of *sphoṭa* in a more original sense, and did not readily associate it with ontological arguments, especially those about the supreme reality, just as Bhartṛhari never used the term *sphoṭa* in the discussion of *śabdabrahman* or *paśyantī*. At least Abhinavagupta does not explain the *sphoṭa* as transcendental in the *Locana* of the *Dhvanyāloka*. But this may just be my imagination. If Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* had survived, we might have been able to see what was really going on and how he understood the *sphoṭa*.

⁸⁶ The sixfold Path is the cosmic and soteriological course that maps the whole cosmos and at the initiation (*dīkṣā*) it is used by the master to lead the disciple from the earth, where he lives, up to Śiva. It consists in three signified Paths, i.e., Kalā, Tattva, and Bhuvana, and three signifier Paths that are Mantra, Pada, and Varṇa. Each Path has its own stories but necessarily divided into pure (*śuddhādhvan*: ‘Pure Path’) and impure part (*aśuddhādhvan*: ‘Impure Path’). See [Padoux 1990: 331; Torella 2004: 175–8].

⁸⁷ [Torella 2004: 183]: “Will this result in going closer and closer to the Mīmāṃsā? Why not? After all, both the Mīmāṃsakas and the Śaivas feel as their primary duty the defence and exegesis of the Śruti, as embodied in the Vedas for the former, in the Tantras for the latter. This is, however, only a prima-facie answer. On a closer examination, it becomes clear that Abhinavagupta’s position is the result of cooking, as it were, Mīmāṃsā elements in a Bhartṛharian sauce.”

8. Un-incorporation of Śaiva Siddhānta: *Sphoṭa*, *Nāda*, *Bindu*

8.1. *Parāṅhyatantra*

What about the situation of the Śaiva Siddhānta, another Śaiva school that flourished in medieval Kashmir? First of all, in the sixth chapter of the *Parāṅhyatantra*, an eighth–ninth century [Goodall 2004: xlvi–lviii] scripture of the Śaiva Siddhānta we find a very classical theory of *sphoṭa* in the view of the opponent.⁸⁸ Thanks to the great work of [Goodall 2004],⁸⁹ this interesting and valuable text is now much more accessible than the rest of the Saiddhāntika canon, and its structure and content can be read and examined with considerable ease.⁹⁰ The main topics of this chapter, where the mantras are the focus, are listed at the beginning: “the raising of mantras (*mantroddhāraḥ*), the arising of the phonemes, the connection of words and sentences with meaning, the defining characteristic of mantras and their convention (*mantralakṣaṇasāṅketāḥ*), how the fruits of particular mantras are attained” [Goodall 2004: 321]. The chapter begins with the creation of the universe and the activation of Bindu, the seed of sounds, by Lord Śiva. From Bindu the totality of sounds (*śabdārāśi*) comes into existence,⁹¹ followed by phonemes, words and sentences, and the understanding of meaning which is the basis for worldly interaction (*vyavahāranibandhana*). Here *Prakāśa*, the interlocutor of the *Parāṅhya*, is challenged by Pratoda [Goodall 2004: xxxix–xli] that it is not phonemes but the *sphoṭa* that is the cause of the understanding of meaning:

Translation by [Goodall 2004: 325]: Since phonemes perish in an instant, *sphoṭa* must be that which effects the understanding of meaning. This all-pervading, eternal entity, manifestable by the phonemes, is, they say (*kila*), what makes the meaning clear.⁹²

Here we see a distinction between the two themes of “the creation of sounds” and “the understanding of meaning.” Pratoda’s question is posed here only to insert a well-known argument about the understanding of language at that time, not to show that the *sphoṭa* is related to the cosmic sonic entity. This is evident from the fact that *Prakāśa*’s answer (stanzas 10–16) merely follows the answers of the Mīmāṃsakas, adding nothing new.⁹³ On the other hand, the

⁸⁸ According to [Goodall 2004: lviii], this scripture deals in particular with a variety of theological and philosophical issues. The “stock discussions of *sphoṭa*,” [Goodall 2004: li] says, indicate that the *Parāṅhya* was composed sometime after that actual discussions.

⁸⁹ See also [Goodall 2001: n. 84].

⁹⁰ As regards the theory of *sphoṭa*, I have not always shared the views of Goodall. But I note here with deep gratitude that his books, on the *Kiraṇatantra* and *Parāṅhyatantra*, and numerous co-authored books, and invaluable guidance and advice have been, and continue to be, a bright light guiding me in my study of Śaiva Siddhānta during my stay in Pondicherry.

⁹¹ See [Torella 2004] and also [Törzsök 2015].

⁹² *Parāṅhyatantra* 6.9: *varṇānām kṣaṇavidhvaṃsāt sphoṭo ’rthapratipādakāḥ | varṇavyaṅgyo vibhūr nityaḥ so ’rthaṃ sphoṭayate kila ||*

⁹³ [Goodall 2004: lxiii] summarises as follows: “*Prakāśa* responds by asking whether this *sphoṭa* is the same as or different from the phonemes, and then showing that the two alternatives are to be rejected: meaning is conveyed by the final phoneme in conjunction with a trace left by the utterance of the preceding phonemes, and thus the phonemes themselves enable worldly interaction.” See also [Torella 2004: 184–6], especially his comment “in the latter part of the chapter the

all-pervading (*vibhu*) and eternal (*nitya*) nature of the *sphoṭa* is showing its potential to be given added ontological value. But not yet. The discussion of *sphoṭa* in this text remains epistemological.

What I want to examine in the next section is whether the old Śaiva Siddhānta theologians really understood the *sphoṭa* as a transcendental entity. And my present conclusion is that they did not. I will try to show this through an examination of the *Nāḍakārikā* and *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā*.

8.2. *Nāḍakārikā* and *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā*

The *Nāḍakārikā* ('Stanzas on *nāḍa*') is a short treatise on *nāḍa* included in a long commentary on the *Sārdhatriśatikālottara* written by Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha (fl. c. 950–1000), a tenth-century Kashmiri Saiddhāntika scholar and disciple of Utpaladeva [Goodall 1998: ix–xviii; Watson 2006: 114–5]. (*Nāḍa*) means 'sound' just as *dhvani* means 'sound' and these two words are almost always synonymous. However, while in the *sphoṭa* theory the word *dhvani* is used more often, giving the image that it is a sound that is heard (perceived),⁹⁴ the word *nāḍa* is used more often, especially in the context of Śaivism, to describe a sound that is pronounced or vocalized, a sound that comes out of the body using the vocal organs to create and emit language,⁹⁵ and it even evolves from there to express the "sonic power" that governs the creation of the universe. As [Torella 2004: 184–6] and [Sferra 2010]⁹⁶ tell us, some stanzas (stanzas 2–9) in the *Nāḍakārikā* are strikingly reminiscent of the *sphoṭa* theory. Here, [Torella 2004: 184] said that we could read an "implicit rejection of the *sphoṭa* doctrine." [Goodall 2004: 326, fn. 653], on the other hand, said that Rāmakaṇṭha's theory of *nāḍa* is rather close to the *sphoṭa* theory, even though a twelfth-century South Indian scholar Aghoraśiva discussed and criticised the "Grammarians' *sphoṭa*" in his commentary on stanza 7.⁹⁷

original Mīmāṃsā-like thesis gradually makes way for a Naiyāyika-like one, with an increasing emphasis on the role of convention (*saṃketa*)."[Goodall 2004: 326] says that a positive endorsement of the *varṇa* theory would be contrary to what Rāmakaṇṭha explains in his *Nāḍakārikā*, but I do not think so. See the next section.

⁹⁴ Having said this, I am fully aware that Bhartṛhari had used the word (*nāḍa*) as well when discussing the *sphoṭa* in the *Vākyapadīya*. There is actually another way to distinguish between the two: subtle particles of sound spread in space, called *dhvani*, and gross sound accumulated by the speech-organs, called *nāḍa* (see [Saito 2020: 80]). But still, I do not think it is futile to try to understand the different nuances in them. Certainly, there are cases where the descriptions are almost identical, such as *prākṛta-dhvani*, *vaikṛta-dhvani*, or *prākṛta-nāḍa*, *vaikṛta-nāḍa* (which discourages me), but I think it is possible to recognize a division between "vocal" and "audible" in these two words, *nāḍa* and *dhvani*.

⁹⁵ This is, for example, supported by the following stanza, Vājasaneyiprātiśākhya 1.6 or Āpastambaśikṣā 1.1, quoted in the beginning of the Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on the *Sārdhatriśatikālottara* 1.5ab [9, ll. 8–9]: *ākāśavāyuprabhavaḥ śarīrātmatam uccaran vaktram upaiti nāḍaḥ | sthānāntareṣu pravibhajyamāno varnatvam āgacchati yaḥ sa śabdaḥ |* 'Nāḍa, produced by the ether [that functions as the medium] and vital-air, approaches the mouth rising up from [the bottom of] the body. When it becomes phoneme through being divided at the various places of articulation, it is [called] speech (*śabda*).'

⁹⁶ With regard to the *Nāḍakārikā* and the *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā*, Sferra's research is indispensable. I also note here that since 2020, together with Dominic Goodall, we have been collaborating on the production of a critical edition of the unpublished commentary on the *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā*, based on his accumulated research and a newly discovered manuscript. I am deeply grateful beyond words for the countless pieces advice and suggestions he has given to me, always accommodating my hasty and lazy nature.

⁹⁷ Rāmakaṇṭha does not mention the word *sphoṭa*. Aghoraśiva's explanation is also not sufficiently long. [Sferra 2010: 310]: "Thus, we could expect Rāmakaṇṭha to explain clearly the differences between (*nāḍa*) and *sphoṭa* at some point, but no explicit reference is made to the *sphoṭa* theory in this short text. It is only in the commentary that a reference is found, but here again Aghoraśiva leaves the reader unsatisfied. While glossing stanza seven he introduces and refutes *sphoṭa* with arguments very similar to some of those that can be read in more detail and depth in, for instance, Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti* (cf. ed.: 119), without offering any explanation of either similarities or the difference between (*nāḍa*) and *sphoṭa*."

I agree with Torella on this. Rāmakaṇṭha divides *nāda* into three types: gross, subtle, and supreme. Of these, as Sferra pointed out, the ontological status of the last two (*nāda*)s is in question. The subtle (*nāda*) is the essential conveyer of meaning (*vācaka*), i.e., speech/word (*vāc*), as distinguished from phonemes, words, sentences, the reflective cognition of those linguistic entities, and so forth. Though he does not refer to the *sphoṭa*, Rāmakaṇṭha here clearly refutes the idea that the fundamental denoter consists of two aspects, the signifier and the signified, and he argued that its true nature must only be a signifier. He slightly predates (almost contemporaneously with) Abhinavagupta, but it is possible to suppose that even for Rāmakaṇṭha the *sphoṭa* was a dualistic entity. Note that he also refutes the idea that phonemes are the essential denoters, indicating that the disagreement is not about how we understand the meaning from the words, but about the ontological position of *nāda*. In other words, in this context, the rejection of the *varṇa* theory does not mean agreement with the *sphoṭa* theory.⁹⁸

The highest supreme *nāda* is called *Mahāmāyā* ('great *māyā*'), which is the fundamental material cause of the universe. *Mahāmāyā* is a well-known alias for *Bindu*, the ultimate material cause, in the *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* authored by Kashmiri Saiddhāntika scholar Śrīkaṇṭha (ninth–tenth c.?) [Sferra 2010].⁹⁹ The three types of *nāda* has its origin in *Sārdhatrīśatikālottara* 1.4–8:

The highest seed called *nāda* is rooted (*avasthita*) in all beings. It is the ultimate bestower of liberation, and furthermore bestower of the supernatural power. Mahāśena, once one knows it, [he] would become a Guru, [and] the one who cuts the bondage [of a soul]. All beings, starting with cowherds, women and children, barbarians, Prakrit users, [and even] those creatures that live in the water always speak that [*nāda*]. Once one knows [*nāda*], gross, subtle, and highest, one would do action as one desires. The gross [*nāda*] is speech; and the subtle [*nāda*] is that which consists of cognition. As for the highest [*nāda*], it is taught to be deprived of cognition.¹⁰⁰

As [Sferra 2007: 448–56] examines in depth, it immediately recalls Bhartṛhari's *vaikharī*, *madhyamā*, and *paśyantī*, and we can see a sufficiently detailed explanation of each level (together with *sūkṣmā*, the fourth level) by Śrīkaṇṭha and the commentators. The affinity between these two language theories is irrefutable. The above description, however, has nothing to do with the *sphoṭa*. In this regard, we must be aware that the theory of three or four planes of speech and

⁹⁸ Here I follow Sferra's summary and explanation [Sferra 2010: 326–34] which tells us how Aghoraśiva understood the *sphoṭa*. According to him, (1) the *sphoṭa*, which is distinct from phonemes, is not perceived; (2) nor is it in the scope of inference since it cannot be perceived; (3) nor is it manifested by either many phonemes or by each single phoneme; (4) nor is it eternal (*nitya*) or all-pervading (*vibhu*). Sferra concludes that "[i]t is not the rejection of *sphoṭa* as a unit of meaning that precedes the unfolding of word in the lower levels of verbal communication, but rather of *sphoṭa* as a reality ontologically separate from phonemes. From the Śaivasiddhānta point of view, the unit of meaning manifested by material sounds must be a material reality as well" [Sferra 2010: 329]. I agree with this.

⁹⁹ See also [Sanderson 2006: 41–4; Sanderson 2014: 16].

¹⁰⁰ *Sārdhatrīśatikālottara* 1.4–8: *nādākhyam yat paraṃ bījaṃ sarvabhūteṣu avasthitam | muktidaṃ paramaṃ kiṃ ca divyasiddhipradāyakam || tad viditvā mahāśena deśikāḥ pāśahā bhavet | āgopālāṅganābālā mleccāḥ prākṛtabhāṣinaḥ || antarjalagatā sattvās te 'pi nityaṃ bruvanti tam | sthūlaṃ sūkṣmaṃ paraṃ jñātvā karma kuryād yathepsitam || sthūlaṃ śabda iti proktaṃ sūkṣmaṃ cintāmayāṃ bhavet | cintayā rahitaṃ yat tu tat paraṃ parikirtitam ||*

that of classical *sphoṭa* are not the same. Moreover, the history of transcendental (*nāda*) is also independent of the classical *sphoṭa* theory, and may in fact be older than that.¹⁰¹ In medieval Kashmir, the theory of *nāda* was so prevalent that it appeared in a huge variety of texts as a linguistic or phonic essence, usually with several sub-categories.¹⁰² Even though the *Nāḍakārikā* clearly incorporates a well-known discussion of the classical *sphoṭa* theory, and the *sphoṭa* may in fact have existed in Rāmakaṇṭha's mind as something to be refuted (or even to be accepted), yet we could emphasize more that neither Rāmakaṇṭha (who must know the *Parākhyā*) nor Śrīkaṇṭha mentioned the term *sphoṭa*, and neither did they explicitly state the possible identity of *nāda* and *sphoṭa*. The fact that Śrīkaṇṭha did not count *sphoṭa*, while counting *śabdātattva* and *brahman*, when he enumerated the synonyms of Bindu in stanzas 70cd–71 of the *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* should be taken more seriously.¹⁰³ Did those Kashmiri scholars really think the *sphoṭa* to be transcendental like *śabdabrahman*? The interchangeability of (*nāda*) and *sphoṭa* suggested by [Goodall 2004: 326], as espoused by South Indian Saiddhāntika scholars,¹⁰⁴ is one that was actually very rare (though not impossible, as we shall see in the next section) in medieval Kashmir. Basically, because of the absence of convincing evidence, I do not consider their *sphoṭa* to be transcendental at the moment, but merely for worldly communication. The concept of *sphoṭa* may have developed into something more mystical outside the flourishing of Śaiva Siddhānta, or after it moved to South India.¹⁰⁵

As we have seen so far, Torellas words, “the *sphoṭa*, which in the Vaiyākaraṇas' conception ranks very high in the ontological-spiritual hierarchy” [Torella 2004: 186], were not true in Patañjali, Bhartṛhari, Maṇḍana, and all the other old thinkers. As it was discussed in Kashmir, its concept was progressively modified, and although the supreme linguistic entity was not yet directly referred to as a *sphoṭa*, Jayanta and the Grammarians gradually steered the discussion towards metaphysical and ontological arguments. However, in Rāmakaṇṭha and Śrīkaṇṭha, this movement

¹⁰¹ I slightly disagree with the opinion of [Sferra 2010: 309–10] that “the (*nāda*) theory was formulated on the *sphoṭa* model.” I would agree with him if he said this about the three/four planes of speech: the *nāda* theory was indeed formulated on them, or to be more precise, swallowed them up and made them its own. But for the *sphoṭa*, it appears to be a more superficial uptake.

¹⁰² I will discuss elsewhere the rich tradition of this *nāda* and *bindu* in the Śaiva Siddhānta which are considered to be both the fundamental material cause and the source of language.

¹⁰³ Ratnatrayaparīkṣā 70cd–71cd: *śabdātattvam aghoṣā vāg brahma kuṇḍalinī dhruvam || vidyāśaktiḥ paro* (Ms.; *parā* E) *nādo mahāmāyeti deśikāḥ | bindur eva* (Ms.; *evaṃ* E) *samākhyāto vyomānāhata* (Ms.; *vyomānāhatam* E) *ity api || 'Śabdātattva* ('the real state of speech'), *aghoṣā vāc* ('inaudible speech'), *brahman*, *kuṇḍalinī*, *dhruva* ('the absolute [syllable]' or 'the eternal one'), *vidyā śakti* (or *Vidyā-tattva* and [*parigraha*]-*śakti*), *paro nāda* ('the supreme *nāda*'), *mahāmāyā*, *vyoman* ('the ether'), *anāhata* ('unbeaten [sound]'): thus the [ancient] teachers named the very Bindu.'

¹⁰⁴ [Goodall 2004: 326]: “This Mīmāṃsaka view runs counter to Rāmakaṇṭha's position as outlined in the *Nāḍakārikā* (see particularly verses 11 and 12). Although Aghoraśiva goes to some length in his *Nāḍakārikāvṛtti* ad 6–7 to refute *sphoṭa*, Rāmakaṇṭha's theory of *nāda* as the entity that conveys meaning is a sort of *sphoṭavāda*, and indeed both Jñānaprakāśa (as is clear from his *Pauṣkaravṛtti* on *Pauṣkara* 8:35c–36) and Umāpati (for example, in his alternative interpretation of *Pauṣkara* 8:20ab (= *Parākhyā* 6:7cd) [575]: *svarasamyogād iti varṇavyaṅgyanādarūpasphoṭadvārety arthaḥ*) appear to understand the terms (*nāda*) and *sphoṭa* to be interchangeable.”

¹⁰⁵ According to [Filliozat 1984: 138–9], the concept of *sphoṭa* is found in mixture with *nāda* in the later (14th c. onwards) Śaiva Siddhānta that flourished in South India. Umāpatiśivācārya, in his commentary on the *Pauṣkarasamhitā*, explains that *śabdasphoṭa* means *śabdasakti* 'power of speech', i.e., the expressive power (*vācakatva*), while *bhāvasphoṭa* means *bhāvasakti* 'power of the object.' Here, the original meaning of *sphoṭa* is completely lost, leaving only its mystic and metaphysical aspect.

is less pronounced. Their efforts are rather focused on the theorisation of *paśyantī* and so forth.

9. Old, and Unique *Sphoṭa* in the *Svacchandatantra* and *Netratantra*

In any case, in cases such as the above, we can easily compare texts based on a focus on similar ideas. History, however, is not always so simple. There are more complex combinations of ideas and scriptures. For example, the list of eight varieties of sound (*śabda*, *nāda*) in the *Svacchandatantra* (seventh c.) is really interesting. This text, though we have no evidence where it had been composed, was widely known and cited together with the *Netratantra* in medieval Kashmir.¹⁰⁶ It was used a lot by the dualistic Śaiva school but Kṣemarāja [Sanderson 2007: 398–401], an eleventh century non-dualistic Śaiva scholar and Abhinavagupta's pupil, wrote a commentary to integrate with non-dualistic Śaiva philosophy. *Svacchandatantra* 11.6c–7ab defines the eight manifestations of (*nāda*), the sound inside the body which has different characteristics by its uplifting from the bottom to the top of the body.¹⁰⁷ Here Kṣemarāja quotes the Paddhati of Dharmasīva where he explains more in detail what these eight sounds are like.¹⁰⁸ They are manifest when one closes his ears by his fingers and named (1) *ghoṣa*, (2) *rāva*, (3) *svana*, (4) *śabda*, (5) *sphoṭa*, (6) *dhvani*, (7) *jhāṅkāra*, and (8) *dhvaṅkāra*, which [Vasudeva 2004: 338–9] translates respectively (1) Noise [of digestive fire], (2) Roar (the harsh sound of a broken gong), (3) Tone [of a bamboo flute], (4) Voice (resembling the resounding hum of a bee in the sky), (5) Articulation [which manifests the distinctions between phonemes], (6) Resonance (the pleasant sound of striking the fifth note played on a stick-zither), (7) sound JHĀÑ (the harmonics produced when all strings of a zither are lightly struck simultaneously), and (8) sound DHVAÑ (resembling the thundering of towering clouds).

These sounds listed above are generated from within the body and are distinct from the physical sounds of the outside world, even though similarities with them have been noted. Nor are they all linguistic. Focusing on the words *śabda* (Voice), *sphoṭa* (Articulation), and *dhvani* (Resonance),

¹⁰⁶ [Sanderson 2005: 240, fn. 20]: “In the Kashmirian Śaiva manuals of ritual the principal deities (mantracakra) are generally Svachchandaḥśaiva (Sakalabhaṭṭāraka [=Aghora] and Niṣkarabhaṭṭāraka) with Aghoreśvarī and Amṛteśvarabhairava with Amṛtalakṣmī at the centre of the Yāga surrounded by the Bhairavas of the Svachchandantra.”

¹⁰⁷ Svachchandantra 11.6c–8ab: *ghoṣo rāvaḥ svanaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭākhyo dhvanir eva ca || jhāṅkāro dhvaṅkāraścaiva aṣṭau śabdāḥ prakīrtitāḥ || navamas tu mahāśabdaḥ sarveṣāṃ vyāpakāḥ smṛtaḥ || nadaty asau sadā yasmāt sarvabhūteṣv avasthitaḥ ||* Translation by [Vasudeva 2004: 339]: ‘The Noise, the Roaring, the Tone, the Voice, the Articulation, the Resonance, the sounds JHĀÑ and DHVAÑ are said to be the eight sounds. The ninth is the great sound pervading them all, it resounds perpetually, existing in all creatures’ According to [Padoux 1990: 138, n. 143], Kṣemarāja’s commentary on *Svacchandatantra* 4.248 states that “sound (*śabda*) is breath associated with *dhvani*, and out of this *dhvani* the phonemes are produced. When breath, which is made of *śabda*, subsides, the phonemes also vanish.”

¹⁰⁸ Dharmasīva’s Paddhati quoted by Kṣemarāja [8, l. 18–9, l. 18]: *śravaṇāṅgulisaṃyogādyaḥ śabdāḥ saṃpravartate | dīptavahnīsavanābhāṣaḥ sa śabdo ghoṣa ucyaṭe || tadante ’nubhavo yasya īṣanmarmavisarpiṇaḥ | bhinnakāṃsyaniḥbo rūkṣaḥ sa rāvaḥ syāt tadantaḥ || tato vaṃśādhvani prakhyo nivāte saumyavarṣavat | sa nādaḥ svana ity uktas tatparaḥ kathito hy asau || caturthaḥ sa tu vai śabdaḥ sarvaśabdabhavāraṇiḥ | ātmānaṃ rāvaṇa nādaḥ khe yathā bhramariravaḥ || vākyasya sphuṭatām dhatte varṇabhedābhāṣakāḥ | sphoṭa ity uditō nādaḥ pañcamāḥ śāstrībhis tataḥ || tato ’tītādharmitvān nādaḥ śrotasukhāvahāḥ | vipaṅcyāḥ pañcamīṇaṃ tantrīṇaṃ hatvā tivrāprayatnataḥ || yathā vyajjyā ākāṣe sa śaṣṭho dhvanisaṃjñitāḥ | sarvatantrisaṃjñitāḥ vīṇāyām iva sādhu yaḥ || mṛdustabdhāṃ ninadati jhāṅkāraḥ saptaṃsa tv asau | ghaṇṭānīnādānukṛtīḥ kadā cid vyajjate ’nyathā || tuṅgameghadhvaninibhaḥ so ’ṣṭamo dhvaṅkṛtaḥ smṛtaḥ ||* See [Sanderson 2007: 388–92] for more information about Dharmasīva.

the *śabda* has some expectancy to verbalization; the *sphoṭa* is the sound which makes manifest speech (*vākya*) by differentiating phonemes; and the *dhvani* is the musical sound. Though it is possible that Dharmasīva's explanation is already influenced by Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa*, the point is that the *sphoṭa* is counted as a sound in the list, its meaning is more like "clear (i.e., articulated) sound" leading to the cognition of a linguistic unit. This is supported by Kṣemarāja's commentary on *Svacchandatantra* 4.374ab, where the arising of the mantra OM from the knot (*granthi*) of the heart, the central channel inside the body, is explained in relation to various sound forms. There Kṣemarāja says that the *sphoṭa* is that in which the phonetic forms that have not yet been manifested become clear (*anabhiviyaktavarṇarūpasphuṭatvāt*). It recalls me of Vṛṣabhadeva's¹⁰⁹ commentary on *Vākyapadīya* 1.104.¹¹⁰ There Bhartṛhari said, as "another view" on *sphoṭa*, and as in the *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.70, that the *sphoṭa*, the phonetic form of words and sounds, is also present in the sound of bells and there is one essential nature in the various sounds that a bell can make. On the other hand, as I mentioned in [Saito 2020: 81–2], Vṛṣabhadeva in this stanza understood the word *sphoṭa* as sharp clear sound (*tāratarah śabdaḥ*) at the first moment of articulation, while *nāda* means resonance coming after the initial sound.¹¹¹ In this case, of course, the *sphoṭa* cannot be exactly the same as that in the *Svacchandatantra*, since it is a physical sound, not a conceptual one. But if the descriptions of the *Svacchandatantra* and Dharmasīva are ancient traces of another *sphoṭa*, this might not be so different from what Bhartṛhari had in mind.

A similar list is also found in Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* 29.155. There Abhinavagupta says that the awareness arising at the moment of absorption into the Khecarī mudrā¹¹² is the power of mantra, which has the following eight forms: (1) *avyakta* ('Unmanifest'), (2) *dhvani* ('Manifest Sound'), (3) *rāva* ('Roar'), (4) *sphoṭa* ('Articulation'), (5) *śruti* ('Heard Sound'), (6) *nāda* ('Resonance'),

¹⁰⁹ There is no information on time and place where Vṛṣabhadeva lived, and his commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*, Paddhati, is in terribly poor condition. But he is considered the earliest commentator, possibly even before Maṇḍana. In [Potter 1990: 179], Ashok Aklujkar says: "An author whom scholars date about A. D. 650, the son of Devayaśas and a protégé of King Viṣṇugupta..."

¹¹⁰ *Vākyapadīya* 1.104: *dūrāt prabheva dīpasya dhvanimātram tu lakṣyate | ghaṇṭādīnām ca śabdeṣu vyakto bhedaḥ sa dṛśyate ||* 'Just as the lay of light [alone] is [observed] of the lamp [from a distance], sound (*dhvani*) alone is observed from a distance. In sounds (*śabda*) of [instruments] such as the bell, clear distinction [of the *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*] is seen.'

Auto-commentary on *Vākyapadīya* 1.104 [170, l. 6–171, l.4]: *iha ke cid ācāryā vyaktaṃ sphoṭaṃ sahajena dhvaninā sarvato dūravayāpīnā prakāśasthānīyena gandhena yuktam dravyaviśeṣam ivāvīrbhāvakāla eva sambaddham manyante dhvaninā | yathaiva pradīpe ghaṭasaṃniviṣṭāvayavaṃ praty upādānam tejodravayaṃ tadāśritaś ca tadvikriyānuparivartī prakāśaḥ, tathā ghaṇṭāyāś cābhighātena vyaktatarau sphoṭanādayor bhedo hi kāryapakṣe piśyate |* 'Here, some teachers think that the *sphoṭa*, manifested by the sound that arises along with it and spreading like light in all directions for some distance, just as certain substances arise simultaneously with their odour, is linked with it at the very moment of [the *sphoṭa*'s] manifestation. In case of the lamp, there is a fiery substance, which is the material cause [shining] on a [particular] part of the pot, and there is the light that depends on that, that changes by the transformation of the [material cause]. In the same way, as a result of the striking of a bell, both *sphoṭa* and resonance [arise] in a very clear form, and [both] are a quality in the production of any phoneme.'

¹¹¹ Vṛṣabhadeva's commentary on *Vākyapadīya* 1.104 [171, ll. 16–17]: *ghaṇṭāyāḥ iti | prathamam 'bhighātajas tāratarah śabdaḥ, tadanyo nāda iti spaṣṭa eva bhedaḥ | sphoṭanādayor bhedo hi kāryapakṣe piśyate |* 'Regarding "ghaṇṭāyāḥ..." There is first of all the clear produced by striking [the bell]. Resonance is different from that. Thus, there is clear distinction [between the *sphoṭa* and *nāda*]. For, the distinction between the *sphoṭa* and resonance is accepted even in the view [that *śabda* is] transient.' This interpretation is also possible in the *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.70: in fact, we encounter the same alternatives there.

¹¹² Cf. [Vasudeva 2004: 265–6].

(7) *nādānta* ('Fading of Resonance'), and (8) *avyucchinānāhata* ('Unbroken and Unstruck').¹¹³ Although the names and order of each sound stage are different, the process by which sound is manifested, articulated, echoed, and diluted can also be seen here.

Finally, the most unique and striking description of the *sphoṭa*, which alerts us to the fact that the concept of transcendental *sphoṭa* actually existed, is the description in the *Netratantra* (700–850) [Sanderson 2005: 385–7], which was also widely known in Kashmir.¹¹⁴ In its 21st chapter, we encounter the reference to *sphoṭa* in the context of the utterance (*uccāra*) of the sacred mantra OM:

Netratantra 21.62cd–63 [II 287, l. 16–288, l. 2]: When *sphoṭa*, whose nature is sound, flows forth with great force from the form of Śiva, which is unseen, filling the universe with sound, it is called (*nāda*), O Master of the gods, and Sadāśiva.¹¹⁵

(*Nāda*) permeates the universe by its resounding echoes and is the cause of the creation of the universe. The emanation (diffusion) of the supreme speech is explained together with the arising of the universe from Śiva who is without forms (*niṣkala*) through visualization of its form like Sadāśiva. *Sphoṭa*, or *nāda*, corresponds to Sadāśiva, the third principle (*tattva*) from the top. Kṣemarāja, commenting on the *Netratantra*, explains as follows:

Uddyota on Netratantra 21.62cd–63 [II 288, ll .3–10]:

Sphoṭa, from which the entire totality of speech-units bursts forth (*sphuṭati*), [namely] becomes manifest, is *śabdabrahman*. For this very reason, [*sphoṭa*], whose nature is sound (*dhvani*), [namely] verbalization (*śabdana*), flows forth with great force, [namely] just like uninterruptedly-rapid roaring of a river from the nature of Śiva that consists of nothing but light and bliss, who is unseen, [namely] formless, whose nature is one with the perceiver, [in other words] whose nature is representation of the highest resonance (*paranāda*).

[Question:] Of what kind [is the *sphoṭa*]?

[Response:] [*Sphoṭa* which is] filling the world or the universe, [namely] assimilating (internalizing) [the universe] in itself by means of sound (*dhvani*), [namely] by means of

¹¹³ *Tantrāloka* 29.155 [107, ll. 12–17]: *etatkhēcaramudrāveśe 'nyonyasya śaktiśaktimatoḥ | pānopabhogalilāhāsādiṣu yo bhaved vimarśamayāḥ | avyaktadhvanirāvasphoṭaśrutinādanādāntaiḥ || avyucchinānāhatarūpais tan mantravīryaṃ syāt* | Translation by [Dupache 2003: 285–6] (with slight modification): 'The awareness which occurs at the moment of absorption into that *khēcara-mudrā* during the mutual kissing, pleasure, play, laughter and so on of *śakti* and the one who possesses *śakti* is the potency of the mantra. It has the [following] forms: *avyakta*, *dhvani*, *rāva*, *sphoṭa*, *śruti*, *nāda*, *nādānta*, and *avyucchinānāhata*.'

¹¹⁴ [Sanderson 2005: 240–1]: "Its high standing in Kashmir is indicated by the composition and preservation of this commentary, by the fact that the cult of its deities, taught only in the *Netratantra*, is one of the two principal bases of the Śaivism of the Kashmirian ritual manuals in use until recent times, by the survival of three previously unidentified images of Amṛteśvara and his consort Amṛtalakṣmī in the small corpus of known non-Buddhist Kashmirian bronzes, and by the fact that a visualization verse for these deities recited in the Śaiva rituals was given pride of place in the non-Śaiva fire-sacrifice of the Kashmirian brahmins, being recited before pouring the oblations that accompany the recitation of the Śatarudriya of the *Kāṭhaka Yajurveda*, the first in a series of five Vedic hymns to Rudra (*the rudrapāñcakam*)."

¹¹⁵ *dhvanirūpo yadā sphoṭas tv adṛṣṭāc chivavigrahāt || prasaraty ativegena dhvanināpūrayaṇ jagat | sa nādo devadeveṣaḥ proktaś caiva sadāśivaḥ |*

“the end of (*nāda*)”(*nādānta*) in the form of reverberation (*anuraṇana*) of a bell.¹¹⁶

We are finally seeing the elements we expected: apparent identification of *sphoṭa* with (*nāda*), and with *śabdabrahman*, and its nature of filling the whole universe. [Padoux 1990], which gives numerous information and suggestions on the concepts involved in speech (*vāc*) in Tantric tradition, begins the section on *nāda* with a reference to the *sphoṭa*.¹¹⁷ His description is exactly on this point. This Netrantantra, if the dating proposed by Sanderson is correct, is even older than Jayanta, and is a strong endorsement of a metaphysical *sphoṭa* that goes beyond the Grammarians’ *sphoṭa*. It should be noted that this text does not mention that the *sphoṭa* belongs to the Grammarians, which is another point that distinguishes it from *sphoṭa* in other texts.

Remarkably, a very similar, albeit very brief, idea of *sphoṭa* is found in Śaṅkara’s commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 1.3.28:

Therefore, the universe, which consists in action, the action elements, and their results, and which is the signified, emanates (*prabhavati*) from the eternal word/speech in the form of *sphoṭa* that is the [essential] signifier.¹¹⁸

The word *prabhavati* (‘emanate’) corresponds to a word derived from the same verbal root in the *sūtra* (“*ataḥ prabhavāt*”), which teaches that “the universe emanates from the words [of the Vedas]” (“*śabdāt prabhavati jagat*”).¹¹⁹ In this regard, Śaṅkara commented that the words are not meant to be the fundamental cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the universe but rather its instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) according to Vācaspati, since the true cause of the universe must be *brahman* alone and not *śabda*. The *Sphoṭavādin* above appears to claim that *śabda* means *sphoṭa*, and at the same time may be claiming that *śabda* is actually *brahman*. If this is the case, Śaṅkara might have shown here how he understood the opening stanza of the *Vākyapadīya*¹²⁰ by linking the *sphoṭa* with the essence of *śabda*, i.e., *brahman* from which the universe manifests (*vivartate*). If so, this is a major step forward, showing that already in the 8th century there was an identity between the ultimate

¹¹⁶ *sphuṭati abhivyajyate asmāt viśvaḥ śabdagrāmaḥ iti sphoṭaḥ śabdabrahma, ata eva dhvanirūpaḥ śabdanasvabhāvaḥ, adṛṣṭād iti anākṛter draṣṭrekarūpāt paranādāmarśātmanāḥ prakāśānandaghanāt śivasvarūpād ativegena avyucchinadrutanadīghoṣavat prasaratī | kidṛk | dhvaninā ghaṇṭānuraṇanarūpeṇa nādāntena jagat viśvam āpūrayan āmarśanena ātmasātkurvan |*

¹¹⁷ [Padoux 1990: 96–7]: “From the Śakti [level] emerges [that of] *nāda*,” with which it may be said that the condensation of the primeval sound vibration begins; this condensation is indeed hardly perceptible, for if (*nāda*) is a form of sound, it remains however imperceptible, at least when taken at the cosmological level: it is the first resonance (*nāda*) of the Supreme Word (*parāvāc*), of the vibration (*spanda*) which gives life to the primary principle. It is, says the Netra Tantra, the *sphoṭa*, which is a sound form pervading the universe.

¹¹⁸ *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1.3.28 [324, ll. 11–12]: *tasmān nityāc chabdāt sphoṭarūpād abhidhāyakāt kriyākārakaphalalakṣaṇaṁ jagad abhidheyabhūtaṁ prabhavātīti ||*

¹¹⁹ *Brahmasūtra* 1.3.28: *śabda iti cen nātaḥ prabhavāt pratyakṣānumānābhyām ||* ‘[If the deities had bodies, this would contradict] the words [of the Vedas]. —If it is said thus. No, for, [the universe, including the deities,] emanates from the words, as [evidenced] by direct perception and inference.’

¹²⁰ *Vākyapadīya* 1.1: *anādi nidhanaṁ brahma śabdatattvaṁ yad akṣaram | vivartate ’rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ ||* Translation by [Houben 1995: 309]: “Beginning- and endless *Brahman*, which as the imperishable essence of language, behaves in various ways (*vivartate*) as the thing-meant; by virtue of which the world proceeds.” Translation by [Rau 2002: 3]: “Ohne Anfang und ohne Ende ist das *brahman*, welches das unvergängliche wahre Wesen des Wortes darstellt, aus dem sich die Hervorbringung der Welt durch die Entwicklung zu Dingen entfaltet.” Cf. *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2: *janmādy asya yataḥ ||* ‘[*Brahman* is that] from which this [universe] arises [, that in which it continues to exist and is dissolved].’

reality and the *sphoṭa* based on the *Vākyapadīya*. Alternatively, it could also be that he knew of a completely different *sphoṭa* and linked it to Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* theory. Śaṅkara's discussion and criticism¹²¹ of the *sphoṭa* is undoubtedly under the influence of Śabara, Kumārila, and Maṇḍana, but the cosmic creation by the force of *sphoṭa* cannot be ascribed to any of them. At the very least, it can be said that there were ideas similar to those described in the *Netratantra* apart from the Tantric context.

In this way, apart from the classical *sphoṭa*, we could classify two other types of *sphoṭas*: *sphoṭa* as sound and that as the supreme reality of speech. If I were to indicate the different nuances of the word *sphoṭa* in the *Vākyapadīya*, *Svacchandatantra*, and *Netratantra*, it would be as follows:

- (a) *Sphoṭa* that Bhartṛhari discusses primarily is in the cognition (*buddhistha*), which is “manifested” by sound. The pronunciation and hearing of speech is the main subject matter.
- (b) In the *Svacchandatantra*, *sphoṭa* is the “articulated” sound inside the body, which might be related to the *sphoṭa* as the initial sound coming out of the instrument, presented as a separate view by Bhartṛhari. The utterance of the mantra (*mantroccāra*) is the subject matter.
- (c) In the *Netratantra*, *sphoṭa* is the sound that “opens up” the diversity of the universe. It is the source of verbal creation, and indeed, the utterance of Tattva (*tattvoccāra*) is the subject there.

We have seen so far that Somānanda and Utpaladeva have taken a major step forward by interpreting the *sphoṭa* as transcendental and supreme. It is not impossible that these old Śaiva scriptures might have existed in the background of their thought, although no traces of them can be seen in their work. Furthermore, if Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmakaṇṭha were aware of the description of *sphoṭa* in the *Netratantra*, it is a natural consequence that they too understood the *sphoṭa* as transcendental, identical with *brahman*. But this too is not clear from what they tell us. It seems to me that, apart from the commentator Kṣemarāja, the *Netratantra* stood alone from both schools and had no significant influence, at least between the ninth and eleventh centuries.

10. Conclusion

I have probably still missed some important scholars and texts, and besides, it would be impossible for me to pick up all the relevant elements, but I hope that in this paper I have been able to show the history of the *sphoṭa* and the evolution of its concept in Kashmir roughly from the seventh to the eleventh century, perhaps not too far removed from reality. The Grammarians, poets, and Śaiva dualistic and non-dualistic theologians. The lively debate of a single concept of *sphoṭa* between scholars belonging to different schools of thought and with different worldviews, mostly triggered by the great ancient Grammarian Bhartṛhari, and the sometimes very vivid

¹²¹ His criticism is important when considering the question of authorship of the *Vivaraṇa* on the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, because there the author approves the existence of the *sphoṭa*. See [Harimoto 1999: 71–129; Harimoto 2014: 236–7, 248–50].

change in its concept, could only be observed in Kashmir during this period. It attests to the existence of a rich, surprisingly diverse and deeply researched philosophy of language. Among them, the contribution of Jayanta is undoubted, but at the same time Śaiva Tantric works are also significant. First, starting with Jayanta and followed by the Kashmiri Grammarians, the *sphoṭa* theory came to acquire the status of a foundational theory that runs through the whole Grammar. In this sense, the achievements of Helārāja, Kaiyaṭa and Puṇyarāja are enormous. Through their efforts, the *sphoṭa* theory became fixed as a fundamental doctrine throughout the *Vākyapadiya* and gained an important status in the *Mahābhāṣya*, as well as having an inseparable relationship with the theory of sentence and sentence object. Second, the nature of the *sphoṭa* to include in its domain from the mundane to the transcendent, and from the non-sacred to the sacred, has been incorporated into their various unique linguistic doctrines, especially when mixed with discussions of ontology and mantra utterances, leading to the construction of a new *sphoṭa*, coloured with a Kashmiri intellectual exchange. And even the most supposedly orthodox Grammarians have been moderately influenced by that.

I shall conclude my paper by referring to the commentary on Maṃmaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* 1.4 by the eminent 18th century pre-modern Grammarian Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. Regarding the word *sphoṭarūpa* (where Maṃmaṭa says that *dhvani* is sounds that manifest the *sphoṭa*: see fn. 85) he explains as follows:

“*Sphoṭa*”[in the commentary] means a single, indivisible signifier. The following is what is meant: based on the expression “this meaning is understood from one word,” there exists one indivisible signifier in the state of *madhyamā*. When *brahman* called *parā* [vāc] is in the navel, there is an illusory form (*vivarta*) [of speech] called *paśyanti*. Then, through a delimitation in the heart, there [arises the plane of speech] called *madhyamā*; it is the signifier that is manifested as being represented by itself by sounds, i.e., by *vaikhari*, which consists of words such as *paṭa*.¹²²

Almost all the doctrines we have seen are completely lumped together: *dhvani* as sounds, *dhvani* as suggestion, *paśyanti*, *śabdabrahman*, the fourth level *parā*, vocalization through the central channel, and *sphoṭa*. The whole history of the *sphoṭa* theory in medieval Kashmir has blossomed beautifully over the centuries, condensed here in Nāgeśa's commentary.

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¹²² Nāgeśa's commentary on *Kāvyaprakāśa* 1.4 [15, ll. 19–23]: *sphoṭarūpaṃ iti | akhaṇḍam ekaṃ vācakaṃ ity arthaḥ | ayam bhāvaḥ | ekasmāt padād ayam artho buddha iti vyavahārād ekaṃ akhaṇḍam madhyamāvasthaṃ vācakaṃ | parākhyasya brahmaṇo nābhau paśyantyākhyo vivartas tato hṛdayāvachchedena madhyamākhyah sa eva paṭāḍipadātmakavaikharyā dhvanirūpayā svarūparūpitatvenābhivyañjito vācakaḥ |*

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A Figure with No Domain

Śleṣālaṃkāra and its relationship to other figures according to the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* by Ruyyaka

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Keywords: Sanskrit poetry, Sanskrit poetics, pun, śleṣa, Ruyyaka, Alaṃkārasarvasva

1. Introduction
2. The structure of Ruyyaka's discussion of *śleṣālaṃkāra*
3. *Śleṣa* and Other *Alaṃkāras*
4. Conclusions

1. Introduction

1.1. *śleṣa*, *śliṣṭa* and the scope of this paper

The Sanskrit poetic figure called *śleṣa* by and large corresponds to what its common English translations—"pun", "paronomasia" or "double entendre"—describe.¹ It exploits the linguistic fact that certain words or, more broadly, successions of syllables can convey more than one



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* The work on this article began in 2020 as a collaborative project between Andrey Klebanov and Somdev Vasudeva. Over the course of more than a year, we were able to meet regularly in Kyoto, reading slowly and diligently through the chapter on *śleṣa* in the *Ālaṃkārasarvasva* together. During this period, we collated two old Śāradā manuscripts (*Ś_P* and *Ś_L*) and drafted a critical edition and translation of selected passages, which form the basis of the present article. Following this initial work, I supplemented the earlier version of the edition with evidence from three additional manuscripts (*D_J¹*, *D_J²* and *D_J³*) as well as three printed versions of the text (*Ed^{KM}*, *Ed^J* and *Ed^S*), largely confirming our initial choices of readings. The main body of the article—that is, the text surrounding the edition and translation—was written solely by me and was not reviewed or validated by Somdev Vasudeva. Although this article is credited to a single author, I wish to express my profound gratitude to Prof. Vasudeva for his generous collaboration in the early stages of this project.

Towards the completion of the article, I received many valuable suggestions from Prof. Yigal Bronner, which, among a myriad of smaller improvements, included compelling proposals for restructuring and rethinking certain arguments, as well as for appending additional sections. While I did my best to incorporate many of Prof. Bronner's minor suggestions, I was unable to adopt the more substantial ones, as the editorial process of the volume was already too far advanced to accommodate major structural changes. I am deeply grateful to Prof. Bronner for his insightful feedback and constructive criticism.

I also wish to thank Prof. Csaba Dezső for his generous feedback on an earlier version of this paper, as well as Prof. Satoshi Oigura for his patience and supportiveness. All remaining mistakes are mine.

¹ The *Śabdakalpadrūpa* and the *Vācaspatyaṃ*, two authoritative 19th-century monolingual dictionaries of Sanskrit, give four definitions of the masculine noun *śleṣa*. Apart from denoting a particular figure of speech, the word can mean "connection" (it is listed as a synonym of *sandhi* in the *Amarakośa*), "burning" (*dāha*), and "embrace" (*ālīngana*). Among these, "embrace" is often chosen to provide a literal translation of the name of the *alaṃkāra*, a choice explicitly discussed by Bronner 2010: 3–6. In this paper, we leave the word *śleṣa* untranslated.

meaning. Unlike puns in European languages, however, this proliferation of meanings relies almost exclusively on orthographic ambiguity, homonymy and figurative language, with relatively limited use of homophonic heterographs.² By contrast, orthographic ambiguity in Sanskrit is significantly amplified by regular sound changes (*sandhi*) and *scriptio continua* (the absence of spaces or other graphic markers of word boundaries), giving it a far broader range of application than in European languages. For instance, the sequence of syllables “*sarvadamādhavaḥ*” can be parsed either as “*sarvadā+umādhavaḥ*” (always, the husband of Umā) or “*sarvadaḥ+mādhavaḥ*” (all-giving Mādhava).³

This broad sense of *śleṣa* is encapsulated in an early definition of the figure given by Daṇḍin (fl. around 700 CE) in his *Kāvyādarśa* (*KāĀ*):

KāĀ 2.310ab: *śliṣṭam iṣṭam anekārtham ekarūpānvitam vacaḥ*

Speech (that is, a poetic utterance) is considered *śliṣṭa* when, having a single form, it has more than one meaning.

It is obvious that rather than carving out a precise definition to fit just a single figure, the KāĀ outlines something like a “*śleṣa* way of speaking.” The text is quick to admit then that as such, *śleṣa* can contribute to forming numerous other figures⁴ and can be framed into a large variety of different syntactic patterns.⁵ At any rate, it is clear that Daṇḍin assigns *śleṣa* with a unique status, according to which it can work alongside almost every other figure and help it to achieve a better poetic effect.⁶

Bhāmaha, the other founding figure of the discipline and Daṇḍin’s close predecessor, adopts a different strategy and identifies several characteristic features of the figure that differentiate it from others. The relevant verses in the *Kāvyālaṃkāra* (*KāAlaṃ*) state:

upamānena yat tattvam upameyasya sādhyate /
guṇakriyābhyāṃ nāmnā ca śliṣṭam tad abhidhīyate // 3.14 //
lakṣaṇam rūpake ’pidaṃ lakṣyate kāmam atra tu /
iṣṭaḥ prayogo yugapad upamānopameyayoḥ // 3.15 //
 [...]
 śleṣād evārthavacasor asya ca kriyate bhidā /
tat saḥoktyupamāhetunirdeśāt trividham yathā // 3.17 //

² In Classical Sanskrit, the scope of homophonic heterographs is confined to a few consonant pairs that are considered nearly indistinguishable in pronunciation—such as *r* and *l*, *r* and *ḍ*, *v* and *b*, etc. This allows for homophonic pairs like *jala* “water” and *jaḍa* “stiff” “stupid.”

³ The distinction between orthographic ambiguity and “real” semantic ambiguity—the latter arising from homonymy and polysemy—was keenly recognized and examined by many *ālaṃkārikas*. Given its complexity, this question is not addressed here. For an analysis of major positions, see Bronner 2010: 206–209.

⁴ KāĀ 2.313: *upamārūpakākṣepavyatirekādigocarāḥ / prāḡ eva darśitāḥ śleṣā darśyante kecanāpare //*

⁵ KāĀ 2.314–315: *asty abhinnaṅkriyāḥ kaścid aviruddhakriyā ’paraḥ / viruddhakarmā cāsty anyāḥ śleṣo niyamavān api //* *niyamākṣeparūpokitir avirodhi virodhy api / teṣāṃ nidarśaneṣv eva rūpam āvirbhaviṣyati //*

⁶ KāĀ 2.363ab: *śleṣaḥ sarvāsu puṣṇāti prāyo vakroktiṣu śrīyam /*

[3.14] When the standard of comparison (*upamāna*) is identified with the thing being compared (*upameya*)⁷ through a quality, an action and a noun, this is called *śliṣṭa*. [3.15] This definition surely applies to *rūpaka* too; however, in this case here (i.e., in *śliṣṭa*), it is required that both the standard of comparison (*upamāna*) and the thing being compared (*upameya*) are expressed simultaneously (that is, through a single string of linguistic segments). [3.17] And its division is based on the “embrace” (*śleṣa*) of meanings or phonemes.⁸ It is threefold, depending on whether it involves a statement of coordination, comparison or causality.⁹

KāAlaṃ’s analysis introduces an important distinction between *śleṣa* as a mere linguistic phenomenon of semantic or orthographic ambiguity¹⁰ and the *śliṣṭa* as a specific figure that is based on *śleṣa* but is further specified by several formal features such as the underlying similarity, identification of the compared items and a particular syntactic construction. This distinction, though not necessarily the terminology it utilizes, becomes essential to many later Kashmiri *ālaṃkārikas* in their effort to formulate a uniform system that requires, among other things, to tell *śleṣa* (or *śliṣṭa*) apart from other figures based on polysemy, above all *samāsokti*, but also others, such as *tulyayogitā*, *dīpikā* etc. In this way, many scholars spend the bulk of their treatments of *śleṣa* debating the exact set of properties that single it out from other poetic and linguistic phenomena. Notwithstanding the intellectual investment, a large group of rhetoricians revert to accepting the fluid nature of *śleṣa* pointed out by Daṇḍin. In doing so, they go even further and claim that in reality *śleṣa* can never occur without any other figure and that it is only due to logical constraints of the *ālaṃkāraśāstra* as a system that we speak of it as a separate figure.

This paper examines a single moment in the intellectual history of the above debate and looks at the arguments put forward by Ruyyaka (12th cent.). It is centered around a new critical edition and an English translation of the relevant excerpts from the chapter on *śleṣa* in Ruyyaka’s *magnum opus*, the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* (*AlaṃSa*). For ease of presentation, rather than printing the Sanskrit text in a separate section, we divide it into several coherent units and provide our analysis of it in form of a running commentary to each of these passages.

1.2. *prastuta* vs. *aprastuta*

Before turning to the main topic, we would like to introduce a brief lexicographical diversion that is necessary for a non-specialist to follow along with our analysis of the text.

In their analyses of poetry, Sanskrit rhetoricians frequently identify semantic structures as “contextually relevant”, as “put forward”, or as “to be described,” or conversely, as “contextually irrelevant”, as “not put forward”, or as “not to be described.” These categories are captured in the

⁷ A literal translation of 3.14ab would be something like “when the state of *upameya* is achieved by *upamāna*,...”

⁸ For the translation of *śleṣa* here, see fn. 1 above.

⁹ For the reasoning behind our translation of 3.17cd and a detailed analysis of Bhāmaha’s definition of *śliṣṭa* in general, see [Mazzarino 1990](#).

¹⁰ This is factually how Daṇḍin defines his *śliṣṭa*.

terminological and conceptual pair *prastuta* ↔ *aprastuta*, or one of its close synonyms.¹¹

This pair provides for an independent taxonomy that can be brought to bear in the analysis of poetic utterances alongside other relational classifications, such as, for example *prasiddha* ↔ *aprasiddha*, *vācya* ↔ *gamya*, *upamāna* ↔ *upameya*, *viṣaya* ↔ *viṣayin* etc. It is employed in order to distinguish between elements of content that are, on the *prastuta* side of the spectrum, directly related to the actual scene described in the verse, to the topic at hand, the main plot etc., and on the *aprastuta* side, to what is excluded from the above fields, namely, elements that are not directly related to the current description and connect to it only via the correlated *prastuta* item.¹²

Prior to Udbhaṭa's popularization of this taxonomy as applicable to the examination of several poetic figures,¹³ the fundamental conceptual framework had been already employed in defining and analyzing the figure *aprustutaprasaṃsā* by both Bhāmaha (see below) and his South Indian interlocutor Daṇḍin (*KāĀda* 2.338 and 340). In the definition of the figure in *KāĀlaṃ* 3.29, Bhāmaha incidentally gives a quasi-definition of what he thought *aprustuta* was:

Acclaim for a **matter** (*vastu*) **that deviates from the main subject** (*adhikāra*) is what is called *aprustutaprasaṃsā* ...¹⁴

An example is helpful to make sense of the abstract definition:

It satisfies those in need, it is sweet, it abundantly ripens/hangs down¹⁵ just at the right time (*kāle*),¹⁶ [and all that] without any human effort! Behold the fruit of trees!¹⁷

This verse is best interpreted as an allegorical praise of a noble-minded king or a donor, whose generous gifts, just like the fruits of a wild tree growing along the road, are bountiful, do not require self-abasement, and are offered in a time of need. We understand here that the trees and their fruit are *aprustuta* elements (that is, in Bhāmaha's words, that what "deviates from the main subject") and the donor and her gift, which are not explicitly mentioned in the poem, are *prastuta*.

Bhāmaha's example should illustrate further that one of the most vexing issues often lies in identifying which of two senses possible in a given case was imposed by the poet as relevant, and which was not. As *KāĀlaṃ* 3.30 demonstrates, this identification is based not only on the immediate textual environment of the verse, the ongoing plot of the story, the imaginary setting of the described scene etc.,¹⁸ but in addition, presupposes the reader to possess a certain minimally

¹¹ Some of the most common synonyms include *prakṛta* ↔ *aprakṛta*, *prākaraṇika* ↔ *aprākaraṇika*, *varṇya* ↔ *avarṇya*, *prakṛānta* ↔ *aprakṛānta* etc.

¹² For the sake of further disambiguation, the pair of "contextually relevant" ↔ "contextually irrelevant" meanings needs to be distinguished from the pair of "intended" (*vivaṅśita*) ↔ "unintended" (*avivaṅśita*) meanings. In a usual verse with *śleṣa*, both meanings (irrespective of their relation to the context) are intended.

¹³ See, for example, Cox 2017: 147, who remarks that the occurrence of these two terms in Udbhaṭa's definition of the *samāsokti* is unprecedented within the history of the particular figure.

¹⁴ *KāĀlaṃ* 3.29: *adhikārād apetasya vastuno 'nyasya yā stutiḥ / aprastutaprasaṃseti sā caivaṃ kathyate yathā //*

¹⁵ The fruit is *pariṇata*, i.e. ripe, but also hanging down, that is, it is conveniently reachable and offered with humility.

¹⁶ That is, when there is a need for it.

¹⁷ *KāĀlaṃ* 3.30: *prīṇitapraṇayi svādu kāle pariṇataṃ bahu / vinā puruṣakāreṇa phalaṃ paśyata śākhinām //*

¹⁸ Note that some of the richest verses taken up by *ālaṃkārikas* for their analysis stem from collections of individual

required tacit knowledge that makes a full understanding of a given verse possible. As much *kāvya* was written for “audiences of experts” a simple, literal translation usually needs to be augmented by at least an adumbration of the situational factors which convey, among other things, what Pollock calls the “social aesthetic”.¹⁹

1.3. Critical edition and its sources

On the following pages, we present an attempt at a preliminary critical edition of several relevant passages from the *AlaṃSa*. Unlike more mature specimens of textual criticism, our edition is based on a limited number of textual sources, which, in purely numerical value, comprise a fraction of all manuscripts of the text preserved in repositories throughout the world.²⁰ Nonetheless, several reasons allow us to argue for a certain added value of our edition compared to the available printed versions of the text. To begin with, our edition records the readings of all three available printed versions of the text [Durgāprasād & Parab, 1893; Janaki, 1965; Śāstrī, 1915]. While the exact basis for the constitution of the text version printed in Durgāprasād & Parab 1893 remains unclear, both Janaki 1965 and Śāstrī 1915 rely exclusively on the evidence of South Indian manuscripts written mostly in Malayalam characters (with a few exceptions of MSS written in Kannada and Telugu scripts in Janaki 1965). Among these publications, Janaki provides a thorough critical restoration of the *AlaṃSa* as it was known to Vidyācakravartin, a 13th-century scholar from the South. We believe that this version will likely represent the state of the text as it was commonly known and circulated in the region. For our work, we have focused our attention exclusively on the MSS from Kashmir, the area where the original text was composed. In doing so, we hoped to furnish a “Kashmiri” version of the text (as opposed to its South Indian version constituted in Janaki’s edition). While we believe that this version may be closer to the original, further research incorporating a wider range of MSS is necessary in order to test this hypothesis. In our edition, we have attempted to record all variant readings (including the ones that may be deemed nonsensical) in a fully positive apparatus. This method of representation not only enables the readers to test our text-critical decisions, but it also allows to supplement our work with the evidence of further MSS in future and facilitates inquiry into the stemmatic connection between these sources.

In our edition we have utilized the following textual sources and their sigla:

- **Ed^{KM}** = Durgāprasād & Parab 1893, a printed version of the *AlaṃSa* along with the 13th-century Kashmiri commentary *Alaṃkāravimarśinī* composed by Jayaratha;
- **Ed^J** = Janaki 1965, a critical edition of the commentary *Saṅjīvanī* by Vidyācakravartin (fl. around 14th century in South India) along with the text of the *AlaṃSa* as presupposed by the commentator. The edition of the commentary is based on 13 MSS and the constituted text of the *AlaṃSa* is checked against two further MSS [Janaki, 1965: i–v];

verses and thus lack the textual environment necessary to determine the setting.

¹⁹ Cf. Pollock 2001.

²⁰ For a comprehensive list of MSS, see NCC I [Raja, 1949: 298] that records about 50 MSS and NCC XXV [Dash, 2011: 240f.] that adds about 20 further MSS. Note that the absolute majority of these entries refer to the libraries in South India.

