

On Possibility of the Postwar Knowledge Continuities and Discontinuities in the thought of Kato Shuichi

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Kato Shuichi (1919-2008) was writer, critic, literary historian and medical doctor. He wrote novels, poems, essays and comments ranging from contemporary Japanese politics and society, international relations to literature, art and mass-culture.¹ At the end of his life, Kato was a founding member of Kyu-jo-no-kai” (Article 9 Association) when in June 2004, together with eight other intellectuals, he appealed for the preservation of Article 9.² Kato’s long intellectual history and rich opus offer extraordinary opportunity for a journey through the life of an “average”³ Japanese citizen in the Post-War era through the Cold War and so-called Post-Cold War era.

After Japan’s defeat in WWII, Kato spent most of his life living and traveling abroad. Departing Japan for the first time in 1951 at the age 32, (after being awarded a scholarship to do medical research at the Institute Pasteur and at the Université de Paris⁴), Kato spent four years based in Paris and traveling around Western Europe. From 1955 to 1958 working in Japan as a doctor and as a French literature lecturer and literary critic, and in 1958, on the occasion of his participation in organizing the second Asian-African Writers` Conference held in Tashkent, decided to finally leave the medical profession and fully devote himself to writing.

Kato was a part of an intellectual trend in postwar Japan called “sengo-keimo” (postwar enlightenment). He experienced the defeat and the occupation as “liberation” from the pre- and during the war regime and long-awaited freedom of expression. He was one of the first intellectuals to criticize the emperor’s system (in 1946, under the pseudonym Fujisawa Tadashi and Arai Sakunosuke⁵) and the role of intellectuals during the war. The war cooperation of leading intellectuals, people who in Kato’s words, read the same books and listened to the same music as him, in other words - people who should have shared the same values as him, Kato experienced as a personal betrayal.

Two experiences deeply affected Kato’s view of thinking – first, the death of his two close friends, one from his world of medicine and the other from the world of literature. Their death did not only produce a kind of sorrow such as when someone loses a brother, but also a sense of guilt why it was them, and not him who got killed. This very emotional context was a point from where originated Kato’s strong interest in the phenomenon of war and his interest in Japanese society – how the bureaucratic apparatus of

¹ He was teaching at the University of British Columbia, the Free University of Berlin, Yale University, Sophia University, Beijing University, Princeton, Brown University, Colegio de México, and Ritsumeikan University.

² Kato appealed for the preservation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, together with Oe Kenzaburo, Hisashi Inoue, Oda Makoto, Umehara Takeshi, Tsurumi Shunsuke, Sawachi Hisae, Okudaira Yasuhiro and Miki Mutsuko.

³ Not many would agree with Kato when saying in the Epilogue of his autobiography “A Sheep’s Song – A Writer’s Reminiscences” that “his personal experience was in some ways comparable to those of an average contemporary Japanese”.

⁴ Kato Shuichi, *A Sheep’s Song – A Writer’s Reminiscences of Japan and the World*, University of California Press 1999, Chronology, p. xix.

⁵ Essay “Tennosei wo ronzu” (Discussing the imperial system) was written in March 1946 and published in the Tokyo daigaku shinbunsha (Tokyo University Newspapers) *Daigaku Shinbun*.

imperial system had been formed, how it advanced to militarism and how it got the support of the nation – were only some of the questions which Kato analyzed from many perspectives, from *Zasshu bunka*⁶ (Hybrid culture) to essays such as *Nihonjin wa to nani ka*⁷ (What is Japanese?), *Nihonjin no shiseikan* (Japanese view on life and death⁸) and many others. Japanese “vertically-structured society” (*tate-shakai*) and “the system of irresponsibility” (*musekinin no taikei*) - the expression he took over from famous postwar political scientist and his good friend, Maruyama Masao, were always on Kato’s mind. Kato was discussing the concepts of a nation (*kokumin*) and state (*kokka*) and its essential incompatibility with the Western notions of nation and democratic state. Here we arrive to the problem of translatability of the Western concepts to Japanese language and culture and the issue of Japanese modernization (*kindaika*).

Another war experience that forever affected Kato’s way of thinking was what he saw as a member of Japan-US Joint Investigative Team of doctors who went to Hiroshima a month after the A-bomb was dropped. Many people who knew Kato say that it was exactly this experience when Kato decided to leave his medical profession. It was also an experience in which originates Kato’s thinking on differences between science and art. Medicine, as any science and unlike art, is characterized by objectivity and its history does not have to be experienced in order to acquire its knowledge. The relationships between the real condition, future prospect of therapy and wish of the patient or doctor is quite different when comparing science and art.

An important problem Kato was writing a lot about was Japanese *kindaika* or modernization. It was one of the quickest modernization processes in the world that started with the opening of Japan to the world upon outside pressure and the collapse of Japan’s Tokugawa isolationist policy. One of the characteristics of that period was intensive translation activity, the so called *honyaku bunka* about what Kato together with Maruyama Masao coauthored a book “*Honyaku no shiso*”⁹ (Translation thought) and “*Honyaku to Nihon no kindai*”¹⁰.

Kato’s autobiography published at the age of forty-nine, *Hitsuji no uta – wa ga kaiso*¹¹ (A Sheep’s Song – A Writer’s Reminiscences of Japan and the World¹²) serialized through 1968 in *Asahi Journal*, which became a sort of recapitulation of Japan’s modernization and the war and to the great extent was different from the recapitulation done in 1946¹³. He wrote:

“My way of thinking about war was gradually getting mature. I have a strong feeling that 1968

⁶ A collection of essays written from the autumn of 1954 to the autumn of 1956, first published in September 1956 by Oo-Nihon-yuben-kaikodansha.

⁷ 1976, Kodansha-gakugeibunko.

⁸ This book was originally co-written in English with Robert Jay Lifton and Michael R.Reich under the title *Six Lives Six Deaths – Portraits from Modern Japan* and was published in 1979 by the Macmillan Press (London and Basingstoke), Paul Norbury Publications (Kent), and Kodansha (Tokyo). Its Japanese translation done by Kato’s third wife, Yajima Midori was published in 1977 by Iwanami Shoten.

⁹ 1991, Iwanami Shoten.

¹⁰ 1998, Iwanami shinsho (also co-edited with Maruyama Masao who died in 1996, before the book was finished).

¹¹ Kato Shuichi: *Hitsuji no Uta – wa ga kaiso*, August 1968, Iwanami Shoten (Shinsho) and *Zoku Hitsuji no Uta – wa ga kaiso*, September 1968, Iwanami Shoten (shinsho).

¹² English translation was done by Kato’s former student from Sophia University, Chia-Ning Chang, published in 1999 by the University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California.

¹³ This comment is derived from the question Narita Ryuichi posed to Kato in the book *Niju seiki no jigazo*, 2005, Chikuma Shobo, p. 56.

was a year in which my experience suddenly got generalized, and after later inquiring, my knowledge has increased, too. I was talking about 1968. As for pre-war, war and postwar periods in Japan, Japanese intellectuals attitudes have greatly changed. I have a strong feeling that I got through observing people in those times that that change was a big thing. As first, it was an interest in history – why did the war happen? Next, if we step into it a little bit more, there was a problematic of attitude of intellectuals – what kind of attitude they took and why did they do so?

Then, If I take myself as a study case and the recapitulation of one Japanese in his generation, comes a question what was I thinking about those three periods (pre, war and postwar)? Why was I in the extreme minority that was against the war? I wanted to know the reason.

It is good to investigate extraordinary people, but I wanted to explain an average person. Why was he so ordinarily docile? (hitsuji=sheep) Why doesn't he get angry when the government is doing idiotic things?"¹⁴

The series of the events, domestic and international, that culminated with the revolt against renewal of Japan-US Security Treaty known as "Anpo-toso" marked the end of the postwar epoch or "sengo". Kato's *Hitsuji no uta* that also ends in 1960, was more than a biography – it was a history of Japan's modernization and it is a testimony of the time and its controversies that modernization brought to Japan – on one side, for Kato, there was no doubt that it was necessary for Japan to pass it, and on the other it produced a "hybridity" that as much as it was a chance for Japan (*Nihon no chiisana kibo* - Japan's small hope as Kato calls it) it presented a continuous contradiction since it also reflected Japan's foreign relations which became increasingly complicated with the Cold War.

Hitsuji no uta, Kato writes, was a reflection of Nagai Kafu's¹⁵ statement that a Japanese is "with one foot in the West and with one in Japan"¹⁶ and that it was impossible to change that fact. This idea was the guiding idea in Kato's theory on hybridity of Japanese culture advocated in *Zasshu bunka – Nihon no chiisana kibo* (Hybrid culture – Japanese small hope). In a way, Kato explained¹⁷ *Zasshu bunka* was a kind of autobiography – it was a statement on him personally who had that specific East-West two-sidedness melted together in his psychology. Since *Zasshu bunka* was a story about general issues and not personal matters, it was not a personal biography but a kind of historical reflective biography of society.¹⁸

Kato's view of Japanese national identity has been determined by domestic and international conditions and most of all by Japan's relation to the "West". His early postwar years (until Anpo-toso) were marked by the flow from pro-Western sentiment and liberal progressive views to nationalistic (conservative) views (which can be seen in Hybrid culture theory). The continuation of such a trend is visible in the late '60s in his *Nihon bungakushi josetsu* (Introduction to History of Japanese Literature) where Kato does not pay attention to the literature (and thought) of Japanese minorities or "zainichi"

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 56-7.

¹⁵ Nagai Kafu (1879-1959).

¹⁶ Kato Shuichi, *Niju seiki no jigazo* (Portraits from the twentieth century), p.58.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 59.

(foreigners, mostly Koreans born and living in Japan) writers. His stance on that issue has not changed even in the retrospective – although he agreed that the notion of “Japan” is not axiomatic¹⁹, he continued to observe the literatures of the Okinawa people, Ainu minority or zainichi (foreigners born and living in Japan, mostly Koreans) as a “regional” phenomenon and essentially not a part of “dochaku sekaikan” (indigenous worldview) that succeeded to resist different foreign influences. Kato’s dochaku sekaikan is quite similar to Maruyama Masao’s “koso” notion, a notion Maruyama was at some point using instead of word “shiso” (thought) when referring to “archetypal” worldviews.

In 1968 while Kato had already lived in North America, the Prague Spring had occurred and Kato happened to be spending his vacation in Vienna. He immediately decided to travel to Czechoslovakia and the result of that travel experience was a book *Kotoba to Sensha*²⁰ (Words and Tanks). Kato was impressed by the non-violent resistance of the people there and in this book expressed his belief in the victory of “words” confronted with tanks. Violence needs words for its justification, Kato writes, but at same time violence cannot escape from words²¹.

When he was back in the US, the situation with American protests was different and it was concentrated around two main issues – the anti-Vietnam War hippy movement and movement of black people against discrimination. At the same time, in Japan there was a strong civil movement against the Vietnam War as well whose leader was a writer Oda Makoto, who was an intellectual-activist who appealed together with Kato for Article 9.

Kato’s writings on 1968 started after his travel to Prague and continued with his stay in North America. Kato in retrospective thought of 1968 as a great riddle. First, it occurred in many parts of the world at the same time and independently of each other. Second, the protests happened because of different issues – in Prague it was a request for “human face of socialism”, in France, Germany, America, Yugoslavia, Japan – reasons were much different and they were very concrete. In Japan, students protested because of the military-industrial-academic complex (gunsan gaku fukugotai). Exactly by that “concreteness” of the problem and “resistance spirit” that was born out of it, Kato drew parallels between the circumstances in 1968 and contemporary War on Terror.

The break up of the Cold War in addition to bringing major changes in international relations, emphasized the problem of nuclear weapon on which Kato extensively talked in the book *Terorizumu to nichijosei – ‘9.11’ to ‘yo naoshi 68’* (terrorism and everyday – 9.11 and 68 changing the world over).

This work followed Kato’s thought and attitudes ranging from the complex relationship between modernity and traditional culture, role of intellectuals and issues of the war responsibility, nationalism and the Cold War to the contemporary problems of terrorism, military intervention and nuclear weapon. Its intention was to show how Kato’s liberalism fluctuated from nationalism to internationalism and from anti- to pro-Asian sentiment varied with the changes in Japan’s relation to the West. This work will not try to give specific judgment of Kato’s thought – it will rather search for the meaning in its change that has

¹⁹ Kato Shuichi, *Niju seiki no jigazo*, p. 93.

²⁰ Kato Shuichi, *Kotoba to Sensha*, Chikuma Shobo, 1969 (Showa 44).

