

How Native Americans Got to Be Indians: Settler Complex and the Acquisition Process of Ethnic Identity in Colonial New England

TSUKADA HIROYUKI

Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Doctoral Student

著者抄録

1990年代以降、初期アメリカの先住民とヨーロッパ人の関係の研究では、それ以前の未開＝文明の二元的なフロンティア史観を脱却し、両者の入り混じるボーダーランズを多面的に明らかにしてきた。ただ、直近では、セトラー・コロニアリズム論が初期アメリカにも進出し、再び、先住民・セトラーの二項対立的な歴史像に回帰しようとしている。そこで、本稿は、植民地期ニュー・イングランドを事例にして、それらを折衷した歴史像を書くための枠組みを設定することを目的とし、セトラー・コロニアリズム論でセトラー陣営の人口構成の多様性を表現するために使われていたセトラー・コンプレックスの概念を、先住民とヨーロッパ人の二項対立を超える同盟関係に適用した。そして、当時の先住民がその対立陣営に「インディアン」と「イングランド人」という言葉を使用していたことをふまえ、戦争や対立を繰り返すなかで後者にいた先住民も前者に移っていくことを観察し、先住民の「インディアン」としてのアイデンティティ形成プロセスを考察した。

Summary

Since the 1990s, early American historians have overcome the dichotomy of civilization and savagery of the Turner's Frontier thesis and elucidated multifaceted relations between Native Americans and European colonists in their borderlands. More recently, studies of settler colonialism have entered the field of early American history and prompted historians to return to Native-settler binarism. This article, a case study of New England in the 17th and 18th centuries, aims to reconcile these two (borderlands and settler colonial) frameworks by applying the "settler complex" concept, which was propounded by Patrick Wolfe, an ethnographer and scholar of settler colonialism, to describe the demographic diversity of settler colonial forces, to explain the Native-settler intercultural alliances in early America. This application is compatible with the fact that the Native Americans initially used the words "Indians" and "Englishmen" as names of the alliances, not ethnic nor racial groups. Throughout the colonial period, the Native people repeatedly experienced wars and conflicts with the colonists, and those Natives who had been on the side of "Englishmen," gradually switched sides and went over to the "Indians" group. This change in the demographic diversity of the settler complex meant the consolidation of an Indian ethnic identity.

キーワード

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Introduction

"What are you, an Indian or an Englishman?" Pequot Natives asked this of a Native person who had accompanied English military leader John Underhill during the Pequot War (1636–37).¹ This question

¹ John Underhill, *Newes from America; or, a new and experimentall discoverie of New England* (1638), in *History of the Pequot War; The Contemporary Accounts of Mason, Underhill, Vincent and Gardener*, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: Helman-Taylor company, 1897), 54. This interpreter was likely identified as John Sassamon. Jill Lepore, "Dead Men Tell No Tales: John Sassamon



reveals two Native perspectives held at that time toward Native-European relations. First, Native peoples recognized that the names “Indians” and “Englishmen” referred to exclusive categories. Second, individual Native persons and nations could move across this border; they were not predetermined as belonging to either category. Roger Williams wrote that New England Native peoples began to “call themselves *Indians*, in opposition to *English*, &c.” after observing the English usage.² However, in the question above, the term “Indian” seems to be used to designate not ethnic identity but alliance formation. Nancy Shoemaker and other scholars have pointed out that Native American groups acquired and strengthened concepts of race or ethnicity during their contact with Europeans.³ The Pequot question reflects the Native perspectives of that era, when Native peoples had not yet fully established an ethnic Indian identity.

Native people were also strongly aware of their self-identification as either “Indians” or “Englishmen” during King Philip’s War (1675–76). Scholars have disputed whether this war was primarily ethnic or political. The former perspective, which emphasizes a Native/settler divide, has been adopted in works such as that of Douglas Edward Leach, but James D. Drake is critical of it as oversimplified. Drake emphasized that many Native people fought with the English against other Native people, and he described the war as a conflict “among various groups of them [Native and English people].” He stated that “historians must rethink their view of the conflict as an unavoidable contest” between two ethnically different peoples. King Philip’s War certainly involved both ethnic and political factors, and scholars cannot include only one type and exclude the other. Lisa Brooks’ recent book challenged the ethnic-political dichotomy by focusing on how Native political choices were strongly influenced by Native kinship systems, which had both an ethnic and political nature.⁴ Another challenge, also from a Native American perspective, can be addressed by considering the not-necessarily-ethnic categorization of “Indians” vs. “Englishmen.”

The scholarly conflict between the perspectives of the intercultural divide and cooperation in studies of King Philip’s War has occurred in those of Native-settler relations in early America as a whole. Since the 1990s, early Americanists have bidden farewell to the Turnerian civilization-savagism paradigm and elucidated an intercultural accommodation in the patchwork borderlands of various cultural groups. Most recently, settler colonial studies, which focus on settler violence against Native people and dominance over their land, have been growing popular among various researchers, including those of early America.⁵ Settler colonial scholar Patrick Wolfe, for example, formulated settler colonialism not as a past single “event” but rather as a fixed “structure,” and he focused on “the binary nature of the Native/settler divide”

and the Fatal Consequences of Literacy,” *American Quarterly* 46, no. 4 (December 1994): 487.

² Roger Williams, *A Key into the Language of America* (1643), ed. J. Hammond Trumbull, in *The Complete Writings of Roger Williams*, 7 vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963), 1: 21–23.

³ Nancy Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); idem, “How Indians Got to Be Red,” *American Historical Review* 102, no. 3 (June 1997): 625–44. My title owes to this.

⁴ Douglas Edward Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip’s War* (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 1; Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 298–300; James D. Drake, *King Philip’s War: Civil War in New England, 1675–1676* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 13–14; Lisa Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin: A New History of King Philip’s War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018).

⁵ Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, “On Borderlands,” *Journal of American History* 98, no. 2 (September 2011): 338–61; Daniel K. Richter, “His Own, Their Own: Settler Colonialism, Native Peoples, and Imperial Balances of Power in Eastern North America, 1660–1715,” in *The World of Colonial America: An Atlantic Handbook*, ed. Ignacio Gallup-Díaz (New York: Routledge, 2017), chap. 10.

rather than internal differences within each category. Some of the early Americanists have not accepted the settler colonial framework because it might result in a second Turnerian history. However, Wolfe unintentionally provided a balanced view that may solve the collision of the two frameworks of multi-directional political relations and ethnic dichotomy. He proposed the concept of the “settler complex” to analyze the demographic diversity and psychological complexity of settlers. In addressing demographic diversity, Wolfe presented the example of U.S. dominance in Hawaii, which was achieved not only by settlers from the U.S. mainland and Japanese and other immigrants but also by Native American soldiers stationed there. Thus, Wolfe understood the possibility that the settler complex included Native Americans in some circumstances.⁶ In July 2019, the *William and Mary Quarterly* discussed the applicability of settler colonial studies in early America and showed a mostly favorable attitude toward them. Jeffrey Ostler and Nancy Shoemaker modified Wolfe’s remarks on settler colonialism to a flexible formulation, calling it “a process, not a structure or an event.” In the words of Susanah Shaw Romney, early America had a “long, complex genealogy of settler colonialism” rather than a “perfect form” of it.⁷ The concept of the settler complex, which portrays both Native-settler relationships of dichotomy and patchwork, can further promote rapprochement between settler colonial and borderlands studies.