- **Ed^S** = *Śāstrī* 1915, a printed version of an untitled commentary (*vyākhyā*) by Samudrabandha (fl. around 13th–14th centuries in South India) along with the text of the *AlaṃSa* as presupposed by the commentator. The edition is based on four MSS [*Śāstrī*, 1915: ii–iii and 2–3];
- **Ś_L** — A manuscript written in Sharada script and preserved at the manuscripts library of the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan in Lucknow under the accession number “76”. The MS was photographed and made publicly available by the eGangotri Digital Preservation Trust.²¹ It is a composite MS containing three texts: the *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, as well as two unnumbered lists of *sūtras* from the *Alaṃkārasarvasva*²² and the *Alaṃkāraratnākara*,²³ each written by a different scribe. The codicological units directly follow upon each other and begin on the next line of the same folio, on which the previous text has ended. They are likely to have been purposefully collected in a single MS bundle.
The exact size and the writing support of the MS cannot be established. It appears to be written on paper and uses a “book”-layout often found in MSS from Kashmir. Each side of a folio contains ca. 19 lines with ca. 25–30 akṣaras per line. The first codicological unit (the one containing the *Alaṃkārasarvasva*) routinely utilizes red ink to write or secondarily highlight the *daṇḍas* and often identifies the *sūtras* by adding a note “*iti sūtram*” in the margin.
- **Ś_P** — A manuscript written in Sharada script and preserved at the BORI in Pune under the accession number “227A of 1875–76”. This is a composite MS containing several texts identified as the *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, the *Alaṃkārasarvasvasūtrāṇi*, the *Alaṃkāraratnākaraṇī*, the *Alaṃkāravimarśinī* and the *Alaṃkāraratnākara*. This MS is described in *Zhao* 2023: 76–77, who reports that “the size of this manuscript is 7.25×7.25 inches (circa 18.4×18.4 cms)” and that it is written on country paper. Each folio side contains ca. 9–10 lines with ca. 25–30 akṣaras per line. According to *Zhao*, the date of production of the MS (or of some of its codicological units) given in a scribal colophon at the end of the *Alaṃkāraratnākaraśūtrāṇi* cannot be ascertained conclusively, and instead could point to either 15th, 17th or 19th centuries. The digital copy of this MS was kindly provided to us by Dr. Shihong Zhao.
- **D_J¹** — A manuscript written in Devanagari on paper and preserved at the Shri Raghunatha Temple Manuscripts Library (in Jammu) under the accession number “476 Gha”. The MS was photographed and made publicly available by the eGangotri Digital Preservation Trust.²⁴

The exact size of the MS cannot be established. Each folio side contains 16 lines with ca.

²¹ <https://archive.org/details/AlankarSarvasvaSharadaRSktSJammuNo4>, last checked on 1.3.2025

²² The text is identified in the colophon thus: “*samāptāni sarvasvālaṃkārasūtrāṇi/ kṛtī rājānarucakasyeti śubham/*”

²³ This text is concluded thus: “*samāptāny alaṃkāraratnākara, alaṃkārasūtrāṇi/ kṛtiḥ paṇḍitabhaṭṭaśrīśobhākareśvaramitrasyeti śivam/*”

²⁴ <https://archive.org/details/AlankarSarvasvaRajanakRuyyak476GhaAlm3Shlf2DevanagariAlankarShastra>, last checked on 3.09.2023

35–40 akṣaras per line.

- \mathbf{D}_J^2 — A manuscript written in Devanagari on paper and preserved at the Shri Raghunatha Temple Manuscripts Library (in Jammu) under the accession number ‘534 Gha’. The MS was photographed and made publicly available by the eGangotri Digital Preservation Trust.²⁵ The exact size of the MS cannot be established. Each folio side contains 11 lines with ca. 30–35 akṣaras per line. The MS is incomplete missing just a few lines to complete the text of the *AlaṃSa*.
- \mathbf{D}_J^3 — A manuscript written in Devanagari on paper and preserved at the Shri Raghunatha Temple Manuscripts Library (in Jammu) under the accession number “801 Gha”. The MS was photographed and made publicly available by the eGangotri Digital Preservation Trust.²⁶ The exact size of the MS cannot be established. Each folio side contains 12 lines with ca. 35–40 akṣaras per line.

A short note is due on the conventions used in the apparatus to our critical edition. As mentioned earlier, we report all variants detected in the sources described above in the form of a fully positive critical apparatus. However, there are two types of instances where we depart from this basic standard in order to shorten the apparatus and thus, hopefully, increase its readability:

1. In cases where a certain reading R_1 is transmitted in a single witness, and all other sources attest to another reading R_2 , rather than listing all individual sources of R_2 , we abbreviate them with the sign Σ . In our notation, therefore, Σ should be understood as “all text witnesses but the one reported separately.” For example, the entry “gamyatve $\mathbf{J} \Sigma$, gamyate \mathbf{D}_J^1 ” indicates that the reading *gamyatve*, which is accepted in our edition, is supported by all sources apart from \mathbf{D}_J^1 that reads *gamyate*.
2. A further exception to the previous state of affairs applies when a certain reading R_C is transmitted in all of our textual witnesses (as such, it is usually accepted in our critical edition), and the only existing variant reading R_1 is attested in a single manuscript prior to a correction (*ante correccionem* = *ac*). Such cases are recorded in a shortened form as “ $R_C \mathbf{J} X^{pc}, R_1 X^{ac}$.” For example, the entry “adhunā $\mathbf{J} \hat{S}_L^{pc}$, adhu \hat{S}_L^{ac} ” indicates that the adopted reading *adhunā* is attested in all of our sources and that the only variant *adhu* is found in MS \hat{S}_L before correction.

²⁵ <https://archive.org/details/AlankarSarvasvamRajanakaRuyyaka534GhaAlm3Shlf4DevanagariAlankar>, last checked on 3.09.2023

²⁶ <https://archive.org/details/AlankarSarvasvamRajanakaRuyyak801GhaAlm4Shlf4DevanagariAlankarShastra>, last checked on 3.09.2023

2. The structure of Ruyyaka's discussion of *śleṣālaṃkāra*

2.1. The position of *śleṣālaṃkāra* within the textual framework of the *AlaṃSa*

According to the analysis found in [Chakrabarty 1989](#): 69-86, Ruyyaka is said to classify *śleṣa* within the category of so-called *viśeṣaṇavicchitti* figures of speech, that is “figures which are said to depend on the charm resting on *viśeṣaṇa* or attribute” (p. 81). [Chakrabarty 1989](#) goes further:

This group is again sub-divided into two groups, viz., (a) Kevala-Viśeṣaṇa-vicchitti (the charm resting on attributes only) and (b) *saviśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-vicchitti* (the charm resting on attribute along with noun). Under the former subdivision two figures are included, viz., i) *Samāsokti* and ii) *Parikara*, and in the latter only *Śleṣa*.

We refer to the above analysis because it helps to situate *śleṣa* within the *AlaṃSa* and relate it to the surrounding figures. However, it is not found as such either in Ruyyaka's own text or in any of its commentaries. Ruyyaka himself talks only of the first category, that is, figures of speech relying on an elegant way of expressing (*vicchitti*) the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*). This group contains only two figures, *samāsokti*, “condensed utterance,” which is based on the homonymy (*sāmya*, lit., “identity,” or “sameness”) of the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*), and *parikara*, “entourage,” which is marked by a purposeful choice of qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇasābhiprāyatva*). The definitions of two *alaṃkāras* that follow upon *parikara*, *śleṣa* and *apraśastutaprasāṃsā*, on the other hand, are related to *samāsokti* inasmuch as they retain the central feature of the latter figure—that is, the phonetic or graphic sameness of the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇasāmya*)—and modify the condition imposed on the qualifiers.

At the beginning of his investigation of *samāsokti*, Ruyyaka gives a schematic overview of the main distinguishing characteristics of the figures *samāsokti*, *apraśastutaprasāṃsā* and *śleṣa*:

- 1 ^a adhunā viśeṣaṇavicchittyāśrayeṇālaṃkāradvayam ucyate | tatrādau
viśeṣaṇasāmyāvaṣṭhambhena samāsoktim āha —
- 3 **viśeṣaṇasāmyād aprastutasya gamyatte samāsoktiḥ ||**
iha prastutāprastutānām kvacid vācyatvaṃ kvacid gamyatvaṃ iti dvaidham | vācyatvaṃ
5 ca śleṣanirdeśabhaṅgyā prthagupādānena vety api dvaidham | etad dvibhedam api
śleṣālaṃkārasya viśayaḥ | gamyatvaṃ tu prastutaniṣṭham aprastutapraśamsāviśayaḥ,
7 aprastutaniṣṭham tu samāsokte gocarāṃ | tatra ca nimittaṃ viśeṣaṇasāmyam,
viśeṣyasyāpi sāmye śleṣaprāpteḥ |

^a Ś_L: 18v3, Ś_P: 35v10, D_J¹: 15r9, D_J²: 22r9, D_J³: 19v10; Ed^{KM}: p. 84. l. 9, Ed^J: p. 102, l. 8, Ed^S: p. 91, l. 5

3 viśeṣaṇa°] viśeṣaṇa° [iti sūtraṃ 24] Ś_L^{mg}

1 adhunā] Ś_L^{pc}, adhu Ś_L^{ac} 2 viśeṣaṇasāmyā... āha] Σ, om. D_J³ 3 viśeṣaṇasāmyād] Σ,
viśeṣaṇānām sāmīd Ed^{KM} 3 gamyatte] Σ, gamyate D_J¹ 4 dvaidham] Ś_L Ś_P^{ac} D_J³, dvaitam
Ed^S, dvaividhyam Ś_P^{pc}(secunda manu) D_J² Ed^{KM} Ed^J 5 dvaidham] Ś_L Ś_P, dvaitam Ed^S, dvaitam
vācyatvaṃ D_J³, dvaividhyam D_J², dvaividhyam Ed^{KM} Ed^J 5 iti dvaidham → vety api dvaidham]
Ś_L Ś_P (D_J² D_J³ Ed^S Ed^{KM} Ed^J), iti dvaividhyam D_J¹(eyeskip) 5 etad] Ś_L^{pc}(secunda manu), evad
Ś_L^{ac} 6 °laṃkārasya viśayaḥ → °praśamsāviśayaḥ] Σ, viśayaḥ D_J³(eyeskip) 7 samāsokte
gocarāṃ] Ś_P^{pc} Ś_L^{pc} D_J¹ D_J², samāsokte gocarāṃ Ś_L^{ac}, samāsokte gocarāḥ Ed^S, samāsokte viśayaḥ Ś_P^{ac}
D_J³, samāsokti viśayaḥ Ed^{KM} Ed^J 7 tatra ca] Σ, tatra D_J³ 8 viśeṣyasyāpi] Σ, viśeṣyasyāpi D_J³

Now, [the next] two figures are stated by relying on an elegant mode of expressing (vicchitti) the qualifiers. Among these, at the beginning [the author of the sūtras] teaches *samāsokti*, “condensed utterance,” on the basis of [orthographic and/ or phonetic] sameness (*sāmī*) of [strings of syllables or words expressing] qualifiers —

When the contextually irrelevant element (namely, the qualificand)²⁷ is implicitly known from [graphic and/ or phonetic] sameness of the qualifiers, [the figure is] *samāsokti*.

Here, contextually relevant and irrelevant elements are of two types: sometimes they are explicit and sometimes implicit. And explicitness (of these elements) is also of two kinds: by means of poetic mode of expression [based on] *śleṣa* (“pun”), or by means of separate enunciation. Both of these two kinds are the domain of the figure *śleṣa*, “embrace”. As for implicitness, when it is confined to a contextually relevant element, it is the domain of *aprastutapraśamsā*, “praise of the irrelevant,” but when it is confined to the contextually irrelevant, it belongs to the epistemic field of *samāsokti*. And in this case, the occasioning factor is [merely] the [graphic and/ or phonetic] sameness of qualifiers, because if the qualificand is also polysemous, then *śleṣa* is warranted.

To further summarize Ruyyaka’s brief synopsis: all three figures resemble each other in that they

²⁷ Ruyyaka does not specify either in the text of the sūtra or in his explanatory comments that the concerned contextually irrelevant (*aprastuta*) element is the qualificand. This is understood implicitly from the fact that the targeted item needs to be different from the qualifiers (see fig. 1). This is further clarified by Vidyācakravarṭin [see Janaki, 1965: 103]: *yatra viśeṣyāṃśe prakṛtamātraparatā viśeṣaṇasāmyāt punar aprakṛto ‘vagamyate, sā [...] samāsoktiḥ*.

occur in verses that make use of words, phrases and clauses, which communicate two meanings at a time and, in terms of the semantic structure of the sentence, belong to the realm of qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*). However, they differ from each other based on how the given verses communicate the corresponding qualificands (*viśeṣya*). In *samāsokti* and *aprastutapraśaṃsā* only one qualificand is actually expressed verbally, while the other is merely understood. In *śleṣa*, for its part, both qualificands are expressed verbally (either by means of two different words or phrases, or by means of a single punning phrase).

This analysis is visualized in figure 1, and the propositional structure of the concerned figures can be represented in the following manner:

- [1] *samāsokti* = {*qualifier*₁₊₂^{pra+apra}} + {*qualificand*₁^{pra}}
- [2] *aprastutapraśaṃsā* = {*qualifier*₁₊₂^{pra+apra}} + {*qualificand*₂^{apra}}
- [3] *śleṣa*^{pra} (cf. A-1-1a) = {*qualifier*₁₊₂^{pra}} + {*qualificand*₁₊₂^{pra}}
- [4] *śleṣa*^{apra} (cf. A-1-1b) = {*qualifier*₁₊₂^{apra}} + {*qualificand*₁₊₂^{apra}}
- [5] *śleṣa*^{pra+apra} (cf. A-1-1c) = {*qualifier*₁₊₂^{pra+apra}} + {*qualificand*₁^{pra} + *qualificand*₂^{apra}}




Fig. 1 Relationship between *śleṣa*, *samāsokti* and *aprastutapraśaṃsā*.

In view of the above, Ruyyaka commences his treatment of *śleṣa* by giving a definition of the figure that highlights the importance of both the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the correlated qualificands (*viśeṣya*) being graphically or phonetically identical. By stressing this fact, Ruyyaka explicates in what way *śleṣa* is different from *samāsokti* (this corresponds to *vyāvṛtti*, one of two basic functions of a definition).

- 1 ^a **viśeṣyasyāpi sām̐ye dvayor vopādāne śleṣaḥ ||**
 kevalaviśeṣaṇasām̐yaṁ samāsoktāv uktam, viśeṣyayuktaviśeṣaṇasām̐yaṁ tv
 3 adhikṛtyedam ucyate |

^a \hat{S}_L : 22v6, \hat{S}_P : 43v8, \mathbf{D}_J^1 : 18v13, \mathbf{D}_J^2 : 27v1, \mathbf{D}_J^3 : 24r8; \mathbf{Ed}^{KM} : p. 95, \mathbf{Ed}^J : p. 123, \mathbf{Ed}^S : p. 110

1 viśeṣyasyāpi || [iti sūtram 26] \hat{S}_L^{mg}

1 viśeṣyasyāpi || Σ , viśeṣyāpi \hat{S}_L 2 viśeṣyayukta° || $\hat{S}_P \mathbf{D}_J^1 \mathbf{D}_J^2 \mathbf{Ed}^{KM} \mathbf{Ed}^J$, viśeṣyayuktam \mathbf{Ed}^S
 3 kevalaviśeṣaṇasām̐yaṁ → °viśeṣaṇasām̐yaṁ tv adhi° || $\hat{S}_P \mathbf{D}_J^1 \mathbf{Ed}^{KM} \mathbf{Ed}^J \mathbf{Ed}^S$, kevalaviśeṣaṇasām̐yaṁ
 tv adhi° $\hat{S}_L \mathbf{D}_J^1$ (eyeskip)

When there is [graphic and/ or phonetic] sameness also of the qualificands (along with the qualifiers), or, a [separate] articulation of both (contextual and non-contextual qualificands), [the figure is] *śleṣa*.

Sameness (*sām̐ya*) of only the qualifiers was declared for the case of *samāsokti*. But this (definition of *śleṣa*) is stated with regard to the sameness of the qualifiers along with the qualificands (*viśeṣya*).

2.2. The overall structure of the chapter on *śleṣālaṁkāra* in the *AlaṁSa*

Following the above definition and its short one-sentence paraphrase, Ruyyaka delves into a detailed treatment of the figure and various problems connected to it. Prior to turning to the specific questions we want to discuss in this article, we consider it worthwhile providing a tabular overview of the main topics discussed in the chapter on *śleṣa* in the *AlaṁSa*. Among other things, this will throw light on the overall structure of the chapter and assist the readers in navigating between its (sub-)sections that we will quote below.

A Major stances of the accepted view (\mathbf{Ed}^{KM} : p. 95 l. 8 – p. 98 l. 6)

A-1 TWO CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES of *śleṣa*.

A-1-1 THREEFOLD CLASSIFICATION of *śleṣa*, depending on how semantically ambiguous qualifiers and qualificands are RELATED TO THE PRAKARAṆA:

A-1-1a *prākaraṇika*: both qualifiers and qualificands are (i) polysemic, and (ii) *prastuta*;

A-1-1b *aprākaraṇika*: both qualifiers and qualificands are (i) semantically ambiguous, and (ii) *aprastuta*;

A-1-1c *prākaraṇikāprākaraṇika*: only qualifiers are (i) semantically ambiguous, and (ii) both *prastuta* and *aprastuta*, while the two qualificands, *prastuta* and *aprastuta*, (iii) are expressed individually.

* When in the above configuration (A-1-1c), both qualificands are also orthographically or phonetically identical, instead of *śleṣa*, there is *dhvani* (\mathbf{Ed}^{KM} : p. 95 ll. 10–11).

A-1-1d Explanation of how the reference to the above three types of *śleṣa* is encoded in the text of the *sūtra* (\mathbf{Ed}^{KM} : p. 96 ll. 1–3).

A-1-1e Examples:

- *yena dhvastamanobhavana* ... (re A-1-1a *prākaraṇika*; \mathbf{Ed}^{KM} : p. 96 ll. 4–7),
- *nītānām ākulibhāvaḥ* ... (re A-1-1b *aprākaraṇika*; \mathbf{Ed}^{KM} : p. 96 ll. 8–9),
- *svecchopajātaviṣayo'pi* ... (re A-1-1c *prākaraṇikāprākaraṇika*; \mathbf{Ed}^{KM} : p. 96 ll. 10–13).

A-1-2 THREEFOLD CLASSIFICATION of *śleṣa*, depending on whether the underlying operation is

located in the phonemes (*śabdaśleṣa*), their meaning (*arthaśleṣa*), or both (*ubhayaśleṣa*) (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 96 l. 15 – p. 97 l. 4)

A-1-2a *śabdaśleṣa*: linguistic segments, which are intended to have two different meanings, are entirely identical in writing (*scriptio continua*), but strictly speaking, need to be articulated differently based on the accentuation or other subtler phonetic features. Essentially, *śabdaśleṣa* is recognized when finding two meanings involves dissolving the sandhis in two different ways and partly parallels the phenomenon of heteronymous homographs. Here, the striking effect of a verse is achieved by forcing two linguistic strings that sound differently into a single utterance.

A-1-2b *arthaśleṣa*: linguistic segments, which are intended to have two different meanings, are identical in spelling and pronunciation. By contrast to the previous type, *arthaśleṣa* does not involve splitting sandhis in two different ways and partly parallels the phenomenon of homonymy and polysemy (i.e., homography together with homophony). Here, a poet achieves appreciation of the verse by carefully choosing homonymous or polysemous words to produce two strings of different meanings.

A-1-2c *ubhayaśleṣa*: a verse is said to contain this variety of *śleṣa*, when it features elements of both the above types.

Examples A single verse exemplifying all three above types (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 97 ll.1–4)

- pāda A: *raktacchadatvam ...*(re A-1-2b *artha*),
- pāda B: *nālaṃ jalaiḥ ...*(re A-1-2a *śabda*),
- the whole verse (re A-1-2c *ubhaya*).

A-2 Two stances on how *śleṣa* INTERACTS WITH OTHER FIGURES of speech found in a single verse (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 97 l. 5 – p. 98 l. 6).²⁸

A-2-1 Some hold that *śleṣa* always overrules other figures (and never becomes a part of the figure *saṃkara*), because it has no domain free from other figures (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 97 ll. 5–6).

A-2-2 Others hold that *śleṣa* can form *saṃkara* with another figure, because it has a separate domain (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 97 ll. 6–8).

A-2-3 Detailed analysis of how the latter understanding (A-2-2) contradicts the opinion of the elders (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 97 l. 9 – p. 98 l. 6).

B Treatment of CONTROVERSIAL TOPICS (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 98 l. 6 – p. 103 l. 15)

B-1 Presentation of the basic conceptual framework for DIFFERENTIATING between *śabdālaṃkāras* and *arthālaṃkāras* (*vis-à-vis* the classification in A-1-2) and its superiority over the framework put forward in the *Kāvyaṣaṅkārāśāstra* (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 98 l. 6 – p. 99 l. 1).

B-2 Other complex and disputed cases of *śleṣa*'s INTERACTION WITH OTHER FIGURES:

B-2a *śleṣa* and *upamā* (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 99 ll. 1–3),

B-2b *śleṣa* and *rūpaka* (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 99 ll. 4–5),

B-2c *śleṣa* and *saṃśodhikā* (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 99 ll. 5–6),

B-2d *śleṣa*, *atīśayokti*, *utprekṣā* and *virodhā*: *trayīmayo 'pi prathito ...* (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 99 l. 6 – p. 101 l. 2).

B-3 Relationship between *śleṣa* and *vastudhvani* (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 101 l. 2 – p. 103 l. 2)

B-4 Further discussion on the possibility for *śleṣa* to have a SEPARATE DOMAIN, *śleṣa* and *apahnuti*: *ākṛṣyādāv amandagraham ...* (**Ed^{KM}**: p. 103 ll. 2–15).

The above outline demonstrates, among other things, that in dealing with *śleṣa*, Ruyyaka elaborates on three main subjects. All three have been long identified in the secondary literature to constitute crucial points relevant not only for a thorough understanding of *śleṣa* but also for the construction of a unified theory of *alaṃkāraśāstra* as a whole [Narasimhacharya 1992 and Bronner 2010: 203ff.]. These subjects can be summarized as follows:

1. *śleṣa* and the basis for its identification as a figure of sound, sense, or both (see A-1-2 and

²⁸ Note that in the text of the *Alaṃkāraśāstra* commented on by Samudrabandha [Śāstrī, 1915], sections A-2 and B-1 are inverted.

B-1);

2. *śleṣa* and its relationship with other figures, in A-2, B-2, B-4;
3. *śleṣa* and its relationship with *dhvani*, in A-1-1c, B-3.

On the following pages, we will devote our attention to a detailed survey of Ruyyaka's treatment of the subject area 2.

3. *Śleṣa* and Other *Alaṃkāras*

3.1. § A-2: Statement of two homologous alternatives?

The first part of the chapter (§ A) presents Ruyyaka's basic stances on all major points of dispute. At the end of this part, after providing a definition and thoroughly considering two classification schemes, the text addresses *śleṣa*'s interaction with other figures of speech. As we will see below, for Ruyyaka this discussion boils down to answering a single question of whether *śleṣa* can ever occur in a verse without any other figure or not. Ruyyaka begins his treatment by introducing two opposing opinions (§ A-2-1 and § A-2-2):

- § A-2-1:^a eṣa ca nāprāpteṣv alaṃkārantareṣv ārabhyamāṇas tadbādhakatvāt
 5 tatpratibhotpattihetur iti ke cit |
 § A-2-2: “yena dhvastamanobhavana balijitkāyaḥ purāstrikrtaḥ” ityādir vivikto ’
 7 sya viṣaya iti niravakāśatvābhāvān nānyabādhakatvam ity anyaiḥ saha saṃkaraḥ,
 durbalatvād vā bādhyatvam ity anye |

^a Ś_L: 23r11; Ś_P: 45r2; D_J¹: 19r16, D_J²: 28r7, D_J³: 24v12; Ed^{KM}: p. 97, l. 5; Ed^J: p. 125, l. 10; Ed^S: p. 114, l. 9.

4 eṣa ca] Σ, eṣa D_J¹ 4 tadbādhakatvāt] Σ, tadbādhakatvena Ed^{KM} 6 balijit°] Ś_PD_J¹D_J³ Ed^{KM}, balijit° Ś_L 6 balijitkāyaḥ purāstrikrtaḥ] Ś_P*Ś_LD_J¹D_J³ Ed^{KM}, om. D_J² Ed^J Ed^S 6 ityādir] Σ, ityādau Ed^{KM} 7 niravakāśatvābhāvān nānyabādhakatvam ity] Σ, niravakāśatvād bādhakatvam iti Ś_L 8 durbalatvād vā bādhyatvam] Ś_LŚ_PD_J¹D_J³ Ed^J Ed^S, durbalatvād vācyakatvam D_J², durbalatvābhāvān nānyabādhakatva(dhyatva)m Ed^{KM}

§ A-2-1 (trl): And some say that this (i.e., *śleṣa*), given that it can only arise when other figures are present,²⁹ overrules these [figures], and, therefore, serves as the cause for the notional presence (*pratibhā*) of these [figures].

§ A-2-2 (trl): Others say that the verse beginning with “yena dhvastamanobhavana balijitkāyaḥ purā strikrtaḥ”³⁰ presents a distinct domain (*viṣaya*) for it (i.e., for *śleṣa*). And

²⁹ Lit.: ...given that it cannot arise when other figures are not present ...

³⁰ This verse, attributed to someone Candraka in *Sūktimuktāvalī* 2.104, encodes two distinct meanings—a homage to Śiva and Viṣṇu. From the compositional point of view, it is striking that until reading the very last word, the unsuspecting reader most naturally takes the verse to praise the mythological exploits of Śiva. But then, suddenly, one encounters the final word Mādhava, a common name of Kṛṣṇa, which acts as a trigger for realizing the cleverly concealed puns in the rest of the sentence.

Śiva: yena dhvasta-manobhavana balijitkāyaḥ purā*astri-krto , yaś codvṛttabhujāṅga-hāra-valayo gaṅgām ca yo 'dhārayat | yasyāhuḥ śāśimac chiro hara iti stutyam ca nāmāmarāḥ , pāyāt sa svayam andhakakṣayakaras tvām sarvadā+umā-dhavaḥ ||

“He who destroyed the mind-born [God of love], who long ago made the body of the conqueror of Bali [Viṣṇu] his

therefore, since it is not the case that it (i.e., *śleṣa*) lacks a scope [of its own] (*avakāśa*) and hence it does not sublate other figures, it either enters into a fusion (*saṃkara*) with other [figures], or, when it is weaker, it is sublated [by them].

3.1.1. § A-2-1, Pratihārendurāja on why *śleṣa* sublates other figures

Jayaratha, a Kashmiri commentator of the thirteenth cent. on the *AlaṃSa*, is unambiguous in assigning the former opinion (§ A-2-1) to Udbhaṭa and his followers.³¹ Although this identification has been taken for granted and repeated in a number of modern studies [for example, Agrawal 1975; Narasimhacharya 1992], it requires a more differentiated analysis. What can be stated with certainty is only that § A-2-1 summarizes the position of Pratihārendurāja (NCC: fl. 920–950 A.D.), the author of the *Laghuvṛtti*, a commentary on Udbhaṭa's work.

KāSāSaṃ 4.10ab [Banhatti 1925: 58]: *alaṅkārantaragatāṃ pratibhāṃ janayat*
... generating the notional presence pertaining to other figures ...

Laghuvṛtti [Banhatti 1925: 59]: *etac ca śliṣṭaṃ dvividham apy*
upamādyalaṅkārapratibhotpādanadvāreṇālaṅkāratāṃ pratipadyate ato 'nenānavakāśatvāt
svaviṣaye 'laṅkārantarāṇy apodyante, teṣāṃ viṣayāntare sāvakāśatvāt |

And this figure *śliṣṭa*, in both its kinds (that is, pertaining to sound or sense), becomes a figure of speech through generating a notional presence of other figures such as simile. Therefore, inasmuch as it has no scope [on its own] (*anavakāśatvāt*), it excludes other figures entering its domain, because they do have a scope in a different domain (*viṣayāntare sāvakāśatvāt*).

Although Pratihārendurāja does not give a formal definition of the term (and the notion of) *anavakāśatva* that he had introduced in explaining Udbhaṭa's laconic remark, it is persuasive that his understanding is dependent on the long established usage in other systems of knowledge, in Pāṇinian grammar above all. Within the latter system, the notion of *anavakāśatva* goes back to another formula frequently found in Kātyāyana's *vārttikas*, namely, argumentation from “the authority of a statement” made by Pāṇini (*vacanaprāmānya*). Pataskar 1991: 1 summarizes the

weapon, whose necklaces and bracelets are vicious serpents, who bore the Ganges, whose head the immortals call ‘Bearing the Moon’ [and call him] by the praiseworthy name: ‘Hara’,* who brought about the destruction of [the demon] Andhaka, who is the husband of Umā, may he always protect you!” *This translation of the third pāda follows the understanding presented, e.g., by Vidyācakravartin in his commentary on the *AlaṃSa* or Appayya Dikṣita in his *Vṛttivārttika*. Ingalls et al. 1990: 292 translate “to whom the immortals give the praiseworthy name of the Seizer (*hara*) who bears on his head the moon.” This translation seems possible when accepting *śaśimacchiroharaḥ* as a single *karmadhāraya* compound.

Viṣṇu: *yena dhvastam ano 'bhavena balijit kāyaḥ purā strikṛto , yaś codvṛttabhujāṅga-hā-a-rava-lyo 'gaṇi gāṃ ca yo 'dhārayat | yasyāhuḥ śaśimac-chirohara iti stutyam ca nāmāmarāḥ , pāyāt sa svayam andhakakṣayakaras tvāṃ sarvado mādhaveḥ ||*

“He who destroyed the cart [as a child], who is unborn, who defeated Bali, who long ago made his body into that of a woman, who killed the haughty serpent [= Kāliya], whose merges in sound ‘a’, who held up the mountain and the earth, whom the immortals call by the praiseworthy name: ‘Seizer of the head of the demon who destroys the moon [= Rāhu]’, who gave shelter to the Andhaka[-tribe in Dvāraka], who is all-giving, may Mādhava protect you.”

³¹ Cf. Vimarśinī ad *śleṣa* (Ed^{KM} p. 97): *ke cid ity udbhaṭādayaḥ*/ Elsewhere in the text, Ruyyaka himself associates the concerned opinion with the followers of Udbhaṭa (Ed^{KM} p. 123): ... *śleṣagarbhatve virodhapratibhotpattihetuḥ śleṣa audbhaṭānām, darśanāntare tu saṃkarālaṃkāraḥ*

relationship between both principles as follows: “Kātyāyana [...] says that a certain rule supersedes another rule because of its being *anavakāśa*. In other words, if the rule is not applied it becomes redundant. Thus on the basis of the authority of the statement [*vacanaprāmānya*] one has to apply the rule which otherwise becomes useless.”

In light of the above, Pratihārendurāja proposes that *śleṣa*, whenever it can be identified in a given verse, should always be given priority when weighted against any other figure of speech present in the same poem. This is because *śleṣa* inevitably coexists with some other *alaṃkāra* and, in this sense, it is *anavakāśa*, that is, “has no scope on its own”. Thus, if we did not give priority to *śleṣa*, the very postulation of it as a separate *alaṃkāra* would become redundant and thus would violate the compositional unity of Udbhaṭa’s *Kāśāṣaṃ* or, perhaps, the *alaṃkāraśāstra* as a system.³² In broader terms, we can say that by adopting strict hermeneutic principles to address the definitions of individual *alaṃkāras* here and elsewhere in his work, Pratihārendurāja treats them in the same way as “the senior knowledge systems”³³ address their fundamental rules. This implies that he views *alaṃkāras* as fundamental aesthetic or even epistemic principles whose existence cannot be doubted or dismissed as mere fantasies produced in the mind of a poet.

Ruyyaka’s choice of words in reporting Pratihārendurāja’s theory in § A-2-1 is further suggestive of an implied parallelism to other *śāstras*. It recalls the famous Pāṇinian metarule (*paribhāṣā*) commonly referred to by its beginning words “*yena nāprāpte*”:³⁴

yena nāprāpte yo vidhir ārabhyate sa tasya bādhako bhavati |

An operation formulated [to apply in cases] when another rule definitely applies sublates the latter.³⁵

As stated in note 32, it is unlikely that Ruyyaka is concerned with the technical implications identifying a rule as an *apavāda*. As we will discuss below, Ruyyaka admits cases when *śleṣa*, though present, becomes subordinate to other figures.

In view of the subsequent discussion we would like to observe that although the majority of *ālaṃkārikas* considered Pratihārendurāja’s technical analysis of Udbhaṭa’s short remark to be faithful to the root-text, other interpretations remain possible. Ānandavardhana, one of the most influential Kashmiri poeticians active in the 9th cent., seems to have understood the same passage

³² From a strict Pāṇinian point of view, Pratihārendurāja conflates the notion of *anavakāśa* with that of *apavāda*, in that he logically derives the latter from the former. Pataskar [1985, 1991] as well as Joshi & Roodbergen 1995: 7–9 demonstrated that in the original sense of the term, *anavakāśa* differed from *apavāda*, as it did not permanently debar the competing rule and both rules could either operate together or in turns. The above studies observe, however, that this distinction, though clearly made by early Pāṇinians, was not carefully observed in the absolute majority of later grammatical treatises (such as, for example, the *Kāśikāvṛtti*). It is also evident that the *alaṃkāraśāstra*-tradition did not take the restrictive character of *apavāda* very seriously, in that they allowed *śleṣa* to either produce the notional presence of other figures, or, even to be sublated by other figures.

³³ This term is borrowed from Bronner 2016.

³⁴ This metarule provides the grounds for the *utsarga-apavāda* (and hence *bādhya-bādhaka*) relationship between rules.

³⁵ See Cardona 2013: 26 for a more technical paraphrase “[A] rule R₂ and its operation (*vidhiḥ*) blocks (*bādhakah* “one which blocks”) a rule R₁ and its operation if it is formulated (*ārabhyate* “is undertaken”) so as to operate in a domain where R₁ must apply tentatively (*yena nāprāpte*).”

in a more inclusive way when, in his commentary to *kārikā* 2.21, he voiced the following objection from an interlocutor:

DhvaĀ ad 2.1 [Śāstrī 1940: 236]: *nanu, alaṃkārantarapratibhāyām api śleṣavyapadeśo bhavatīti darśitaṃ bhaṭṭodbhaṭeṇa, tat punar api śabdaśaktimūlo dhvanir niravakāśa ity āśaṅkyedam uktam “ākṣiptaḥ”iti/*

Objection: Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa demonstrated that even when there is a [mere] notional presence of another figure, we commonly apply the designation *śleṣa*. In this way, however, *dhvani* based on the capacity of speech-sounds has no independent domain. It is anticipating this objection, that [the *kārikā*] has said “implied”.

The two elements that are key for our reading of the *Dhvanyāloka* are, firstly, the conjunctive or adversative particle *api* (“also”, or “even”) and, secondly, the position of the above remark right after the quote of the verse “*yena dhvasta°...*” (see note 30) aimed at exemplifying a somewhat anomalous case where apart from *śleṣa* no other *alaṃkāra*, either explicit or suggested, can be detected. This seems to suggest (we are intentionally careful here) that in Ānandavardhana’s view, the fact that *śleṣa* could occur in a verse in absence of any other *alaṃkāra* did not contradict Udbhaṭa’s contention that whenever *śleṣa* operated alongside another *alaṃkāra*, it was always considered predominant.

3.1.2. § A-2-2, Other scholars, who think that *śleṣa* can occur alone

The position of “other” scholars that one encounters in § A-2-2 is closely parallel to the set of arguments put forward in both Tilaka’s commentary on Udbhaṭa’s *KāśāSaṃ* called *Vivṛti* as well as in Mammaṭa’s independent work, the *Kāvyaṇṣa* (*KāPra*).³⁶ In both texts, the discussion on general principles that underlie *śleṣa*’s interaction with other figures arises apropos of the specific question on how it relates to the figure *upamā*, “simile” (Ruyyaka addresses this topic in § B-2a, and we will review his arguments later). This question forms a part of the analysis of the following verse provided by Udbhaṭa as one of the examples of *śleṣa*:

svayaṃ ca pallavātāmrabhāsvatkaravirājini |
*prabhātasamḍhyevāsvāpahalalubdhehitapradā ||*³⁷

³⁶ Many similarities and parallels between the *Vivṛti* and the *KāPra* call for a thorough examination of their relative chronology. This important question, however, is beyond the scope of our study and will not be addressed here. There is some evidence suggesting that Ruyyaka was Tilaka’s son (see the colophon to Ruyyaka’s *Sahṛdayalīlā*) or / and his student in *alaṃkāraśāstra* (see Ruyyaka’s introductory verse to the *Saṅketa* on the *Kāvyaṇṣa*) and that, in Jayaratha’s view, Ruyyaka occasionally followed Tilaka’s arguments in his *Alaṃkārasarvasva* [see, for example, Durgāprasād & Parab, 1893: 115, 124]. This being the case, Mammaṭa and Tilaka could have been contemporaries. Ramaswami Sastri, the editor of the *Vivṛti*, considered various standpoints and evidences (pp. 41–45) and concluded that both authors must have flourished around the same time in Kashmir, but that Mammaṭa was more likely to draw from Tilaka’s composition than the other way around. Raghavan 1978: 372ff. was convinced that Mammaṭa followed Tilaka and argued based on this assumption throughout.

³⁷ See *KāśāSaṃ* 4, example verse *15 [Banhatti, 1925: 59] and *KāPra* 399 [Jhalakikar, 1983: 519].

And you yourself (<i>svayaṃ ca</i>),	[are] like the morning dawn (<i>prabhātaśāṃdhyeva</i>)
splendid with your hands, copper-colored and shining, like sprouts (<i>pallava-ātāmra-bhāsvat-kara-virājini</i>),	that is splendid with sprout-like-coppery rays of the Sun (<i>pallava-ātāmra-bhāsvat-kara-virājini</i>),
bestow what is desired to those eager for the result that is difficult to attain (<i>asvāpa-phala-lubdha-ihita-pradā</i>).	that bestows what is beneficial to those who do not desire the fruit of sleep. ³⁸

According to Pratihārendurāja, the first and the second halves of the stanza illustrate *arthaśleṣa*³⁹ and *śabdaśleṣa*⁴⁰ respectively, and both of them give further rise to the notional presence of an *upamā*.⁴¹

Tilaka and Mammaṭa, however, jointly argue that the fundamental theoretical assumption underlying Pratihārendurāja's interpretation (see sec. 3.1.1 above) is wrong. There are cases where *śleṣa* is found in isolation from other figures (both authors backup this claim with an illustration), and, this being the case, there is no reason to assume that *śleṣa* should always overrule other *alaṃkāras*. In this way—Tilaka, Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka's "others" conclude—*śleṣa* can either enter into a composite figure called *saṃkara*, "fusion", in which, according to *AlaṃSa* 85, the involved figures are so intertwined as to become virtually inseparable from each other,⁴² or, at other instances, *śleṣa* itself can be sublated by another figure.

The succinct presentation in § A-2-2 is very effective in reporting the above position of Ruyyaka's predecessors and in relating it to the one expressed by Pratihārendurāja. Furthermore, it uses one of Ruyyaka's own examples of *śleṣa* (the *prākaraṇika* type in § A-1-1e) that, as discussed above, has been introduced already by Ānandavardhana in order to demonstrate precisely the kind of verse where *śleṣa* occurs without other figures. Jayaratha, who, by the way, considers this position to reflect Ruyyaka's own standpoints (we will return to this later), brings in another authority and observes that these arguments were discussed at length in the *Alaṃkārasāra* [Durgāprasād & Parab,

³⁸ Our translation follows the commentarial gloss of Pratihārendurāja. Grimal & Sarma 2014: 105, n. 15 translate: "Resplendissante avec ses mains brillantes et cuivrées comme des feuilles tendres, e chant d'elle-même les désirs de ceux qui souhaitent le fruit qui ne peut être obtenu facilement, [Gaurī apparaît] comme l'aurore resplendissante des rayons du soleil cuivrés comme des feuilles tendres, attribuant des mérites à celui qui ne souhaite pas le fruit du sommeil."

³⁹ Laghuvṛtti [Banhatti, 1925: 59, l. 23]: *atra cobhayatrāpi halādanāṃ sāmyam / atas tanreṇoccarāṇasaṃbhavād ayam arthaśleṣaḥ //*

⁴⁰ Laghuvṛtti [Banhatti, 1925: 60, l. 9]: *ato'yaṃ śabdaśleṣaḥ*

⁴¹ Laghuvṛtti [Banhatti, 1925: 60, ll. 10ff]: *etayoś ca dvayor apy arthaśleṣaśabdaśleṣayor upamāpratibhotpattihetutvam ... tena neyam upamā api tu śleṣa upamāpratibhotpattihetuh //*

⁴² *AlaṃSa* 85 (Ed^J p. 222): *kṣīraniranyāyena tu saṃkaraḥ //* [...] *anutkaṭabhedāḥ saṃkaraḥ* / Note that the reading of the vṛtti in Ed^{KM} is corrupt.

1893: 97]. We know so little about this text, now lost, that it is nearly impossible for us to judge whether Ruyyaka might have used it as a source of inspiration, or, as Dwivedi 1963 proposes, it was written in response to Ruyyaka's novel theories.

3.1.3. § A-2-3, What the ancients really thought

With regard to the latter opinion of “some” *ālaṃkāraṇikas*, Ruyyaka observes the following:

- 9 § A-2-3: tan na pūrveṣāṃ abhiprāyaḥ | iha prākaraṇikāprākaraṇikobhayaṛūpānekārtha-
gocarātvena tāvat pratiṣṭhito 'yam ālaṃkāraḥ | tatrādyam prakāradvayam tulyayogitāyā
11 viṣayaḥ | trṭīye tu prakāre dīpakam prabhavatīti tāvad ālaṃkāradvayam idam śleṣaviṣaye
vyāptyā vyavatiṣṭhate, tatprṣṭhe cālaṃkāraṇtarāṇām utthānam iti nāsti vivikto
13 'sya viṣayaḥ | ata evālaṃkāraṇtarāṇām bādhitatvāt pratibhāmātreṇāvasthānam |
“yena dhvastamanobhavana” ityādaḥ ca prākaraṇikatvād arthadvayasya tulyayogitāyāḥ
15 pratibhāsanam |

9 tan na] $\hat{S}_P^{mg} D_J^3$, tatra $\hat{S}_L \hat{S}_P^{ac} D_J^1 D_J^2$ Ed^{KM} Ed^J Ed^S 9 pūrveṣāṃ abhiprāyaḥ]
 $\hat{S}_L \hat{S}_P D_J^1 D_J^2 D_J^3$, pūrveṣāṃ ayam abhiprāyaḥ Ed^{KM}, pūrveṣāṃ abhiprāyo 'yam Ed^J Ed^S 9
“prākaraṇikobhaya”] \hat{S}_L^{ac} , “prākaraṇikayor ubhaya” \hat{S}_L^{pc} 10 tulyayogitāyā] Σ , tulyayogitāyā eva
 D_J^1 11 prabhavatīti] D_J^2 Ed^J Ed^S, prabhavatīti iti $\hat{S}_L \hat{S}_P D_J^3$, bhavati iti D_J^1 bhavatīti Ed^{KM}
12 “viṣaye vyāptyā vyavatiṣṭhate”] $\hat{S}_P D_J^1 D_J^3$ Ed^{KM}, “viṣaye vyāptyā vyatiṣṭhate” $\hat{S}_L D_J^2$, “viṣayam
vyāpyāvatiṣṭhate” Ed^J Ed^S 12 tatprṣṭhe] Σ , tanniṣṭhatvena Ed^S 12 utthānam] $\hat{S}_L \hat{S}_P D_J^3$
Ed^J Ed^S, utthāpanam D_J^1 Ed^{KM} 13 ata evālaṃkā°] $\hat{S}_L \hat{S}_P D_J^1 D_J^3$ Ed^{KM} Ed^J, ata eva cālaṃkā°
Ed^S 13 tatprṣṭhe cālaṃkāraṇtarāṇām → ata evālaṃkāraṇtarāṇām] Σ , tatprṣṭhe cālaṃkāraṇtarāṇām
 D_J^2 (eyeskip) 13 bādhitatvāt] Σ , bādhitatvena° Ed^S 13 pratibhā°] Σ , pratibhāna° Ed^{KM}, 14
“manobhavana”] Σ , “manobhave” Ed^S 15 pratibhāsanam] $\hat{S}_L \hat{S}_P D_J^3$, pratibhānam $D_J^1 D_J^2$ Ed^{KM}
Ed^J Ed^S

§ A-2-3 (trl): This is not the (actual) intention of the ancient (authors).⁴³ On this topic (*iha*), to begin with, this figure has been established as operating within the field (-gocara) of multiple meanings, which may be contextual (*prākaraṇika*), non-contextual (*aprākaraṇika*), or combined (*ubhaya*). Among these, the first two modes are the domain of *tulyayogitā*, “equally connected,”⁴⁴ but in the third mode, *dīpaka*, “the lamp,” obtains. Thus, this pair of figures (i.e., *tulyayogitā* and *dīpaka*) pervasively (*vyāptyā*) underlies the domain of *śleṣa*, and on its back other figures can arise. Therefore, it (*śleṣa*) does not possess an exclusive domain. And this is precisely why, since other figures are overruled, they can only exist notionally. And in an example such as “*yena dhvastamanobhavana*” etc., there is an apparent presence of *tulyayogitā*, since both meanings are contextual (*prākaraṇika*).

Notwithstanding the polemic character of § A-2-3, in our analysis of the entire chapter of the

⁴³ The reading *tan na* is found in the margins to \hat{S}_P and in the late Devanagari manuscript D_J^3 , which can be observed to have a strong affinity with \hat{S}_P . We have adopted it even though both available readings can be construed to mean more or less same, for the reading *tan na* labels the foregoing as an unacceptable interpretation of the ancients' view. This, of course, would make Jayaratha's reordering of the flow of the arguments less plausible. If this unnatural reordering is secondary, as we believe it is, we have uncovered the motivation to move from *tan na* to *tatra* and, in following this change, to add the pronoun *ayam* that smooths the syntax of the sentence.

⁴⁴ Or, more literally, “being equally connected” or “being an equal conjunct”.

AlaṃSa (see sec. 2.2, on pp. 11f.), we consider this paragraph to conclude the first part (§ A) of the text, in which Ruyyaka declares his basic stances concerning the working of *śleṣa*. We reach this conclusion based on two reasons. Firstly, in line with the adopted reading of the text (see note 43), we interpret § A-2-3 as a direct reaction and an explicit rebuttal of § A-2-2 and not, as construed by Jayaratha, as an ancillary assessment of the views held by the ancient *ālaṃkārikas* and summarized in § A-2-1. Secondly, we observe that the arguments presented in this subsection are not found in any earlier work on *ālaṃkāraśāstra*. Rather, they constitute Ruyyaka's original contribution and, therefore, are likely to reveal his quintessential attitude to the question at hand.

In establishing the position that *śleṣa* cannot occur without other figures, Ruyyaka shifts the discourse by moving away from reasoning based on the evidence of individual verses and instead argues in general terms about the three types of *śleṣa* he postulated at the outset of his treatment. For this, he demonstrates that *śleṣa* always coincides with one of the two figures, *tulyayogitā* or *dīpaka*.

In a summarizing overview of several related figures (in *AlaṃSa* 25), Ruyyaka asserts that *tulyayogitā* and *dīpaka* share two defining characteristics: (1) an implied comparison—that is, a comparison expressed without explicit comparison words such as *iva*, “like”, etc., and (2) a single enunciation (*sakṛnnirdeśa*) of the property (qualifier) that is common to both the thing being compared (*primum comparationis*, *upameya*) and the standard of comparison (*secundum comparationis*, *upamāna*).⁴⁵ The actual definition of *tulyayogitā* stipulates further that this common qualifier should modify two elements that are both either *prastuta* or *aprastuta*,⁴⁶ while in the case of the figure *dīpaka*, so the following *sūtra*, one of the modified elements should be *prastuta* and the other *aprastuta*.⁴⁷ The propositional structure of the *ālaṃkāras* can be represented as follows:⁴⁸

$$[6] \text{ tulyayogitā}^{pra} = \{qualifier_{1+2}^{pra}\} + \{qualificand_1^{pra} + qualificand_2^{pra}\}$$

$$[7] \text{ tulyayogitā}^{apra} = \{qualifier_{1+2}^{apra}\} + \{qualificand_1^{apra} + qualificand_2^{apra}\}$$

$$[8] \text{ dīpaka} = \{qualifier_{1+2}^{pra+apra}\} + \{qualificand_1^{pra} + qualificand_2^{apra}\}$$

Considering merely the propositional structures of both figures, we can see that they align with other three *ālaṃkāras*, whose structure was presented above, namely, *samāsokti* [1], *aprustutaprasāmsā* [2] and the three types of *śleṣa* [3], [4], [5]. All these figures are similar in that they simultaneously convey two distinct syntactic clauses, whereas the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) of both clauses are expressed by a single semantically ambiguous linguistic string (or, more commonly, by several such strings). Now, one can see that the propositional structure of *dīpaka* [8] is identical with that of *ubhaya-* or *prakāraṇikāprakāraṇikaśleṣa* [5]. The parallelism between

⁴⁵ Cf. *AlaṃSa* Vṛ 25 (Ed^{KM} p. 54): *sāmānyadharmasya [...] ivādyanupādāne sakṛnnirdeśe dīpakatulyayogite*.

⁴⁶ *AlaṃSa* 23 (Ed^{KM} p. 70): *aupamyasya gamyatve padārthagatatvena prastutānām aprastutānām vā samānadharmābhisambandhe tulyayogitā/*

⁴⁷ *AlaṃSa* 24 (Ed^{KM} p. 71): *[aupamyasya gamyatve padārthagatatvena samānadharmābhisambandhe] prastutāprastutānām tu dīpakam/*

⁴⁸ In the formulaic representation, I use the following notation: $\{ABC_{1+2}\}$ and $\{XYZ_1\}$ both stand for a single phonetic/ orthographic unit. Of this, ABC expresses two meanings 1 and 2, and XYZ—only meaning 1. *pra* *apra* qualify this meaning further and stand for *prastuta* *aprastuta*, respectively.

the two types of *tulyayogitā*, [6] and [7], with the first two types of *śleṣa*, [3] and [4], is less striking. In order to better understand Ruyyaka's argument here, we may recall his analysis of the structural difference between *śleṣa*, on the one hand, as well as *samāsokti* and *aprastutaprasāṃśā*, on the other (see schematic overview in figure 1 above). Ruyyaka points out there that in cases of *śleṣa*, unlike in other two figures, the qualified elements (*viśeṣya*) are communicated directly (*vācya*) by means of words or phrases present in the current verse. This feature is also present in both types of *tulyayogitā* and *dīpaka*, and hence, on Ruyyaka's interpretation, it is accurate to conclude that *śleṣa* necessary concurs with one of these figures: *prākaraṇikaśleṣa* [3] coexists with **prākaraṇika-tulyayogitā* [6], *aprākaraṇikaśleṣa* [4] with **aprākaraṇika-tulyayogitā* [7] and *ubhayaśleṣa* [5] with *dīpaka* [8]. What can be gleaned from this reasoning is that Ruyyaka must have accepted the condition that, in a semantically ambiguous clause, both qualified elements must be verbally expressed (*viśeṣyāṇāṃ vācyaṭvam*) rather than conveyed by punning expressions (*viśeṣyasāmyam*) as the defining and distinctive characteristic of *śleṣa*.

We can infer a further presupposition that, to the best of our knowledge, is not addressed explicitly anywhere in the *AlaṃSa*. Above, we have referred to an overview of several figures in *AlaṃSa* 25. There, Ruyyaka establishes that *tulyayogitā* and *dīpaka* are characterized by a “single enunciation” (*sakṛnnirdeśa*) of the common property. This formulation makes it possible indeed to cater for both: the “actual” common properties, such as, for example, *kaṭhoratā*, “stiffness”, in *mālatiśaśabhṛllekhākadalīnāṃ kaṭhoratā*, “stiffness of a Jasmin flower, the crescent moon and a banana”,⁴⁹ as well as the ones expressed through paronomasia, such as, for example, *yena dhvastamanobhavana*, “[by Śiva, who] destroyed the mind-born” and “[by Viṣṇu, who] destroyed the cart, [by him, who is] unborn”.

However, the actual wording of the *sūtras* 23 and 24 (see notes 46 and 47), in which Ruyyaka defines the two figures, speaks of a relation with a single common property (*samānadharmābhisambandha*), which, he explains further in the text, can be either a quality (*guṇa*) or an action (*kriyā*) that both qualifiers have in common.⁵⁰ This necessitates postulating the view that the mere phonetic—or, rather, orthographic—coincidence of phonetic strings (*śabdasāmya*) expressive of two semantically distinct properties can, in itself, be considered a shared property of the two distinct entities to which they apply. To explain, this view holds that the only commonality between Śiva and Viṣṇu is the mere fact that we can reasonably say of both: “*yena dhvastamanobhavana*.” Now, this position—that is, the position that *śabdasāmya* is a legitimate common property of two entities—was explicitly argued for by Ruyyaka's predecessor, Mammaṭa, and even earlier by Rudraṭa. Thinking through this argument, Mammaṭa asserted that if a comparison between Śiva and Viṣṇu were indeed implied in the verse, the dominant *alaṃkāra* could

⁴⁹ See Ruyyaka's example of one of four types of *tulyayogitā* [Janaki, 1965: 86]: *tvaṇḡgamārdavaṃ draṣṭuḥ kasya citte na bhāsate/mālatiśaśabhṛllekhākadalīnāṃ kaṭhoratā*//“Who, witnessing the delicacy of your body, would not consider a Jasmin flower, the crescent moon and a banana stiff?” Note that banana trees are commonly associated with weakness, feebleness, evanescence [Syed, 1990: 162ff].

⁵⁰ *AlaṃSaVṛ* 23 (Ed^{KM} p. 70): *samānaguṇakriyāsambandha anvitārthā tulyayogitā*/

not be anything but *upamā*.⁵¹ This brings us to another problem.

The third problematic presupposition—indeed, “the elephant in the room”—arises from the fundamental semantic requirement for the occurrence of the figures *tulyayogitā* and *dīpaka*—namely, the implied comparison between the two qualified elements. Even if one can usually put forward a certain comparison-based relationship in verses containing an *ubhayaśleṣa* (coincident with *dīpaka*), in two other kinds of *śleṣa* (pervaded by the *tulyayogitā*) this rendition becomes far more problematic. It is hypothetically possible to think that Ruyyaka considered the verse “*yena dhvastamanobhavana...*” to imply a comparison between Śiva and Viṣṇu. In fact, may have had an implicit comparison—or perhaps even an expression of their metaphysical identity—in mind. Nevertheless, this reading of the poem seems to have no clear precedence in the mainstream Sanskrit poetological literature, and, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been explicitly advanced anywhere in Ruyyaka’s oeuvre.⁵² It is, we believe, for this apparent lack of careful consideration, that Śobhākaramitra, a rigorous intellectual opponent of everything Ruyyaka, while being unusually favorable to the majority of his rival’s innovations to the *śleṣa*-discourse, harshly criticizes exactly this point. His main arguments are twofold. On the one hand, Śobhākara deems impossible (from the point of epistemology) to distinguish between the two basic constituents of a comparison (that is, a comparee and a standard of comparison) in cases where both are expressed by means of paronomasia. On the other hand, he observes that in a verse such as “*yena dhvastamanobhavana...*,” both statements concerning Śiva and Viṣṇu are complete in themselves and do not require each other to be fully comprehended. That is why no comparison or, for that reason, no other semantic relationship between both of them need be or can be postulated.⁵³

3.1.4. § B-2a, śleṣa and upamā

The second major section in the treatment of *śleṣālaṃkāra* in the *AlaṃSa* (§ B in our overview) sets out with a detailed exposition of the basic conceptual framework that allows a differentiation between the so-called *śabda*- and *arthālaṃkāras*, “figures located in speech-sounds” and “figures located in the meaning” (§ B-1).⁵⁴ Ruyyaka formulates this section as a direct refutation of a competing theory proposed earlier by Mammāṭa and Tilaka, who, for their part, address their

⁵¹ We will return to Mammata's arguments in the analysis of B-2a below.

⁵² Bronner 2010: 205, particularly in note 39 on p. 306, proposes that Ruyyaka's identification of *tulyayogitā* in this verse proves that he must have considered it to imply a comparison between Śiva and Viṣṇu. In the same note, he further suggests—referring to *Vakroktiṣvita* III.44–47 [Krishnamoorthy, 1977: 219]—that “Kuntaka seems to have taken this verse to contain a plain similitude.” While we have not yet found an explicit statement to this effect in Kuntaka, Bronner's assessment appears correct insofar as Kuntaka, who rejects *dhvani* as a distinct category, readily acknowledges (*Vakroktiṣvita* III.45) that in all cases of *śleṣa*, the reader perceives an implied *alaṃkāra* based on the *upamāna-upameya* relationship between the elements encoded in the paronomasia.

⁵³ For a detailed review of Śobhākara's reasoning, see [Klebanov forthcoming](#). For the newly edited text of Śobhākara's chapter on *śleśālamkāra*, see [Klebanov & Vasudeva forthcoming](#).

⁵⁴ This somewhat strenuous translation of the terms *śabdālaṃkāra* and *arthālaṃkāra* follows Ruyyaka's own view that the relationship between *śabda* and *artha*, on the one hand, and *alaṃkāra*, on the other, is the so-called *āśrayasārayibhāva* 'the relation of the locus and the superstratum'. This opinion is taken for granted by an early Kashmiri poetician Mahimabhaṭṭa, for which see, for example, *Miśra* 1936: 88: *alaṅkā'py alaṅkāryān na prthag avasthātum arhati, tayor āśravāsārayibhāvenāvasthātāt* [...]

criticism to Udbhaṭa and his commentator Pratihārendurāja.⁵⁵ That Ruyyaka mainly targets here the exposition of the *KāPra* (and not Tilaka’s *Vivṛti*) can be seen from the introductory *evaṃ ca*, “and in this way”:

§ B-2a:^a *evaṃ ca*,
 17 sakalakalaṃ puram etaj jātaṃ saṃprati sudhāṃśubimbam iva
 ityādaṃ na guṇakriyāsāmyavac chabdasāmyam upamāprayojakam; api
 19 tūpamāpratibhotpattihetuḥ śleṣa evāvaseyaḥ |

^a Ś_L: 23v13; Ś_P: 46r2; D_J¹: 19v16, D_J²: 28v10, D_J³: 25v1; Ed^{KM}: p. 99, l. 1; Ed^J: p. 127, l. 6; Ed^S: p. 115, l. 11.

17 puram] Σ, param D_J² 18 sāmyavac] Σ, sāmyava // sāmānyavac Ś_L 18 °prayojakam api] Σ, °prayojakapi D_J² 19 °tpattihetuḥ] Σ, °tpattiḥ hetuḥ D_J³

§ B-2a (trl): And in this way, in an example such as the following: “At once (*saṃprati*), this city (*puram etad*) turned (*jātaṃ*) noisy (*sa-kalakalam*) like (*iva*) the full (*sakala-kalam*) moon-disk (*sudhāṃśubimbam*),” the commonality of speech-units (*śabdasāmyam*), unlike the commonality of qualities or actions, is not an instigator for the figure simile (*upamā*). To the contrary *śleṣa* alone should be determined as the cause for the arising of a notional presence of simile (*upamā*).




Fig. 2 Graphic representation of the argument structure of the verse line *sakalakalam*...

Paragraph § B-2a launches an entirely new group of topics (§ B-2) that looks at four progressively more complex and multi-layered instances of *śleṣa*’s interaction with other figures. Within the structure of the *AlaṃSa*, these topics have no direct connection to the question explored in § B-1 so that it appears counterintuitive to introduce § B-2a with a conjunctive clause “in this way” (*evaṃ*).⁵⁶ A plausible explanation can be gained, however, from considering § B-1 (and § B-2a)

⁵⁵ This part of the *AlaṃSa* as well as the pertinent passages from Udbhaṭa’s *KāSāSaṃ*, Pratihārendurāja’s *Laghuvṛtti* and Mammaṭa’s *KāPra* were translated into French and analyzed in Grimal & Sarma 2014.

⁵⁶ As noted above (see note 28), Samudrabandha rearranges the text of the *AlaṃSa* and, in doing so, likely responds to this apparent inconsistency. Since no other available textual source reflects this restructuring, we believe it is best understood as a deliberate intervention by the commentator.

a direct rebuttal of the arguments presented in Mammaṭa's *KāPra* 120 [Jhalakikar, 1983: 518ff.].⁵⁷ Proposing his own principles for distinguishing between *śabda*- and *arthālaṃkāras* in general as well as *śabda*- and *arthasleṣa* in particular, Mammaṭa, among other things, critically engages with one of Udbhaṭa's examples. According to Pratihārendurāja's unpacking, the verse illustrates both types of *śleṣa* (*artha*- and *śabdasleṣa* in each hemistich), and, what is more, demonstrates that *śleṣa* causes the arising of a notional presence of simile.⁵⁸ In line with Mammaṭa's own theories, both claims are wrong and he goes on refuting them one after another. The reasons behind the faultiness of the first claim are not relevant for the present discussion, but those disproving the second claim will be reviewed here in brief.

