

インド・パキスタン分離独立の
史的研究

資料集 II

昭和51年度科学研究費補助金総合研究(A)

— 中間報告 —

中村平治編

東京外国語大学
アジア・アフリカ言語文化研究所

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まえがき

この資料集は、昭和51年度の東京外国語大学アジア・アフリカ言語文化研究所の共同研究プロジェクト、ならびに昭和51年度文部省科学研究費補助金（総合研究A）『インド・パキスタン分離独立の史的研究』に基づく共同研究の成果の中間報告第2集である。

昨年の資料集(I)が、主に第2次大戦期から1947年8月のインド・パキスタン分離独立を挟んで、1950年ころまでの主要な決議、法令、演説、声明を編集したものであるのに対して、この資料集IIには、インドとイギリス本国での諸政党機関誌・一般紙、およびアメリカ、香港で発行された定期行物にあらわれた、分離独立とそこに至る諸過程に関する記事、社説、論文が収められている。収録した新聞、雑誌について以下に簡単にふれておこう。

The Times of India (Daily; Bombay) : インド国民会議派の見解をほぼ代表する。

Dawn (Daily ; New Delhi) : ムスリム連盟の機関紙ともいべきもの。

People's Age (Weekly ; New Delhi) : インド共産党の機関誌。

The Times (Daily ; London) : イギリスの代表的日刊紙。

The Modern Review (Monthly ; Calcutta) : 会議派系の英字月刊誌。

Labour Monthly (Monthly ; London) : R. パーム・ダットの編集になるイギリス共産党機関誌。

The Round Table (Quarterly ; London) : イギリス国会内の保守派議員による同名のグループの機関誌。

Far Eastern Economic Review (Weekly ; Hongkong) : 香港発行のアジア地域政治・経済関係の週刊誌。

Foreign Affairs (Quarterly ; New York) : アメリカの外交政策を知る上で重要なもの。

Pacific Affairs (Quarterly ; New York) : 太平洋問題調査会(IPR)の機関誌として定評があるもの。

この資料集の作成に当っては、参加メンバー全員、すなわち伊藤正二（アジア経済研究所）、加賀谷寛（大阪外大）、桑島昭（同）、古賀正則（大阪市大経済研究所）、近藤治（追手門学院大）、田中敏雄（東京外大）、内藤雅雄（東京外大アジア・アフリカ言語文化研究所）、浜口恒夫（大阪外大）、森利一（琉球大）、山口博一（アジア経済研究所）、山崎利男（東大東洋文化研究所）の諸氏と、共同研究者の押川文子（お茶の水大院生）と吉田光義（一橋大院生）の諸氏の全面的な協力を得た。具体的な準備作業については、押川、吉田、内藤三氏と私が、他の参加メンバーの討議と了承を得つつ進めた。なお、海外研究出張の佐藤宏氏（アジア経済研究所）は出発前にこの資料作成の準備作業に加わっていただいた。

関係当局、資料参照を快諾下された諸研究機関ならびに関係各位の、本研究プロジェクトに対する御理解と御協力に対して、同プロジェクトおよび資料集刊行の責任者として心からの感謝の意を表したい。

昭和52年1月

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中村平治

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DECISIVE STAGE AT SIMLA

On Sunday the negotiations between the British Cabinet Mission and the leaders of India's two chief political parties entered at Simla on their most critical and decisive stage. At long last representatives of the three groups are meeting round a common table. To reconcile the present demands of the Congress and the League within a single India is, of course, impossible. Equally impossible is it, in our view, to construct a feasible independent Pakistan State from two widely separated areas of the country. From the point of view of the defence of the sub-continent alone—apart altogether from the defence of Pakistan itself—the difficulties appear insuperable. The task of statesmanship is to reconcile the opposing points of view by evolving a constitution which will give the widest possible autonomy to a component Pakistan in view of the clearly expressed support for the Muslim League's policy in the recent Central and provincial elections. The British Cabinet Mission are said to have suggested a plan of this type in the formula which they submitted to the leaders of both parties as a basis for the negotiations at Simla. It is reliably learnt that the formula envisages a Union Government to deal with subjects such as defence and foreign affairs; within the Union there would be two groups of provinces, one group predominantly Hindu and the other predominantly Muslim, each with a common policy in respect of their group affairs, while the provinces comprising the groups would enjoy a wide measure of autonomy with residuary powers.

This is what is known as the Confederation scheme, that is, a confederation of two separate federations. Broadly, it is a compromise, a sort of half way house, between the League demand for a completely independent Pakistan and the Congress plan for a federal India with the provinces as units having a common centre. The important thing about the Mission's formula is that, without endangering India's cohesion for defence and other essential purposes, it concedes Pakistan to the Muslims. Within their federation or sub-federation they can develop their culture and their way of life. There is, as the Mission

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have pointed out, nothing sacrosanct about their formula; it is a basis for negotiations and can be altered to secure agreement on details or on fundamental points.

It is trite to say that if the Indian people are to settle down to internal peace and harmony there must be compromise. Agreement by compromise is one of the factors which distinguishes democracy from totalitarianism. The solemn thought confronting us is that this is probably the last time that the Indian parties will have an opportunity of coming to an amicable understanding with each other. Time and again failure to compromise has resulted in disaster for India. The rejection of the Cripps plan in 1942 was one such tragedy; the failure of Lord Wavell's Simla conference last year was another. Responsibility for averting a third and greater disaster rests on both sides. For the sake of a common Centre the Congress must agree to the widest kind of autonomy for the Muslims. But while the Congress responsibility is great, an even heavier liability rests upon Mr. Jinnah: a tremendous gain will be made if he wisely decides not to go to extremes over Pakistan. If, however, the Muslim League unhappily insists on cutting the Muslims adrift, it must clearly understand the full implications of its act. We do not think there is any outside authority in the world, any third party from the United Nations Organisation downwards, which would award India's Muslims more territory than that which is strictly theirs. The issue, we repeat, rests with the Indian people, aided by the counsels of the Mission. If agreement is not forthcoming, the consequences must be clearly understood. So grave are they that they cannot be contemplated with equanimity. Apart from resulting horrors and anarchy, in present circumstances famine would overtake millions of people and India's prestige in the eyes of the world would sink to zero. But we are definitely not without hope. The fact that the parties have agreed to meet on a common formula is an encouraging sign. They cannot fail the country at this supremely critical stage.

The Times of India

Monday, May 6, 1946

THE MISSION'S PLAN

In considering the plan which the British Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy propose as a solution of India's constitutional problem, one dominant fact must be borne in mind. It is that after eight weeks of the most intensive effort to reach an agreed settlement between India's two chief political parties, failure had to be recorded. Yet it would be wrong to regard the result as a complete and utter failure. The negotiations produced one striking result; they got both parties to agree to an Indian Union with a common centre, and for that achievement all concerned—particularly Mr. Jinnah—deserve credit. Yet the melancholy fact remains that final agreement eluded the negotiators and the Simla talks ended. For the British Mission to leave things as they are would lead directly to chaos and bloodshed; nobody has any doubts on that score. But the Ministers came to this country charged with a specific mission, namely, how best to arrange for the smooth transfer of power from British to Indian hands. Their proposals to that end are now before India and the world.

Having failed to secure complete agreement, the Mission and the Viceroy have done the next best thing. That is, they indicate what in the opinion of the British Government is an equitable solution and the procedure by which it can speedily be effected; we lay special emphasis on the word speedily. The plan falls naturally into two parts. Firstly, the immediate setting up of a constituent body on the broadest possible foundation, and secondly, the immediate formation of an Interim Government composed of representatives of our chief political parties. A bold attempt has been made to simplify the procedure for representation. In any assembly called upon to decide an issue so important to all parties, population figures are the ultimate basis. Moreover, there is no attempt to fetter the constituent body or to tie it down to a rigid formula. The Mission recommend for consideration a form of constitution which, like most

compromises, seems unduly complicated, but the constituent body will have full freedom to reach any agreed decision it likes either outside or inside the suggestions made by the Mission and the British Government.