In colonial New England, English people had close contact and bitter conflicts mainly with four Native nations: the Pequots, Narragansetts, Mohegans, and Wampanoags. Those conflicts, which occurred between “Indians” and “Englishmen [i.e., the settler complex]” were the Pequot War, King Philip’s War, and the Mohegan case (1704–73). The Pequot War was a conflict between the Pequots and the New England colonies, Mohegans, and Narragansetts. King Philip’s War involved the Wampanoags and many Narragansetts vs. the New England colonies and Mohegans. The Mohegan case refers to a conflict between Mohegans and the colony of Connecticut. Over the course of these conflicts, the colonists conquered all of the Native people in the region, one after another, and Native people gradually came to categorize themselves as “Indians” alongside existing tribal categorizations. In other words, Native people became aware of the ethnically binary structure in which they had been placed. This process preceded and connected with another type of reinforcement of the Indian identity that occurred when the Natives were living as a minority in a colonial state.⁸ The formation of the settler complex and its transformation in the former stage will be further discussed below with a focus on Native American use of “Indians” and “Englishmen” and the changes in usage, based on English sources.

1. The Narragansetts, Pequots, and Mohegans

Before the Pilgrim Fathers arrived in 1620 and began to build the Plymouth colony, the

⁶ Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event* (London: Cassell, 1999), 163; idem, “The Settler Complex: An Introduction,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 37, no. 2 (2013): 1–22; idem, “Recuperating Binarism: A Heretical Introduction,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no. 3–4 (2013): 257–79; idem, “Introduction,” in *The Settler Complex: Recuperating Binarism in Colonial Studies* (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 2016), 1–24.

⁷ Jeffrey Ostler and Nancy Shoemaker, “Settler Colonialism in Early American History: Introduction” and Susanah Shaw Romney, “Settler Colonial Prehistories in Seventeenth-Century North America,” both in Forum: Settler Colonialism in Early American History, *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser., 76, no. 3 (July 2019): 364, 382 (hereafter *WMQ*).

⁸ Daniel R. Mandell, *Behind the Frontier: Indians in Eighteenth-Century Eastern Massachusetts* (Lincoln: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996).

Wampanoag people had been severely afflicted by an epidemic brought by the Europeans. The Pequots and Narragansetts, who lived to the west of the Wampanoags, were immune and, as a result, gained dominance among the Native people of the southern New England area. Owing to their disadvantage, the Wampanoags welcomed the English and concluded a peace agreement in March 1621. In contrast, “the great people” of the Narragansetts, in a braving manner, sent to the Plymouth colonists “a bundle of Arrows, tyed together with a Snakes skin.” The colonists could not understand the reason behind this and asked friendly Native people, who informed them that it was meant as “a threatening and a challenge.” In the words of the later colonist Nathaniel Morton, the Narragansetts “thought to domineer and lord it over” the other Native peoples of this country but “conceived the English would be a bar.” In return, the English engaged in a furious exchange, sending back the “skin with powder and shot.” Thus, from the beginning, there was tension between the two parties: the Wampanoags and English settlers on one side, and the status quo dominant Native peoples on the other.⁹

In the 1630s, the Pequots and Narragansetts began to worry about English incursions into their lands. Over the decade, the number of English immigrants into the newly erected colony of Massachusetts Bay exceeded 20,000. In 1633 and 1634, another epidemic broke out among the Native people, including the Pequots and Narragansetts this time. Researchers have estimated that the population of Native people in southern New England was originally around 135,000, but that after these epidemics, it declined by 80 percent.¹⁰ Mohegan Chief Uncas, who was subordinate to the Pequots, observed this change in the balance of power and intended to demand freedom from the inferior position by gaining favor with the English. Uncas revealed that the Pequots were planning to attack the colonies, a threat that was taken very seriously by the English. They recalled the precedent of the assault by the Powhatan people on the Virginia colony in 1622 and concluded that a preemptive attack was necessary.¹¹ When the Pequot War began, the Pequots sought to establish a Native coalition. They gave the Narragansetts “pernicious arguments” that “the English were stranegers and begane to overspred their [the Natives’] countrie, and would deprive them therof in time, [...] and if the Narigansets did assist the English to subdue them [the Pequots], they [the Narragansetts] did but make way for their owne overthrow, for if they [the Pequots] were rooted out, the English would soone take occasion to subjugate them [the Narragansetts].” The Pequots believed that “open battle” would not be necessary because “the English could not long subsiste, but they would either be starved with hunger, or be forced to forsake the countrie” if the Native people “fire their houses, kill their katle [cattle], and lye in ambush for them.” These words indicate that the war exhibited a Native/settler dichotomy even though the composition of the fighting forces was not strictly Natives vs. settlers.

The Narragansetts were nearly persuaded by this appeal, and William Bradford wrote that they “were

⁹ William T. Davis, ed., *Bradford's History of Plymouth Plantation*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908), 125; Edward Winslow, *Good Newes from New England: or A true Relation of things very remarkable at the Plantation of Plimoth in New-England* (London: I. D., 1624), 2–4; Nathaniel Morton, *New-England's Memorial* (Boston, 1669), 33; John Booss, “Survival of the Pilgrims: A Reevaluation of the Lethal Epidemic among the Wampanoags,” *Historical Journal of Massachusetts* 47 (2019): 108–33.

¹⁰ Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500–1643* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 25–30; Eric E. Jones and Sharon N. Dewitte, “Using Spatial Analysis to Estimate Depopulation for Native American Populations in Northeastern North America, AD 1616–1645,” *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology* 31 (2012): 83–92.

¹¹ Philip Vincent, *A trve relation of The Late Battell fought in New-England, between the English and the Pequet Salvages* (1638), in *History of the Pequot war*, 109–10; Alfred A. Cave, *The Pequot War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996).

once wavering, and were halfe minded” to the Pequot side. However, the two dominant Natives had been rivals for a long time, as a result of which the coalition did not materialize. In October 1636, in Boston, the English and the Narragansetts concluded “a firm peace.”¹²

During the Pequot War, however, the Native people were surprised at the brutality and strength of the English military forces, and anti-settler feelings strengthened among the Narragansetts. During the assault at Mystic in late May 1637, the colonists brutally killed hundreds of Pequots. One Native who supported the English lamented that the English fighting was “too fury” and slew “too many men.”¹³ In September 1638, the three winners of the war, namely, the colony of Connecticut, the Narragansetts, and the Mohegans, concluded the Hartford Treaty. It established a New England order under English authority by stipulating an English role of arbitration in future troubles between Mohegans and Narragansetts. Moreover, the treaty stated that the English allowed the Narragansetts and Mohegans to “make up” their population by receiving the Pequot captives into their nations; however, the English also considered this adoption to be risky, believing that the Pequots might take umbrage and cause problems, and thus they required the Narragansetts and Mohegans to pay them wampum in exchange for these adoptions. Thus, through the war and treaty, the English presence in New England became considerably larger and more established, and the Mohegans not only achieved liberation from Pequot authority but also acquired English treatment equal to that afforded to the Narragansetts. Uncas, thereafter, continued his strategy of deepening relationships with the English, telling them that “this heart (laying his hand upon his breast) is not mine, but yours.” In contrast, the Narragansetts were displeased with the degradation of their authority.¹⁴

By 1640, the English had received information that Narragansett Chief Miantonomi was visiting Native villages to call for a pan-Native coalition against the Europeans. Bradford of Plymouth and John Haynes of Connecticut told John Winthrop of Massachusetts Bay that Miantonomi had sent wampum to the Mohawks and promised military cooperation against the Europeans. Miantonomi also visited the Long Island Native people to ask that they take up arms together. According to Lion Gardiner, Miantonomi called attention to the destruction of the Native world that “had plenty of deer and skins,” and was “full of deer, as also our woods, and of turkies,” and “our coves full of fish and fowl.” Thus, he said, “so are we all Indians as the English are [English], and say brother to one another; so must we be one as they are, otherwise we shall be all gone shortly.”¹⁵ The colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven, in response to the impending war in 1643, established the United Colonies of New England. When Miantonomi was captured during a conflict between the Mohegans and the Narragansetts, the Mohegan Chief, Uncas, delivered the captive to the English to ask how he should be treated. The United Colonies considered that “it would not be safe to set him [Miantonomi] at liberty,” and concluded

¹² James Kendall Hosmer, ed., *Winthrop's Journal: "History of New England," 1630–1649*, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908), 1: 192–94 (hereafter *WJ*); Davis, *Bradford's History of Plymouth Plantation*, 338.