In clarifying his position, Mammaṭa quotes an anonymous line from an *ārya*-verse "*sakalakalam* ...". The predominant figure here (just as in Udbhaṭa's verse) is simile (*upamā*) for a number of reasons. In accordance with Rudraṭa's dictum, to begin with, a common property in a simile does not necessarily need to be a quality (*guṇa*) or an action (*kriyā*), but rather, it can also be a mere commonality of *śabd*as "speech-sounds" (or, rather, "graphemes").⁵⁹ This being the case, should the predominant figure in this line be *śleṣa*, another figure, namely, the complete simile (*pūrṇopamā*), in which all four elements of a comparison are explicitly mentioned, would lose its domain.⁶⁰ In fact, in a complete simile (*pūrṇopamā*), the word or phrase expressing the common property (e.g., "beautiful" or "shines intensely" in note 60) applies simultaneously to both qualificands and, in this way, fulfills the conditions for *śleṣa*. In the above line (*sakalakalam*...), *śabdasleṣa* would leave *pūrṇopamā* with no domain on its own, and in more common examples, such as the one discussed in note 60, *pūrṇopamā* would be superseded by *arthasleṣa*. This is because in Mammaṭa's framework, a complete simile can be considered an *arthasleṣa* (*śleṣa* related to the meaning), inasmuch as the word or phrase expressing the common property can be replaced with its synonym without changing the meaning of the sentence. Finally, Mammaṭa thinks that unlike *pūrṇopamā*, *śleṣa* has a domain on its own and, therefore, does not necessarily sublate every other figure (see § A-2-2).

Ruyyaka's reply to this complex contention is rather anticlimactic. He does not go into discussing individual allegations and plainly dismisses Mammaṭa's point and reiterates his own: here, just as in other similar cases, *śleṣa*, which has no individual domain isolated from other

⁵⁷ Note, however, that Prof. Bronner (personal communication) has suggested a much simpler—and indeed highly plausible—explanation of the force of *evaṃ ca*. This phrase could simply serve to connect the current discussion of *śleṣa*'s interaction with *upamā* to the earlier discussion of its interaction with *tulyayogitā* and *dīpaka*, indicating that just as *śleṣa* overruled those two *alaṃkāras* in the previous case, so it does here as well. If we accept this interpretation of *evaṃ ca*, my argument about Ruyyaka's reaction to Mammaṭa may become obsolete, and I am indeed willing to accept this.

⁵⁸ See Banhatti 1925: 60: *dvayor apy arthasleṣaśabdasleṣayor upamāpratibhotpattihetutvam*.

⁵⁹ Rudraṭa 4.32 [Durgāprasāda & Parāba, 1866: 48]: *sphuṭam arthālaṃkārav etāv upamāsamuccayau kiṃ tu/ āśrītya śabdamātram sāmānyam ihāpi saṃbhavataḥ*// "It is clear that these two, the *upamā* and the *samuccaya*, are figures related to the meaning. However, they can also occur in the cases considered here (that is, verses employing homographs and heteronyms) relying merely on the speech-sounds (*śabdamātra*) as a common property."

⁶⁰ Four elements of a complete simile are the comparee (*upameya*), the standard of comparison (*upamāna*), the comparison word such as *iva* 'like' etc., and the common property (*samānadharmā*). Mammaṭa's example is [Jhalakikar, 1983: 521]: *kamalam iva mukham manojñam etat kacatitarām* "Just like a lotus this beautiful face shines intensely." This line exemplifies both the common quality, that is, the beauty, and the common action, that is, intense shining.

figures, needs to be considered the predominant *alaṃkāra* that causes a notional presence of simile.

Coming back to the significance of the adverbial clause *evaṃ ca* “and in this way,” we can see that Ruyyaka’s § B-1 and § B-2a parallel the progression of arguments found in the *KāPra* and discussed above. In this way, it appears plausible to assume that, by using *evaṃ ca*, Ruyyaka connects his rebuttals to two subsequent contentions stated in the *KāPra* and not two unconnected arguments.

3.1.5. § B-2b, *śleṣa* and *rūpaka*

In the two following paragraphs, § B-2b and § B-2c, Ruyyaka considers two counter-examples to the established general principle of *śleṣa*’s unfailing predominance over every other figure found in the same verse. In accordance with Ruyyaka’s own taxonomy discussed elsewhere in the *AlaṃSa*, certain types of *rūpaka*, “metaphorical identification,” and *samāsokti*, “compound speech,” are said to rely upon on expressions that carry multiple meanings or can be understood in different ways, and, in this way, potentially co-occur with *śleṣa*. Needless to say, it is undesirable that *śleṣa* should overrule the concerned figures, because this would effectively leave them with no scope for application. Mindful of these special cases, Ruyyaka explains the reasons underlying this apparent contradiction.

§ B-2b: śleṣaḡarbhe tu rūpake rūpakahetukasya śleṣasya tṛtīyakakṣāyāṃ rūpaka eva
21 viśrāntir iti rūpakeṇa śleṣo bādhyate |

20 śleṣaḡarbhe] Σ, śleṣaḡarbhe Ś_L 20 rūpakahetukasya] D_J^{1pc}, rūpakahetuka D_J^{1ac} 20
°kākṣāyāṃ] Ś_LD_J¹ Ed^{KM}, °kākṣāyāṃ D_J² Ed^J Ed^S, °kākṣāyā Ś_PD_J³, 20 rūpaka eva] Ś_PD_J²D_J³
Ed^{KM} Ed^J Ed^S, rūpake eva D_J¹, rūpakatve eva Ś_L

§ B-2b (trl): But in the case of metaphorical identification (*rūpaka*) pregnant with *śleṣa*, *śleṣa*, which was itself caused by metaphorical identification (*rūpaka*), comes to rest in metaphorical identification (*rūpaka*) in the third level [of cognition], and therefore, *śleṣa* is overruled by (*rūpaka*).




Fig. 3 Classification of *rūpaka* in the *AlaṃSa* [Durgāprasād & Parāb, 1893: 36].

According to Ruyyaka’s classification of *rūpaka* (see fig. 3), two types of the figure (i.e., types 5 and 6) potentially co-occur with *śleṣa*. Both of them rely on the use of semantically ambiguous expressions (*śliṣṭapadanibandhana*), due to which the process of metaphorical identification unfolds gradually or in steps (*paramparita*). Discussing B-2b, all three commentators illustrate the issue

at hand with the help of the verse given in the *AlaṃṢa* as an example of the sixth type (that is, the *paramparita-sliṣṭapadanibandhana-mālā-rūpaka*), and in our treatment we will follow suit. The *mālā* (garland) type of *rūpaka* is characterized by multiple identifications of either one or multiple things.⁶¹

vidvanmānasahaṃsa vairikamalāsaṃkocadīptadyute
durgāmārgaṇanīlahita samitsvikāravaiśvānara |
satyapṛitividhānadakṣa vijayaprāgbhāvabhīma prabho
sāmrājyaṃ varavīra vatsaraśataṃ vairīṇcam uccaiḥ kriyāḥ ||

Oh King, the best hero!

[You are] a swan (<i>haṃsa</i>) on the Mānasa-lake (<i>mānasa</i>)	that is the mind of the learned people (<i>vidvan-mānasa</i>)!
[You are] the Sun (<i>dīptadyuti</i>) for the blooming (lit. non-closure) of lotuses (<i>kamala-asamkoca</i>)	that is the withdrawing of your enemies’ fortunes (<i>vairi-kamalā-samkoca</i>)!
[You are] Blue-Red Śiva (<i>nīlahita</i>) in desiring Durgā (<i>durgā-mārgaṇa</i>)	that is, in avoiding (lit. not searching for) fortresses (<i>durgā-amārgaṇa</i>)!
[You are] the fire (<i>vaiśvānara</i>) in devouring fuel (<i>samitsvikara</i>)	that is, in accepting battles (<i>samitsvikara</i>)!
[You are] Dakṣa in showing enmity towards Satī (<i>satya-apṛiti-vidhāna</i>)	that is, in finding pleasure in the truth (<i>satya-pṛiti-vidhāna</i>)!
[You are] Bhīma in being born before Arjuna (<i>vijaya-prāgbhāva</i>)	that is, in being at the forefront of conquest (<i>vijaya-prāgbhāva</i>)!

[May you] govern for a hundred of Brahma years!⁶²

⁶¹ Cf. Jayaratha [Durgāprasād & Parab, 1893: 36]: *mālā caikasyānekasya vānekāropād bhavati/*

⁶² Our translation of the verse follows the glosses given by Vidyākarvartin (Ed^J: pp. 47f.) and Samudrabandha (Ed^S: p. 35). As pointed out by Csaba Dezső, in the last two compounds, the words *dakṣa* and *bhīma* can express additional punning meanings, “clever” and “terrifying” respectively. Although we think that this interpretation is likely to reflect the original intention of the poet, we have not rendered this in our translation because it disturbs the parallelism in the structure of the elements of *rūpaka* and because as such, it is not mentioned in the commentaries we have used for rendering this verse into English.




Fig. 4 Graphic representation of the argument structure in the verse *vidvanmānasahaṃsa ...*

The verse at hand is a benediction (*āśīrvāda*) wishing a victorious king many years of prosperous government. At the same time, it eulogizes the sovereign for his excellent qualities and, in doing so, employs a string of vocatives, each containing a metaphorical identification. The first of these compliments is *vidvanmānasahaṃsa*, “[Oh, King, you are] a swan in the minds of the learned, that is, the lake Mānasa”. All three commentaries on the *AlaṃSa* use slightly different terms to describe the cognitive process underlying the comprehension of this compound. They all agree, however, that the three progressive “stages” or “moments” (*kṣaṇa*) that Ruyyaka claims it takes this cognition to develop can be determined as follows:⁶³

⁶³ Jayaratha (ad *rūpaka*) says [Durgāprasād & Parab, 1893: 38]: *vidvadyādi/ haṃsarūpaṇāmāhātmyān mānasarūpaṇeti paramparitam/*. “In the verse beginning with ‘*vidvan*’, [the metaphorical identification (*rūpaka*)] is gradual (*paramparita*), because the identification of the lake [with the mind] happens by the power of identification of the swan [with the king].” Later (ad *śleṣa*), he adds [Durgāprasād & Parab, 1893: 99]: *prathamakakṣāyām hi rūpakapratītir eva/ dvitīyakakṣāyām*

1st stage: The king is identified with a swan. This partial cognition corresponds to *rūpaka*.

2nd stage: The word *mānasa* is recognized to have two meanings: “the mind” and “the lake *Mānasa*”. This partial cognition corresponds to *śleṣa*.

3rd stage: The lake *Mānasa* (*mānasa*) is identified with the mind of the learned (*vidvanmānasa*). This cognition itself corresponds to *rūpaka*, and, furthermore, it substantiates the initial identification between the king and a swan.

Prior to drawing any conclusion from the above analysis, we would like to examine yet another verse that ends the section on *rūpakālaṃkāra* in the *AlaṃSa*. According to Ruyyaka’s evaluation of the verse, it furnishes a counterexample to the above scenario, namely, a case in which *śleṣa* does not deviate from its usual course and sublates the co-occurring *paramparitarūpaka*:

bhramim aratim alasahṛdayatām
pralayaṃ mūrcchāṃ tamaḥ śarīrasādam/
maraṇaṃ ca jaladabhujagajaṃ
prasahya kurute viṣaṃ viyoginīnām//

“The cloud serpents pour forth water
 pour forth venom
 which brings to ladies whose husbands are away
 a sudden dizziness, a listlessness and wariness of heart,
 then fainting, darkness, emaciation, death.”⁶⁴

In his brief commentary, Ruyyaka admits that after noticing a *śleṣa* in the word *viṣa*, which simultaneously expresses “water” and “venom,” one goes on to metaphorically identify both the meanings. Similar to the above example (*vidvanmānasahaṃsa...*), this constitutes the case of *rūpaka*, which, furthermore, substantiates another identification of serpents with clouds in *jalada-bhujaga*. Unlike in the above example (*vidvanmānasahaṃsa...*), however, *śleṣa* is not, in its turn, dependent on this latter identification. On the contrary, at first, both the figures are established separately and, as far as *śleṣa* is concerned, it is called for by the specific words used to describe the condition of the “ladies whose husbands are away,” that is, “dizziness,” “listlessness,” “wariness,” etc.⁶⁵

tu śleşapratītiḥ/ “For, in fact, in the first stage there is a cognition of nothing but a metaphorical identification (*rūpaka*), while in the second stage there is a cognition of a pun (*śleṣa*).”

Vidyācakraṇvartin (ad *rūpaka*) says [Janaki, 1965: 48]: *atra viduṣāṃ mānase tvam haṃsa iti pratītau katham asya haṃsatvam iti vimarśo jātaḥ, mānasapade śleşam avagamayati/ tathāvagamitena śleşaṇa haṃsatvam eva vyvavatiṣṭhata iti śliṣṭaśabdaparamparitam/* “Here, when one first understands [the compound to mean] ‘In the mind of the learned ones you are the swan,’ one starts wondering in what sense is he a swan, and this makes one notice a *śleṣa* in the word ‘*mānasa*’. With the help of *śleṣa*, which was brought to notice in this way, [the king’s] being a swan becomes settled.”

Samudrabandha (ad *śleṣa*) says [Śāstrī, 1915: 116]: *yathā ‘vidvanmānasahaṃse’ tyādaḥ tvam eva haṃsa iti prathamam rūpakasya pratītiḥ/ paścāt taddhetukā mānasaśabde śleşasya/ tato mānasam eva mānasam iti rūpakasya/* “In the case of the compound ‘*vidvanmānasahaṃsa*’ there is first a cognition of metaphorical identity (*rūpaka*) that takes the form ‘You are a swan.’ Then, on its basis, there is a cognition of a pun (*śleṣa*) in the word ‘*mānasa*’. And afterwards there is a cognition of metaphorical identity in form ‘the mind is the lake *Mānasa*.’”

⁶⁴ Translation quoted from Ingalls et al. 1990: 298.

⁶⁵ *Durgāprasād & Parab* 1893: 40: *bhramim aratim [...]* ity atra niyatasamkhyākākyaviṣeṣoṭthāpito garalārthaprabhāvito

Juxtaposing the above two cases, we can postulate that for Ruyyaka, it is not the form of the final cognition that determines the choice of the predominant *alaṃkāra*, but rather their casual relationship. It is only when the very recognition of *śleṣa* is conditioned by *rūpaka* that Ruyyaka agrees to consider the latter to be predominant. In all other cases, however, that is, when both *alaṃkāras* arise independently or when the co-occurring *alaṃkāra* is itself conditioned by *śleṣa*, *śleṣa* has to sublate the other figure for, as Ruyyaka repeats now and again, it would otherwise have no separate domain. Given this postulation, it seems likely that in the above example of *śleṣa*'s interaction with *upamā* (see § B-2a), Ruyyaka would argue either for the independent origin of both figures or, possibly, for *upamā*'s dependence on *śleṣa*.

3.2. B-2c, *śleṣa* and *samāsokti*

§ B-2c: śliṣṭaviśeṣaṇanibandhanāyāṃ ca samāsoktau viśeṣasyāpi gamyatvāc
23 chleṣabādhikā samāsoktiḥ |

22 viśeṣasyāpi] $\hat{S}_P D_J^2 D_J^3 \text{Ed}^{KM}$, viśeṣasyaiva Ed^S , viśeṣyāṃśasya Ed^J , viśeṣasyāpi $\hat{S}_L D_J^1$ 22
gamyatvāc D_J^{1pc} , gamyatvā D_J^{1ac} 23 chleṣa° $\hat{S}_P D_J^3 \text{Ed}^S$, chleṣasya] $\hat{S}_L D_J^1 \text{Ed}^{KM} \text{Ed}^J$, chleṣa-
 D_J^2

§ B-2c (trl): And since in “compound speech” (*samāsokti*) that is based on phonetically and/or graphically identical (*śliṣṭa*) qualifiers, the qualificand is additionally implicit, *samāsokti* sublates *śleṣa*.

Compared to the complexity of the preceding case (§ B-2b), *śleṣa*'s interaction with *samāsokti* is rather straightforward. It brings us back to Ruyyaka's remarks at the beginning of his examination of the latter figure, which we discussed earlier in section 2.1 (see schematic representation in fig. 1). In short, both figures share the condition that the qualifiers modifying two different qualificands need be expressed by a single punning word or phrase. However, in the case of *samāsokti*, only the contextually relevant qualificand is expressed verbally, while the contextually irrelevant one is implicit (see propositional structure of the figure in [1]). By contrast, in the corresponding case of *ubhayaśleṣa*, both qualificands are expressed verbally by means of two separate words or phrases (see [5]).

3.3. § B-2d, *śleṣa*, *atiśayokti*, *utprekṣā* and *virodha*

Having mapped out the general scheme for *śleṣa*'s interaction with other figures, Ruyyaka proceeds by applying his analysis to a structurally more complex verse, which, apart from *śleṣa*, involves three individual *alaṃkāras*, *atiśayokti*, “intensification,” *utprekṣā*, “seeing as,” and *virodha*,

viśaśabde śleṣa eva/ jalāḍabhujagajam iti rūpakasādhakam iti pūrvaṃ siddhatvābhāvān na tannibandhanam viśaśabde śliṣṭaśabdaparamparitam iti śleṣa evātrety āhuḥ// “The [old scholars] teach as follows: In this verse, it is exactly the *śleṣa* in the word *viśa*, which is brought about by [mentioning] a fixed number of specific effects [and thus] allows for the meaning ‘venom’. The *rūpaka*₁ in the word *viśa* that is cognized gradually, inasmuch as it is based on the use of a heteronym (*viśaśabde śliṣṭaśabdaparamparitam*), substantiates the *rūpaka*₂ in the expression ‘coming from the cloud serpents’, hence, because this *rūpaka*₂ is not established prior to *rūpaka*₁, *rūpaka*₁ is not based on *rūpaka*₂. Therefore, in this verse the figure is exactly the *śleṣa*.”

“poetic contradiction,” some of which further combine into a complex figure *saṃkara*, “fusion”.

§ B-2d: iha tu —

- 25 trayīmayo 'pi prathito jagatsu yad vāruṇīm pratyagamad vivasvān |
 manye 'staśailāt patito 'ta eva viveśa śuddhyai vaḍavāgnimadhyam ||
 27 iti śloke vivasvato vastuvṛttasaṃbhavy adhaḥpradeśasaṃyogalakṣaṇam
 yat patitvatvaṃ yaś ca vaḍavāgnimadhyapraveśaḥ, te dve api
 29 trayīmayatvasaṃbandhivāruṇīgamanarūpaviruddhācaraṇahetukābhyāṃ
 patitvatvāgnipraveśābhyāṃ atīśayoktyā śleṣamūlayābhedenādhyavasite | so '
 31 yam atatkriyāyogaḥ | taddhetukā ca “manyē”, “ata eva śuddhyai” ity utprekṣā,
 yatra “ata eva” iti parāmṛṣṭo virodhālāṅkāṛālāṅkrto 'rtho hetutvenotprekṣyate,
 33 “śuddhyai” iti ca phalatvena, ataś ca hetuphalayor dvayor apy atrotprekṣā |
 virodhālāṅkāṛasya ca viruddhābhāsatvaṃ lakṣaṇam, ato virodhābhāsanamaya
 35 eva hetuphalotprekṣotthānam, uttarakālāṃ tu virodhasamādhīḥ | śleṣasya ca
 sarvālāṅkāṛāpavādatvād virodhapratibhotpattihetur ayaṃ śleṣaḥ |

24 iha tu] iha tu ityādinā *Vimarśinī*

24 iha tu] $\dot{S}_L D_J^1 D_J^2 \text{Ed}^{KM} \text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$, om. $\dot{S}_P D_J^3$ 25 vivasvān] Σ , visvān D_J^1 26 vaḍavā°] Σ , vatavā° D_J^1 27 iti] $\dot{S}_P D_J^2 D_J^3$, atra $\dot{S}_L D_J^1 \text{Ed}^{KM} \text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$ 28 yaś ca] $\dot{S}_L \dot{S}_P D_J^3 \text{Ed}^S$, yac ca $D_J^1 D_J^2 \text{Ed}^{KM} \text{Ed}^J$ 29 trayīmayatva] $\dot{S}_P D_J^1 D_J^2 D_J^3 \text{Ed}^{KM}$, trayīmaya $\dot{S}_L^{pc} \text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$, trayīmayam \dot{S}_L^{ac} 30 śleṣamūlayā°] Σ , om. D_J^2 30 °vasite Σ , °vasīyete Ed^S 31 atatkriyā°] $\dot{S}_L \dot{S}_P D_J^2 D_J^3 \text{Ed}^{KM}$, atahkriyā° D_J^1 , ekakriyā° $\text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$ 31 śuddhyai] $\dot{S}_L \dot{S}_P D_J^1 D_J^3 \text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$, viśuddhyai $D_J^2 D_J^3 \text{Ed}^{KM}$ 32 yatrāta] $\dot{S}_P \dot{S}_L D_J^1 D_J^2 D_J^3$, ata $\text{Ed}^{KM} \text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$ 33 śuddhyai] $\dot{S}_L D_J^1 \text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$, viśuddhyai $\dot{S}_P D_J^2 D_J^3 \text{Ed}^{KM}$ 33 ity utprekṣā/ yatra “ata eva” iti parāmṛṣṭo virodhālāṅkāṛālāṅkrto (*secunda manu*) °laṅkāṛākrto 'rtho hetutvenotprekṣyate | “śuddhyai” (*deleted* iti)] \dot{S}_L^{pang} , om. \dot{S}_L^{ac} 33 ataś ca] $\dot{S}_L D_J^1 D_J^3$, atac ca \dot{S}_P , tataś ca $D_J^2 \text{Ed}^{KM} \text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$ 33 atrotprekṣā] Σ , utprekṣā Ed^S 34 viruddhābhāsatvaṃ] $\dot{S}_P \dot{S}_L D_J^2 D_J^3 \text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$, viruddhāsatva° D_J^1 , virodhābhāsatvaṃ Ed^{KM} 35 °tprekṣotthānam] $\dot{S}_P D_J^1 D_J^3 \text{Ed}^S$, °tprekṣyotthānam \dot{S}_L , °tprekṣaṇotthānam D_J^2 , °tprekṣayor utthānam $\text{Ed}^{KM} \text{Ed}^J$ 35 virodhasamādhīḥ] $\dot{S}_L \dot{S}_P^{pc} D_J^1 D_J^2 \text{Ed}^{KM} \text{Ed}^J \text{Ed}^S$, virodhasamādhī $\dot{S}_P^{ac} D_J^3$

§ B-2d (trl): As for [the relevant problem] here —

The sun, even though famous in all worlds as *Trayīmaya*,
 “The Personification of Three Vedas,”

since it returned to the (yad vāruṇīm pratyagamat) since it turned to alcohol,
 West,

[and] descended (patitaḥ) [and] committed a sin,

from the Sunset Mountain
 (astaśailāt),

therefore, I believe, to purify itself (manyē ... ata eva ... śuddhyai)
 it entered the Submarine Fire (viveśa ... vaḍavāgnim).

In this verse, the sun's falling (i.e., descent)—defined as contact with a lower position—that is inherently plausible (*-saṃbhavi*) in consensus reality (*vastuvṛtta-*), and its entry into the Submarine Fire, both of them are—by way of *atiśayokti*, “intensification,” based on *śleṣa*—identified as non-different (*abhedenādhyavasite*) from a [moral] falling (*patitvatva*) and an entry into fire, which are occasioned by contradictory behaviour in form of taking to alcohol on the part of somebody tied to being a Personification of Three Vedas. And this [identification] is a connection of an action with something that does not possess it.

And the *utprekṣā*, “seeing as,” which is based on it (i.e., on *atiśayokti*), is constituted by [the phrases] “therefore, I believe, to purify itself...”. Within this (*utprekṣā*), the meaning referred to by the phrase “therefore” and ornamented by the figure *virodha*, “contradiction,” is fancied as the cause, while [the meaning of the phrase] “to purify himself” is fancied as the effect, so that there is poetic fancy (*utprekṣā*) of both, cause and effect.

And poetic contradiction (*virodha*) is defined as the appearance of something as being contradictory, and therefore, the poetic fancy of cause and effect can arise only while (*-samaye*) the contradiction remains apparent. However, subsequently, there is a resolution of the contradiction. And, because *śleṣa* sublates all other figures, this [instance of] *śleṣa* is the cause for the arising of a notional presence of the figure “contradiction” (*virodha*).

As for the content of the exemplified verse, it describes the sunset: in course of its daily journey through the sky, the sun returns to the West and sets there from the “Western Mountain” (*astaśaila*, lit. “Setting Mountain”),⁶⁶ descending from which, it enters the mythological Submarine Fire (*vaḍavāgni*).⁶⁷ From here, the poet develops the imagery further through several poetic devices. The careful choice of semantically ambiguous words allows to convey another set of meanings: the sun's return to the West puns on its return to the habit of drinking liquor (this is based on the dual meaning of the word *vāruṇī*), and the sun's descent (*patitvatva*) refers not only to its downward movement (*adaḥpradeśasaṃyoga*) but, at the same time, to its metaphorical moral decline. This morally deviant behaviour, encoded through punning, is juxtaposed with the sun's well-known attribute as the personification of the Three Vedas—and, consequently, of the moral conduct enshrined in them—creating an apparent contradiction. Based on this contradiction, the poet adds further complexity and proposes a poetic interpretation for the reasons behind the sun's entry into

⁶⁶ The “Western Mountain” is a common trope in the description of sunset in Sanskrit classical poetry. It appears, to give but a few examples, in several verses of Vidyākara's *Subhāṣitaratnaśa* [Kosambi & Gokhale, 1957], such as, vs. 864 on p. 158 (*astācala*), vs. 880 on p. 160 (*astādri*) and several others.

⁶⁷ We were not able to locate an exact source of or a parallel for this poetic convention. It is likely, however, that our poet alludes here to a purāṇic belief, according to which, at night, the sun lodges its heat into fire. See, for example, *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* 1.(2).24.16cd–17ab [Shastri, 1983: 36]: *prabhā saurī tu pādena hy astam yāti devākare // agnim āviśate rātrau tasmād dūrāt prakāśate* / “As for the solar light, when the Sun sets along with its ray(s), at night, it enters fire. Therefore, it radiates from afar.”

fire: having committed the sin of indulging in alcohol, the sun must enter fire to ritually purify itself (here the poet alludes to the purifying property of fire).

Commenting on this verse, Ruyyaka represents the interaction between the many *alaṃkāras* as a sort of multilayered matrix. To begin with, he identifies the following figures:

- The first hemistich contains two figures:

śleṣa₁ The homonymy in the word *vāruṇī*, “the west” and “liquor,” accounts for *śleṣa*.

virodha The concessive particle *api*, “even though,” triggers a contradiction (*virodha*) between the property of being the personification of the Three Vedas (*trayīmayatva*) and the activity of indulging in alcohol (*vāruṇīgamana*), a meaning that relies on the above pun.

- The second hemistich prompts further figures:

śleṣa₂ A metaphoric interpretation of the word *patita*, “fell, i.e., descended” and “fell, i.e., fell morally,” and the phrase *vaḍavāgniṃ viveśa*, “entered the Submarine Fire” and “entered [ritual] fire,” amount to another instance of *śleṣa*.

atiśayokti The two sets of meanings cognized in *śleṣa₂* are identified as being entirely non-different from each other. This amounts for two instances of *atiśayokti*, “intensification.” Hereby the set of meanings inherently plausible in the consensus reality (*vastuvṛttasambhavin*) and contextual to the main topic of the verse (*prakṛta*)—that is, descent and entrance into Submarine Fire—is completely concealed by the other two meanings—that is, moral falling and entrance into ritual fire—which, for their part, feature in the cognition of *virodha*.⁶⁸

utprekṣā The word *manyē*, “I believe,” marks the occurrence of *utprekṣā*, “seeing as.” It is based on the working of *atiśayokti*—that is, the fact that the meanings associated with the description of sunset are concealed by the meanings associated with the behaviour of a drunkard—and has two aspects: *phalotprekṣā*, “seeing something as the result,” and *hetūtprekṣā*, “seeing something as the cause.”

utprekṣā_{phala} *śuddhyai*, “to purify itself,” is seen as the result.

utprekṣā_{hetu} the set of meanings associated with the drunkard and connected with *virodha*—that is, the fact that someone known as the personification of the Three Vedas drank liquor, thus committing a sin, and entered ritual fire—is seen as the cause.

As far as the hierarchy of the *alaṃkāras* is concerned, we may conclude the following:

- *atiśayokti* is evidently conditioned by the recognition of the two meanings in *śleṣa₂*, which is, for its part, called for by the realization of *śleṣa₁* and *virodha* in the first hemistich. For, in fact, as long as one does not become aware of the punning meaning “turned to alcohol” of the phrase *vāruṇīṃ pratyagamāt* and its contradiction with the property of being the personification of the

⁶⁸ In the *AlaṃSa* 22 [Janaki, 1965: 80], *atiśayokti* is defined as a figure, in which “the identifyingly ascertained predominates” [Vasudeva, 2016: 503]: *adhyvasitapradhānyē tv atiśayokti*. This is to say that, unlike in the case *utprekṣā*, in *atiśayokti* the actual process of identifying two entities is already accomplished and one merely perceives the superimposed entity (*viśayin*) concealing the one, which is the locus of the superimposition (*viśaya*).

Three Vedas (*trayīmayatva*), one does not perceive the puns in *patita* and *viveśa ...vaḍavāgnimadhyam* (i.e., *śleṣa*₂).

• *utprekṣā* (or, to be more precise, two *utprekṣās*), on its turn, is directly dependent on the identity relationship encoded in *atiśayokti* and hence, it ultimately relies on the combination of *śleṣa*₁ and *virodha*. In order to substantiate *utprekṣā*'s reliance on *virodha*, Ruyyaka refers to his own views on the latter figure. According to *AlaṃSa* 40, the core feature of *virodha* is “the erroneous cognition of an item as being contradictory.”⁶⁹ By contrast, the “resolution” (*samādhāna*) of the apparent contradiction—that is, the moment one recognizes that the two items are, in fact, not contradictory and understands that the previous cognition was indeed erroneous—is deemed by Ruyyaka to occur outside the working of *virodha*. For him, a lack of *samādhāna* does not eliminate the entire figure but rather gives rise to a poetic fault (*doṣa*) called *prarūḍha*, “grown (or, budded) [but not completed (or, blossomed)].”⁷⁰ This being the case, *utprekṣā* can sustain only as long as the cognition of *virodha* (i.e., *virodhābhāsa*) and all following cognitions are maintained. As soon as one resolves the contradiction—that is, as soon as one remembers that the sun is not drinking alcohol but, rather, moves to the west—one cannot keep *utprekṣā* in existence any longer. Hence, as Ruyyaka explains later in his commentary on the figure *saṃkara*, “fusion,” the combination of *śleṣa*₁ and *virodha* contains *utprekṣā* and, therefore, relates to it as a composite whole to its part (*aṅgāṅgibhāva*).⁷¹

In view of the above, we can establish that the combination of *śleṣa*₁ and *virodha* causally determines all other figures and dominates the verse. The ultimate issue, therefore, remains to establish the relationship between these two figures. Here, Ruyyaka maintains his intransigent attitude and declares that “because *śleṣa* sublates other figures, this *śleṣa* is the cause for the arising of a notional presence of *virodha*” (*śleṣasya ca sarvālaṃkāṛāpavādatvād virodhāpratibhotpattihetur ayaṃ śleṣaḥ*). Given our above postulation (see section 3.1.5), this statement can apply in two cases, when *śleṣa* is perceived independent of *virodha*, or when it conditions the latter figure. Although Ruyyaka does not make any explicit comment with this regard, we believe that he likely considered the first option—that is, an independent occurrence of both *alaṃkāras*—to be preferable. We infer this, among other things, because in his analysis of the figure *saṃkara* in *AlaṃSa* 85 [Janaki, 1965: 223], when hypothetically assuming the theoretical position that *śleṣa* need not sublate every figure co-occurring in the same verse, Ruyyaka states that in this view too, one needs to accept *śleṣa* and *virodha* as two independent figures with no possibility for their “fusion” in terms of *aṅgāṅgibhāva* (cf. note 71). That Ruyyaka's final position is, indeed, that *śleṣa* overrules all other figures can be seen from a short postscript to his analysis of the concerned verse in the chapter on *saṃkara*. Here, Ruyyaka assumes a hypothetical contention that *śleṣa* does not sublate all other co-occurring figures, because it is found in verses even without *virodha*. Ruyyaka replies to it by saying that he

⁶⁹ *AlaṃSa* 40 [Janaki, 1965: 152]: *viruddhābhāsatvaṃ virodhaḥ* |

⁷⁰ *AlaṃSaVṛ* 40 [Janaki, 1965: 152]: *iha ... virodhibhyāṃ sambandhe virodhaḥ* | *sa ca samādhānaṃ vinā prarūḍho doṣaḥ* | *sati tu samādhāne pramukha evābhāsamāntvād virodhābhāsaḥ* |

⁷¹ Janaki 1965: 223: *atra prathamārdhe virodhāpratibhotpattihetuḥ śleṣaḥ* | *darśanāntare tu virodhasleṣau dvāv alaṃkārau* | *tadanugrhitā dvitīye 'rdhe manyapadaprakāśitotprekṣā* | *ataś cāṅgāṅgibhāvaḥ* |

does not hold the position that *śleṣa* can never occur without *virodha*, but rather that it is never found in absence of other figures, *virodha* being just one of them. Hence, he reiterates that *śleṣa*, having no independent scope, always sublates co-occurring figures.⁷²

What seems to be at stake for Ruyyaka when providing a detailed analysis of the verse at this point in the text (even though he scrutinizes the same poem later in the *AlaṃSa*) is the fact that notwithstanding the structural complexity of a given verse, the general principles delineating *śleṣa*'s interaction with other figures—nameley, the logical necessity for *śleṣa* to sublimate all other figures—remain the same. Following Ruyyaka's deliberations presented in a later chapter, we learn that ultimately the current verse as a whole contains “fusion” (*saṃkara*) of two figures, *śleṣa*—or, to be more precise, *śleṣa* that gives further rise to the notional presence of *virodha*—and *utprekṣā* (cf. note 71). “Fusion” requires, furthermore, that the involved figures relate to each other in one of three specified ways, and in the case of *śleṣa* and *utprekṣā* here, it is the so-called *aṅgāṅgibhāva*. However, none of these three relations can be relevant with regard to *śleṣa*'s direct interaction with other figures (such as *śleṣa*'s interaction with *virodha*), simply because it can never occur in isolation from them.

After exploring *śleṣa*'s place vis-à-vis other *alaṃkāras*, Ruyyaka proceeds to an inquiry into *śleṣa*'s interaction with another item from the catalogue of Sanskrit literary terms, namely, *dhvani*, “suggestion.” This discussion relies on a specific set of ideas, their histories and a number of characteristic problems and, hence, will not be reviewed here. Instead, we will turn our attention to the final section in the chapter on *śleṣa*, where Ruyyaka once again reassesses the question whether *śleṣa* can ever be found in a verse without any other figure or not.

⁷² Janaki 1965: 224: *ataś ca niravakāśatvād bādhakatvam | na ca virodham antareṇāpi śleṣo dṛśyata iti śleṣasya sāvakāśatvam iti | yato na brūmo virodham antareṇāpi śleṣo na bhavati | kiṃ tarhy alaṃkāraṅtaravivikto na śleṣasya viśayo 'tīti niravakāśatvāt teṣāṃ bādhah | tanmadhye ca virodho 'nupraviṣṭa iti so 'pi tena bādhyata iti na kaś cid doṣaḥ |*

3.4. § B-4, *apahnuti*37 § B-4:^a iha ca —

ākṛṣyādāv amandagraham alakacayaṃ vaktram āsajya vaktre
 39 kaṇṭhe lagnaḥ sukaṇṭhaḥ prabhavati kucayor dattagāḍhāṅgasaṅgaḥ |
 baddhāsaktir nitambe patati caraṇayor yaḥ sa tādṛk priyo me
 41 bāle lajjā nirastā nahi nahi sarale colakaḥ kiṃ trapākṛt ||
 ity alaṃkāṛāntaravivikto 'yaṃ śleṣasya viṣaya iti nāśaṅkāṇiyam, apahnuter atra
 43 vidyamānatvāt |
 vastuto 'pahnavasya sādṛśyārtham apravṛtter nāyam apahnutyalaṃkāra iti
 45 cet, na, ubhayathāpy apahnutisaṃbhavāt | sādṛśyaparyavasāyīnā vāpahnavena,
 apahnavaparyavasāyīnā vā sādṛśyena bhūtārthāpahnavasyobhayatra vidyamānatvāt |
 47 sādṛśyavyaktaye yatrāpahnavo 'sāv apahnutiḥ |
 apahnavāya sādṛśyaṃ yatrāpy eṣāpy apahnutiḥ||
 49 iti saṃkṣepaḥ |
 ādyā svaprastāva evodāhṛtā, dvitīyā tu saṃprati darśitā | tenālaṃkāṛāntaravivikto nāya
 51 viṣayo 'stīti sarvālaṃkāṛāpavādo 'yam iti sthitam ||

^a \acute{S}_L : 24v17; \acute{S}_P : 48r2; D_J^1 : 20v15, D_J^2 : 31r5, D_J^3 : 26v7; Ed^{KM} : p. 103, l. 2; Ed^J : p. 131, l. 7; Ed^S : p. 120, l. 9.

37 iha ca] Σ , om. D_J^3 38 vaktram āsajya] $\acute{S}_P^{pc} \acute{S}_L D_J^2 D_J^3 Ed^{KM} Ed^J Ed^S$, vaktramām sajya \acute{S}_P^{ac} ,
 vaktramasajya D_J^1 40 patati caraṇayor] \acute{S}_L^{pc} , patitaca patati caraṇayor \acute{S}_L^{ac} 41 lajjā] \acute{S}_L^{pc} , majjā
 \acute{S}_L^{ac} 41 colakaḥ] Σ , calokaḥ D_J^1 42 nāśaṅkāṇiyam] $\acute{S}_L D_J^1 D_J^2 Ed^{KM} Ed^J Ed^S$, na śaṅkāṇiyam
 $\acute{S}_P D_J^3$ 42 apahnuter] $\acute{S}_L \acute{S}_P^{pc} D_J^1 D_J^2 Ed^{KM} Ed^J Ed^S$, apahrter \acute{S}_P^{ac} , apahrater D_J^3 42
 atra] Σ , om. Ed^J 44 sādṛśyārtham apra°] \acute{S}_P^{ac} , sādṛśyārtham saṃpra° \acute{S}_L , sādṛśyārtham atra pra°
 $\acute{S}_P^{pc} D_J^1 D_J^2 D_J^3 Ed^{KM}$, sādṛśyārthapra° $Ed^J Ed^S$ 44 apahnuty°] $\acute{S}_P \acute{S}_L Ed^{KM} Ed^J Ed^S$, apahnutir
 $D_J^1 D_J^2$ 45 apahnuti°] $\acute{S}_P \acute{S}_L^{pc} D_J^1 D_J^2 D_J^3 Ed^{KM}$, upahnuti° \acute{S}_L^{ac} , apahnuteḥ $Ed^J Ed^S$ 46
 vāpahnavena → vā sādṛśyena] Σ , apahnavena → sādṛśyena D_J^1 46 °bhayatra] $\acute{S}_P D_J^2 D_J^3 Ed^{KM}$
 Ed^J , °bhayatrāpi $\acute{S}_L D_J^1$, °bhayathāpi Ed^S 48 yatrāpy eṣāpy] $\acute{S}_P D_J^2 D_J^3 Ed^{KM} Ed^J$, yatrāsty eṣāpy
 D_J^1 , yatra saīṣāpy Ed^S 48 sādṛśyavyktaye → °ṣāpy apahnutir iti] Σ , sādṛśyavyktaye yatrāpahnutir
 iti \acute{S}_L (eyeskip) 50 svaprastāva] Σ , svaprstāyaṃ D_J^3 50 tu] Σ , tayā D_J^1 50 saṃprati darśitā
] $\acute{S}_P \acute{S}_L D_J^1 D_J^3 Ed^{KM} Ed^J$, saṃprati pradarśitā Ed^S , saṃpradarśitā D_J^2 50 °vivikto] Σ , °vyavakto
 D_J^2

§ B-4 (trl): And here,

“I love the handsome one, that drawn to me catches at my hair,
 then presses face to face;
 fair-necked that clasps my neck,
 and bodily enfolds my breasts;
 that finally having hugged my hips
 falls before my feet.”

“My child, you’ve lost all shame!”

“Not I; it’s you

are crooked-minded. What’s shameful in a dress?”⁷³

one should not suspect that it presents an instance of a domain for *śleṣa* that is devoid of other figures, because here the figure *apahnuti*, “poetic denial,” is present.

If someone objects that in reality this is not a case of the figure *apahnuti*, because [here] the denial is not used to express similarity, we reply “No!”, since the figure *apahnuti* is possible in both cases.⁷⁴ This is because we have the presence of a denial of a reality (*bhūtārthāphnava*) in both cases, either through a denial culminating in similarity, or through similarity culminating in a denial.

Summary: Where we have a denial for the sake of manifesting similarity, this is poetic denial (*apahnuti*); and where we have similarity for the sake of [manifesting] denial, this too is poetic denial (*apahnuti*).

The first type (of *apahnuti*) has been exemplified in its own presentation, the second [type] has been shown now. In this way, it (*śleṣa*) has no domain devoid of other figures of speech, and thus it is established that it sublates all other figures.

All three commentaries on the *AlaṃSa* agree that this final section in the treatment of *śleṣa* presents an exception to Ruyyaka’s basic postulation made earlier in § A-2-3—that is, to the position that *śleṣa* always co-occurs either with *tulyayogitā* or *dīpaka*. We may add that the verse treated in § B-2d and in the related discussion on *saṃkara* seems to deviate from this general rule as well.⁷⁵

The verse at hand presents a playful dialogue, in which the main heroine sets out with a rather pictorial account of what seems to be her beloved’s way to engage in loveplay. Her dialogue partner, presumably her female friend, is shocked by this report, presumably made in public, and criticizes her for her indecency. To this, the main heroine replies that she did not mean to say anything inappropriate, for she was only describing her favourite dress.

From the analytical point of view, we recognize that all the qualifiers apply simultaneously to both the lover (here, certainly the contextual element) and the dress (the non-contextual element), and that among these two, it is the latter that is mentioned explicitly and the former that is implied.

⁷³ Translation quoted from Ingalls 1965: 255. Note that this translation reflects a slightly different version of the verse [Subhāṣitaratnakośa 820, Kosambi & Gokhale, 1957: 151]. Most of the variants have no bearing on the meaning of the verse. However, in pāda D, Kosambi & Gokhale 1957: 151 read *kuṭile* instead of *sarale*. Hence, in place of ‘crooked-minded’ in the above translation, our version of the verse reads ‘simple-minded’.

⁷⁴ The reading of \dot{S}_L^{PC} (*sādrśyārtham apravṛtter*) is indirectly supported by \dot{S}_L (*sādrśyārtham saṃpravṛtter*). A possible direction of change could be: *“rtham apra”* → *“rthasapra”* → *“rtham saṃpra”*. The prefix “saṃ” in *saṃpravṛtti-* seems pleonastic, and is best explained as an attempted repair of a misreading (see above). The reading *atra* of Ed^{KM} , \dot{S}_L^{PC} as well as $\text{D}_J^1\text{D}_J^2\text{D}_J^3$ (note also that Ed^{KM} prints without word-break as: *“matrapravṛtter”*) is clearly wrong as it does not elicit the response and the discussion of the two kinds of *apahnuti* given by Ruyyaka in the following. As a matter of fact, we will see that Ruyyaka states unambiguously that in this verse, the denial is not employed to manifest similarity. The reading of \dot{S}_L as well as the suspect compounding (*sādrśyārthapravṛtter*) adopted in Ed^J Ed^S , on the other hand, could be translated as follows: “If someone objects that this is not a case of *apahnuti*, because [in this figure] the denial serves to express similarity, we reply ‘No!’.”

⁷⁵ Both cases of *śleṣa* discussed in § B-2a and § B-2b, on the other hand, can be considered to contain *dīpaka*. In both cases, the contextual and non-contextual qualifiers are expressed by means of polysemes, and the two qualificands are stated explicitly.

This structure does not allow to qualify the underlying *alaṃkāra* either as *tulyayogitā* (there, the qualifiers should express either two contextual or two non-contextual meanings), or as *dīpaka* (there, both qualificands need to be stated explicitly), or, as a matter of fact, as *samāsokti* (there, it is the non-contextual qualificand that needs to be implicit).⁷⁶ Thus, Ruyyaka's interlocutor is finally able to find an example of a verse that contains no other figure but *śleṣa* and, therefore, produces evidence that Ruyyaka's basic assumption—that is, the assumption that *śleṣa* has no separate domain and sublates other figures—is wrong.

To this, Ruyyaka replies that this observation is incorrect because even though lacking any of the above *alaṃkāras*, this verse still contains another figure, namely, *apahnuti*, “poetic denial.” This proposition, however, triggers another disagreement concerning the nature of the latter figure. The interlocutor objects that what one really achieves by means of *apahnuti*—that is, by means of denying the existence of a real, contextual item (such as the face of one's beloved) and establishing an unreal, non-contextual item (such as the moon) in its place—is the cognition of similarity between both items. To use a schematic example provided a few centuries later by Appayya Dīkṣita in his *Cītramīmāṃsā* [Śivadatta & Parab, 1893: 5], when saying *candro 'yaṃ na mukham*, “this is the moon, not [her] face,” a poet wishes to express that her face is similar to the moon. In this way, *apahnuti* should always result in the cognition of similarity. Here, however, the causality is reversed. The speaker's ultimate intention is certainly not to say that her lover is similar to her dress. Rather, by a skilful choice of punning words, she demonstrates that both are similar to each other only in order to deny talking about her lover (the real, contextual item) and instead pretend to describe her dress (the unreal, non-contextual item).

Unexpected in the context of the current chapter though not unusual for the text of the *AlaṃSa*, Ruyyaka seizes the occasion to update his definition of *apahnuti*. The core feature of the figure, he says, is, after all, the mere denial of a real, contextually relevant entity (*bhūtārthāpahnavā*). Although this denial should always involve similarity between two items, the direction of causal relation between both (i.e., denial and similarity) does not matter. In fact, one needs to accept that *apahnuti* is present in both cases: when a poet uses a denial in order to manifest similarity, and when one uses similarity in order to manifest a denial. This idea is highlighted by being recorded in a mnemonic verse, and Ruyyaka remarks, furthermore, that it was the first kind of *apahnuti* that was dealt with earlier in the chapter dedicated to the figure and that the second type of *apahnuti* is exemplified by the very verse at hand. This being the case, the verse does not offer an example of *śleṣa* isolated from other figures, and Ruyyaka's basic assumption remains intact.

Now, there are several important observations that need to be made in connection with the above treatment of *apahnuti*. If one looks back at the discussion of the figure in *AlaṃSa* 20, to begin with, one finds that it lacks any mention of both semantic requirements—that is, (1) similarity between the items and (2) the application of denial to a “real entity” (*bhūtārtha*)—that Ruyyaka

⁷⁶ Considering merely the constellation of qualificands and qualifiers, it appears possible to argue for the presence of the figure *aprasutaprasāṃsā* in the verse. However, neither Ruyyaka nor any of the commentaries on the *AlaṃSa* take this possibility into account.

deems central to the figure in the chapter on *śleṣa*. Instead, *AlaṃṢa* 20 contains a purely structural definition that emphasizes two formal elements: (1) superimposition of one thing on another (*āropa*) resulting in the ascertainment of the superimposed item (*āropyamānapratīti*), and (2) denial of the object of superimposition (i.e., of that, on which another is superimposed).

Ed^J: 63: *āropaviṣayāpahnutāv āropyamānapratītāv apahnutyākhyo 'laṃkāraḥ |*

When there is a denial of the locus of superimposition and ascertainment of the superimposed item, there is the figure called *apahnuti*, “[poetic] denial.”⁷⁷

We note, however, that both the semantic requirements and, in addition, the use of the exact term *bhūtārthāpahnavā* are found in the definition of the figure in Udbhaṭa’s *KāSāSaṃ*:

KāSāSaṃ 5.3 [Banhatti, 1925: 62]:

apahnutir abhīṣṭā ca kiñcidantargatopamā |
bhūtārthāpahnavenāsyā nibandhaḥ kriyate budhaiḥ ||
etad dhi na tapaḥ satyam idaṃ hālāhalaṃ viṣam |
viṣeṣataḥ śaśikalākomalānām bhavādrśām ||

Poetic denial is said to incorporate, to a certain degree, simile. The learned compose it through a denial of a factual entity.

[For example:] For, surely, this is not true penance. [But rather], it is the poison *Halāhala*,⁷⁸ especially [it is true] for people of your kind, tender like a digit of the moon.

Commenting on the example verse, Pratihārendurāja makes a crucial observation that in *apahnuti*, the denial leads up to the cognition of similarity. To the best of our knowledge, he is the only early *ālaṃkārika* to spell out this position in clear terms.⁷⁹

Pratihārendurāja on *KāSāSaṃ* 5.3 [Banhatti, 1925: 62]:

atra prākaraṇikasya tapasaḥ svarūpaṃ apahnutya hālāhalaviṣeṣarūpatādhyāropeṇa
tatsādrśyaṃ avagamitam |

In this verse, denying the existential nature (*svarūpa*) of austerity, which is contextual here, and superimposing [upon it] the nature of being a particular poison *Halāhala*, [the poet] expresses similarity [of austerity] with it (that is, with the deadly poison).

All things considered, it appears that in extending the scope of *apahnuti* in the current section, Ruyyaka, rather than relying on his own definition of the figure, addresses primarily the exposition

⁷⁷ This is Ruyyaka’s own expansion of his laconic definition (**Ed^J**: 62): *viṣayāpahnavā 'pahnutiḥ |* “When the object is denied, it is [poetic] denial.”

⁷⁸ In our translation of the verse, we follow the metrical division of the verse in singling out individual syntactic clauses, thus we take *satyam* to qualify *tapas*, “penance.” It is, however, equally possible to take *satyam* with the next syntactic clause: “In reality, this is the poison *Halāhala*.”

⁷⁹ Rudraṭa can be argued to describe the same causal relation, however, taking the viewpoint of a composer rather than a listener of a verse. *Kāvyaśālaṃkāra* 8.57 [Durgāprasāda & Paraba, 1866: 111]: *atisāmyād upameyaṃ yasyām asad eva kathyate sad api | upamānam eva sad iti ca vijñeyāpahnutiḥ seyam ||* “When, based on extreme similarity, the comparee, though real, is said to be unreal, and only the standard of comparison to be real, this one should be recognized as *apahnuti*.”

adopted by Udbhaṭa and interpreted by his early commentator Pratihārendurāja. This assumption is corroborated by Ruyyaka's own statement in the chapter on *vyājokti*, “sham expression.”⁸⁰ The figure was first introduced by Vāmana (in his *Kāvyaṭīkā* 4.3.25), though Ruyyaka's definition as well as the example verse are evidently borrowed from *KāPra* 184 [Jhalakikar, 1983: 700–1]. In the following, we quote the relevant portion of the text in whole:

AlaṃSa 76 (Ed^J: 199): **udbhinnavastunigūhanam vyājoktiḥ** |

[...] *yathā* —

*śailendrapratipādyamānagiriḥastopagūḍhollasad-
romāncādivisaṃṣṭhulākhilavidhivyāsaṅgabhaṅgākulaḥ |
hā śaityaṃ tuhinācalasya karayor ity ūcivān sasmitaṃ
śailāntaḥpuramāṭṛmaṇḍalagaṇair dṛṣṭo 'vatādvah śivaḥ ||*

[...] *nanv apahnutigranthe “yathā sādṛśyā yo 'pahnavah sāphnutiḥ, tathāpahnavāya yat sādṛśyaṃ sāpy apahnutiḥ” iti sthāpitam | vyājoktau cottaraḥ prakāraḥ vidyate, tat katham iyaṃ alaṃkāraṇāreṇa kathyate | satyaṃ | udbhaṭasiddhāntāśrayeṇa tatroktam | na hi tanmate vyājoktyākhyam alaṃkāraṇam asti | iha tu tasya sambhavād vyatiriktāphnutir iti prthag ayam alaṃkāro nirdiṣṭaḥ ||*

“Concealment of a [secret] matter that has become manifest [by means of introducing another matter] is called *vyājokti*.”⁸¹

[...] As, for example, in the verse:

Frightened that all the marital rites may be ruined, when Parvatī, as she was given to him by the Lord of Mountains, clasped him with her hand [and thus made him feel] uneasy because of horripilation and other [bodily reactions] that manifested [due to her touch], Śiva, smilingly watched by the royal ladies of the mountain, the Mātṛkās and the gaṇas, said: ‘Ah, cold are the hands of Snow Mountain!’ May he protect you!”⁸²

[...] Objection: the following was established in the textual passage dealing with *apahnuti*: ‘Just as a denial that leads up to [a cognition of] similarity is *apahnuti*, so also a [cognition of] similarity that leads up to a denial is *apahnuti* as well.’ And the latter kind is present in the case of *vyājokti*, so how is it taught here as a separate figure? This is correct. In that text passage (*tatra*) it was argued based on Udbhaṭa's position, for, in fact, on his view, figure *vyājokti* does not exist. In this text (*iha*), however, since this figure is accepted, *apahnuti* is different, and this figure (i.e., *vyājokti*) is taught separately.”

⁸⁰ This translation of the term *vyājokti* is borrowed from Warden 1974 and seems preferable because it not only fits the actual figure, but also captures the meaning of the original Sanskrit word. Gerow 1971, on the other hand, proposes “pretext,” which seems much less appropriate. Dāsa & Dāsa 2015 translate the term as “artful concealment,” which we consider a successful description, rather than a translation.

⁸¹ Note that the supplied instrumental phrase “by means of introducing another matter” modifies the action of “concealment”. This and other suppletions here follow Ruyyaka's own unpacking of the definition: *yatra nigūḍham vastu kutaścin nimittād udbhinnaṃ prakāṭatām prāptaṃ sad vastvantaraprakṣeṇa nigūhyate apalapyate, sā vastvantaraprakṣaprūpasya vyājasya vacanād vyājoktiḥ ||*

⁸² Prior to the *AlaṃSa*, this verse was utilized in Mammaṭa's *KāPra* as an example of the same figure *vyākoti*. It is quoted anonymously (as “*kasyāpi*”) in Jalhaṇa's *Sūktimuktāvalī* 2.6 [Krishnamacharya, 1991: 17].

This section has a direct bearing on the main topic of the present article. Here, Ruyyaka not only addresses the alleged superfluity of the figure *vyājokti vis-à-vis* his definition of *apahnuti* provided in the chapter on *śleṣa* (that he ambiguously calls *apahnutigrantha*, “textual passage dealing with *apahnuti*,” without giving any clue to his readers where to look for this passage in the text of *AlaṃSa*). Ruyyaka also resolves the apparent inconsistency between this treatment and the analysis of the figure furnished in the actual chapter dealing with the figure (*AlaṃSa* 20) that we observed earlier. Ruyyaka clarifies to his readers that the treatment of *apahnuti* in the chapter on *śleṣa* need not be taken as his ultimate position. He explains that the modified definition of the figure as well as the special provision to its domain were provided only with view on Udbhaṭa’s system, but not as applying to his own theory.

This admission casts a quasi-existential doubt on the validity of the entire body of arguments that we assigned to Ruyyaka in this article. As a matter of fact, Jayaratha, the earliest known exegete of the *AlaṃSa*, is firmly convinced that all statements, where Ruyyaka argues for *śleṣa*’s unique capacity to sublate all other *alaṃkāras*, need to be taken merely as reporting Udbhaṭa’s opinion and not, as one may misunderstand them, to conform to Ruyyaka’s own views. Statements to this effect are frequently found in Jayaratha’s commentary, and, to quote but one example, we may recollect his remarks concluding the current section § B-4 and the entire chapter on *śleṣa*:

Jayaratha on *AlaṃSa* 35 (**Ed**^{KM}: 103):⁸³ *atra ca granthakṛtā śleṣaḥ sarvālaṃkāṛāpavādaka itī na kevalaṃ prācyamatānusāram uktaṃ yāvad apahnavaṇyavasāyisādrśyarūpo ’pahnutibhedo ’pi tanmatānusāram evoktaḥ |*

“And here, the author of the treatise not only teaches that *śleṣa* sublates all other figures [merely] in conformity with the views of the ancients, but he even teaches the type of *apahnuti* that consists of a denial leading up to [a cognition of] similarity only in conformity with their views.”

At the current state of our knowledge, we are unable to provide a conclusive hypothesis explaining Jayaratha’s motivation behind insisting on this understanding of Ruyyaka’s statements. It is possible, however, to frame the commentators complex reassignment of views to other interlocutors as an attempt to change Ruyyaka’s conclusion to counter criticism from Śobhākara. At any rate, we believe that Jayaratha misinterprets Ruyyaka’s larger project of highlighting *śleṣa*’s distinct characteristic of being always paired with another *alaṃkāra*. What seems ultimately stake in the case of the particular verse here, is not to demonstrate that *śleṣa* cannot occur in absence of *apahnuti* specifically, but, rather, that it is always accompanied by one or another *alaṃkāra*. That Jayaratha is misrepresenting Ruyyaka’s views can be ascertained from external evidence as well. In Ruyyaka’s own commentary to the *Vyaktiviveka* we read:

⁸³ Note that our cursory collation of several Sharada manuscripts transmitting the text of Jayaratha’s commentary has detected copious, at times substantial deviations from the *editio princeps* (*Durgāprasād & Parab* 1893 = **Ed**^{KM}). While hoping to furnish a text-critical study of the text sometime in future, we limit ourselves to quoting it here according to the reading of *Durgāprasād & Parab* 1893.

Vyaktivivekavyākhyā of Ruyyaka [Śāstri, 1909: 2.50]: *alaṃkārantaravivikṭaviṣayābhāvena sarvālaṅkārapavādatvāc chleṣasyopamāpratibhotpattihetuḥ śleṣa evātra nyāyyo nopamety abhiprāyaḥ |*

“The meaning is that the figure of speech is here properly *śleṣa* and not simile, because *śleṣa* cancels all [other] figures of speech by lacking a domain different from other figures of speech.”

Here Ruyyaka presents this exclusionary view of *śleṣa* as the correct analysis without further qualification,⁸⁴ and we may assume that this is also the easiest way to understand the flow of the argument in the *AlaṃSa*.

Our understanding is corroborated by the opinion of the two other commentators on the *AlaṃSa*, Vidyācakravartin and Samudrabandha. In his verses summarizing Ruyyaka’s deliberations on *śleṣa*, Vidyācakravartin writes:

Saṅjivānī of Vidyācakravartin on *AlaṃSa* 33 [Janaki, 1965: 132]:

śabdasāmyaṃ bhavet chleṣo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣayoh /
yady eko ’prakṛtārthaś ced bhedyāṃśe bhinnasābdatā //
śābdārthobhyanīṣṭho ’yaṃ sarvālaṃkārabādhakaḥ /
pūrvasiddhasya ced aṅgaṃ tadā nyāyena bādhyate //

“If (*yadi*) [in a verse, there is] identity of linguistic items (*śabdasāmyaṃ*) [expressive of] the qualifications and the qualifiers, there is *śleṣa*. When (*cet*)⁸⁵ [only] one item (*ekaḥ*) has meaning that is irrelevant to the context, then the modified items should be expressed by two different linguistic items.⁸⁶ This [figure *śleṣa*] is located in speech-sounds, meanings or both, [and] it cancels all other figures. When it is a constituent of an *alaṃkāra* that is established prior (to cognition of *śleṣa*), then, by [this] reasoning, it is cancelled [by this very figure].”