To bridge the time gap between the immediate self-government which is desired, by all political parties and the ultimate form which the Indian constitution will take, it is the intention of the British Ministers and the Viceroy at once to give effect to the second part of their plan, namely, the setting up of an Interim Government. So far we have no details of that government—these presumably will be for Lord Wavell to settle in consultation with the Indian leaders—but its purpose is clear. It will carry on the administration of the country at the centre in accordance with the wishes of the people, and its powers and position will be recognised by the Viceroy and the British Government, who will give it "the fullest measure of co-operation... in the accomplishment of its tasks of administration and in bringing about as rapid, and smooth a transition as possible." We think the Mission's statement might have given a clearer picture of both the Interim Government and its powers, but that will presumably follow as the Viceroy proceeds with the task—already started—of forming a Cabinet in which all portfolios, including that of the War Member, "will be held by Indian leaders having the full confidence of the people." As we see it, the Interim Government will be a really popular Government on the lines envisaged at the first Simla Conference, and will be empowered to give effect to a national policy. There is, however, one vital difference between the Interim Government now proposed and the one which failed to fructify last year. This time there is no question of one party putting a veto on the setting up of the Government; it will be formed and it will proceed to function irrespective of whether a party stands out or not. If any party refuses to join the Interim Government it will deprive itself of a vital share in the administra-

tion of the country during a crucial period.

Such, then, is the picture. On the one side we have a hopeless deadlock, a weary prolongation of a sterile attitude which can only end in misery and civil strife. Are our leaders going to condemn millions of their fellow country-men to unnecessary suffering, since after all it is the common people who will suffer most? Or are they to adopt a course which will lead them in speedy and orderly fashion to their desired goal? Patriotism no less than common sense dictates the answer. India's supreme tragedy in recent years was the number of opportunities of an honourable settlement which all parties missed. This is the final opportunity. To miss it would be a supreme disaster.

The Times of India

Friday, May 17, 1946

MR. JINNAH'S PROTEST

Mr. Jinnah has taken the somewhat odd course of issuing a long critical analysis of the British Cabinet Mission's scheme without indicating whether he will accept or reject it. That decision, he says, must be made by the Working Committee and the Council of the All-India Muslim League which are shortly to meet in Delhi. Much of Mr. Jinnah's statement comprises a list of Muslim League demands which were wholly or partly regarded as unacceptable by the Mission. At the head of his grievances Mr. Jinnah places the Mission's rejection of the League demand for the establishment of a completely sovereign state of Pakistan which, Mr. Jinnah still avers, "is the only solution of the constitutional problem of India and which alone can secure a stable government and lead to the happiness and welfare not only of the two major communities but of all the people of this sub-continent". Mr. Jinnah accuses the Mission of using "commonplace and exploded arguments" against Pakistan; he regards the Mission's language as "deplorable" and calculated to hurt the "feelings of Muslim India", and seems to think that the Mission's object was to appease and placate the Congress. Unfortunately for Mr. Jinnah, the Mission proved their case against an independent Pakistan by facts and figures which cannot be disputed. The League's claim fell between two stools. It had either to claim a Pakistan which would include substantial portions of Hindustan, or to rest content with a predominantly Muslim Pakistan which would have left a sadly truncated State. We cannot see how a clear statement of fact can be regarded as either "deplorable" or as "calculated to hurt the feelings of Muslim India", nor how it can be described as appeasement of the Congress.

Mr. Jinnah's statement seems all the more odd when it is remembered that at the Simla conference he showed great statesmanship in accepting an Indian Union with a Common Centre. He secured a type of Pakistan which is a feasible proposition. To those who have given a moment's consideration to the Mission's plan, it is obvious that what the British Ministers did was to get the two parties as close together as possible, to use matters of common agreement as a basis for a settlement and to make suggestions for the bridging of the gap. Mr. Jinnah may well feel aggrieved over some of the points in the Mission's plan which run counter to his views, and he may well ask for clarification of other points which seem obscure to him. The Congress leaders in their correspondence with His Excellency the Viceroy and the Mission have done exactly the same thing. Each side must realise that if the Mission are to be coerced into altering the fundamentals of their plan in such a way as to make it completely acceptable to either side, the whole of their past two months' efforts would be wasted and any hope of Indian unity in constitution-making would vanish into thin air. The two Indian parties came very close together at Simla. It would be disastrous if they now drift apart, and the only way to avoid that calamity is for both sides to accept the Mission's plan as a basis and to work out the details in free consultation.

The Times of India

Thursday, May 23, 1946.

4 PARAMOUNTCY TO END

Almost unrealised in the glare of public attention concentrated on the Cabinet Mission's scheme and British Indian views thereon, the Ministers and the Viceroy have quietly revolutionised the position of the Indian States. At first sight references to the States in the Mission's constitutional proposals and in the Memorandum presented to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes appear to confer on the Rulers complete freedom to do as they like—to come to any or no arrangements with the self-governing Union. Theoretically that is the position; in practice almost the complete reverse is true. For many years the Princes have been adversely criticised, particularly in British India, for their insistence on the sanctity of their respective treaties with the Crown and for their adamant objection to any alteration of those relationships without mutual consent. That claim has been consistently acknowledged by the Paramount Power, but it rests fundamentally on the British Crown retaining its peculiar position. The British Government have unequivocally announced their intention of ceasing to be the ultimate power in India; automatically the rights and obligations ceded to Paramountcy by the States come to an end.

Qualification of the sovereignty of Indian States has existed by their being bound to the Crown by treaties, engagements, *sanads*, usage and political practice. In great measure "Paramount Power", which is in itself an expression of fact rather than of a constitutional creation, exercises authority through Acts of State not cognisable in any court either in British India or in Great Britain. By virtue of the intention of this Power to withdraw, and of the declared wish of the Chamber of Princes that the Indian States desire both to see a self-governing India established and to participate in its structure, relationships between the Crown and the Rulers will automatically lapse by mutual consent. Were there any individual dissentient the situation would be the same in that the British authority simply releases the Ruler concerned from his obli-

gations since it is no longer available to fulfil its own undertakings. Thus, while in theory complete sovereign independence will be restored to the States, in practice both individually and collectively they will have to come to terms with the new predominating power in the sub-continent, namely, the Government of the Indian Union. There they start from scratch, without "treaties, engagements, *sanads*, usages and political "practice" to govern their relationships. Nor does any further question arise of Rulers'—or even a proportion of Rulers'—willingness or otherwise to join in the Union affecting that self-governing Union's establishment. The States can either negotiate their position in the fabric as a whole, thus becoming part and parcel of the paramount power in India or seek, if anyone of them is so minded, an independent existence without any assurance of any kind of protection, political, economic or personal.

Happily it is clear that the majority of Indian Rulers are fully alive to the position and are more than ready to negotiate with the Constituent Assembly of British India on a basis of active partnership. It is to be hoped, however, that Their Highnesses will lose no time in implementing the sound advice offered by the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy, particularly in respect of their internal affairs. They have everything to gain by early rather than belated participation in the constituent machinery which it is proposed to establish. Indeed it may well be to the advantage of most, if not all, of the States as well as of British India that appropriate States should join in the Group machinery envisaged, as well as at the Centre. In their own interests, therefore, the Negotiating Committee recommended in the British constitutional proposals should reach an understanding enabling representative spokesmen of the Indian States to join the Constituent Assembly as soon as possible. The longer the States operate as a separate element the weaker will their negotiating position become.

The Times of India

THE MONTH OF DECISION

Political Famine Must End

Hope is unanimous that this month of June will at long last prove decisive for India. As the dry soil awaits the refreshment of the monsoon rains, so a politically parched people eagerly looks forward to the nourishment of speedy constitutional growth. Future history and immediate events will not forgive further resort to dilatory gerrymandering with a straightforward programme which merely awaits action. Hopes are high, and fortunately have never had better cause so to be. The reactions of the main political parties to the compromise plan evolved from the tripartite discussions in Simla were natural criticisms from the respective points of view of a scheme which sought to meet and thus bring together each side. Nevertheless, to the credit of each goes the spirit of their statements which, while deprecating certain aspects of the British proposals, displayed a forthright recognition of their sincerity and general appreciation of their aim and conception. Following on the conciliatory tone of party comment, there is general expectation of acceptance and thus of the country's political life settling down to the purposeful and constructive work which is so pre-eminently the material and spiritual need of the hour.

NO TIME TO LOSE

The leaders will disappoint that eager expectation and reject the opportunity of co-operative effort at the peril not only of the country but of themselves. An over-heated political atmosphere stimulated to high pressure by the prospect within reach offers no other alternatives than advance or disaster. Whetted by the vision of planned relief from political famine the public appetite will not be gainsaid. Any further prolongation of man-made starvation will stretch a considerable

patience to that breaking point where the godowns of ordered progress will be stormed to the ultimate stultification of political freedom and economic advance. It is against that background that the great political parties have now finally to consider their attitudes and their actions. There is no time to be lost. Before the present month is past the country expects not only an interim Executive Council to assume the responsibilities of Central Government, but also a Delhi directive calling upon the Provincial Governments and Legislatures to move in the matter of electing the requisite Constituent Assembly. Further obstinate disputation on details can but revitalise that atmosphere of mutual suspicion so conspicuously and so creditably reduced. Never before in recent years has Indian statesmanship been offered so sublime an opportunity to relegate the voice of prejudice to the background and to create a new sense of mutual confidence which, if carefully cherished, can miraculously disperse those misgivings which still persist and which are responsible for the residue of controversy.