¹³ Underhill, *Newes from America*, 84.

¹⁴ *WJ*, 1: 271; Davis, *Bradford's History of Plymouth Plantation*, 388; Daragh Grant, “The Treaty of Hartford (1638): Reconsidering Jurisdiction in Southern New England,” *WMQ* 3rd ser., 72, no. 3 (July 2015): 461–98. Studies of the contrast between the attitudes of the Narragansetts and Mohegans toward the English include: Paul Alden Robinson, “Lost Opportunities: Miantonomi and the English in Seventeenth-Century Narragansett Country,” and Eric S. Johnson, “Uncas and the Politics of Contact,” both in *Northeastern Indian Lives, 1632–1816*, ed. Robert S. Grumet (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 13–28 and 29–47; Michael Leroy Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

¹⁵ *WJ*, 2: 6, 74–76, 79–80; *Winthrop Papers*, 5 vols. (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1929–47), 4: 258–59; Lion Gardiner, “Relation of the Pequot War” (1660), in *History of the Pequot War*, 142–43.

that Miantonomi “should be delivered to him [Uncas] again, and he [Uncas] should put him [Miantonomi] to death so soon as he [Uncas] came within his own jurisdiction.” This was certainly the safest method for the English, and Uncas followed the instructions.¹⁶

This execution produced two results in the diplomacy of the Narragansetts. First, they revised their policies toward the English. An advisor who helped shape the new policy, Samuel Gorton, was an exile from the New England colonies and lived in a region given by the Narragansetts. The Narragansetts first welcomed Roger Williams in the 1630s, after which additional political and religious radicals gathered there. One factor influencing Williams’ confrontation with the Massachusetts Bay colony was their different opinions regarding Native land. In December 1633, the Massachusetts Bay leaders seriously discussed Williams’ insistence that “claiming by the king’s grant” was insufficient for title “except they compounded with [i.e., purchased the land from] the natives.” In his *Key into the Language of America* published in 1643, Williams wrote that the widespread opinion “that Christians have right to Heathens Lands” was “sinfull.”¹⁷ Rhode Islanders and the Narragansetts shared the objective of preventing the regional dominance of the Massachusetts Bay colonists, who were then in conflict with King Charles. In April 1644, after listening to Gorton’s idea, the Chiefs of the Narragansetts, Pessicus and Canonicus, swore allegiance to the King of England. In their letter to the Massachusetts Bay colony, they insisted upon equal status with the English colonists, stating that “being subjects now [...] unto the same King and State your selves are: [...] if any great matter should fall, [...] then neither your selves nor we are to be Judges, but” should seek “recourse” to the King of England.¹⁸

Second, the Narragansetts’ hostility toward the Mohegans intensified. According to the Narragansetts, the Mohegans executed Miantonomi despite having received a ransom for his liberation. Their battles were sometimes boisterous, and in June 1645, Williams reported to Winthrop saying that “the Flame of warr rageth next dore vnto vs” and the two parties “haue deeply implunged themselues in Barbarous Slaughters.” At this time, the United Colonies dispatched Edward Gibbon’s forces “not onely to ayde the Mohegans but to offend and invade Narrohiggansets.” The Narragansetts originally stated that “they resolved to have no peace without Uncass his head,” but upon military intervention by the English, they were forced to conclude a treaty with the United Colonies in August. This treaty demanded a fine from the Narragansetts and the reconfirmation of the 1638 Hartford agreement to the effect that the New Englanders should resolve troubles between the Native peoples. This reconfirmation was in sharp contrast to the Narragansetts’ insistence in 1644 that they were not subordinate to the English colonies.¹⁹ Despite this treaty, the enmity between Narragansetts and Mohegans did not cease. In 1648, the English received information that the Narragansetts and other Native peoples were gathering to prepare for war against Uncas. In response to the English investigation, the gathering people answered that “they knew the

¹⁶ Nathaniel B. Shurtleff and David Pulsifer, eds., *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England*, 12 vols. (Boston: William White, 1855–61), 9: 3 (hereafter *RCP*); *WJ*, 2: 134–36.

¹⁷ *WJ*, 1: 116–17; Williams, *Key into the Language of America*, 180.

¹⁸ Samuel Gorton, *Simplicities defence against seven-headed policy* (London: John Macock, 1646), 81–89; *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series* (London, 1860–), 1: 326 (hereafter *CSPC*).

¹⁹ *Winthrop Papers*, 5: 31–32; *RCP*, 9: 38, 47; Davis, *Bradford’s History of Plymouth Plantation*, 397; James A. Warren, *God, War, and Province: The Epic Struggle of Roger Williams and the Narragansett Indians against the Puritans of New England* (New York: Scribner, 2018), 161–62.

English to be a wise and warlike people, and they intended not to fall out with them,” but the Narragansett chiefs stated that “they would not meddle with Uncas” only for a while.²⁰ At that time, Narragansett attacks and plots primarily targeted the Mohegans and not the English; however, the Mohegans were consistently supported by the United Colonies, constituting a settler complex that confronted the Narragansetts.

Given this deep enmity, in 1669, the English felt considerable fear upon hearing that Ninigret of the Narragansetts, Uncas of the Mohegans, and other chiefs of different Native nations had gathered and danced to form a pan-Native coalition to destroy the English. Ninigret definitively denied this before the Rhode Island council, but modern scholars Julie Fisher and David Silverman explain the possibility that this conspiracy did exist.²¹ The Native peoples’ ill feelings toward the English grew in the 1660s. The Narragansetts petitioned the King of England to arbitrate their land problems with the English, and the Mohegans also had boundary disputes with neighboring English settlements.²² Nevertheless, the enmity between both Native nations and the Narragansetts’ dissatisfaction with the English support for the Mohegans persisted. When King Philip’s War began in 1675, the Narragansetts asked the English (1) why the Plymouth colony pursued Philip and (2) why the Massachusetts Bay and Rhode Island colonies had joined Plymouth against Philip. The English answered saying that (1) Philip “broke all Laws and was in Armes of Rebellion” and (2) “all the Colonies were Subject to one K.[King] Charl[e]s and it was his pleasure and our Dutie and Engagemnt for one English man to stand to the Death by Each other in all parts of the World.” The Narragansetts were not convinced by the answer, and they, as subjects of the same King of England, spoke of a “great and vehement desire of Justice upon Tatuphosuit [a Mohegan Chief] for the late killing of a Nahiggonset young men” in accordance with the English “Dutie and Engagemnt.”²³

2. The Wampanoags

After the agreement of March 1621, the Wampanoags generally maintained a peaceful relationship with the Plymouth English. Native interpreter Squanto, whom Bradford extolled as “a spetiall instrument of God,” taught the colonists “how to set their corne, wher to take fish, and [where] to procure other commodities,” and guided them to “unknowne places.” After the fruitful harvest of 1621, Chief Massasoit and many Natives visited the colony and entertained each other. In March 1623, when news that Massasoit was on his deathbed arrived at the colony, the colonial leader Edward Winslow paid him a visit. By the time Winslow arrived, Massasoit was becoming blind, and several Native women “chafed his armes, legs, and thighes, to keepe heat in him.” Winslow cooked “a confection of many comfortable conserves” for him to drink. The Natives rejoiced because Massasoit had not swallowed anything in two days. Winslow then “washed his mouth, and scraped his tongue, and got abundance of corruption out of the same,” and gave

²⁰ *WJ*, 2: 349–50.