This exact view is also attributed to the author(s) of the *AlaṃSa* by the 16th-century polymath Appayya Dīkṣita in his monumental *Citramīmāṃsā*:

Citramīmāṃsā of Appayya Dīkṣita [Śivadatta & Parab, 1941: 12-13]:

kiṃ tu śleṣasyālaṅkārantaravivikṭaviṣayābhāvena niravakāśatayā
balavattvenālaṃkārantarabādhakatvād upamāpratibhāne ’pi tatpratibhotpattihetuḥ śleṣa
eva nopameti māṅkhakādibhir abhyupeyate |

⁸⁴ That is, one might hesitate to accept this as evidence, as Ruyyaka might be simply reporting Mamṭa’s view, not his own.

⁸⁵ In our translation we take the particles *yadi* and *cet* to construe with two different clauses. However, it is also possible that Vidyācakravartin used both particles in conjunction and connected them to a single phrase (*yadi eko ’prakṛtārthaś cet*). In this case, the first hemstitch could be understood as “The identity of linguistic items expressive of qualifications and qualifiers is *śleṣa*.”

⁸⁶ Lit.: “the property of being expressed by two different linguistic items should be present in the modified part”.

“But Mañkha and others⁸⁷ accept that even if a simile is apparent, [the main figure is] *śleṣa* that is the cause for its (i.e., *upamā*’s) notional presence, and not simile [itself], since *śleṣa* cancels all [other] figures of speech through its relatively greater strength, since, for absence of a domain free from other figures of speech, it has no scope [on its own].”

We consider the above evidence sufficient to invalidate Jayaratha’s claims about the provisional character of Ruyyaka’s arguments. At the current state of our knowledge, however, we are unable to furnish a conclusive explanation for the author’s elaborate engagement with Udbhaṭa’s definition of the figure *apahnuti*. We may observe, nonetheless, that the discussed verse (*ākṛṣyādāv ...*) was supplied in Tilaka’s *Vivṛti* [Ramaswami Sastri, 1931: 40] as a “correct” example of *arthasleṣa*. Given that Tilaka disapproves of Udbhaṭa’s and Pratihārendurāja’s stand on *śleṣa*’s lack of an exclusive dominion on its own, we may assume that he deemed this verse to contain no other figure but *śleṣa*. It is possible, therefore, that in analyzing this verse Ruyyaka sought to prove the opposite, namely, that even assuming Udbhaṭa’s systematization of *alaṃkāras* it is still impossible to point out any verse, in which *śleṣa* would not co-occur with one or another figure.

4. Conclusions

In his structurally complex and argumentatively dense chapter on *śleṣa* (*AlaṃSa* 33), Ruyyaka provides a series of reasons establishing the unique capacity of the figure to overrule all (or almost all) other figures co-present in the same verse. We believe that by framing his analysis as an unpacking of “the actual intention of the ancient authors” (*pūrveṣāṃ abhiprāyaḥ*), Ruyyaka wishes to root his views in the ancient doctrine and establish a lineage of his own system going back to his luminary predecessor Udbhaṭa, and not—as Jayaratha wants us to believe—to indicate a transitory and ultimately bogus status of his deliberations. Accepting Udbhaṭa’s (or, more precisely, Pratihārendurāja’s) basic premise that *śleṣa* can never occur in absence of another *alaṃkāra* and thus, for lack of a distinct domain on its own, need be logically accepted to sublate any of these, Ruyyaka posits some original arguments in defense of this assumption. He observes, to begin with, that all three kinds of *śleṣa* (contextual, non-contextual and mixed) necessarily co-occur with either one of two figures, *tulyayogitā*, “equally connected,” and *dīpaka*, “the lamp.” However, he admits several peculiar cases, where *śleṣa* cannot but be deemed secondary. As aptly summarized by Vidyācakravartin in the concluding verses to his commentary on *AlaṃSa* 33, this applies specifically to poems, in which our recognition of *śleṣa* is itself prompted by the prior comprehension of yet another *alaṃkāra*. Allowing for this limited number of exceptions, Ruyyaka boasts his proficiency as a literary critique and provides an exemplary analysis of several complex verses. By doing so, he proves that in the absolute majority of these intricate poetic compositions, *śleṣa* cannot be considered secondary, because it either gives rise to our apprehension of other figures, or, because their comprehension happens independent of *śleṣa*, in which case we are

⁸⁷ Appaya here refers to Mañkha as the author of the explanatory *Vṛtti* that follows each *sūtra* of the *AlaṃSa*.

compelled to accept śleṣa's predominance on purely logical grounds (for its lack of a dominion on its own).

Apart from illuminating the argumentative structure of Ruyyaka's text, this article accomplishes yet another important purpose of providing a new improved critical edition of the pertinent passages from the *AlaṃSa*. We hope to continue our text-critical examination of the *AlaṃSa* and related corpus of texts in the coming years, or, perhaps, to motivate other scholars to join us in this endeavor.

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From Kashmir to Vṛndāvana: Abhinavagupta's Influence on Jīva Gosvāmī's *Bhaktirasa* Theory

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1. Introduction

Ever since Abhinavagupta (10th–11th century), the dominant view held by the tradition of Sanskrit aesthetics has been that it is the audience (*sāmājika*) who experiences *rasa*. In the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Abhinavagupta introduces and examines the theories that preceded him. According to Abhinavagupta, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (9th century) argues that it is primarily the original character (*anukārya*) and actor (*anukartṛ*) who experience *rasa*, while Śaṅkuka (9th century) argues that the actor is the primary experiencer of *rasa*. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (10th century) rejects the views of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka, and argues that the audience is the primary experiencer. Following Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta concludes that *rasa* experience primarily belongs to the audience. We have access to the views of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, and Nāyaka mainly through Abhinavagupta's writing. This fact combined with Abhinavagupta's penetrating insight left a decisive impact on the development of *rasa* theories. Assessing his influence J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan [1970: 25] go so far as to state: 'There has been a tendency [...] for the post-Abhinava writers to remain relatively silent on the issue of *rasa*. [...] there is no doubt that no later writer has written anything more profound on *rasa* than Abhinavagupta.'

However, despite Abhinavagupta's influence, he was not the only voice in the field. For example, Bhojadeva (11th century), a Paramāra king who was roughly contemporaneous with



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Abhinavagupta, argued that *rasa* is ultimately singular. This view was radically different from Abhinavagupta who accepted the nine types of *rasa* [Pollock 1998; 2016; Raghavan 1978]. Nor did post-Abhinava writers remained silent. For example, Śiṅgabhūpāla II (14th century) rejected Abhinavagupta's view and argued that Bharata accepted only eight types of *rasa*, [Vijayan 1981: 104].¹ Another significant development in the post-Abinava period was the *rasa* theoreticians' engagement with *bhakti*. Vopadeva (13th century) and his contemporary Hemādri coined and articulated the concept of *bhaktirasa* for the first time in their discussion on the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* [Buchta and Schweig 2010; Lutjeharms 2014; 2018: 150–155; Pollock 2016: 285–289].

A culmination of those alternative views was the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theories of *bhaktirasa* presented by Rūpa Gosvāmī (16th century) and his nephew Jīva Gosvāmī (16th century). As Pollock points out, Rūpa's theory is unique because he re-centers the locus of *bhaktirasa* experience. Pollock summarizes Rūpa's view: "All interactions of characters with God in the storyworld of the drama or poem are blissful, and hence cannot but satisfy the final definition of *rasa* [Pollock 2016: 301]." This radical re-centering, according to Pollock, is "at variance with the notions ascendant since the reformulation of Abhinavagupta [Pollock 2016: 301]." It is even more clearly expressed in Jīva's work: *rasa* in the primary sense of the term "arises in the characters [Pollock 2016: 301]." In contrast, discussing Rūpa's system, David Haberman emphasizes the role of the devotional actor as the locus of *bhaktirasa* experience: "Reemphasis on the actor, as opposed to the audience, constitutes one of the main contributions of Rūpa's *rasa* theory [Haberman 1988: 37]."

We observe that scholars offer widely divergent assessments on the development of *rasa* theories after Abhinavagupta. On the one hand, scholars such as Masson and Patwardhan suggest that post-Abhinava authors more or less agreed with Abhinavagupta and did not offer any important innovation. On the other hand, Haberman, Pollock, and others suggest that post-Abhinava authors such as Rūpa and Jīva offered their theories on *rasa* that radically broke away from Abhinavagupta's view. Then there are other scholars whose assessments on the Gauḍīya theories of *rasa* lie somewhere in the middle. Neal Delmonico for example offers the following observation on Rūpa's theory: 'Rūpa takes a stand which apparently aligns him with the interpretation of Abhinavagupta. The location Rūpa specifies, however (the heart of the devotee), is broad enough to include the characters in a play and the audience as well [Delmonico 1998: 87].' In this view Rūpa agrees with Abhinavagupta and yet offers some innovation at the same time.

Pollock and Haberman are certainly correct to point out the importance of the original character and the actor in the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theories of *bhaktirasa*. What they do not elaborate enough however, is the place of the devotional audience in the discussion of *bhaktirasa*, and Abhinavagupta's influence on the Gauḍīya view. In this paper I argue that Rūpa and Jīva consciously engaged with the earlier Kashmirian theories of *rasa* in order to construct more devotionally oriented theories of their own. Thus, I take 'a middle path', so to speak, between the two extreme views presented by Masson and Patwardhan on the one hand, and by Haberman and Pollack on the other. In this sense

¹ *Rasārṇavasudhākara* 2.161ab: *tad aṣṭāv eva vijñeyāḥ sthāyino munisaṁmatāḥ* / On Śiṅgabhūpāla II's influence on the Gauḍīya authors, see [Bhattacharyya 1958, Broo 2011, Okita 2016 and 2017].

my assessment on Rūpa and Jīva is close to that of Delmonico. However, while Rūpa has relatively little to say concerning the loci of *bhaktirasa* Jīva offers a more robust engagement with the existing views on *rasa*. Since Delmonico focuses on Rūpa, in this paper I will elaborate Jīva's view, in order to offer a fresh assessment on the Gauḍīya views.

In this regard, what is most astonishing is Jīva's claim that *bhaktirasa* can be experienced by all—that is, by the original character, the actor and the audience. In what follows, first I discuss Rūpa's view according to his *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu*. Then I outline Jīva's view as discussed in his *Prītisandarbha Anuccheda* 111. Following those I examine Jīva's discussion of the devotional audience. The keynotes in his discussion are the ideas of generalization and latent disposition (*vāsanā*), which condition the experience of *bhaktirasa* for the devotional audience. In the last section I then explore Abhinavagupta's view on generalization and latent disposition, to make a comparison with Jīva's view. In conclusion, I point out that Jīva's view on the loci of *bhaktirasa* demonstrates the influence of Abhinavagupta that is more fundamental than Haberman and Pollock suggest. At the same time, I also point out Jīva creatively reformulated the Abhinavaguptian concepts. This suggests that against the assessment of Masson and Patwardhan, the post-Abhinava authors did offer significant innovations.

2. *Bhaktirasa* and the Original Characters

Rūpa articulates his view on the loci of *bhaktirasa* in *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* 2.5.107–108. In these two verses, Rūpa first agrees with the view represented by theorists such as Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and Abhinavagupta that the original characters cannot be the locus of *rasa*. In the second verse however, Rūpa argues that in relation to Kṛṣṇa's sport (*līlā*), not only the audience but also the original characters experience *bhaktirasa*. In *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* 2.5.107, Rūpa states:

Those who are experts in drama say that due to the reasons such as being mundane (*laukikatva*), delight situated in the original characters is not *rasa*. This is indeed appropriate.²

Commenting on this verse, Jīva explains that 'Those who are experts in drama' refer to those who know only dramas that are mundane (*laukika*).³ In this context, Rūpa and Jīva uses the term 'mundane' in the sense of 'non-devotional', meaning it is not about God Kṛṣṇa. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta, original characters, actors, and reciters cannot experience aesthetic sentiment.⁴ Jīva explains that Rūpa agrees with this view in so far as non-devotional dramas and poems are concerned.

However, in *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* 2.5.108, Rūpa argues against the view of 'the experts of

² *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* 2.5.107: *ratih sthitānukāryeṣu laukikatvādihetubhiḥ / rasaḥ syān neti nātyajñā yad āhur yuktam eva tat //*

³ Jīva, *Durgamasaṅgamanī* on *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* 2.5.107: *nātyajñā ity upalakṣaṇaṁ kāvyamātrajñānām / te ca laukikā eva //*

⁴ Jīva, *Durgamasaṅgamanī* on *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* 2.5.107: *tatrānukāryaśrotavyayo rasanīpattim na te manyante laukikatvāt, pārimityāt, bhayādisadbhāvā ca / na cānukarṭṛvaktro jīvikārthaṁ tattadanukaraṇāt //*

drama,’ and asserts that supra-mundane figures such as Kṛṣṇa and those who accompany him do experience *rasa* even though they are original characters:

However, this supra-mundane (*alaukikī*) delight toward Kṛṣṇa (*kṛṣṇarati*) is more astonishing than the most astonishing, becoming a special *rasa* in Hari’s beloved when in contact [with Kṛṣṇa].⁵

Describing this delight in Kṛṣṇa, Jīva states that it eclipses the bliss of liberation, bestows bliss even to Kṛṣṇa himself, and it is superior to the delight experienced in relation to the other manifestations of Kṛṣṇa such as Rāma and Narasiṃha.⁶ Rūpa’s view is that when it comes to literature concerning Kṛṣṇa, original characters do experience *rasa*. Thus, according to these two verses, Rūpa divides literature and drama into two categories namely, (1) those which focus on God Kṛṣṇa, and (2) those which do not. Rūpa argues that while only the audience experience *rasa* in relation to those in the second category, the locus of *rasa* shifts to the original character as far as those in the first category are concerned. Rūpa’s view clearly suggests his awareness of the earlier Kashmirian theories of *rasa*. However, Rūpa’s view on *rasa* leaves many questions unanswered. In relation to devotional drama and literature, is it only the original character who experiences *rasa*? What happens to the actor and the audience? Do they also experience *rasa*, and if so, how does their *rasa* relate to the *rasa* of the original character? To address these questions now we move to Jīva’s work.

3. *Bhaktirasa* for All

In his *Prītisandarbha Anuccheda* 111, Jīva starts his discussion on the locus of *rasa* by pointing out four options. The first view states that *rasa* is primarily located in the original character.⁷

The second view is that *rasa* exists solely in the actor.⁸

According to the third view, the experience of *rasa* belongs only to the audience.⁹

The fourth view combines the second and the third views. According to this last view, both the actor and the audience experience *rasa*.¹⁰

Jīva’s formulation here closely follows Viśvanātha’s *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (14th century) [Haberman 1988: 25]. However, the first three views can be traced back to Abhinavagupta. In his

⁵ *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* 2.5.108: *alaukikī tv iyaṃ kṛṣṇaratiḥ sarvādbhutādbhutā / yoge rasaviśeṣatvaṃ gacchanty eva haripriye //*

⁶ Jīva, *Durgamasāṅgamaṇī* on *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* 2.5.108: *mokṣānandasyāpi tiraskāritvāt / sarvānandamūlasya śrībhagavato’py ānandakatvāt, sarveti / śrībhagavatprādurbhāvāntarāṇāṃ ratito’pi paramādhikyāt //*

⁷ *Prītisandarbha Anuccheda* 111: *rasasya mukhyayā vṛttyānukārye prācīne nāyaka eva vṛtthi / naṭe tūpacārād ity ekaḥ pakṣaḥ //*

⁸ *Prītisandarbha Anuccheda* 111: *pūrvatra laukikatvāt pārimityād bhayādisāntarāyatvāc cānukartari naṭa eva dvitīyaḥ / Cf. Viśvanātha, Sāhityadarpaṇa* 3.17cd–18ab: *pārimityāl laukikatvāt sāntarāyatayā tathā / anukāryasya ratyāder udbodho na raso bhavet //*

⁹ *Prītisandarbha Anuccheda* 111: *tasya ca śikṣāmātreṇa śūnyacittatayaiva tadanukartṛtvāt sāmājikeṣv eveti tṛtīyaḥ / Cf. Viśvanātha, Sāhityadarpaṇa* 3.18cd–19ab: *śikṣābhayāsādimātreṇa rāghavādeḥ svarūpatām / darśayan nartako naiva rasasyāsvādako bhavet //*

¹⁰ *Prītisandarbha Anuccheda* 111: *yadi ca dvitīye sacetastvaṃ tadobhayatrāpi katham na syād iti caturtha iti / Cf. Viśvanātha, Sāhityadarpaṇa* 3.19cd: *kāvyaṛthabhāvanenāyam api sabhyapadāspadam //* Auto-commentary: *yadi punar naṭo’pi kāvyārthabhāvanayā rāmādisvarūpatām ātmano darśayet tadā so’pi sabhyamadhya eva ganyate //*

Abhinavabhāratī, Abhinavagupta attributes the first view to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, the second view to Śaṅkuka, and the third view to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Although Abhinavagupta criticizes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, he also ultimately embraces the third view.

After stating those four views, Jīva states his conclusion that rejects, or rather, embraces all of them:

In contrast, glorious devotees of the lord accept the *rasa* consisting of delight toward him in all cases since mitigating factors such as mundaneness are absent.¹¹

In this statement, the term ‘in all cases (*sarvatra*)’ refers to the original character, the actor, and the audience. According to Jīva, *bhaktirasa* exists in all three loci. As Pollock points out, Jīva, following Rūpa, states that in the context of stories, dramas and poems concerning Kṛṣṇa, the *rasa* in the original characters is complete and the most important. As we saw above Rūpa does not clarify whether the actor and the audience experience *bhaktirasa*, and if they do, how their *bhaktirasa* relates to that of the original character. According to Jīva, it is this *rasa* of the original characters that is transferred to the actor and to the audience.¹²

In Jīva’s view *rasa* in the original characters is primary, and that in the actor and audience is derived from it. Jīva’s theory validates Haberman’s observation as well, which emphasizes the role of the actor in Rūpa’s system. What Pollock and Haberman miss, however, is the significance of the devotional audience in Jīva’s thought. Although Jīva emphasizes the primacy of *bhaktirasa* in the original characters, he states that the devotional audience, i.e., *bhaktas*, can experience *rasa* as well. In what follows, I elaborate Jīva’s discussion of the devotional audience.

4. *Bhaktirasa* for the Devotional Audience

Toward the end of *Anuccheda* 111, Jīva provides a typology of those who experience *bhaktirasa*. According to Jīva, there are two types of people who experience *bhaktirasa*, namely, (1) those who are included in Kṛṣṇa’s *līlā*, and (2) those who believe they are included in his *līlā*.¹³

At the end of the previous section namely in *Anuccheda* 110, Jīva already explained that the attendants in Kṛṣṇa’s *līlā*, who are the original characters, comprise the first group, while the devotional audience who are outside Kṛṣṇa’s *līlā* comprise the second group.¹⁴ Those in the first group constantly experience *rasa*.¹⁵

As for those in the second group, Jīva provides further distinctions. According to Jīva, those

¹¹ *Pṛtisandarbha Anuccheda* 111: śrībhāgavatānām tu sarvatraiva tatpṛitimayarasasvīkārah, laukikatvādihetor abhāvāt /

¹² *Pṛtisandarbha Anuccheda* 111: tatrāpi viśeṣato’ nūkāryeṣu tatparikareṣu yeṣāṃ nityam eva hṛdayam adhyārūḍhaḥ pūrṇo raso’ nūkartrādiṣu sañcarati /

¹³ Jīva, *Pṛtisandarbha, Anuccheda* 111: bhāgavatpṛitirasikāḥ dvividhāḥ, tadīyalīlāntaḥpātinaḥ tadantaḥpātītābhīmāninaḥ ca /


¹⁴ Jīva explains this point as he comments on *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* 1.1.3 in his *Pṛtisandarbha, Anuccheda* 110: rasānubhavino hy atra dvividhāḥ (1) “pibata” ity upadeśyāḥ, (2) svatas tadanubhavino līlāparikarāḥ ca / tatra (2) līlārasānubhavino hy atra parikarā eva tasya sāram anubhavanti antaraṅgatvāt / (1) pare tu yatkiñcid eva bahiraṅgatvāt / *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* 1.1.3: nigamakalpataror galitaṃ phalaṃ śukamukhād amṛtadravasāmyutam / pibata bhāgavataṃ rasam ālayaṃ muhur aho rasikā bhuvi bhāvukāḥ //

¹⁵ Jīva, *Pṛtisandarbha, Anuccheda* 111: tatra pūrveṣāṃ prāktanayuktyā svata eva siddho rasaḥ /

outside Kṛṣṇa's *līlā* are divided into (a) those who listen to Kṛṣṇa's exploits with his various attendants and (b) those who listen to Kṛṣṇa's sweetness and so on.¹⁶

The distinction between (a) and (b) is based on what the audience focuses on. While those in (a) focus on Kṛṣṇa's *līlā*, those in (b) focus on Kṛṣṇa's qualities. As for the latter, namely those in (b), Jīva says they automatically experience *bhaktirasa* just as do those in (1), who are the actual attendants in Kṛṣṇa's *līlā*.

Jīva further divides into three categories those who belong to group (a), namely the devotional audience who focus on Kṛṣṇa's *līlā*. They are: (i) when the audience and the original character share the same latent disposition (*vāsanā*); (ii) when they share a different latent disposition; and (iii) when they share a contradictory latent disposition.



The first case (i) occurs for example when an audience that has a comradely feeling toward Kṛṣṇa watches or listens to the *Gopas'* dealings with Kṛṣṇa. In this case the audience experiences comradely (*preyas*) *bhaktirasa*.¹⁷

According to Jīva, the audience in this case experiences *bhaktirasa* because the foundational emotion in the audience generalizes (*sādhāraṇīkaroti*) aesthetic elements (*vibhāva*) in the *līlā*.¹⁸

¹⁶ Jīva, *Prītisandarbhā, Anuccheda* 111: *tattallīlāntaḥpātisahitabhagavaccaritaśravaṇādinaikā* / *bhagavanmādhuryādiśravaṇādina cānyā* /

¹⁷ According to Rūpa five primary *bhaktirasas* and corresponding paradigmatic devotees are as follows:

<i>sthāyibhāva</i>	<i>rasa</i>	Devotees
<i>priyatā-rati</i>	<i>madhura-bhaktirasa</i>	<i>Gopīs</i>
<i>vātsalya-rati</i>	<i>vatsala-bhaktirasa</i>	Nanda and Yaśodā
<i>sakhya-rati</i>	<i>preyo-bhaktirasa</i>	<i>Gopas</i>
<i>prīti-rati</i>	<i>prīta-bhaktirasa</i>	Hanumān
<i>śānti-rati</i>	<i>śānta-bhaktirasa</i>	<i>Yogīs</i>

Note that these five *bhaktirasas* include only two (*madhura* or *śṛṅgāra* and *śānta*) out of nine *rasas* accepted by Abhinavagupta. Rūpa relegates the rest of seven traditional *rasas* into the category of the secondary *bhaktirasas*:

<i>sthāyibhāva</i>	<i>rasa</i>
<i>hāsa-rati</i>	<i>hāsyā-bhaktirasa</i>
<i>śoka-rati</i>	<i>karuṇa-bhaktirasa</i>
<i>krodha-rati</i>	<i>raudra-bhaktirasa</i>
<i>utsāha-rati</i>	<i>vīra-bhaktirasa</i>
<i>bhaya-rati</i>	<i>bhayānaka-bhaktirasa</i>
<i>jugupsā-rati</i>	<i>bībhatsa-bhaktirasa</i>
<i>vismaya-rati</i>	<i>adbhuta-bhaktirasa</i>

¹⁸ Jīva, *Prītisandarbhā, Anuccheda* 111: *yadi samānavāsanas tallīlāntaḥpātī bhavet tadā svayaṃ sadṛśo bhāva eva tasya*

Jīva cites a passage from the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* that describes this state: “This is another’s”, “This is not another’s”, “This is mine”, “This is not mine.” In savouring [a *rasa*] there is no separation of aesthetic element and so on.¹⁹ When the original character and the audience share the same latent disposition, the audience can identify themselves with the original character. Due to this absorption in the *līlā* the audience experiences *bhaktirasa*.

In the second case (ii) when the original character and audience share a different latent disposition, Jīva explains that the aesthetic elements (*vibhāva*), reactions (*anubhāva*), and transitory emotions (*vyabhicāribhāva*) in Kṛṣṇa’s drama or poem become almost generalized (*prāyaśa eva sādharāṇyaṃ bhavati*) for the audience. However, this process of generalization does not occur completely. Therefore, aesthetic elements and so on only stimulate the audience’s foundational emotion, but it does not fully develop into a *rasa*.²⁰ Although Jīva does not give any example, an example for the second case could be when the audience with a comradely feeling (*sakhyarati*) toward Kṛṣṇa listens to Hanumān’s dealings with Rāma. Since Hanumān has subservient (*prīta*) *bhaktirasa* toward Rāma, the audience’s foundational emotion is stimulated but they do not experience comradely *bhaktirasa*.

In the third case (iii) when the original character and audience share a contradictory latent disposition, Jīva explains that the audience’s general love toward Kṛṣṇa is stimulated, but it does not experience *bhaktirasa*. This occurs when, for example, the audience has the feeling of comradery (*sakhyarati*) toward Kṛṣṇa, and the original character a parental feeling (*vatsalabhaktirasa*).²¹ Thus when an audience with a comradely feeling listens to Yaśodā’s dealings with Kṛṣṇa, their foundational emotion is not stimulated. Consequently, it does not experience comradely *bhaktirasa*.

In Jīva’s discussion of the devotional audience, what is striking is his use of the concept of generalization (*sādharāṇīkaroti / sādharāṇyaṃ bhavati*). While for Jīva the immediate source of this concept is Viśvanātha’s *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, the concept itself is central in Abhinavagupta’s view of *rasa*. Thus, while both Pollock and Haberman emphasize the radical break Rūpa and Jīva made with Abhinavagupta’s dominant view, there is also an important element of continuation as well.

5. Latent Disposition (*vāsanā*) and the Devotional Audience

As one might expect, however, Jīva’s engagement with the Abhinavaguptian theory is not straightforward. While Abhinavagupta’s influence on Jīva is visible in his adaptation of the concept of generalization, Jīva also modifies it to accommodate the devotional context. This is observable, for example, in Jīva’s discussion of latent disposition (*vāsanā*). According to Abhinavagupta, the

tallīlāntaḥpātivīśeṣasya vibhāvādikam tādṛśatvābhimānini sādharāṇīkaroti /

¹⁹ Viśvanātha, *Sāhityadarpaṇa* 3.12: parasya na parasyeti mameti na mameti ca / tadāsvāde vibhāvādeḥ paricchedo na vidyate //

²⁰ Jīva, *Pṛtisandarbha*, Anuccheda 111: yadi tu vilakṣaṇavāsanā tadā vibhāvānām sañcārīṇām anubhāvānām ca prāyaśa eva sādharāṇyaṃ bhavati / tena tadbhāvaviśeṣayoddīpanamātraṃ syāt, na tu rasodbodhaḥ /

²¹ Jīva, *Pṛtisandarbha*, Anuccheda 111: yadi tu viruddhāvāsanāḥ syāt, yathā vatsalena preyaśi, tadāpi tasya pṛtisāmānyasyaiva vātsalyādīdarśanoddīpanaṃ bhavati / na bhāvaviśeṣasya / na ca rasodbodho jāyate /

audience members can experience all the varieties of *rasa* because they have accumulated the experiences of all types of life through their previous births.²² Abhinavagupta advances his view, rejecting the opinion he attributes to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, when a drama is based on supernatural stories the audience cannot perceive *rasa*. For example, when we listen to the *Rāmāyaṇa*'s narration of Hanumān's jumping over the ocean to the island of Laṅkā, or Rāma's construction of a bridge across the ocean, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says that we cannot experience *rasa* since such aesthetic elements cannot be generalized for the audience due to their uncommon nature.²³

In his *Dhvanyālokalocana*, Abhinavagupta rejects Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's view:

It is foolhardy when [Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says] that not everyone relishes the exploits of Rāma and so on. [This view is false] because the mind is characterized by various latent dispositions ((*vāsanā*)). This is stated [in *Yogasūtra* 4.10 and 4.9]: "They [i.e., latent dispositions] are beginning-less because desire is eternal"; "[Latent dispositions] are without any intervals even when they are separated by birth, place, and time because memory and latent impression are of one nature." With this much, therefore, the perception of *rasa* is established.²⁴

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's view is that ordinary humans cannot appreciate the *rasa* in the extraordinary exploits of divine figures such as Hanumān and Rāma because a human audience does not have the appropriate latent dispositions and the supernatural exploits therefore remain un-relatable to them. Abhinavagupta, however, argues that it is possible to relish *rasa* in these extraordinary exploits as well because the audience members have accumulated limitless latent dispositions through their repeated births.

In his *Abhinavabhārati*, Abhinavagupta also states that any living entity is able to understand all types—in his case nine—of *rasas*:

Only these [nine types of emotion] are foundational. In fact, from its very birth a living creature is possessed of these types of awareness [...] To explain, no living entity is devoid of latent dispositions based on these mental activities. It is just that for some a certain mental activity is more prevalent and another mental activity is less so [...].²⁵

Abhinavagupta thus promotes the view that the audience can relish all types of *rasas*.

²² Kamimura 1990: 103, 119, 138 [*Locanā* 187–188]. *Abhinavabhārati*: "[T]he audience members all share a homogeneous comprehension thanks to the concurrence of their predispositions—everyone's mind being studded with an infinite array of such predispositions—and this supplies even greater enhancement to the *rasa* [Pollock 2016: 195]."

²³ *Abhinavabhārati* [Gaekwad Oriental Series 4th ed., 270]: *devatāḍau sādharāṇikaraṇāyogyatvāt, samudralaṅghanāder asādhāranyāt / Dhvanyālokalocanā* [1940: 181] *devatāvartanāḍau tad api katham / [...] alokasāmānyānām ca rāmādinām ye samudrasatubandhādayo vibhāvās te katham sādharāṇyam bhajeyuh /*

²⁴ *Dhvanyālokalocana* [1940: 187–188]: *rāmādicaritam tu na sarvasya hṛdayasaṃvādīti mahatsāhasam, citravāsanāviśiṣṭatvāc cetasaḥ / yad āha, "tāsām anāditvam āśiṣo nityatvāt" / "jātidēśakālvavahitānām apy ānantaryam smṛtisamskārayor ekarūpatvāt" iti / tena pratītiś tāvad rasasya siddhā /*

²⁵ *Abhinavabhārati* [Manavalli Ramakrishna Kavi 1956: 182] *sthāyitvam caitāvātām eva / jāta eva hi jantur iyatibhiḥ saṃvidbhiḥ parito bhavati / [...] na hy etaccittavṛttivāsanāśūnyaḥ prāṇi bhavati / kevalam kasyacit kācid ādhikā cittavṛttih kācid ūnā [...]*

Jīva's view however is closer to that of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. As discussed above, Jīva says that in the case of Kṛṣṇa's *līlā*, the devotional audience experiences only the aesthetic sentiment of those original characters who share its same disposition. In other words, in Jīva's scheme the type of *bhaktirasa* a devotional audience can experience is limited, and it depends on the type of latent disposition an individual possesses in relation to Kṛṣṇa.²⁶

6. Conclusion

So, who experiences *bhaktirasa*? First Jīva acknowledges the views expounded by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta, and Viśvanātha. Then he promotes the all-inclusive view, accepting *bhaktirasa* not only in the original character and in the actor but also in the devotional audience. According to Jīva, the key to the audience's experience of *bhaktirasa* is the latent disposition the members possess because it determines the degree to which the process of generalization occurs. Although mediated through Viśvanātha, terms such as generalization and latent disposition clearly suggest Abhinavagupta's influence on Jīva's thought. Thus, against the views of Haberman and Pollock I suggest that Jīva's *bhaktirasa* theory reflects Abhinavagupta's continued legacy. At the same time, Jīva creatively modifies Abhinavagupta's ideas so that they fit in to the context of Kṛṣṇa devotion that he wishes to focus on. Thus, against Masson and Patwardhan I suggest that post-Abhinava authors such as Jīva did offer substantial innovations which merit our attention.

What all this suggests is that Jīva does take the experience of the audience seriously. In many ways this is not at all surprising given that both the *Advaita* and the *Bhāgavata* traditions emphasize the significance of *śravaṇa* or listening in devotional practices. Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra* in the fifteenth century states *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* are the three steps in the realization of Brahman [Hirst 1996: 59]. *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* 7.5.23. lists nine processes of worshipping Bhagavān, starting with *śravaṇa* and *kīrtana*. It is then quite expected that Jīva addresses the accessibility of *bhaktirasa* for the audience since any devotional practitioner would start her engagement with Kṛṣṇa's narratives as neither the original character nor as the actor, but as an audience member. Therefore, while Jīva re-centered the original character in his theory of *bhaktirasa*, we need to also remember that he elaborated the *bhaktirasa* experience of the audience as well.

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Kashmir and its valley in al-Bīrūnī's writings

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1. Introduction
2. Delimitation of the Territory
3. Contact zone
4. Religion
5. Calendars
6. Scientific exchanges
7. Conclusion

1. Introduction

Due to the location of the Kashmir Valley between two high mountain ranges, the Pir Panjal Range on the south-west and the Trans-Himalayas on the north-east, the Valley has been relatively isolated, while at the same time constituting a zone of contact between Central Asia, China, and India. In the early eleventh century CE, al-Bīrūnī (973–ca. 1050) offers descriptions of Kashmir in his writings, especially in his book on India, the *Taḥqīq mā li-l-Hind* (ca. 1030), hereafter the *Taḥqīq*.

This work constitutes the primary source of the present chapter, as other writings by al-Bīrūnī only refer to Kashmir in passing, if at all. For instance, *Al-āṭār al-bāqīya* (*The Chronology of Ancient Nations*, 1000 CE) and the *Taḥfīm* (*The Book of Instruction in the Elements of the Art of Astrology*, 1029 CE) do not contain any references to Kashmir. The *Taḥdīd nihāyāt al-amākin* (*The Determination of Coordinates*, 1025), *Al-qānūn al-Mas'ūdī* (ca. 1030), *Al-ḡamāhir fī l-ḡawāhir* (*The Collection of Gemstones*, after 1030) and the *Kitāb al-ṣaydana fī l-ṭibb* (*Pharmacology*, ca. 1050)¹ only sparsely refer to this region. The main reason is that these books did not focus on India but on various topics, ranging from astral sciences to mathematical geography, via minerals or medicinal substances. In addition, *Al-āṭār al-bāqīya* was composed in the year 1000, that is, 17 years before al-Bīrūnī traveled with the Ghaznavids from Khwarezm to the east, i.e., in Kabul, Ghazna, Gandhāra and Panjab. Thus, the lack

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¹ The *Pharmacology*, an encyclopedia listing names and properties of plants, animals, and minerals, allows for the understanding of al-Bīrūnī's scope of knowledge on the topic and for studying early medieval scholarly dialogues on medicines. For writing this book, al-Bīrūnī's sources of information are numerous, mostly consisting in writings by Greek and Muslim thinkers. Whereas he had information about Indian medicines, such as their names and their origins, he only refers once to Indian treatises, without providing their titles [Said 1973: 250, no 13].

of references to Kashmir in *Al-āṭār al-bāqīya* may be only due to him not having been in contact with thinkers and travelers from Kashmir at the time.

The present chapter gathers many passages from al-Bīrūnī's writings on Kashmir. It also aims at contextualizing his account by supplementing it with other textual sources, such as the Sanskrit *Nīlamatapūrāṇa* (ca. 8th century CE) and *Rājatarangīnī* by Kalhaṇa (composed in 1149/1151 CE),² as well as Arabic and Persian records, the *Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam* (compiled in 982/983; hereafter *Ḥudūd*), the works by al-ʿUṭbī, Gardīzī and Bayhaqī (996–1077), three authors working at the Ghaznavid court.

The first objective is to provide updated information about geographical names mentioned by al-Bīrūnī in relation to Kashmir. The identification and localization of these toponyms led to eventually delineate the territory of Kashmir as it was conceptualized by him. This research then addresses the question of how the historical, political, geographical, and intellectual contexts of al-Bīrūnī influenced his access to information about Kashmir and interest in gathering it. While this study reconstructs the picture that al-Bīrūnī drew of Kashmir when evolving in these contexts, it also discusses the reasons why and how he was able to depict the cultural and geographical landscapes of Kashmir in such a detailed manner.

The study reveals that Kashmir was an essential zone of exchanges in various ways—commercial, intellectual, and religious—and that it maintained active interactions with its neighbors despite al-Bīrūnī's description of it as an isolated region. He generally explains that Kashmir defends its boundary from Muslim incursions in India. Nevertheless, whereas al-Bīrūnī did not travel to the Kashmir Valley, he was well acquainted with its geography, religious customs, and sciences through other sources of information. His knowledge about Kashmir certainly reflects exchanges and interactions taking place between Kashmir and neighboring regions in the early eleventh century CE. The present chapter shows that intellectual exchanges between Kashmir and other parts of India continued vigorously amid tensions between Muslims and Hindus.

This research also brings forward specific type of information about Kashmir, which al-Bīrūnī gathered and transmitted in the *Taḥqīq*. Lastly, enriching al-Bīrūnī's descriptions of Kashmir with other textual sources, Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian, has brought out a more comprehensive picture of the region and its interactions with neighboring countries.

Al-Bīrūnī's descriptions of Kashmir have been broadly classified into three main topics, i.e., geography, religious practices, and astronomical sciences because he elaborated much less upon other sciences or cultural customs. The first section of this chapter focuses on his geographical descriptions and discusses al-Bīrūnī's geographical conceptualization of Kashmir, its territorial delimitation, and its position as a contact zone. The second section, based on al-Bīrūnī's account of religion and astronomy, especially the calendrical systems, highlights how information circulated between Kashmir and the regions of Gandhāra and Panjab, the two regions where al-Bīrūnī mostly accessed Indian sciences. The last section further delves into the question of the intellectual exchanges taking place then.

² See [Witzel 2016: 610, note 4; 618].

2. Delimitation of the Territory

2.1. A Road from Kanauj to Kashmir

A few comments on the sources and methods are necessary before the textual analysis. Many of the locales mentioned by al-Bīrūnī in the *Tahqīq*, including those dealt with in the present chapter, are unidentified historically and geographically. For some of these places, al-Bīrūnī provides the latitudes in a portion of the *Tahqīq* and the two geographical coordinates, i.e., latitudes and longitudes, in a table of his mathematical treatise, *Al-qānūn al-Mas'ūdī* (hereafter *Al-qānūn*) [*Tahqīq* 1887: 123.3–7; *Tahqīq* 1958: 270.5–11; Sachau 1910: I 317; *Qānūn* 1955: 548–79].³ The figures that are found in the two books concerning one and the same place do not always agree with each other nor match the geographic coordinates of modern corresponding known places.

A. D. H. Bivar [1979: 162–4] remarks that if 26° are deducted from the longitudes found in the printed edition of *Al-qānūn*, it is possible to come nearer to the correct data of modern places. It appears that this computation provides figures that are more realistic than al-Bīrūnī's original coordinates, but the accuracy of these figures also varies from one locale to another, and despite the deduction of 26° they do not always fit data of the actual corresponding geographical locales. Thus, some geographical coordinates are provided and discussed in this chapter, but they do not constitute the main pieces of evidence to identify and localize geographical places mentioned by al-Bīrūnī. Furthermore, distances given by al-Bīrūnī in *farsah*-s, which are unprecise, have not been taken into account for situating those places. In keeping with these preliminary observations, al-Bīrūnī's geographical descriptions of them and their relative localization will be first considered and then compared to the coordinates.

Because al-Bīrūnī does not specify whether he understands the term Kashmir (کشمیر) as including only the Valley of Kashmir or as covering a broader area, it is necessary to determine how he delimited the geographical borders of Kashmir in order to further depict the cultural and intellectual landscapes of Kashmir in relation to its western and southern neighbors, Gandhāra and Panjab, as the places of al-Bīrūnī's visits in South Asia. Two passages drawn from the *Tahqīq* (A and B) are fully quoted below because they answer the question of the geographical delimitation of the territory of Kashmir at al-Bīrūnī's time, i.e., in the early eleventh century CE. These two passages also provide useful information about the topography and geography of Kashmir, about geographical places neighboring Kashmir and their names, and about the contacts between these regions and Kashmir.

The first passage describes a road leading from Kanauj to Kashmir:

A) From Kanauj to the north-north-west to Śīrṣāraha (شرشاره), there are 50 *farsah*-s; [from there] to Panḡawar (پنجور) 18 *farsah*-s—it is on the mountain, and opposite to it there is the plain of the country of Tāneshar (تانیشر); [from there] to Dahmāla (دهماله), the capital

³ The table in *Al-qānūn* also provides the coordinates of places in regions other than India. See also [Sachau 1887: xii–xiii] on the latitudes of some places.

of Jālandhar (جاندھر), [which is] on the foot [of the mountain], there are 18 *farsaḥ*-s; [from there] to Ballāwar (بلاور) there are ten *farsaḥ*-s, then westward [from there] to Laddah (لده) 13 *farsaḥ*-s; [from there] to the Fort Rājagirī (راجگری) there are eight *farsaḥ*-s and from there to the north, to Kashmir, 25 *farsaḥ*-s [Taḥqīq 1887: 100.18–21; Taḥqīq 1958: 164.15–165.2; Sachau 1910: I 205].

Although the toponyms Śīrṣārāha, Paṅḡawar, Dahmāla, and Laddah (or Laddat)⁴ in the above passage are unidentified, it is possible to know that they are all situated on a road that goes from Kanauj to Kashmir. The road stretches from east to west, located to the north of Kanauj and to the south of the Himalayan Range, alongside the Shivalik Hills. It is, however, not clear how close to the Shivalik Hills some of these towns were situated (see Map 1). The itinerary then bifurcates northward at Fort Rājagirī to reach the Valley of Kashmir, most probably via the Pir Panjal Pass.

Sachau transliterates Paṅḡawar (پنجور) as 'Pinjaur'. Both readings are possible. The first section of the word *paṅḡa-* may be, however, a transcription of the Sanskrit *pañca*, i.e., five, while the last part of the term *-war* is a derived form of *-pura*, i.e., town.⁵ Thus, the reading Paṅḡawar is preferred here. As is often the case with locales mentioned by al-Bīrūnī, the name of this historical town can refer to several modern places. According to his description, Paṅḡawar lies on the foothills of the Himalayan range, facing—i.e., north to—Tāneshar, the historical Sthanīśvāra and present-day Taneshwar [Dey 1927: 110; 194; Bhattacharya 1991: 280].

Just like Tāneshar, Jālandhar is a well-known historical region. The modern city by the name Jālandhar is located between the rivers Beas and Sutlej [Dey 1927: 80; Bhattacharya 1991: 156]. According to al-Bīrūnī, its capital, i.e., Dahmāla, is located on the foot of a mountain. The author of the *Hudūd*, composed approximately fifty years before the *Taḥqīq*, describes a city named Jālandhar located on the top of a mountain [Bosworth 1970: 90].⁶ In the mid-twelfth century CE, Kalhaṇa refers to the kingdom of Jālandhara in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, as being connected to Kashmir by political dependency, kinship or in the context of political plots [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: IV 177, VII 150, VIII 1651, 1670, Stein 1900: I 138, 279, II 130–1]. The *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* does not mention any city named Dahmāla or a toponym similar to it, let alone as the capital of the kingdom of Jālandhar.

Ballāwar probably corresponds to the historical city of Vallāpura, today known as Billawar and located in modern Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* referred to it several times as an independent kingdom with its own lord [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: VII 220, 270, 588, VIII 539, 542, 622; Stein 1900: I 287, 291, 315, II 44, 50. See also Sachau 1910: II 319 and Bhattacharya 1991: 86, 303].

The localization of Fort Rājagirī is problematic since several hypotheses exist among scholars. Nevertheless, according to the above passage, the road from Kanauj to Kashmir bifurcates north at Rājagirī, the last station before Kashmir. This description locates it south of the Pir Panjal Range, perhaps at the entrance of its homonymous pass, and north-west to the unidentified Laddah.

⁴ Narendra Nath Bhattacharya [1991: 201] mentions Laddah without identifying it.

⁵ On phonetic transformation of the Sanskrit original name into Arabic, see below section 2.3 (last paragraphs).

⁶ See also Gardizi's comment on some plants found in Jālandhara [Minorsky 1948: 629].

Further, in another passage of the *Tahqīq* (Passage B below), Fort Rājagirī is described as located near Rājāwūri (Rajouri) and as lying south of a mountain named Kulārḡak, which is itself south of Kashmir and is probably to be identified with Mount Taṭakuṭi in the Pir Panjal Range.

Further, the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* recounts how the king Saṃgrāmapāla of Rājapurī, i.e., modern Rajouri, located to the south of the Kashmir Valley, in Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, is asked to capture a man named Uccala and to imprison him in the Fort Rājagirī, in order to please the Kashmiri king Harṣa (11–12th c. CE) [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: VII 1248–70, Stein 1900: I 366–7]. In this narrative recounting events occurring at the end of the eleventh century, Fort Rājagirī belonged to the country of Rājapurī. Considering these elements, Marc Aurel Stein [1900: I 367, note 1270, II 298] placed Rājagirī in a valley on the road to the Pir Panjal Pass. This hypothesis concurs with al-Bīrūnī's localization of Rājagirī on the road from Kanauj to Kashmir and is accepted in this chapter.⁷

In the mathematical treatise *Al-qānūn*, al-Bīrūnī provides geographical coordinates of several of the places located on the itinerary leading from Kanauj to Kashmir. In spite of a lack of precision in some of these figures, the coordinates offer complementary information for localizing the above places. Coordinates after the computation (of deducting 26° from the original coordinates)⁸ suggested by Bivar are given in the following table:

Place name	Geographical Coordinates
Śīrṣāraha (also Sūrsāraha; سورسارهه)	9°00'N; 76°40'E [Qānūn 1955: 563]
Panḡawar	30°05'N; 75°40'E [Qānūn 1955: 563]
Tāneshar	30°10'N; 78°25'E [Qānūn 1955: 563]
Dahmāla (capital of Jālandhara)	31°10'N; 74°55'E [Sachau 1910: II 317; Qānūn 1955: 563]
Ballāwar	31°55'N; 74°00'E [Qānūn 1955: 562]
Laddah (also Laddat)	32°35'N; 73°40'E [Qānūn 1955: 562]
Fort Rājagirī	33°20'N; 73°15'E [Qānūn 1955: 562]

Table 1: geographic coordinates of places located on the road from Kanauj to Kashmir based on al-Bīrūnī's *Al-qānūn*.

Comments to the table:

Sachau enumerates some geographical coordinates as found by him in *Al-qānūn*. In his annotations to his English translation of the *Tahqīq*, he provides those of Śīrṣāraha as follows: 38°50' N and 102°10'E [Sachau 1910: II 317], i.e., 76°10'E after the deduction of 26°. In the available printed edition of *Al-qānūn* [Qānūn 1955], we only find coordinates of a place named Sūrsāraha, which are different from Sachau's figures: 29°00'N and 76°40'E (after computation). The coordinates provided by Sachau situate the locale north of the Himalayan Range in West China, while those found in the edition of *Al-qānūn* locate the place south of it, northwest of Kanauj. Therefore, the

⁷ The identification of Fort Rājagirī with a place situated in the Swāt Valley, as was argued by Abdur Rehman [1979: 275–6; 2003: 9], is unlikely.

⁸ The reader may look into *Al-qānūn* in order to have original coordinates.

latter are taken into account in the present chapter.

The above coordinates delineate an itinerary (white marks in Map 1 below) with a similar orientation to that of the road delineated by al-Bīrūnī. Except for Tāneshar, whose figures may be corrupt, the itinerary based on the coordinates is globally located slightly further south and west as compared to their most probable actual location based on al-Bīrūnī's description (green marks in Map 1 below). The locales marked by the white symbols follow Bivar's suggestion of deducting 26° E from the original data found in the printed edition of *Al-qānūn*. It may be, however, possible to revise his computations on the basis of al-Bīrūnī's descriptions of these locales. Their location may be moved slightly eastward (green marks in Map 1), and it is likely that less than 26° E should be deducted from the original numbers given in *Al-qānūn* in order to obtain figures that come near to reality.

Map 1 below represents places situated according to al-Bīrūnī's geographic coordinates after the computation as proposed by Bivar marked in white color, those located on the basis of al-Bīrūnī's descriptions in green and the modern locales in turquoise. The map aims to illustrate the above observations:



Map 1: itinerary described by al-Bīrūnī between Kanauj and the Kashmir Valley

Legend of the map

- Putative positions, according to al-Bīrūnī's description
- Positions according to geographical coordinates given by al-Bīrūnī
- Modern places

2.2. The Neighbouring Regions

The following passage drawn from the *Tahqīq*⁹ provides additional details on the geographical delimitation and topographical features of the territory of Kashmir:

B) As for Kashmir, it is a plain surrounded by a high inaccessible mountain [range]. The [regions] south and east of [Kashmir] belong to al-Hind. Its west [belongs] to kings, among whom the nearest ones [to Kashmir] are the Bolūr Šāhs. Then [we find] the Šaknān Šāhs and the Waḥān Šāhs toward the borders of Badaḥšān. Its (i.e., of Kashmir) north and a part of [its] east belong to the Turks from Ḥotan and Tibet. There are approximately 300 *farsaḥ*-s, [passing] along the land of Tibet, from the pass of Bhūtešār (بهوتیشر; i.e., Bhūteśvara) to Kashmir. [...] ¹⁰

The most famous entrance to [Kashmir] is from the village Babarhān (ببرهان), which lies halfway between the two rivers Sind (i.e., Indus River) and Jhelum. From this [village] to the bridge on the confluence of the rivers Kunsārī (کنساری) and Mahwī (مہوی)—both coming from the mountains Šamīlān (شمیلان) [and] falling in the stream of the Jhelum (جہلم)—there are eight *farsaḥ*-s.

From there [up to] the entrance to the ravine, from which comes the stream of the Jhelum, is a five-day journey; at the end of it (i.e., the ravine), there is the town Dvāra (دوار), a watch-station on both sides of the river. Then, the [route] goes out to the open plain. It ends at Addištāna (ادشتان; i.e., Śrīnagar), the capital of Kashmir, within two days [of journey], during which one stops at both the town of Ūškārā (اوشکارا) and the town of Barāmūlā (برامولا), which are on both sides of the valley.

The [capital] city of Kashmir is built over four *farsaḥ*-s along the two banks of the stream of the Jhelum. In-between, there are bridges and boats. Its (i.e., Jhelum's) source is [located] in the mountains Haramakūt (هرمکوت), from which the Ganges also comes. They are cold and not practicable. Their snow never melts or disappears. Behind them, there is Mahācīna (مہاجین), that is the great China. When the stream of the Jhelum has flowed out of the mountains and continued for [a distance equivalent to] a two-day journey, it passes through Addištāna, and, after four *farsaḥ*-s from there, it enters a swamp, whose size is one *farsaḥ* by one *farsaḥ*. They have (i.e., the people of Kashmir) plantations on its border and on its [parts where] they could fill it [with earth]. Then, [the Jhelum River] goes out of the swamp up to the town of Ūškārā and reaches the ravine.

As for the stream of the Sind, it comes out of the mountains Unang (اننگ) in the territory of the Turks. This is what you [can do] if you want to reach it: from the ravine—the entrance [to the Valley]—there are, on the left of the mountains Bolūr and Šamīlān, during

⁹ Stein [1900: II 360–4] discusses parts of this passage and notes that al-Bīrūnī's descriptions are rather close to the actual topography.

¹⁰ See Passage C below for the elided section of text dealing with customs and traditions of Kashmir.

a two-day journey, Turks who are called Bhattavaryān (بهتوریان) and whose kings are the Bhatta Ṣāhs.¹¹ Their towns are Gilgit, Aswira (اسوره), and Šiltās (شلتاس), and their language is Turkish. Kashmir is in distress due to their attacks.

Traveling on the left, one continues through the cultivated [lands] up to the capital on the right, through contiguous villages longing the south of the capital, one reaches the mountain Kulārḡak, which is like a dome, similar to the mountain Dunbāwand.¹² The snow never melts there. It is always seen from the territories of Tākešar and Lawhāwūr. Between it (i.e., the Kulārḡak mountain) and the Kashmir Valley, there are two *farsaḡ*-s. Fort Rājagirī lies to the south of [Kulārḡak], and Fort Lahūr to its west. I did not see stronger [places] than these two [forts], and at three *farsaḡ*-s from it, there is the city of Rājāwūri. Our merchants trade with it but do not go beyond it [Taḡqīq 1887: 101.5–102.4; Taḡqīq 1958: 165.11–167.7; Sachau 1910: I 206–8].

The above report enables us to outline the early medieval boundaries of the Valley of Kashmir and to get acquainted with the important towns of the time. Localizing these places is relevant to the present argument. Several of these towns were located on roads connecting Kashmir to its neighbors and, as seen below, enabled commercial, religious, or intellectual exchanges. They thus contributed to Kashmir's position as a contact zone. Approximately fifty years before al-Bīrūnī composed the *Taḡqīq* in 1030, the Persian geographical report *Ḥudūd* describes Kashmir as “a large and pleasant land (*šahr*) with numerous merchants” [Bosworth 1970: 92]. This description suggests that Kashmir already benefitted from a strong position for trade in the mid-tenth century CE.

According to al-Bīrūnī's account, Kashmir is delimited by mainland India (al-Hind) in the south and east, by Bolor in the west, and by Ḥotan and Tibet in the north. Bolor corresponds to the region of Gilgit (Pakistan-administered-Kashmir). Waḡān is located south of the Pamir Range.¹³ In the above passage and in *Al-qānūn*, Waḡān is described by al-Bīrūnī as located on the limits of the territory of Badaḡšān [Qānūn 1955: 573]. According to Vladimir Minorsky, who translated into English and annotated the *Ḥudūd*, a road passing by Bolor and Waḡān may have connected Kashmir to Transoxiana [Bosworth 1970: 254].

As for Šaknān, it is considered to be part of Waḡān in the *Ḥudūd*, which describes the two places as lying to the north of India [Bosworth 1970: 86].¹⁴ Badaḡšān is a region located between the upper Amu Darya and the Hindu Kush on the trade road between Balkh and Tibet [Bosworth 1970: 350, 364–365].¹⁵ Al-Bīrūnī mentions Turks living in Ḥotan and Tibet, north of Kashmir. The

¹¹ The Sanskrit term *-bhaṭṭa* serves as a title for Brahmins according to the *Kuṭṭanimita* composed by the Kashmiri Dāmodaragupta (referred to in [Witzel 1994: 265]).

¹² Dunbāwand or Danbāwand is Mount Damavand located near Tehran, which al-Bīrūnī presumed to be known among his readerships.

¹³ Al-Bīrūnī gives the coordinate of Waḡān in *Al-qānūn*, as follows, after the computation: 36°30'N and 70°00' [Qānūn 1955: 573].

¹⁴ See also [Bosworth 1970: 63, 71, 120–1].

¹⁵ Al-Bīrūnī provides the coordinates of Badaḡšān in *Al-qānūn* which are 35°00'N and 69°10' after computation [Qānūn 1955: 573; also referred to in Bosworth 1970: 365].

word meaning Tibet in Arabic and Persian early literature was used in a rather vague manner, denoting different geographical zones or social concepts, depending on the authors. While some of these sources identified the Tibetans with Turks, some others distinguished each community from another [Akasoy 2011: 20, 22–6]. In the above passage, al-Bīrūnī understood Tibet as a geographical region, whereas he used the term Turk to designate an ethnic group, seemingly including both Turkic and Tibetan people.

The pass Bhūteśvara is named after an epithet of Śiva. According to al-Bīrūnī's above account, it lies much north of the Kashmir Valley, most probably in the geographical Tibetan plateau. In another passage of the *Tahqīq*, al-Bīrūnī describes Bhūteśvara as being located on a thirty-day journey from Nepal, corresponding to eighty *farsah*-s, and at the frontier of Tibet. For this report, al-Bīrūnī relied on the description of a traveler whom he met [Sachau 1910: I 202].

Śiva Bhūteśvara (also Bhūteśa) is believed to reside south-east of Mount Haramukh, according to Stein, who identifies the site of pilgrimage to the God near Wangat, a small village located in the gorge of the Kanakavāhinī stream.¹⁶ Stein also discusses the importance of the cult of Śiva Bhūteśvara in Kashmir [Stein 1900: I 20–1, note 107; II 407–8]. According to him, Śrīnagar and Bhūteśvara are approximately thirty-two miles away from each other [Stein 1900: I 25, note 129], which does not fit with the 300 *farsah*-s which al-Bīrūnī gives. Bhūteśvara, its shrines and pilgrimage site are often referred to in the *Rājatarāṅgīnī* [Rājatarāṅgīnī 1988: I 107, 347, II 123, 169, IV 189, V 40, 46, 48, 52, 55, VII 106, VIII 3356; Stein 1900: I 20, 52, 65, 71, 140, 191–4, 275, II 262], but the Sanskrit text does not provide any exact location for this site.

At the end of the above passage, al-Bīrūnī describes regions south of Kashmir, the mountain Kulārḡak, Tākeṣar, Lawhāwūr, Fort Rājagīrī, Fort Lahūr and Rājāwūrī. The mountain Kulārḡak, or Kulārḡak (كلار جك), should be identified with Mount Taṭakuṭi, located in the Pir Panjal Range. Stein remarks that it has a form in a dome seen from the region of Lahore [Stein 1900: I 297–8, 363].¹⁷ This observation agrees with al-Bīrūnī's statement that the mountain is seen from Lawhāwūr, i.e., Lahore.

Tākeṣar corresponds to Ṭakkadeṣa situated near Sialkot [Dey 1927: 200; Bhattacharya 1991: 285]. Ṭakkadeṣa is referred to several times as Ṭakka in the *Rājatarāṅgīnī* [Rājatarāṅgīnī 1988: V 150, VII 414, 520, 1001, 1064, VIII 1091; Stein 1900: I 205, 301, 310, 346, 350, II 86]. According to this text, Ṭakka's land did not belong to Kashmir, and its people traded with Muslims. Ṭakka is probably located to the south-east of Rājapurī, i.e., Rājāwūrī or Rajouri [Stein 1900: I 205, note 150], which also suits al-Bīrūnī's descriptions. It may also be identical with Ṭāqī mentioned in the *Ḥudūd*

¹⁶ Bhūteśvara, Haramakuṭa and Kanakavāhinī are mentioned in the *Nilamatapurāṇa*. See [Tokunaga 1994: 406–8].

¹⁷ The name Kulārḡak is difficult to explain. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa in the fourteenth century CE mentions a high mountain Karāčīl lying above the city Jidyā (?), which, according to Hans von Mžik, is the same as Kulārḡak in al-Bīrūnī's *Tahqīq*. Mžik suggests that originally the term was a Sanskrit compound, constituted by *kala* (black) and *acala* (mountain), i.e., *kalācala*. This compound would stand as a local translation of Karakorum, a Turkic word meaning black gravel (Mžik 1911: 168, footnote 9). Alternatively, the term Kulārḡak could correspond to a corrupted form of the Persian Kūh-i-yakh, meaning the mountain of ice, which the author of the *Ḥudūd* also names Q.s.k (Qasak?). The geographical location of Kūh-i-yakh, according to this text globally matches that of the Karakorum range [Bosworth 1970: 71–2, 199]. As al-Bīrūnī describes the mountain as Kulārḡak as a mountain south to the Kashmir Valley, it is reasonable to think that it was located in the Pir Panjal range as Stein suggests rather than in the Karakorum.