POINTS IN DISPUTE

It is obvious that the remaining points of argument are rooted in a degree of distrust inconsistent with the remarkable and most praiseworthy spirit of substantial concession palpable during the Simla discussions. On the issue of grouping quite unnecessary fears are entertained and propagated. There is an apparent but surely uncalled for suspicion that somehow the majority in the north-eastern and north-western groups might seek so to devise the group and provincial constitutions and franchise of their areas as to deny a truly representative expression of opinion in new elections and therefore to vitiate the power granted to a province to opt out of the group after the first general election under the new constitution. Here is an outstanding example of a provision in the framework of the Mission's scheme which, if a spirit of mutual accommodation is present among and encouraged by

party leaders, can be varied by the All-India Constituent Assembly when it meets. Mr. Jinnah himself in his Simla correspondence suggested that the question of a province's desire to opt out could be settled by a referendum. This in itself and the Cabinet Mission's interpretation of the group proposals are consistent with the Congress Party's own original conception of the constitution of the Indian Union, whereby it was proposed that only after the constitution of a United India had been settled, and not before, should any area or province be given the self-determining opportunity to opt out through the medium of a referendum. In other words, this matter of grouping can be safely left to the Assembly itself, and the chance the idea offers of evolving Indian constitutional life on truly political rather than communal lines is obvious if the right spirit is forthcoming.

INTERIM PROBLEM

Nothing can do more to promote the emergence of that spirit than the composition and policy of the Interim Government being agreeable to all from the outset, so that its successful operation can stimulate a new feeling of trust and confidence. It is not the letter of the constitutional plan so much as the manner of human approach to its development which will matter in the long run. It must therefore be obvious that unless the problem of Interim Government is approached with the same practical instinct for mutual accommodation as inspires the general opinion favouring acceptance of the Mission's plan, much if not all of the invaluable contribution to understanding will be lost. With luck, helped along by a substantial portion of goodwill and community of purpose, the new constitutional arrangements can be hammered out in a comparatively short period. It has, however, to be recognised that there are many complicated issues—complicated in technical detail, apart from party predilections—which will require settlement by the constituent bodies of the Union and Groups. Some time may perforce have to elapse before the full self-governing

machine is ready for operation. Nothing could be more dangerous in the meantime than the establishment of what will be a 99 per cent. self-governing administration on lines in direct contra-distinction to the new constitution ultimately envisaged. It would be as flagrantly inconsistent for any party to claim a right of separate concurrence amounting to a sort of veto in matters which it is accepted will ultimately pertain to the Indian Union, as it would be for any section to demand what would in practice be the power to do anything it liked without regard to future decentralisation of responsibilities.

The world watches to see whether Indian leadership can rise to its opportunities. Acceptance of the Plan and of Central responsibility is not the end but the beginning. To Indian hands and minds will be given the task of straightening out the intrinsic, frustrating tangles of political, communal and social fears. Together majorities and minorities alike can contribute mutually to the construction of a way of life which in action will in course of time eradicate those discrepancies which confuse the normal contours of democratic ideas. Yet this can only be done if political leadership itself ceases to think in terms of the divine rectitude of majorities or of perpetual political separatism for minorities.

The Times of India

Monday, June 3, 1946

INDIAN POLITICAL NOTES

Estimate Of Cabinet Mission's Work

By "CANDIDUS"

WITH the departure of the British Ministers from India the time is appropriate for an analysis of what they have achieved and have failed to achieve and an estimate of what is likely to happen. Everyone knows that the Cabinet Mission has evolved a formula for the future Indian constitution which has met with the approval of the two major parties, though with reservations, and indeed of the bulk of the country excepting the Sikhs. Similarly it is known that in regard to the second part of their task, namely, the formation of a coalition Government at the centre for the interim period, they have achieved only partial success, if that, for one of the two protagonists has accepted their proposals so that the effort has to be made all over again.

MISSION'S OBJECTIVE

People's estimate of the mission as a whole has therefore varied according to their notion of the Ministers' objective. Thus, those who regard the present as but a temporary phase and anticipate an early resumption of the effort, compliment the Mission on their "success", while those who think that the interim machinery is a vital section of the whole scheme and apprehend that the success of the long-term plan may be imperilled by immediate difficulties contend that the mission has been a "failure".

The truth lies, however, in between these two extreme viewpoints. Undoubtedly the Ministers and the Viceroy have every reason to congratulate themselves on bringing the two hostile parties so closely together that a small step was sufficient to bridge the outstanding differences. One has only to recall what happened in Bombay in the autumn of 1944 at the time of the Gandhi-Jinnah negotiations to realise the enormous size of the task that confronted the Mission. While the League leader insisted that the acceptance of the principle of Pakistan was the condition pre-requisite to further negotiations, the Congress leader refused to concede the two-nations theory on which the League's claim was based. The Mission was faced with a neat problem in which Mr. Jinnah would not contemplate a common centre either for the future constitution or for the immediate Government and the Congress would not think in terms of a division of the country. It is against this background that the Mission's achievement has to be judged.

OPPOSITE VIEWS

With two sets of publicists holding diametrically opposite views, the solution had to be a compromise. While it denied Pakistan to the League, it gave the Muslims sufficient scope to get together and protect their interests from Hindu domination which was the fear underlying the Pakistan demand. Similarly, it contemplated a joint centre for all-India but with attenuated powers. Another example of the spirit of compromise is to be found in the disappearance of the existing weightage to minorities, coupled with the assurance that the consent of the majority of the community concerned is essential for the adoption of measures involving a major communal issue. That the long-term plan proposed by the Mission has been accepted by both Congress and the League is a tribute alike to their statesmanship and to the patience and diplomatic skill of the Cabinet Ministers. Truly may the Labour Government claim credit for "solving the insoluble"—they have found a way out of the impasse which has blocked political progress for years.

One would have expected that the spirit which brought about a long-term settlement would lead to an understanding for interim purposes. A multiplicity of factors contributed to the failure of the Mission to achieve similar success in the immediate problem. In the first place, Mr. Jinnah did not call a meeting of his committee until nearly three weeks after the publication of the Mission's first statement. In the second, the Mission became inexplicably lukewarm in regard to the negotiations for an interim settlement; the drive and vigour which the Mission displayed in the first six weeks were not to be seen in the latter part of their stay here. Thirdly, these negotiations did not appear to have had the benefit of years of Parliamentary training and experience of handling high policies and delicate issues which the Cabinet Mission brought to bear on the earlier negotiations.

VICEROY'S PURVIEW

The interim arrangements were left solely to the Viceroy, evidently because it fell within his purview and after all it is he that has to run the administration in future months if not years. True, the Ministers were available for constant consultation, but theirs was not the initiative. It was not until they saw that there was danger even to the long-term plan that they stepped in; but it was

trifle too late.

It avails little to traverse the tortuous and painful course of the second set of negotiations, to ascertain the causes of their failure and to apportion blame. Suffice it to record the fact that with the refusal of one of the parties to come in there could be no coalition government. As the Mission throughout endeavoured to bring the two principal parties into their scheme of settlement, short-term as well as long-term plan, it cannot be gainsaid that they have failed in respect of the short-term plan—failed that is, for the present. They have declared that the effort will be renewed after a few weeks. The negotiations will obviously have to be resumed because no one will contemplate with equanimity the prospect of a purely official government at the centre for a length of time. Exactly when, how, by whom, and on what basis the negotiations will be conducted is not clear at the moment. The only available indication is that they may be undertaken somewhere about the end of this month after the completion of the elections to the constituent assembly.

GOOD HEALER

Apparently irreconcilable differences were reconciled for long-term purposes, but differences like parity, veto, and the right to represent Muslims have wrecked the short-term plan. Clearly there was no use making a second attempt immediately after the failure of the first. Time may prove a good healer. Whatever may be the basis of the next series of negotiations it is clear that they have to satisfy the majority and at the same time not to ride rough-shod over the minority. That was the spirit underlying Mr. Attlee's statement in the Commons. Nothing has happened since to suggest a deviation from it. The inference is therefore legitimate that future negotiations will be informed by the same spirit.