²¹ Kato Shuichi, *Niju seiki no jigazo*, p. 67.

occurred inside the specific historical context. It will also argue that in that very change of the attitude and taking pro-active stance today more than ever lies the possibility of the continuity of Kato's thought and survival of basic human values which seemed to be so promising in the post-war epoch.

If we agree with Hayden White that the way one approaches the past - the posture one assumes before the data of history, the voice with which one reports one's findings about the past, the ratio between one's capacities for tolerance and one's interest in interpreting and criticizing – all functions of *metahistorical* (specifically ethical), how can we judge Japan's postwar enlightenment knowledge today when it is characterized as an incomplete venture, a failed project that lost its convincing power, or in the best case as a relict of the past? We shall not dispute here that a certain distance from the knowledge of past eras is necessary for proper assessment of present possibilities. Neither we will try to "rescue" postwar enlightenment thought. But, as we can see, the question is essentially of an *ethical* nature – it has to do more with the *value* that one assigns to the knowledge of the past than to the inadequacy of the knowledge itself. Thus we can approach it in various ways and with a variety of sensibilities. It was already pointed out by Nietzsche "who reminded his age that there are different kinds of historical sensibility, and that sympathy and tolerance are not necessarily the most desirable attributes for all historians in all situations"²². Although this study will undeniably be colored by sympathy for the thought of Japanese *senjo*, it is not going to be indiscriminate sympathy for old things. It is not going to be a restorative sympathy, but a reflexive one that does not necessarily wish to restore anything lost or destroyed²³ Japanese *senjo keimo shiso* or postwar enlightenment thought was a product of the times, and the times have changed. We shall not search for the possibility in the experience and thought of that time – we shall rather search for the possibility in the very change its thought has undergone.

Sengo, or post-war period in Japan was characterized with lively writing activity that burst out after the defeat of the Japanese imperialistic army and regime. The writers and thinkers of that period dealt with various issues – social, political and cultural, all based on their experience of the war and suppressed freedom of speech since the end of "Taisho-democracy" and progressive militarization of Japan which led first to occupation of Korea and Taiwan, and then to the invasion of Manchuria. The "post-war" simply brought, writes Oe Kenzaburo, "a kind of simultaneous outburst of self-expression once freedom came"²⁴, in the circumstances when "the Japanese, in losing the Pacific War, saw for the first time the entire picture of the modernization of a nation called Japan". It is widely accepted that *senjo* period lasted for some fifteen years after the end of the war - from 1945 to 1960 when New American-Japanese Security Treaty (ANPO) was introduced and when it was already clear that the country had stepped into its high-speed economic growth that was going to make Japan an economic giant, the fact that was, even to the greatest optimists hard to predict. In 1997, Kato wrote:

"Returning to the subject of Japan, my firm belief on the day of Pearl Harbour was that its eventual defeat was merely a matter of course, but during the days of the Occupation, I failed to imagine

²² Hayden White: *Tropics of Discourse – Essays in Cultural Criticism*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 136.

²³ Boym, Svetlana: *The Future of Nostalgia*, Basic Books, 2001.

²⁴ Kenzaburo Oe, *Japan, the Ambiguous and the Myself*, p. 70.

that the country would one day become an economic giant”²⁵.

Oe Kenzaburo writes that the “postwar school” of literature (and intellectual thought) came to its close in 1970 or 1972, when respectively Mishima Yukio “performed” his suicide at the headquarters of the SDF and when the Asama Mountain Villa Incident took place²⁶. All Japanese post-war writers were young intellectuals who established their identities by absorbing European literature, Oe writes. Kato himself was not an exception to this trend – in his student days and war days he read French poetry and listened to the lectures of Prof. Watanabe.

The writings on Japanese *sengo* (on politics, international relations, social movements, life and culture) in the past, in Japanese and English, were prolific. Nevertheless, there is a new trend among Japanese intellectuals to re-read and re-think Japanese post-war intellectual thought that we can call a “translation of Japanese postwar thought”. It is an attempt to historicize it, much more than to explain, criticize or defend. This trend means less return to the past and more looking for the way to continue the elusive quest for democratic subjectivity, as well as to give it a historical meaning related to the present state of affairs. After the period of the 70s and the 80s when among Japanese intellectuals it was extraordinarily fashionable to import new intellectual trends without much consideration of their application to the specific situation in Japan²⁷, and with the changes on the domestic and international scenes, the end of the Cold War brought a certain tendency to revise history (or to hear “the unvoiced”). While the tendency for historical revision in the last two decades cannot be understood in any other way but as unacceptable relativization of the facts, guilt and responsibility, we cannot escape recognizing the need to go back to the experience of the early postwar period and to rethink it in relation to the basic questions of today – why Japanese forgetting of its inconvenient past coincided with the start of the economic growth (*kodo keizai seicho*) and with the same pace with which the country was rising to become the second world economic power²⁸? Can closing its eyes help understand the events and prevent the horrible crimes committed in Asia from ever repeating? Does history always repeat and can we understand why? In the fifties it was believed that the history will never repeat itself. The future looked bright and the promises looked so realizable.

In a round table on the guide map of the “*sengo*” age and the introduction to the *Nihon-sengo-sutadizu* (the postwar studies) collection, Narita Ryuichi, Iwasaki Minoru and Komori Yoichi indicate events and phenomena that marked the period. From the imperial system’s responsibility and the impact of the Chinese revolution in the late 40s over the energy of Maruyama Masao’s brisk thesis on Japanese political thought, the Korean War that was shrouded in a veil of silence, age of military bases, the meaning of “The 1955 System” and the problem of generational turnover towards the 1960’s Anpo-toso (protests against Japan-US Security Treaty) which symbolically ended and put a final conclusion to the

²⁵ A Sheep’s Song, p. 441.

²⁶ Kenzaburo Oe, pp. 76-82.

²⁷ Kenzaburo Oe, p. 86.

²⁸ See Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of the Memory – Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1979*, Princeton University Press, 2000.

radiant and promising epoch.

Among many Japanese writers of the “post-war school”, Kato Shuichi is a distinctive figure from several reasons. His life and active writing career covers a very long span of almost six decades, and by following his work it is possible to follow post-war transformation of Japan and the world - with the range of topics – from literature, film, religion and art to politics and international relations, Kato provided the Japanese readership with a comprehensive image of their times. He was avant-garde in terms of “mixing” politics and culture in his essays, a trend that we see today in so-called cultural studies.²⁹ By encompassing past and future in his works, Kato was a representative figure in the new literary trend and had a vital impact on generations educated in those times. Kato through his regular writings in daily newspapers had the same readership for more than twenty years. Kato Shuichi continued to write in his own distinctive style until he passed away in 2008. It is natural that his opinion on the same issues has been changing through time to a certain extent, nevertheless, his conception of the knowledge has undergone a principal change which will be an argument of this dissertation in later chapters. I will also try to suggest that the specific change in his concept of knowledge has a broader social meaning and can offer an inspiration and possibility for the future thinking and actions of intellectuals and masses.

The loss of power of the “post-war school” has been discussed relatively extensively in Japan. From lamenting on the loss of its unique status of enlightening Japan and its people³⁰, towards the statements that today such Renaissance men of letters (universal intellectuals of a J.P. Sartre type) are simply not necessary any more³¹. The world is looking for specialists in their field and Japan itself is not an exception. However, in such a highly fragmented world, is it possible to see an overall picture of important social, political or cultural phenomena? Of course, it is not, but it does not seem that much important anyway, we agree here, until we are reminded that the past and its unfulfilled promises do matter– in Japan, it was the triple catastrophe on March 11, 2011, which has occurred during my work on this dissertation and completely changed my initial intention to have an ironic view of the impressive, but lost world of Japan’s post-war time. It reminded not only Japan, but the whole world of the grave consequences of not learning the lessons of the past. No more Fukushima, no more Hiroshima and many other paroles that can be seen in this year’s no-nukes protests in Tokyo and throughout Japan. The ghosts of the past appeared in Japan, just like in the last documentary with Kato entitled *Shikashi, soredake dewanai* (But, that is not all)³², in which Kato talks with the dead souls of his friends killed in the war. Kato’s late years will be fully devoted only to one thing – appealing for preserving Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Preservation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution imposed by the Occupation Forces and enacted in 1946, while being quite a controversial issue, about which will be more discussed in further chapters, was a thing by which Kato annihilated his life guiding principle of being a marginal observer and never being involved in any political action. I will try to show that this major shift in Kato’s value system is a

²⁹ Kato Shuichi, *Niju seiki no jigazo* (Part II – Narita Ryuichi).

³⁰ Oe, p.77.

³¹ Motohashi Tetsuya (hensha), *Kakuto suru shiso, Heibonsha shinsho*, 2010, p.218.

³² DVD by Sakurai Hitoshi, *Shikashi soredake dewanai*, Ghibli gakujutsu raiburari, 2009.

consequence of changes in the international and domestic scenes, and a symptom of a situation in the society that is striving to respond the tide of conformity and pragmatism in the society as well as severe reactionary tendencies.

Kato's writings were serialized in the daily newspapers and had wide readership (it was a common practice for intellectuals to publish their essays weekly in the newspapers). Later, those essays would be issued as books. While Kato's life-path by no means could be described as path of an "average" Japanese citizen, his experience of the war surely was a shared heritage of the majority of the population.

As stated earlier, Kato was writing extensively on wartime and postwar responsibility, defeat, occupation and liberation, democratization, the Cold war, economic growth and continuity of regimes.

The Postwar Knowledge – A matter of Assessment

The postwar knowledge of an "average" Japanese intellectual was shaped by three distinct experiences: the war experience, contact with the Western culture and the so-called *minshuka* or democratization process in Japan which started under the occupation and very quickly was twisted by the Cold War structure.

Later, in more concrete analyses we will return to Kato's *Zasshu bunka* (Hybrid culture) theory and two opposed tendencies of Westernization (*seiyo-ka*) and pure traditionalism (*junsui-ka*) that, according to Kato, coexist in a vicious circle of constant exchange. Nevertheless, Japan's postwar Enlightenment, for its time, was as much necessary as it was desirable (to borrow White's expression), and it is in hardly any dispute that *senjo keimo* through its criticism and dismantlement of the old institutions (authority of tradition, Emperor's system, communal body etc) was unproductive or insignificant. It is hard to believe that Japanese postwar enlightenment thinkers (in further text the Enlighteners) were unaware or incapable of understanding or sympathizing with the "irrational" as opposed to reason, progress and "historical necessity". It is rather that they failed to conceive the notion of knowledge in general as a *problem*.³³

With postmodernism in the 80s, and especially with trend of turning to the "right" and rising historical revisionist tendencies in the 90s, the Enlightenment thought has been observed, if not completely denied, ironically, as a narrative of heroism and villainy, of good and evil, or of reason and folly.

Why did the Enlightenment and its highly self-reflexive and self-critical thought lose its power? If we observe development of the postwar enlightenment thought and Japanese modernism (*kindai-shugi*) concurrently, and if we separate the modernism from modernization (*kindai-ka*), we can trace the origins of that antagonism exactly in the tension between modernism and modernization. Postmodernism has originated from being a reply to that antagonism. Modernization in the Japanese context meant an utter industrialization and Westernization (Americanization) of lifestyle. It was Kato's theory that the hybridity of Japanese culture that was born as a possible answer to that antagonism. Although the wish to break with

³³ See White, Hayden, *Tropics of Discourse – Essays in Cultural Criticism*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. pp. 135-149.

the traditional authority was undoubtedly strong, at the same time, Kato wanted to be independent of foreign authority (although he did not call it explicitly “American hegemony”). Kato clearly stated³⁴ that his main reason to write *Zasshu bunka* was to show and prove that “it is not that he, as a modernist [kindai shugisha] thinks that it would be good for Japan to resemble France”³⁵. However, Kato continues, “it is not that I want to throw away all Western elements in the fanatical way of Motoori Norinaga³⁶ and make a clear Japanese state”³⁷. Kato rather suggested that “in a culture in which foreign culture has entered so deep to the root, we should let it be and transform it with a creative power”³⁸. That is why his “main point is that pure Japanese traditionalism (Nihon-shugi) is an unreal and unreasonable idea”³⁹.