[Bosworth 1970: 91, 239, 249–50].¹⁸

Another passage drawn from the *Tahqīq* (Passage L) mentions the region of Lawhāwūr (لوهاور) alongside Tākešar and locates the two places eastward of Nīrahara, i.e., Nagarahāra, and of Mārīgala, i.e., Taxila.¹⁹

In another portion of the *Tahqīq*, al-Bīrūnī describes Lawhāwūr as having Mandahūkūr (مندھوکور) as its capital, located east of Ravi River (Īrāwah; ایرواه) [Tahqīq 1958: 165.7; Sachau 1910: I 206]. Today, the urban center of Lahore is located to the east of the Ravi. Al-Bīrūnī appears to have used the designation Mandahūkūr for modern Lahore, the capital of Pakistani Punjab.²⁰

The latitude of Mandahūkūr is provided in the *Tahqīq*, i.e., 31°50'N. In *Al-qānūn* [Qānūn 1955: 562], al-Bīrūnī gives the exact same latitude for a city, which he calls Kakamāwūr (ککماور), and complements this data with the longitude: 73°25'E (after Bivar's deduction). These coordinates locate the city near modern Lahore. There is no doubt that Mandahūkūr and Kakamāwūr refer to the same place, i.e., the capital city of Lawhāwūr, located not far from modern Lahore and east of the River Ravi. In addition, as discussed below, Lawhāwūr is an Arabic rendering of the original Sanskrit Lavapura, a historical town [Dey 1927: 114; Bhattacharya 1991: 244] located near modern Lahore.²¹

Fort Lahūr (لہور), also spelled Lawhūr (لوهور), is a different place from Lawhāwūr. Al-Bīrūnī records several spellings for both Lawhāwūr and Fort Lahūr, which complicates their geographical identification. In addition, in *Al-qānūn*, al-Bīrūnī provides the exact same name, i.e., Lawhāwūr (لوهاور), for two different locales: one is the aforementioned region having Kakamāwūr/Mandahūkūr as capital [Qānūn 1955: 562], while the second place is “the fort Lawhāwūr in the mountains of Kashmir” (قلعة لوهاور في جبال کشمیر) [Qānūn 1955: 574], each with a different set of coordinates. The fort Lawhāwūr mentioned in *Al-qānūn* most probably corresponds to Fort Lahūr referred to in the *Tahqīq* because al-Bīrūnī gives the exact same description of the place in both works. Only the spellings differ.

Thus, in my view, the two “Lawhāwūr” spelled in the exact same way in the same book refer to two different places, the region of Lawhāwūr (i.e., modern Lahore) and of Fort Lahūr. This indicates that a difference, or a similitude, of spelling does not constitute a strong piece of evidence to identify two places or, on the contrary, to reject their identifications. The specification by al-Bīrūnī of Lahūr as a fort in both the *Tahqīq* and *Al-qānūn* carries more weight than a variance of spellings for its identification.

¹⁸ See also [Sachau 1910: II 320]. Muhammad Waliullah Khan [1979: 222–3] identifies Tākešar with Taxila. Al-Bīrūnī, however, identifies Taxila (تکسرل) with Mārīgala (کله ماری) [Tahqīq 1887: 156; Tahqīq 1958: 257; Sachau 1910: I 302–3].

¹⁹ See below Passage L in section 5 [Sachau 1910: II 360], the Margalla Hills are located to the north of Islamabad and to the east of Taxila. On the identification of Taxila with Mārīgala or Marīgālā, see Dani [1999: 1].

²⁰ The *Ḥudūd* (982/83) knew Lahore (لہور) as a town being under the governance of Multan and as possessing several districts, without any Muslim inhabitants [Bosworth 1970: 89–90, 246–7].

²¹ Khan [1979: 223–4] argues that Lawhāwūr, which al-Bīrūnī describes as having Mandahūkūr as its capital, corresponds to modern Lahore and Sialkot regions, while Lawhāwūr, which al-Bīrūnī mentions together with Tākešar refers to another site. Khan supports his argument by stating that no mountain is seen from Lahore or Sialkot, which would contradict al-Bīrūnī's descriptions of Lawhāwūr and Tākešar. According to Stein [1900: II 298], however, as seen above, one can see Mount Taṭakuṭi from Lahore.

Fort Lahūr was located to the south-west of the Pir Panjal Range, i.e., south-west to Mount Taṭakuṭī, as described by al-Bīrūnī. Further, according to Stein [1900: II 293–300, 364], Fort Lahūr is Lohara, also known as the Castle of Lohara, situated south-west of the Pir Panjal Range and referred to in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* as a region depending on Kashmir [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: IV 177; Stein 1900: I 138]. Maḥmūd of Ghazna attempted twice—in the years 1015/16 and 1021/22—to seize a fortress known as Lohkot or Loharin located on the foothills of Kashmir [Nazim 1931: 104–5].²² In Sanskrit, *loha-koṭa* literally means iron fort, pointing to the strength of the place claimed by al-Bīrūnī with regard to Fort Lahūr. Thus, considering the above, Lohkot is most probably Fort Lahūr mentioned by al-Bīrūnī and identical to Lohara mentioned in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*.

Lohara, or Fort Lahūr, might have been located on the Tosmaidan Pass [Stein 1900: II 298; 433]. Al-Bīrūnī provides the latitude of Fort Lahūr in the *Tahqīq* [Tahqīq 1887: 163.3; Tahqīq 1958: 270.5–6] which is 34°10'N and both coordinates in *Al-qānūn* [Qānūn 1955: 574], i.e., 33°40'N and 72°20' E after the deduction of 26° suggested by Bivar.²³ According to Stein, the difference between the two latitudes of 00°70' is an inaccuracy that does not impact the identification of Fort Lahūr with Lohara. Stein also compares the coordinates given by al-Bīrūnī with the latitude of Loharin, i.e., 33°48'N and remarks that the data found in *Al-qānūn* are closer to the reality [Stein 1900: II 298].

The localization of Rājāwūri is less problematic, and this city corresponds to the modern Rajouri, situated to the southeast of Punch [Dey: 1927 165; Sachau 1910: II 320]. It is identical with Rājapurī mentioned in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*. It is extensively referred to in this Sanskrit work, which testifies to the close contacts, either strained or collaborative, between Rājapurī and Kashmir (See, for instance, [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: VI 286, 348–9, 351, VII 104–5, 267; Stein 1900: I 259, 264, 275, 291]). Rājāwūri or Rājapurī benefited from being located on the road from Panjab to Kashmir, as attested by the testimony of the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* and al-Bīrūnī. Its zone of influence probably included the upper Valley of the Tohī and Rājagiri [Stein 1900: II 433].

2.3. The Kashmir Valley

The middle section of the above passage deals with Kashmir and its valley, rivers, towns, passes, and general topography. The identification of the town Babarhān is uncertain, but al-Bīrūnī describes it as located on one of the trails leading to the Kashmir Valley. Minorsky [Bosworth 1970: 370], following Stein [1899: 222], locates it in the basin of Chamhad.²⁴ In *Al-qānūn* [Qānūn 1955: 562], al-Bīrūnī describes Babarhān as being “the door of Kashmir toward several of its roads” (Also in [Bosworth 1970: 370]). The confluence of the river Kunsārī and Mahwī, which one reaches after leaving Babarhān according to al-Bīrūnī, is located in modern Muzaffarabad. Sachau [1910: II 320] suggests that Kunsārī is the River Kunhar located in today’s Pakistan and Mahwī identical

²² The historian Gardīzī at the Ghaznavid court reports for instance Maḥmūd’s and Mas‘ūd’s attacks to Lohkot, also called Loharkot [Bosworth 2011a: 87–88, 92, 104]. Al-Bīrūnī states that he saw Fort Lahūr. This may have happened during the second excursion of Maḥmūd to the fortress in 1021/22 [Said/Khan 1981: 85–6].

²³ See also [Sachau 1910: II 317].

²⁴ Al-Bīrūnī gives the geographic coordinates Babarhān in *Al-qānūn* [Qānūn 1955: 562], which Minorsky [Bosworth 1970: 370] also reproduces, seemingly after emending them, too. However, the coordinates given for the town Babarhān appear to be particularly inaccurate. Therefore, they are not taken into account here.

to Kiṣāṅgā (also Neelum River). Their confluence is located today at the site of the Red Fort of modern Muzaffarabad. Stein [1900: II 361] is also of the opinion that the place referred to as “the bridge on the confluence of the rivers Kunsārī and Mahwī” corresponds to modern Muzaffarabad.

The confluence between Kiṣāṅgā and Jhelum is located a few kilometers further south. From there, the Jhelum Valley can be followed to enter the Kashmir Valley via Barāmūlā, i.e., modern Baramulla. Before reaching Baramulla, the road leads to a place called Dvāra. Literally, *dvāra* signifies door, passage, or entrance in Sanskrit. As a generic term, it designated several passes to Kashmir (See, for instance, [Stein 1900: I 23, note 122]). In this case, it is a watch station located in the Jhelum Valley located somewhere before Barāmūlā on the way from Muzaffarabad to Śrīnagar.²⁵

Addištāna stands for Adhiṣṭhāna, an alternative name for Śrīnagar. In *Al-qānūn* [Qānūn 1955: 574], al-Bīrūnī provides its coordinates, which are after computation 34°20'N and 72°40'E.²⁶ These figures locate the town somewhat further westward than modern Śrīnagar. In the above passage drawn from the *Tahqīq* and in *Al-qānūn* [Qānūn 1955: 574], al-Bīrūnī states that it is the capital of Kashmir and that it lies on both banks of the Jhelum River, referred to by its alternative name Vitastā, by way of an Arabic derived form (بیت). The city of Adhiṣṭhāna is also mentioned several times in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: I 104, 129, 306, IV 6; Stein 1900: I 19, 25, 46, 121].²⁷

Ūṣkāra corresponds to the ancient Huṣkapura, which was an important Buddhist site visited by Xuanzang [Watters 1904: 258; Dey 1927: 262; Bhattacharya 1991: 298]. It is referred to throughout the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: I 168, IV 188, V 259, VI 186, VII 1311, VIII 390, 719, 822; Stein 1900: I 30, 140, 220, 251, 371, II 33, 57, 66]. The many occurrences of this city in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* indicate its importance for the history of Kashmir for a long period of time. Barāmūlā is a derived form of the Sanskrit Varāhamūla, also known as Vārāhakṣetra [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: IV 186, VII 1309, VIII 451–2, 1229; Stein 1900: I 251, 370, II 37–8, 98]. Varāhamūla was hosting an image of Viṣṇu in the form of its boar's avatar [Dey 1927: 222; Bhattacharya 1991: 88].²⁸ The two towns, Huṣkapura and Varāhamūla, were located opposite to each other, on each side of the Jhelum River.

Al-Bīrūnī also mentions the mountains Šamīlān, Haramakūt, Unang and Bolūr. The identification of Šamīlān is uncertain. The Arabic is perhaps a rendering of the original Sanskrit *śyāmalā*, an epithet of the Goddess, particularly venerated in Kashmir. The Haramakūt mountains correspond to the modern Mount Haramukh, or Haramakuṭa, located to the north of the Kashmir Valley in the Great Himalayas of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir [Stein 1900: I 8, note 36, 20, note 107, II 285, 380, 407; Bhattacharya 1991: 146]. The term Unang (possibly Anang) bears some resemblance with the modern Nanga Parbat, an eight-thousand-meter mountain located in the Western Himalaya north to the Haramukh peak in the Pakistani administrated sector of Kashmir. Its name derived from the Sanskrit *nagna parvata* means the naked mountain.

²⁵ See also [Stein 1900: II 355, 362].

²⁶ Minorsky reads 33°20'N and 98°40'E [Bosworth 1970: 370].

²⁷ See also [Stein 1900: II 439–41].

²⁸ On the two cities, see [Stein 1900: I 251, note 186, II 482–4]. See also [Sachau 1910: II 320].

In general, al-Bīrūnī's account of the rivers' sources is doubtful. In contrast with the above report, neither the Ganges nor the Jhelum arises from this peak, and both have separate sources. Stein explains that this confusion can be due to the Kashmiri tradition according to which the Indus emerges from Mount Haramukh and to the name of a sacred lake, Gangā-lake, or Gangabal, situated in the foot of Mount Haramukh [Stein 1900: II 363]. Lastly, according to Stein [1900: II 363], the swamp mentioned by al-Bīrūnī corresponds to Wular Lake, while the cities Aswira (read Asūra?) and Śiltās, belonging to the Bhatta Śāhs together with Gilgit, should be identified with Hasor and Chilās, respectively.

The following map shows the different regions discussed above:



Map 2: Kashmir and the surrounding regions in [Bosworth 1970: 261, Map iv].²⁹

To conclude these initial observations on the geography of Kashmir and its surroundings, the exact localizations of some of the above places are problematic. In particular, the localizations of Fort Lahūr, Fort Rājagīrī, Lawhāwūr and Tākešar can be debated. The present discussion however shows that Stein's identifications of these places are likely to be correct. In addition, the locales referred to in the above passage and belonging to the territory of al-Hind, i.e., the Indian Subcontinent, were positioned in one same region: south, south-west and south-east of the Kashmir Valley, and relatively close to it, i.e., in today's Pakistani and Indian Panjab, and in the modern states of Jammu and Kashmir, and Himachal Pradesh. Al-Bīrūnī, in his report, mentions these places together in relation to the southern boundary of the Kashmir Valley.

Al-Bīrūnī's description covers the territory of Kashmir, its limits and the itineraries leading to it and outlines boundaries that approximately corresponds to the edge of the modern Valley of Kashmir. It however appears that al-Bīrūnī also included the forests and mountains south to it in his conception of Kashmir. Forts Rājagīrī and Lahūr are for instance described as being located in the "mountains of Kashmir" (في جبال کشمير) [Qānūn 1955: 562, 574]. Another of al-Bīrūnī's comments confirm that he included southern forests in the territory of Kashmir. In the *Pharmacology* (*Kitāb al-ṣaydana*), composed in approximately 1050, al-Bīrūnī states that he has seen apples in the woods of Kashmir [Said 1973: 91]. He however never visited the Kashmir Valley, as he states it in a passage of the *Tahqīq*,³⁰ while his writings reveal that he visited the woods and mountains, i.e., forts Lahūr and Rājagīrī, of Kashmir.³¹

Only one instance found in al-Bīrūnī's writings offers an explicit specification of whether his description pertains to the Valley of Kashmir, or to a broader area. In passage E below, al-Bīrūnī relates his account to "inner Kashmir" (داخل کشمير)³² Minorsky explains that the later geographer, al-Dimašqī (1256–1327 CE) distinguished between inner and outer Kashmir [Bosworth 1970: 254]. This differentiation may indicate a territorial division of Kashmir into two zones, i.e., the Valley strictly speaking and a broader area including some surrounding mountains and territory, a differentiation which al-Bīrūnī vaguely specified at times.

Further, in addition to sole geographical considerations, two remarks arise about the topographical names transmitted by al-Bīrūnī in the above two passages (A and B). A phonetic change occurred in a systematic way between the original Sanskrit designations of the places and their Arabic corresponding transliterations by al-Bīrūnī. Two well-known examples of such phonetic transformation are that of the city of Puruṣapura which was converted into Paraśāwar (برشاوار), Paraśawar (پرشاور) or Peśāwar in Arabic and Persian languages, and of Lavapura which

²⁹ See also the "Maps showing the routes taken by Buddhist monks before [...] and after [...] the mid-sixth century" in Kuwayama 2002: Illustration 17 and the "Map of the routes across the Karakorum and the Hindukush" in [Inaba 2010: 444].

³⁰ See passage D in Section 3 below.

³¹ Another place described by al-Bīrūnī as being located in the mountains is the unidentified village Sālyāha (مساليها) [Ġamāhir: 87.9–10; Said 2001: 99].

³² See Passage E in Section 4.

was transcribed as Lawhāwūr, i.e., the modern Lahore in Panjab. A few other instances of a similar phonetic modification occur in al-Bīrūnī's account: Rājapurī was rendered as Rājāwūrī in the *Taḥqīq*, i.e., today's Rajouri; Vallāpura changed into Ballāwar; and perhaps Panjapura, or rather Pañcapura in Sanskrit, was transcribed as Panḡawar by al-Bīrūnī. If this is correct, it is then possible to determine that the Sanskrit synonymous words *-pura* and *-purī*, meaning fortress or town, at the end of a compound in topographical terms were transformed in the Arabic forms *-war* and *-wūrī*.³³

Furthermore, Stein [1900: II 362, note 59] observes that al-Bīrūnī refers to the capital of Kashmir as Adhiṣṭhāna rather than as Śrīnagar, which indicates a Sanskritized source of information. In addition to this example, other topographical names mentioned by al-Bīrūnī are terms coming from the Sanskrit language, even if phonetically transformed. Examples are the Paraśawar, Lawhāwūr, Rājāwūrī, Ballāwar, Panḡawar, Addiṣṭāna, but also Dvāra, Ūṣkāra representing the Sanskrit Huṣkapura, Fort Lahūr for Lohara and Mahācīna (مہاجین), an Arabic transliteration of the Sanskrit *mahācīna*, literally meaning great China or China. Al-Bīrūnī is also using Sanskrit terminology for mountains, such as the pass Bhūteśvara, the mountain Ṣamīlā(n), in most likelihood a transliteration of *śyāmālā*, and the Haramakūt mountains for Haramakuṭa. Al-Bīrūnī's reliance on Sanskrit in his geographical descriptions indicates at least that his informants were Sanskrit speakers. As seen below, some content related to Indian astronomy and Hindu religion, also indicates that they were Brahmins.

3. Contact zone

The itineraries which al-Bīrūnī describes at length suggest that Kashmir was in the center of a network of roads, through which goods and ideas circulated. It also appears that the Valley of Kashmir was located at the crossroad of several cultural or political zones. Although there is little information about the political and economic situations of the territory neighboring Kashmir and its valley, literary sources, examined for the present study, suggest that this territory was divided into local kingdoms.

According to al-Bīrūnī, regions north to Kashmir belonged to Turks of Ḥotan and Tibet. He also refers to rulers whose dominions were located to the north-west of the Valley, i.e., the Bolūrs, Ṣaknāns, Waḡāns and Bhaṭṭas (Passage B). The kings of Bolor are mentioned in the *Ḥudūd* as the Bulūrin-shāh and as claiming to be of solar descent [Bosworth 1970: 121]. Al-Bīrūnī further explains that Gilgit and Chilās belong to the territory of the Bhaṭṭa Ṣāhs, whom he also calls Bhattavaryān (perhaps Bhaṭṭavarman) and identifies as Turkish. According to the *Ḥudūd*, these two towns, located on the ancient Silk Road network, were commercial platforms in the exchanges of products and goods of the time notably with Kashmir and the Islamic world [Bosworth 1970: 350, 364–5, 369].³⁴ For instance, the *Ḥudūd* explains that Bolor imports its salt from Kashmir [Bosworth

³³ Phonetic modifications of original Sanskrit words into Arabic letters, which were rather frequent in al-Bīrūnī's writings, often occurred in a systematic way [Sachau 1888; Chatterji 1951: 89–94; Verdon 2019: 71–7].

³⁴ See also [Bhattacharya 1991: 136].

1970: 121]. In the *Ṣaydana*, al-Bīrūnī mentions plants brought from Kashmir to other unspecified regions, in most likelihood parts of Central Asia [Said 1973: 193, 276].


Commercial exchanges also took place with regions south of Kashmir. An example is the salt trade between the Panjab and Kashmir. Salt was produced in the Salt Range and brought to the Valley through the Pir Panjal pass [Kuwayama 2002: 112]. As seen above, the itinerary described by al-Bīrūnī leading from Kanauj to Kashmir probably went through the Pir Panjal Pass. This pass leading from the Valley to different parts of southern regions also connected Kashmir to the Late Shahi realm.

The kingdom of the Late Shahis extended south and south-west to the Valley of Kashmir, i.e., in Gandhāra and Panjab. Its rulers were struggling to counter the Ghaznavids' attacks. It appears however that other local kings were governing smaller regions south of the Kashmir Valley. According to the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, the king Siṃharāja, father of Queen Diddā, was the ruler of the Castle Lohara in the second half of the tenth century CE and son-in-law of the Late Shahi king Bhīmadeva (r. ca. 921–964) [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: VI 176–8; Stein 1900: I 249]. Other kingdoms connected to Kashmir in some way or the other in the course of early medieval history are for example Jālandhar and Rājapurī [Rājatarāṅgiṇī 1988: IV 177, VII 150, 267; Stein 1900: I 138, 279, 291]. Bayhaqī and al-ʿUtbi refer to an Indian king named Jankī (possibly for Cāṇakya) and ruling a territory located on a pass leading to Kashmir, in the mountains, in the year 1030. This king would be affiliated to the rulers of a place known as Kālanjar (not Fort Kālinjar in central India) on the foothills of Kashmir. Jankī is described by Bayhaqī as having given allegiance to the Ghaznavids from the year 1018 onward [Bosworth 2011b: 145–6; 2011c: 208–9; 2011d: 61–2, note 269].

The exact nature of the relations and affiliations which these neighboring rulers maintained with each other, with Kashmir and the Ghaznavids is undetermined. However, these regional kingdoms of the time also played a role in the geographical, political, intellectual, economic, and cultural landscapes of the region.

In addition, al-Bīrūnī recalls that China is located behind the mountain Haramakūt, i.e., Mount Haramukh, in the Himalayas. Another passage of the *Taḥqīq* explains that “the country of Kashmir is in their centers (i.e., of the Himalayan mountains) and is connected to the country of the Turks” [Taḥqīq 1887: 128.19–20; Taḥqīq 1958: 214.3–5; Sachau 1910: I 258]. Most of the aforementioned regions surrounding Kashmir are linked with the Valley by mountain passes. Thus, Kashmir served as a contact zone between these differently influential kingdoms and empires, i.e., Turk, Tibetan, Chinese and Hindu, which were also connected to each other through this zone. At this time, the south-western boundaries of the Valley of Kashmir had been also reached by Muslim armies, representing another political and cultural group connected to the Valley.

In the *Taḥdīd*, composed in 1025 CE, i.e., approximately five years before the *Taḥqīq* and *Al-qānūn*, al-Bīrūnī provides a map representing the seven Persian *kišvars*, dividing different regions of the world into seven zones [Ali 1967: 102; Tibbetts 1992: 93–94]. Whereas it is not necessary to take into account his full and detailed discussion about this topic, it is worth noting the place held by Kashmir in this map:



Map 3: seven kingdoms according to al-Bīrūnī's *Tahdīd* [Ali 1967: 102, Fig. 23]

Irrespective of when this conceptualization of these different regions has entered in the history of geographical literature, the above map illustrates how Kashmir was seen by al-Bīrūnī, i.e., as a contact zone between India and China. It also reflects the geopolitical situation of the Kashmir Valley in early medieval South Asia and its importance for intercultural interactions of the time.

Yet, in other passages, al-Bīrūnī suggests that Kashmir was rather isolated, notably from the south-western regions. In Passage B above, for instance, he comments that “our (i.e., Muslim) merchants trade with [Rājāwūrī] but do not go beyond it”. This remark indicates that commercial exchanges took place between the Islamic world and Indian regions located south to the Kashmir Valley, while stopping before reaching the Valley. There are a few additional passages illustrating tensions between the Islamic state and the Indian world, and especially the Valley of Kashmir. Al-Bīrūnī thus writes about the Kashmiris:

C) The people of Kashmir are pedestrians—they do not have riding animals, nor elephants. Their noble ride a *khaṭvā-s* (کتوت),³⁵ i.e., bedstead (i.e., palanquin) carried on the neck of men. They take care of the strength of [their] place and constantly take precautions to secure their entrances and passes. Therefore, it is very difficult to intermingle with them. Before, one or two foreigners could enter [Kashmir], especially Jews. Now, they do not let enter any Indians unknown [to them], thus how [could they let] others? [Taḥqīq 1887: 101.7–11; Taḥqīq 1958: 165.15–166.2; Sachau 1910: I 206].

This excerpt, in addition to describing means of locomotion specific to the people of Kashmir, emphasizes the condition of the Valley of Kashmir as isolated from neighboring regions. According to al-Bīrūnī, this seclusion was encouraged by its inhabitants and resulted in a total closing of the boundaries. In the following passage, al-Bīrūnī attempts to provide a historical reason for the isolation of Kashmir:

D) He (i.e., Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim) penetrated the country of al-Hind, to the city Kanauj, and walked on the land of Gandhāra and on the boundaries of Kashmir while returning by fighting at times and peacefully at other times. He left the people [to keep their] faith, except for those among them who accepted the conversion. This planted hatred in their hearts [...]. He (i.e., Sebūktigīn the founder of the Ghaznavid dynasty) paved the way for those who succeeded him to weaken the border of al-Hind, with roads which Yamīn al-Dawla Maḥmūd—may Allah be merciful to both of them—would follow for more than thirty years. He (i.e., Maḥmūd) destroyed with these [years] the collective bulk of them³⁶.

Before narrating the inroads of Muḥammad Ibn al-Qāsim, i.e., the commander working under the order of the Umayyad Caliphate, to Kanauj, Gandhāra and Kashmir, al-Bīrūnī reports his raids to Sistan, al-Mansura and Multan. Despite this account, Ibn al-Qāsim reached as far as Multan, passing via Sistan and Daybul in Sind, but did not advance further north or east to places such as Kanauj, Gandhāra and Kashmir. This misleading information may be due to the fact that the commander benefited from such a fame, after having opened the eastern boundaries in Sind, that other military achievements were attributed to him, or perhaps because al-Bīrūnī wanted to trace the feats of Sebūktigīn and his son, Maḥmūd al-Yamīnī, in Gandhāra, Panjab and mainland India back to an older legacy, i.e., that of Ibn al-Qāsim. Whatever be the case, al-Bīrūnī's historical account of the military conquests of al-Hind terminates with the successes of Maḥmūd. This history of wars

³⁵ [Stein 1900: I 159, note 407] conjectures that the Arabic word کتوت romanized as *katwat* is the rendering of the Sanskrit *karnīratha* which means “kind of litter”. The Arabic transliteration is however closer to the Sanskrit *khaṭvā*, meaning bedstead, probably the term which al-Bīrūnī referred to here.

³⁶ The expression “he destroyed with it the collective bulk of them” (فأباد بها خضرأهم) recalls the saying “may Allah destroy the collective bulk of them” (أباد الله خضرأهم) and performed some wondrous things in their country by which they became just like atoms scattered in all directions and just like a famous tale told in the night. The remaining of them, [being] vagabonds, kept up an extreme aversion to, and distance from, the Muslims, nay, this was the reason why their sciences vanished from the conquered frontiers and retired toward unreachable [places], such as Kashmir, Varanasi and the like, with an intensification of their enmity toward every side on account of politics and religion [Taḥqīq 1887: 11.5–13; Taḥqīq 1958: 16.8–19; Sachau 1910: I 21–2]

means to show the reasons of the hatred which Indians harbored toward Muslims, and the seclusion of Kashmir.

The above suggests that commerce stopped at the boundary of the Kashmir Valley (Passage B), that the restriction of exchanges—already few in numbers formerly—between the Valley and other regions of South Asia (Passage C) became total, and that this restriction was due to the expansive policy of Muslim military chiefs (D).

Al-Bīrūnī's comment on the withdrawal of sciences to Kashmir and Varanasi leads to two observations. It strongly suggests that neither Maḥmūd's army nor him accessed Kashmir and Varanasi by the time of the composition of the *Tahqīq*, in approximately 1030 CE. Overall, Passages C and D help understand how Kashmir was conceptualized in the early eleventh century CE, i.e., as an inaccessible and secluded land, reputed to have strong military defenses and intellectual tradition. Al-Bīrūnī's remark on Kashmir being a center of science is corroborated by Sanskrit literary sources [Witzel 1994: 272–3, 2016: 628–31] and by Gardīzī, a historian at the court of the Ghaznavids contemporaneous to al-Bīrūnī. Gardīzī states that sages come particularly from the province of Kashmir.³⁷

Al-Bīrūnī's comment also points to a consequence of Islamic military conquests to al-Hind on the intellectual history of South Asia. The question arises of whether these incursions primarily impacted the development of sciences, or also influenced commercial and religious activities. It appears that literary sources, including other al-Bīrūnī's accounts of Kashmir, shows that various types of exchanges continued to take place in spite of the Islamic military incursions at the doors of Kashmir.

4. Religion

Six passages, drawn from al-Bīrūnī's *Tahqīq* (ca. 1030) and *Ṣaydana* (ca. 1050), are quoted here consecutively to each other. They are discussed below and complemented with other sources of information. They all indicate that information about Hindu religious practices of the Valley of Kashmir were available to al-Bīrūnī, about specific deities worshipped there, customs related to pilgrimage sites and religious festivals. These passages are the following:

E) In inner Kashmir, at two or three days of journey from the capital in the direction of the mountains of Bolor, there is the house of a wooden idol, called *Śārada* (شارد), which is much venerated and visited [Tahqīq 1887: 56.15–6; Tahqīq 1958: 89.12–3; Sachau 1910: I 117].

F) Jars of the water of the Ganges (گنگ) and basket of plants of Kashmir are carried to [Somnāth (سومناث)] every day. Their belief about it (i.e., the *lingam* of Somnāth) is that it heals chronic illness and frees from every disease to which there is no cure [Tahqīq 1887:

³⁷ Gardīzī draws from several sources for his account of India: al-Bīrūnī for describing the Indian religious festivals, Ġayhānnī, Ibn Ḥurādābah and Barmakid Yaḥyā ibn Ḥālīd (ca. 800 CE) [Minorsky 1948: 625 and footnote 2, 626–7].

203.5–6; Taḥqīq 1958: 430.17–9; Sachau 1910: II 104].

G) Kashmir is now visited [by devotees]; similarly, Multan (مولتان) was [visited] before the destruction of its temple [Taḥqīq 1887: 276.1–2; Taḥqīq 1958: 466.5–6; Sachau 1910: II 148].

H) The second [day] of the month of Caitra (چیترا; March-April),³⁸ the people of Kashmir have a festival, called Agdūs (اگدوس), on account of a victory of their king, Muttai (مئی; i.e., Lalitāditya Muktāpīda) over the Turks. According to them, he was ruling over the whole world [Taḥqīq 1887: 287.14–5; Taḥqīq 1958: 486.9–11; Sachau 1910: II 178].

I) Jīvaśarman (جییشرم) relates that the people of Kashmir celebrate a festival on the 26th and 27th of this month (i.e., Bhādrapada, August-September),³⁹ because of woods'logs (قطع خشب) called *ganaha* (?) (گنه) which the stream of the River Vitastā (بیست; i.e., Jhelum) carries inside the capital, called Adhiṣṭhāna, during those two days. They maintain that Mahādeva (مهادیو) send them in the [river]. They claim their particularities: whoever wants to take them is not able to seize them, because these [logs] go away. The people of Kashmir, whom I have seen, do not agree with the place and time [of the festival] and they maintain that this [festival] takes place in a water pond called Kūdaśahara (کودشهر; Kapaṭeśvara?)⁴⁰ on the left [side] of the source of the aforementioned river and that it takes place in the middle of [the month of] Vaiśākha (بیشتاک; April-March). The latter [version is more likely], because Vaiśākha is the moment of the rise in the water. About this matter, similarities exist with the piece of wood of Ġurġān (i.e., ancient Gorgan), which emerges when the water rises in its source [Taḥqīq 1887: 289.6–14; Taḥqīq 1958: 489.10–490.12; Sachau 1910: II: 181–2].

J) The Indians from Kashmir [reported] that in the land of the Dardars (دردار; Dards?) their people are called Bhaṭṭavarman (بهتاواران; Bhatāwarān) and that they were neighbors with them (i.e., Kashmiris) from the province of the Turks. Sometimes we find in cultivated fields numerous footsteps of cattle, in which are stains of gold, [which is] insignificant [and] low in value. They attribute them to the bull of Mahādeva (مهادیو), the chief of the angels (i.e., *deva*-s), [which] presented this [gift] to the bull of the owner of the field [Ġamāhir: 237; Said 2001: 294].

Passages E and I points out two Hindu deities which were worshipped in the Valley of Kashmir in the early eleventh century CE., i.e., the goddess Śāradā and the god Mahādeva, i.e., Śiva. The temple of Śāradā, mentioned in passage E, located to the north-west of Śrīnagar, i.e., toward Bolor, according to al-Bīrūnī, may correspond to today's ruins of the site known as the Śāradā Pīṭha,

³⁸ This corresponds to the second tithi of the *śuklapakṣa* of Caitra [Verdon 2019: 69].

³⁹ This corresponds to the eleventh and twelfth tithi of the *kṛṣṇapakṣa* of Bhādrapada [Verdon 2019: 69].

⁴⁰ The Arabic term Kūdaśahara most probably refers to the original Sanskrit Kapaṭeśvara, despite an important phonetic change. This word is mentioned in the *Nilamatapurāṇa* and refers to a “statue of Śiva in the form of a wooden log” [Tokunaga 1994: 406]. This pilgrimage site was renowned beyond Kashmir, as Bhoja, the ruler of Malwa, had a building erected at Kapaṭeśvara [Witzel 1994: 258, 262].

situated west of Pakistan-administered-Kashmir in the valley of Mount Haramukh.

In a passage of the *Ġamāhir*, al-Bīrūnī mentions in passing the idol *Šamīl* (شمیل) in Kashmir,⁴¹ which is the goddess *Śyāmalā*, a form of *Durgā* (but also the name of a mountain, see above). He does not however give its precise location of the idol but describes it as opposite or parallel (محاذاة) to the Indus River. Muneo Tokunaga [1994: 418, no 1347] lists a site of pilgrimage named *Šamālā* (modern Hamal Pargaṇa, north of the Jelhum River and the Wular lake). *Šamālā* was a district often mentioned in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* [Stein 1900: I 280, note 159, II 484], but none of these references indicates the existence of a pilgrimage site or a temple dedicated to the goddess *Śyāmalā*. Nevertheless, al-Bīrūnī's account indicates that cults dedicated to the Goddess were practiced by Kashmiri people.

The last of the above passages (J) gives information about religious practices of people inhabiting a region near Kashmir, probably the Dards. Al-Bīrūnī identifies them as the Bhaṭṭavarman, who, according to Passage B, live in the region of Bolor, west to Kashmir. These people were devotees of *Mahādeva*, i.e., *Śiva*. Thus, *Śiva* was worshipped not only in Kashmir but also in its neighboring regions.

Further, passages F and G indicate exchanges of goods and movements of people for religious purposes in pilgrimage sites. Al-Bīrūnī also gathered information about Hindu religious festivals in Kashmir. Passages H and I describe two festivals. One of these festivals was dedicated to an ancient ruler of Kashmir, i.e., *Lalitāditya Muktāpīda* (mid-8th century CE),⁴² while the other one celebrated the god *Mahādeva* in a site called *Kapaṭeśvara*.

Lastly, passages I and J show that al-Bīrūnī directly communicated with Kashmiris. Cultural exchanges were thus taking place between Kashmir and mainland India in the early eleventh century CE, even when the Ghaznavids exerted pressure on its boundaries. Al-Bīrūnī gathered his information about religious practices and beliefs in Kashmir by way of his interactions with Indians, rather than through the Sanskrit literature he consulted. These informants were Kashmiris as seen above, while other passages of the *Taḥqīq* reveal that his interlocutors came from different parts of the Indian Subcontinent [Taḥqīq 1958: 125.5–6, 129.3–4, 170.4–5, 347.15–8, 451.4–5; Sachau 1910: I 161, 165, 211, II 9, 129], and were in most likelihood pilgrims, traders, and travelers.

Because al-Bīrūnī collected this information through communicating with people, his reporting of two shrines dedicated to feminine deities highlights their fame as important religious sites of the time. In general, the above passages point to the role of Kashmir as a religious center for Hinduism in the early medieval period. The description of Kashmir by the *Ḥudūd* (982/83) as a land housing numerous Hindu pilgrimage sites [Bosworth 1970: 92] corroborates this observation. Al-Bīrūnī's account also lends support to Sanskrit literature indicating the strong presence of some forms of *Śāktism* and *Śaivism* in the Valley of Kashmir [Witzel 1994: 249, 269–71].

Furthermore, the study by Michael Witzel on the religion and intellectual tradition of Kashmir

⁴¹ وإذا انتهى الى محاذاة منصب صنم شمیل في بقعة کشمیر على سمت ناحية بلور سمى هناك ماء السند [Ġamāhir: 236.11–2; Said 2001: 293].

⁴² The king is also referred to in al-Bīrūnī's *Gemology* [Ġamāhir: 125.2–3.; Said 2001: 147].

chiefly based on the *Nilamatapurāṇa* points to the intensity with which exchanges were taking place then [Witzel 1994: 269–72]. According to him, cultural interactions and movements of population between Kashmir and other parts of the South Asian subcontinent were related to the expansion of Śaivism through medieval India [Witzel 1994: 258–61].⁴³ Al-Bīrūnī did not use any sectarian terminology, such as Śaivism. Śāktism and Vaiṣṇavism, for the obvious reason that those terms are later lexical creations. His account however reflects the importance of the cults of the Goddess and Śiva, whom he only designated by the term Mahādeva.⁴⁴ Lastly, as Tokunaga's survey [1994] on the religious sites mentioned in the *Nilamatapurāṇa* (ca. 8th c. CE) testifies, Kashmir hosted numerous pilgrimage sites and temples. In the early eleventh century CE, Kashmir was thus still functioning as an important religious center.

5. Calendars

Al-Bīrūnī was particularly interested in mathematics and astronomy. It is thus natural that he dedicated much of the *Taḥqīq* to these Indian sciences. For instance, he was informed about calendars and eras in use in north-western India and Kashmir as the two following passages illustrate:⁴⁵

K) I have seen [this astronomical information] in the calendars of the year 951⁴⁶ of Śakakāla (شگکال) brought from Kashmir [Taḥqīq 1887: 196.5; Taḥqīq 1958: 328.9–10; Sachau 1910: I 391].

L) It is said that those who use the Śaka (شق) era, as well as the astronomers, begin the year with the month of Caitra. It is said that the inhabitants of Kanīr (کنیر), [the region] neighboring Kashmir, begin it with the month of Bhādrapada (بهادریت), while their era [starts] 84 [years] before our [gauge-]year (i.e., 1031 CE).⁴⁷ The inhabitants of the [region] between Bardari (برداری) and Mārīgala (ماری گله; i.e., Taxila) begin [the year] with the month of Kārttika (گارتک) (October-November), while their era starts 110 [years] before our [gauge-]year. It is claimed in Kashmiri [calendars] that this is the sixth [year] of a [new] century and this is the viewpoint of the people of Kashmir. The inhabitants in Nīrahara (نیرهر), beyond Mārīgala (ماری گله) up to the utmost frontiers of Tākeṣar and Lawhāwūr, begin [the year] with [the month of] Mārgaśīrṣa (منگهر) (November-December), while their era starts 108 [years] before our [gauge-]year. The people of Lanbaga (لننگ, i.e., Laghmān (لمغان), follow them in this [matter]. I have heard people of Multan say that this

⁴³ See [Witzel 2016: 623–6] on Brahmins' movements from and to Kashmir in general.

⁴⁴ On the development of Śāktism and Śaivism in Kashmir see [Sanderson 2009].

⁴⁵ See also al-Bīrūnī's *Al-āṭār al-bāqīya* which describes calendars and era of different civilizations.

⁴⁶ The year 951 of Śakakāla corresponds to the year 1029 CE.

See the online converter: <http://www.cc.kyoto-su.ac.jp/yanom/pancanga/index.html>.

⁴⁷ In order to discuss several Indian eras, al-Bīrūnī proposes a gauge-year as a comparative tool. This gauge-year which starts at the Nowrūz, i.e., New Year of the year 400 of the Persian era, corresponds to March 9, 1031 CE [Sachau 1910: II 358].

was the view of Sind and of people of Kanauj, that they began the year with the new moon of Mārgaśīrṣa, and that the people of Multan gave up this [system] a few years ago and turned to the view of the people of Kashmir and agreed with them on the beginning of the [year] with the new moon of Caitra [Taḥqīq 1887: 206.12–8; Taḥqīq 1958: 347.7–18; Sachau 1910: II 8–9].

Several observations emerge from these two quotations drawn from the *Taḥqīq*. Passage K supports the above comments that Kashmir served as a center of knowledge, in this case, a place where calendars were found.⁴⁸ Passage L describes calendrical systems starting the year with different months and following various eras in several regions of India located relatively close to each other. This points to a variety of traditions in a rather confined area of South Asia, i.e., Gandhāra, Panjab, Sind, and Kashmir, thereby suggesting the existence of regional communities in the early medieval north-western Subcontinent. In addition, it indicates that changes in calendrical systems occurred.

According to Passage L, the era of Kashmir begins six years after that of Taxila, with the new moon of Caitra (March–April), i.e., with the bright fortnight (*śuklapakṣa*) of Caitra. Michio Yano [1994: 225] explains that, according to the *Nilamatapurāṇa*, two kinds of year existed in Kashmir: one related to social life starting with the dark fortnight (*kṛṣṇapakṣa*) of Āśvayuja (September–October), and another related to astronomical and religious events, beginning with the *śuklapakṣa* of Caitra. Al-Bīrūnī only reports about the second one. This is however unsurprising, considering his interests in astronomy and the above observations that he accessed information about religion in Kashmir.

While he based his account of religious practices and events on his interactions with Indians, in the case of calendars and eras he appears to have relied on both written sources, i.e., calendars (passage K), and his informants (passage L).

6. Scientific exchanges

Intellectual exchanges related to other sciences also took place between Kashmir and its southern neighbors. The following passage, drawn from the *Taḥqīq*, indicates the existence of books' circulation between these two regions:

M) I have been told that this man [Ugrabhūti, the grammarian] was the educator and teacher of the Śāh of our time Ānandapāla, son of Jayapāla,⁴⁹ that, he sent the book to Kashmir after having composed it, but that the people there did not take it because of their pride and arrogance with regard to these [things]. The man (i.e., Ugrabhūti) then complained about this to the Śāh who ensured to [Ugrabhūti], by [his] duty as a student

⁴⁸ Al-Bīrūnī briefly mentions these Kashmiri calendars, once more, shortly after Passage K [Sachau 1910: I 391].

⁴⁹ Jayapāla and Ānandapāla were Late Shahi kings, whom the Ghaznavids fought in the region of Kābul, Gandhāra and Panjab. They had contact with Kashmiri rulers and are said to have eventually taken shelter there. See [Nazim 1931: 86–122; 194–6].

his obtention of his desire. Thus, [Ānandapāla] ordered to send 200,000 *dirham*, as well as similar gifts to Kashmir, in order to distribute [it] among those who would study the book of his master. All of them flocked to [have] it and replaced any other [book] than this one by its copies. They lowered themselves by greed and the book became notorious and became more expensive [Taḥqīq 1887: 65.10–4; Taḥqīq 1958: 105.1–7; Sachau 1910: I 135–6].

Before this passage, al-Bīrūnī lists several Sanskrit works on grammar and he provides the title of the book composed by Ugrabhūti (اوگرہوت) from Kashmir, i.e., *Śiṣyahitāvṛtti?* (شکھت پرت).⁵⁰ The Indian thinker named Ugrabhūti, or by a name similar to it, is unidentified yet. Nevertheless, this passage tells us about existing relationships between Ānandapāla (r. ca. 1002–1010 CE), the Late Shahi king, and the Valley of Kashmir. In addition to corroborating previous remarks that the Valley was not as secluded as implied by some passages of al-Bīrūnī's *Taḥqīq* seen above, this excerpt shows that close contacts and intellectual exchanges existed between the two kingdoms. It has been also observed above that Queen Diddā of Kashmir was the granddaughter-in-law of the Late Shahi Bhīmadeva.⁵¹ The anonymous author of the *Ḥudūd* (982/82) also testifies to these connections, as he considered that both the rulers of Kashmir and the Late Shahi rulers based in Gandhāra were vassals of the king of Kanauj [Bosworth 1970: 92, 238]. The subordination of these two kings to Kanauj is doubtful in the mid-tenth century CE [Bosworth 1970: 254], but this statement may have been misled by the influential role which Kanauj enjoyed between the eighth and the early eleventh centuries CE.⁵²

Considering these relationships, it is likely that al-Bīrūnī also collected information thanks to the Indians he met in the area he chiefly travelled in al-Hind, i.e., Gandhāra and Panjab, and which belonged to the kingdom of the Late Shahis. The above passage also sheds light on how a book circulated in early medieval South Asia and the reasons for its success, that is in relation to the interests of the rulers of the time.

Furthermore, other elements based on the study of al-Bīrūnī's writings indicate the importance of the communication and intellectual exchange between Kashmir and its southern neighbors. In 1036, al-Bīrūnī wrote a catalogue (فہرس) of the works of the physician and philosopher al-Rāzī (865–925). He supplemented this catalogue with his works composed by the year 1036 [Boilot 1955]. In this auto-bibliography, al-Bīrūnī enumerates two works entitled *Answers to the ten Kashmiri questions* (الجوابات عن المسائل العشر کشمیری) [Boilot 1955: 200], and *Answers to the questions of the astronomers of al-Hind* (الجوابات عن المسائل الواردة من منجمی الهند) [Boilot 1955: 199]. Neither of these works is extant. It is thus not possible to know their content. However, their titles prove the intellectual activity between al-Bīrūnī and Indians, i.e., Kashmiri and astronomers, in the early eleventh century CE.

Al-Bīrūnī's contact with Kashmiri thinkers is as of now conspicuous from his detailed

⁵⁰ Witzel [1994: 272–3] recalls the importance of the study of grammar in Kashmir.

⁵¹ According to Gardīzī (referred to in [Bosworth 2011a: 85]) and al-ʿUṭbī, the king Ānandapāla fled to the mountains of Kashmir after an attack of Maḥmūd in the year 1006 [Nazim 1931 88–9].

⁵² On political tensions around Kanauj during that period, see [Thapar 2002: 405–12].

descriptions of Kashmir in various topics, as well as from the above example of their direct intellectual exchanges. Another element lending evidence to the existence of these interactions has been noted by Witzel who analyzed al-Bīrūnī's explanation about Brahmin's education that "the study period extends until the 25th year for a young Brahmin" as reminding "of Kashmiri conceptions" [Witzel 2016: 619]. Further, the circulation of texts appears to have played a role in the scholarly dialogues between Kashmiri thinkers and al-Bīrūnī. For instance, Witzel also highlights the importance of manuscripts' exchanges, the results of "intensive cultural relations" [Witzel 1994: 262, 2016: 627–8] between Kashmir and the mainland India, which al-Bīrūnī's writings on Kashmir also reveal. According to Kalhaṇa, colleges known as *maṭha* were built to welcome students from different parts of India by the end of the tenth century CE [Witzel 2016: 611]. They also played a role in the scholarly interactions and manuscripts' circulation of the time.

The next example illustrating how intellectual exchanges occurred between Kashmir and al-Bīrūnī is drawn from the *Taḥqīq* is the following:

N) We have verified these [methods] in the astronomical treatise which we have composed for Syāvapala/Śivapala (سیاوپل)⁵³ the Kashmiri, and which we have called the Arabic *Kaṇḍakhādya* (کنڈکاتک) [Taḥqīq 1887: 300.13–4; Taḥqīq 1958: 512.18–9; Sachau 1910: II: 208].

This short quotation allows for determining an additional manner in which intellectual exchanges were taking place between Kashmir and regions south and west of it, i.e., Gandhāra and Panjab. It points to an active endeavor of early medieval thinkers to compose and translate books for one another and across cultures.

Lastly, there are other passages drawn from al-Bīrūnī's writings indicating the extent of his knowledge about Kashmir. In particular, the passage below gives an account of the script used in Kashmir and about a specific practice related to writing in manuscripts. It reads:

O) As for the most widespread script among them, it is called *Siddhamātrkā* (سدّماترک) and it is sometimes traced to Kashmir [as its place of origin] because [this] writing is [found] among its people. It is also in use in Varanasi. The latter and Kashmir are the two schools of their sciences. [...] ⁵⁴ The people of Kashmir imprint the leaves with a mark, which is like a drawing or like the letters of the people of China, and which is not understood except with practice and with a lot of assiduous study [Taḥqīq 1887: 82.8–83.2; Taḥqīq 1958: 135.3–136.9; Sachau 1910: I 173–4].

Al-Bīrūnī puts his descriptions of Kashmiri script into perspective, as he offers comparisons with the Indian mainland, in the same way as he did with regard to the calendars and the eras. This passage, however, does not help understand how al-Bīrūnī obtained this information.

⁵³ This name has not been identified yet. Sachau makes some assumptions about this figure, but with little certainty [Sachau 1910: II 400].

⁵⁴ Other Indic scripts are enumerated and writing conventions are briefly discussed in the section of text omitted here.

In addition to religious practices, calendars, scripts, and manuscripts, al-Bīrūnī provides information about various other topics. He states about the climate of Kashmir that around the mountains of Kashmir monsoon is abundant during two and a half months starting with the month of Śrāvaṇa (July-August), whereas the Kashmir Valley itself does not have monsoon, but continuous snow for two and a half months from the month of Māgha (January-February) [Sachau 1910: I 211–2]. He also compares the practice of polygamy current among Arab Pre-Islamic populations before his time to that of the inhabitants of the mountains extending from Panjshīr (پنجشیر) to the vicinity of Kashmir [Sachau 1910: I 108]. Other brief mentions of Kashmir in the *Taḥqīq* are: a man named Vasukra (بِسْكَر or بَشْكَر) described as a famous Kashmiri Brahmin who committed himself to writing down the *Veda*-s [Taḥqīq 1887: 61.8; Taḥqīq 1958: 97.12–3; Sachau 1910: I 126]; a list of countries of the north-east [Sachau 1910: I 303]; and the belief of the people of Kashmir about the Great Bear [Sachau 1910: I 393].

About the fauna of Kashmir, al-Bīrūnī provides much information in his book *Ṣaydana*. For instance, he states that the herb of a species of the *amla* fruit is abundant in Kashmir or mentions a variety of Saffron from Kashmir [Said 1973: 42, 167].⁵⁵ In the *Ġamāhir* too, al-Bīrūnī enumerates precious stones coming from Kashmir [Said 2001: 231]. Despite of his vast knowledge about Kashmir, in various domains, al-Bīrūnī appears to be ignorant of the works of his contemporary, the Kashmiri thinker Abhinavagupta (fl. ca. 975–1025).⁵⁶ Nevertheless, al-Bīrūnī's account testifies to the intellectual activities and intercultural exchanges taking place between Kashmir and its southern regions in early medieval times.

7. Conclusion

This study localized and discussed the possible identifications of certain places of Kashmir and surroundings mentioned by al-Bīrūnī, a task which had not been done thoroughly since the time of Stein. It demonstrated that Kashmir and its valley were far from being a secluded place, as against some of al-Bīrūnī's explicit statements in the *Taḥqīq*. On the contrary, Kashmir was connected to its neighboring regions by mountain passes and roads, enabling important intercultural exchanges in commercial, religious, and intellectual matters. Kashmir was also in contact with a variety of cultures, i.e., Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, and a variety of ethnic groups, i.e., Turkish, Chinese, Tibetan, Indian, Arab, and Persian. The position of Kashmir in the center of these different cultural spheres certainly contributed to its intellectual effervescence, even at a time of high political and military tensions.

Al-Bīrūnī's sketch of Kashmir reflects a Brahminical society that adopted Hindu cults and developed sciences indebted to classical Indian tradition. His interlocutors thus must have been Brahmins. Al-Bīrūnī's interactions with them likely occurred when two royal courts met, that of Maḥmūd and that of Late Shahi kings, Maḥmūd's main opponents in his conquest to the East.

⁵⁵ See also [Said 1973: 81–2, 193, 276] on other Kashmiri plants.

⁵⁶ On the intellectual environment surrounding Abhinavagupta's works see [Franco/Ratié 2016].

As Brahmins were supported by these local Indian rulers, military contacts between the rulers also resulted in intellectual contacts of their officials. In some other cases, however, al-Bīrūnī's interlocutors were also pilgrims travelling for religious reasons, notably from Kashmir.

This chapter also highlighted the benefit of taking on multidisciplinary approaches, in the present case of combining textual sources from two distinct cultural backgrounds. Thus, if supplemented with information drawn from other fields, such as Art History, Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Numismatics, this approach can surely bring our understanding of this past to a further step.

Nevertheless, this research also raises a number of questions related to the study of the history of the borderlands of Central and South Asia in the early medieval period. Al-Bīrūnī was working under the patronage of Maḥmūd of Ghazna, whose primary interest was in military and political conquests. Yet, this political context enabled al-Bīrūnī to collect such amount of information about Kashmir, but also about Indian religion, science, philosophy, etc. in the *Tahqīq*. This simple fact reveals that military campaigns did not mean complete destruction of the attacked culture nor absence of interactions between populations. It may be expected that economic interactions are carried on in human societies in the most troubled contexts, but this research showed that ideas also circulated along trade roads, in the domains of sciences and religion, which continued to be lively discussed and practiced. This observation questions the modern tendency to compartmentalize theories and ideas into fields and domains, such as geography, economy, politics, science, and religion, and highlights its limits in cultural historical studies.

Another challenge emerges from this chapter. The political situation of Kashmir and its neighbours was heterogeneous. Al-Bīrūnī depicts a portrait of several local political rulers, whose mutual relationships and affiliations appear to have evolved in time. Whereas the present book and other edited volumes [Ikari 1994; Franco and Ratié 2016] on the intellectual context of Kashmir during the early medieval period shed light on the role of Kashmir in the history of Indian science and religion, the question of its south-western neighbours and their contribution for scholarly exchanges remains open. These local political agents also played a role in the cultural landscape of the region.

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Translation, Philology, and Reception

Notes toward Reconstructing a Bilingual History of Śrīvara's *Kathākaṭuka*

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The *Kathākaṭuka*, a Sanskrit poem presented to the Sultan of Kashmir, Muḥammad Šāh in 1505 CE holds a fascinating, if not unprecedented place in South Asian literary history. The Sanskrit poem translates the Persian text *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā*, written by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī in Herat, a city in modern-day Afghanistan. Jāmī’s text, while ostensibly a love story recounting the union of the Prophet Yūsuf and the beautiful Zulayḥā, remains a deeply religious text, informed by Šūfī ideas and ultimately teaching a Šūfī theology. Although Śrīvara is a Hindu, his Sanskrit translation does not shy away from the theological aspects of Jāmī, rather it directly confronts issues of religious and cultural difference in the elite encounter between Šūfī-inflected Persian textual traditions and Śaiva-oriented Sanskrit literary culture in Kashmir. Thinking through the *Kathākaṭuka* shows the mechanics of a particular creative moment in South Asia; Śrīvara’s Sanskrit poem directly confronts Persian modes of expression and creatively reimagines and remakes the *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā*. Throughout this text, Śrīvara implicitly argues that Sanskrit literature and expression deserves a place in the Sultanate elite literary ecology. While the *Kathākaṭuka* is positioned in at a provocative juncture in South Asian religious and cultural history, it has received very little attention from modern scholarship. Although this situation is slowly changing, the reasons for the *Kathākaṭuka*’s neglect have been given as its “derivative”¹ form, relatively late date, regional outlook, and stilted language. While such factors may have added to the lack of serious literary evaluations of the text, it is these very characteristics that help illuminate the genesis of the work within the Sultanate milieu.

Chronologically, the *Kathākaṭuka* appears to be Śrīvara’s final work and can be dated firmly to the spring of 1505. The appearance of the poem almost twenty years after Śrīvara’s *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* had come to a spluttering and uncertain halt in 1486 is suggestive, however nothing for certain can be said of Śrīvara’s life in the immediately preceding years. In light of the confusing, tense, and



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* I would point to my own chapters [Obrock 2018][Obrock2019] as well as Satoshi Ogura’s close reading of Šūfī ideas within the text presented in his excellent contribution to the SIAS-KIAS Joint Workshop in Kyoto [Ogura 2015].”

¹ A. K. Warder has perceptively noted the close affinity of the text with Somadeva’s *Kathāsaritsāgara* but has seen this as a sign of creative ossification rather than as a clue to the textual ecology in which the text acts.

changeable political situation in late fifteenth century Kashmir, it is possible that he had fallen out of favor with the court. While this is just a conjecture, we know from both Sanskrit and Persian sources that Muḥammad Ṣāh himself fought a constant struggle to retain his throne being deposed and reinstalled numerous times in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. It is against this backdrop that Śrīvara returns to the scene, with his strange and startling translation of love and longing set in ancient Egypt.

Śrīvara's translation of Jāmi's Persian *maṭnavī* appeared a little over 20 years after its first appearance in Herāt in 1484. The text of Jāmi's *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā* has a complex history which can be only briefly touched upon here. Jāmi's own skillful telling of the story of Joseph is based on the twelfth *sūra* of the Qur'ān, which itself has a long backstory both inside and outside of the Islamic tradition. With important relations to earlier Near Eastern literature, the *Sūra Yūsuf* is the longest narration of a single figure's life in the entire Qur'ān, having 111 verses. Further, the *Sūra Yūsuf* has a self-contained literary structure, with a clear beginning, middle, and end, and can be read as a complete tale in and of itself. In fact, Todd Lawson notes that according to the scholar al-Šahrastānī, a certain group called the Maymūniyya "rejected the *sūra* of Joseph in the grounds precisely that it was a complete, consistent narrative ("a [mere] story") and a love story at that"[Lawson 2012: 226]. However, throughout the Islamic world, the story of Joseph became a touchstone of both literary and spiritual importance. The eleventh-century Islamic scholar al-Ṭa'labī (d. 1035) writing from the eastern side of the Islamic world states in his *Qīṣaṣ al-Anbiyā'* (*The Tales of the Prophets*) that the story of the prophet Joseph is the most beautiful "because of the lessons concealed in it, on account of Joseph's generosity, and its wealth of matter—in which prophets, angels, devils, jinn, men, animals, birds, rulers, and subjects play a part"[Brinner 2002: 646]. On the far western side, the famous twelfth/thirteenth-century Šūfī mystic and theologian Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1240) discussed Joseph in his *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* (*The Bezels of Wisdom*), concentrating on the role of dreams in the Qur'ānic text, and the implications of these dreams for the understanding of ultimate reality [Abrahamov 2012: 68–73].

Given the Qur'ānic tale's importance in Islamic culture, it is no wonder that Jāmi's *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā* compelling poetic and religious vision quickly moved throughout the Persianate and Islamicate world. While the *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā* was a finely crafted love story, Jāmi was also famous in his time as Šūfī theologian and clearly infused his Šūfī learning and agenda into his *maṭnavī*.² In such a way, the argument can be made for a particular power that such a text would have within the Islamic or Islamicizing religious world. Indeed, other iterations of Jāmi's *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā* encountered tend to be within the Islamic fold, with authors bringing the texts into the vernaculars for Muslim audiences.³ This explicitly allows the recourse to certain shared sets of Islamic vocabulary and ideas, and, and even if these are not explicitly utilized, a similarly imagined unifying cultural sphere in which the translation can operate. The *Kathākautuka* does

² For Jāmi and Šūfism see [Algar 2008].

³ The *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā* was translated into a variety of languages, from Turki to Pashtun. See [d'Hubert and Papas 2019]. In respect to its transmission within Islamicate South Asia, see [Alam 2019].

not operate within this “Islamicizing” dynamic and thus questions all of these assumptions about the movement of Islamic (especially Ṣūfī) texts into Indic languages.

The basic story of the *Kathākaṭuka* is simple. The lovely Zulayḥā (Sanskrit Jolekhā), having seen Joseph (Sanskrit Yosobha)⁴ in a dream, strives to be united with her unknown and absent beloved. After a long series of adventures and separations, she eventually achieves her goal. When placed side by side with Jāmī’s tale, on the whole Śrīvara’s *Kathākaṭuka* follows the general trajectory quite closely. Zulayḥā sees Joseph’s handsome form in a dream becomes lovesick, pining after the seemingly unattainable Joseph. Her father marries her to the king of Egypt,⁵ where she still longs for the divine form of her unknown lover. Joseph meanwhile is the most beloved son of Jacob (Yakobha in the Sanskrit), and after his father gives him a miraculous coat and spear, his brothers plot revenge. They leave him for dead in a well, but through divine intervention, a merchant’s caravan rescues him. Upon arriving in Egypt he is sold as a slave. The crowd in the market is astonished at such beauty incarnate upon the earth, and in a bidding frenzy he eventually ends up as a servant to the king. Zulayḥā sees him and recognizes her beloved from the dream. Determined to have him, she attempts to seduce him. He flees, but she tells the king that he assaulted her. The king in a rage places Joseph in jail. While Joseph is imprisoned, the king has disconcerting dreams, only Joseph is able to interpret them, and in his gratitude, the King releases him. Joseph is reunited with his father and brothers, and is set up as a ruler. Meanwhile, Zulayḥā has grown old waiting for her beloved. Upon meeting him again, she regains her youth and beauty through divine intervention. She finally unites with Joseph and the tale ends happily.