²¹ John Russell Bartlett, ed., *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island an Providence Plantations, in New England*, 10 vols. (Providence, 1856–65), 2: 270; Julie A. Fisher and David J. Silverman, *Ninigret, Sachem of the Niantics and Narragansetts: Diplomacy, War, and the Balance of Power in Seventeenth-Century New England and Indian Country* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 104–12. An abridged compilation of primary sources on the 1669 rumor is available in J. Hammond Trumbull and Charles J. Hoadly, eds., *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, from 1665 to 1678*, 15 vols. (Hartford, 1850–90), 2: 548–51 (hereafter *RCC*).

²² *CSPC*, 5: 342; *RCC*, 2: 47–48.

²³ Glenn W. LaFantasie, ed., *The Correspondence of Roger Williams*, 2 vols. (Hanover: Brown University Press, 1988), 2: 694–95 (hereafter *CRW*).

him more of the confection to drink, which brought “a great alteration in him.” Other Native patients also hoped for the same treatment, and Winslow responded favorably to them. Upon his recovery, Massasoit told him, “Now I see the English are my friends and love me; and whilst I live I will never forget this kindnesse they have shewed mee.”²⁴ Massasoit did not forget this for four decades, until his death.

Owing to the conflicting primary sources, there has been some controversy among scholars over the constitutional relationships between the Wampanoags, the Plymouth colony, and the King of England. Mourt’s Relation, coauthored by two colonial leaders, Bradford and Winslow, and published in 1622, noted that the March 1621 agreement comprised seven articles: Articles 1 to 5 covered ways to deal with injury, theft, and war among themselves or between them and other people; Article 6 addressed their civil behavior at conferences; and Article 7 centered on the declaration that “King James would esteeme of him as his friend and Alie,” while admitting that “the Interpreters did not well expresse” the meaning of the last article related to King James. Bradford and John Smith omitted the last article in their own histories. In contrast, in his Memorial, written in 1669, Morton added his description that Massasoit “acknowledged himself content to become the Subject of our Sovereign Lord the King aforesaid [James].”²⁵ Following the March agreement, according to Mourt’s Relation and Morton’s Memorial, several other Native chiefs “besides Massasoiet” visited the colony and “yeelded willingly to be vnder the protection, and subjects to” King James.²⁶ In September 1639, Massasoit and his son Wamusutta “desired that the auncient league and confederacy formerly made with this government, wherein he acknowledgeth himself subject to the King of England, and his successors, may stand and remayne inviolable.”²⁷

As for the constitutional relationships established in 1621, the contemporary English people did not seem to unanimously understand whether they had achieved the submission of the Native people toward the English authority, as indicated by conflicting sources. As regards Massasoit’s own understanding and that of the Wampanoags, Drake described Massasoit’s pledge as entailing “subordination to Plymouth,” Neal Salisbury accepted Morton’s statement that Massasoit became a subject of the King of England, Jenny Hale Pulsipher insisted that Massasoit viewed Native-English relationships as equal, and John Humins wrote that Massasoit may have even thought that he had incorporated the colonists into his confederation and gained the upper hand over them.²⁸ Of the four opinions, the first and second are unlikely. On the eve of King Philip’s War, Philip remembered that when the English first came to this country, Massasoit was “a great man,” and the English were like “a litell Child.”²⁹ By 1639, however, when Massasoit possibly came under the King of England through his own will, the English population had increased and demonstrated their military strength during the Pequot War.

²⁴ Davis, *Bradford’s History of Plymouth Plantation*, 111; *Mourt’s Relation or Journal of the Plantation at Plymouth* (1622), ed. Henry Wartyn Dexter (Boston: John Kimball Wiggin, 1865), 133; Winslow, *Good Newes from New England*, 25–32.

²⁵ *Mourt’s Relation*, 92–94; Davis, *Bradford’s History of Plymouth Plantation*, 111; John Smith, *The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Isles* (1624), in *The Complete Works of Captain John Smith (1580–1631)*, 3 vols., ed. Philip L. Barbour (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 2: 448; Morton, *New-England’s Memorial*, 24–25.

²⁶ *Mourt’s Relation*, 134–35, 148–49; Morton, *New-England’s Memorial*, 29.

²⁷ *RCP*, 1: 133.

²⁸ Drake, *King Philip’s War*, 64; Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence*, 115–16; Jenny Hale Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 18–19; John H. Humins, “Squant and Massasoit: A Struggle for Power,” *New England Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (March 1987): 57 (hereafter *NEQ*).

²⁹ John Easton, “A Relacion of the Indyan Warre” (1675), in *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675–1699*, ed. Charles H. Lincoln (New York: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1913), 10.

After Massasoit's death, his son Wamsutta came to the Plymouth colony in 1660. He requested an English name for himself and another for his younger brother Metacom. The English gave Wamsutta the name Alexander and his brother the name Philip. This consultation seemingly indicated that their peaceful relations would continue. Alexander, however, had complained of damage caused to his crops by English livestock. In 1662, he was summoned to Plymouth because of a rumor of his engagement in a conspiracy against the English. During his visit, he became sick and died soon after, which caused the Native people to suspect that their chief had been poisoned.³⁰ After the mishap, the new Chief Philip visited the colony in August 1662 to "earnestly desire the continuance of that amitie and frindship that hath formerly bine between this go[ver]nment and his deceased father and brother" and to hope to "for euer remaine subject to the Kinge of England."³¹ However, rumors of Wampanoag conspiracy against the English did not stop. In 1667, the colonists heard a rumor that Philip had intended to cooperate with the French or the Dutch to attack the English, and, after some investigation, it was believed that the rumor was "very probably true." Philip denied this and insisted that it was a plot of his enemy, Narragansett Chief Ninigret, to break up peace between the Wampanoags and the English.³² In 1671, Philip was suspected again and summoned to Plymouth, where he was accused of having "entertained, harboured, and abetted diuers Indians, not of his owne men, which were vagabonds, our professed enimies." He was forced to renew a treaty articulating that he reflected on his "evil intent" and submitted himself and his people not only "unto the Kings Majesty of England" but also "to the Colony of New Plimouth."³³ In other words, from the English perspective, Wampanoag's constitutional status had been degraded to one in subordination to the colony.

When Philip met with the Massachusetts Bay colonists around 1671, he refused to negotiate with them, stating that "The Governour was but a Subject, and that he [Philip] would not Treat except his Brother King Charles of England were there."³⁴ Scholars have paid attention to Philip's word "brother" to grasp the Native people's understanding of their constitutional relationships. Indigenous Americans often used kinship metaphors in representing the relationships between the two polities. For example, "brother" has two meanings: either (1) equality or (2) equality plus some obligations that the older brother has toward his younger brother, especially when "older" and "younger" are clearly stated.³⁵ Brooks and Pulsipher only insisted that Philip's word "brother" meant equality and that Philip saw the King of England as such.³⁶ Because the Wampanoag chiefs had not only acknowledged his subjection to the King of England but also accepted the royal arbitration of intertribal conflicts,³⁷ Philip seemed to use "brother" in the latter meaning, although without a clear designation of older or younger in this case; in other words, Philip (the

³⁰ *RCP*, 3: 167, 192; William Hubbard, *The history of the Indian Wars in New England* (1677), 2 vols., ed. Samuel G. Drake (Roxbury, 1865), 1: 50–51.

³¹ *RCP*, 4: 25–26.

³² *RCP*, 4: 151, 164–66.