Here we can notice a sort of liberal nationalistic pragmatism that we will comment on more in the later text. And, of course, it would not be Kato if he would not immediately be in search for counter-balanced thought and justifying his thoughts from what we can conclude that those ideas in Japan, even ten years after the defeat, were indeed still very controversial and sensitive. “Let me look back on pure modernism”, Kato elaborates and continues that “there are still ideas who advocate Europeanization or Americanization as much as it is possible. During the Meiji Restoration⁴⁰, Mori Arinori⁴¹ was advocating English as the official language. Isn’t it the same as when today eminent men gather and ask for English to be the second official language? It does not differ much from the then Mori Arinori’s idea. And I consider it as a caricature of modernism. The *Zasshu bunka*’s argument is an attack on both, Japanese traditionalism (Nihon shugi) and Western-ism (Seiyo shugi), Norinaga’s illusion (*genso*) and Mori Arinori’s fantasy (*kuso*). Its basis even today⁴² has not changed much. Of course, if we would precisely talk about strength and weakness of the hybridity in Europe and observe in details its history of cultures, many would appear. Nowadays, as we know such knowledge is advancing, nevertheless, this is what I have to say on this issue for now”⁴³.

What we can see here is that Kato was a kind of typical Japanese scholar influenced with Western liberal philosophy but avoiding radical tendencies, an eminent example of so-called “churitsu” (standing in the middle) trend in thinking. He was somewhere in-between those two antagonisms, searching for the reason and avoiding extremes as well as possible extreme criticism of his own ideas.

Kato distinguishes his attitude towards a different culture from the ones of Mori Arimasa⁴⁴,

³⁴ In his comment given on International Seminar on Japanese Studies [Nihon kenkyu kokusai semina] held under the auspicious of Fukuoka Unesco Association in 2000, - published as a book: Kato Shuichi, Ronald Dore, *Nihon wo toi tsuzukete*, Fukuoka Unesco kyokai, 2004.

³⁵ Kato Shuichi, Ronald Dore: *Nihon wo toi tsuzukete*, Fukuoka Unesco kyokai, 2004, p.83.

³⁶ Motoori Norinaga was ...

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁴⁰ Meiji Restoration started in 1868

⁴¹ Mori Arinori (1847-89)

⁴² In 2000 (45 years later)

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁴⁴ Mori Arimasa (1911-76), a philosopher and literary critic, taught French literature and philosophy at Tokyo University (1948-50). The first postwar generation of Japanese scholars in France. Kato was the second to leave for France in 1951. See: Kato Shuichi, *Joshiki to hijoshiki*, 2003, Kamogawa shuppan. pp.216-219. See also: Ebisaka Takeshi: *Sengo shiso no mosaku – Mori Arimasa, Kato Shuichi wo yomu*, 1981, Misuzu Shobo.

Takata Hiroatsu⁴⁵ or Nakahara Chuya. So he writes:

“Mori Arimasa and me did not have same opinion. I think that difference existed from the beginning. Mori Arimasa wanted to enter foreign culture as much as it was possible. He was thorough in it. His life is a story about his wish and effort to enter a foreign culture. What he was writing was only about his effort to understand the French culture as much as possible. As for me, I think I am incapable of such thing. What would have been born out of it would probably be miserable. That is why I wrote *Zasshu bunka*. I trod the path of Japan’s affairs and I think I got used to thinking what would be creative and possible to do for Japanese culture.”⁴⁶

Translation and Modernization

In every possible sense, translation is necessary, but impossible. (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak)

Meiji society opened to the world under the pressure of Commodore Perry’s gunboats. However, it wanted to show the world that Japan is a modern nation, a nation that can go shoulder to shoulder with the Western world. And to be able to show it, Meiji Japan had to act very fast. In those dynamic circumstances, numerous antagonisms were born and on the basis of Kato’s writings, we can say that the sensibility of that time was not felt as distant history to the intellectuals of Showa period. In other words, either the problems born by the opening of the country and the rushing to modernize it, or either the memory of it, were still quite alive in Showa period. Kato writes:

“If we go to the time before us, while being conditioned by the time, at the same time those people were creating their own time. This is my very strong rumination. As a real and concrete fellow of the time, Soseki played a central role in it. He played it for people of ordinary professions as well. For example, although my father was a practicing physician, when talking about Soseki, he would put “san” to Soseki’s name. It used to be “Soseki-san”. ...that was the way how we felt. He was not a relative, nevertheless, it was a capture of an intimate feeling.”⁴⁷

Soseki, as the first generation of students sent abroad was a good example of an intellectual who at the same time was good at the Chinese classics as well as in English. However, an important problem according to Kato, emerged very quickly – together with popularity of the Western learning went a trend of forgetting the Chinese classics (here we shall remind that Kato in his essay on Nakae Chomin admired the fact that “Chomin although a scholar of French literature insisted that classical Chinese be included in the curriculum of all students, arguing that since the Chinese classics were an integral part of Japan’s cultural heritage, all educated Japanese should have a good command of them, as educated Europeans knew Latin and Greek classics”⁴⁸). However, the problem was an overall level of the knowledge, Kato writes, – while with the popularity of the Western learning knowledge of Chinese classics was deteriorating, the

⁴⁵ Takata Hiroatsu (1900-87), sculptor and friend and translator of Roman Rolland’s works. See *A Sheep’s Song*, Chapter 28: *Medieval Europe or Hitsuji no uta –zoku* (sequel), Chusei.

⁴⁶ Kato Shuichi: *Joshiki to hijoshiki*, 2003, Kamogawa shuppan. p. 222.

⁴⁷ Kato Shuichi-taiwashu 6, *Kenpo, koten, kotoba*, Kamogawa Shuppan 2008, p. 155.

⁴⁸ *Six Lives, Six Deaths*, p. 133.

knowledge of the Western learning was not emulating its quality. In other words, according to Kato, a deterioration in the quality of both emerged. As a typical example he gives a case of translating legal books⁴⁹ that clearly can lead to serious troubles. Very quickly, large quantities of translations, just like professional translators, started to emerge. The symbol of that became Sekai bungaku zenshu (Compilation of world's literature). At the time almost all important things were read through translations that often did not translate the original faithfully⁵⁰. Even today, Kato says, students of the foreign literature read it mostly in Japanese.⁵¹ While Kato generally agrees that translations are desirable, he thinks that translations for a writer often represent a problem. In other words, while the knowledge about a foreign culture through translation does increase, the same cannot be simply said for the depth of the influence of that foreign literature on a writer.

“Chinese characters are not foreign language, but reading of English or other foreign language and especially writing in that foreign language, means loss of the relationship that we call the basic contact...the power of learning our mother tongue through experiencing it is disappearing. In that meaning – Soseki's problem is very contemporary problem.”⁵²

Kato has lived outside of Japan almost half of his life and certainly he was contemplating a lot on this issue. A result of awareness of the importance of the issue were two books co-authored with Maruyama Masao – *Honyaku no shiso* (Thought in translation) and a book published by Iwanami shinsho in 2008 (two years after Masao passed away), under the title *Honyaku to Nihon no kindai* (Translation and Japanese modernity). The latter was conceptualized as a question-answer talk in which Kato was posing questions and famous political scientist Maruyama Masao was answering. The talk took place in 1991. The questions were mainly about the translation in early Meiji period while the answers went beyond them.⁵³

For Kato, the problem of translation could not be separated from Japanese modernization and the two should be considered synchronically. However, it should also be considered through a passage of time, diachronically, and the culture of the Tokugawa period, as its previous phase, cannot be omitted. In order to achieve translation refinement in almost all domains in such a surprisingly short span of time, Kato writes, it was necessary on the side of Japanese to have respectable historical experience, linguistic methodology and, moreover, intellectual ability. Here, Maruyama Masao was explaining the general conditions of intellectual thought of the early Meiji and its characteristics. Which books were the most translated and what was the character of those early translations? What is today's legacy of those early translations?

Maruyama points out that of two main trends noticeable in those early translations both – the first is a faithful translation and the second is interpretation. We can understand it as two main problems: is a translation complete or not and is a translation (or interpretation) correct. As we could see, from the talk of

⁴⁹ Bankoku koho or International Law.

⁵⁰ Kato Shuichi taiwa shu 6, p.198.

⁵¹ Kato Shuichi taiwa shu 6, p.199.

⁵² Ibid., p. 200.

⁵³ Maruyama Masao, Kato Shuichi, *Honyaku to Nihon no kindai*, Iwanami shinsho, 1998, p.185.

Maruyama and Kato, many early Meiji translations were quite incomplete. Japan was taking what they thought they needed. That is how the part from the International Law on pirates⁵⁴, while in Chinese translation occupying an important place, was completely omitted from the early Japanese translation. Sometimes a translation, conditionally speaking, has to be “incorrect” in order to be “faithful” and such case Maruyama and Kato discuss regarding translation of the word “Christian nations”⁵⁵ – in Japanese it was translated faithfully to the meaning as “civilized”. Maruyama and Kato also discuss the issue of destiny of a certain literature work in other country which often depends on the quality of its translation. That is how, for a long time, works of E.M. Forster were relatively unpopular in Japan⁵⁶. Specific humor and irony of his works were its essence, and it was poorly translated into Japanese.

From Translation (honyaku)⁵⁷ to Hybrid (zasshu) Culture

If the subject of Japanese honyaku-bunka was born out of need to acquire Western learning and catch the pace with “civilized” world powers⁵⁸, we can say that the subject of Kato’s *Zasshu bunka* was born out of need for the very opposite but not unrelated process – the process of “translating” Japanese culture transformed through contact with Western learning. *Zasshu bunka* was written after Kato spent four years in France, in 1955, and in that sense we can say that Kato’s quest for modernity, the “second youth” or a new chance for “bildung” . Nevertheless, both these cultures’ target was Japanese readership and in that sense *Zasshu bunka* did not contribute to improving the imbalance of a “one-way” translation activity. Perhaps Kato’s later works, such as his capital work *Introduction to History of Japanese Literature* did contribute to the two-way direction of the translation movement. However, Kato was widely and with reason criticized that this history was an expression of so-called “nihonjin-ron”, a discourse on Japanese uniqueness. Although Kato states that honyaku bunka did not appear out of blue and that it was a product of three things among which was the important role played by the tradition of Chinese texts read in Japanese style, the “kanbun – yomi kudashi” style of Sorai school. Sakai Naoki considers such statements to be misleading since the modern Japanese language was formed following the formation of Japan as modern state with the Meiji Restoration in 1868.

If we understand *Zasshu bunka* as Kato’s translation of changes in Japanese culture under the influence of the Western culture, what we can say about the translation “filter” that Kato used?

Translation is undeniably the most important phenomenon of literature mediating between the people. While monuments or music have a sort of universal language (that sometimes must be interpreted, explained or decoded), translations fully depend on the knowledge of foreign language and specific field,

⁵⁴ Honyaku to Nihon no kindai, p. 145.

⁵⁵ Ibid. pp.135-136 -“all Christian nations” was translated as [subete no bunmei no kuni].

⁵⁶ Kato Shuichi taiwa shu 6, p. 198.

⁵⁷ *Honyaku* consist of two Chinese characters: *hon* and *yaku*. *Hon* means a movement of turning in general like turning of a page, leaf, a sheet of paper, while *yaku* has meaning of interpretation and explanation. *Zasshu* is consisted as well of two Chinese characters: *zatsu* which means miscellaneous, sundry, coarse, rough, while *shu* means a sort, a kind, a type, a category.

⁵⁸ Maruyama and Kato while commenting translation of the International Law [Bankoku koho] by Wheaton explain that actual word in Wheaton’s book was not civilized but Christian. However, it was properly translated as civilized, according to both of them.

and on the knowledge of mother tongue. Translations can be understood as a kind of “transplanting” its object into the other (foreign) ambient. It is a kind of travel of a literature work from inside to outside, a kind of imitation or shadow of the original, but at the same time a process of imagining and creating. In that meaning, Sakai Naoki writes:

“We cannot forget that the term translation contains a doubled sense of meaning. Translation is the work of process of re-writing or re-stating, but at the same time is the text which emerges as a result of passing through this work or process. To speak of the translations of Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu* on the one hand signifies the task of repeating the original text in another medium, and it also connotes the new text that is born out of this task. From the outset, the work of translation differs from that of literary creation in that translation has the character of imitation performed on citation.”⁵⁹

Hybrid Culture

Hybrid culture (Zasshu bunka) was written in 1955. It was a year in which Kato Shuichi was back to Japan after four years spent in France. He resumed work at Tokyo University Hospital and also started working as a physician at Mitsui Mining Company, and as a lecturer of French literature at Meiji University. He also served as literary critic for the literary journal *Gunzo*.⁶⁰

His experience of living abroad (he departed for France in 1951 as a recipient of a French government scholarship to do medical research at the Institute Pasteur and at the Université de Paris⁶¹) was a crucial condition for the genesis of this work which, regardless of many widely read Kato’s works, has been one of the first and the most recognizable throughout his long career. *Zasshu bunka* is a product of its time, and in accordance with that, there appear many issues of the immediate postwar era in Japan are aired. Through sightseeing the West and Thinking on Japan from the distance, Kato discusses cultural purification and hybridization, inside and outside view, travel and marginality, intellectual role and activism, war responsibility, nationalism and cultural nationalism, modernization and modernity.