This story is well known from various versions from the Hebrew Bible up through Andrew Lloyd Weber’s musical *Joseph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat*. Here Śrīvara’s *Kathākaṭuka* operates more along the lines of what A. K. Ramanujan calls a “telling.” For Ramanujan, translated texts “not only relate to prior texts directly,” rather each new telling “brings out a unique crystallization, a new text with a unique texture and fresh context” [Ramanujan 2004: 158]. Śrīvara’s *Kathākaṭuka* operates as a telling in the same way, not translating the text in a modern academic sense, but fashioning a text of his own, deeply embedded in a specific place and time, and speaking to certain imagined audiences.

The fifteen chapters of *Kathākaṭuka* retells the entire *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā of Jāmī*, yet read in tandem with the Persian, the Sanskrit presents fascinating additions, reorderings, omissions, and explanatory digressions. Śrīvara accents the character Zulayḥā much more than Jāmī, indeed after the introductory section the *Kathākaṭuka* introduces Zulayḥā, unlike in the Persian in which Joseph is the first character discussed. Further from the very start the *Kathākaṭuka* clearly positions itself clearly as a Sanskrit Śiva-worshipping text. Unlike the other translations of the

⁴ Here and throughout, I use the names “Zulayḥā” (who is known only as Potiphar’s wife in the Biblical tradition) and “Joseph” as a generic terms to refer to both the characters in the Persian *maṭnavī* and the Sanskrit poem. When aspects specific to either the Persianate/Islamicate version or the Sanskrit version come under discussion, I tend to use either Yūsuf or Yosobha, respectively.

⁵ Interestingly, Śrīvara translates the term “king of Egypt” as *ajjamesra*, obviously building on the Persian term ‘*azīz-i meṣr*, instead of relying on Sanskrit calques.

Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā, Śrīvara attempts to translate not only the language of the Persian text, but also to transform the religious and cultural underpinnings of Jāmi's worldview. Śrīvara's translation is audacious, ignoring or explicitly excising certain Islamic elements (including the *bismillāh*) while actively turning Jāmi's Šūfī text into a poem of religious devotion to Śiva.

At this point it must be reiterated that Śrīvara's strongly stated Śaivism springs from neither an ignorance nor avoidance of the religious philosophy contained in the original; his translation is no religious polemic. Nor is it aimed at fellow Śaiva or Hindu correlative religionists in order inform them about the religious beliefs and practices of an alternate religion (like, for instance, Peter the Venerable's medieval translations of Arabic into Latin). Śrīvara is well aware of the Persian and its cultural context; indeed, some verses are almost exact translations of Jāmi's stanzas and the colophons of the *Kathākaṭuka* declare him *yāvanaśāstrapāraṅgama* or the "Complete Master of Muslim Learning."

Despite his knowledge of Jāmi's language and the expectations of Islamicate poetry and religion, he makes striking translational choices. While he states that he is adhering closely to the original text, changing only the language of its expression, in actuality he moves the text from a Persianate and Islamicate context to a Sanskrit (particularly Kashmiri Sanskrit) and Śaiva orientation. This shift can be understood by looking at the text of the *Kathākaṭuka* as existing at the center of a series of complex negotiations, often, but not always, played out on the level of religion. Although the *Kathākaṭuka* is Śaiva in orientation, it remains directed toward a Muslim patron, and although it strives to move within a Sanskrit landscape, it is never far away from poetry of the Persian original.

To understand the complex ideologies at play in Śrīvara's *Kathākaṭuka*, the text itself must be constituted, compared, and interrogated. In the remainder of this short essay, I will look at three instances from the first chapter of Jāmi's text. I hope that these instances will show 1) the necessity for a new and truly critical edition of the text, 2) the importance of reading the Persian in parallel with the Sanskrit, and 3) the complex strategies involved in producing this "translation" can help identify the mechanics of the creation of an Indo-Persian courtly culture in sultanate Kashmir. While some of these themes have been developed in other articles,⁶ here I make the case for further philological, text critical, and literary studies of the text, and offer a few more examples that I hope move the conversation toward a more complete picture of textual dynamics underlying the creation of the *Kathākaṭuka*.

Despite its provocative position and its fascinating subject matter, the *Kathākaṭuka* has never been truly critically edited, nor has it been compared systematically to its Persian source.⁷ Two editions of the text exist, one edited by Paṇḍit Durgāprasāda in the *Kāvyamālā* series, and one edition accompanied by a German translation by Richard Schmidt. Both editions have a certain value as a witness to the textual tradition, however, the Sanskrit text that they provide is often

⁶ For instance, see [Ogura 2015] and [Obrock 2018 and 2019].

⁷ In an 1883 publication entitled *Das Kathākaṭukam des Śrīvara Verglichen mit Dschāmi's Jusuf und Zuleikha*, Richard Schmidt has compared the Sanskrit to Vincenz Edlem von Rosenzweig's 1824 translation of the poem, yet Rosenzweig's poetic style in German and Schmidt's lack of access to the Persian original does not allow for anything more than an impressionistic and imperfect comparison.

difficult to construe. The Kāvyaṃālā edition is full of questions and conjectures, and while Schmidt's text appears more stable, it is often fails to address the difficulty of the Sanskrit itself given the unsatisfactory state of the critical apparatus and its at times debatable editorial choices.⁸ There exist a few manuscripts, both inside and outside Kashmir, in both Śāradā and Devanāgarī scripts. These manuscripts provide valuable witnesses, but they often diverge at critical points. This, I argue, shows that the Sanskrit work itself was often difficult to comprehend by Sanskrit-educated scribes. The difficulty arises from the creative and often unconventional choices Śrīvara had to make when transforming Persian literary idiom into Sanskrit verse. Throughout this essay I quote from the published editions, the manuscripts that I have access to, the Persian edition, and my own provisional edition of the Kathākautuka noting variant readings between the editions, and provide my own translations of both the Sanskrit and its Persian parallels.⁹

In addition to Sanskrit manuscripts, the Persian text is also an essential witness that has not been taken into account by any of the previous editions. A comparison with the Persian can help resolve ambiguities and textual problems in the text of the Kathākautuka. To begin with one example, Kāvyaṃālā edition of verse 1.8 reads as follows:

medhābha(?)bhadrikāyās tu śubhavāgyogam adbhutam |
mahyaṃ dehi bhaved yena kāryasiddhis sukhāvahā ||1.8||

Schmidt's edition is close, reading:

medhābhapattribhāyās tu śubhavāgyogam adbhutam |
mahāṃ dehi bhaved yena kāryasiddhis sukhāvahā ||1.8||

Leaving aside other difficulties, we can see the main area of difference is the compound

⁸ Schmidt's German translation also deserves closer attention, however its attempt to be literal often makes it confusing and difficult to read.

⁹ It must be noted that the Persian text of the *Yūsuf wa Zulaykhā* also has no critical edition, not has a scholarly translation been made into any western language. That is not to say that this text suffered any neglect in scholarly circles; quite the contrary, in Persophone contexts, especially in India, it received numerous learned commentaries (Thibaut d'Hubert of the University of Chicago is now working on making electronically accessible versions of some of these important commentaries). In the West, it was translated into German Romantic verse by Rosenzweig as early as 1824. Goethe was impressed enough by the story to include Zulaykhā (Suleicha) as a major speaker in his *West-östlicher Divan*. Ralph Griffiths (the English orientalist who also translated the *Rig Veda*) gave a Victorian translation into rhyming couplets in 1882. As late as 1980, David Pendlebury's translation the *Yūsuf wa Zulaykhā* appeared in English, heavily edited and abridged. While such translations are useful for the general arc of the story and to see the ways in which Persian literature was adapted for Western tastes, they are unhelpful and often misleading in regard to Jāmi's language. Much research remains to be done, although three new dissertations on Jāmi's poetic influence (Ertuğrul I. Ökten, "Jāmi (817–898/1414–1492): his biography and intellectual influence in Herat" (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2007); Farah Fatima Golparvaran Shadchehr, "Abd al-Rahman Jami: 'Naqshbandi Sufi, Persian Poet'" (Columbus: The Ohio State University, 2008), Chad G. Lingwood, "Jami's 'Salaman va Absal' as an esoteric mirror for princes in its Aq Qoyunlu context" (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2009)) and the Chicago and Paris-based project "A Worldwide Literature: Jāmi (1414–92) in the Dār al-Islām and Beyond" will hopefully bring greater emphasis on Jāmi, his poetry, and its place in the literary, religious, and intellectual history of medieval Asia.

medhābhabhadrikā or *medhābhapattrikā*. In two Śāradā manuscripts, one kept in Srinagar and the other in Pune these two readings are confirmed. Either way, what could this line possibly mean? The compound itself is obscure: *medhā* (intelligence) + (*ā*)*bha* (appearance, manifestation) + *pattrikā/bhadrikā* (sheet, page/amulet). In order to understand the Sanskrit, we must turn to the Persian. Jāmī's text reads:

za taqvīm-i ħīrad behruzī-am baḥš
bar iqlīm-e sakhun firūzī-am baḥš

From the calendar of wisdom grant me an auspicious day
Grant me victory in the world of poetry

In this way the strange compound *medhābhapattrikāyāḥ* is shown to be a direct translation of *za taqvīm-i ħīrad*, "from the calendar of wisdom." This we can see the Sanskrit compound must be resolved *medhā* (wisdom)+*ābha-pattrikā* (appearance-paper, i.e., astrological chart). Once this is clarified, the equally puzzling compound *śubhavāgyogam* can be deciphered, understanding the word *yoga* to mean "astrological conjunction." Thus, the verse becomes a translation and expansion of Jāmī's Persian:

From the astronomical calendar of intelligence, grant me a wonderful astrological conjunction (*yoga*) [=occasion] for auspicious speech, through which the completion of my undertaking would bring pleasure.

Examples like this show the necessity of both a new edition of the Sanskrit as well as a close comparative reading. While I am still at an early phase in the work necessary to create a critical edition of the text, here I discuss the materials necessary for such a project, to flag the philological problems attendant to the making of a critical edition, and finally to gesture toward how such a project can nuance our understanding of language, religion, translation, and literature in elite sultanate elite spaces. This necessity is made explicit at the beginning of the *Kathākautuka*. Here, Śrīvara lays out a sort of theory on translation, in which he states Jāmī's original tale (*kathā*) was "connected to the treatises (*śāstra*) of the Muslims" (*yavanaśāstrabaddhā*). Śrīvara understands Jāmī's entire work formed by the textual and intellectual tradition of the Islamicate world. Tacitly underlying this observation is that his own telling (once he composes it in the unageing language of Sanskrit, *viracitā mayā nirjarābhāṣāyām*) is bound to a different *śāstra*, a different world-view with different expectations.

While we have seen above the importance of the Persian in establishing the meaning of the *Kathākautuka*, it is indispensable for establishing the Sanskrit text. To give another brief example, we read in Schmidt's edition (following the spacing of the Devanāgarī printing):

yadi cittam bhaved rāgavyathāhīnam na tanmanah |
tanus tatpīḍayā tyaktvā na sā mṛddhārīṇā vinā ||1.67||

While some sense could perhaps be garnered from the Sanskrit, it remains obscure. However,

the same verse reads as follows in the Kāvyaṃālā edition:

yadi cittam bhaved rāśa(?) vṛthāhīnaṃ na tanmanaḥ |
tanna satpīḍayā vyaktā na sā mṛd vāriṇā vinā ||

In the Śrīnagar manuscript, the same verse reads:

yadi cittam bhaved rāgavṛthāhīna na tanmanaḥ |
tannastatpīḍayā tyaktā na sā mṛd variṇā vinā ||

And in the Pune manuscript:

yadi cittam bhaved rāgavyathāhīnaṃ na tanmanaḥ |
tanus tatpīḍayā tyaktā na sā mṛd vāriṇā vinā ||

When compared to the Persian text, the situation perhaps becomes more complicated with an added witness:

dilī fāriḡ zi dard ‘išq, dil nīst
tan-i bī dard-e dil juz āb-u gil nīst

When taken together, these four Sanskrit witnesses when taken along with the Persian point to a solution for the problems within the readings of the editions. Further, the variations show that the root misreadings within the transmission. Finally, these factors demonstrate how difficult Śrīvara’s Sanskrit was to decipher in the context of Sanskrit literature. Firstly, it seems clear that Ed. K’s *tanna* must be corrected to *tanus*, given that the Persian word *tan* (cognate with Sanskrit *tanuḥ*) occupies exactly the same place in the line (The Srinagar *tannas* points to a mistake in the transmission, with a misreading of the Śāradā -*nu-* for -*nna-*). Ed. K’s *rāśa* can easily be emended to *rāga*, given their similarity of the *akṣaras* in the Kashmiri Śāradā script. The word *vyātha* also fits the context better and can possibly be explained by a scribal misreading of the conjunct *vṛ-* for *vyā-* and *thā* for *ṣā*. Neither *tyaktvā* nor *vyaktā* fit the context, I would suggest following the Pune manuscript and reading *tyaktā*. Further, Ed. K’s reading of *mṛdvāriṇā* (corroborated by both Srinagar and Pune) follows the sense of the Persian more closely, and makes better sense in the argument of the verses. With these arguments in mind, I would argue that the Pune Manuscript preserves the original most closely and posit that Śrīvara’s original would be translated as follows:

If a mind could exist without the agitation of passion, [then] that [would] not [be] a mind.
[If] a body [were] abandoned by the pain of it (=passion/*rāga*) [then] that is not [a body, it
is nothing but] clay without water.

Here we see a similar meaning to Jāmi’s verse:

A heart free of love’s pain is not a heart,
A body without the heart’s pain is nothing but clay and water.

This verse exemplifies Śrīvara's translational style. Telegraphic, sometimes obscure, and often crying out for comparison with the Persian original.

While these two previous examples show the importance of reading the Sanskrit along with the Persian at a granular, verse-based level, as a final example I want to show how longer portions of Jāmī's text are reworked and reimagined by Śrīvara. The at the beginning of *Yūsuf wa Zulaykhā*, Jāmī narrates why the story of Yūsuf and Zulaykhā needs to be retold and shows the reader that he is up for the task.

gaṣṣādī nāmāh-i ṭab'-i marā nāf
mu'aṭṭar kun zi mušk-am qāftā qāf
zi ṣa'ir-am ḥāmāh rā šikkar-zabān kun
zi 'ittr-am nāme rā 'anbar-faṣān kun
saḥun rā ḥūd sar-injāmī namānde-st
v-az ān nāme bajaz nāmī namānde-st
dar-in ḥam-ḥānah-i šīrīn-fasāne
namīyābam navāyī z-ān tarāne
harīfān bādah-hā ḥordand-u raftand
tahī ḥam-hā rahī kardand-u raftand
nabīnam puḥtah-ī in bazm ḥāmī
kah bāṣad bar kaf-iš z-ān bādah jāmi
biyā sāqī rahī kun šarm-sārī
zi ṣāf-u durd piš ār ānče dārī

Open the musk-bag of my work (*nāme*)
 make the entire world (*qāftā qāf*) fragrant with my musk
 Make the pen sweet-speaking through my poetry,
 Through its fragrance make my work spread ambergris.
 No end has come about for this very speech
 And yet from that poem (=the *Yūsuf and Zulaykhā*), only the name has remained.
 In this tavern full of sweetly beguiling stories
 I cannot find a single melody from that song.
 The drinking companions drank cup after cup of wine and left,
 They left the wine-jars empty and left
 I can see no beginner [in poetry/drinking] experienced enough in this feast
 In whose hand there would be a goblet of that wine.
 Come, o Cup-bearer (*sāqī*), leave aside your shyness (*šarm-sārī*)
 bring forth the [wine,] that you have, [be it] fresh or the dregs.

This selection hearkens back to specifically Persian ways of discussion poetry and the past. The

image of musk, and the scent of the musk spreading through the world as the spread of poetry and the poet's fame is a deeply Persianate image. Further the imagination of the world as a tavern and poetry as wine has a deep history in the Persian literary tradition. Alluding to previous tellings of the story of Joseph, perhaps thinking in particular of Niẓāmī (d. 1209), Jāmī evocatively portrays the desolation of the tavern after the feast, and the creation of poetry out of the fragments of an almost entirely forgotten past. To do this, Jāmī invokes the cup-bearer (*sāqī*) so important in Šūfī religious poetry to bring forth the wine of poetic inspiration, and for the tale to commence. Jāmī positions himself and his writing in a certain imaginary with deep cultural ties to Persianate past.

Such an imagination of literature and history is completely foreign to the Sanskrit literary tradition. While it might seem that Śrīvara could just skip this section (as indeed he does with other problematic and culturally specific contents like the *bismillāh*), it is necessary to in some way take into account the “newness” of the work and the necessity for undertaking the tale. Here again the *Kathākautuka*'s sly translational inventiveness comes forward. Parallel to the *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā*, Śrīvara writes his own account of the newness of his work:

sthairyam hi jagato naiva dṛśyate vacanam vinā |
śambhubhaktiyutam tac cec chobhate sādhuṇūjitam ||1.10||
puṇyam śāstrāmṛtam pītvā yātās te hi kavīśvarāḥ |
nidhāya vipulām kīrtim susthirām bhuvanatrāye ||1.11||
nāvaśiṣṭaḥ kaviḥ kaścit teṣāṃ yo 'dyatanān bhavet |
kṣamaḥ śikṣayitum svalpakāvyāśaktiyutān svayam ||1.12||
tasmād ehy adhunā kāla gatiṃ vikṣya śubhāśubhām |
kāvyaṃ yady asti te śaktir vidhātum kuru satvaram ||1.13||

10. For without words, the world never finds stability; if words are devoted towards Śambhu (=Śiva), they appear beautiful, praised by pious men.

11. For the best of poets have drunk in the holy nectar of śāstra and are gone after establishing far-reaching fame, well-established in the three worlds.

12. Out of them, not a single poet remains who would be able to instruct the poets of today who are endowed with only a small measure of poetic capacity (*kāvyāśakti*).

13. Therefore come now, O Kāla, after having seen the way, both good and bad. If you are able to bestow a poem, do it immediately.

At first glance, this section may seem to be completely different from Jāmī's text. However, a close reading of the verses show that Śrīvara is both translating and responding to the *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā*. In both passages, the poetic vision expands; Jāmī talks of the fame of poetry pervading whole world (*qāf tā qāf*) as the scope of poetry and Śrīvara positions the world of poetry as coterminous with the triple world (*bhuvanatrāyam*). Although the *Kathākautuka* does not have the same direct references to old stories that circulated previously (Persian *nāme*, *fasāne*), Śrīvara is less

metaphorical and more directly concerned with the fame of previous poets—Jāmi’s “experienced people” (Persian *puḥtah*) become explicitly “the best of poets” (Sanskrit *kaviśvarāḥ*). While following the general motif of drinking, Śrīvara portrays the past poets as having drunk of the nectar (*amṛta*) of śāstra, here meaning perhaps authoritative texts. The wine of Jāmi has been converted into non-alcoholic Sanskrit nectar. Further Śrīvara positions fame in the poets of the past, not as his desire. Yet Jāmi’s essential elements are present.

While these verses can be seen as an adaptation of Jāmi, the last verse of the selection from the *Kathākaṭuka* provides a bit of a puzzle. At one level, of all the verses it is most clearly a translation. It has an exhortation for someone to come and bring a poem (more directly in the Sanskrit, more metaphorically in Persian), there is a reference to the inspired poem as good or bad (*śubhāśubhaṃ* in the Sanskrit, *ṣāf-u durd* in Persian), and a similar embedded clause (Sanskrit “if you are able...”, “that you have” Persian). However, the question remains here who is Śrīvara addressing? The *Kāvya*mālā edition reads *kālagatiṃ*, while Schmidt reads *kālaṃ gatiṃ*. *Kālagatiṃ* seems improbable since the compound crosses the *pāda* boundary, and the adverbial accusative *kālaṃ* for a moment of time seems unlikely. Following the Persian text (and the manuscripts from Pune and Srinagar), I would propose reading *Kāla* as a vocative. Yet this still gives an unsatisfactory meaning—is it to be understood as “O Time”? An epithet of Śiva? While these are certainly possible, it also seems at least conceivable that there could be scope for emendation for some word in the vocative meaning a servant or cup-bearer. Perhaps a solution will be provided by more manuscripts and philological work. However, here what is important is the strategies for translating in an elite sultanate context.

The *Kathākaṭuka*, while striving to remain close to the original Persian, also attempted to put everything in a Hindu, specifically Śaiva milieu. Yet here the religious teaching—be it the Ṣūfi-centered Islam of Jāmi or the Śiva-worshipping Hinduism of Śrīvara—is not the point. The *Kathākaṭuka* offers a vision of the *Yūsuf wa Zulayḥā* that presents itself as self-consciously literary while still supported by religious motifs and ideas. Although the text itself poses many difficult philological problems and poses various methodological questions, untangling this difficult text will shed light on an understudied area of South Asian history and culture. While translations from Sanskrit to Persian in the Mughal court have begun to get the attention that they deserve, the story of Sanskrit literature in pre-Mughal Sultanate court spaces has barely begun to be told.

The *Kathākaṭuka* uses the elite transregional language of Sanskrit rooted in a specific Kashmiri historical moment. In such a way, his innovative act of translation offers a new imagination of Sanskrit. Śrīvara openly and self-consciously recognizes the distance between works bound by different cultural assumptions, in attempting to translate, he came to the limit of what can be said in Sanskrit. The *Kathākaṭuka* directly confronts Persian literary and religious expectations, and in so doing creates its own web of adaptations, equivalences, and omissions. Śrīvara’s language pushes Sanskrit to the very edge of its cosmopolitan world, enriched, enlivened and challenged by Islamicate forms and ideas. In the conversation of text and translation, telling and retelling, that the *Kathākaṭuka* becomes meaningful within the context of Sultanate Kashmir.

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A Sacred Shrine Without a Saint's Shrouded Body

Hagiographical Politics Over the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā in Srinagar in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

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Keywords: Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā, Srinagar, *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr*, *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*, *waqf* custodianship

1. Introduction
2. Historical and Sectarian Background
3. Information about the Ḥānqāh up to the end of the fifteenth century
4. Sectarian Factionalism in the Sixteenth Century: Claims for Custodianship
5. Conclusion
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1. Introduction

The Jhelum River, traditionally known as the Vitastā, flows from southeast to northwest through the Kashmir Valley, meandering numerous times before flowing into the city of Srinagar. It joins a canal at Mārīsaṅgama, changes direction to flow due north, and then enters Srinagar's old city. At a bridge called the Zaina Kadal, on the right bank just before the Jhelum changes direction to flow west, there is a Kashmiri-style wooden building. This building is the famous “Khanqah-e-Moula” (hereinafter “Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā” as per the academic transliteration), which Kashmiri Muslims still visit to reconfirm and reinforce their piety. Although the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā is now commonly accepted by lay Muslims to be a mosque, as the term “*ḥānqāh*” suggests, it was originally a Ṣūfī lodge where members of a Ṣūfī order or brotherhood (*ṭarīqa*) gathered to perform spiritual and ascetic practices. The Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā is widely believed to be associated with a famous Ṣūfī and productive author named Sayyid 'Alī Hamadānī (1314–85), and was regarded as a religious center for Muslims during the Islamization of Kashmir, as it is often referred to as the second Ka'ba in a Persian hagiography from the sixteenth century [Elias 2000: 408–9]. Even today, many Kashmiri Muslims hold such a view.



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* This paper is a revised and updated version of the author's Japanese article from 2015 published in *Sundai Historical Review* 154: 51–90. The author was motivated to make their argument readable to English readers by a Facebook post by Dean Accardi, dated March 11, 2024, which introduced Shakir Mir's online article published on *thewire.in* (<https://thewire.in/history/how-kashmirs-medieval-persian-tarikh-were-mined-for-modern-politics>). The author is grateful to them both for a fruitful discussion in the thread of the aforementioned post.

For the rulers of Muslim dynasties in the post-Mongol Persian cosmopolis,¹ the shrines of saints were of great value, and they willingly patronized them. As Azfar Moin highlighted, imperial engagement with the graves of saints was one of the most significant features of the political culture in Eastern Islamdom after 1258, when the last 'Abbasid caliph was executed [Moin 2018]. Relevant examples are known, such as the Safavid dynasty's patronage of the shrine of Šayḥ Šafi al-Dīn (d. 1334) in Ardabil [e.g., Watabe et al. 2022] and the early Mughal Empire's patronage of the Čištī shrines in Ajmer, Delhi, and other places. Moin calls such a political culture "a new form of shrine-centered sovereignty" [Moin 2015: 496]. In addition, when several rival polities each had their own engagement with shrines of saints, one polity sometimes desecrated the shrines associated with the rival polity [Moin 2015].

The importance of saint shrines in Muslim society is primarily explained by the bodies of saints being buried there, and Muslim saints are believed to have the authority to intercede (*šafā'a*) with God. Muslims want to be buried in the vicinity of these shrines in the hope that the dead saints will intercede for them on Judgment Day [Hamada 2020: 112–7], while visitors expect the saints' intercession so that God will make their wishes come true. In the post-Mongol era, the authority of saints was recognized to the extent that it guaranteed the legitimacy of the dynasties.

However, one cannot immediately conclude that the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā came to be regarded as a symbolic structure in Kashmiri Muslim society by the same logic as the "saint shrine cult" in the Persian cosmopolis because no bodies were buried. 'Alī Hamadānī is well known to have died on his way back to Central Asia from Kashmir in 1385, and his body was transferred to Kūlāb in Ḥuttalān (present-day Southwestern Tajikistan) [Böwering 1985]. His son Muḥammad Hamadānī (d. 1450), who also visited Kashmir and was active during the sixth Šāhmīrid Sulṭān Sikandar's period (r. 1389–1413), was buried there with his father. If saints' bodies were the central element of the shrine-centered political and religious culture, then the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā's center would be empty.

How did the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā come to be recognized as a symbolic structure in Kashmiri Muslim society? Persian sources from the sixteenth century indicate that 'Alī Hamadānī was a key figure in Kashmir's Islamization [Elias 2000] and the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā is his legacy in the region. When and how were these narratives formed? The author suggests that the Nūrbahūšīya's separation in 1423 from the Kubrawīya, to which 'Alī Hamadānī belonged, led to the creation of a new style of hagiographical narratives about 'Alī Hamadānī. These narratives, which originated in Central Asia, were later brought to Kashmir. The rivalry and contest for legitimacy between the Nūrbahūšīya and non-Nūrbahūšīya groups were embedded in them, including the evaluation of the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā. Both sides sometimes omit inconvenient information, instead presenting their own unique accounts of the Ḥānqāh. However, it is difficult to take such information as historical fact when one analyzes it according to the procedures of source criticism.

In this paper, the author explores the sources relevant to the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā produced

¹ For the concept of the Persian cosmopolis, see [Eaton and Wagoner 2014] and [Eaton 2018].

in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and aims to demonstrate how the Nūrbah̄šīya and non-Nūrbah̄šīya groups elevated the Ḥānqāh, claiming to be the inheritors of ‘Alī Hamadānī’s legacy.



Image: The Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā, Shamswari, Srinagar
Photographed by Satoshi OGURA on March 5, 2024

2. Historical and Sectarian Background

2.1. The Nūrbah̄šīya and its enemies

The Persian hagiographies that contain references to the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā, which this paper deals with, must be analyzed with attention to the historical and sectarian contexts of the Nūrbah̄šīya’s separation from the Kubrawīya² in Ḥuttalān in 1423 and the subsequent rivalry between them. This sectarian antagonism was brought from Central Asia to sixteenth-century Kashmir, and the author claims that it contributed to the creation of the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā narratives through the composition of Persian hagiographies. Therefore, this section provides an overview of the foundation of the Nūrbah̄šīya, the appearance of opposing descriptions between the Kubrawīya and the Nūrbah̄šīya, the Nūrbah̄šīya’s arrival in Kashmir and Šams al-Dīn ‘Irāqī’s

² It should be noted that the term “Kubrawīya” does not appear in the works by early “Kubrawī” Šūfis such as ‘Alā al-Dawla Simnānī (d. 1336) and Ja’far Badaḥšī. When we call those who belonged to the *silsilas* descended from Najm al-Dīn Kubrā up to Ishāq Ḥuttalānī “Kubrawī Šūfis,” this definition is a retrospective projection of the *ṭarīqa* identity formed by the later generations.

(d. 1526) missionary activity in the Kashmir Valley, and the formation of sectarian antagonism between the Nūrbah̄šīya and anti-Nūrbah̄šīya in sixteenth-century Kashmir.³ Excellent studies have already been conducted on these issues by Devin DeWeese, Jamal Elias, Shahzad Bashir, and Wolfgang Holzwarth [Elias 2000; DeWeese 1988; DeWeese 1999; Bashir 2003; Holzwarth 1997].

Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh, a proclaimer of messianism and the founder of the Nūrbah̄šīya, was born on Muḥarram 27, 795/December 13, 1392, in Sāwījān, a small village in Quhistān. In 1416, Muḥammad was recruited into a Kubrawī ḥānqāh in Ḥuttalān, from which Ḥwāja Ishāq Ḥuttalānī (d. 817/1424) ran his Ṣūfī circle as a principal successor of ‘Alī Hamadānī. When Muḥammad became a disciple of Ḥuttalānī, he already firmly believed in his spiritual position as a seal of sainthood (*ḥātam-i walāyat*). One day, one of his associates at Ḥuttalānī’s ḥānqāh dreamed that heavenly light shone on Muḥammad. Hearing the disciple’s report, Ḥuttalānī gave Muḥammad the title “Nūrbah̄š” (giver of light).

In 1423, Nūrbah̄š proclaimed himself the *mahdī* (the person rightly guided by God, or messiah) and, with his master Ishāq Ḥuttalānī, initiated agitation and preparations for military action against the third Timurid ruler Šāhruḥ Mīrzā (r. 1409–47). His aim was to establish a theocratic state as an Imām. Sulṭān Bāyazīd, the local Timurid governor of Ḥuttalān, soon quelled the rebellion and captured Nūrbah̄š and Ḥuttalānī. Nūrbah̄š was sent to Šāhruḥ Mīrzā’s court and imprisoned, while Ḥuttalānī was executed the following year in Balkh along with his brother.

After his release, Nūrbah̄š continued his missionary work in Lorestan and Kurdistan among other places; however, he was arrested again by Šāhruḥ Mīrzā when the latter conducted a military expedition to Azerbaijan. Nūrbah̄š was forced to publicly disavow his claim to being the *mahdī* at the Friday Mosque in Herat. Following his last release in 1437, he lived in Gilan for approximately 10 years before managing a ḥānqāh in Suliqān near Rayy. During his time in Suliqān, he produced most of his writings until his death in 1464. After Nūrbah̄š’s death, the *ṭarīqa* was maintained in Iran by his elder son Šāh Qāsim Fayḍbah̄š (d. 1513–4) and others. The spiritual lineage descended from him survived in Rayy until the time of Šāh Ṭahmāsp (r. 1524–76), the second Safavid ruler [Bashir 2003: 189–91; Ogura 2022b]. Moreover, notable disciples of Nūrbah̄š, such as Šams al-Dīn Lāhijī (d. 1506–7) and Ḥusām al-Dīn Bidlīsī (d. 1494–5), established Nūrbah̄šīya circles in several cities in West Asia.

Mīr Šams al-Dīn ‘Irāqī (d. 1526), who introduced the Nūrbah̄šīya to Kashmir, was a disciple of Fayḍbah̄š and a grand disciple of Nūrbah̄š. ‘Irāqī came to Kashmir twice for missionary work. His first visit was in 1484, during the late years of Ḥasanšāh, the tenth Sulṭān of the Šāmīrid dynasty, as an envoy of Sulṭān Ḥusayn Mīrzā (r. 1469–1506), the Timurid ruler in Herat. At the time, Fayḍbah̄š was staying in the Timurid court because Sulṭān Ḥusayn Mīrzā held him in high esteem; yet, some Sunni-oriented intellectuals in the court, including ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 1492) and ‘Alīšīr Nawā’ī (d. 1501), were hostile toward him. On this first visit, ‘Irāqī stayed in Kashmir until 1491. After returning to Iran, he lived in Durušt near Rayy with Fayḍbah̄š. Later,

³ The following paragraphs are chiefly based on my *EI3* entries [Ogura 2022a; Ogura 2022b].

he returned to Kashmir in 1503 at his master's request. Between then and his death in 1526, he conducted missionary activities centered on the Zadībal quarter in Srinagar and supposedly gained many followers. It seems that he deployed the strategy of emphasizing his position as a spiritual descendant of 'Alī Hamadānī to spread the Nūrbah̄shīya circle in Kashmir while, as Shahzad Bashir suggested, he seemed antagonistic to Kubrawī Šūfīs in Kashmir who had managed the ṭarīqa since the time of 'Alī Hamadānī's son Muḥammad Hamadānī [Bashir 2003: 214–9]. In addition, the Nūrbah̄shīya's messianic doctrine caused an anti-Nūrbah̄shīya faction to emerge among Kashmir's Sunni-oriented Muslims. Whereas the leaders of the Čak (Skt. Cakra) and Rayna (Skt. Rājānaka, i.e., Candra clan) clans cooperated with 'Irāqī, members of the Māgrī (Skt. Mārgapati) clan, who were political rivals of the former two clans, were hostile to the Nūrbah̄shīya.

The Nūrbah̄shīya's period of flourishing in Kashmir was disrupted by Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥaydar Duḡlāt (d. 1550),⁴ who conquered Kashmir in 948/1541 and ruled for approximately 10 years through the puppet Sulṭān Nāzukšah (second reign 1540–51). Mirzā Ḥydar hastened the Sunnitization of Kashmiri Muslims after receiving a legal opinion from some 'ulamā' (religious scholars) in Hindustan, who considered the Nūrbah̄shīya to be heretics [TR: 627–9]. He demolished the Ḥānqāh in Zadībal and executed 'Irāqī's son and successor Dāniyāl in 1550.

The Nūrbah̄shīya in Kashmir was revived under the Čak dynasty (1555–86). Mughal sources indicate that the community persisted into the first quarter of the seventeenth century. However, after this period, the Nūrbah̄shīya were assimilated into Kashmir's Twelver Shiite community.

2.2. Making of Šūfī narratives through hostility between the Nūrbah̄shīya and anti-Nūrbah̄shīya

Just before Nūrbah̄š's proclamation of being a *mahdī* and the start of the agitation, a conflict occurred between Nūrbah̄š and 'Abd Allāh Barzišābādī (d. 1468), another of Ḥuttalānī's leading disciples, over the position of Ishāq Ḥuttalānī's successor at his ḥānqāh. Ultimately, Barzišābādī lost the fight and left Ishāq's ḥānqāh. Due to this event, the chain of master–disciple relationships that followed Barzišābādī was often called the Ḍahabīya, after the Arabic verb ḍahaba, which means 'to go' or 'to leave' [DeWeese 1988: 55; Bashir 2003: 49].

The hagiographers who belonged or were sympathetic to one of the two groups—namely the Nūrbah̄shīya and the Ḍahabīya, respectively—provide divergent descriptions of the chain of events. For example, the *Rawḍāt al-jinān wa jannāt al-janān* (completed around 1582) by Ḥāfīz Ḥusayn Karbalā'ī and the *Majālis al-mu'minīn* by Nūr Allāh Šūštārī (d. 1610) offer different views on who was responsible for the rebellion in 1423. The differences between these accounts likely stem from the succession conflict of Ishāq Ḥuttalānī between Nūrbah̄š and his rival Barzišābādī, as well as from the authors' factional affiliations. Karbalā'ī's father was connected to Barzišābādī's spiritual lineage, while Šūštārī was linked to the Shiraz circle of the Nūrbah̄shīya. The *Rawḍāt al-jinān* recounts that after Ishāq Ḥuttalānī appointed Barzišābādī as his successor, Nūrbah̄š and his followers pressured Ḥuttalānī to recognize Nūrbah̄š's messianic status. Due to Ḥuttalānī's

⁴ For the year of his death, see [Ogura 2024].

advanced age and impaired judgment, he consented—despite Barzišābādī's objections [RJ: II 243–50]. Conversely, the *Majālīs al-mu'minīn* states that Ḥuttalānī named Nūrbah̄š as his successor and encouraged him to rebel against Šāhruḥ Mīrzā in anticipation that the mahdī would vanquish tyrants [MM: II 143–8]. Karbalā'ī portrays Nūrbah̄š as the instigator of the rebellion, whereas Šūshtarī attributes the responsibility to Ḥuttalānī.⁵

As in this example, Persian hagiographies on the Šūfis of the Kubrawīya and the Nūrbah̄šīya, which were compiled from the mid-fifteenth century onward, inserted new narratives to assert the legitimacy of both sides. One feature is that both the Kubrawīya and the Nūrbah̄šīya narrate episodes concerning 'Alī Hamadānī's activities in Kashmir. As is known, the earliest text to mention Hamadānī's visit to Kashmir is the *Manqabat al-jawāhir*, which was completed in the mid-fifteenth century.

Ḥaydar Badaḥšī, the text's author, was a disciple of Barzišābādī, and his *Manqabat al-jawāhir* is characteristic compared with the *Ḥulāṣat al-manāqib* by Ja'far Badaḥšī, the preceding hagiography about 'Alī Hamadānī that was compiled soon after his death in 1385 [DeWeese 1999: 126].⁶ As is well known, the *Ḥulāṣat al-manāqib* contains no information about Hamadānī's activity in Kashmir, while the *Manqabat al-jawāhir* contains three episodes about his contributions to Kashmir's Islamization, including one about the construction of the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā, as we will see below. DeWeese highlights that the *Manqabat al-jawāhir* is characterized by its repeated emphasis on the solidarity of the Kubrawīya as the best path to God. This is a distinct characteristic of the *Manqabat al-jawāhir* compared with the *Ḥulāṣat al-manāqib*. For instance, the *Ḥulāṣat al-manāqib* depicts Hamadānī as a model of the Šūfī master–disciple relationship and simply states that he received *ijāzas* (licenses for training disciples) from an anonymous 33 prominent Šūfis without discussing his affiliation to the Kubrawīya [DeWeese 1999: 139]. By contrast, the *Manqabat al-jawāhir* stresses that Hamadānī—rather exclusively—belonged to the “solid order” descended from Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 1221). Ḥaydar Badaḥšī states the following:

“Just as Prophethood is completed in the lineage of the friend of God, Ibrāhīm —peace be upon him—, so sainthood and [Divine] gnosis are perfected in this path (*ṭarīq*). Everyone who sets foot upon the Kubrawī path will certainly become a voyager in the way of *ṭarīqat* and *ḥaqīqat* [...] [Manqabat: 441b–2a; DeWeese 1999: 141]”⁷

A possible reason for this change in narrative style was a sense of rivalry among Barzišābādī's circle against another branch, namely the Nūrbah̄šīya. That is, the *Manqabat al-jawāhir* was addressed to Kubrawī disciples of his circle to claim that Barzišābādī's *silsila* was the authentic

⁵ Regarding the rebellion in 1423, DeWeese, on the one hand, suggested that the *Rawḍāt al-jināns* account more reliable and adopts the theory that Nūrbah̄š led the Messianic proclamation and preparations for the rebellion [DeWeese 1988: 54–60]. Bashir, on the other hand, by examining Nūrbah̄š's own writings, has pointed out that Nūrbah̄š had no intention of establishing a secular authority and considers Iṣḥāq Ḥuttalānī to have been the leading figure in the series of events [Bashir 2003: 50–4].

⁶ For Ḥaydar Badaḥšī's representation of 'Alī Hamadānī, see also [DeWeese 2014].

⁷ “čunānča nubuwwat pas nasl-i Ibrāhīm-i ḥalīl-i Allāh ta'ālā 'alay-hi al-salām tamām ast, hamān sabīl walāyat wa ma'rifat dar in ṭarīq ḥatam šuda'ast. har ki pāy dar ṭarīq-i Kubrawīya dar ārad, albatta sālīk-i rāh-i ṭarīqat wa ḥaqīqat ḥwāhad šud.”

Kubrawīya and inherited Hamadānī's legacy, implicitly denying the authority of the Nūrbah̄shīya.

Turning one's attention to sixteenth-century Kashmir, one finds that the Nūrbah̄shīya–anti-Nūrbah̄shīya hostility caused the divergent descriptions of the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā. Both sides claimed to inherit the Ḥānqāh as a legacy of 'Alī Hamadānī in Kashmir. The main Persian sources discussed in this paper are the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* by Sayyid 'Alī and the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* by 'Alī Kašmīrī.

Sayyid 'Alī's *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* consists of a record of historical events in Kashmir from the 1350s to the 1550s and hagiographical narratives of the Kubrawī Ṣūfīs and R̥ṣī saints. The text begins with 'Alī Hamadānī's disciples' visit to Kashmir during the reign of Šihāb al-Dīn (r. 1355–73), the fourth Šāhmīrid sulṭān. The author's father was Sayyid Muḥammad, and his grandfather's name was the same as that of the author (i.e., Sayyid 'Alī). Sayyid Muḥammad was married to Sulṭān Nāzūkšāh's sister, and the Sulṭān family and Sayyid 'Alī were related by marriage.

The following three theories have been proposed in previous studies regarding Sayyid 'Alī's origins, although a conclusion remains elusive: First, Mohibbul Hasan and Zubaida Jan propose that Sayyid 'Alī was one of the Bayhaqī Sayyids [Hasan 2002: 7; TSA: xxvi]. However, as Abdul Qayyum Rafiqi highlights, Sayyid 'Alī wrote critically of the Sayyid family's despotic activities at the court [Rafiqi 2011: 10]. Second, Mohammad Ishaq Khan proposes that Sayyid 'Alī was a descendant of Sayyid Tāj al-Dīn, who was a nephew of 'Alī Hamadānī, and that he visited Kashmir before the latter [Khan 2002: 243–4]. However, the genealogy from Sayyid Tāj al-Dīn to Sayyid 'Alī that Khan proposes⁸ is not at all supported by primary sources, and it gives the impression that Khan simply connected the names of people who appear in historical sources. Lastly, Muḥammad A'zam Dīdahmarī, the author of the *Wāqī'āt-i Kašmīr* (completed in 1747), proposes that he was a member of the Māgrī clan [Rafiqi 2011: 8]. However, this is also not proven by primary sources.

Although conclusions cannot be drawn about his origins, one can infer his political and religious tendencies to a certain extent. First, Sayyid 'Alī supported Muḥammadšāh when two royal families ruled in parallel from 1486 to 1538. Second, Sayyid 'Alī's father, Sayyid Muḥammad, and he both had a strong pro-Sunni inclination [Bashir 2003: 217], and while they praised the Ṣūfīs of the Kubrawīya, they did not hide their hatred for the Nūrbah̄shīya. Indeed, they were always friendly to Mīrzā Ḥaydar, who effectively controlled Kashmir in the 1540s and suppressed the Nūrbah̄shīya during that time. Therefore, we can regard the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* as one of the representative texts of the anti-Nūrbah̄shīya side.

The *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* is a hagiography of the Nūrbah̄shīya that mainly deals with the life of a master of the Nūrbah̄shīya, Mīr Šams al-Dīn 'Irāqī.⁹ The author, 'Alī Kašmīrī, entered the Nūrbah̄shīya

⁸ Sayyid Tāj al-Dīn → Sayyid Ḥasan Bahādur → Sayyid Kamāl al-Dīn → Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn → Sayyid Ni'mat Allāh → Sayyid Šams al-Dīn → Sayyid 'Alī → Sayyid Muḥammad → Sayyid 'Alī [Khan 2002: 243–4].

⁹ In my 2015 Japanese paper, I referred to a manuscript of the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*, which is among Pīr 'Awn 'Alī Šāh's (d. 1991) private collection in Khaplu. The author received a xerox copy of this manuscript from Gulām Ḥasan Ḥasanū Nūrbah̄shī when carrying out fieldwork in Khaplu in October 2008. In 2016 and 2018 then, Gulām Rasūl Jān, former director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies of the University of Kashmir, published a critical edition and Urdu translation of the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* in two volumes. Jān's edition employs Pīr 'Awn 'Alī Šāh's manuscript as the basis and its quality is admirable. The author changed the reference from the manuscript to his edition in this paper. Besides, Kashinath Pandit published an English translation of the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* in 2009 [Pandit 2009]. Pandit's translation is so rough and rife with

through his father Ḥalīl Allāh and received instruction from 'Irāqī himself. The author notes that he first met 'Irāqī when he was five years old at the Ḥānqāh in Zadībal [Tuḥfat: II 66–71]. Since it is mentioned elsewhere that this Ḥānqāh was completed in 1507 [Tuḥfat: II 68; Bashir 2003: 227], one can presume that 'Irāqī and 'Alī Kašmīrī differed considerably in age. As the text references Mīrẓā Ḥaydar, Holzwarth estimates that the book was completed in around 1552 [Holzwarth 1997: 20]. Needless to say, the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* is a pro-Nūrbah̄shīya source.

In the following sections, the author discusses information about the Ḥānqāh from the fifteenth century onward.

3. Information about the Ḥānqāh up to the end of the fifteenth century

3.1. Construction

When and how was the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā constructed? Jonarāja's *Rājatarāṅgīnī*, one of the most reliable sources for the history of Kashmir from the end of the fourth century to the first half of the fifteenth century, does not record any information about its construction. After Jonarāja's death in 1459, his disciple and successor Śrīvara (d. after 1505), who continued the historiography of the Śāhmīrid dynasty, related an incident in which the Hindus damaged a *ḥānqāh* during the reign of the ninth sultān Ḥaydaršāh (r. 1470–2). According to Walter Slaje's latest edition of Śrīvara's *Zainatarāṅgīnī*,¹⁰ it was Ḥasan Sayyid's *ḥānqāh* that was damaged by the Hindus. It is highly likely that the Ḥasan Sayyid referred to here is Sayyid Ḥasan, the leader of the Bayhaqī Sayyids, who are discussed later. If Sayyid Ḥasan Bayhaqī was in possession of the custodianship of the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā for some reason during the reign of Ḥaydaršāh, it would not be unnatural for Śrīvara to record this. If so, then this reference by Śrīvara is the earliest reference to the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā in sources compiled in Kashmir. However, no proof exists that Sayyid Ḥasan's *Ḥānqāh* is the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā.

The earliest known source to mention the construction of the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā is Ḥaydar Badaḥshī's *Manqabat al-jawāhir*, which was introduced in section 2. This Persian hagiography contains three episodes about 'Alī Hamadānī's visit to Kashmir, two of which contain references to the Ḥānqāh; however, the description of its construction differs between the two. In the first episode, it is described as follows:

He ('Alī Hamadānī) he built a *ḥānqāh* looking like the highest heaven at the place named Mātā Sarasvatī on the bank of Vitastājī in the *maḥalla* of 'Alā' al-Dīnpura. This *ḥānqāh* is called under the name of "Dargāh-i haḍrat-i Šāh Hamadān" or "Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā" in Kashmir. All Muslims perform prayers every morning and evening at the place. [Manqabat: 347a; DeWeese 1999: 152 (slightly modified by the author)]

misunderstandings that a reader cannot imagine the original Persian text relying on the translation. In this paper, the author does not refer to [Pandit 2009].

¹⁰ Here, I follow Slaje, who calls the first two cantos of Śrīvara's history "*Zainatarāṅgīnī*" and cantos three and four "*Rājatarāṅgīnī*" [Slaje 2005b].

Interestingly, this Persian hagiography compiled in Central Asia mentions the names of places and a river in Srinagar, namely ‘Alā’ al-Dīnpura, Mātā Sarasvatī, and Vitastā. However, the content of this episode, in which ‘Alī Hamadānī himself built the Ḥānqāh, contradicts the second episode. Furthermore, of the three episodes about Hamadānī’s visit to Kashmir, only this one does not include any information about the narrator. It also appears not to have been accepted by the Persian histories and hagiographies compiled in later periods.¹¹

The second episode was reported by two of ‘Alī Hamadānī’s disciples, namely Qiwām al-Dīn Badaḥšī and Ishāq Ḥuttalānī. Hamadānī dreamed that the Prophet Muḥammad told him to go to Kashmir and convert its people to Islam. However, his disciples hesitated to go due to the difficulty of the journey and because the people of Kashmir were all infidels. Hamadānī was firm in his resolve, and they eventually departed. During the journey, they encountered a lion and heard a rumor of the existence of a cannibal demon who desires a man, four ṣā‘ of alcohol, and a basket of nan bread each day. Qiwām al-Dīn further states the following:

“When we came near that kingdom, we realized that there was no smell of Islam and *īmān* in that kingdom. When we reached the city [of Srinagar] [f. 420b], there were idol temples everywhere instead of mosques. When we reached the place of that demon, there was also an idol temple. [‘Alī Hamadānī] ordered Qiwām al-Dīn to call *aḏān*. When I called *aḏān*, I saw that one person appeared. He started weeping and told: ‘O great Sayyid! I am imposed a great amount of tax! If I leave this place, it would be better (i.e., the Muslim ruler was satisfied with imposing tax instead of accelerating conversion).’ His Holiness the Sayyid got angry. He grabbed the person and made him a disciple. He appointed the person as a servant (*ḥādīm*) of that place. Possibly he is still the servant. After that, all people at the place got the honor of Islam. The emperor of that place also became a disciple. They destroyed the idol temple and set a platform at the place and performed a *namāz* upon the platform. People came to [the platform] and became Muslims... [Manqabat: 420a–b]”

In this episode, ‘Alī Hamadānī is said to have only built a platform for prayer in the place where the Ḥānqāh now stands. As we will see later, Persian sources compiled in the sixteenth century and the so-called *waqf* document of the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā mention that Muḥammad Hamadānī, the son of ‘Alī Hamadānī, built the Ḥānqāh structure on the platform that his father had set up when the son visited Kashmir. One can assume that this episode was more believable to the people of Kashmir at the time. First, let us examine Sayyid ‘Alī’s statement:

In the year AH 798 (October 16, 1395 to October 4, 1396), Sulṭān Sikandar started building the Ḥānqāh which Divine favors appear. The construction completed in the year AH 799 (October 5, 1396 to September 23, 1397). The place where His Holiness, the Sayyid, Mīr Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī sat was incorporated into a corner of the Ḥānqāh. It became

¹¹ Incidentally, the claim that a Hindu temple once existed in this location based solely on the mention of the place name Mātā Sarasvatī is a weak argument.

the place of doing *ṭawāf* (walking around seven times in a counterclockwise direction) for people regardless of high or low status. After the completion, His Holiness Sayyid Muḥammad Hamadānī gave a ruby from Badaḥṣhān to Sulṭān Sikandar as a blessing [TSA: 16–17].

Like Sayyid ‘Alī’s *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr*, the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* also claims that ‘Alī Hamadānī set up a platform on which Muḥammad Hamadānī built the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā structure. ‘Alī Kaśmīrī states the following:

His Holiness, Amīr Sayyid Muḥammad Hamadānī —May his secret be purified—arranged to build a Ḥānqāh at the place where his magnificent father (‘Alī Hamadānī) performed prostration and *ṣalāh*. He built a monastery on the clean platform (*ṣuffa*) of His Holiness (‘Alī Hamadānī). After the completion of that splendid edifice, he purchased two flourished villages named Trāl and Wačī from the fortune emperor (Sulṭān Sikandar) with his own money and made [the two villages] *waqf* assets of the sacred edifice...[*Tuḥfat*: II 190].

The *Bahāristān-i šāhī*, a Persian history of the Kashmir region that was compiled in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, also includes an episode almost identical to that of the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* [BS: 35a–36a]. Whatever the actual history, one can safely assume that the Muslims of sixteenth-century Kashmir widely accepted that the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā was built after a platform was first constructed by ‘Alī Hamadānī before a building was later constructed on top of it by his son Muḥammad Hamadānī.

Why does the view of the second episode seem to be accepted as more reliable? For this, three reasons can be provided. First, Jonarāja’s *Rājatarangīnī*, a contemporary eye-witness source, does not record the arrival of ‘Alī Hamadānī in Kashmir at all. By contrast, Jonarāja states that Muḥammad Hamadānī had a close relationship with Sulṭān Sikandar [JRT: 573–4], which suggests that he was a more impressive figure in the court than his father. The sixteenth-century chronicler and hagiographer of Kashmir knew, directly or indirectly, of Jonarāja’s reference to Muḥammad Hamadānī and accepted the view that he had the Ḥānqāh built on the platform.

Second, the view that the Ḥānqāh was built in stages by the father and son could have reminded people of the construction process of the Ka‘ba in Mecca at the time. According to Qur’ān 2: 125–7, God first designated a place of worship for Abraham, and then Abraham and his son Ishmael built the Ka‘ba. In the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*, the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā is often described as the second Ka‘ba, probably because it was thought to have been constructed using a similar process to the Ka‘ba.

However, in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*, Šams al-Dīn ‘Irāqī expresses a complex attitude toward the view that the Ḥānqāh was built by Muḥammad Hamadānī. In this hagiography, he writes the following:

“His Holiness Amīr Sayyid ‘Alī did not built the Ḥānqāh-i Amīriya Hamadāniya. After His Holiness (‘Alī Hamadānī), when his beloved son, His Holiness, Amīr Sayyid Muḥammad Hamadānī —May peace be upon the two—came to this kingdom [of Kashmir], he built

the Ḥānqāh on the platform where was His Holiness's (ʿAlī Hamadānī) place for *ṣalāh*. Amīr Sayyid Muḥammad Hamadānī had not aged more than three or four during his great father's lifetime, and after his father's death, not only he did not bow his head to His Holiness, the axis of horizons, Ḥwāja Ishāq [Ḥuttalānī]'s teaching and instruction until he got matured. Besides, on account of being intimate with demons (*ṣayāṭīn*)¹² and temptation by devils, he chose the way of opposition to and contention with His Holiness Ḥwāja Ishāq. Due to this opposition and contention, he left his birthplace and homeland and fell into this land. No one among his father's successors (*ḥulafāʾ*) was in front of him and he did not have the basic knowledge of seekers and ascetics [belonging to the Kubrawīya]. Consequently, the Ḥānqāh which he ordered to build could not be in accordance with the rules of seekers and men of *ṭarīqa*, because when I (ʿIrāqī) visited this Ḥānqāh for the first time, I saw that a room for seclusion (*ḥalwat*) was lightly built in the inner court. I think that Amīr Muḥammad Hamadānī's servants did not know the basic knowledge of forty-days seclusion (*arbaʿīn*) and manners of seekers. Chiefly he ordered carpenters and joiners: 'Build a Ḥānqāh' and carpenters in all ways built according to their views..."[*Tuḥfat*: I 524–5]

In this quotation, Šams al-Dīn ʿIrāqī makes the following claim: Muḥammad Hamadānī was too young to receive instruction from ʿAlī Hamadānī when he was alive, and he arrived in Kashmir without receiving much instruction from Ḥwāja Ishāq Ḥuttalānī. In other words, ʿIrāqī was skeptical about Muḥammad Hamadānī's quality as a Šūfī master. The author suggests that the background to this claim is the discontinuity in the chain of the master–disciple relationship (*silsila*) between Muḥammad Hamadānī and ʿIrāqī. Although there is a master–disciple chain between ʿAlī Hamadānī and ʿIrāqī via Ishāq Ḥuttalānī, Muḥammad Nūrbah̄š, and Šāh Qāsim Fayḍbah̄š, Nūrbah̄š and ʿIrāqī had no connection to Muḥammad Hamadānī. Consequently, for ʿIrāqī, Muḥammad Hamadānī was no more than ʿAlī Hamadānī's son. As Jamal Elias highlights, the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* describes not only Nūrbah̄š's sainthood but also ʿAlī Hamadānī's quality as the exemplar of Kashmir's Islamization. Moreover, ʿIrāqī is depicted as the person who will continue ʿAlī Hamadānī's legacy in Kashmir and continue its Islamization [Elias 2000: 406–9]. In this passage, while acknowledging that it was Muḥammad Hamadānī who built the Ḥānqāh, the author asserts that this is why the Ḥānqāh still has its shortcomings and implies that ʿIrāqī can make the Ḥānqāh even better by intervening in its management and renovation.

3.2. The *waqf* document

The third reason why several sixteenth-century sources offer similar views on the Ḥānqāh's construction process is that the authors likely all referred to the *waqf* document of the Ḥānqāh-i muʿallā. A copy of this document was kept in the Jawahar Museum in Etawah, Uttar Pradesh. Radha

¹² This probably means the faction supporting Barzišābādī, who was competing with Nūrbah̄š for the position of successor in Ḥuttalānī's *ḥānqāh*.

Krishan Parmu first introduced a copy of this document in his monograph with a poor-quality photo, a handwritten copy, and an English translation [Parmu: 1969: 467–75]. Later, the museum's collection was transferred to the Maulana Azad Library at Aligarh Muslim University. While the author was studying at the university and researching the manuscript collection in the library in 2011, the person in charge at the time, namely Dr. Ata Khursheed, showed the author this copy. Currently, it is marked with the press mark number Jawahar Farsi Alif 1. At the end of this paper, a transcription of this copy is provided along with an English translation, where the author has corrected any mistakes and unclear points that remained in [Parmu 1969].

According to Abdul Qayyum Rafiqi, the authenticity of this document has not been verified, considering that the text of this copy was transferred from the *Futūḥāt-i Kubrawīya*, a Persian hagiography compiled in the mid-eighteenth century [Rafiqi 2009: xlii].¹³ Rafiqi's doubts are reasonable. First, the term *waqf* itself was uncommon in premodern South Asia. Under the Muslim dynasties of South Asia, *madad-i ma'āṣ* (aid for subsistence) was the term for a land grant system that functioned like *waqf*. If Muḥammad Hamadānī drafted this document, then one might think that its terminology would also follow that of Central Asia, not that of South Asia. However, this copy uses the word *pargana*, which is unique to South Asia, as the regional administrative unit. Although the word *pargana* appears as an administrative unit in Šams Sirāj Afīf's *Tārīḥ-i Fīrūz Šāhī* [Davies 2012], *qaṣba* was generally used as a regional administrative unit during the Tuḡluq dynasty, and the relationship between *pargana* and *qaṣba* is unclear. Furthermore, the Šāhmīrid dynasty was politically independent of the Delhi sultanates, and it is difficult to verify whether a common South Asian administrative unit was used. Aurel Stein even speculates that *pargana* was introduced in Kashmir during the Mughal period [Stein 1900: II 437, n. 5]. Second, no reference is made to the vicinities of each *waqf* asset in the document. Normally, *waqf* documents must mention vicinities that adjoin each *waqf* asset on the four directions, such as rivers and other villages that border the properties on all sides.¹⁴ Otherwise, the exact extent of *waqf* assets cannot be determined. One cannot help but wonder whether this document was actually functional in the light of Islamic law.

Nevertheless, the text of this *waqf* document is certain to have already existed in the first half of the sixteenth century, as one can find textual parallels to the copy in both the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* and the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*. First, the names of the three villages listed as *waqf* assets in the copy accord with all three of the village names mentioned in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr*, while two of them are also the same as those mentioned in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* [TSA: 17; Tuḥfat: II 190]. Moreover, one sentence—“[t]he dark rust of unbelief and polytheism was scraped away from our hearts by the whetstone of guidance and instruction (*ḡalām-i zang-i kufr wa širk rā ba-ṣayqal-i hidāyat wa*

¹³ Rafiqi referred to a manuscript of the *Futūḥāt-i Kubrawīya* housed in the Oriental Research Library (Persian, no. 50) and stated that the parallel text with the *waqf* document is found in folios 63b–4b [Rafiqi 2009: xlii, n.19]. However, his numbering is incorrect and correct folio numbers are 111a–2b.

¹⁴ For example, a *waqf* document related to a *ḡānqāh* of the Kubrawīya in Samarqand, dated 1547, clearly specifies the lands and buildings that the *waqf* assets are used for and their borders [Schwarz 2008: 200–8].

iršād [...] *az dil*¹⁵ *zudūda*)”—in lines 3 and 4 of the copy is almost identical to that in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* [TSA: 13]. Furthermore, one finds that another expression in line 14 of the copy—“[for] the inhabitants of the Ḥānqāh and its vicinity would be fortune and protected. [For] all people would make an effort to be just and pious. And [for] poor persons and needy men would be just and faithful God-fearing persons would be fragrant thanks to the fruits of this honorable tree (*tā mutamakkinān wa mujāwirān-i ḥānqāh maḥzūz wa maḥfūz šawand wa hama ba-ṣalāḥ wa wara’ iqdām namāyand wa fuqarā’ wa masākīn ṣālīḥ wa atqiyā’-yi šiddīqīn fā’ih az ṭamara-yi in šajara-yi maḥmūd bāšand*)”—is identical to one in [TSA: 16].