³³ Hubbard, *history of the Indian Wars in New England*, 1: 54–55; *RCP*, 5: 78–80.

³⁴ Nathaniel Saltonstall, *A Continuation of the State of New England; Being a Farther Account of the Indian Warr* (1676), in *Narratives of the Indian Wars*, 73.

³⁵ Francis Jennings, et al., eds., *The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 119–20; Patricia Galloway, "'The Chief Who Is Your Father': Choctaw and French Views of the Diplomatic Relation," in *Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast*, eds. Gregory A. Waselkov, Peter H. Wood, and Tom Hatley (2nd ed.; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 345–70; Robert A. Williams, *Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600–1800* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 72–73.

³⁶ Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin*, 132–33; Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, 98.

³⁷ *CRW*, 2: 578–79n4.

younger brother) expected King Charles (the older brother) to mediate and protect his Native subjects.

Contemporary colonists and current historians have considered John Sassamon's case to be an important event leading up to King Philip's War. Sassamon, who had been acquainted with the English since childhood, had adopted Christianity and acquired English literacy. In December 1674, Sassamon arrived at the Plymouth colony and revealed Philip's plan to launch an assault on the English. This kind of information had reached the colony so often that the colonists did not take it seriously. Nevertheless, Sassamon expressed his fear that he would be killed if Philip knew about this secret meeting. His fears came true, and his corpse was found under the ice of Assowamsett Pond, in Plymouth. Afterwards, another Christian Native, Patuckson, testified that Philip's counselor Tobias and two other Wampanoag Natives named Wampapaquan and Mattashunnamo had killed and thrown Sassamon into the pond. The Plymouth court, in early June 1675, adopted the testimony and sentenced the accused to death for their crime. Tobias and Mattashunnamo were executed on June 8; Wampapaquan temporarily survived because of a loose rope, but was later shot. The three criminals had confessed to the English that they had murdered Sassamon under Philip's order, and colonists William Hubbard and Increase Mather wrote that Philip had resolved to begin a war for fear of his own execution. However, Philip did not avow his guilt, and Rhode Island Deputy Governor John Easton gave careful consideration to the matter. Easton suspected the possibility of accidental death and not murder. He wrote that some Native people acknowledged that "sumtimes naty [naughty, i.e., wicked] indians wo[u]ld kill others but, not as ever thay herd to obscuere as if the dead indian was not murdered"; that is, if the Native people killed someone, the truth usually soon came to light, but not in this case.³⁸

It is uncertain whether Hubbard and Mather's reasoning on Philip's motivation for the war is correct, but Philip's dissatisfaction toward the English certainly grew through the proceedings of Sassamon's case. Mather stated that the trial of the three Wampanoag suspects was "fair" because "Indians as well as English sate upon the *Jury*," but Philip did not agree. Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote that Philip was "so Exasperated" and was resolved to revenge, "judging that the English Authority have nothing to do to Hang any of his Indians for killing another." Easton and Philip held a meeting in June 1675, in which the latter criticized English partiality, stating that "if 20 of there [h]onest indians testefied that a Englishman had dun them [w]rong, it was as nothing, and if but one of ther worst indians testefied against ani indian or ther king when it plesed the English that was sufittant [sufficient]." Philip also deplored the increase in the number of praying Native people, whom the English made "not subject to their [Native] kings." Easton separated these writings from Sassamon's case, but both might be relevant. In Sassamon's case, murder by the three Wampanoags was doubted by some Natives, but was testified by Patuckson, the "worst Indian" who "wo[u]ld pleas the English so to think him a beter Christian."³⁹

In the meeting with Easton, Philip also expressed other causes for dissatisfaction, such as deceptive

³⁸ *CRW*, 2: 694; *RCP*, 5: 159, 167, 10: 362–63; Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," 7–8; Hubbard, *history of the Indian Wars in New England*, 1: 58–63; Increase Mather, *A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England* (Boston, John Foster, 1676), ed. Paul Royster, An Online Electronic Text Edition, Faculty Publications, UNL Libraries, 31: 11–12; Saltonstall, *Continuation of the State of New England*, 55; Irving B. Richman, intro., "Harris Papers," *Collections of the Rhode Island Historical Society* 10 (1902): 163–64; James P. Ronda and Jeanne Ronda, "The Death of John Sassamon: An Exploration in Writing New England History," *American Indian Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1974): 91–102.

³⁹ Mather, *Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England*, 11; Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," 10–11;

land dealings and damage to Natives' crops by English cattle. He also deplored the suspicion that the English had poisoned his older brother, Alexander. Easton was not necessarily helpful to Philip, because his objective for holding this meeting was not to "Consider" these complaints, but to "prevent war." Easton warned that once English blood was spilled all Englishmen would become engaged in the war because the English were "to be all under one king," and the English were stronger than the Native people. Philip also knew that "fighting was the worst way," but questioned, "how right might take pla[c]e." Easton proposed an idea that two indifferent leaders should meet; Philip would choose one Native chief, and the other would be the Governor of New York, a person who was not necessarily familiar to New Englanders. Philip seemed to be interested in this new idea.⁴⁰ However, before long, a war began, and Philip announced to the neighboring Natives "that the English had a Design to cut off all the Indians round about them, and that if they did not Joyn together, they should lose their Lives and Lands."⁴¹

In June 1675, Roger Williams of Rhode Island had a conference with the Narragansett chiefs and three envoys of the Massachusetts Bay colony to discuss the imminent war. The Narragansetts said that they did not have an agreement with Philip and that "they had not sent one, nor would" they do so, either. Further, the Native chiefs promised that their people who had married Wampanoags "should returne or perish there" and that if Philip or his men fled to them, "they would not receave them but deliver them up unto the English."⁴² Immediately after the conference, however, armed Narragansetts marched to Warwick in Rhode Island, which frightened the English inhabitants. The English observed that "for diverse Weekes (if not months) Canoes passed to and again (day and night betweene Phillip and the Nahigonsiks [Narragansetts])," and their suspicions increased. One Narragansett chief admitted that he "could not Rule the Youth and Common people, nor perswade others Chiefe."⁴³ As King Philip's War started in Swansea in Plymouth and spread to other colonies, the Narragansetts divided themselves; Chief Ninigret's party stayed on the English side and the others participated in Philip's cause, which sparked a crucible battle named the Great Swamp Fight in December 1675.

3. King Philip's War and the Mohegans' Last War

Scholars have been concerned with the different names of the war, noticing that they were unavoidably biased. "King Philip's War" is predominantly used today, although the name was perhaps invented in 1716 when Thomas Church published the "entertaining" memoir of his father Benjamin, who led a march against Philip. Before that, the war was referred to by various names, such as "the Warr in New-England," "the Warr with the Indians in New-England," "the Indyan Warre," the "Narraganset Wars," and "the warres with the Generall Nations of Indians." Brooks considered the last one "the most accurate" because it focused on Native kinship networks that served as a decisive factor for the Narragansetts' collaboration with Philip. This name appeared in a petition put together by Mohegan Chiefs Owaneco

Nathaniel Saltonstall, *The Present State of New-England With Respect to the Indian War* (1675), in *Narratives of the Indian Wars*, 25.

⁴⁰ Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," 9–12; Philip Ranlet, "Another Look at the Causes of King Philip's War," *NEQ* 61, no. 1 (March 1988): 79–100.

⁴¹ Saltonstall, *Present State of New-England*, 26.

⁴² *CRW*, 2: 693–95.