As introduction to the essay *Hybrid nature of Japanese Culture*⁶² there are two essays – the first is *Thinking on Japanese Literature on the way of Sightseeing of the West*⁶³ and *A view from the distance*⁶⁴.

Kato through analyses of Japanese literature and culture as a whole comes to the conclusions of social, political and economic nature. In the above-mentioned introductory essay, he starts by explaining necessary the condition of going “outside” of Japan and then writes on Japan’s modern and traditional literature. He considers Japan as a very “strange” and “unique” country because there could not be found a similar country that requested new cultural background in such a thorough way as did Japan. Even some

⁵⁹ Sakai, Naoki, *Honyaku to iu firuta* – draft version of an article entitled “Bordering of the Area: Translation and Discontinuity”, which will constitute a chapter the book *Dislocation of the West*. This is based upon the English translation by Gavin Walker of the article *Honyaku to iu firuta*, Iwanami koza tetsugaku, vol 15, Iwanami Shoten, 2009, pp. 181-211.

⁶⁰ *A Sheep’s Song*, p. xxi.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. xix.

⁶² *Nihon bunka no zasshusei*.

⁶³ *Seijo kenbutsu no tochude kangaeta Nihon bungaku*.

⁶⁴ *Takami no kenbutsu ni tsuite*.

big countries of Asia that started later with modernization and the importation of the Western technology did not take over Western (West European) heritage in the field of literature, art and intellectual thought to the extent Japan did. Kato very quickly focuses on what kind of “uniqueness” he is considering – he is aware that Japanese culture is not as old as Chinese or Indian, nor it is grandiose. But, watched from the outside, Kato writes, it has pretty clear features and makes an independent world (at least when it comes to literature or sculpture).⁶⁵ All that distinctiveness, he continues, has been voluntarily thrown away, the Western model was uncritically accepted as a desired ideal and “something” was to be achieved with that.⁶⁶ In Japanese tradition, he further argues, if an extract could have been taken from it and later developed, there had been a lot of potential. One of the biggest reasons for that loss is just the idleness of Japanese people, he says.⁶⁷ Here, Kato perhaps could be understood as a conservative who advocates cultural purity. However, what will be seen through later reading is that he is probably just taking critical stance towards insufficient understanding of what is borrowed as well as what is rejected. The cultural hybridity idea meant breaking stereotypes, those inside as well as outside, and at the time it was created it was an original contribution to the process of postwar enlightenment. Nevertheless, we can understand it also as a pragmatic compromise which brought the enlightenment thought to an impasse. The theory itself was written in the sensitive period of Japan’s history and we can say that such pragmatic attitude of a “average” Japanese did and is having its consequences about which it will be more talk in further chapters. Hybrid Culture is a story about one of the most controversial modernizations in the world. Kato with his hybridity theory offered a “small hope” which was did not show as enough for the times which were coming. Its fundamental lack of historical perspective was the reason why it failed.

Hybridity and the question of masses (minshu)

Kato’s *Hybrid Culture* begins with the description of the circumstances that brought him to think in the way of “hybridity”. While being in the West (Western Europe), he had been thinking of Japanese culture and although “his principles haven’t changed”, there was some divergence in thinking about the content of “Japanese” without any influence of the “Western”. If influence of technology would be excluded, very little would stay and it is all superficial and shortsighted. He compared cities. In Tokyo, there were things which were similar and things which were dissimilar to Western cities. But when thinking what is really old and “Japanese” in terms of building, that could be some old houses in Kyoto and there is nothing else so old. Thinking about something that could be imitation of Cézanne or something comparable to it would be even bigger nonsense, according to Kato.⁶⁸ When it comes to fine arts, Hokusai or Korin can be reached and it cannot be gone further. English culture, for example, is specifically English and can be seen from academic art to the costumes and way of life, it is not overlaid and there is a feeling of stability and peace. The French case is similar to the English one. Cultures of both

⁶⁵ Zasshu Bunka, p. 8.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

⁶⁸ Zasshu bunka, p. 29.

countries cherished purity of tradition and that is something that all travelers must notice. It is not that English and French cultures did not borrow from others, but in the most of those cases it was not about accepting foreign principle that does not exist in their own cultures, but only about enriching and developing its own original cultural principles. Most of the English and French are aware of this and they developed specific type of nationalism. But the fact is that this conclusion is wrong and Kato realized it when he was coming back to Japan and when he saw the Japanese coast. His impression of Japan was very emotional and subjective and while watching mountains and pine trees leaning against the white washed walls of fishing villages⁶⁹, he nostalgically remembered old and beautiful Japan depicted in sumi-e sceneries. It was completely different world from the Western, but when he entered the Kanmon strait (Shimonoseki strait) and when the first factories with their tall chimneys appeared next to each other on the shore of Kita-Kyushu, result of the “effort of an industrious nation”, Kato was soon reminded on “modern Japan”. On the other hand, that modern Japan was completely different from the rest of Asia. Kobe differs from Marseille, but from Singapore as well. As a matter of fact, seen from the outside, Singapore is more similar to Marseilles than Kobe. And why is it so? Here, Kato touches upon the problem of colonialism and we cannot say that this part of the *Hybrid culture* shows a certain nationalistic sentiment and lack of awareness of the post-colonial issues. “Hybridization” with the West in Asia differed depending on whether a country has just “imported” a finished product or the product was made by the country recipient. In Japan, Western culture is adopted, but everything that is built or made is a work of Japanese people and in accordance with their own needs. The port of the Kobe was made by Japanese hands, buildings in the style of western architecture, manners and customs – everything Japanese took and adapted to their own needs. In Singapore, the case is different – it was built by Europeans according to Europeans’ needs or standards – measures for length, for example, were same as in Marseille. On the other hand, Malaysia, India and China are specific cases, again different from Japan. While he was in Europe, Kato writes, he was thinking about the difference between Europe and Japan, but once back to Japan, he started thinking about old Japan, its tradition and the difference between Japan and other Asian countries in the sense that process of westernization was far more thorough than in any other Asian country, Kato writes and clearly is displacing Japan of the Asian context. It was impossible to separately think Japanese tradition and westernized Japan, Kato notices, – they were too much interwoven and it is not possible to separate those two. It is important to understand that the story about hybridization is not story about “branches and leaves”⁷⁰. If it would be a story about branches and leaves, there is no country that has not been under some foreign influence. Kato here gives an example of Japanese extreme or radical spiritualist⁷¹ as a proof to what extent Western culture is at the root of Japanese culture and how impossible is to extract it. There are people, Kato says, which advocate pure Japanese spirit and art, but those same people do not advocate Japanese-type trains or elections. Those people do not write with a writing brush, but with a pen, and they make western-type books. Politics, education and other systems and institutions are all modeled on the

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 30.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 32.

⁷¹ Kyokutan-na seishin-shugi-sha.

West.⁷² It is considered by Japanese spiritualists that Japanese spirit developed independently from economic substructure, but it is not possible, Kato argues that what is called Japanese spirit stays intact from everyday life and economic substructure. When talking about the concepts – for arguing it is necessary to use western concepts such as liberty, humanism, analyses and synthesis – without adopting these concepts it is hard to construct the argumentation and persuade people. Hybridity of Japanese culture was supposed to be “solved” much before translated western concepts and cultivated hybridity. The masses in Japan understand that well, Kato writes. Hybridity is accepted by masses, Kato writes, and it is quite interestingly used as means of life and there are not so ridiculous ideas as purification from hybridity.

It is important to make a digression here and note that beginning of the fifties were the period when issue of the masses (*minshu*) in relation to the success of the Chinese Revolution was questioned by Japanese intellectuals. Takeuchi Yoshimi, the scholar of Chinese literature contrasted China’s modernization with that of Japan. According to Takeuchi, Japan had never since ancient times possessed its own culture and it was rather the elite that had always imported culture from outside and forced masses to conform. Takeuchi thought of Japanese modernization as of a series of “*tenko*” (conversion or apostasy) in which the existing culture would be rejected and the new one imported. At the same time, China on the basis of successful use of its traditional culture succeeded in achieving modernization stemming from the masses.⁷³

Although criticizing ‘purification’ tendencies which by Kato could not be anything else but failure⁷⁴, Kato in his claim that Japanese culture is a complicated history of hybridity and purification tendencies actually lacks the historical perspective about what he did talk in 2005. Actually, his hybrid theory was very similar to presentism that he was criticizing so much when discussing “characteristics of Japanese people” in, for example, *Nihon bunka ni okeru jikan to kukan*⁷⁵. Kato criticized his hybrid theory in *Niju seiki no jigazo*⁷⁶ and draw the following table:

Past	D (Japan)	C (Anglo-French)
Present	A (Japan)	B (Anglo-French)

A and D represented Japanese culture and B and C Anglo-French. The past in Kato’s chart is a distanced past - like the culture in the twelfth century (Heian period). What he compared in his hybridity theory was only the “present” conditions of Japanese and Western cultures marked by A and B. D and C were not compared, Kato writes. Kato was aware that *kindaika* (modernization) must be passed and in the fifties looked for the most pragmatic way to do it under the changing domestic and international conditions.

⁷² *Zasshu bunka*, p. 32.

⁷³ *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu* (Takeuchi Yoshimi’s collected works), vol.4, Chikuma shobo, 1980. See also: Oguma Eiji, *Minshu to aikoku – sengo nihon no nashonarizumu to kokyosei* (Democracy and patriotism – postwar Japanese nationalism and publicness), Shinyosha 2002.

⁷⁴ p. 33.

⁷⁵ Kato Shuichi, *Nihon bunka ni okeru jikan to kukan* (Time and space in Japanese culture), Iwanami shinsho, 2007.

⁷⁶ Kato Shuichi, *Niju seiki no jigazo*, Chikuma shinsho, 2005, p. 45.

Hybrid culture theory was undoubtedly colored with nationalistic (liberal) sentiment which was essential anti-Asian and pro-West. This theory although from today's perspective a failure, is a valuable source of understanding complexity of the postwar condition in Japan, and different positions of its enlightenment thinkers which varied according to the changes in the country and the region.

In order to see how Kato observed those changes, we shall now briefly be back to Kato's analysis – it was already mentioned before that Japanese movements for purification of the culture roughly can be divided into two opposite poles which are rotating endlessly– one which uncritically accepts western culture and wants Japan to be completely westernized and the other who wants to preserve pure Japanese spirit and remove all elements of westernization. Nevertheless, manners, feelings and attitudes in contact with foreign culture are gradually changing and in certain sense moral and esthetic values are moving away from tradition. The *wakon-yosai* principle becomes difficult to preserve, and as one of the forms of movements for preservation tradition, nationalism emerges. At the same time other phenomena emerge – imported technological system gives birth to the society in which need for an adequate system of thought emerges as well. This thought at the beginning strongly opposes nationalism and a becomes driving force for westernization. The direction in which westernization of Japanese culture goes is also an introduction to historicism, Kato writes.⁷⁷ In historicism, or course that everything explains with history, Japanese westernization is called Japanese modernization. Historically, it happened at the same time. Japan was late with modernization and both sides were concerned with advancing the pace of modernization to catch up with the rest of (western) world, but conflict based on the question how to catch up was born and since then between those two tendencies in Japanese culture there is an ever increasing discrepancy. Among the recent cultural movements, there can be seen many elements of the conflict – for example, between old and new hobbies, between the historical and a-historical approach to explaining social phenomena, between conservative and progressive attitudes etc.

The form in which this conflict was the most obvious was the war and period of the occupation, especially its first part.⁷⁸ The first part of the occupation is the period from the defeat to 1947.2.1. (General strike) and more broadly, it can be considered the period until 1950 and start of the Korean War. Before the war, state authorities did not interfere in an institutional way in different cultural fields. The emperor's system, with its central politics being “rich country – strong military” was systematically present in the field of education but not in the field of thought-art-literature. From case to case, it was oppressive but never institutionalized. During the war, the authorities started having an active role in the thorough mobilization of the spirit⁷⁹. Cultural nationalism, to an unprecedented level, actively helped the government in spiritual mobilization. Active cultural nationalism engaged and became a connector between the state and the masses. The Kyoto school philosophers and the Japan romantic school undertook the job of justifying the war and deifying the Emperor. The philosophers of these movements exercised western philosophical methods and “modernized” the emperor system. According to Kato, this was

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 36.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 37.