' The Times of India '

Wednesday, July 3, 1946

CONGRESS AND MUSLIMS

Appeal To The League

Critical decisions, bound to exercise a profound influence on India's immediate future, are being taken by the Congress Working Committee at Wardha. For we are definitely at a crossroads where an unwise step may have very serious consequences. Newspaper comments reveal that public opinion abroad, and particularly in Great Britain, is keenly alive to the fateful character of the next few weeks. Experienced observers in India are no less apprehensive. The whole problem of Hindu-Muslim relations, of this country's peaceful progress to freedom, is again in the melting pot. Nothing illustrates the stark tragedy of that event more clearly than the desperate and prolonged efforts by which the British Cabinet Mission got the two parties to accept an agreed procedure. Even if agreement was only partial, it represented a distinct achievement by providing a basis for self-determination which—clumsy though it might appear—at least went a long way to satisfy the aspirations of both India's major communities. The Muslim League's Bombay decision leaves the Mission's whole scheme in the air, and we have arrived at the strange position wherein each party has accepted that half of the plan which the other rejects. Not only so, but—what is far graver—the relations between the two communities have deteriorated to an alarming extent. Taking a leaf out of the Congress book, the League has threatened for the first time to adopt law-breaking as a means to achieve its ends and, in the words of its President, holds a pistol in its hand.

LEAGUE'S CHARGE

All this is very depressing, but there are bright gleams in the darkness. The League's *volte face* in Bombay whereby it rejected the Mission's plan for the Constituent Assembly was based on two factors. The first was a protest against the refusal of the Mission and the Viceroy to proceed immediately with the formation of an Interim Government disregard for its fundamental principles.

A WISE STEP

Happily the Congress has seen the wisdom of this course. On Saturday the Working Committee passed a resolution making it clear that while the Congress does not approve of all the proposals contained in the State Paper, it accepts the scheme "in its entirety". On the vexed question of grouping of provinces, the resolution refers to the "inconsistency" in the Mission's plan, but proceeds "The question of interpretations will be decided by the procedure laid down in the statement itself and the Congress will advise its representatives in the Constituent Assembly to function accordingly." It is obvious from this pledge that the Congress will not use its over-all majority in the Assembly to upset the grouping arrangement against the wishes of the League. So also with regard to another hurdle from the Congress point of view, the problem of sovereignty. The resolution says that despite Congress views "the Assembly will naturally function within the internal limitations which are inherent in its task, and will further seek the largest measure of co-operation in drawing up the constitution of free India, allowing the greatest measure of freedom and protection for all just claims and interests." Finally the resolution appeals to the Muslim League and all others concerned to join in the great task which faces the country.

UNEQUIVOCAL

The Congress is to be warmly congratulated on so forthright and unequivocal a statement of its attitude. There will be widespread agreement that so far as clarity is concerned the resolution leaves nothing to be desired, and that the Working Committee has made the *amende honorable* for the ill-advised utterances of Congress spokesmen after the official A. I. C. C. acceptance of the scheme. The Muslim League has no longer any excuse for rejecting the long-term plan on the grounds that the Congress does not accept "any of the terms or the fundamentals of the scheme", and that the Congress is going into the Constituent Assembly to take "such decisions as it may think proper in total disregard of the terms and the basis on which it is to set up." Moreover, the League cannot very well ignore the direct appeal by the Congress, at the end of the Wardha resolution, for co-operation in the wider interests of the country.

INTERIM GOVT.

So far so good. There remains the problem of the Interim Government, on the subject of which the League's resentment is directed mainly against the British Cabinet Mission. We have always taken the view that the short-term arrangement is an integral part of the Mission's scheme, and that it would be difficult—if not impossible—to proceed successfully with one half of the plan while holding up the other indefinitely. In justice to the Mission and the Viceroy, it must be allowed that whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the Mission's interpretation of the State Paper of June 16, it was never the Mission's intention to abandon the formation of an Interim Government after Congress rejection of the formula. As Lord Wavell pointed out at the time, all that happened was that the project was postponed until a more favourable chance occurred. Indeed, although no official confirmation is forthcoming, there is evidence that recently His Excellency addressed letters to the Presidents of both the Congress and the Muslim League on the subject. It is a safe assumption that the fresh efforts which the Viceroy promised in June are now under way.

STATESMANSHIP

Here, then, is a golden opportunity for both sides to reconsider their position. The Congress has opened the way for the League to withdraw its second thoughts on the long-term plan; the Working Committee has in effect solemnly declared its intention to adhere to the provisions of the State Paper and its wish to adopt strictly constitutional methods in the Constituent Assembly. With the air thus cleared so far as the Constituent Assembly is concerned, there is room for similar statesmanship and magnanimity on the subject of the short-term proposals. Apart from the fact that the Mission's scheme is an integral whole, the difficulty of running the Central Administration with the present Caretaker Government at so critical a period in India's post-war reconstruction is glaringly obvious. We therefore trust that Lord Wavell will press on vigorously with his efforts to set up an Interim Government, and that he will receive the fullest assistance from both the Congress and the League.

The Times of India

Interim Government Formation

By "CANDIDUS"

EVENTS have moved in quick succession since the Viceroy's invitation to the Congress to make proposals for the immediate formation of an Interim Government and Pandit Nehru's acceptance thereof. Although the new Government has not yet been constituted, it seems fairly certain that the present care-taker regime at the Centre will be replaced before long. Considering the drastic change involved, the progress already made must be held to be gratifying.

On the morrow of the offer and acceptance of the invitation the Congress President wrote to Mr. Jinnah seeking the latter's co-operation in the task of forming a popular administration at the Centre.

LETTERS EXCHANGED

After a quick exchange of letters in a matter of hours, the Presidents of the two major political parties met in Bombay, but the approach proved infructuous. The Congress President thereupon proceeded to Delhi where he is holding consultations with his colleagues for the formation of proposals to be submitted to the Viceroy. As soon as they are presented to His Excellency the latter will obtain the approval of His Majesty's Government and then formally announce the change-over.

Everyone would naturally desire that the provisional machinery should be as broad-based as possible and should, therefore, be a coalition comprising the main political forces in the land. The British Cabinet Mission strove hard to bring this about. The parties, too, tried to adjust their respective claims, although mutual accommodation did not go far enough to produce their coalition. Even after the authorities, under the compulsion of circumstances, had thrown up the sponge, the Congress of its own bat attempted to secure the collaboration of the League. It was not forthcoming. Let us examine the recent course of events.

Ten days after the Congress rejection of the statement of June 16 relating to the Interim Government the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy announced that the plan of June 16 had lapsed but that after the completion of the elections to the Constituent Assembly the Viceroy would make fresh efforts to form an Interim Government representative of those who had accepted the long-term plan.

LEAGUE REJECTION

This obviously promised a new attempt at a coalition. While the Viceroy was contemplating a fresh approach to the problem, the League swore itself out of court by rejecting the long-term proposals. Under the terms of Paragraph 5 of the statement of June 16 the League, after its Bombay decisions, could not, technically at least, expect to be included in the interim arrangements. Even so the Congress, by its Wardha assurances, sought to create an opening for the League to revise its Bombay decisions and requalify for the Interim Government. Mr. Jinnah did not elect to avail himself of the opportunity.

Thereupon in fulfilment of Paragraph 8 of the statement of June 16 and of the Cabinet Mission's pledge of June 28, the Viceroy called upon the Congress to undertake the formation of a provisional Government. The formal abandonment of a coalition, implicit in this step, was inevitable since Mr. Jinnah's refusal to reconsider the position made it impossible for His Excellency the Viceroy to ask the League to join.

It was left to the Congress to do so if it chose. The Congress did. Mr. Jinnah again failed to respond. To his old inhibitions (Congress attitude to the long-term plan, Britain's "breach of faith" with the League, and "no truck with quislings") he added one more, namely, that he would not consider an offer from the Congress on the basis of the Viceroy's invitation to that organisation. The terms of this invitation are the direct outcome of the League Council's decision.

Even at this late stage, while the formulation of the Congress proposals for an Interim Government was under way, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad made yet another appeal to the League for co-operation. It evoked no response. Mr. Jinnah's latest statement, issued during the week-end, is interpreted as showing that the League leader has no desire to participate in the long-term or short-term plans. Indeed, reports from New Delhi suggest that Mr. Jinnah thus removed even the slender possibility of one more, and perhaps the last, appeal to him to join the Interim Government.

After all that has happened, especially after the rejection of the offer made by Pandit Nehru to Mr. Jinnah last week, the Congress leaders are averse to a reopening of the subject, leading to an indefinite postponement of the advent of the Interim Government.

JINNAH'S ATTITUDE

Nor could the Viceroy take a hand at this stage. Apart from the League's rejection of the State Paper of May 16, which automatically though technically excludes the League from the Interim machinery, His Excellency the Viceroy could not without Congress concurrence deviate from the terms of his invitation to the Congress President. At all events, the attitude displayed by Mr. Jinnah in his latest statement seemed to divest any such move of potential success.