⁴³ *CRW*, 2: 698–99.

and Ben Uncas toward resolving their land problems in 1700. Its scribes were Samuel Mason and other Englishmen, who were “appointed and impowered” to play this role. The name of this war may have been the intended reference by the Mohegans when they called attention to having fought with the English against “the Generall Nations of Indians” in the past; that is, the Mohegans differentiated themselves from the “Indians” by positioning themselves on the side of the English.⁴⁴

At the beginning of the war, Uncas and Owaneco arrived at the Connecticut colony and declared their fidelity to the English. Uncas “made a longe narrative of his acts of friendship in former dayes” and Owaneco gave his son “a very great Sachem” of the future, as a hostage, serving as a token of his faithfulness. Throughout the war, the Mohegans served in several marches and contributed through their “intelligence,” which involved discovering enemies nearby. The records of the Connecticut Council frequently refer to the Native services, many of which were provided by the Mohegans. The records sometimes articulate their numbers: one of the forces in August 1675 contained “80 Pequots & some Moheegins, [...] about one hundred,” and one in March 1676 consisted of “37 pressed men and 42 volunteers, with about 100 Indians, Pequots, and Mohegans, with some of Ninigret’s daughter’s men.” This ratio indicates that the Native people played a considerable role in the English cause. In April 1676, mixed forces comprising English, Mohegan, Pequot, and other people “fell upon a Party of the Enemy, commanded by that famous but very bloody and cruel Sachem, Quononshot” of the Narragansetts. In this battle, the former “obtained the Victory; killed above 50 of the Enemy [...] and took 40 more alive.” The Narragansett chief was also taken captive, and he desired “not to be tortured, but presently be to put to death.” The Pequots “shot him,” the Mohegans “cut off his Head and quartered his Body,” and Ninigret’s men “made the Fire and burned his Quarters,” because “all might share in the Glory of destroying so great a Prince.” While the Mohegans certainly had their complaints, stating that “their former services had not been sufficiently rewarded,” they kept their position on the English side through the war.⁴⁵

The Mohegans were not the only Natives who supported the English. Nipmuc Native people said that “they do account them selves as English man” and “they would not fight against them selves.”⁴⁶ The Nipmucs were people who were under the influence of strong nations such as the Pequots and Narragansetts at the English arrival.⁴⁷ After the 1640s, the Massachusetts Bay colonists earnestly built missions for the neighboring Native people, including the Nipmucs, and Christian Native people began the practice of “othering” of non-Christian Native people by considering them to be “Indians.” According to

⁴⁴ Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Knopf, 1998); Brooks, *Our Beloved Kin*, 7–8, 205–7; Thomas Church, *The entertaining history of King Philip’s war, Which began in the Month of June, 1675* (1716), ed. Samuel G. Drake (Exeter: J. & B. Williams, 1843); Richard Hutchinson, *The Warr in New-England Visibly Ended* (1677), in *Narratives of the Indian Wars*, 101–6; Mather, *Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England*; Easton, “Relacion of the Indyan Warre”; Joshua Scottow, “A Narrative of the Planting of the Massachusetts Colony Anno 1628” (1694), ed., Paul Royster, *Joshua Scottow Papers* 4 (2006): 40, 61; “The complaints and prayer of Oweneco and Ben Uncas: 1700,” Edward E. Ayer Digital Collection (Newberry Library, Chicago), Ayer_MS_671_00002_o2, accessed at March 5, 2020, https://collections.carli.illinois.edu/cdm/ref/collection/nby_eeayer/id/23230.

⁴⁵ RCC, 2: 336, 348, 427, 450; Nathaniel Saltonstall, *A New and Further Narrative of the State of New-England; being a Continued Account of the Bloody Indian War* (1676), in *Narratives of the Indian Wars*, 90–91; “Wyllys Family Papers,” *Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society*, 21 (1924): 213–14, 217.

⁴⁶ Massachusetts Archives Collection (1629–1799) (Massachusetts State Archives, Boston), 30: 169, available in <https://www.familysearch.org/en/>; Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, 298n36.

⁴⁷ Daniel Gookin, “Historical Collections of the Indians in New England” (1792), Special Collections Publications (Miscellaneous), University of Rhode Island, Paper 13 (https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/sc_pubs/13), 147–48; Dennis A. Connole, *The Indians of the Nipmuck Country in Southern New England, 1630–1750: An Historical Geography* (Jefferson: McFarland, 2001), 11–15.

Thomas Shepard, one Native chief stated that if Native people dwelled “far from the English” settlement, Native conversion would not proceed, and “they would be all one *Indians*.”⁴⁸ In King Philip’s War, they also participated actively in English campaigns, and English military leaders noted that they “acquitted themselves courageously and faithfully.”⁴⁹ However, owing to English popular distrust toward Natives as a whole, the Massachusetts Bay council on August 30, 1675 “judg[ed] it of absolute necessity for security of the English and Indians in amity with us, that” the Native people should be confined to several towns and “their usual commerce with the English and hunting in the woods” should be restrained.⁵⁰ Further, on October 26, when an old barn caught fire in Dedham, neighboring Native people in Natick were suspected of involvement and ordered to move to Deer Island.⁵¹ Daniel Gookin observed in December that the Native people on the Island had lived “patiently, humbly, and piously, without murmuring or complaining against the English for their sufferings” in spite of the fact that “the Island was bleak and cold, their wigwams poor and mean, their clothes few and thin.” Even during confinement, the English continued to use these Native people mainly to gather intelligence and as guides. For example, in the winter of 1675, two Native Americans, Job Kattenanit and James Quannapohit, agreed to engage in intelligence gathering of the Narragansetts to prove “their love to the English.”⁵² In April 1676, the Massachusetts Bay colony changed its policy and acknowledged that the English could accompany Native soldiers. A few months later, moreover, the colony declared that if enemy soldiers surrendered, they would be given amnesty and expected to participate in the English marches. Finally, King Philip was shot down in August by a Native named Alderman, who had recently switched sides.⁵³

Although some Native people thus contributed to the English victory, it was not the settler complex that won, but the settlers alone. The war was a crucial turning point in the weakening of the Native presence in New England, although Jean O’Brien demonstrated elaborately that the Native people in New England were never eradicated thereafter.⁵⁴ Daniel Mandell estimated that, during this war, the Native population declined by half, and its ratio to the whole population of southern New England also diminished from 25 percent to 10 percent.⁵⁵ Mandell further summed up the change in status of the eastern Massachusetts Native peoples after King Philip’s War in three stages: from (1) “identifiable Indian towns,” in which Native people were “organized into a political, municipal, or social unity” to (2) “enclaves” within larger

⁴⁸ Thomas Shepard, *The Clear Sunshine of the Gospel Breaking Forth upon the Indians in New-England* (1648), reprint (New York, 1865), 4; Henry Whitfield, *Strength Out of Weakness: Or a Glorious Manifestation of the Further Progress of the Gospel among the Indians in New-England* (1652), reprint (New York, 1865), 33; Harold W. Van Lonkhuyzen, “A Reappraisal of the Praying Indians: Acculturation, Conversion, and Identity at Natick, Massachusetts, 1646–1730,” *NEQ* 63, no. 3 (September 1990): 396–428; Richard W. Cogley, *John Eliot’s Mission to the Indians before King Philip’s War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

⁴⁹ Daniel Gookin, “An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England, in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677” (1677), in *Archaeologia Americana, Transactions and Collections of the American Antiquarian Society* 2 (1836), 442–43.

⁵⁰ Gookin, “Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians,” 450–51.

⁵¹ Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., *Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England*, 5 vols. (Boston: William White, 1853–54), 5: 57; Gookin, “An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians,” 472–73.

⁵² *RCC*, 2: 392; Gookin, “An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians,” 485–86.

⁵³ Hubbard, *history of the Indian Wars in New England*, 1: 249; Mather, *Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England*, 61–62; Gookin, “Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians,” 509.