⁷⁹ kokumin-seishin-so-doin.

nothing more than “ultra-nationalism”⁸⁰ and “universality and rationalism” of the idea of the theory of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere⁸¹ had geopolitical function and was necessary for Japan’s imperialistic goals.

Japan and this ideology were defeated in the war and Japan was occupied and democracy imposed. Kato discusses about process of democratization and democratic awareness of masses. The West has a tradition of Declaration of Human Rights, and is it possible, he wonders, that in Asia which does not have a history of liberty, equality and self-awareness, can it come spontaneously? Probably it is not possible, Kato concludes, and emphasizes active approach in the process of accepting values of humanism as a modern task of Japan.

View from distance and its paradoxes

Kato’s travel and view from outside or distance was necessary element in creating theory of hybridity for Japanese culture. Travel provided him with a new perspective on Japanese art, culture and society. His perspective is perspective of a traveler. However, “not of a passenger who in high-speed meets only airports”.⁸² *Zasshu bunka* was written in Japan, after coming back from France. Real place for thinking about Japanese literature or culture is Japan and not the West, Kato writes. Traveler is far from his country, in a foreign country he bears no social responsibility and that is an abstract and exceptional existence.⁸³ Although in a contemporary world there is an “international culture”, it is not a “cosmopolite culture”, Kato emphasizes.⁸⁴ An assumption for cosmopolite culture is development of national culture, and if it is all the time in conflict with the antagonist tendencies (such as extreme purification movements), that is not an easy task. In a way, it is no wonder that Kato wrote *Zasshu bunka* at almost the very beginning of his writing career and that it stayed an important principle or axis of his thinking throughout his long career of traveling and writing. Back in France, he was able for the first time to observe “in live” (not through the books) and feel purely “foreign” (since that can be said for French or English cultures), and when coming back, his observations about differences and similarities of western cultures and Japanese (hybrid) were the strongest.

Zasshu bunka is a story about differences between cultures and societies, and different responses to adoption of the foreign element. It is not story about “universality” as some of the rare western scholars analyzed it.⁸⁵ Individuals are everywhere the same, Kato writes in his *Zasshu bunka*, but societies are different.⁸⁶ *Zasshu bunka* is a story of breaking stereotypes about Japan and its society. It is a kind of “middle” but realistic ground of analyses, it has no prejudice or need to make Japanese culture unique or superior nor it approves snobbism or “fashion for the foreign”. Both tendencies still exist, Kato wrote in a

⁸⁰ cho-kokka-shugi.

⁸¹ daito-a-kyoei.

⁸² *Zasshu bunka*, p. 16.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁸⁵ Kato Shuichi, Ronald Dore, *Nihon wo toitsuzukete*, Fukuoka Unesco kyokai, Iwanami Shoen 2004, p. 79.

⁸⁶ *Zasshu bunka*, p. 25.

comment in 2004, and reminded of Mori Arimasa's request for introducing English as official terminology. According to Kato, such tendencies still exist and represent no more than a caricature.

Zasshu bunka is also a story about nationalism and pragmatic reaction on the domestic and international changes. It is also a discussion on question of the masses (*minshu*) that especially started intriguing Japanese postwar enlightenment thinkers after the success of Chinese revolution. It is a theory that displaced Japan from its Asian context and as such was in accordance with American interests to build an anti-communist wall in Japan.

Kato was aware of Japan's position in the constellation of international relations of that time and with hybrid culture made a sort of compromise and pragmatically accepted it. As a product of the Cold War structure, with its collapse the theory showed to be invalid. The theory perhaps did give a "small hope" at the time, but essentially was without potential to inspire the change the postwar intellectuals yearned for. After all, Kato was out of the country at that time and could not be a true part of any change. He was certainly aware of such position when he offered an example of Cassandra, Trojan prophet. He is self-examining his role in the war. In his thoughts, he was always on a "right" side, but it was not enough and in that meaning he was wrong and his behavior was a mistake.⁸⁷ However, a view from a distance cannot be achieved by active role in the society because it is only in the distance, he is "invisible" for both societies in terms of responsibility for his role in it.⁸⁸ This is probably a paradox that Kato was trying to solve the whole of his life. Perhaps he succeeded in it at the very end of his life when he engaged in Association for preservation of Article 9, and appealed to Japanese public. Article 9 itself can be considered as a kind of "hybrid" because there are arguments that as much as it is imposed by the occupier, it is also a truly Japanese idea (Social Democratic Party as early as 1902 demanded complete abolition of armaments⁸⁹) As much as it was wanted by the foreign power, it was wanted and accepted by domestic power⁹⁰.

Intellectuals and 1968

1968 was a year that questioned once again the role of intellectuals and the resistance that can be offered. In the essay *Intellectuals and War*, Kato first defined what he meant by the "war", and then what he meant by "intellectuals". When talking about the war, he related to the Fifteen Years War that started with Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and ended with Japan's defeat in the WWII. By intellectual he meant an educated person who had more or less impact on the public. Subject of this essay is Japanese intellectuals' characterization and attitude towards the mentioned war. Kato's attitude is clear – it was an aggression without any possibility of justification either the war itself nor, either the people who supported it. Kato divided intellectuals into three groups: the minor group who actively supported the war and glorified it as sacred, the majority which in different ways collaborated with the war, and the third minority

⁸⁷ *Zasshu bunka*, p. 20.

⁸⁸ *Zasshu bunka*, p. 19.

⁸⁹ Masao, Maruyama, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, Oxford University Press 1969, p. 307.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, speech of PM Shidehara, p. 308.

of intellectuals who were sharp war critics and uncompromisingly against it. The results of his critique Kato considered as to be relevant for today's Japan as well. Regardless of the character of the government (democratic or not) all governments in the world lie, Kato quotes a journalist I.F Stone or Viennese writer Karl Kraus who wrote after the WWI that war is the organization of lies. The duty of an intellectual is to follow and identify contradictions in the information and that is eminently intellectual's job. It is not always an easy task, Kato writes, but it is absolutely necessary and it is always possible. Only in that way, can intellectuals influence the formation of the anti-war determination of the masses⁹¹. Throughout his writings, Kato never forgot his experience of the war, and was worried about accelerated forgetting of the war in Japan and possibility of repetition of the history.

In the *Watashi ni totte nijuu seiki* (Twentieth century for me), Kato wrote on a Symposium on the overcoming of modernity (Kindai no chokoku zadankai) held in the midst of the war, in 1942⁹². It was a symposium held in two days and published in the magazine Bungakkai in September of the same year. Overcoming modernity is a concept that appeared in Europe after the WWI in the writings of Oswald Spengler (1880~1936). Spengler wrote on the decay of European civilization (The Decline of the West) and among intellectuals gathered at the symposium, many had read it and thought that Japan could (at least in the Far East) overtake the role of leader in overcoming modernity problems, liberate Asian colonies from European colonial powers and form the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. From very simple reasoning, Kato writes, he did not believe in these words from the pure beginning. As the first reason, Japan if it really had such intention, should have liberated first Taiwan and the Korean peninsula from its own colonial rule, and the second – it should first modernize itself and then try to overcome the modernity. Japan at the time, compared with European colonial powers, was still predominantly an agrarian society. Further, its multiparty political system and the institution of the prime minister was established only during the First World War. The Imperial system as well was not a characteristic of a modern nation. The Japanese Constitution of the time instead of the word “nation” (kokumin) used the word “shinmin” (subject) which was a word used in European terminology before modernity. Therefore, economically and politically, Japan was stuck half-way in the modernization process and by no means could lead the overcoming of modernity. Socially, it was also late, Kato writes and gives an example of marriages that were almost a hundred percent arranged. Men could get divorced, however, it couldn't be granted to women on their own initiative. And individualism was an unknown term even for Japanese intellectuals who only as a community (kyodotai) could say something about “overcoming modernity”. Overcoming modernity by no means could mean a return to agricultural community, Kato writes.

The Japanese system has changed a lot after the defeat. Nevertheless, Kato wrote in the *Watashi ni totte nijuu seiki*, intellectually or mentally, continuity of the post-war state of affairs with the pre-war ones was strong and it is extending to the present day⁹³. Remembering war for Kato was not a matter of the past, but of the present moment.

⁹¹ Washizu Tsutomu, *Kato Shuichi ga kaita Kato Shuichi, 91no atogaki to 11 no maegaki*, Heibonsha, Tokyo, 2009.

⁹² Kato Shuichi, *Watashi ni totte nijuu seiki*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo 2000, p. 90.

⁹³ *Watashi ni totte nijuu seiki*, Kindai no choetsu zadankai nit suite, p. 94.

The U.S. Occupation Army was well aware of this persistence in mentality of Japanese society and made its first goal to disarm Japan and make it defenseless. As its second goal, they set democratization. Those two goals, of course, are not unrelated, Kato writes. There is a myth in the U.S that democratic nation will never commit aggression against the other nations. Nonetheless, that is a myth that history showed to be incorrect. Japan was meant to be a show case of capitalism for the socialist Soviet Union. In this processes, the U.S. used human resources from the pre-war period, like PM Kishi Nobusuke or head of the police. This, for sure, contributed to the strengthening of the mentioned continuity with the pre-war state of affairs. In order to keep the country united and “stable”, the Imperial system as a relict of the past was used as well. During these processes, the war responsibility of the Japanese nation became vague and eventually disappeared. In the circumstances in which war responsibility was not questioned or enough criticized, it was slowly getting forgotten. Inversely proportional to it, the possibility of revival of the system and values that caused the war is getting bigger. The symposium of overcoming modernity is one example of such a trend⁹⁴.

To return to his writings on war and the intellectual, in short, what is at the stake is the choice, Kato wrote. The idea was developed by Sartre and it is deeply related to his idea of freedom and the experience of resistance. The choice means to either betray a comrade or not. If you say his name, you will be saved. If you do not say, you will be arrested and killed. Liberty is about solidarity (*rentai*) of individuals who go underground and about their free individual choice. This is the basis of Sartre’s philosophy of freedom. Group (*shudan*) is something completely different. The beginning of a group is not an individual, but customs and pressure to obey the rules. In Japan, there is no individual as the beginning of the gathering and solidarity (*rentai*). In the group, it is cooperation (*kyoryoku*)⁹⁵ as the highest value. In another words, there is no resistance in Japan, Kato wrote at the end of the twentieth century. There is no subject who can make free judgment and choice. During the war in Japan, individual spiritual freedom existed only hidden inside the body, in its thinking and feelings. And it could not be expressed outside of it. Individual strength was close to zero, says Kato. There were writers during the war who justified their collaboration with the regime saying that they did not have information about what was going on. But, Kato writes, it is not that they did not know but they did not want to know. They were not deceived, they wanted to be deceived. Such people tended to forget the war, Kato write⁹⁶

ANPO and Intellectuals⁹⁷

The fight over the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security treaty lasted for about a year. On one side there was an economic connection with the U.S, on the other there was a military connection. Opinions on the evaluation and regulating those two dimensions varied. The government was trying to explain that

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 96.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 102.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 105.

⁹⁷ Kato Shuichi, Komori Yoichi, Narita Ryuichi, *Kotoba to sensha o misuete, Kato Shuichi ga kangaetsuzuketekitakoto*, editors : Komori Yoichi and Narita Ryuichi, Chikumagakugei bunko, Tokyo 2009, p. 214.

there is no danger of Japan being involved in any conflict in the Far East, as well as that U.S.' intentions are good and Japan will be "consulted in advance" (jizenkyogi) on any issue. It was clear that the word "consultation" is not same as "approval". The government asked the people to believe it, just like, Kato writes, it was a kind of religious belief after eternal peace of mind and enlightenment will come. In the night of 19-20th of May, 1960, the police entered the Diet and the bill on the treaty was passed. Direct reason for the police interference (which is an unprecedented act) was a "sit-down strike" of the opposition to the bill. Of course, that was irregular and abnormal act and may Japanese intellectuals, Kato writes, remembered the pre-war Japanese parliament and gradual restriction of democratic principles. The experience of these intellectuals was saying that an immediate reaction is necessary. It is a loss of freedom and resistance is needed. If the country cannot decide on its own destiny, then it means that the principles on which democracy rests are disappearing. This moment is decisive one, the moment in which something like that is going on? Japanese post-war intellectuals felt that the moment has come and it has nothing to do with being left or with liberalization. People who experienced fascism know that in such moments it is important to abandon armament and to protect the pacifist constitution. In such moments, idealism is necessary.