Mention must also be made of the Calcutta horrors in this connection. Apart from the inhumanity and the insanity of it, the Calcutta rioting has had political repercussions in two directions, one Provincial and the other All-India. Comments of newspapers in the afflicted city mostly agree that the League Ministry in that Province, through acts of commission and omission, had made itself responsible for the shambles that Calcutta is today. The association of some Ministers with dangerous preachings, the declaration of a public holiday suggesting Governmental sympathy for the demonstrations, the failure to take precautionary measures, the abundant evidence that the course of the rioting affords of premeditation, and above all the inaction of authority till several hours after the start of the trouble—these and other circumstances have been cited as factors leading to the conclusion that the Ministry is culpable. A section of the press has demanded its dismissal, while another asks for a public inquiry into the whole affair including the action and inaction of the Ministry.

ALL-INDIA PLANE

On the all-India plane the consensus of opinion tends to hold the League organisation responsible for the orgy, especially because authoritative League spokesmen of the League have not been unequivocal in their insistence on non-violent and peaceful methods of demonstration on the "Direct Action" day. As for the Congress, its President has already spoken, indicating that Congressmen would not be browbeaten. Another Congress leader remarked, "We refuse to be bludgeoned by violence into surrender to unreasonable and impossible demands".

The Constitution of India

Wednesday, August 21, 1946

INDIAN POLITICAL NOTES

"Momentous Step Forward"

By "CANDIDES"

LAST week-end occurred an event of epochal significance in Indian history. The Viceroy announced the first free Indian Government. Doubtless it is provisional in character in that it will hold office during the interim period between now and the evolution of the permanent constitution of future India. Its scope and powers will, formally at least, be limited by the provisions of the existing Constitution Act. Nevertheless, in actual practice it will function in an unfettered manner like the Government of the Dominions until it is replaced by an executive formed under the constitution to be framed in the near future.

MUSLIM OPINION

It cannot in truth be said to be fully representative of the political forces in the country since the large majority of Muslim opinion, which owes allegiance to the Muslim League, is not reflected in the composition of the new Government. That is, indeed, a serious detraction from the value of the change. Yet, it cannot be gainsaid that the Interim Government represents about 75 per cent. of the country's population, the Muslim League being the only section unrepresented. As far as the Congress is concerned, it marks the culmination of the effort of more than a quarter of a century. There is reason to believe that the Congress views it as such; if it were a half-way house or partial reform the Congress would not have accepted it. Even as it is, the left-wing of the organisation is fulminating against what is described as "a climb down" and "reformist mentality." The critics constitute, however, a small minority within the Congress.

Official recognition of the character of the change is noticed in the text of the *communiqué* and in the wording of the Viceroy's broadcast. The *communiqué* refers to the exit of the members of the old Executive Council but speaks of the new administration not as a Council but as "the Interim Government". The Viceroy's broadcast employs the same terminology except when His Excellency says: "I welcome them to my Council". This is not without significance.

INTERIM GOVT.

The circumstances leading to, and attendant upon, the formation of the Interim Government have a considerable bearing on the importance of the development. Two months ago, the Viceroy abandoned the effort to form a Coalition Interim Government owing to the refusal of the Congress to come in on the basis of the statement of June 16. In reality the effort was only postponed for a few weeks. On the completion of the election to the Constituent Assembly, the Viceroy renewed his attempt and wrote to the Presidents of the Congress and the League repeating the offer of June 16—which had been accepted by the League—but with modifications calculated to overcome the objections which prompted the Congress to reject it. Within a week of the receipt of the renewed offer, Mr. Jinnah's League Council with-

drew its acceptance, of the interim proposals as well as the long-term plan. In view of the decision of the Cabinet and the Viceroy that the Interim Government would be formed so as to include those who had accepted the long-term scheme, as provided for in Paragraph 8 of the statement of June 16, the League by its Bombay decisions rendered itself ineligible for consideration and the Viceroy had no alternative but to go ahead with the Congress and others who subscribed to the statement of May 16. This he decided to do on August 8. Three days later His Excellency made a public announcement to that effect. In the next week the Congress President personally renewed the offer to work with the League. When that was turned down, the Congress proceeded to propose a Government without the League. After a week's discussion the personnel of the new Government was announced. Meanwhile, two incidents took place, the Calcutta carnage and its backwash in other cities and, secondly, the stabbing of Sir Shafa'at Ahmed Khan at Simla, which, if they are expressive of the League resentment at being left out of the Interim Government, also brought sharply to the notice of the League leadership the inflammatory potentialities of the hymn of hate accompanying direct action propaganda. This is evident from Leaguers' reactions.

In spite of the attempts made in certain League quarters to underestimate the value of the change brought about by the formation of the new Government, there is no denying the fact that it constitutes "a momentous step forward on India's road to freedom." In his letter to the Congress President dated May 30 the Viceroy assured the Congress that His Majesty's Government would treat the new Interim Government with the same close consultation and consideration as a Dominion Government, that they would give the Indian Government the greatest possible freedom in the exercise of the day to day administration of the country, that it was His Excellency's intention faithfully to carry out that undertaking and that "we shall be able to co-operate in a manner which will give Indians a sense of freedom from external control and will prepare for complete freedom as soon as the new constitution is made."

LIBERAL AIMS

He could not go farther because of the technical constitutional position and because "the most liberal intentions may be almost unrecognisable when they have to be expressed in a formal document." These words cannot but lead one to the conclusion that the new set-up will in every sense of the term be a free Provisional Government—form apart.

The Viceroy's broadcast following the announcement of the new Government may, from a superficial reading, seem to be a detraction from these sentiments and a departure from the position arising from the invitation to the Congress President to make proposals for the formation of the Interim Government; it is not so. The limitations on the powers

of the new Government or on the scope of the Constituent Assembly, mentioned by the Viceroy, like the invitation to the League, to reconsider its Bombay decisions, are there with the wholehearted concurrence of the Congress. This is evident from the fact that His Excellency discussed the broadcast with the Congress President before finalising it. Moreover, the content of the broadcast faithfully reflects the position of the Viceroy and the Congress, their intentions and hopes, as unfolded since July 22.

No one could have desired a Coalition Government with the League more fervently than the Viceroy or the Congress. More than one attempt has been made to secure this in recent weeks, more than once has the offer been turned down by Mr. Jinnah. The Viceroy's broadcast affords another hope.

LEAGUE REACTIONS

Reactions of League leaders, not excluding those of Mr. Jinnah, encourage hope. Responding to the manifest sincerity of the Viceroy, who had professedly spoken with the full concurrence of the Congress, and evidently prompted by heart-searching concerning the implications of Calcutta and Simla, some League leaders have urged a revision of League policy. Mr. Jinnah's latest statement, to my mind, is not unhelpful either. Its operative part seems to lie at the end where he says: "If the Viceroy's appeal is really sincere and if he is in earnest, he should translate it into concrete proposals by his deed and actions." Although it is difficult to understand what exactly Mr. Jinnah expects the Viceroy to do, the sentence quoted above indicates a readiness to re-examine the direct action attitude.

The Times of India

Wednesday, Aug. 28, 1946

INDIAN POLITICAL NOTES

National Government In Office

By "CANDIDUS"

INDIA'S first National Government has been installed in office and, as Mr. Gandhi remarks, "the door to *Purna swaraj* has at long last been opened." Even making allowances for the fact that the Muslim League is out of it and that a wave of inter-communal tension is sweeping over the country, the political significance of the change is immense. It is clearly the first step in the liquidation of British authority over India, an earnest of Britain's determination to quit India.

The process of transfer of power to Indian hands has yet to be gone through—it may take quite a while—but it has begun and there is no going back on it as far as Britain is concerned. This is amply proved by recent declarations and present deeds.

INDIAN TRUST

Two hundred years ago the flag followed the trade. Diplomacy as well as prowess of arms over a long number of years enabled the British commercial community to expand their authority from a few "islands" to the whole vast country. The Indian Empire or Trust, whichever way one looks at it, is now being relinquished. It took more than a century to build up suzerainty, but sixty years of growing political consciousness in India have brought about a state of affairs in which Britain deems it advisable to vacate in favour of the ward who has attained her majority.

International developments leading to a new world outlook no less than changes in the British ideology have doubtless contributed largely to what is happening in India today; but few will gainsay that Indians by their struggle and sacrifice have earned what they seem about to enjoy. The Congress at any rate has proved the motto engraved on the main stone archway entrance of the north block of the Secretariat buildings in New Delhi: "Liberty will not descend to a people. People must raise themselves to liberty. It's a blessing that must be earned before it can be enjoyed." The architect of the Secretariat building has proved prophetic.