⁵⁴ Jean M. O’Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick, Massachusetts, 1650–1790* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁵⁵ Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip’s War: The Conflict over New England* (New York: Chelsea House, 2007), 117–18; idem, *King Philip’s War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 134–35.

English communities, and then (3) “an ethnic group” that had “common character,” “identity,” and “social intercourse.” During this process, the Native people fostered an ethnic identity that transcended their original tribes.⁵⁶

Nipmuc chief John Wampus was absent during King Philip’s War because of his stay in England from 1674 to 1677. On his return, he confronted English anti-Native sentiment immediately after the war. He questioned the English settlers, using the word “Indian,” “whether they [New Englanders] never saw an Indian before?” This expression well reveals his surprise that the English attitudes toward the same Native people had sharply changed from before to after the war. Then, he visited England again and submitted a petition for improvement of the English treatment of the Native people. This petition said that “Yo[u]r pet[it]ione[r] [Wampus] & other native Indians there inhabiting are miserably comprized within the Laws made by the English calculated only for their particular advantage” and there was “no supreme Courts of Judicature established in that Country, whereunto the oppressed may repair for redress.” In this petition, Wampus announced his concern for “other native Indians,” which is distinctive, compared to the previous personal petition of 1676 regarding “a certaine Parcell of Land” of his own. As Pulsipher pointed out, these question and petitions indicate that Wampus strengthened “Indian” identity.⁵⁷

The Mohegans, who were on the English side throughout the war, and the Connecticut colony confirmed a “mutual respect and friendship” in their agreements in May 1678 and May 1681, but the latter text reflected the Mohegans’ unfavorable position according to the understanding of the English. In the second article, Mohegan Chief Uncas acknowledged that “I do resign up to the said Colonie of Connecticutt all my lands and Territories.” In the fifth article, he acknowledged that he “will take advice of the Generall Court of Connecticutt from time to time, especially in the making of peace and warre with any persons or people.” In exchange, the Connecticut colony should “take care that a sufficiencie of land for the said Indians and their successors be still reserved for them to plant on,” and should “furnish them with amunition at a just price” when foreign enemies invaded the Native people’s land. Paul Joseph Grant-Costa interpreted this agreement as “the appearance of a total submission to the colony.”⁵⁸

Finally, the Mohegans came into conflict with the English during *The Mohegan Indians v. the Governor and Company of the Colony of Connecticut*, a legal case that became a nonmilitary dimension of the English conquest that Grant-Costa called the “last Indian war in New England.”⁵⁹ The conflict began with Chief Owaneco’s letter to an intermediary, Nicholas Hallam, in 1703. Owaneco requested him to acquaint Queen Anne with the English territorial encroachment upon the Native people, stating thus:

⁵⁶ Mandell, *Behind the Frontier*, esp. 5.

⁵⁷ *Suffolk County Court Files, 1629–1797* (Salt Lake City, Utah: Genealogical Society of Utah, 1972), 19: 1642, accessed September 16, 2020, available in <https://www.familysearch.org/en/>; “Petition of John Wampus, alias John White to King Charles II” (August 22, 1676) and “Petition of John Wampus to Charles II” (March 14, 1678/9) both in Yale Indian Papers Project (Yale University Library, New Haven, <https://findit.library.yale.edu/yipp/>), no. 1676.08.22.00, 1679.03.14.00; Jenny Hale Pulsipher, *Swindler Sachem: The American Indian Who Sold His Birthright, Dropped Out of Harvard, and Conned the King of England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 193–95, 213.

⁵⁸ Yale Indian Papers Project, no. 1678.05.14.00; *RCC*, 3: 309–11; Paul Joseph Grant-Costa, “The Last Indian War in New England: The Mohegan Indians v. the Governor and Company of the Colony of Connecticut, 1703–1774” (PhD Diss., Yale University, 2008), 41.

⁵⁹ Grant-Costa, “Last Indian War in New England”; Mark D. Walters, “Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British North America,” *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 33, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 785–829; Craig Bryan Yirush, “Claiming the New World: Empire, Law, and Indigenous Rights in the Mohegan Case, 1704–1743,” *Law and History Review* 29, no. 2 (May 2011): 333–73.

“if I Obtain not Relief from ye Great Queens Ma[jes]ty my People will be in Temptation [...] to flee to the Eastward Indians, the ffrench’s [French’s] ffriends, & the English’s Enimys.”⁶⁰ The Queen of England worried about the power relationships with France and soon organized a commission to investigate and resolve the dispute.⁶¹ In 1705, the commission decided in favor of the Mohegans on the ground that the Mohegans had an “undoubted right” to the disputed land, and they would not be able to “subsist” without it.⁶² However, the Connecticut colony brought forward a counterargument. Agent Henry Ashurst claimed that the colonists had acquired the disputed land “with great difficulty, and by their only endeavours, expences, and charge,” as well as “by conquest,” meaning the Pequot War. He said that the Mohegans had been dependent on the Pequots before the war, and, in return for their cooperation during the war, the colony had merely “permitted” them to “possess” some parts of the conquered land as the colonists “thought fit.” Further, according to his insistence, their agreements (in May 1681) stated that the colony could dispose of the Mohegans’ land for building new English “plantations, villages, or farms” in exchange for “reasonable satisfaction” and the word “reservation” should not be interpreted that the Mohegans reserved any right on the land.⁶³ Subsequently, Queen Ann set another commission for review.⁶⁴

After some decades of being left alone, this case began again in 1735 when Mohegan Chief Mahomet visited England and submitted a petition that they were dispossessed of hunting and planting grounds, and their remaining land was so “Rocky” that they could not subsist on it.⁶⁵ However, the English arbitration accepted the Connecticut arguments in 1738 and 1743, which became final in 1773.⁶⁶ During these proceedings, Chief Ben Uncas made an appeal in July 1743. He referred to two items to emphasize a special relationship long maintained between the Mohegans and the English. The first was “the bible translated into Indian, which was sent by the late great king Charles the Second of England” and subsequently delivered through Mohegan chiefs. The second was a “brass hawk, taken from a famous and great captain of the Narragansets,” “by one of my ancestors in a famous battle and victory [King Philip’s War],” which had “been delivered [...] as a memorial of” it. Ben Uncas noted as a selling point that the Mohegans supported the English in the past wars and were set to continue the role they played in other ongoing and future wars. However, he identified himself as “Indian” rather than as “English.” His address began with his own introduction, which said: “I Ben Uncas, chief Sachem of the Mohegan Indians” (emphasis added).⁶⁷

Table 1 chronologically rearranges documents with Mohegan signatures and indicates that the word “Indians” was not used frequently in representing the Mohegan people in the seventeenth and early

⁶⁰ David Murray, intro., “Letter of Instruction from Oanhkoe, Sachem of the Mohegan Indians, 14 July 1703,” in *Early Native Literacies in New England: A Documentary and Critical Anthology*, eds. Katrina Bross and Hilary E. Wyss (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 15–27.

⁶¹ *CSPC*, 22: 76–77.

⁶² *Governor and company of Connecticut, and Mohegan Indians, by their guardians. Certified copy of book of proceedings before Commissioners of Review* (London: W. and J. Richardson, 1769), 27–29.

⁶³ *Governor and company of Connecticut, and Mohegan Indians*, 153–54.

⁶⁴ *CSPC*, 23: 150–51.

⁶⁵ “Talcott Papers,” *Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society* 4 (1892): 368–72; Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in the Northeast* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), chap. 2; Alden T. Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500–1776* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 162–63.

⁶⁶ *Governor and Company of Connecticut, and Mohegan Indians*, 137–43.