Additionally, line 16 of the copy is as follows: “They could spend [time] for invocations (*awrād*) and other duties regulated by His Holiness, [my] noble father in the condition of *ḥāl*¹⁶ without any distraction (*ba-fāriḡbāl wa ḥuḍūr-i ḥāl ba-awrād wa waḡā’if-i ḥaḍrat-i wālīd-i buzurgwār muštaḡil tawānand būd*).” Almost the same wording is found in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*, which reads as follows: “They could spend [time] for invocations, other duties, *awqāt*, and *zīkrs* regulated by His Holiness, [my] noble father in the condition of *ḥāl* without any distraction (*ba-fāriḡ al-bāl wa ḥuḍūr al-ḥāl ba-awrād wa waḡā’if wa awqāt wa aḍkār-i wālīd-i buzurgwār muštaḡil tawānand būd*)” [Tuḥfat: II 191]. Another similar phrase in the copy is “keep away those who commit indecent acts in the Ḥānqāh” [Tuḥfat: II 191]. Furthermore, the summaries of the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā’s *waqf* document referred to in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* and the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* are almost identical to the text of this copy. If one found such textual parallels in one of the sources, then one could assume the *waqf* document to have been fabricated by one of the two authors or their relatives. However, because one finds textual parallels in different parts of the two sources, whose authors took opposing positions, it is highly likely that the archetype text of the *waqf* document actually existed by the first half of the sixteenth century at the latest and that the two authors referred to it.¹⁷

3.3. Fire at the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā in 1484

The Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā, believed to have been built at the end of the fourteenth century, burned to the ground in a fire in 1484. This event is recorded in Śrīvara’s *Rājataranḡiṇī*, a contemporary Sanskrit source. Walter Slaje repeatedly highlights Śrīvara’s attitude toward reliably recording eye-witness events; thus, the *Rājataranḡiṇī* is of high value as a primary source [Slaje 2005a; Slaje 2012]. Furthermore, since Śrīvara had no direct political interest in the people involved in the fire at the Ḥānqāh, considering it a fact is not problematic. One should note, however, that in

¹⁵ The TSA states: “*az ā’ina-yi dil*”(from mirror of [our] hearts).

¹⁶ The term *ḥāl* refers to the highest spiritual condition in Sufism.

¹⁷ There is no reference between the TSA and the *Tuḥfat*. Another possibility is that the author of the *Futūḥāt-i Kubrawīya*, ‘Abd al-Waḥḥāb Nūrī, created the text of the *waqf* document by referring to both the TSA and *Tuḥfat*. However, neither TSA nor *Tuḥfat* is listed as a reference in the *Futūḥāt-i Kubrawīya*. In addition, it would actually be quite difficult to quote fragments of texts from two different sources and put them together into one coherent text. The works cited as references in the *Futūḥāt-i Kubrawīya* are as follows: (1) the *Risāla-yi Muḥammadiya*, (2) the *Miršād al-‘ibād* [by Najm al-Dīn Rāzī Dāya], (3) the *Risāla-yi iqbalīya*, (4) the *Nafāḥāt al-uns* [by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī], (5) the *Ma‘rifat al-murīdīn*, (6) the *Ḥulāṣat al-manāqib* [by Ja‘far Badaḥšī], (7) the *Ḥādat al-‘āṣiqīn dar zīkr-i maqāmāt-i Ḥaḍrat-i Maḥdūm-i A‘zam Šayḥ Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥusayn Ḥwārazmī*, (8) the *Maqāmāt-i Šayḥ Ya‘qūb Šarfī*, (9) the *Maqāmāt-i Mīr Muḥammad Ḥalīfa*, (10) the *Nūr-nāma*, (11) the *Asrār al-abrār* [by Bābā Dāwūd Miškātī] [FK1: 2a].

the latest edition published in 2022 [ZRT S], Slaje employs different readings of crucial passages of the fire compared with that of the formerly well-referenced edition by Śrīkaṇṭh Kaul [ZRT K]; the difference in the verses between the two editions causes diverse interpretations of the incident. Here, while developing an argument that chiefly relies on Slaje's edition, the author also pays attention to Kaul's readings. In canto 4 of the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, Śrīvara states the following:

Mārgeśa [Jahāṅgīr] recalled that the Sayyids had burned down the Rudravihāra [monastery] out of anger and now [he himself] ordered to set fire to burn down the Ahalā's maṭha. This fire, a gruesome sea of flames that raged terribly through the heat generated by the [burning] houses, transformed the [neighboring northern] quarter [named after] 'Alā' al-Dīn (i.e., 'Alā' al-Dīnpura) into a scorched forest. The fire that had broken out in the Ḥānqāh of the venerable Sayyid Hamadānī, located to the north of this, shone like the fire of his anger at the ruler and the people's wicked deeds [ZRT S: IV 316–8; Slaje 2022: 393–5].¹⁸

As can be seen from this quotation, the Ḥānqāh was set on fire as an act of revenge against the destruction of Rudravihāra monastery by the Bayhaqī Sayyids. According to Śrīvara, this incident occurred on the first day of the dark fortnight in the month of Śrāvana in the year [45] 61 of the Saptarṣi calendar (July 24, 1484). The background to this incident, which was a conflict between the Sayyid family and the indigenous potentates of Kashmir, is briefly explained in the following paragraph.

The Sayyid family, headed by Sayyid Nāṣir, migrated from Bayhaq (present-day Sabzevar in eastern Iran) to Kashmir during the reign of Sulṭān Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn. At the time, Sayyid Nāṣir formed a kinship with the Ṣahmīrid Sulṭān family and was granted the rule of Bahurūpa¹⁹ [ZRT S: II 19; Slaje 2023: 207]. When Sulṭān Ḥasanṣāh died on April 19, 1484, Sayyid Nāṣir's son Sayyid Ḥasan ascended the child born to Ḥasanṣāh and a woman from the Sayyid family to the throne as Sulṭān Muḥammadṣāh. The boy was aged just seven years old. He then assumed control of the court as the regent of the child ruler and eliminated the indigenous clan members. The hostility between the Sayyid family and the indigenous potentates became decisive, and Sayyid Ḥasan was assassinated on the fourteenth of the dark fortnight in the month of Vaiśākha in [45] 60 (May 9, 1484) [ZRT S: IV 47, 93; Slaje 2023: 353–9]. This led to a conflict between Sayyid Muḥammad, the son of Sayyid Ḥasan, and the Kashmiri indigenous potentates, which lasted nearly three months. Among them was Jahāṅgīr Māgrī, who had been hostile to the Sayyid family since the reign of Ḥaydarṣāh; however, he was defeated in a political struggle at the court during the reign of Ḥasanṣāh and

¹⁸ smṛtvā Rudravihārāgnidāhaṃ saidakṛtaṃ krudhā |
Ahalāmaṭhadāhāya Mārgapo 'gnim adāpayat || [316]
jvālājālakarālo 'sāv agnir veśmoṣmadāruṇaḥ |
alāvadenanagaraṃ dagdhāraṇyam ivākarot || [317]
śrīmat SaīdaHamādānaKhānagāhoditānalaḥ |
rājaprajāpacārotthatatkrodhāgnir ivādyutat || [318]

¹⁹ Bahurūpa was an area in the western part of the Kashmir Valley, almost directly west of Srinagar, and a holy spring with the same name as Bahurūpa is located at 34°0.37 N, 74°35.48 E [Slaje 2014: 311].

forced to leave Kashmir. However, in the battle against the Sayyid family, he became the leader of the side of the indigenous potentates and led the battle from his base in the western part of the Kashmir Valley. As it became clear that the indigenous potentates would ultimately emerge victorious, Jahāngīr Māgrī ordered the Ahalyā maṭha,²⁰ located to the south of the Ḥānqāh, to be burned to the ground. Thus, the burning of the Ḥānqāh was a side event that occurred during the conflict between the Sayyid family and the indigenous potentates. In contrast to Slaje's edition, Kaul employs the variant "alābhapura ('Alā' al-Dīnpura)" in place of "Ahalāmaṭha" in stanza 316.²¹ If this variant is valid, then it would suggest that Jahāngīr Māgrī intentionally set the Ḥānqāh on fire. Although the details are unknown because it is not mentioned in Śrīvara's *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* and the author has yet to conclude which edition is more reliable regarding this stanza, if one relies on Kaul's reading, then one can presume there to have been some kind of connection between the Sayyid family and the Ḥānqāh at the time because setting fire to it was a way to inflict a political blow to the Sayyids.

It should also be noted that the relevant documents kept in the Ḥānqāh were probably destroyed in the fire. When creating a *waqf* document for a property, generally speaking, two copies of the same document were generally prepared, with one being kept at the property and another at the home of a *qāḍī* (Islamic jurist), who stamped the document. Therefore, when the *waqf* document of the Ḥānqāh is mentioned in historical sources in the later period, the authors must have been referring to the copy kept at the *qāḍī*'s house; however, no sources confirm this.

After the battle between the Sayyid family and the indigenous potentates, peace returned to Srinagar and the Ḥānqāh was rebuilt in the same location. Śrīvara states the following:

They moved the royal palace from Padmapura to the center of Srinagar and also repaired the Ḥānqāh [of Hamadānī], which had been set on fire. The Ḥānqāh of the venerable Sayyid Hamadānī then rose up, as if in his form as the complete [re-established] totality of his virtues on the bank of the [Vitastā] river [ZRT S: IV 343–4; Slaje 2022: 398–9].²²

The Ḥānqāh was likely rebuilt by the end of Saptarṣi 4560 because these verses appear before Śrīvara's first reference to the following year [ZRT S: 500].

Next, we turn our attention to how later Persian sources narrated the burning and rebuilding of the Ḥānqāh. First, Sayyid 'Alī describes the fire at the Ḥānqāh; however, the details differ from those in Śrīvara's report:

²⁰ This monastery for Brahmins was built by Lakṣmadeva's (r. 1273–86) queen Ahalā. The Ahalyā maṭha was still active in the first quarter of the fifteenth century and a manuscript of the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā* of the *Atharvaveda* was copied in 1419 [Slaje 2007].

²¹ Manuscripts Ś6–8 employ "Ahalāmaṭha," while Ś3, I3–5, and B employ "alābhapura." For the details of each manuscript, see [Slaje 2014: 38–41].

²² *rājadhānīm samāniya navām Padmapurāntarāt |*
Khānagāhaṃ navicakrur dagdhaṃ Śrīnagarāntare || [343]
bābāSaidaHamādānaKhānagāho naditāṭe |
pūrṇas tatpunyasambhāras tadākāra ivotthitah || [344]

After that, Ḥasan b. Ḥaydaršāh took his father's place and ascended the throne. During his reign, the Friday Mosque [in Khanyar] was burnt. It is said that ... (partly skipped) ... When the reconstruction [of the Friday Mosque] completed, the Ḥānqāh which was the appearance of Divine grace in 'Alā' al-Dīnpura was burnt by fire on account of being adjacent to ordinary people's houses. Sulṭān Ḥasanšāh by himself politely gained the plots of land of those who had houses around the Ḥānqāh, and paid commensurate amount [of money with the value of those plots] to each of them. A person named Mullā Bābā 'Alī did not received it.²³ [Ḥasanšāh] thus purchased a plot of land in a different place and gave him. [The plot of land for the Ḥānqāh] got enough space in its neighborhood and surroundings. A big one-storied Ḥānqāh was built. [TSA: 26–7]

While Sayyid 'Alī records that the Ḥānqāh was destroyed by fire once, he states that this was during the reign of Ḥasanšāh. Furthermore, unlike Śrīvara's record, 'Alī's record is written as though the Ḥānqāh had succumbed to spontaneous combustion, as opposed to the arson attack ordered by Jahāngīr Māgrī. Śrīvara does indeed record that a fire broke out in Pravareśapura in Srinagar in [45] 55 of the Saptarṣi calendar during Ḥasanšāh's reign (1479) and the Friday Mosque was destroyed by it [ZRT S: III 276–8; Slaje 2022: 295]. However, the subsequent destruction of the Ḥānqāh is not recorded. Sayyid 'Alī may have mistakenly identified the time of the destruction of the Ḥānqāh.²⁴

Next, in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*, 'Alī Kašmīrī does not mention the Ḥānqāh being destroyed by fire, and the record is written as though the building had survived throughout Šams al-Dīn 'Irāqī's time in Srinagar. 'Irāqī came to Kashmir in the later years of Ḥasanšāh's reign in 1484 and stayed there until 1491; therefore, he must have already been in Srinagar when the Ḥānqāh burned down. However, as we will see in the next section, the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* contains descriptions that are unrelated to the Ḥānqāh's destruction by fire, as though it was inconvenient for the author to write that the building had burned down once.

4. Sectarian Factionalism in the Sixteenth Century: Claims for Custodianship

As we have seen, the accounts of the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā in Sayyid 'Alī's *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* and 'Alī Kašmīrī's *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* are generally consistent in terms of the construction process. However, there are several notable differences, such as the burning down and rebuilding of the Ḥānqāh.

²³ In Zubaida Jan's edition, due to a printing error, this part is transcribed as "AWZD TGRFTH AWR," making it illegible. It should be read as "ān rā na-girifta, ū rā."

²⁴ The burning of the Ḥānqāh is also mentioned in the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*, but its cause is stated to be the same as for Sayyid 'Alī's *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr*, i.e., that it was adjacent to other buildings. Moreover, the date of the fire is stated to be further back, in the reign of Zayn al-'Ābidīn [BS: 35a–b]. It is not possible to confirm whether Muḥammad Šāhābādī's Persian translation of the *Rājatarānginī* contains a mention of the burning of Ḥānqāh, as the relevant folios of the extant manuscripts are missing. Nevertheless, because the *Intihāb-i tāriḥ Kašmīr*, whose text relies on Šāhābādī's translation, correctly states that the Ḥānqāh was set on fire as a result of the conflict between the Bayhaqī Sayyid family and the local clans that broke out during the first reign of Muḥammadšāh [ITK: 279], it is highly likely that Šāhābādī faithfully traced Śrīvara's account. However, the *Intihāb-i tāriḥ Kašmīr* states that this event occurred in the year 892/1486–7, which is a difference of about two years from the ZRT description.

Moreover, the following descriptions of the Ḥānqāh are completely different, especially in terms of who the *waqf* custodians (*mutawallī*) were, and it is impossible to interpret both descriptions consistently. In this section, the author first introduces the accounts in ‘Alī’s *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr* and Kaśmīrī’s *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* before examining the reliability of each account.

4.1. Claim by Sayyid ‘Alī in the *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr*

First, the author reviews the description in the *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr*. According to its author Sayyid ‘Alī, when Muḥammad Hamadānī built the Ḥānqāh, Sulṭān Sikandar set up its assets. Sikandar appointed a man named Mawlānā Sa‘īd²⁵ as the custodian of the Ḥānqāh as well as Malik Dīwī Ganā‘ī to audit him. As mentioned above, the names of the villages of the *waqf* assets mentioned in the *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr* correspond exactly to those mentioned in the copy of the *waqf* document. In addition, the two names Mawlānā Sa‘īd and Malik Dīwī Ganā‘ī match the description in the copy.

After stating that the Ḥānqāh burned down during the reign of Ḥasanšāh and was then rebuilt, Sayyid ‘Alī states that another person was appointed custodian as follows:

Qāḍī Ḥamīd al-Dīn, father of the historian Qāḍī Ibrāhīm was appointed as the custodian (*mutawallī*) of the *waqf* assets for the [Ḥānqāh] for those who call invocations (*awrād*), recluses, and those who perform seclusion (*ḥalwat*) in that place do not need cloths, daily foods, medicines, and shrouds. [TSA: 27]

As this quotation shows, a new person, Qāḍī Ḥamīd al-Dīn, was appointed as the custodian of the reconstructed Ḥānqāh. At this point, nearly a century after the possible date of its construction, it is safe to assume that Mawlānā Sa‘īd was already deceased. However, it is unclear to whom the custodianship passed after his death.²⁶

Sayyid ‘Alī further describes that the Ḥānqāh was again destroyed by ‘Irāqī and his supporters, the Čaks, and was then rebuilt a third time. This description comes immediately after he recounts ‘Irāqī building his own Ḥānqāh-i Nūrbahšīya in Srinagar’s Zadībal quarter. According to Sayyid ‘Alī, ‘Irāqī was not satisfied with building the Ḥānqāh-i Nūrbahšīya and announced that he would also own the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā, as the following quotation demonstrates:

After that, [Šams al-Dīn ‘Irāqī] said to Kājī Čak: “the Ḥānqāh of the sign of Divine grace is just one-storied. It must be [once] destroyed and a two-storied [building] must be built and its interior should be that.” In building the Ḥānqāh, a wicked way occurred. Although Muḥammadšāh who was the emperor at that time did not have trust in him (‘Irāqī), he had the intention to gather people to his Ḥānqāh (i.e., after possessing the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā). Malik Kājī Čak and Ġazīḥān²⁷ always visited ‘Irāqī’s front. [‘Irāqī] always said to them: “His Holiness Amīr’s Ḥānqāh must be destroyed and a bigger one

²⁵ The *Futūḥāt-i Kubrawīya* states that he was one of ‘Alī Hamadānī’s companions [FK1: 128a; FK2: 162b–3a].

²⁶ Sayyid ‘Alī often cites a chronicle attributed to Qāḍī Ibrāhīm, the son of Qāḍī Ḥamīd al-Dīn, as a source; however, this chronicle no longer exists.

²⁷ He was the founder of the Čak dynasty by dethroning the last Šāhmīrid Sulṭān Ḥabībšāh.

must be built [at the same place].”Consequently, Malik Kājī Čak came [to the place] and destroyed that (the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā). His (Kājī’s) sister named Sāliḥa Mājī was a disciple of Šayḥ Ismā‘īl [Kubrawī]. When she knew that Malik Kājī Čak annihilated the Ḥānqāh, she said: “Sultān Muḥammadšāh gave a certain thing to me. Ismā‘īlšāh (sic.) also gave information to me. I donate all gold I have as a *waqf*. My assets are to be used to build the [new] Ḥānqāh. Because your assets have many problems, they are probably not lawful.” Since that mother got married to Muḥammadšāh, she had a lot of assets. After one year, the Ḥānqāh was built for the third time and completed. She spent sixty thousand *tanga* [of money] and one thousand *ašrafī* pure gold. When it completed, she weaved one thousand and two hundred kurta shirts and five thousand hats and donated them to the workers. She also gave dishes to one thousand people. One day when a rope was set on the top [of the Ḥānqāh] she requested Muḥammadšāh’s office: “betrayal on the *waqf* of the Ḥānqāh should not be. The custodianship of that *waqf* should be entrusted to Sayyid Muḥammad b. Sayyid ‘Alī (the author’s father). If a problem occurs on this issue, kingship must not stay on your hands.”Muḥammadšāh wrote a document on the appointment of custodianship (*tawliyat-nāma*) and gave it to him (Sayyid Muḥammad). Things were confirmed according to the document. In 898 AH (October 23, 1492 to October 11, 1493), during Muḥammadšāh’s reign, that Ḥānqāh completed. [TSA: 32–3]

According to this quotation, after Kājī Čak destroyed the Ḥānqāh, he probably attempted to rebuild it in the style ‘Irāqī wanted. However, for some reason, the project was suspended. Šāliḥa Mājī, a disciple of Kubrawī Šudī Šayḥ Ismā‘īl and the queen of Muḥammadšāh, rebuilt the Ḥānqāh with her own money. She then approached her husband, Muḥammadšāh, to appoint Sayyid Muḥammad, the father of Sayyid ‘Alī, as the *waqf* custodian of the rebuilt Ḥānqāh, which was realized. As mentioned above, Sayyid ‘Alī had a clear pro-Sunni, anti-Nūrbahšīya stance. Judging from his relationship with Mīrzā Ḥaydar, Sayyid Muḥammad is thought to also have had the same inclinations. In other words, the Ḥānqāh, which had been destroyed by ‘Irāqī’s supporters, ended up in the hands of the anti-Nūrbahšīya side, and ‘Irāqī’s hope of rebuilding and possessing the Ḥānqāh in the style he wanted was crushed.

4.2. Claim by ‘Alī Kašmīrī in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*

The *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* does not provide the name of the custodian appointed when the Ḥānqāh-i Mu‘allā was built. The first mention of its custodian’s name in this hagiography is in the account of ‘Irāqī’s first visit to Kashmir in 1484: “The status of *šayḥ* and custodian belonged to Ḥājī Šams.”Ḥājī Šams, along with his brother Ḥājī Ḥasan, was a courtier of Sultān Ḥasanšāh, and these two men are said to have looked after ‘Irāqī while he was in Kashmir [Tuḥfat: I 456].

Several years later, during the first reign of Sultān Faḥšāh, a minister (*wazīr*) named Malik Sayfdār²⁸ often held evening meetings (*majlis*) in the Ḥānqāh, where he gathered influential

²⁸ Sayfdār is a Persian word that means “sword-bearer,”but in Śrīvara’s *Rājataranḡiṇī*, Sayfdār is written as “chief of lords,

Muslims and masters of the *ṭarīqas*. The *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* narrates that a heated dispute arose between ‘Irāqī and a Qādirī Ṣūfī named Šihāb al-Dīn Hindī²⁹ at the *majlis*. When they met a third time, the two began arguing in the room where the food was served; then, the argument became a violent brawl involving others [Tuḥfat: I 503–11; Bashir 2003: 211]. A few days later, Sayfdār issued the following decision:

After several days, he (Malik Sayfdār) cosigned the Ḥānqāh-i Amīriya Hamadāniya’s custodianship to Šayḥ Šihāb notwithstanding that unjust and oppression. Before him, that sacred estate’s custodianship was upon Ḥājī Šams’s hand of protection as stated above. When this Šayḥ Šihāb unjustly obtained that sacred estate’s custodianship, his evil-commanding soul (*nafs-i ammāra*)³⁰ became malevolent to put steps of audacity and foot of temerity on the way (*ṭarīq*) of shameless. He extended his arm of alternation and hand of changing on the regulations and duties of the sacred estate which had been maintained as customs and usual practices since Amīr Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadāni’s time in His Holiness’s lofty chain (*silsila*) and right way (*ṭarīqa*)...[Tuḥfat: I 511–2]

Following this quotation, ‘Alī Kašmīrī describes at length how Šihāb al-Dīn Hindī prohibited the various duties and practices of the Kubrawīya that the Ṣūfis had been following at the Ḥānqāh since the time of ‘Alī Hamadāni; instead, he forced them to follow the practices of the Qādirīya, such as the *Awṛād-i Qādirīya* regulated by ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī (d. 1166). Sayfdār’s decision was humiliating for ‘Irāqī, who considered himself to be the heir to Hamadāni’s legacy in Kashmir [Bashir 2003: 213]. For this reason, ‘Irāqī decided to revive the recitation of the *Awṛād-i faṭḥīya* at the Ḥānqāh-i Mu‘allā.

Next, the author compares the description in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* with that in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* to determine what facts can be found. If, as the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* states, the Ḥānqāh was rebuilt after burning down during the reign of Ḥasanšāh and Qāḍī Ḥamīd al-Dīn became the custodian, then it would be possible to interpret both accounts without contradiction by thinking that the custodian was replaced from Qāḍī Ḥamīd al-Dīn to Ḥājī Šams during the same reign. However, Śrīvara clearly states that the Ḥānqāh burned down in 1484 during the first reign of Muḥammadšāh. The *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* states that the period during which Ḥājī Šams is said to have been the custodian was from a certain point during the reign of Ḥasanšāh until a certain point during the first reign of Faṭḥšāh. Thus, if one redates the series of events recorded in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* by relying on Śrīvara’s *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*—that is, if one considers the fire and subsequent rebuilding of the Ḥānqāh and Qāḍī Ḥamīd al-Dīn being appointed custodian to have actually occurred during the first reign of Muḥammadšāh, then there must have simultaneously been two *waqf* custodians from a certain

Saif Malik (*Dāmarendra Saipha Malleka*)”[ZRT S: IV 657]. Both the Persianization of *dāmara* and the Sanskritization of *dār* are possible, so this person’s original name is not clear.

²⁹ According to Śrīvara, the messenger who sent a letter to Jahāngīr Māgrī on behalf of the Sayyid family in the battle of 1484 was a man named Śikhaśahābādīṃ, who can be identified as Šihāb al-Dīn Hindī [ZRT S: IV 147].

³⁰ *Nafs-i ammāra* is one of the terms used in Sufism. It means to the lowest state of the soul, which is left to follow one’s desires. The reference is Qur’ān 12:53.

point during the first reign of Muḥammadšāh until a certain point during the first reign of Faṭḥšāh. In other words, the period when Qāḍī Ḥamīd al-Dīn was the custodian according to the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* and that when the custodian changed from Ḥājī Šams to Šihāb al-Dīn Hindī according to the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* partly overlap. Moreover, Qāḍī Ḥamīd al-Dīn never appears in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*, while neither Ḥājī Šams nor Šihāb al-Dīn Hindī appears in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr*.

The *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* further claims that during his second stay in Kashmir, 'Irāqī succeeded in obtaining the *waqf* custodianship of the Ḥānqāh. According to 'Alī Kašmīrī, the Sulṭān at the time, namely Muḥammadšāh, issued a royal mandate (*farmān*) and personally approved 'Irāqī's appointment as custodian. The full text of the mandate is quoted in the relevant passage, which the author translates here from the text before the mandate is quoted:

The fortune emperor (Muḥammadšāh), in agreement with nobles of the sultanate, pillars of the dynasty, lord of rule, and *amīrs* of the kingdom, appointed [His Holiness] as the position of the master of the Hamadāniya's blessed Ḥānqāh and the custodianship of that noble estate for the purpose of His Holiness's stability and source of livelihood. [Muḥammadšāh and his followers also] granted and entrusted the reins of executions of all commands relevant to the blessed estate as well as the right of exclusion and invitation of those residing in the noble place and its vicinity and the right of dismissal and appointment of workers and provosts into His Holiness's hands of will and palm of confidence. The noble estate's *waqf* document was written as [the following] explanation and writing, which was made over to His Holiness. When the *waqf* document was written in accordance with his royal mandate (*farmān*), the emperor of the kingdom was Sulṭān Muḥammadšāh.

—By the highest imperial *farmān* which is everlastingly sublime—

The noble command (*ḥukm*) by His Highness, *amīr of amīrs*, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusaynī (Muḥammadšāh),³¹ and the lofty order which became the lines of words in the presence of Malik Ibrāhīm Māgrī, Malik Šams Čak, Malik 'Īdī Rayna as well as all pillars of the dynasty and nobles of the kingdom must be carried out. The contents [of the command] is as follows: the Ḥānqāh-i Hamadāniya, the place of Divine grace, which that gate (*dar-i pay*) has been *waqf* of it with all stable estates and villages from the time of His Chieftainship, His Felicity, Amīr-i Ašraf Amjad Amīr Sayyid Muḥammad Hamadānī —May God purify his secret everlastingly—to our time, was transferred to the possessor of leadership, His Sainthood, the axis of seekers of truth, the exemplar of masters, the essence of masters of disclosure, the royal authority specially ordained by the grace of God the

³¹ This person is the one who made the command, and since it is stated immediately after that Sayyid Muḥammad, the son of Sayyid Ḥasan, was against this mandate, it can only be interpreted as referring to Muḥammadšāh himself. Perhaps because his mother was from the Bayhaqī Sayyid family, this name claims that Muḥammadšāh was a Sayyid. However, this is a somewhat odd statement. In addition, as far as verifying the numismatic sources, the Šāmīrid sultāns consistently claimed the title *al-Sulṭān al-A'ẓam* [Ahmad 2013: 43–51], and there is no similar example of *Amīr al-umārā* as a ruler's title in the Šāmīrid dynasty.

Eternal, Šayḥ Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad ‘Irāqī —May his conditions be fragrant and his perfections be everlasting—. In addition, its *waqf* custodianship was entrusted to [him]. All orders, commands, important matters, and duties relevant to the blessed estate about management, receipt, expansion, dismissal, appointment, command, and prohibition, are upon His Holiness’s will. That is to say, that no great kings, *amīrs*, or *ḥākims*, nor any of the various peoples, noble or common, shall interfere with, occupy, or control its noble estates against the will of His Holiness, and that they may command, prohibit, and have powers only with His Holiness’s permission. And according to the *waqf* document which was written with noble autograph of His Chieftainship, [Muḥammad Hamadānī], —May his secret be purified—the settlers and inhabitants of that blessed place direct to revive the ways of customs, invocations, and *zīkrs* regulated by the second ‘Alī, Amīr Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī, and to give guidance and direction to those who dwell near that noble estate and to those who have obligations towards it. **“But whoever changes the will after hearing it, the blame will only be on those who made the change.”**(Qur’ān 2:181) **“And salvation will be for whoever follows the ‘right’ guidance.”**(Qur’ān 20:47) [Tuḥfat: II 51–3]

This quotation also contradicts the account in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr*. According to the text, the rebuilding of the Ḥānqāh was prevented according to the will of ‘Irāqī, and its custodianship was assigned to Sayyid Muḥammad, the author’s father. By contrast, the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* states that ‘Irāqī himself was appointed as *waqf* custodian. Thus, a discrepancy exists in the descriptions of the *waqf* custodian of the Ḥānqāh, with Qāḍī Ḥamīd al-Dīn being mentioned in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* and Ḥājī Šams and Šihāb al-Dīn Hindī being mentioned in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*. The two authors claim to have had a close relationship with the contemporary custodian, as Sayyid ‘Alī states that his father was the custodian while ‘Alī Kašmīrī states that his master was.

Furthermore, ‘Alī Kašmīrī writes about how the Ḥānqāh, which had become a place for infidels and debauchees to gather, was once again made a place for worship when ‘Irāqī became the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā’s *waqf* custodian. This is described in the following quotation:

When His Holiness, Amīr Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad —May God purify his secret—has made the land of these kingdoms be honored with his noble walk and has opened the hand of sainthood for the destruction of idols in this idol temple, which was a place of worship for the unbelievers and was a debauched brothel, and rulers and Sulṭāns consigned and secured the Ḥānqāh-i Hamadānīya’s custodianship and administration, and when His Holiness heard the detailed circumstances of those corrupters and knew those ill-fated people’s activity and behavior, he first ordered to expel those unbelievers from that angels’ abode. He also made the blessed monastery of Hamadānī, which had been the second Ka‘ba with [his] dignity, but tyranny and lewd appeared by opposing rulers’ negligence and by rebellious hypocrites as if it was a Ka‘ba among debauchees’ idol temples and taverns, purified [the Ḥānqāh] from impureness of alcohol and *ḥarām* drinks,

from uncleanness of adulterers and sinners, from dirty of debauchees and adultery in that time, and from corruption of unbelievers and wicked people. He refined that splendid estate from every settlement and dwelling of the cursed people and occupation invasion by demons, and made it a place where the great angels patrol, a place of pilgrimage (*ziyaratgāh*) for kind and pious men, and a place of worship for excellent men. He further arranged and repaired that blessed estate and splendid monastery as it bears greatness, magnificence, openness, and wideness. [Tuḥfat: II 192]

This quotation clearly indicates that ‘Irāqī is positioned as the reviver of the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*. The people whom ‘Alī Kašmīrī repeatedly reviles as unbelievers, debauchees, and adulterers, among others, indirectly refer to the supporters of the anti-Nūrbahšīya faction. As can be seen from the Ḥānqāh’s comparison to the second Ka‘ba in the sultanate, ‘Alī Kašmīrī claims that the Ḥānqāh is a building that can be said to be a symbol of Islam in Kashmir, left behind by ‘Alī Hamadānī, and the claim that ‘Irāqī was appointed as the Ḥānqāh’s custodian means that he is its legitimate successor.

After examining the examples described thus far, the author concludes that it is impossible to interpret the descriptions of the Ḥānqāh’s *waqf* custodianship in the two sources in a consistent manner. At least one of the two sources definitely provides false information.

4.3. Embedding hagiographical narratives for political privileges

The author now examines the reliability of statements about the Ḥānqāh’s *waqf* custodianship in the two sources. First, the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* states that the Ḥānqāh was once rebuilt and Sayyid Muḥammad was appointed its *waqf* custodian in 1492–3, during the reign of Muḥammadšāh. Since ‘Irāqī returned to Rayy after his first stay in Kashmir in 1491, one can interpret the series of events as follows: ‘Irāqī had the Ḥānqāh destroyed during his first stay in Kashmir but could not rebuild it before he left. Then, Šālīḥa Mājī rebuilt the Ḥānqāh. If one adopts such an interpretation, then the accounts of the two sources can be explained without contradiction; that is, after Sayyid Muḥammad became custodian—as the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* states—and ‘Irāqī became custodian—as the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* states. Moreover, according to previous studies, Faṭḥšāh’s first abdication and Muḥammadšāh’s second accession to the throne occurred in 1493, which seems consistent with the description in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr*. However, no extant contemporaneous sources provide the year of Muḥammadšāh’s second accession.

From Śuka’s account of *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, a pandit named Prājyabhaṭṭa chronicled the events from 1486 to 1513 as the sequel of Śrīvara’s historiography in a work called *Rājāvalīpatākā* [ŚRT: I 7–8; Slaje 2023: 118]. Unfortunately, the *Rājāvalīpatākā* was not translated into Persian when *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* was presented to the court of Akbar (r. 1556–1605), the third Mughal emperor, because it was not included in the manuscript, and the *Rājāvalīpatākā* itself remains lost.³² What can be used today

³² At least the year of Muḥammadšāh’s second abdication can be confirmed from the record of Faṭḥšāh’s second reign in the ŚRT as 1505 [ŚRT: I 93; Slaje 2023: 128].

as a source of information on events from 1487 to 1512, a period for which no contemporaneous sources exist, is the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*, a Persian text completed in 1614.

In most Persian provincial histories of Kashmir, descriptions of events from 1487 to 1512 are missing, and an immediate transition occurs from a description based on Śrīvara's *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* to one based on that of Śuka. Only the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*, however, provides a diachronic record of events from 1487 to 1512. Furthermore, the *Bahāristān-i šāhī* often gives the year in which an event occurred in the form of the last two digits of the year in the *Saptarṣi* calendar, as does *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*. The dates in the *Saptarṣi* calendar in the *Bahāristān-i šāhī* are generally consistent with those of the *Rājatarāṅgiṇīs*,³³ and it is highly likely that the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*'s anonymous author was referring to the *Rājatarāṅgiṇīs* [Ogura 2010–1: 45–7]. In addition, some events that occurred between 1487 and 1512 are also dated using the *Saptarṣi* calendar. One example is the reference to the death of Malik Sayfdār, a minister in the first reign of Faṭḥšāh mentioned in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*. According to the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*, he died in [45]72/CE 1496, and the Sulṭān at the time was Faṭḥšāh [BS: 70b]. If this statement is a historical fact, then—contrary to the view of previous studies—Faṭḥšāh's first reign lasted until 1496. This contradicts the description in the *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr*, which states that the Ḥānqāh was rebuilt in the second reign of Muḥammadšāh in 1492–3. The *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr* also reports that 'Irāqī ordered the destruction of the Ḥānqāh shortly after he built his Ḥānqāh in Zadībal [TSA: 31–2]; however, the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* dates the construction of the Ḥānqāh in Zadībal to 910 AH/1504–5 [Tuḥfat: II 49], which is also inconsistent. If the *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr* is correct, then the father of the person who wrote the history in the 1570s would have been appointed custodian in the 1490s, making the chronology of the description less reliable.

In light of the above, it is difficult to regard the *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr*'s statement that Sayyid Muḥammad was appointed the Ḥānqāh's *waqf* custodian as a historical fact. To begin with, the *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr* contains numerous passages throughout that are dubious as to their dating from the Hijri calendar. For example, Sulṭān Quṭb al-Dīn is said to have died in 796 AH/1393–4 [TSA: 12]; in fact, he died on August 9, 1389 [JRT: 537]. The *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr* further dates Sulṭān Sikandar's death on Muḥarram 22, 818AH/April 5, 1415 [TSA: 20]; in fact, he died on April 23, 1413 [JRT: 612]. A more crucial case is the account of Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn's childhood. Sayyid 'Alī states that when Amīr Tīmūr (r. 1370–1405) took the still young al-ʿĀbidīn back to Samarkand during his expedition to India, he remained in Samarqand and returned to Kashmir after Tīmūr's death [TSA: 20]. However, since Tīmūr's expedition to India occurred in 1398–9 and al-ʿĀbidīn was born in 1401 [Slaje 2007: 340], this statement is anachronistic and not a historical fact.³⁴ Furthermore, one finds problematic descriptions of events from a period not too far from the year of writing. For example, the *Tārīḥ-i Kaśmīr* contains the following statement:

After Muḥammadšāh's death, Šams 'Irāqī's missionary activity (*kār wa bār*) became more

³³ For example, the *Bahāristān-i šāhī* records the year of Mūsā Rayna's killing as [45]89 [BS: 81a]; this year accords with that referred to in Śuka's *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* [ŠRT: I 8, I 64]

³⁴ In all likelihood, Sayyid 'Alī confused Malik Jasrath Khokhar, who was actually captured by Tīmūr with Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn. [Ps-JRT: B732–4; ZNŠ: 179–80; ZNY: II 47–48; Lal 1980]

active than when Muḥammadšāh was alive; Malik Kājī Čak and others became his disciple, but during his reign, he behaved as if one of the people of Sunnah and *jamā'a*. In the reign of Ismā'īlšāh (1538–40), he had made his beliefs [of the Nūrbahāšiya] clear. [TSA: 33].

However, since 'Irāqī died in 1526 [Bashir 2003: 233] and Muḥammadšāh in 1538 [ŚRT: II 118], this statement is also anachronistic. If one considers the issue of the Hijri chronology that runs throughout the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr*, then it seems likely that the events concerning the destruction and reconstruction of the Ḥānqāh-i mu'allā took place during 'Irāqī's second stay in Kashmir after 1503. However, this would overlap with the time the mandate cited in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* was promulgated, and it is difficult to interpret their statements in terms of chronology. In any case, we cannot literally accept the description in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr*.

Next, the author examines the statements in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*. According to 'Alī Kašmīrī, Muḥammadšāh's mandate was promulgated during 'Irāqī's second stay in Kashmir. Since 'Irāqī died in 1526, this means that the mandate was issued between 1503 and 1526. During his second stay, Muḥammadšāh was on the throne from 1503 to 1505,³⁵ 1514 to 1515, and 1517 to 1526; therefore, the mandate was issued at some point during those periods. However, examining the movements of the attendants mentioned in the mandate reveals a discrepancy with the descriptions in the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*'s accounts, which supposedly rely on the *Rājāvalipatākā*.

According to the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*, the ministers when Muḥammadšāh took the throne for the second time were Mīr Sayyid Muḥammad Bayhaqī, Mūsā Rayna, and Ibrāhīm Māgrī. Šams Čak, whose name is mentioned in the mandate, was excluded from the regime and stayed in Kamrāj (<Skt. *Kramarāja*) in the northern Kashmir Valley [BS: 70b]. At some point during Muḥammadšāh's second reign, the battle of Sopore broke out, and Šams Čak, defeated in this battle, found it difficult to remain in the Kashmir Valley; therefore, he fled to Nawšahr, where Faṭḥšāh was staying, and joined him [BS: 71b]. Šams Čak became a minister during Faṭḥšāh's second reign but was imprisoned only four months later by Mūsā Rayna, who was also a minister, and later murdered [BS: 77a]. When Śuka began his historiography, there were three ministers serving Faṭḥšāh, namely Mūsā Rayna, Ibrāhīm Māgrī, and Malik Jahāngīr b. Miyān Ḥājī [ŚRT: I 16–20; Slaje 2023: 119–20]. That Mūsā Rayna's supremacy was established among them is reported by not only Śuka but also the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*'s anonymous author and 'Alī Kašmīrī [BS: 78b; Tuḥfat: II 43; Bashir 2003: 223]. The account of Faṭḥšāh's second reign in the *Bahāristān-i šāhī* is entirely consistent with the account in Śuka's *Rājatarānginī*; therefore, the anonymous author supposedly faithfully traced the information in the *Rājāvaliparākā*. Moreover, Šams Čak is not mentioned at all in Śuka's *Rājatarānginī*, probably because he died before 1513. The description in Śuka's *Rājatarānginī* excludes the possibility that the mandate was issued between 1514 and 1515 or between 1517 and 1526. Thus, the mandate could only have been issued between 1503 and 1505, when Šams Čak was alive and Muḥammadšāh was the Sulṭān. However, the descriptions in the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*, which

³⁵ According to the *Bahāristān-i šāhī*, the battle in which Faṭḥšāh regained the throne broke out on the 9th day of the month "ĀŠWŠT" in the *Saptarši* calendar [45]81 [BS: 75a].

seems to be based on the *Rājāvaliparākā*, suggest that Šams Čak could not have been in Srinagar during this period. In other words, at no time were the attendees referred to in the mandate all together.

Throughout the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb*, little attention is paid to the factional antagonism among the indigenous potentates of Kashmir at the time, and ‘Alī Kašmīrī writes as though ‘Irāqī had been on friendly terms with most of the influential figures of Kashmir. The reference to the leaders of the Māgrī, Čak, and Rayna clans in the mandate indicate that ‘Irāqī’s authority was omnipresent among the leading local clans in Kashmir. However, such a description is clearly inconsistent with Kashmir’s political history in the early sixteenth century, as assumed from other sources. We should therefore conclude that it is doubtful that the mandate cited in the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* was actually promulgated.

In sum, the contradictory accounts of the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā’s *waqf* custodianship in the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* and the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* cannot, in the author’s view, be regarded as records of historical facts. Unfortunately, because the contemporary sources—namely Śuka’s *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* and Mīrzā Ḥaydar’s *Tārīḥ-i Rašīdī*—contain no mentions of the Ḥānqāh, it is difficult to determine who the actual *waqf* custodian was at the time. At any rate, in the sixteenth century, two authors—one from the Nūrbahāšīya faction and another from the anti-Nūrbahāšīya faction—both claimed that the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā was a foothold for each faction to assert their legitimacy, and they believed that having the *waqf* custodianship would guarantee their legitimacy. They did not hesitate to blend false information in their writings to claim ownership of the Ḥānqāh. As the hagiographical politics over the Ḥānqāh’s ownership unfolded, the shrine without the saint’s body was elevated to a symbolic structure in Kashmiri Muslim society.

5. Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter can be summarized as follows. Regarding the construction of the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā, sources generally agree that the platform was first laid by ‘Alī Hamadānī, and the building was constructed by Muḥammad Hamadānī upon that foundation. The Ḥānqāh was then destroyed by arson in 1484 during the first reign of Muḥammadšāh and rebuilt the same year. The *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* misstates the timing of this event, while the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* is silent on the affair. The two subsequent histories of the Ḥānqāh differ completely in who they identify as the *waqf* custodian, with the *Tārīḥ-i Kašmīr* ultimately claiming it to be the author’s father while the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb* claims it to be the author’s master, namely ‘Irāqī. Although it is difficult to regard either of these claims as historical fact, the fact that two “narratives” have arisen—each of which attributes the custodianship of the *waqf* for the Ḥānqāh to its own faction—confirms the extent of the influence of the Ḥānqāh on the Kashmiri Muslim community, which had been developing in the sixteenth century. Whatever the historical facts, being a *waqf* custodian of the Ḥānqāh-i mu‘allā could be a means of asserting one’s legitimacy to the Muslims of Kashmir, so authors belonging to both factions embedded false narratives that would elevate the status of their own faction.

Even if there was such a historical background, there is no doubt that this building is important

to Kashmiri Muslims today. For them, the Ḥānqāh-i muʿallā in Srinagar is indeed a symbol of their religious life because the building witnessed the lives of Kashmiri Muslims for more than five centuries; the Ḥānqāh-i muʿallā has a long and piled-up history up to the present day.

However, the Ḥānqāh is now under threat. A social media account named “True Indology” posted a thread on X (formerly Twitter) on June 6, 2017, starting with the statement: “This Shrine of Hamadani had been built after destroying the temple of Goddess Kali and killing its priests.”³⁶ Claiming such a view is a typical one of subsequent issues after the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 like the cases of Ḥwāja Muʿīn al-Dīn Čišī’s shrine in Ajmer,³⁷ the Šāhī Jāmaʿ Masjid in Sambhal,³⁸ and the Atālā Masjid in Jaunpur.³⁹ As written above, the contemporary Sanskrit chronicler Jonarāja recorded nothing about the construction of the Ḥānqāh-i muʿallā; the view that the Ḥānqāh was built on a temple relies solely on a literal reading of the descriptions of the aforementioned Persian hagiographies without taking historical and sectarian context embedded in these texts into consideration. As the proverb “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes” goes, today we witness that, ironically, the hagiographical narratives about the Ḥānqāh-i muʿallā produced through political and sectarian antagonism in the sixteenth century are picked up and utilized in contemporary Kashmiri political discourse as if only several parts of these narratives that are in favor of justifying desecration of the Ḥānqāh were historical facts. What we literally need to face this issue is a substantial discussion about this issue based on source criticism of primary sources.

³⁶ <https://x.com/TrueIndology/status/872097585808510977>. See also Shakir Mir’s online article mentioned above.

³⁷ The Times of India article on Nov 28, 2024 (<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ajmer/ajmer-dargah-contains-pieces-of-temple-what-hindu-sena-petition-contains-about-khwaja-moinuddin-chishti-shrine/articleshow/115754462.cms>)

³⁸ BBC News on November 25, 2024 (<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3de7k5gk78o>).

³⁹ Omar Rashid’s article on thewire.in (<https://thewire.in/communalism/uttar-pradesh-atala-masjid-jaunpur-hindutva-survey-radar>)

6. Appendices

6.1. Text of the Copy of the Waqf Document

Aligarh Muslim University, Maulana Azad Library

Jawahar Museum Collection, Alif 1

71.5*28.0cm, 38 lines.

[۱] نقل مطابق اصل وقفنامه خانقاه معلی

[۲] بمهر و دستخط حضرت میر سید محمد همدانی قدس الله سره

[۳] بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

[۴] الحمد لله الذي وفق على عباده الصالحين والصلوة والسلام على سيد المرسلين وعلى آله واصحابه والطيبين [۵] فقير الحقير كثير التقصير والتواني محمد بن مير سيد علي الهمداني رضي الله تعالى عنه هميگويد كه چون حضرت والد بزرگوار ظلام زنگ كفر و شرك را بصيقل [۶] هدايت و ارشاد از دل سگان خطه كشمير زدوده و اين ملك را بجنبت نظير مخاطب ساخت و اهالي و موالي و ارکان دولت و اكابر و اصاغر آن ديار را [۷] بشرف اسلام مشرف ساخته باعانت و ياری پادشاه سعادت يار سلطان قطب الدين انار الله برهانه در موضع علا الدين پوره رباط خورد را ويران [۸] نموده طرح بنای خانقاه معلی کرده سلطان مذکوره از راه طوئيت اخلاص هر صبح و شام برای جماعت خمس اوقات و جمعه از موضع قطب الدين پوره [۹] در بقعه لطيف و منزل شريف حاضر ميبود مقدار سيصد و هشت درعه طولاً در ميان دو ياره بل و يكصد و بيست درعه عرضاً از حدّ دريای بهت [۱۰] تا بازار برای فنا و وسعت خانقاه معلی وقف کرده شد و سوای آن طرف شرقي مقدار همين سيصد و هشت درعه در طول و يكصد و ده درعه در عرض [۱۱] برای جمعيت مردم و ستور و دواب گذاشته شد چنانچه تا رسيدن اين فقير قليل البضاعت بی احاطه ديوار بود. چون اين فقير با جمعی از سادات در بلدة [۱۲] كشمير در وقت حكومت پادشاه دين پناه سلطان سكندر شاه بن سلطان قطب الدين شاه خلد الله ملكه رسيد حسب الخواش و التماس سلطان مذکور اين داعی مسلمين را حواشی خدمه آن سعادتمند [۱۳] باعزاز و تكريم بدان بقعه رسانيده اند سلطان امارت مآب بر صفة كه والد بزرگوار حسب الفرموده جدّ عالمقدار [۱۴] بنا نموده بود خانقاه قايم ساخته برای آن وقف خاص كرد موضع وچي از پرگنه شاوره و قريه نونه وني از پرگنه مارنند و قصبه ترال از پرگنه اولر [۱۵] تا متمكنان و مجاوران خانقاه محظوظ و محفوظ شوند و همه بصلاح و ورع اقدام نمايند و فقرا و مساكين صالح و اتقياء صديقين فايح از ثمره اين شجره محمود [۱۶] باشند و منزويان زاويه آن بقعه بحضور لی مع الله وقت موصوف باشند تا بفارغبال و حضور حال باوراد و وظاف [وظايف؟] حضرت والد بزرگوار مشغول توانند بود [۱۷] و در ازمنه صالحه بادعيه فاتحه پادشاه عهد مشغول توانند شد و بدین بقعه مذکور و بدین قريات مذكوران متولی گردانیده شد برادر ارشد امجد اشرف [۱۸] مولانا محمد سعيد اطال الله عمره تا درین بقعه متصرف باشد و از احوال و اعمال ساكنان و مسافران با خبر باشد و بزرگانرا خادم و كهترانرا برادر و [۱۹] يتيمان

را پدر باشد و نفع جمیع دهات را ناظر و حافظ و ناصر و متفحص باشد و اوراد و وظایف را بجا آورده باشد باوجود استمداد بوقت فرصت طلب مراد را [۲۰] باز نماند و زمام اهتمام بدست تصاریف امور فانیۀ مکدر و منغص دنیویۀ ندهند تا از زمرۀ مردودان منکوس و مطرودان منحوس نگردد که [۲۱] پنداشته و مطلوب را مهروب انگاشته و حق را بمستحق مصروف نرساند و از وقفیات مذکورین هر سال موازی هزار و دویست خروار شالی و ده هزار جیتل بوجه خرج خود [۲۲] بگیرد و باقی آنچه نوشته شده است در طومار و فرمان سلاطین آن جزئیات را عمل کند و در صلاح وقاء متمکنان خانقاه نیک مشغول باشد تا اگر از درویشی [۲۳] نعوذ بالله ذلتی واقعشود آنرا یکبار و دوبار عفو کند و اگر سوم کرت ازو آنچنان ببیند او را منع و زجر کند بلکه او را از خانقاه اخراج کند و طعام دو وقت [۲۴] هر روزی برای فقرای جوار و ساکنان خانقاه میسر دارد و در میان خواجه و گدا و امیر و وزیر و صغیر و کبیر و خورد و بزرگ تسویه رعایت کند نه آنکه در پیش [۲۵] بزرگان اکثر و الطف طعام گذارد و نزد خوردان اقل و اسک طعام بدهد و برهنگانرا بیوشاند و گرسنگانرا سیر گرداند تا عند الله ماخوذ نباشد و از برای نمک [۲۶] مطبخ خانقاه دو صد مرد لوانی نیز وقف کرده آنهم در تصرف مولانا باشد و در سلک تفحص و تفحیض باشد [...] و ملک دیوی گنایی را ناظر احوال و مشرف [۲۷] احوال و اقوال مولانا سعید گردانیدیم تا در جزئیات امور اوقاف حاضر و ناظر باشد تا اگر تیره روزگاری از عمای حرص و حسد درین اوقاف طمع کند [۲۸] و دست زور و زیادتی دراز کند خدمت ملک دیوی گنایی او را از آن کار باز دارد و اگر مولانا سعید حق بمستحق نرساند و اهمال دارد او را نصیحت کند [۲۹] خلاء و ملاء تا او را از آن اهمال منزجر گردد پس عرض ازین مقدمات و مقصود ازین عبارات و اشارات آن است که دانسته شد که دنیا و لذت دنیا همه سر بسر [۳۰] باد است و مقصد اصلی و عرض حقیقی آنست که حاصل نمیشود مگر بخیر کلی و خیر کلی آنست که جمیع جزئیات خیر را کسی مراعات کند پس یکی از همه خیرات اوقات است [۳۱] که سبب نظام اسلام و اهل اسلام است و واسطه داشت جانهای دعاهای فقرا و ایتام است فلاجرم عدم تعرض باوقات از جمله مهمات ملک و عمال است که [۳۲] رعایت بهترین اعمال است پس این وصیت بر زمرۀ جمله اهل اسلام است که آنچه درین وقفنامه نوشته شده است بران موجب عمل کنند و در محصول اوقاف [۳۳] این خانقاه همدانیه دست ظلم دراز نکنند و آنچه مکتوب و مسطور است درین توقیع آنرا تغییر و تبدیل رواندارند آیه شریفه فمن بدل بعد ما سمعه فاتما اثمه علی الذین یبدلونہ را نصب العین دانسته این خیر جاری بسد [۳۴] هوای شیطانی و وساوس نفسانی محکم نگردانند که وسیعالم الذین ظلموا [۳۵] ائی منقلب ینقلبون پیش نظر ببینند که گرفتن خیر قلیل موجب شرکثیر است خصوصا خیریکه آن کثیر بود چگونه بود و بدانند که خراب کردن اوقاف نه خیریت [۳۶] دین و دنیاست و از تصرف و تعرض باوقاف خانقاه همدانیه نپرهیزد که تا درویشان بجمعیّت خاطر بر محصول آن اراضی اوقاف بطنا بعد بطن و قرنا بعد قرن [۳۷] الی ما تناسلوا او توالدوا قابض بوده بصرف مصارف خود نموده بدعا کوءی دوام دولت پادشاه عهد و سلاطین وقت مشغول باشد تحریر [۳۸] فی التاریخ تاسع عشر من ربیع الثانی سنه ۷۹۷ هجری سبع و تسعین و سبعمائه فقط

Notes

- Line 4: FK1 and FK2 state “*waffaqa jamī‘ ‘ibāda*” in place of “*waffaqa ‘alā ‘ibāda*.”
- Line 4: FK1 and FK2 do not have “*‘alā*” at “*‘alā āli-hi*.”
- Line 4: FK1 and FK2 state “*wa aṣḥābi-hi al-ṭayyibīn al-ṭāhirīn*.”
- Line 5: FK1 and FK2 state “*‘anhumā*” in place of “*‘anhu*.”
- Line 8: FK1 and FK2 state “*kard*” in place of “*karda*.”
- Line 8: FK1 and FK2 state “*ḥamsa wa awqāt-i jumla*” in place of “*ḥamsa wa awqāt-i jum‘a*.”
- Line 8: FK1 and FK2 state “*maḥallah*” in place of “*mawḍi‘*.”
- Line 8: FK1 and FK2 have “*ki*” after “*Qutb al-Dīn pura*.”
- Line 9: FK1 and FK2 state “*mašrab*” in place of “*YARH BL*.”
- Line 13: FK1 and FK2 state “*imārat-nišān*” in place of “*imārat-ma‘āb*.”
- Line 14: FK2 states “*way*” in place of “*barāyi*.”
- Line 16: FK1 and FK2 state “*wazā‘if*” in place of “*wazẓāf*.”
- Line 17: FK1 and FK2 have “*dīn*” after “*pādišāh*.”
- Line 19: FK1 does not have “*ba-waqt*.”
- Line 23: FK1 and FK2 have “*wa taqṣīrī*” after “*zallatī*.”
- Line 23: FK1 does not have “*az ū*” after “*karrat*.”
- Line 25: FK1 does not have “*buzurgān*.”
- Line 26: FK1 and FK2 state “*mardīwānī*” in place of “*MRDLWANY*.”
- Line 26: FK1 states “*waqt tā ān nīz*” in place of “*ānham*.”
- Line 27: FK1 and FK2 state “*gardānam*” in place of “*gardānīdīm*.”
- Line 35: FK1 states “*čiziki*” in place of “*hayriki*.”
- Line 37: FK1 ends with “*qābiḍ u mutaṣarrif būda bāšad*.”

6.2. English translation of the *waqf* document

A copy that corresponds to the original in terms of content of the handwriting *waqf* document of Ḥānqāh-i Mu‘allā, with the seal of His Holiness Mīr Sayyid Muḥammad Hamadānī —May God purify his secret—

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

Praise be to God, who guides His righteous servants to success. Peace and blessings be upon the chief of the Messengers, his household, his companions, and the good people.⁴⁰

I, Muḥammad b. Mīr Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī —May God be pleased with him—,⁴¹ who is weak-willed and full of lassitude, say the following. When the great father (‘Alī Hamadānī) led he

⁴⁰ This follows the original text’s notation of *al-ṭayyibīn*. Usually, after the praise to the first generation of the *aṣḥāb*, praise to the second generation (*al-tābi‘īn*) is listed. In the FK, Nūrī writes, “His companions (*aṣḥābi-hi al-ṭayyibīn al-ṭāhirīn*) who are good and pure.”

⁴¹ This optative phrase is for ‘Alī Hamadānī, who was already deceased at the time this text was written. In contrast, in the FK, the optative phrase is in the dual form, and is for the two people ‘Alī Hamadānī and Muḥammad Hamadānī.

dark rust of unbelief and polytheism being scraped away from our hearts of the people of Kashmir by the whetstone of guidance and instruction, made this kingdom to be called *Jannat-naẓīr* (the place resembling paradise), bathed the people of this region, the noble people, the pillars of the dynasty, and the people of all ranks in the glory of Islam, with the help and assistance of Sulṭān Quṭb al-Dīn —may God illuminate his proof—who is a friend of fortune, and planned to destroy a small hermitage (*ribāṭ*) in the place called ‘Alā al-Dīn pura, and to construct a noble Ḥānqāh, and when the aforementioned sulṭān used to come from the place called Quṭb al-Dīn pura to the place of beauty and nobility to gather [for prayer] five times every morning and evening and on Fridays out of his intention of loyalty, he (Quṭb al-Dīn) made the land measuring 308 *dir’a* (yard) in length between two bathing places (YARHBL)⁴² and 120 *dir’a* in width from the river bank of the Vitastā River (*daryā-yi BHT*) to the bāzār a *waqf* for the front garden of the Ḥānqāh-i Mu‘allā. Separately, on the east side, an area of 308 *dir’a* in length and 110 *dir’a* in width was set aside for the use of people and pack animals. This was not enclosed by walls until I, a person lacking in talent arrived [in Kashmir]. When I arrived in the city of Kashmir with the group of Sayyids in the reign of the refuge of faith, the Emperor, Sulṭān Sikandar Šāh b. Sulṭān Quṭb al-Dīn Šāh —may God make his kingship everlasting—I sent the group to this estate with affection and respect to join the ranks of those who serve the fortunate place of prayer for these Muslims, in accordance with the request and demand of the aforementioned Sulṭān. The Sulṭān, the receptacle of governance, built the Ḥānqāh on the platform (*ṣuffa*) built by the great father by order of his high ancestor.⁴³ He also dedicated as *waqf* the place called Wači⁴⁴ in the Pargana of Šāwura,⁴⁵ the village called Nonavanī in the Pargana of Mārtaṇḍ⁴⁶ and the qasbah called Traḷ⁴⁷ in the Pargana of Ural. May the inhabitants of the Ḥānqāh and its vicinity would be fortune and protected. May all people would make an effort to be just and pious. May poor persons and needy men would be just and faithful God-fearing persons would be fragrant thanks to the fruits of this honorable tree. May the hermits of this estate of Zāwiya be described by the words “I have a time with Allah” (*lī ma‘ Allāhi waqtun*. i.e., they are in a state of spiritual communion with Allah). And they were able to spend their time in the condition of *ḥāl* without any distraction to engage in the service and *awlād* [established by] the great father, and to offer prayers for the success of the ruler of the time when it was appropriate.

The great and noble eldest brother, Mawlānā Muḥammad Sa‘īd —may God lengthen his life— was appointed as the custodian of the aforementioned estate and the aforementioned villages. [He should] dispose of the estate, and to be well-acquainted with the conditions and actions of the people who live there and the travelers who visit it, and to be a retainer to the powerful, a brother

⁴² This is a Kashmiri word. In the FK, Nūrī uses instead an Arabic word *mašrab*.

⁴³ Considering the anecdote in the MJ, it probably refers to prophet Muḥammad.

⁴⁴ 33°48’20”N, 75°2’36”E.

⁴⁵ One of the eight Parganas in the Shopian region of the south-west Kashmir valley [Bates 1873: 342; Stein 1900: 2, 473].

⁴⁶ Martand is the name of a region in the southeast of the Kashmir Basin, and is famous for the Surya temple built by Lalitāditya Muktāpīḍa (r. 724–60) of the Karkota dynasty. The name of the village, Nonavanī, is probably the same as NOWBUG NAI, which is introduced in Bates 1873 as a long and narrow village lying to the south-east of Kashmir [Bates 1873: 295].