Perhaps I have over emphasised the value of the step that has already been taken. There are bound to be many obstacles in the way of the complete removal of foreign rule over India.

MANY SLIPS

There may be many a slip between the cup and the lip as indeed there nearly were in the past five or six months. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that the step taken now is irrevocable. Britain surely means it, this time.

There are many reasons for this conclusion. The foremost of these is the translation into action of the pledges given by the British Ministers and the Viceroy in regard to the status and powers of the Government now installed at the Centre. Though legal requirements dictate that it should in name be "the Governor-General's Executive Council", it has been designated in Court circulars and in press statements issued with the authority of the Viceroy as "Interim Government."

I am in a position to say that, this is not a mere paper sop. The Viceroy is understood to have given categorical assurances to Pandit Nehru that His Excellency has every intention to let the Interim Government function as a Cabinet with joint responsibility. But for this Pandit Nehru clearly would not have made the announcement which he did in Delhi a few hours after assuming office.

It is also believed that in actual practice the Cabinet—whose members are being described by the All-India Radio as Ministers—will function as the Executive of a virtually free country, barring of course transitional limitations.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has voluntarily relinquished his high status and has agreed to be subordinate to an Indian Minister for Defence. The I.C.S. men will from today in practice as well as in theory be real servants of their Ministers and the public. They will have no direct access to the Governor-General over the heads of their departmental chiefs. The I.C.S. era has ended; the bureaucratic regime is a thing of the past. Provincial conventions will apply to the Centre; provincial autonomy has been capped by "Central autonomy" in preparation for the full freedom to come.

Constitutionally the Viceroy's veto remains, but it goes without saying that he would not like to upset the unanimous decisions of his Cabinet except in cases of glaring injustice of which the Cabinet, it can be expected, will take care not to be guilty.

BRITISH REALISM

On other occasions it is expected that the Governor-General will find it neither necessary nor expedient to invoke the veto for fear of a certain crisis. It speaks as much for British realism as for the strength of Indian opinion that this vast change has taken place in little more than a quarter of a century.

I said earlier in this article that there were recently many slips between the cup and the lip. There were indeed. Even during the last few days situations arose which might well have wrecked or at least long delayed the consummation witnessed this week. The Congress spokesman no less than the representative of British authority displayed a commendable spirit of accommodation.

The Congress during the past fifteen months has been singing a tune different from that of the past. It wants to build, to reconstruct, in the words of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. It has entered upon a new phase. The revolutionary fighting organisation, "the permanent opposition," has ceased to be. As usually happens on such occasions internal criticism grows; extremism becomes restive. Hence the value of the absorption in the Congress Executive of Mr. Jai Prakash Narain, leader of the Congress Socialist Party. With his proverbial shrewdness, Mr. Gandhi, who saw the wisdom of having this year a President with leftist tendencies, worked successfully to assimilate leftism.

LEAGUE ATTITUDE

No review of the present situation can be complete without taking note of the fact that the absence of the League from the picture constitutes, as correctly pointed out by Mr. Gandhi, a serious detraction. It affects not only the present but also the immediate future in which steps will have to be taken in fulfilment of what has just been begun. It is a tragedy no less for the country as a whole than for the League and the Muslims who owe allegiance to it. Appeals have been made by Lord Wavell, Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Nehru to the League to reconsider its decision to non-co-operate and to co-operate in the grand undertaking of building a free India. There is evidence that a section of the Muslim League itself desires a reorientation of policy. Mr. Jinnah remains adamant.

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Wednesday, Sept. 4, 1946

The Problem Of A New Age

Since the end of World War II people have, as on previous occasions, declared that steps must be taken to prevent any recurrence of that catastrophe. Sustained by public opinion, statesmen have sought to devise political and economic machinery on an international basis which will have the means, authority and, if need be, the military power to prevent resort to force in inter-State disputes. An organisation to this end has been constituted, but the search for means to make it effective still proceeds and must inevitably be prolonged. The freedom of the individual as represented by the sovereignty of the nation-state has still to be subordinated by consent in specified respects to a superior authority so nicely balanced as to avoid any untenable rigidity. Deadlock stems from the fantastic analogy on "democratic" lines which would give each nation the status of an individual with equal rights. The attempt to redress this fallacy by attributing special status and voting authority to the "Big Five" has had scant success because of the excessive weightage accorded to the right of veto. If understanding existed among the Great Powers, it is believed that a degree of practical harmony would prevail which would enable the United Nations Charter to work. For temporary purposes that is almost certainly true, but the responsibilities of power are themselves unchanging, and the lack of flexibility innate in the "sovereign nation" idea is as dangerous in the long run to the United Nations as it was to its ill-fated predecessor at Geneva.

BOLD THINKING

Small wonder that individual Governments, while leading their peoples in prayer for the victory of international organisation, feel in duty bound to avoid any neglect of national defence. Manning, equipping and organising defences today require a bold revolution of thought. Lessons are to be drawn from experience, both bitter and successful, in the great struggle so recently concluded, but of equal if not greater importance is shrewd and calculated anticipation of the shape of war to come, if come it must. At present a great deal of training and military effort is being spent on peace-time practice and the employment of methods and equipment which may well have little or no effective share in any battle of the future. This means a measure of expenditure which few countries can well afford on misdirected effort. That is, of course, unavoidable until there is something to take its place.

but it emphasises the urgency of re-organisation and of re-orientated ideas. War on a major scale has long ceased to be even mostly a military matter. While Frederick the Great of Prussia revolutionised many military ideas, Napoleon initiated the phase which led to military effort becoming a projection of the whole of a nation's life. There must, of course, be some differentiation between

tary sense and national defence against serious aggression. It is obviously out of the question for any single nation nowadays to maintain in being all the forces and paraphernalia which might be necessary to defence against a mortal threat. Governments can only think in terms of a basic organisation and all-over potential capable of being mobilised in the shortest possible time. At root, therefore, security is dependent on the capacity of the people and on the economic, scientific and industrial resources which can be switched from peace to the support of war.

INTEGRATION

In an interesting article on this page, Lt.-General Martin discusses Britain's defence organisation of the future. He explains how the devastating development of new weapons means that in any future conflict there will be no time for a country to develop its war potential "after the flag has fallen", as Britain and the Commonwealth have managed at great cost to do in the past. It follows that a country's chances are dependent on its ability to absorb without breaking the savagery of sudden attack, to strike back, and eventually to follow up with a counter-offensive. Hopes are, of course, pinned on some form of international control, preventing the use of discoveries like the atom bomb as instruments of destruction. But none can afford to forget that, although gas was outlawed by common consent after the first Great War, no nation was so confident as not to provide for defence against gas warfare and even to develop that instrument in case it was required for reprisal. Clearly account has to be taken of weapons like the atom bomb until some superior power is effectively established to make its employment out of the question. Not only does this change the whole face of future warfare, but in terms of budgetary considerations makes it inevitable that so long as complete confidence cannot be reposed in a global international organisation like the United Nations, certain States must, in their inter-dependence for security, combine to inter-lock their plans for defence. The resulting integration will not be confined merely to a suitable balance of collective military force but will have to comprehend the organis-

ation of supply, of food and of all resources and their distribution in any contingency.

It follows automatically that the strength of a defence system will depend on the efficiency of its organisation and on the capacity of the peoples involved to make the best use of their mutual resources should the need arise. Fortunately recognition of these facts is already receiving practical attention. The last war gave most striking proof of quality's growing superiority over quantity. Manpower in a numerical sense has an importance today only directly relative to its mental as well as physical qualities. A new conception has developed in regard both to military organisation and military life. Under the leadership of Lord Montgomery, the new Chief of the General Staff, the way of life of the ordinary soldier is being revolutionised to free him from the narrowing inhibitions of undue discipline and make him at the same time an intelligent and self-respecting expert in what has become a highly technical profession of the greatest importance to the community. The vital problem of leadership is being tackled by the reorganisation of institutions like Sandhurst, enabling them to draw from the best material available in any strata of the nation, and providing an education and training calculated to produce officers of broad and comprehensive education.