⁶⁷ *Governor and Company of Connecticut, and Mohegan Indians*, 109–10.

eighteenth centuries. The document scribes may have been English, even if the Native leaders placed their marks at the bottom. Nonetheless, it is certain that the Native leaders were present at the creation of the documents. In the deed dated August 15, 1659, Uncas and Waukequa introduced themselves as “Sachems of the mohegan country,” and Owaneco used a formula of rank “Sachem of Mohegan” in his deeds, both contrasting another standard phrase, “Mohegan Indians,” which was often used in later years. The August 1666 agreement was drawn up between two parties: “Uncas, Sachem of Moheag, in behalf of himself and people of Moheag and Nahantick,” on the one hand, and “Indian people at Windsor, Podunk, Hartford,” on the other. In this text, the term “Indians” was used only to refer to non-Mohegan Native people.

This acquisition of “Indian” identity by the Mohegans also appears in the writings of Samson Occom, who produced several English publications in the latter half of the eighteenth century. He was born in 1723 and learned about Christianity and the English language in his late teens, followed by Latin and Greek. Then, he began to engage in missionary work in his own and neighboring Native nations. Despite this acculturation, Occom was discontented on multiple points: land dispute between the Mohegans and the colony of Connecticut, the harsh treatment the English meted out to their indigenous servants, and the limited financial assistance for his services from his religious society. Occom knew that “an English family [...] whipt and beat” a Native boy “almost every Day” and the English missionaries received twelve times as much reward as he did. These circumstances made him remark, “I am a poor Indian. I Can’t help that God has made me So; I did not make myself So.” Michael Elliott has pointed this self-representation out as a “stark depiction of Anglo-Native race relations.”⁶⁸

Conclusion

Wolfe’s concept of the settler complex might find one area of rich application in early America, which had only a “long, complex genealogy of settler colonialism” rather than a “perfect form” of it. In Native-settler conflicts in seventeenth-century New England, the Native nations and individuals chose their sides under the categories of “Indians” and “Englishmen.” During the Pequot War and King Philip’s War, many Native people joined the English side and formed the settler complex, but both wars also had characteristics of ethnic conflicts, as Pequots and Wampanoags called for Native alliances. The concept of settler complex, which indicates demographic diversity of the settler side in Native/settler conflicts, is useful to describe both aspects of the intercultural divide and cooperation. The formation of the settler complex resulted from the rivalries between the Native peoples, but the English colonial expansion and the bad treatment of Native people alienated their Native fellows. Indian identity was strengthened by Narragansett chief Miantonomi after the Pequot War, Nipmuc chief Wampus after King Philip’s War, and the Mohegans during their case; thus, through their conflicts, Native Americans’ categorization of “Indians” and “Englishmen” gradually came to coincide with ethnic boundaries of the English mind. This process of self-awareness as “Indians” and the disappearance of the demographic complexity of the settler

⁶⁸ Samson Occom, autobiography, undated, in Occom Circle, Rauner Special Collections (Dartmouth College Library, Hanover, <https://www.dartmouth.edu/occom/>, accessed October 4, 2020), no. 768517, pp. 12r–13v; Michael Elliott, ““This Indian Bait”: Samson Occom and the Voice of Liminality,” *Early American Literature* 29, no. 3 (1994): 249; Bernd Peyer, “Samson Occom: Mohegan Missionary and Writer of the 18th Century,” *American Indian Quarterly* 6, no. 3–4 (Autumn-Winter 1982): 208–17.

side was part of the process of the emergence or construction of the Native/settler dichotomy.

[Table 1] USE of “Indians” for Self-Representation or NOT in Documents with Mohegan Signatories

M/(D)/Y	Type	Mohegan Signatories	USE	NOT	Sources (Pages/No.)
9/28/1640	Deed	Uncas		NOT	G 151–52, 157–58
8/1658	Deed	Uncas		NOT	G 251
8/19/1658	Deed	Uncas	USE		G 169
8/15/1659	Deed	Uncas & Wawequa		NOT	G 46
5/20/1661	Deed	Uncas & 2 persons		NOT	G 160
5/20/1662	Deed	Uncas	USE		G 176–77
12/14/1665	Confirmation	Uncas & 2 persons		NOT	G 46–47
8/3/1666	Agreement	Uncas		NOT	G 44–45
3/10/1669	Deed	Uncas & Owaneco	USE		G 43–44
1/9/1677	Indenture	Owaneco & Jomee		NOT	Y 1677.01.09.00
3/10/1677	Deed	Uncas & Owaneco		NOT	G 250
5/14/1678	Agreement	Uncas & Owaneco	USE		Y 1678.05.14.00
5/13/1680	Petition	Owaneco	USE		Y 1680.05.13.00
3/26/1683	Deed	Uncas		NOT	G 175–76
2/12/1684	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	Y 1684.02.12.00
3/6/1684	Deed	Owaneco	USE		G 217
6/9/1684	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 152–53
12/9/1686	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 150–51
7/13/1691	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 248
4/29/1693	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 242
11/11/1698	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 249
11/12/1698	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 239–40
11/14/1698	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 241–42
6/9/1699	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 149–50
8/19/1699	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	Y 1699.08.19.00
6/26/1702	Deed	Owaneco & Mahomet	USE		G 171–72
10/13/1703	Complaint	Owaneco & 2 persons		NOT	Y 1703.10.13.00
1/14/1704	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 240–41
4/3/1707	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 245
4/3/1707	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 246
4/3/1707	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 247
2/6/1710	Declaration	Owaneco	USE		Y 1710.02.06.01
2/17/1710	Deed	Owaneco		NOT	G 173–74
5/10/1710	Deed	Owaneco	USE		G 182–84
5/10/1710	Deed	Owaneco	USE		Y 1710.05.10.01
5/10/1710	Deed	Owaneco	USE		Y 1710.05.10.02
5/30/1715	Deed	Ceafar Uncas	USE		G 185–86
7/25/1716	Complaint	Ceasar Uncas		NOT	Y 1716.07.25.01
2/16/1722	Deed	Ceasar Uncas		NOT	Y 1722.02.16.00
10/21/1724	Deed	Ben Uncas & 5 persons	USE		G 213–15
9/29/1726	POA	Ben Uncas II & 3 persons	USE		Y 1726.09.29.00
10/1733	Petition	Ben Uncas II	USE		Y 1733.10.00.00
5/9/1737	Memorial	Wemuscum & 4 persons	USE		Y 1737.05.09.01
8/2/1737	Recognition	58 persons	USE		G 210–11
2/28/1738	Release	18 persons	USE		G 196–98

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3/1/1738	Declaration	54 persons	USE		G 218–19
4/24/1738	Return	15 persons	USE		Y 1738.04.24.00
4/24/1738	Confirmation	14 persons	USE		Y 1738.04.24.01
5/10/1739	Petition	Ben Uncas II	USE		Y 1739.05.10.00
7/1/1742	Choice	Ben Uncas II	USE		Y 1742.07.01.00
10/6/1742	Instrument	42 persons	USE		G 223–25
5/13/1743	Selection	22 persons	USE		Y 1743.05.13.00
5/17/1743	Memorial	Joshua Uncas & 3 persons	USE		Y 1743.05.17.00
6/1/1743	Instrument	84 persons	USE		G 229–32
7/6/1743	Instrument	14 persons	USE		G 72
7/6/1743	Declaration	Ben Uncas II	USE		G 113–15
7/20/1743	Declaration	11 persons	USE		G 109–13
M/(D)/Y	Type	Mohegan Signatories	USE	NOT	Sources (Pages/No.)

Sources: [G:] *Governor and Company of Connecticut, and Moheagan Indians, by their guardians. Certified copy of book of proceedings before Commissioners of Review* (London: W. and J. Richardson, 1769); [Y:] Yale Indian Papers Project (Yale University Library, New Haven, <https://findit.library.yale.edu/yipp/>).