This had a direct negative impact on spirit of the people. It is time in which university professors resigned their jobs (like Takeuchi Yoshimi). It was no longer an internal problem or dilemma, it was a problem of value system of the society. If the faith in democratic ideal vanishes, and legitimacy of government is being destroyed...what is necessary is idealism, Kato wrote. It was the moment with which Kato ended his autobiography and never returned to it again.

The Year 1968 in Japan – and issue of the "military industrial – academic complex"

"One dream has become past, but humanity cannot leave without dreams"

Kato Shuichi

In his lectures at Bonjinkai's meetings Kato brings the past events of 1968 and the contemporary War on terror in connection. The two backgrounds according to Kato meet around two important questions – protest against disparities (North-South, rich-poor) and the problem of asymmetry or inequality. The generation of 1968 waived their privileges and chose to raise their voices against different problems in their societies, writes Kato. Hippies believed they can live without electricity, water or furniture. Without going into the debate of the reality of such aspirations, the generation of 1968, Kato writes, had one thing in common: they rejected to be a part of "inequalities" in the society and to use their privileges.⁹⁸ Isn't an effort to redress such backgrounds of asymmetry a way to a possible solution of the asymmetries that are essential reason for terrorism, Kato is thinking, and emphasizes the importance of not only resigning its individual privileges but of criticizing of privileges of the society's "super-structure" as well. Exactly such structure that has given a birth to the "privileges", in Japan concretely of a "military-academic-industrial complex" (gun-san-gaku-fukugou-tai), the movement of 1968 wanted to wreck. However, there were some

⁹⁸ Kato Shuichi, Terorizumu to nichijousei – 9.11 to Yo-naoshi 68, Bonjinkai 2002, p. 71.

weak points, Kato points out, and those were the fact that an “enemy” was too big and the critic too abstract. Moreover, a trend of “subjectivity” was too strong. As he explained in the essay “Barike-do no seishun” (The Youth of barricades)⁹⁹, the “raison d’etre”-ism and heroism (ejyuu shugi) were the movements weak points. Japanese students made barricades inside their university campuses and while resisting the riot police, they played inside the barricades, watched yakuza movies etc, which, according to Kato was all right and necessary thing to do. However, it was not supposed to become a resisting because of resisting, but a resisting with reason, Kato writes and adds that in such circumstances, Japanese students movement ran out of fuel.¹⁰⁰

Another important thing regarding the student movement in 1968, when compared to students movements in Japan before the war was a lack of sufficient class consciousness, that is a shortage of so-called objective consciousness. Why was it so, Kato asks, and explains that the postwar student movement was leftist, but “anti-communist” while the pre-war one was “baptized” with Marxism. Although Kato himself was not a member of the Communist party (nor Maruyama Masao), they have read Marxist literature and through that literature approach close to leftist ideas.¹⁰¹ Since Marxism is based on the objectivism, it does not emphasize emotional solidarity based on internal excitement. The hero of student movement of 1968 was Sartre, Kato writes, whose thought had two aspects – existentialism and Marxism. Among Japanese students, understanding of objective Marxism was weak and the existential aspect was emphasized. The collapse of the movement marked the end of fashion of reading Sartre in Japan. Sartre, according to Kato, was standing on the crossroad of two European philosophies – Kierkegaard’s existentialism and Hegel’s objectivism (on which Marxism was based). The existential line based on subjectivism was originally weak.¹⁰² Sartre analyzed those questions in his *Question de method* (1960) and *Critique de la raison dialectique* (1960).

Kato considered himself to originally be prone to subjectivism, but having on mind his “training” on the issue of reality equal to Imperial militarism, he was “colored” by the objectivism. So, as a result, he was standing on the position of Sartre. However, he was also emphasizing the philosophies of K.R.Popper and Wittgenstein whose analytical philosophy was a pure objectivism but not related to social reality explained by Marxism.

The protests of 1968, just like those of 1848 have passed without “big victories”. Kato finds reasons for that in the prevalent mood among people in advanced industrial countries. American sociologists talked about the “death of ideology” and Marxism. In Japan as well, since protests against “Anpo” Security Treaty in 1960, the feeling of failure of the left was strong. The economic prosperity in those countries, Kato writes, turned the attention of masses towards “weekend travels”, cars and kitchen furniture, and in media could be heard anything critical about the system. In Japan, the word for more concrete happiness, “shiwase” entered the fashion, compared to the word “kofuku” (happiness) which had

⁹⁹ Kato Shuichi, *Terorizumu to nichijousei*, p. 229.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 73.

more abstract meaning.¹⁰³ In such circumstances it was difficult for minority of intellectuals or students to turn attention of masses. In case they became radicalized, the distance from masses would become even bigger. In case they were silent, the masses would not pay attention at all. Here we can find Kato's remark that "rentai" or solidarity of broader social strata is necessary for any kind of change of a system.

By Kato, the protests of 1968, essentially not connected to each other, spread to many countries in a similar way as in 1848. In 1968 Kato visited Prague in order to see for himself the protest made famous as "Prague Spring" and based on experience there he wrote "Words and Tanks" (Kotoba to sensha) about which we discussed above. As Kato writes, in America it emerged around the issue of discrimination, in West Germany around the Emergency Acts, in Japan around "Anpo". The end of the sixties is also a period when Kato had already moved to North America (Canadian Vancouver) where he could observe (from the marginal position again) the situation in the U.S., which according to Kato was peculiar – it was organized around two main issues – the Vietnam War and the Black People issue and consequently had an anti-war and anti-discriminatory character. Although, as he said, he was not interested in hippy movement at first, while living in Canada and working in the university environment, he came in touch with young hippy students and learned about them.

The Article 9 in Kato's thought - Is Japan really bound together in the common fate with the U.S.?

It is impossible to talk about the Japanese Pacifism without talking about the Article 9. Although Article 9 existed for a long time, as well as attempts of its revising, Kato's interest in the question was much intensified in 2003, together with the war in Iraq and after sending Japanese SDF's troops there. It is exactly this event that prompted Kato to actively engage in protection of the Article 9. In the situation where Japanese government and Diet hastily prepared for revising the constitution, Kato decided to act politically for the first time in his life. If Article 9, as the heart of Japanese "Pacifist Constitution", would be changed, Kato wrote, there would be no more legal obstacle for the SDF troops to participate war in any place of the world where the U.S. is fighting. Kato believed it was a wrong thing to change it, and together with a group of public persons organized *Kyujō-no-kai* [Association for Preservation of Article 9] in 2004 and appealed to the Japanese public. For him it was a question of utmost importance for security of Japan and inseparable from stability of the East Asia as a whole. And, according to Kato, it is enough to compare the situation in Europe between Germany, France and Poland with the situation between Japan, China and Korean Peninsula to clearly see that Japan failed in establishing mutual relationship of trust with China and Korea. Strengthening of the military alliance with the U.S is definitely not the way to improve things, Kato writes. It is the Article 9, and it is the Article 9, now and here, and its spirit that is the only way to fill the gap. We might question the way Article 9 could improve things now, when it was not powerful enough in previous period of almost sixty years to establish the "mutual trust relationship" Kato is writing about? Nevertheless, Kato claimed that it is exactly now the time to insist on renouncing the war and maintaining of the military power. For Kato, it was inevitable that Japan would be requested to participate more and

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-4.

more in the U.S. wars all around the world and it was only matter of time for Japan to be under pressure for introducing conscription system. Major landmarks for Kato were coolheaded judgment, moral justice, and interest of the country.¹⁰⁴ And the way to exit the situation is supposed to be diplomatic, Kato writes. Japan is too afraid of American reaction¹⁰⁵ or its anger, but if Japan would only think about French or Canadian example, it could realize that although they rejected American requests nothing happened! Canada has a long border with the U.S., Kato writes, they speak same language, they are economically dependent on the U.S. but still they did not answer to all American requests and did not send their troops to Iraq. However, only Japan believes that “they” (the U.S. and Japan) are a “community bound together by common fate” [unmei kyodotai]. It is a complete illusion, Kato writes, and Japan should get rid of it.

There are several issues in the discourse of Article 9 and the most discussed ones are an issue of being imposed from the above (American Occupation forces), generation gap, change in the international relations and the need for active contribution to the international community. A famous argument in favor of change of the Article 9 was the fact that it has been imposed. Today, Kato writes¹⁰⁶, he is happy it has been imposed, and it is not necessarily a case that something imposed is not good. For example, imposing gender equality can be good for improving position of women in a society. As for generation gap, Kato was, of course, aware that it was very important that young people support the appeal for preservation of the article.¹⁰⁷ There are two aspects of generation gap problematic here and Kato defines it like this: the first one is that younger generations do not have war experience and therefore cannot resist something that they do not know, and the second one is that younger generation can react much quicker than older and raise their voice for preservation of the pacifist article. Nevertheless, today’s young generation are considerably brainwashed, Kato writes, and there is a widespread negative view of anyone who is an activist. As long as he is seen in the neighborhood distributing leaflets, he is immediately labeled as the “leftist”. Kato wrote:

“Today, I have an impression that the left is unconditionally bad. If someone appeals for preservation of the ‘Article 9’, it is not that he will be dismissed from the society, but there are a lot of people who believe that it might negatively affect their career prospect. Such an atmosphere exists inside the society or government office. In the case of housewives, too, beside various pressures inside the community, it is not observed amicably and it can go so far to real ostracism. It is generally not felt in case of students who are relatively free. Therefore, if they were explained, many people would think about preservation of the constitution.”¹⁰⁸

It is clear from this quote that Kato was aware that continuous action is needed in order to get more people (especially young) for the preservation of the article.

¹⁰⁴ Kato Shuichi taiwa shu, 5, pp. 318-319.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁰⁶ Kato Shuichi taiwa shu 5, *Rekishi no bungiten ni tatte*, Kamogawa shuppan, 2005, p. 16.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

Hypocrisy of “International contribution”

Arguments which can be often heard in favor of Article 9 revision is the need for “international contribution” (kokusai kouken). It is often said that the times have changed and that we do not live in times when to give money is enough. However, Kato writes, 95% of projects that need “international contribution” is without using armed force, such as AIDS, famine, illnesses and illiteracy problems. Only 5% is related to sometimes necessary use of weapon in resolving conflicts.

“If we really want to contribute internationally, first we should do everything what we can without using weapon. Then, if there is no other way to solve a problem but using arms and if there is no other country to send its soldiers, we should decide upon it only after a debate about sending or not sending our soldiers. The word coming together as soon as we say ‘international contribution’, that ‘Article 9 of the Constitution is an impediment’ is an inversion.”¹⁰⁹

Kato turns attention to number of important issues and double standards in contemporary international politics, such as “humanitarian intervention” and “Protection of human rights” notions.

“For example, Tiananmen Incident was a violation of human rights. And I am, of course, against it. But, violation of human rights is going on in many places in the world. Why does not America solve human rights violation in Dominica, Haiti, El Salvador? They are all countries in what we call ‘backyard’ of the U.S. in El Salvador many Catholic nuns were murdered. Although such thing is happening in their ‘backyard’, why don’t they ‘impose economic blockade to Salvador government until they stop’? If they use such strong repressive measures like employment of military force abroad or economic blockade and at the same time they themselves do not respect human rights, it is strange, isn’t it? For countries who want to join to EU, the death penalty is forbidden. Why Japan still has a death penalty? Japanese law does not recognize political exile. But other countries in the group of G7 recognize political exile. If you respect human rights to the reasonable degree, you should speak about other countries. But if not, to say ‘China and the North Korea do not respect human rights’ is ridiculous.”¹¹⁰

Kato also emphasizes that Japan does not have to necessarily choose between pro- and anti-American stance. He criticizes Japanese unconditional support because of the excessive fear (Nihon wa Amerika wo kowagari sugita¹¹¹ – Japan is too afraid of America) and gives an example of Austria and incident with an American military carrier who on the way from the base in Germany towards Lebanon without permission flew over Austrian sky. When Austrian government sent a fighter plane to warn them, America apologized. Of course, Austrian government did not intend to shoot and they are, of course, aware that their military power does not make a one hundredth of the American one. Austrian government’s act was not necessarily an act of animosity. But still, they showed that they will not tolerate American planes flying over their sky without permission. In case of Japan, Kato writes, such thing is unthinkable – American planes can do self-centrally whatever they like. After all, Kato was ironic, Japanese should show to Americans a little bit of their Self-Defense Forces (SDF) power, just to tell them that they cannot treat

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 18.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 9-21.

them so easily.