IN INDIA

The inspiration and initiative of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck have ensured that India has not been neglected in this all-important matter. Fortuitously, perhaps, but none the less fortunately, this country has on the military side the advantage of initial organisation on an Inter-Service basis. During and since the war Field Marshal Auchinleck has developed this on the very lines so strongly recommended by Lt.-General Martin, whereby for executive purposes the efforts of the three services are combined and co-ordinated under a supreme command. Further profit and improving on Western experience, there is being organised for India a national institution for the production of the type of leaders required. These are essential aspects of the grand strategy which India's administrators must seek to promote. The country, its future security, and the contribution it can make to any Commonwealth or international system will depend on the extent to which general education, health, nutrition and specialisation are scientifically organised to get the best out of the enormous popu-

COALITION AT THE CENTRE

All doubts about the Muslim League's intentions are removed by the official announcement from New Delhi that five of the League's nominees have been added to the Interim Government. India thus has for the first time a truly National Government, based on the support of our major political parties. That is a tremendous achievement, for which credit must be given firstly to the British Cabinet Mission, and secondly to the untiring perseverance of Lord Wavell. The only hurdle which remains to be surmounted is the allocation of portfolios, but presumably there must have been some general agreement on this subject between the Viceroy, Mr. Jinnah and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru before the *personnel* of the new Government was announced. It is, of course, most unfortunate that nothing came of the direct negotiations between Mr. Jinnah and the Congress leaders at the instance of His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal. Had these fructified the two major parties would have entered the Interim Government in a spirit of friendship and mutual accommodation. As it is, the Muslim League is taking office in response to assurances which it received in the public utterances of both the Viceroy and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. In accepting these assurances the League has shown both wisdom and statesmanship, and it is sincerely to be hoped that Mr. Jinnah and his followers will have no cause to regret their action.

There will be general disappointment that Mr. Jinnah himself is not to become a member of the Interim Government. It is possible that, in view of the breakdown of direct negotiations with the Congress, considerations of prestige prevailed with him. His team of five members includes one surprise, namely, the nomination of a non-Muslim in the person of Mr. Jogendra Nath Mandal. Mr. Mandal is a member of the Scheduled Castes, which he has hitherto represented in the Muslim League Government of Bengal. Several reasons for Mr. Jinnah's unexpected choice have been mentioned by our special representative in New Delhi: the League's selection of a Scheduled Caste Hindu may be a counterblast to Congress insistence on a Nationalist Muslim, but it is more likely that

Mr. Jinnah had in mind the securing of support from a group which is opposed to the Congress. Mr. Jogendra Nath Mandal represents the Scheduled Castes Federation, of which Dr. Ambedkar is the leader, and he can therefore be regarded as a substitute for Dr. Ambedkar in the Central Government. Although Mr. Jinnah's motives in selecting Mr. Mandal may be political, it can at least be said that the Muslim League has dropped for the time being its rigid insistence on purely Muslim representation in the government of the country. In certain pro-Congress circles this is hailed as a welcome development.

Despite the lack of an amicable agreement, the setting up of a Coalition Interim Government is a matter for profound satisfaction. A vicious circle has been broken. The country, we trust, will gain a respite from the communal wrangles which were directly responsible for recent disturbances throughout India, including the Calcutta catastrophe. We do not believe Jeremiahs who allege that the League has entered the Interim Government for the purpose of wrecking it, for the simple reason that no movement of that kind can possibly succeed at this stage. The day for purely destructive efforts is past. On the contrary, we sincerely trust that the coming together of representatives of India's major political parties in a common administration will promote better mutual understanding, thereby paving the way for the ultimate friendly settlement of their differences. Now that a Congress-League Coalition Interim Government is in being, it is the duty of all members of the two parties to co-operate with each other. We hope that this co-operation will extend to provincial Governments, where much needless bitterness has been generated in the last few months.

The Times of India

Thursday, October 17, 1946

Sino-Indian Relations

With the announcement that India and China are to raise the status of their respective diplomatic missions to the rank of embassies, Sino-Indian relations achieve a new and closer link of friendship. It is expected that India and the United States will also enter shortly into full diplomatic relations. Although standing on the threshold of political freedom, India—in the strict language of constitutional usage—is not technically an independent Power, and the decision of the United States and China to appoint ambassadors to this country will be welcomed as a graceful compliment to the Interim Government. It is doubtful whether precedent exists for the exchange of ambassadors in similar circumstances.

Between India and China there subsist ancient ties going back to the seventh century when the Chinese traveller, Hsuien Tsang, first visited this country. This Eastern Marco Polo has left a remarkable record of his journeyings to and inside India, and two years ago Mr. K. P. S. Menon, whose name is mentioned as India's first ambassador to China, travelled overland from Srinagar to Chungking by a route which lay partly along the trail followed by Hsuien Tsang. India was drawn closer to China when in 1937 the Japanese attacked and ravaged that country; the bond was strengthened in the difficult years of the late war. There is therefore something peculiarly appropriate in the fact that China is the first country with whom India exchanges ambassadorial representatives.

Within the next few months, India's diplomatic relations, as Pandit Nehru foreshadowed in his first press conference as Vice-President of the Interim Government, will be considerably extended. Plans are under way to appoint Indian representatives in varying capacities in both Eastern and Western countries, and the creation of an Indian Foreign Service to man these diplomatic posts is among the new undertakings of the Interim Government. Inevitably these diplomatic ties buttressed by trade relationships, must in time profoundly affect the economy and international outlook of India. No country today can live in isolation, and India's wish to find recognition in the vast and variegated comity of nations is both a natural and desirable ambition.

The Times of India

Wednesday, Oct. 23, 1946.

INDIAN POLITICAL NOTES

Coalition Government At The Centre

By "CANDIDUS"

SINCE the last article of this series was written it has been officially announced that the Muslim League has decided to join the Interim Government and that its President has submitted the names of five persons to fill the quota allotted to it. This marks the consummation of the prolonged and untiring effort by His Excellency the Viceroy over a period of weeks. If not months. Indeed, it was begun by Lord Linlithgow during the war when he negotiated with the League President for the formation of an Executive Council representative of popular parties. It is an ideal sought after for many years by agents of British authority in India.

ONE HURDLE

Before the League's entry into the co-operative field of administration can become an accomplished fact, there is yet one more hurdle to be cleared, namely, the allocation of portfolios in a manner acceptable to those who are already in the Government and to the new entrants. Although this may constitute a potent source of dispute, which may conceivably imperil the eventuation of a coalition, I have taken the liberty of assuming that it will be smoothed over and that a satisfactory and equitable distribution of status and power will be effected.

Before analysing the circumstances in which the League has come in and attempting an estimate of the future it is just as well to note that Lord Wavell undertook to form a Congress-League Coalition Government at the Centre as far back as the end of May, not taking into account the effort made by him in the late summer of 1945. The skeleton of the Interim Government was the subject of a personal discussion between His Excellency and Mr. Jinnah even before the publication of the State Paper on May 16. After the announcement of the Cabinet delegation plans for India's constitutional future immediate as well as ultimate, Lord Wavell plunged into the Interim Government problem. During the period between May 16 and June 26, the Viceroy was the principal negotiator, the British Ministers remaining more or less in the background, although later they were constantly available for consultations. After the departure of the Cabinet delegation from India the burden fell entirely on His Excellency's shoulders.

VICEROY'S POLICY

For nearly a month after the Cabinet Ministers' departure, the Viceroy leaned back partly with a view to letting time heal the wound caused by the breakdown of the June negotiations and partly to enable the elections to the Constituent Assembly to be completed in an undisturbed atmosphere. On July 22 His Excellency picked up the threads where they had snapped on June 26 and wrote identical letters to the Presidents of the Congress and the League inviting them to coalesce into a national Government at the Centre for

the interim period till the evolution of the country's future constitution on the lines laid down in the State Paper. Pandit Nehru responded and discussed details with His Excellency in person. Mr. Jinnah on the other hand considered the offer worse than that made in the preceding month. The League's answer to the invitation of July 22 was the decision taken by its Council a week later in Bombay to boycott not only the Interim Government but also the Constituent Assembly.

For the third time a Congress-League coalition had eluded Lord Wavell. In the atmosphere generated by the League Council meeting Mr. Jinnah could hardly consider a fresh approach at that stage and as the League had disqualified itself from consideration for inclusion in the Interim Government, whose formation was an urgent preliminary to the implementation of the Mission's scheme, Lord Wavell proceeded to invite the Congress to assist him in the formation of an Interim Government.

Even at this stage Lord Wavell expressed the hope that the Congress would make a direct approach to the League with a view to securing its co-operation, but His Excellency obviously could not make the invitation to the Congress conditional on such a step. The Congress made the approach but failed. Once again, during discussions relating to the personnel of the one-party Government, the Viceroy is known to have attempted to make others as convinced as he was that a smooth transfer of power was no possible without such a coalition.

Repeated failures did not, however, deter the Viceroy from trying once again. Report has it that it was at Lord Wavell's instance that Pandit Nehru made the now famous broadcast of September 7, declaring that the Congress was willing to enter the sections stipulated in the State Paper. This reassurance, coupled with his own broadcast appeal to the League a fortnight earlier, was designed to induce the League to reconsider its attitude. The appeal was unavailing; but Lord Wavell persevered.