⁴⁷ A village located at 34°30’ north latitude and 75° east longitude, along the Kishanganga River [Bates 1873: 385].

to the young, and a father to the orphans. [He should] be the one who manages, preserves, protects, and investigates all the revenues collected from the villages, and to fulfill the extra-regulation acts of worship. [He should] be the one who, despite everything being in place at the right time, does not let the desire to achieve the goal be hindered. [He should] not let the reins of effort be grasped by the hands directed towards fleeting actions that cause sorrow and turmoil in this world. Besides, [he should] not consider what has escaped to be what should be desired, and do not consider what should be desired to have escaped, and should not try to prevent rights from reaching who should be received, that is, should not be corrupted again by a group of those who have been rejected, or be made unhappy by those who have been expelled.⁴⁸

Moreover, from the income of the aforementioned *waqf* assets, 1200 *ḥarwār* of rice and 10,000 *jītal* [coins] should be obtained each year as his own expenditure. [He should] carry out the details of the matters written in the scrolls and mandates of the Sultāns with the remaining income. [He should] ensure that the good people who have the right to the Ḥānqāh are properly protected. If a dervish —may God save him—does something vile, forgive him the first and second time. If he finds him doing such a thing a third time, keep him away and expel him from the Ḥānqāh. He should prepare food twice a day for the poor people in the neighborhood and for those staying in the Ḥānqāh. He should treat the noble and the poor, the *amīr* and the *wazīr*, the lowly and the powerful, the young and the old, equally. He should not give more and better food to the adults and less and poorer food to the young. He should clothe the naked and feed the hungry. For this, he would not be held accountable in the presence of God [on the Day of Resurrection]. In addition, 200···(illegible)···for salt (to secure the cost of ingredients for meals) in the kitchen of the Ḥānqāh will also be made into *waqf*, and they will be placed under the possession of Mawlānā and will be [subject to] investigation and management.

We appoint Malik Dīwī Ganāʾī as the supervisor of Mawlānā Saʿīd's affairs and inspector of his conduct, so that he may be informed of any trivialities concerning the various *waqf* assets. If any unfortunate person, out of being blinded by the haze of greed and envy, tries to take possession of these assets by the hands of force and overreaching, Malik Dīwī Ganāʾī should prevent him from doing. If Mawlānā Saʿīd is negligent and does not deliver the rights to the rightful recipients, then he (Malik Dīwī Ganāʾī) should warn, whether in private or in public, so that he does not fall into such negligence.

Now, the intention of the foregoing statements, and the purpose of these explanations and instructions, is as follows: It is known that this world and the pleasures of this world are all but like the wind. The essential purpose and the true intention are only achieved through universal goodness. Universal goodness is that a person adheres to all the details of goodness. Every good deed is a cause for the order of Islam and the people of Islam, and an opportunity to protect the


⁴⁸ The meaning of the first part, “what has escaped” and “those who have been rejected” and “those who have been expelled,” is similar to worldly amusements and materialistic pleasures, and the second part, “what should be desired,” is the truth of Allah that should be aimed for in *taṣawwuf*, and the main point of this passage is that we should devote ourselves to the truth of Allah without being distracted by worldly things.

lives of the poor and orphans, and to pray for them. In short, the elimination of unjust claims to *waqf* assets is one of the important matters of kings and officials, such that observing it is the best deed. This advice is addressed to all Muslims to implement what is written in this *waqf* document in accordance with the motivation, and to prevent the hands of oppression from reaching the income of the *waqf* assets of this Khanqah of Hamadāniya, and to not allow any changes or alterations to be made to the contents written and recorded in this document with sign. Understand that the verse **“But whoever changes the will after hearing it, the blame will only be on those who made the change”** (Qur’ān 2:181) is in front of you, and do not let the wall of the devil’s desires and temptations of selfishness harden against this current good deed and keep in mind the verse **“The wrongdoers will come to know what evil end they will meet”** (Qur’ān 26:227) because taking a little good is a cause of much evil. And how much more so if [one takes] much good? Know also that it is not a good deed in faith or in this world to ruin the *waqf* assets. Do not dispose of the *waqf* assets of the Ḥānqāh of Hamadāniya or claim unjust rights over them. For dervishes, their descendants and their descendants’ descendants, being at peace, can possess the benefit of the land of the *waqf* assets, spend it on their own needs, and pray for the fortunes of the rulers and Sultāns of the time to be perpetuated.

Written on the nineteenth of Rabī‘ al-ṭānī, of the year AH 797 (February 11, 1395).⁴⁹ End.

⁴⁹ In FK1, Nūrī gives the date as the seventeenth of Rabī‘ al-awwal the same year (January 10, 1395).

6.3. *Silsila* Lines Descended from Najm al-Dīn Kubrā



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In the Shadow of the Mughal Court Mullā Tuḡrā's Travels to Kashmir

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Ancient and medieval accounts of Kashmir provide information about the various routes in and out of the Valley. The renowned seventh-century Chinese monk and traveler Xuanzang, one of the earliest sources on the subject, simply wrote that one gets there after “crossing over mountains and treading along precipices, passing over chain bridges”[Xuanzang 1884: I 147]. The eleventh-century Muslim scholar al-Bīrūnī also described the route briefly, although he does not seem to have visited Kashmir himself, “Kashmir lies on a plateau surrounded by high inaccessible mountains. ...The best-known entrance to Kashmir is from the town Babrahan, halfway between the rivers Sindh and Jailam [Jhelum]”[al-Bīrūnī 1971: 206]. Jumping ahead to the early modern period, the Mughal conquest of the region in 1586 under the emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605) initiated a great deal of traffic to Kashmir from the plains. For half a century, Srinagar, or Kashmir as it was known, was also a resort for the imperial family, especially for the emperors Jahāngīr (r. 1605–27) and Šāh Jahān (r. 1628–56), who frequently summered there and commissioned numerous gardens and buildings in and around the city. Akbar’s historian Abū al- Faḏl, in his encyclopedic gazetteer the *Ā’in-i Akbarī*, described more than one way to reach the Valley, “From Hindustan there are twenty-six routes, but the Bhimbar and Paklī routes are the best and most easily traveled by horse. The first of these is shorter and has several different ways, three of which are good: (1) Hastī Watar, which was formerly the route for armies, (2) Pīr Panjal, by which His Majesty entered the Happy Vale of Kashmir three times. If a cow or a horse is killed in these mountains, immediately clouds and wind arise, and rain and snow fall. (3) Tangtala”[Thackston n.d.; Abū al-Faḏl 1891: 348–9]. The number of routes and information about them kept increasing over time.

During Šāh Jahān’s reign, the court historian ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Lāhorī, in his *Pādšāhnāmah*, describes the four most popular routes between Lahore and Kashmir in great detail, with one more stage than found in Abū al-Faḏl’s text. The Pīr Panjal route, which came to be called the Mughal or Imperial road, was the one favored by the Mughal court. According to Lāhorī:



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It is “80 imperial leagues long. From Lahore to Bhimbar, where the road is flat, there are 8 stages and the way is 33 leagues long; from Bhimbar to Kashmir, which is in the mountains, there are 12 stages, and the way is 47 leagues long. Passage, most of which is through towering mountains, is so difficult that camels can go no farther than Bhimbar and loads have to be borne by elephants, horses, and pack animals, which means that the *pīshānas* have to be reduced on this route relative to others. For that reason, from the time of His Majesty Jannat-Makānī on it has been ordered that in eleven of the twelve stopping places—Joghatti, Nowshera, Changez Hatti, Rajaur, Thana, Bairamgala, Poshiana, Ladhi Muhammadquli, Hirapur, Shaja Marg, and Khanpur—a structure which is called a *ladhi* in the idiom of the people of Kashmir, comprising a harem and a hall of private audience, should be built, and each of the structures should be assigned to the care of one of the great lords. Should the imperial retinue take any other route to Kashmir the same procedure is followed along the stages of the mountains. Although the Pīr Panjal route is better and shorter than the other three, it is not possible to reach Kashmir by this route in time to see the blossoms and tulips because there is snow on the top of the Pīr Panjal Pass until the end of Urdibihisht [late May], which is the end of spring”[Thackston n.d.].¹

This route continued to be used later by British travelers to the Kashmir Valley, many of whom described the Mughal caravanserais at various stations along the way. One of the most detailed travelogues was written by Frederick Drew, a geologist in the employ of the Maharaja of Kashmir. In 1875, Drew published his *The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories: A Geographical Account*, and two years later a version of it for a general audience with the title, *The Northern Barrier of India: A Popular Account of the Jummoo and Kashmir Territories* [Drew 1875; Drew 1877]. Drew’s work was both a travelogue and guidebook for intrepid travelers to the vast mountainous kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir along with a great deal of ethnographic details about the people of the region.

No Indo-Persian prose travelogues about Kashmir were written in the Mughal period, but around twenty or so poets composed poems, either in the *qasīdah* or *maṭnavī* forms, on various topics associated with the Valley, chiefly celebrating its natural beauty and the Mughal gardens and buildings dotting the landscape. The best known and influential poems were those by the poet laureate Kalīm Hamadānī (d. 1651) and Qudṣī Mašhadī (d. 1646), the two senior poets of Šāh Jahān’s court. Although most of these poems were about the Mughal gardens and natural beauty of Kashmir, some of them included a poetic description of the difficult journey, especially crossing the Pīr Panjal pass.²

A lesser-known poet of the time whose works are virtually unknown to modern scholars, Mullā Tuḡrā Mašhadī (d. before 1667–8), was one of the many Iranian *émigré* poets of the seventeenth century and one who also wrote about traveling to Kashmir. Although primarily a poet, his prose works, in the form of short essays (*inšā*) and letters (*ruqa’āt*) were especially admired and

¹ Unpublished translation by Wheeler M. Thackston.

² This topic is explored by [Sharma 2017: 125–66].

imitated in India, and were published numerous times in lithographed editions in the nineteenth century. Tuḡrā was known to have used Hindi words in his Persian works, as noted by the eighteenth-century man of letters Ḥān Ārzū (d. 1756), but this was increasingly common in Indo-Persian literature of the time [Gulčīn-i Ma‘ānī 1369/1990: I 813–22]. He was the object of satire composed by several major poets, and interestingly, there is no account of him in any major contemporary source. Thus, we don’t have a great deal of factual information about his life. We can piece together the facts that Mullā Tuḡrā came to India at the end of Jahāngīr’s reign. He was in the Deccan for some time, then was in the service of Prince Murād Baḥš (d. 1661), son of Šāh Jahān, as his *munšī*. He accompanied Murād Baḥš on the infamous campaign to regain the Mughal ancestral lands in Central Asia in 1646. Following this, Tuḡrā went to Kashmir with the dīwān Mīrzā Abū al-Qāsim (Qāzizādah), with whom he had a falling out at some point. Our poet died in Kashmir and was buried in the graveyard of Persian poets in Srinagar. The eighteenth-century chronicle writer, Muḥammad A‘zam Dīdahmarī, in his *Wāqī‘āt-i Kašmīr, Tārīḥ-i A‘zamī*, writes that Tuḡrā wrote a great deal of verse in praise of Kashmir, and especially notes his work on the imperial route to the valley [Dīdahmarī 1995: 317–8]. A‘zamī also says that Tuḡrā “had a strange independence or detachment” (*istiḡnā-yi ‘ajībī dāšt*), which might explain his shadowy presence among the Mughals. Tuḡrā composed three essays on the beauty of Kashmir, all in mixed prose and verse: *Risālah-yi Tī‘dād al-nawādir* (On the Enumeration of Rarities), *Risālah-yi Firdawsīyah* (The Paradisial Treatise), and *Risālah-yi Tajallīyat* (On Manifestations).³

Tuḡrā’s *Tī‘dād al-nawādir* is a short rhapsodic guide-book, listing the eight stations on the Mughal road to Kashmir. The basic template of each part of the work consists of a few sentences in rhyming prose, including one (and in one instance two) phrase(s) from the Qur’ān, and ending with a quatrain (*rubā‘ī*). The language of the work, in keeping with the genre of *inšā*, is extremely rhetorical and replete with wordplay. The poet begins the work with this sentence and two quatrains: “*Risālah-yi Tī‘dād-i nawādir* comprises colorful essays; for the meaning-seeker, *inšā* is the capital of charming fancies.

Rubā‘ī 1

In the dark land of India, I became despondent.
From sorrow of the black soil, I became old.
Perhaps I would find the flower of youth,
I set off for Kashmir in the spring season.

Rubā‘ī 2

In the mountainous region of fresh temperament,
Flower and wine cup took the place of clay and brick.
Although the path has a thousand tuba trees,
The stations are eight like the gardens of paradise.”

³ These short works were gathered together in *Rasā’il-e Tuḡrā* (Kanpur: Matba‘-e Mustafā’ī, 1864). For my translation in this paper, I have used the text found in [Rashidī (ed.) 1967: 749–55].

The image of black India and the trope of being depressed and homesick in a state of exile frequently appear in the poetry of Iranian *émigré* poets at the Mughal court in the seventeenth century.⁴ A new element is added here by the poet's mood being lightened at the prospect of a trip to the beautiful land of Kashmir. Tuḡhrā then goes on to describe the first station on the road.

1. Joghatti

“Due to its rejuvenating air, the heart's bud is rescued from wilting, and due to the felicitous atmosphere, the sorrow of leaflessness has been removed. The breezes of its mountains have softened the fierce-natured ones, and the scent of its trees has reformed the wrong-minded. Until the wise man set up a *panīhar* [cistern] for the people of this place, they did not receive [the judgment]: *The companions of fire and paradise are not equal* (59:20).⁵ A spring with its bubbling mouth is desirous for the sake of *tasnīm*, the stream with its wave-tongue seeks tribute from the pool of *kausar*.⁶

From its moisture, a stone provides the satiety of greenery.
Its fresh flowers provide a lesson to the whirlpool.
From the mountain spring (*čāšmah*), a hundred eyes (*čāšm*) of desire opened
so that it gives its own eye due to the sprouting of courtliness (*adab*).⁷

With this cluster of metaphors and use of ornate prose and verse, it may be difficult to discern the fact that Tuḡhrā is describing an actual place rather than a poetic fantasy. But Joghathi seems to be a place situated in Rajouri district; it was the first stop on the way to the Kashmir valley near the Hathinala Pass after Bhimbhar. On 3 November 1621, the emperor Jahāngīr describes setting up camp there on his way back to the plains: “A slave named Murād had planned the buildings in this station, and he had done them beautifully. There is a nice platform in the middle of the palace. It is much better than other stations” [Jahāngīr 1999: 350].⁷ The reader is thus expected to imagine a real place that not only has associations with paradise, but one that is even better than paradise. Tuḡhrā reinforces this idea in the second station.

2. Naušahra [Nowshera]

“Although the inside of its fort has faded in color to an unadorned tower of poppy-seed (*kuknār*), the outside from the leaf of ornament, like a fortress of tulips is worthy of display. In its genius,

⁴ This theme is discussed by [Dale 2003].

⁵ Quotations from the Qur'an are in quotations with the sura and verse provided in parentheses.

⁶ *Tasnīm* is the fountain or spring in paradise, while *kausar* is the river or pond of abundance in paradise that will sate the thirst of the ones who rise up on the Day of Judgment.

⁷ Thackston reads the name of this place tentatively as “Chauki Hatti [?].”

it calls itself better than paradise with lofty pillars (*iram-e zāt al-‘imād*), and as *The likes of them had never been created in the land* (89:8), it knows its own worth. Loveliness winks from its gate over the good and bad, and grace laughs from its crenellations over the white and black. An extremely beautiful tower reposes on its slope, and an elegant moat winds around it. A bazaar stretches out before it impatiently, and a river behind it weakly calls out in complaint.

Spring has become maddened by the season of summer,
The time of autumn has become better than spring.
So pure is the earth on the slope of its mountain
that a hundred waters have placed their head at its feet.”

Here we have more concrete images of an inhabited place. As it turns out, Nowshera is a large town in Rajouri district where the ruins of an old caravanserai and hammam are to be found today. This stop is described by Jahāngīr as having a fortress that was built under Akbar [Jahāngīr 1999: 74]. The large sarāy contains two enclosures, and the outer enclosure has double-storied bastions with a crenellated battlement. The palace complex faces the river. The Mangla Fort is also located nearby, to which Tuḡrā may be making a reference when he mentions crenellations. In this place, natural beauty exists along with the magnificence of Mughal buildings, which together intoxicate the viewer. Tuḡrā begins his next section with a reference to intoxication too, one of the most common tropes in Persian poetry.

3. Changez Hatti (Chakkar Hatti, Chingus Sarai)

“Here emerald-making of bhang has not become a custom, for it can be called the ruby-work of wine. The nightingale of this place without crows does not breathe the spirit of the red royal falcon (Lāl Šahbāz), and the deer of this plain without donkeys does not graze on the breath of Bābā Kapūr. The quality of the air has refreshed the clouds up high. If the breeze of this pleasure place opens the hand of investigation, *Indeed, the wrongdoers will be in pleasure*, flowers will emerge from the book.

The moist eye of the water is bright with buildings,
Its pool has opened the book of water with waves,
The fountains did not rest for a moment
Always standing like [the letter] alif over the water.”

We learn from his memoirs that in 1626 Jahangir celebrated Naurūz, the Persian new year, in Changez Hatti [Jahāngīr 1999: 455]. Incidentally, the following year when the emperor died on the road his body was brought here and buried until his remains could be taken for an official burial in Lahore. Tuḡrā contrasts the red color of the building with the greenery of the landscape, something that can still be seen in a contemporary photo. The references to Lāl Šahbāz and Bābā

Kapūr, two renowned Sufis whose shrines are pilgrimage spots in Sehwan (Sindh) and Gwalior, connect Kashmir to the spiritual networks of the larger Mughal empire.⁸ With his Arabic sentence, Tuḡrā in an ironic twist actually combines two different verses from the Sura al-Infītār of the Quran: *Indeed, the righteous will be in pleasure* (82:13) and *And indeed, the wicked will be in hellfire* (82:14).

4. Rajaur (Rajouri, the ancient Rājapurī, or in Al-Bīrūnī, Rājawarī)

“If the son of its landowner (*zamīndār*) had not dropped some wheat, Adam—may God purify him—would not have given a barley of his heart for wheat. And if the daughter of its governor were not brown-skinned, the prophet Ḥizr would not have put on green. From the reflection of the beauties, the land has found the source of freshness, and from the shade of the cypress-statured ones the waters gracefully rush forward. If the painter of creation had made the faces of greenery so beautifully. *We have created man in the best of molds* (95:4), there would be no oyster.

Its mountain is a green idol, full of airs and coquetry,
 Its two waterfalls are two tresses
 Standing on every side with a beautiful waist
 are graceful firs.”

Rajouri is a large town now that is built on both sides of the River Tawi. Until recent times there were numerous remains of Mughal buildings, most notably the caravanserai that Tuḡrā would have known. In this place although nature and the landscape are emphasized, it is the beloved’s body that is the focus of the poet. In an unusual image, in the quatrain the entire mountain is described as a beautiful beloved, appropriating the entire landscape as a poetic metaphor. The allusions are to the prophets Adam and Ḥizr.

5. Thana (Thhanamandī)

“Due to the level of its air it has an eyebrow on the page of cloud-reaching flowers, the face of its ground from the colorfulness of its tropes cannot take in the sight of the rose-garden. The loftiness of its portico pushed to the side the words of lowness of the heavenly throne, the parasol of its arch has made the horizon the face of subjugation of the sun. Its pool is a bride with the mirror of purity on its knee, who has opened its hair to comb it with waves. For its walk, marble stones have become the carpet on the dust of its path, and the ground where it appears heard from the flowing water. *Woe unto me, would that I were dust* (78:40).

Every drop of it has become better than a fresh pearl,
 In desire for it, the luster of the pearl has become pale.
 Its fountain is as a tall cypress tree,

⁸ For the former, see [Boivin 2008: 77]; for the latter, see [Gold 2015: 69].

the water thrown up is a chador on its head.”

In Thhanamandī, Tughrā returns to the architecture of the caravanserai and Mughal architectural marvels, combining his references to a personification of the natural beauty of the place. Incidentally, in the nineteenth-century, Drew describes the sarāy in Thana as a fine example of architecture, commenting that “the rooms are larger and higher than in usual, but fewer in number”[Drew 1975: 93].

6. Bairamkala (or Baramgala, Bahramgala)

“Under the force of the abundant greenery, every mountain gives a hundred emerald mines as land tax, and due to the abundantly fresh tulips the hills lay a thousand ruby mines in the ground. Its trees like the painted picture of a pheasant are all lush, and its river like a peacock-like spring by diving has produced flowers. If the silver mine were not boiling due to the fiery tulips, the waterfall at the peak of the mountain would not seem to be melting silver. Anyone who has not seen this heavenly waterfall, he has not understood *We send down from the sky* (25:48).

From a drop, the vines in the mountain have been kissed.
From waves, furrows have appeared in the mountain’s breast.
It never lifts its foot from the head of the mountain
since the rebellious mountain settled on the mountain.”

This place is called Bhairavagala in the twelfth-century Sanskrit chronicle, *Rājataranginī*, by Kalhaṇa, in Poonch district. Jahangir had set up camp here on 29 October 1621. He mentions “an extremely fine waterfall” there. Moved by the beauty of the place, he had an inscription placed there and a court poet, Bebadal Khan composed a few verses [Jahāngīr 1999: 349]. Šāh Jahān too stopped at this place on 7 June 1634. The historian ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd describes it in these words: “On either side of it are mountains filled with flowers and pine trees towering to the skies. It has a river, the source of which is Tal Parian, and for its sweetness and delicacy of it could be said, “This is fresh and sweet”[35:12]. The imperial ladhi in Ṣafar Ḥān’s charge is on the bank. In a valley in the mountain is a waterfall over which three or four millstones of water pours from a height of thirty ells into the river, and by order of His Majesty Jannat-Makānī a platform of stone was constructed opposite the waterfall. The next day, since it was the Feast of the Sacrifice, a halt was observed there, and after the ritual of slaughter was performed the emperor made a tour of the waterfall and then engaged in a *qumargha* hunt, during which five *rammu* goats that appeared on the slope of a mountain, despite the distance, were shot, and seven *rammus* were captured by the foot soldiers.”

⁹ For Tughrā, the features of the landscape are precious gifts from God.

⁹ *Pādshāhnāmāh*, trans. Wheeler M. Thackston.

7. Poshana

“Due to their similarity of its trees to the date palm on Mt. Sinai it has a noble lineage, and due to the correspondence of its river to the spring of Kausar it has a fine family tree. Every mountain is an Aḥmad Zhindapīl wearing a robe of greenery, and every hill is an Ibrāhīm Adham in a three-piece suit. Its air makes a bouquet of the flowers of clouds, and its atmosphere collects fresh, red tulips in its skirt. From its agriculture, the theme *In each spike there is a hundred grains* (2:261) is apparent, and from the stream of its location, the meaning of *That we may bring forth grain and vegetation* (78:15) is clear.

Without seeds the ground became better than the azure sky,
 From the fertility of its soil, hard rock became verdant.
 If its spring would be fated to have a drought
 Without water, it becomes a green silky garden.”

Pusiana, or Pushyananda as it appears in the history of Kalhaṇa, is the last stop, officially in Poonch district. Jahangir mentions it as being very steep [Kalhaṇa 1900: 398].¹⁰ Drew noted the remains of a small *sarāy*, commenting that there was not much flat land even to pitch a tent [Drew 1875: 93]. In Tuḡrā’s description, there is a sacred geography attached to the land: from the stream of paradise to the names of notable Sufis from the Iranian world. The land is not just verdant, it is fertile as well.

The last description in Tuḡrā’s work is not a Mughal station, but the Pir Panjal pass which would take the traveler over the imposing mountain range into the Kashmir valley.

8. Pīr Panjal

“If the hyacinth of the night had roots in its mountain, it would have thought the green hill of heaven to be non-existent; and if the wild rose got pleasure from the moon in its stream, it would not have asked a favor of water from the spring of the sun. The pheasant of its trees with the murmur of *Gardens underneath which rivers flow* (61:12) in a fresh voice, and the partridge of the mountain chanting *Within it is a flowing spring* (88:12) in a colorful tune. Water is available to the water-carrier of birds from its air, the tree of life from its earth is plentiful for the Adam of water. It doesn’t have dust, but if a speck rises from the earth, it sifts the turquoise dust with the sieve of amazement.

The sword of this mighty mountain has gone through the clouds.
 The stream of Kausar was used up in its water.
 There are cataracts in the turquoise eye of heaven,

¹⁰ Stein describes the routes to the Valley in the section “Memoir on the Ancient Geography of Kaśmīr.”

So white is the plaster of snow.”

The various references to nature, especially to snow, marks the arrival of the traveler at the difficult passage through the mountain pass.

Tuḡrā ends his work with a glimpse into the beautiful landscape that awaits the traveler into Kashmir:

Although there is a bit of distance from the foot of this magnificent mountain to the real paradise of Kashmir, in properly viewing the variegated flowers the thought of the distance does not occur, for indeed it is no distance, from the overgrowth of tulips the world has strewn happiness on city and village, from the spurt of violets the world of amazement is mixed in the streets and bazaars. The interpreter of the book of the rose has understood *And prevented the soul from unlawful desire* (79:40) in reverse, and the reciter of the *sī-pārah of the hyacinth*, *Indeed, it is the garden of refuge* (53:15), did not see it as special to anyone. The shapely cypress has the penname “Cloudy” due to the loftiness of its nature, and the riddling fir considers the ability of its comprehension to be the apex. From every flower, the earth takes on a hundred feathers of the pheasant and a sketch for a painting, and from every piece of land it takes a thousand peacock tails as a plan for a garden.

Kashmir is a garden without a door and walls,
As long as the eyes work, it is a rose and garden.
Indeed, be the page of its sapling, for in its praise
the stream of the poem is overflowing with the water of poesy.

and

In composing poetry, Tuḡrā became a spring rain cloud,
The writing of poetry became verdant due to him.
So long as the foot of autumn reaches the garden of his speech,
he has made spring a settler in [the land] of poetry.

The *Ti'dād al-nawādir* stands out among the poetic works on Kashmir composed in the seventeenth century, not only because of its mixed prose-verse form, but also due to the purpose behind writing it. Tuḡrā shares with other court poets an effusive celebration of both the natural and manmade beauty of various sites in Kashmir. But he does not focus on the Valley itself with its many Mughal gardens and pavilions, rather the road until the most difficult part of the journey, the Pir Panjal pass. In a recent article, Anubhuti Maurya argues that the Mughal “courtly imaginary” with respect to Kashmir was “a discourse of power” and that imperial journeys to the Valley “dismantled earlier notions of insularity of the region ...[and] reflect the reconstitution

of the sense of wonder associated with Kashmir”[Maurya 2017: 42]. However, in describing the Valley, poets depicted an Edenic picture that was only available to those attached to the Mughal court. Tuḡhrā’s emphasis on the road and stations, which call to mind the seven stations (*maqāmāt*) on the Sufi path, invites others to share in the experience. In his emphasis on nature and travel, Tuḡrā can be compared to his exact contemporary, the Edo period Japanese poet, Matsuo Basho (d. 1694), who wrote the masterpiece *The Narrow Road to the Deep North* (*Oku no Hosomichi*). Like Basho, for him the road, in the words of Richard Bevis, “was both a metaphor of spiritual questing in life and a structural principle”[Bevis 1999: 22]. While it is true that Basho wrote in a simple style, and Tuḡhrā’s Persian is ornate, nevertheless the latter’s work had a wide appeal to Indian readers. The juxtaposition of Koranic quotations with Persian poetic metaphors was part of a discourse on the place of nature in religious and spiritual life in Mughal cultural life. The landscape of Kashmir was not just a gift from God to mankind, Tuḡrā like other poets emphasized that the Mughals had also contributed to it and were its guardians. As he says at the end of his essay, “Kashmir is a garden without door and walls”, indicating a call to anyone who has the resolve to travel and the insight to appreciate the way and what awaits him at the end. In this way, a trip to Kashmir became a pilgrimage to a paradise-like land of natural beauty.

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On the Classification of *Bhakti* in Sadānanda Kāśmīraka: In Comparison with Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

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Keywords: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, *Bhaktirasāyaṇa*, Sadānanda Kāśmīraka, *Svarūpaprakāśa*, *Bhakti*

1. Introduction
2. The lineage of thought from Madhusūdana to Sadānanda
3. Definition of *bhakti* and its result in Sadānanda's *bhakti* Theory and Madhusūdana's
4. On the Classification of *bhaktis*
5. Conclusion

1. Introduction

Bhakti, the idea of offering unselfish devotion to the God (*paramēśvara*, *īśvara*) and seeking salvation by His mercy, was first articulated in the *Bhagavadgītā*. Following the arguments developed by its founder Śaṅkara (ca. 756–72 CE)¹ in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, the Advaita Vedānta school traditionally considers *bhakti* to be a kind of meditation (*upāsana*). Therefore, *bhakti* is relegated to a position inferior to the attainment of *brahmavidyā*, which is essential for achieving liberation, and it is not considered an independent soteriological means. This view of *bhakti* originating with Śaṅkara may be called the classical approach.

However, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, an Advaita scholar who flourished in about the 16th–17th centuries CE, interpreted *bhakti* as tender passion (*rati*) or love (*preman*) for *īśvara* and thereby established a new view of *bhakti* in the Advaita school. Madhusūdana articulated this view in his *Bhaktirasāyaṇa*, which was mainly based on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, and in the *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā*, an auto-commentary on the *Bhaktirasāyaṇa*. Furthermore, Madhusūdana applied the *rasa* theory of Indian aesthetics to his conception of *bhakti* and argued that *bhakti* as love ought to be understood as *bhakti-rasa*.² Moreover, in the *Bhaktirasāyaṇa(ṭīkā)* and in his commentary on the first three



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¹ This date is based on Harimoto[2006].

² Madhusūdana's *bhakti* theory based on the *Bhaktirasāyaṇa(ṭīkā)* has been investigated in the following works; Hino [1985], [1988], Nelson [1986], [1989], [1998], [2004], Gupta [2006], Venkatkrishnan [2015a] and Manabe [2018b], [2019], [2020] and so forth. It has been pointed out that Madhusūdana's *bhakti* theory is similar to that of Bengali Vaiṣṇavism (Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava), which was founded by Caitanya (ca. 1486–1534 CE). However, there does not appear to have been any direct contact between Madhusūdana and Bengali Vaiṣṇavism. In this regard, see Gupta [2006: 120], Nelson [2004: 388–

verses of *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, Madhusūdana positioned *bhakti* as a soteriological means independent from the attainment of *brahmavidyā*.

After Madhusūdana, his *bhakti* theory based on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* was inherited by the lineage of Advaita exegetes on his works. Among them, it is Sadānanda Kāśmīraka (ca. the late half of 17th CE–the early 18th century CE)³ whom I will focus on in this paper. As his name suggests, Sadānanda was an Advaita scholar who was from Kashmir or was flourished there. He was well known as the author of the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*. Sadānanda discussed *bhakti* in Chapter 3 “*tatpadārthaprakaraṇa*” of his *Svarūpaprakāśa*, a summary exposition of Advaita doctrines. Sadānanda’s *bhakti* theory demonstrates both the influence of and the divergence from Madhusūdana.

In this paper, I argue that in Sadānanda’s *Svarūpaprakāśa* the definition of *bhakti* and its classification are influenced by Madhusūdana’s *bhakti* theory. After briefly tracing the lineage of thought from Madhusūdana to Sadānanda, first I point out that in the *Svarūpaprakāśa* Sadānanda’s definition of *bhakti* inherits an aspect of Madhusūdana’s view. Then, I demonstrate that Sadānanda presented the nine kinds of *bhakti*, which are classified into three types: as means (*sādhana*), both as means and as goal/result (*sādhana* and *sādhya/phala*), and as goal/result (*sādhya/phala*). In the *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* Madhusūdana classified *bhakti* into two types: as means (*sādhana*) and as goal (*sādhya*). However, analyzing the eleven stages of *bhakti* found in his *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā*, I elucidate that Madhusūdana practically classified *bhakti* into three types, and that Sadānanda’s three types of *bhakti* are in continuity with Madhusūdana’s view. Accordingly, I trace how the Kashmir Advaita scholar developed his *bhakti* theory based on his Bengali Advaita predecessor.

2. The lineage of thought from Madhusūdana to Sadānanda

There is not much known about Sadānanda Kāśmīraka. The appellation “Kāśmīraka” suggests that he was born in Kashmir or flourished there, and that he was different from Sadānanda (ca. 16th CE), an author of the *Vedāntasāra*. Sadānanda Kāśmīraka is considered to be a disciple of both Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (ca. 17th century CE) and Brahmānanda Sarasvatī (or Gauḍa Brahmānanda, ca. 17th century CE), who were probably younger contemporaries of Madhusūdana and commentators on his works. Sadānanda wrote the *Svarūpaprakāśa* based on the works of Madhusūdana, Nārāyaṇa and Brahmānanda.⁴ In the following, I provide a brief overview of the lineage from Madhusūdana to Sadānanda.

Madhusūdana is said to be born in Koṭālipāḍā, which now belongs to Bangladesh. He first moved to Navadvīpa, now part of West Bengal, to learn Nyāya (the system of Indian logic), and then switched to the Advaita school in Varanasi, where he flourished afterward.⁵ Madhusūdana wrote

90].

³ Regarding the dates of Sadānanda, see Gode [1949].

⁴ With regard to Sadānanda, see Ramamurti [1986], Mishra [1993], Nachane [2000: 312], Tripāthī [2010].

⁵ With regard to Madhusūdana, see Modi [1929], Nachane [1950], Karmarkar [1962: xi–xv], Achalananda [1981], Gupta [2006: 1–13] and so forth.

3. Definition of *bhakti* and its result in Sadānanda's *bhakti* Theory and Madhusūdana's

In this section, I compare Madhusūdana's theory of *bhakti* with that of Sadānanda to ascertain Madhusūdana's influence on Sadānanda. By examining their works, I elaborate on how they defined *bhakti* and what they considered the result of *bhakti*.

First, I examine the definition and the intended result of Sadānanda's *bhakti*. In the *Svarūpaprakāśa*, the general definition¹² of *bhakti* is “serving (*bhājana*)” which is “the operation (*vyāpāra*) belonging to the servant which is performed by the body (*kāya*), the mind (*manas*) and the word (*vāc*), which is the cause of satisfaction (*tuṣṭi*) of someone who is worthy of being served.”¹³ Additionally, the individual definitions are, when we understand that [the Lord] is the greatest of all, (1) *bhakti* is “the flow of love (*premapravāha*) since he is the one to be worshiped (*ārādhya*)” or (2) *bhakti* is “just knowing (*jñānamātra*) that he is to be worshiped.”¹⁴ On the other hand, as we saw already, the result of *bhakti* is “the arising of the mental activity (*cetovṛtti*) which is the cause for directly realizing the identity between *brahman* and *ātman*.”¹⁵

Of Sadānanda's definitions of *bhakti*, the first individual definition of *bhakti* in the *Svarūpaprakāśa* is the type of emotional love (*prema**bhakti*) found in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, not the type of abandoning action (*saṁnyāsa*) found in the *Bhagavadgītā*. Sadānanda clearly thus takes Madhusūdana's view of *bhakti*. In the *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā*, Madhusūdana defines *bhakti*, and although the word “love” (*preman*) is not used in the definition of *bhakti* itself, the relation between *bhakti* and love is clear. This is because Madhusūdana describes the result of *bhakti* to be “the excellence of love (*preman*) for the Lord.”¹⁶ In his commentary on *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 1.1.1, Madhusūdana also argues that “those who take delight only in *bhakti*” (*kevalabhaktirasika*)¹⁷ mention that love (*preman*) arises from Kṛṣṇa or for Kṛṣṇa.¹⁸ From these descriptions, we

¹² Although there is no word “*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*” in the text of the *Svarūpaprakāśa*, since we find the word “*viśeṣalakṣaṇa*,” I regard the following definition as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.

¹³ *Svarūpaprakāśa* 45,10–2: *tatra bhaktir nāma bhajanam, “bhaj sevāyām” (Dhātupāṭha 1.1047) iti smaraṇāt. tac ca kāyena ma-nasā vācā vā niṣpādyo bha-janiyasya kasyacit tuṣṭau hetur vyāpāro bhajamānapuruṣaṇiṣṭhaḥ. Cf. Nyāyaratnāvalī 359,8–9: tatra bhaktir bhajanam kāyena manasā vācā vā niṣpādyo bhajaniyasya tuṣṭihetur vyāpāro bhajamānapuruṣaṇiṣṭhaḥ.*

¹⁴ *Svarūpaprakāśa* 45,12–4: *viśeṣalakṣaṇaṁ tu sarvottamatvajñānapūrvaka ārādhyatvena (conj: ‘pūrvakārādhyatvenasīc) premapravāho bhaktiḥ, ārādhyatvena jñānamātraṁ vā.*

¹⁵ See fn. 12. Cf. *Nyāyaratnāvalī* 363,23–5: *tādṛśasya saguṇaviśayakapremṇaḥ nirguṇaśravaṇādisahitasya caramātmanivedanarūpā brahmātmaikyasaṁkṣātkārārūpajñānalakṣaṇā bhaktiḥ phalam.*

¹⁶ *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* 26,9–27,5: *dravibhāvapūrvikā hi manaso bhagavadākārātā savikalpakavṛttirūpā bhaktiḥ, ... bhagavadviśayakapremaprakāro bhaktiphalam* (Indeed, *bhakti* is mental activity associated with conceptualization, the state in which the mind possesses the form of the Lord that is preceded by the condition of [its] melting. ... The result of *bhakti* is the excellence of love toward the Lord).

¹⁷ In the Madhusūdana's commentary on *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 1.1.1, he comments from the three standpoints of the Aupaniṣada, that of the *Sātvata*, and that of the *Kevalarasika*. The standpoint of the *Kevalarasika* is that of the *Bhāgavata*. See Manabe[2018a] and Bhuvaneshwari [2021].

¹⁸ Madhusūdana's commentary on *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 71,8–11: *tasya sarvapremāspadatvena dhyeyatām āha –janmādyasya yata iti. yataḥ śrīkṛṣṇāt, yasmimś chrikṛṣṇe vā, ādyasya ratibhāvasya premākhyasya janma bhavati* ([Vyāsa] states that [we should meditate upon] him (Kṛṣṇa) as the abode of love (*prema**spada*) of all. [Vyāsa states this by the expression] “from whom the origin of the first thing [proceeds].” From whom, that is to say, from glorious Kṛṣṇa, or for whom, that is to say, to glorious Kṛṣṇa; the origin of the first thing, that is, of tender passion (*ratibhāva*) called love (*preman*), proceeds).

observe that there is a close relationship between *bhakti* and love in Madhusūdana's thought. Furthermore, in Madhusūdana's *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* we find the expression "preceded by melting" (*dravībhāvapūrvikā*) in the definition of *bhakti*.¹⁹ Since this signifies that the mind has melted due to love for Kṛṣṇa,²⁰ we can establish that according to Madhusūdana *bhakti* is defined as love. This is why Madhusūdana says in the *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* that the result of *bhakti* is the excellence of love for the Lord.

However, according to Sadānanda's second individual definition *bhakti* is knowledge rather than love. Furthermore, while Madhusūdana states that the result of *bhakti* is the excellence of love for the Lord, Sadānanda considers it to be the mental activity that is the cause of the direct realization of the identity between *brahman* and *ātman*. These Sadānanda's views seem to follow those of Śāṅkara, who understood *bhakti* as a kind of knowledge. Nevertheless, from the above, it can be pointed out that an aspect of Sadānanda's definition of *bhakti* in the *Svarūpaprakāśa* follows Madhusūdana's.

4. On the Classification of *bhaktis*

4.1. The kinds of *bhakti* and their relationship

Now, I clarify Madhusūdana's influence on Sadānanda with regard to the classification of *bhakti*. At a first glance their classifications of *bhakti* may seem to be different from each other. Therefore, let us first examine the classification of *bhakti* as found in Sadānanda's *Svarūpaprakāśa* and Madhusūdana's *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā*.

Sadānanda mentions that there are nine kinds of *bhakti*.²¹ Based on *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 7.5.23–24 they are listed as (1) hearing (*śravaṇa*), (2) praise (*kīrtana*), (3) remembrance (*smaraṇa*), (4) rendering service (*pādasevana*), (5) worship (*arcana*), (6) paying obeisance (*vandana*), (7) servitude (*dāśya*), (8) friendship (*sakhyā*), and (9) offering oneself (*ātmanivedana*)/par

In the *Svarūpaprakāśa*, Sadānanda argues that the order of these nine kinds of *bhakti* indicates progressive stages, which he classifies into three: (I) *bhakti* as means (*sādhana**bhakti*), (II) both *bhakti* as means and *bhakti* as goal/result (*sādhya*/phala), and (III) *bhakti* as goal/result.²² Out of the nine

¹⁹ See fn. 17.

²⁰ In *Bhaktirasāyaṇa* 1.3, *bhakti* is defined as follows: *Bhaktirasāyaṇa* 1.3: *drutasya bhagavaddharmād dhārāvāhi-katām gatā / sarveṣe mana-so vṛttir bhaktir ity abhidhiyate* // (It is declared that *bhakti* is the activity of the mind toward the Lord of all, [the activity] that has become a stream, [of the mind]: which has melted from [the performance of] duties concerning the Lord).

²¹ *Svarūpaprakāśa* 45,14–9: *tac ca navavidham śravaṇakīrtanaḍibhedena. tad uktaṁ prahlādena hiranyakaśipuṁ prati śrīmadbhāgavate –śravaṇaṁ kīrtanaṁ viṣṇoḥ smaraṇaṁ pādasevanam / arcanaṁ vandanaṁ dāśyaṁ sakhyam ātmanivedanam // iti pumsārpitā viṣṇau bhaktis cen navalakṣaṇā / kriyate bhagavaty addhā tan manye 'dhitam uttamam* // *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 7.5.23–4 // (And it (*bhakti*) is nine-fold due to the differences of hearing, praise and so forth. Prahlāda spoke that [nine-fold *bhakti*] is told to Hiranyakaśipu in the *Śrīmadbhāgavata*: "Hearing, praising, remembering Viṣṇu, rendering service, worship, paying obeisance, servitude, friendship, offering oneself –if a person offers *bhakti* with these nine characteristics to Lord Viṣṇu, I consider it (*bhakti*) the highest attainment"). Cf. *Nyāyaratnāvalī* 359,9–14: *tatra vibhāgo bhāgavatādāv uktaḥ –śravaṇaṁ kīrtanaṁ viṣṇoḥ smaraṇaṁ pādasevanam / arcanaṁ vandanaṁ dāśyaṁ sakhyam ātmanivedanam // iti pumsārpitā viṣṇau bhaktis cen navalakṣaṇā / kriyate bhagavaty addhā tan manye 'dhitam uttamam* //

²² *Svarūpaprakāśa* 49,6–21: *atredaṁ vivecanīyam. śravaṇādināṁ saguṇanirguṇaviśayakatayā saṁkīrṇānāṁ sādhana**bhaktitvam* *eva, sakhyasya tu sādhanasādhya**bhaktitvam, premamātrasya sādhanatve 'pi paramakāṣṭhāpannapremṇaḥ*

kinds of *bhakti* the seven *bhakti* types from (1) hearing to (7) servitude are called *bhakti* as means. Then, (8) friendship is said to be *bhakti* as means and *bhakti* as goal/result. Finally, (9) offering oneself is called *bhakti* as goal/result.²³

	<i>Bhāgavata Purāṇa</i> 7.5.23–24	Sadānanda's three types of <i>bhakti</i>
1	<i>śravaṇa</i>	<i>sādhana</i>
2	<i>kīrtana</i>	
3	<i>smaraṇa</i>	
4	<i>pādasevana</i>	
5	<i>arcana</i>	
6	<i>vandana</i>	
7	<i>dāsyā</i>	
8	<i>sakhya</i>	<i>sādhana</i> and <i>sādhya</i>
9	<i>ātmanivedana</i>	<i>phala/sādhya</i>

In contrast, Madhusūdana classifies *bhaktis* into only two types [Gupta 2006: 125] in the *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā*: *bhakti* as means, and as result.²⁴ Among them, *bhakti* as means is said to be “hearing, praise and so forth.” In Madhusūdana's scheme, this *bhakti* as means refers to all of the above nine kinds of *bhakti*.²⁵ This is because in the *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* “hearing” is the representative

*saguṇanirguṇaviśayaśravaṇādisādhya*tvāt ... *tādṛśasya* *saguṇanirguṇa-śravaṇādisahitasya* *caramātmanivedanarūpā* *brahmātmaikyāsāṅkāṭkārārūpajñānalakṣaṇā* *bhaktiḥ phalam* (Concerning this (i.e., concerning *bhakti*), the following should be understood. Since hearing and so forth have the conditioned [Lord] and the unconditioned [Lord] as their object, their mixtures are only *bhakti* as means. On the other hand, friendship is both *bhakti* as means and *bhakti* as goal, because, even though mere love is a means, the love that reached the highest limit is the goal of hearing and so forth, which have the conditioned [Lord] and the unconditioned [Lord] as their object. ... The result of such [friendship], which is accompanied by hearing and so on of the conditioned [Lord] and the unconditioned [Lord], is the final *bhakti*, which has the form of offering oneself and which is defined by the knowledge in the form of intuitively realizing the identity between *brahman* and *ātman*). Cf. *Nyāyaratnāvalī* 363,14–25: *atredaṃ vivecanīyam. śravaṇādīnāṃ* *saguṇanirguṇaviśayatayā* *saṃkīrṇānāṃ* *sādhana* *bhaktitvam eva. sakhyasya* *tu* *sādhana* *sādhya* *bhaya* *avidhabhaktitvam. premamātrasya* *sādhana* *te* *pi* *paramakāṣṭhāpānnapremṇaḥ* *saguṇaviśayaśravaṇādisādhya*tvāt ... *tādṛśasya* *saguṇaviśayakapremṇaḥ* *nirguṇaśravaṇādisahitasya* *caramātmanivedanarūpā* *brahmatmaikyāsāṅkāṭkārārūpajñānalakṣaṇā* *bhaktiḥ phalam*.

²³ In the *Svarūpaprakāśa*, offering oneself is regarded as the result of friendship. However, since there is a subsequent description that offering oneself is to be accomplished by hearing and so forth, I consider offering oneself as *bhakti* as a result. *Svarūpaprakāśa* 52,11–2: *tasyaiśā* *paramapremṇaḥ* *sādhana* *rūpā* *śravaṇādibhaktis* *tatsādhya* *tmaniedanaparyantā* *navavidhāpi* ... (With regard to the highest love, *bhakti* such as hearing is the means, even though it is nine-fold up to offering oneself that is their goal ...).

²⁴ *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* 21,2–6: *bhajanam antaḥkaraṇasya* *bhagavadākāratārūpaṃ* *bhaktir iti* *bhāvavyutpattiyā* *bhaktiśabdena* *phalam* *abhidhiyate. tasya* *ca* *niratiśayapumarthatvāt* *pūrvoktavādānāṃ* *prāmāṇyam* *avyāhatam. tathā* *bhajyate* *sevyate* *bhagavadākāram* *antaḥkaraṇaṃ* *kriyate* *'nayedī* *karaṇavyutpattiyā* *bhaktiśabdena* *śravaṇakīrtanādi* *sādhanaṃ* *abhidhiyate* (According to the etymological interpretation [based on] condition (*bhāvavyutpatti*), *bhakti* in the sense of serving (*bhajana*) is the state in which the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) has the Lord as its form. [Based on this analysis] the word “*bhakti*” denotes the result. In addition, since it (*bhakti* as the result) is the super-excellent goal of human beings, the credibility of the above-mentioned theories (that *bhakti* is a human goal) is not obstructed. Similarly, according to the etymological interpretation [based on] the means of action (*karaṇavyutpatti*) [*bhakti* is] that [means] by which [the Lord] is served, adored, that is, the internal organ which has the form of the Lord is created. [Based on this analysis] the word “*bhakti*” denotes the means such as hearing and praising).

²⁵ *Nārāyaṇa*, like Madhusūdana, also regards all nine kinds of *bhakti* as means. *Nārāyaṇī* 368,3–9: *sādhana* *bhaktis* *tu* *bhajyate* *sevyate* *bhagavadākāram* *antaḥkaraṇaṃ* *kriyate* *'nayedī* *vyutpattiyā* *–śravaṇaṃ* *kīrtanaṃ* *viṣṇoḥ* *smaraṇaṃ* *pādasevanam* */* *arcanaṃ* *vandanaṃ* *dāsyam* *sakhyam* *ātmanivedanam* *//* *iti* *pūṃsārpitā* *viṣṇau* *bhaktiś cen* *navalakṣaṇā* */* *kriyate* *bhagavaty* *addhā* *tan* *manyē* *'dhitam* *uttamam* *//* *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 7.5.23–4 *//* *iti* *navadhā* (On the other hand, according to the etymological

of the duties of the worshippers of the Lord (*bhāgavatadharmā*),²⁶ and in the Madhusūdana's commentary on *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, the above nine kinds of *bhakti* also are the representative duties of the worshippers of the Lord.²⁷

Consequently, there is the following difference between Madhusūdana and Sadānanda: while Madhusūdana classifies *bhaktis* into two types, *bhakti* as means and *bhakti* as goal/result, Sadānanda classifies them into three types, *bhakti* as means, as both the means and goal/result, and as goal/result. There is also a difference in that Sadānanda classifies the nine kinds of *bhakti* such as hearing into three types while Madhusūdana treats all of them as means.

4.2. The relationship between the stages of Madhusūdana's *bhakti* theory and Sadānanda's threefold classification of *bhaktis*

In the following, I argue that despite the difference mentioned above we can consider Sadānanda's threefold classification of *bhakti* to be stemming from Madhusūdana's classification of *bhakti*. Apart from the classification into means and result discussed above, in the *Bhaktirasāyaṇa* Madhusūdana provides another analysis which provides the eleven stages (*bhūmikā*) of *bhakti*: (i) service to the great one, (ii) to be the recipient of the great one's mercy, (iii) faith in their duties, (iv) hearing the virtues of Hari, (v) arising of the sprout of love, (vi) realization of one's nature, (vii) development of love toward the supreme bliss (i.e., Hari), (viii) manifestation of him (i.e. Hari as the supreme bliss), (ix) being fixed in the duties concerning the Lord, (x) possessing his glorious properties within oneself, and (xi) the highest limit of love.²⁸

Of these eleven stages, Madhusūdana considers the first four the means of *bhakti*.²⁹ In particular, the fourth stage "hearing the virtues of Hari" (*hariguṇaśruti*) includes all of the nine kinds of *bhakti* mentioned above.³⁰ Then, Madhusūdana says the fifth stage "arising of the sprout of love"

interpretation [*bhakti* is] that [means] by which [the Lord] is served, adored, that is, the internal organ which has the form of the Lord is created, *bhakti* as means is nine-fold [as follows]: "Hearing, praising, remembering Viṣṇu, rendering service, worship, paying obeisance, servitude, friendship, offering oneself –if a person offers *bhakti* with these nine characteristics to Lord Viṣṇu, I consider it (*bhakti*) the highest attainment".

²⁶ *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* 115,4: *hariguṇaśrutir iti kṛtsnabhāgavatadharmopalakṣaṇam* (Hearing Hari's virtues represents all duties of the worshippers of the Lord). Since in my view that in the *Bhaktirasāyaṇa(ṭīkā)* Madhusūdana mostly uses the word "*bhagavata*" to indicate "the worshipper of the Lord," I understand the word "*bhāgavatadharmā*" as "the duties of the worshippers of the Lord." For instance, see the following passage. *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* 85,12–3: *bhāgavatasya bhagavaddharmānuṣṭhātūḥ prathamam bhagavatprabodhas tataḥ param vairāgyam tataḥ premalakṣaṇā bhaktir ity arthaḥ*.

²⁷ Madhusūdana's commentary on *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 15,5–6: *tatra –śravaṇam kīrtanam viṣṇoḥ smaraṇam pādasevanam / arcanam vandanam dāsyam sakhyam ātmanivedanam // Bhagavadgītā 7.5.23 // ityādibhāgavatadharmāpratipādanāt* (Because the [following] duties of the worshippers of the Lord are not taught there (in the *Manusmṛti* and so forth), [the duties] such as: "Hearing, praising, remembering Viṣṇu, rendering service, worship, paying obeisance, servitude, friendship, offering oneself")

²⁸ *Bhaktirasāyaṇa* 1.34–6: *prathamam mahatām sevā taddayāpātratā tataḥ / śraddhātha teṣāṃ dharmeṣu tato hariguṇaśrutih // tato ratyankurotpattih svarūpādhigatis tataḥ / premavṛddhiḥ parānande tasyātha sphuraṇam tataḥ // bhagavaddharmanīṣṭhātāḥ svasmiṃś tadguṇaśālītā / preṃṇo 'tha paramā kṣāthety uditā bhaktibhūmikā //* See Nelson [2004: 382–4], Gupta [2006: 131–6].

²⁹ *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* 124,2: *etac catuṣṭayam sādhanam eva* (These four are the means only).

³⁰ *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* 115,9–13: *tac ca bhajanam vivṛtam –śravaṇam kīrtanam viṣṇoḥ smaraṇam pādasevanam / arcanam vandanam dāsyam sakhyam ātmanivedanam // iti puṃsārpitā viṣṇau bhaktiś cen navalakṣaṇā / kriyate bhagavaty addhā tan manye 'dhitam uttamam // Bhāgavata Purāṇa 7.5.23–4 //* (And the serving (*bhajana*) [which is to hear the virtues of Hari] was explained –"Hearing, praising, remembering Viṣṇu, rendering service, worship, paying obeisance, servitude, friendship, offering oneself –if a person offers *bhakti* with these nine characteristics to Lord Viṣṇu, I consider it (*bhakti*) the highest

(*ratyaṅkurotpatti*) is the essence (*svarūpa*) of *bhakti*. According to him, the difference among the rest of the stages, i.e., from the sixth to the eleventh stages, is due to the difference in maturity of love (*rati*) mentioned in the fifth stage. Furthermore, Madhusūdana considers the last six stages, i.e., from the sixth to the eleventh, the results.³¹ Madhusūdana also explains that the first seven stages are the means that are repeated [again and again] (*sādhanaābhyāsa*) of *bhakti*,³² while the rest of the stages, i.e., from the eighth to the eleventh, are accomplished without effort.³³

In short, Madhusūdana offers two parallel explanations on the eleven stages of *bhakti*. In the first explanation, the fifth stage is the essence of *bhakti*. This fifth stage is accomplished by the first four stages which are the means. And the later six stages are called the results, and they are the fruits that appear as the fifth stage matures. Thus, we can classify the fifth stage into *bhakti* as result rather than *bhakti* as means. In the second explanation, Madhusūdana calls the first seven stages the means that are repeated, and the last four stages the goals which are accomplished without effort. When we combine these two explanations together, we may conclude that the three stages from the fifth to the seventh correspond to *bhakti* as goal/result, and they are at the same time the means to the result of *bhakti*. Therefore, I suggest that the eleven stages of *bhakti* can be classified into three types: *bhakti* as means, *bhakti* as both means and goal/result, and *bhakti* as goal/result.³⁴

	Madhusūdana's eleven stages of <i>bhakti</i>	First explanation	Second explanation	Madhusūdana's three types of <i>bhakti</i>
i	<i>sevā</i>	<i>sādhana</i>	<i>sādhanābhyāsa</i>	<i>sādhana</i>
ii	<i>taddayāpātratā</i>			
iii	<i>śraddhā</i>			
iv	<i>hariguṇaśrutiḥ</i>			
v	<i>ratyaṅkurotpattiḥ</i>	<i>svarūpa</i>	<i>sādhya</i>	<i>sādhana</i> and <i>sādhya/phala</i>
vi	<i>svarūpādhigati</i>	<i>phala</i>		
vii	<i>premaṇḍaliḥ</i>			
viii	<i>sphuraṇam</i>			
ix	<i>bhagavaddharmaniṣṭhā</i>			
x	<i>tadguṇaśālītā</i>			
xi	<i>preṇḍo paramā kāṣṭhā</i>			

attainment”).

³¹ *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* 126,7–8: *iyam ca pañcamī bhūmikā bhakter svarūpam. etasyā eva paripākaviśeṣād anyāś ṣaḍbhūmikāḥ phalabhūtāḥ* (Moreover, the fifth stage is the essence of *bhakti*. Based on the proficiency of just this [stage], there are six other stages as the results).

³² *Bhaktirasāyaṇaṭīkā* 131,10–132,1: *etādṛśasaptamīparyanta eva sādhanaābhyāsaḥ. ataḥ param tu bhūmikācatuṣṭa-yaṁ ayatnasādhyaṁ* (Only such [stages] up to the seventh are the repetition of the means (*sādhanaābhyāsa*) [of *bhakti*]. On the other hand, the four stages higher than this can be accomplished without effort).

³³ See fn. 34.

³⁴ The interpretation that classifies the eleven stages of *bhakti* into three types has already been presented in Gupta [2006]. See Gupta [2006: 132–133]. My argument here follows her and adds an interpretation to it. It would be useful to refer to Gupta's argument in the main part of the essay.

Now, the following question may arise at this point: Is *bhakti* as goal/result the same as the result of *bhakti*? This is because the result of *bhakti* in the *Svarūpaprakāśa* is the arising of the mental activity which is the cause of directly realizing the identity of *brahman* and *ātman* and it is considered different from offering oneself (*ātmanivedana*) which is *bhakti* as goal/result. In addition, it could be generally thought that *bhakti* as means and *bhakti* as goal/result are the distinctions within *bhaktis* and that the result of *bhakti* may be different from *bhakti* itself. In the case of Madhusūdana, *bhakti* as goal/result is considered to be the same as the result of *bhakti* because, of the eleven stages of *bhakti*, the stages classified as *bhakti* as goal/result are the results of the fifth stage which is the essence of *bhakti*, i.e., *bhakti* itself. In the case of Sadānanda, we can also consider that *bhakti* as goal/result correspond to the result of *bhakti* based on the following reasons: In the *Svarūpaprakāśa*, regarding “offering oneself,” we can find the description, “*bhakti* which is in the form of offering oneself, which is defined as knowledge in the form of intuitively realizing the identity of *brahman* and *ātman*.”³⁵ In this description, the offering oneself is equated with the direct realization of the identity of *brahman* and *ātman*. Now, in the *Svarūpaprakāśa*, the result of *bhakti* is “the mental activity which is the cause of the intuitive realization of the identity of *brahman* and *ātman*.” We can observe that the result of *bhakti* is very similar to the *bhakti* of offering oneself described above. Therefore, within Sadānanda’s scheme the *bhakti* of offering oneself as goal/result corresponds to the result of *bhakti*.

Having examined Madhusūdana’s theory of the eleven stages of *bhakti*, I hope it is sufficiently clear that Madhusūdana’s eleven stages of *bhakti* practically fall into three types, and also that their structure corresponds to Sadānanda’s three types. From these correspondences, we may conclude that Sadānanda’s three types of *bhakti* are in continuity with Madhusūdana’s eleven stages of *bhakti*.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have demonstrated that in Sadānanda’s *Svarūpaprakāśa* the definition of *bhakti* and the classification of the three types of *bhakti* are influenced by Madhusūdana’s *bhakti* theory. In particular, though Sadānanda’s classification of the three types of *bhakti* seems to be different from Madhusūdana’s classification of *bhakti* into two types, when compared to Madhusūdana’s classification of the eleven stages of *bhakti* it can be shown to inherit the classification laid out by Madhusūdana.

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³⁵ See fn. 23. Furthermore, we can consider the following definition having the same meaning. *Svarūpaprakāśa* 49,1–5: *ātmanivedanaṃ svasya viṣṇor nivedanam. ...yad vā viṣṇurūpe saccidānandaghane sāksyabhedena sāksātkāre ātmanivedanam* (Offering oneself means offering oneself to Viṣṇu. ...Or [offering oneself] means offering oneself to perceive the form of Viṣṇu directly as being non-different from the witness, [Viṣṇu] who is the mass of the being, the knowledge, and the bliss). Cf. *Nyāyaratnāvalī* 362,20–363,2: *ātmanivedana svasya nivedanam ...viṣṇusvarūpe satyajñānānandātmake asaṅgasākṣirūpe svābhedaññānam apy ātmanivedanaṃ bodhyam*.

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