Formation background, content and interpretation issue

In 1989, on the hundredth anniversary of the Meiji Constitution, Kato wrote about his theoretical approach to this problematic. When discussing on the Japanese Constitution, he specified three problems. First, it is a problem of formation of constitution. In other words, this problematic deals with the background in which a constitution is made – under which circumstances and in which past events' context it was formed. Second is problematic of content of a constitution. Third was problematic of interpretation, its applicability and history of interpretation. Today's constitution has a history of about forty years of interpretation (Kato wrote this essay¹¹² in 1989 and the Japanese existing constitution was enforced in May 1947).

Kato develops a logic that present Japanese Constitution was not imposed to the people. The word “oshitsukerareru” (to be imposed) implies that what is imposed is not wanted from the person to who it was imposed. It was imposed to the Japanese government by GHQ but not to the people who did not know that the government presented a proposal to the GHQ and that it was rejected. When the new constitution became public, a survey of public opinion (done by Mainichi Shinbun on May 7, 1946) showed that 70% of respondents agreed with the “senso hoki” (the renunciation of war) article, and 85% agreed with the “Shocho tennosei” (symbolic emperor system). Japanese government was the one who did not want the imposed constitution, while majority of people welcomed it, Kato writes.¹¹³ Thus, since the people (kokumin) were not the one who “did not want” it, they could not be “imposed”, Kato derives a logical conclusion. Also, there are many other changes in the Constitution that were, without doubt, imposed to the government among the most important are people's sovereignty and respect for human rights. Kato compares the process of formation of the constitution with the process of formation of the previous, Meiji Constitution which was promulgated in 1889, and mentions that the Freedom and People's Rights Movement from Meiji Period (Jiyu minken undo, formed in 1883) requested that constitution should be made in accordance with democratic principles. Meiji government did not make an assembly for forming the constitution nor summoned the Diet. It was enacted by the imperial command. Since the people were not represented in the process, it can be said it was imposed. Kato again uses the principle of “wanted or not-wanted” and surely, Kato writes, there were people who wanted it and there were those who did not. Since public opinion survey data do not exist, it is hard to say, he continues, but from the procedural side it is sure that the government imposed the constitution to the people. Therefore, Kato concludes, in the case of present constitution, it was imposed by GHQ on the government, and the previous, Meiji one, was imposed from the government on the people. In the case of present constitution, there is a huge difference between government and people, and the constitution was imposed to the former.

This fact is related to the content of the constitution, Kato continued his analyses.. He quotes

¹¹² Kato Shuichi, *Sengo wo kataru, koen-shu, bekkon* (separate volume), Kamogawa shuppan, 2009, p. 313.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 315-6.

article 1, 3 and 4 from which it is clear that the sovereignty lays in the Emperor and not in the people. Japanese word for “people” in the Meiji constitution was “shin-min”. In the new constitution, the word for “people” was “koku-min” (where “koku” means “kokka” or state) although the closest one would not be “koku-min” but “jin-min” (“hito” is a person, individual). Kato, in ironical tone concludes that, the “koku-min” translation is obvious “do-it-yourself” translation of the Japanese government since the leap from “tenno-shuken” (sovereignty of emperor) to “jinmin-shuken” (sovereignty of people) would have been a too drastic change. For Kato, it was a sign of protest and disagreement of the government with the “imposed” constitution.¹¹⁴ This is not the only issue related to the word “kokumin” used in the new constitution, Kato writes and looks for an answer if the “koku-min” exists for “kokka” or “kokka” existss for “koku-min”.¹¹⁵ The present constitution, undoubtedly, meant the change compared to the constitution where people were “subjects” *for* the state. In the new constellation, the state was there *for* its people. At this important point, Kato writes, the people are not imposed with the new constitution, but liberated.

“In America, slaves are liberated in 1865. It was a result of the Civil War. Is liberation from slavery of the black people, who were until then enslaved, imposed on them? We cannot say so since they were not imposed but liberated. Those who were followers (kerai) stopped being followers and became state’s actors, sovereigns. In normal meaning of Japanese language, it cannot be said that people were imposed the constitution...and to say so would be a complete mistake...”¹¹⁶

Here we can trace continuity in Kato’s thought of liberation with the end of war and coming of Allied powers.

When talking about the interpretation, Kato discusses the vague meaning of the “war potential for self-defense”. Article 9 stipulates that Japan will not maintain war potential. But in reality, Japan has Self-Defense Forces. The interpretation Japanese government (that for longer than fifty years has not been changed which is a precedent among G7 countries¹¹⁷) developed was that the constitution’s ban of maintain war potential does not apply to self-defense”. But, does America or any other country say that they maintain the military for an attack on other country? All countries in the world say that their military is only for self-defense purpose. “Military for self-defense” and “military” thus becomes the same thing.

“Even if we say that a cat with four legs is not a cat, since all cats have four legs when we say ‘cat with a four leg’ it is same as to say ‘cat’”¹¹⁸.

There is even an interpretation of Japan’s “Hikaku san gensoku” (three nonnuclear principles)¹¹⁹. It is said that is it the government’s policy not to make, posses or allow entry of nuclear weapon to Japan. However, the government’s interpretation of the principle is that the principle is not violated if nuclear weapon enters the territory for a short time, and then goes out. In the three principles text, by Kato, it is not

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 326.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 326.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 326-7.

¹¹⁷ The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (Jiminto) was on power for almost 54 years since its founding in 1955 until its defeat in the 2009 elections (with short period when it was out of power in 1993-4).

¹¹⁸ Kato Shuichi, *Sengo wo kataru*, p. 332.

¹¹⁹ not to make or posses nuclear weapons, and not to allow their entry to Japan.

said if that is temporary or for longer time, and it should be interpreted as “never”.¹²⁰

International Relations and the Article 9

Kato's reflections on the Article 9 in the context of foreign affairs of Japan are especially important. He tried to connect the past with the present and to brake the myth that the Article 9 is unrealistic, idealistic principle, separated from the reality. The role of article 9 was very visible, Kato wrote, in major conflicts on Asian territory after the World War Second – the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Although Japan did form a 75000 people-National Police Reserve, not a single Japanese man was sent to the Korean War, thanks to the Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru who, based on the Article 9 provision, resisted dispatching of Japanese troops.

“He said that Japan could not once more send its troops into war maelstrom, and extraordinarily resisted. From the side of countries engaged in the war, of course, pressure was strong, but he resisted. Therefore, the Article 9 in the 50s performed a remarkable role in the question are Japanese soldiers going to be killed or not.”¹²¹

The same thing happened in the case of Vietnam War. The South Korea sent its troops into the Vietnam War and their casualties were huge (less, of course, than Vietnamese or American).

Article 9 was made to guarantee to neighboring countries which suffered from Japan that Japan would never again engage into the war and, therefore, it is from the beginning an international issue. By Kato, it is a big mistake to ignore this fact and understand article 9 as domestic issue, and it is same with Yasukuni shrine problem or historical textbooks revision problem. The Japanese government, Kato says, should look at these issues from the perspective of an outsider of domestic affairs¹²².

When discussing the quality of Japanese diplomacy, Kato on many places insisted on its failure in establishing trustful relationship with its neighbors. The relationship which was never good is continuously deteriorating and the main reason for that Kato sees in the way Japanese government perceive history. Visit of Japanese officials to Yasukuni shrine is a kind of metaphor or concentrated expression of history revising tendency. In April 2005, in China a huge anti-Japan demonstrations occurred (han-nichi demo). Demonstrators made a huge damage not only to Japanese companies in China, but on the Embassy's building. While negotiating after the incident, Chinese side has apologized and positively answered on Japanese side's request for indemnity. However, the Chinese raised a question why it happened and called Japanese side to responsibility because it wobbled the interpretation.

Requests for the Revision

The formation of the so-called System 1955, in November 1955, (creation of the Liberal Democratic Party as a merger of conservative Liberal party and Democratic Party of Japan), the forces behind constitutional revision slightly change their emphasis and while requesting changes, insist on

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 332-3.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 363.

¹²² Ibid., p. 346-7.

respect of three fundamental principles of peace, democracy and fundamental human rights. The unexpectedly strong opposition of the public to Constitutional revision was clearly demonstrated in the 1955 general election, Maruyama writes, and that is the situation in which the conservatives became more careful and started to give constant assurances that they will not touch the basic spirit of the Constitution.

On Sino-Japanese relations and turnover in the 50s

Since Japan surprised the world and defeated the Chinese navy in the First Sino-Japanese war (1894-5), the Japanese started to watch China (and rest of “Asia”) as inferior to them for the first time in history. That feeling was intensified after the Manchu incident in 1931, and especially with Japanese full-scale invasion of China in 1937. However, when in 1949 Chinese communists won the long civil war with Chang kai-shek’s nationalists, and established the People’s Republic of China, Japanese intellectuals were bewildered. Around same time, the independence movements in India and Egypt came to a successful conclusion.

In 1953, historian and Communist Party member Ishimoda Sho wrote:

“The Chinese Revolution has born witness to the arrival of an age in which the Asian masses – long thought to be governed by different principles from Europeans – are creating these systems through their own efforts.”¹²³

At the same time, together with the transformation in the image of Asia, domestic and international conditions of the 1950s started to change drastically – the Cold war was intensified and the Korean War started. The American occupation forces have already (starting with the 1947 Red Purge) started changing their priorities in Japan concerning democratization and disarmament of Japan (most clearly represented by the Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution). In 1952, during the Korean War, the San Francisco Peace Conference was held. China was not invited. Soviet Union and Eastern European countries did not participate as well, On the same day of signing the Peace Treaty which officially ended the occupation, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed. By the treaty, American forces in Japan were to continue stationing their troops in Japan. Many Japanese communists and liberals developed a strong anti-American sentiment at the time. Oguma Eiji quotes the novelist and future Nobel laureate Oe Kenzaburo (born 1935, later involved together with Kato in the appeal for the preservation of Article nine) who “chose to major in French literature in reaction against the United States. We shall just remind ourselves here that Kato’s “escape” to French literature during the war years (and his professor’s Watanabe lectures) was an escape from war madness and Japanese militaristic policy. However, unlike Takeuchi Yoshimi (who sought for his inspiration in Chinese culture), Kato and Oe (some twenty years later) looked for it in the European (non-English speaking) culture. However, there was another trend in the 1950s and that was a new fascination with “the people” (minshu) that emerged in reaction to elitism of the

¹²³ Oguma Eiji, *Postwar Japanese Intellectuals’ Changing Perspectives on “Asia” and Modernity*, translated by Roger Brown, p.4 of 14 http://www.japanfocus.org/articles/print_article/2350, accessed on 2010/12/10.

early-postwar Enlightenment activities.¹²⁴ The influence of Chinese Revolution resulted in the slogan, “Intellectuals must learn from the masses!”

Enlightenment thinkers appeared to be too paternalistic in their attitude to the people, and “one-sided” in their embracing of the Western thought.

Kato seemed to become aware of that “one-sidedness” (ippento) of the enlightenment thought after his visit to China. He was also aware of the limitations of avoiding that “one-sidedness” by simply being “anti-American”. For Kato, China for Japan was a foreign country different from any other foreign country.

In “China: against the world” he wrote :

“Because China is a foreign country, a very unique foreign country different from any other, awareness of it, especially in the context of making friendly relationship, is important. Our understanding of China should start from understanding that fact. At least, I think so. Unfortunately, until today, in Japan’s postwar psychology, the trend of “one-sidedness” (ippento) is remarkable. Regarding the previous trend of one-sidedness towards America - as first, the slogan “pro- or anti-America”, hinders an accurate understanding of America (if you know your opponent, the attitude of the opponent should not repeatedly present a “shock”). As second, not in spite of “following America”, but exactly because of it, establishing of sincere friendship relation became difficult (if we had a sincere friendship relation, today’s mutual distrust would be impossible). An accurate understanding of China is now for my country extremely important as well as extremely difficult. It should be an important part of our country’s long-term plans, and great undertaking having in mind given the Cold war.”¹²⁵ In this sense, Kato’s stance on the importance of working on a friendship relation between Japan and China has not changed. In his writings about China at that time, Kato also deals with the issue of “masses”. He is very critical towards the dominance of the “collectivity” over the individual that he saw in China. He is also skeptical towards the centralization of the power.

“The biggest Chinese strength today is spontaneity of the masses. If they lose that spontaneity, building of socialism as well as defending it becomes impossible”¹²⁶

In 1966 Kato wrote *Gendai Chugoku wo meguru sobokuna gimon* (Simple questions about contemporary China). (in 1974 – *The Japan-China Phenomenon: Conflict or Compatibility?*) 1977 visited China for the second time (*Chugoku saihou – A second visit to China*). For the first time he went to China in 1971. He spent about three weeks there as a member of the Association for Japan-China Cultural Exchange. Upon returning to Japan he published four essays: *Chugoku mata wa hansekai* (China:against the world), *Chugoku-futatsu no kao* (China – two faces)

On Sino-Japanese relations after the Cold War

In the last fifty years, Kato writes in 1996, Japan has failed to properly address the issue of war

¹²⁴ Oguma Eiji, *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹²⁵ Kato Shuichi, *Chosakushu* 9, pp. 82-3.

¹²⁶ Kato Shuichi, *Chosakushu* 9, p. 54.

responsibility and in constructing a trust relationship with China which is a cornerstone of stability in Northeast Asia and Pacific area.

For Kato, it was impossible to discuss Japanese-Chinese relations out of context of the past. It was also impossible to build a friendly relationship without reflecting on the Japanese aggression and severe damage Japan has caused to China. According to him, adequate solving of the problem is of crucial importance not only for the future of those two countries, but for Northeast Asia and Pacific regions as whole. The present condition of these relations is everything but satisfying, Kato wrote, and the basis of that condition lies in difference in observing the past.¹²⁷ Although numbers of victims does vary and is exaggerated by Chinese historians, the fact that Japanese committed horrible war crimes in China remains and must be adequately addressed by Japan. Here he quotes the words of his friend, a playwright, Kinoshita Junji, well-known for his play *Yuzuru* (Twilight Crane), who said that Japan can never compensate damage or “clear” the issue with China. Kato agrees that full compensation is impossible, and suggests that the word “clearance” (*seisan*) should be translated with the word “conquest the past” (*kako no kokufuku*). The issue of the past is not simple and it did not start with the Fifteen Years War, Kato writes. It dates back to end of the nineteenth century, Sino-Japanese War and territorial issues. Kato wrote about Nanking massacre as the symbol of Japanese aggression and genocide over the Chinese people. Interpretation of Nanking and similar crimes, especially in historical textbooks is in Japan under continuous examination by the Ministry of Education in Japan and depicts the rising revisionist tendencies, Kato writes.

Although he is aware that during the war it was difficult to criticize the regime, Kato is still bewildered that it was possible to publish in a daily newspapers a photo of two Japanese soldiers competing in “cutting a hundred people” (*hyaku nin kiri*) without any reaction of the public after it. Glorification of the war by the regime and use of media in that purpose still cannot justify unreserved support of the public. After the war, instead of insisting that Nanking should never happen again, Japanese people tried to forget Nanking and insisted that Hiroshima should never happen again. Nanking in the same way, Kato argues, should never be forgotten.¹²⁸

Nevertheless, what is done so far in the postwar period is a success in economics and failure in international politics regarding Asia, especially China and Korea. And that isolation in relation to Asia has only deepened after the war. In fifty years after the war, Japan was the most successful in economic development. And it was the most unsuccessful regarding Japan’s political isolation from other Asian countries. As a member of G7, Japan sends its self-defense forces to participate in PKO mission with its Western partners. In Asia, according to Kato, it is first necessary to make a government that will undertake responsibility. And the second important thing is information. In Japan, information on other Asian countries opinions and feelings in regard to Japan are extremely poor. In Japanese media, the world is limited to sumo and baseball and there is only one world – only Japan. Japan’s postwar inadequate pursuit

¹²⁷ Kato Shuichi, *Koenshu I*, p. 232.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

of responsibility regarding the aggression of China includes inadequate diplomatic steps to establish the friendship. Basics of any friendship to Kato are grounded in the principles: anti-hegemonism and non-interference into internal affairs. Although there are sensible issues, such as human rights issue, those issues should be discussed and publicly said, but any kind of pressure on the governments for what is going on in their country is not acceptable, Kato writes. Kato is strongly opposed to any form of outside pressure, especially economic sanctions, because it always turns out to be more political tool than true fight for human rights or any other humanistic value.

In order to establish a friendship, it is important to be aware of differences. China and Japan have different cultures, language (Chinese by its structure is closer to indo-European language group), population structure (Japan's is almost homogenous and China is a multiethnic state. According to Kato, all this is not an easy task, however, that is the only way and it is worth putting effort in it.

Conclusion

"We cannot avoid striving to make this world better"

Kato Shuichi

The defeat and "liberation" (kaiho) for Kato Shuichi had two aspects – the first one was liberation from the repressive war regime in which young men from Kato's generation who still had not been mobilized were daily expecting an invitation for conscription, as well as the long-yearned freedom of speech and possibility of criticizing the irrationalities of the imperial system and its propaganda that the war was led for the liberation of Asia. Another aspect for Kato was awareness that, to a greater or lesser degree, Japanese people overwhelmingly supporting the war. Exactly that awareness was an inspiration for Kato to continuously write and question the role of intellectuals in society. That was also the starting point for Kato's view of a modern subject that was represented by strong individuality which by no means should become egoistic. It was also a source of Kato's life principle of existing on the "periphery", far from the center of power, of neither being an insider nor complete outsider. Such position, which Kato called "periphery", "view from outside" or "takami no kenbutsu" (view from a distance) – was possible through the medium of travel or life abroad. Such life choice for Kato sometimes was accidental and sometimes planned. Kato left his profession of being a physician - specialist in hematology, in 1958 and the trigger for such an important decision was his wish to participate for three months in preparations for the Second Asian-African Writer's Conference in Uzbekistan. From that period dates his travelogue on the "three faces of socialism" (Travelogue from Uzbekistan, Croatia and Kerala) where Kato again applied his principle of investigating the phenomenon on the periphery and outside of the center of power (Moscow).

Another problem that occupied Kato was an issue of war responsibility. Closely related to the issue of intellectual's war-cooperation, it is also related to the issue of "teiko" or resistance. One of the main reasons for Kato to leave Japan for France was his admiration for the mass of French writers who in their works resisted the war. The result of this preoccupation were Kato's Teiko no bungaku (Resistance

literature¹²⁹), and translation of Jean Paul Sartre's "Qu'est-ce que la littérature" (Bungaku to wa nani ka or What is literature?¹³⁰). Here we can see intrinsic contradiction of his life-principle – being "outside" meant having better perspective and understanding of the circumstances, but at the same time it meant a distance and non-involvement, and the most controversial – the impossibility of changing the things.

In this context, Kato discussed and problematized the relation between war and culture and found this relation to be paradoxical. He pointed out that a culture changes with war¹³¹.

Hitsuji no uta (A Sheep's Song) was Kato's autobiography with two interesting peculiarities – it was written while Kato was relatively young (forty-nine) and it went beyond the meaning of classical autobiography and describing personal experience. It represents a kind of history of the "average" Japanese before, during and after the war. Kato emphasized many times that he counted himself in the category of the "average" Japanese here not because it was a joke or from modesty, but because he was as well as other Japanese, a product of the time which was "average" in what it has achieved, but we can say much more "average" in what it has not achieved. "Sengo" was a time of promise and in 1960 it was already clear that the promise will stay unfulfilled. Japan was already emerging as an economic giant, but the full price of it still is continuously coming to its due and with the end of the Cold War structure it shows signs of negative escalation which made Kato, for the first time in his life and against his life-principles to engage politically.

Kato's attitude towards Japan and Asia changed with the changes in domestic and international conditions (with the end of the 60s). Especially with the end of the Cold War, Kato's stance towards the pillars of Japanese national identity has changed and he took a stance that Japan cannot be observed out of the Asian context. In 1956, the year after the establishing of the so-called 1955 System (Gojugo nen Taisei), the rising trend of the strengthening military alliance with the U.S. and a time when the high-rate of economic growth (kodo keizai seicho) had already taken a momentum, Kato wrote his theory on Hybrid culture (Zasshu bunka). This theory was criticized to displace Japan from Asia as it surely was in the middle of the fifties when it was clear that the Cold War tensions (the Korean War) are growing and that Japan with its high-rate of economic growth started moving away from its Asian neighbours. That course will have its culmination in 1960's Anpo toso (the protests against renewal of Japan-US Security Treaty) and demonstrations in 1968.

This work followed Kato's thought and attitudes ranging from complex relationship between modernity and traditional culture, the role of intellectuals and issues of war responsibility, nationalism and the Cold War to the contemporary problems of terrorism, military intervention and nuclear weapon. Its intention was to show how Kato's liberalism fluctuated from nationalism to internationalism and from anti- to pro-Asian sentiment varied with the changes in Japan's relation to the West. This work will not try to give specific judgment of Kato's thought – it will rather search for the meaning in its change that has occurred inside the specific historical context. It will also argue that in that very change of attitude

¹²⁹ Kato Shuichi, *Teiko no bungaku*, Iwanami shinsho, Showa 26 (1951).

¹³⁰ Kato Shuichi, *Bungaku to wa nani ka*, Kamogawa shinsho, Showa 25 (1950).

¹³¹ Comment of Narita Ryuichi in *Niju seiki no jiga zo* written by Kato Shuichi in, *Chikuma shinsho*, 2005.

and taking pro-active stance today more than ever lies the possibility of the continuity of Kato's thought and survival of basic human values which seemed to be so promising in the post-war epoch.

From Zasshu-bunka and the search for "small hope" in melting pot of Japanese traditional culture and imported Western culture which was essentially an intellectual compromise in dealing with the pressure of the US within the structure of the Cold War, Kato's attitude ended in the search for hope in cooperation with its Asian neighbors and in activism. Here Kato again found a "unique" feature of Japanese culture that represents continuity with his theories of modernity and literature theories. Nevertheless, his stance has changed from being an observer on the margin to acting politically. This time, the hope was big and for Kato it lay in "small groups" activism.

"Compared to industrially advanced Europe or the US, in Japan there are a lot of very small groups. They are not of the size of one thousand people, but of about ten. Friendly, like a club, they all grapple with different issues. Among them are environmental, educational, urban planning problems, and there are anti-war groups as well. And there are many of such small groups...which among themselves do not have a horizontal communication (yoko no renraku). Even those who deal with the same problem do not have communications although they are very active – they often gather for discussions or reading meetings (dokushokai), they raise their voices, support friends in front of courts, take part in demonstrations, etc."¹³²

In discussing what can be done now, in regard to the war threat,¹³³, Kato distinguishes three phases – the first one is a phase of wandering, not fully understanding what is going on. Wandering is normal and good, Kato said and it is a necessary phase for the second one – taking a clear attitude against the war. The third phase is action – any form that has power of influence. Each phase is necessary condition for the next one and this is how according to Kato's explanation of how an anti-war movement functions. The third phase has different methods and it is controversial because of possible violence and illegality. Here, the elections become an important and effective way of change, but there is one more way, too, and that is to demonstrate. To make placards and to raise the voice. Kato's political activism started in 2004 with engagement on preservation of the Article 9.

Article 9 is a living symbol of the unfulfilled promise of the past. It is an ideal, but it is not utopia or something far from reality and Kato has proved it in his writings. It is a promise made in a devastated, poor and hungry country with the present and future that will never be able to apologize enough for the past events to its Asian neighbors. It is an article of faith that became hope and part of the identity of Japanese people in the postwar epoch. It is a promise made before the Cold War and it is the only promise that has still stayed alive after the end of the Cold War. Kato Shuichi at the end of his life came to this conclusion. And completed his travel to "modernity" – through travels in Europe and America, he found it in Asia and political activism for the right thing regardless of how unrealistic it may look. Kato's thought, therefore, found its way to the future. Historical circumstances and people's ideas will always change or

¹³² Kato Shuichi Sengo wo kataru, koenshu bekkkan, Kamogawa shuppan, 2009.

¹³³ Ima, nasu beki koto – speech held in September 2003 in Kobe Asahi hall "Kato Shuichi koen to taiwa no tsudoi", Kato Shuichi Sengo wo kataru, p. 388.

search for its new interpretation, but one thing is sure – as Kato said “people will never stop dreaming of a better world”¹³⁴.

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¹³⁴ in Japanese the expression yo-naoshi has meaning of “changing the world over”, “a social reform”, “restoration of peace and order to the world”.

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