JINNAH INVITED

A couple of weeks later, His Excellency persuaded the Vice-President of his Cabinet to concur in the issue of an invitation to Mr. Jinnah for a personal discussion. The League leader arrived in Delhi in the middle of last month. The past month's negotiations with Mr. Jinnah on the one hand and the Viceroy and the Congress on the other are too recent to require recapitulation. Exactly one month after Mr. Jinnah's arrival in Delhi, the Viceroy was able to announce the League's eventual decision to join the Interim Government. Few will grudge Lord Wavell the mead of tribute that is his due for the perseverance, patience and tact which he has all along shown.

So tortuous have been the negotiations and so many have been the failures of the past that pessimists ask

with plausible suspicion: "Will the coalition work?" "How long will it last?" and "How can it work in face of the League's sullen approach?" Unfortunately the pessimists have been supported by certain remarks made by League spokesmen of no mean standing.

It must, however, be said in fairness to the new League members that they cannot be expected to be altogether happy and to exude goodwill in the circumstances in which the League has entered the Government and especially after the failure of the negotiations with the Congress. Leaguers contend that they have every right to work for Pakistan from within the Government. Making allowances for expressions of party ideologies, one can only express the hope that the mutual understanding and sympathy that are bound to be generated by day to day handling of administrative problems, will eventually dissolve the asperities between the two, if not lay the foundations of lasting concord.

LEAGUE'S QUOTA

Mention must be made in this review of the inclusion of a representative of the Scheduled Castes in the League's quota. This is a bold stroke on the part of Mr. Jinnah which has been attributed to various motives by various people. At its best it is a good sign in as much as it throws open the door of the League to non-Muslims and, by changing its present exclusive communal character, makes it a non-communal body and shows the beginnings of a move to establish a political party comprising minorities. At its worst it is an act of spite against the Congress which has been claiming to represent the minorities, particularly the Scheduled Caste. Maybe it is an answer to the Congress claim to represent a section of the Muslim community. At all events, it is a bid on the part of Mr. Jinnah to secure the support of Scheduled Caste votes in the C Section in the Constituent Assembly.

'The Times of India'

Wednesday, Oct. 23, 1946

INDIAN POLITICAL NOTES

Central Coalition Cabinet At Work

By "CANDIDUS"

RESCUED from what appeared to be certain failure, a Coalition Government has been installed at the Centre. Not until the actual swearing in ceremony did one feel sure of it. The manner of its functioning since it was born, no less than the far-from-happy circumstances of its birth, does not, to tell the truth, induce any high degree of optimism concerning its longevity or success. But then the important factor in such matters is TIME. Time can, and let us hope will, heal the many wounds in the body politic. Indeed, it has been the opinion of more than one British statesman that the Hindu-Muslim or Congress-League problem can be solved only by the two coming together.

REMEDIES TRIED

Lord Linlithgow and more particularly Lord Wavell have worked on the assumption that there is little prospect of the two getting together unless they are thrown together and that theoretical agreements and paper formulae will avail little unless the two parties get down to work. Paradoxical though it may seem, "Dr." Wavell has steadfastly adhered to the diagnosis that the malady which prevents the two from coalescing can be cured by their meeting somehow in some serious joint effort. He tried many a remedy including the faith cure but to no purpose. Eventually he decided on the policy that underlay the Simla Conference of 1945, namely, to give them both a job of work to do. The same policy has inspired the many attempts made since then to bring them on one platform, in one conference, into one Government. Now that he has succeeded, his recipe will start working.

The initial reactions may not be, indeed are not, favourable; but let the remedy work for a while. The prognosis is unfortunately not very encouraging; yet the curative process just begun must have a fair trial.

While hoping for the best, one cannot shut one's eyes to what has just happened and what is still happening. Three broad issues were involved in the negotiations that preceded the reconstruction of the Cabinet. A fourth factor, namely, the attitude of the new entrants and the old team towards each other, though governed by predetermining causes, belongs to the period after the establishment of the new Government and will therefore have to be dealt with separately.

THREE ISSUES

The three issues are, first, the character and method of work of the Interim Government, secondly, the League's attitude to the long-term plan, and, thirdly, the allocation of portfolios. All three provided a headache, particularly the last which precipitated a crisis.

The first of these covers a wide field and involves principles on which both the Congress and the League hold strong views. According to the Congress conception, the new Government should be and is the provisional national Government of free India functioning without let or hindrance from the Governor-General or any other agency pending the final determination of the future constitution. Towards this end it sought progressively, though symbolically, to eliminate the Governor-General. Under the Constitution Act he remains and can exercise the functions of his office; but in actual fact he does not interfere with the Government in its day-to-day work. The members of the Government have, generally speaking, a free hand. His Excellency does not nowadays preside over the Co-ordination Committee of the Cabinet, which is a kind of Inner Cabinet. The practice of the Secretaries of Government having direct access to the

Governor-General has been allowed to lapse, so that in administrative matters the Ministers are the final authority for the Services except in regard to Service conditions and that too only for the present. All matters of policy and execution alike are determined by the Cabinet with the Governor-General formally approving of them.

The League dislikes these developments for both ideological and practical reasons. In principle it objects to the establishment of one Centre with unlimited powers even though it may be of temporary duration. That is why it has asked for the retention of the Viceroyal veto. Then again, the League is reluctant to let the Congress dominate over such a Government. Indeed, it is this consideration that impelled the League Working Committee to enter the Interim Government. The League is convinced that "it will be fatal to leave the entire field of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the Congress". Thus the League's entry is designed to prevent the Congress from having a free run of the Central Government and from consolidating the position created by the formation of Government under one-party leadership on September 2.

CABINET MEETINGS

The preservation of joint responsibility, as all this was cryptically called, therefore formed one of the principal points of controversy during the past few weeks' negotiations. Homogeneity could not be produced to order, and Lord Wavell contented himself with the suggestions that differences be "resolved in advance of Cabinet meetings by friendly discussions." The obvious meaning is that he had no objection to the daily Informal Cabinet meetings, expected the new-comers to go through a process of mutual adjustment and looked forward to smooth working of the Coalition as a united team. He is reported to have said as much at the inaugural meeting of the full Cabinet. This disposes of joint responsibility and explains the remarks of Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan at Saturday's press conference potentially fruitful of friction between the groups holding different views.

The second issue is the Constituent Assembly. Throughout recent negotiations the League President has studiously avoided committing himself in this behalf until after the settlement of the Interim Government controversy. This is evident from his correspondence with both Pandit Nehru and Lord Wavell. Even so he has stated that the League enters the Interim Government in terms of the Viceroy's broadcast and of Lord Wavell's letters of October 4 and 12, the latter of which stipulates that "the basis for participation in the Cabinet is, of course, the acceptance of the statement of May 16" and assumes that "the League Council will be called at a very early date to reconsider its Bombay resolution". Having accepted these conditions, Mr. Jinnah clearly accepts the long-term plan.

Enough has been said in reports in the daily press about the portfolios, and it is not necessary to dilate on this issue further. The Congress refusal to surrender certain specified portfolios derives from suspicions of the League's intentions in regard to the working of the Government. The Congress carried it nearly to breaking point. The question was asked to be referred to the British Government. In effect the Congress was prepared to be dismissed from office. The Viceroy did not allow it to break and gave a decision which Mr. Jinnah accepted.

UNHEALED WOUNDS

Since the re-formation of the Cabinet certain incidents have occurred which militate against the early realisation of the hope of smooth working. Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan has so far persistently repelled Pandit Nehru's approaches for joint prior consultations. The League Member refused first to attend a meeting of Ministers at Pandit Nehru's residence and later to participate in a conference of Ministers at the Viceroy's office in the Council House an hour before the re-opening of the Assembly session on Monday. The behaviour of the members of the two groups is not yet spontaneously cordial. The Assembly discussion on adjournment motions relating to communal disturbances revealed unhealed wounds. The present is not encouraging. Let us hope the future holds promise.

The Times of India

Wednesday, Oct. 30, 1946

Preparations For Division?

By "CANDIDUS."

ALTHOUGH Lord Mountbatten does not yet appear to have finalised his conclusions on the process of transfer, there are indications that he has reached tentative decisions. Their outline and character are the subject of considerable speculation. His Excellency may or may not have given an inkling of his mind to the leaders who met him repeatedly during the past month and more. In any case it may legitimately be assumed that the leaders who have met him repeatedly, and for long periods of time, must have acquired sufficient insight into his mind to know the trends of his thought. There is a variety of evidence in support of the theory that a division of some kind is regarded as inevitable; at any rate, present preparations seem to proceed on that basis.

PLAYING FAIR

The foremost of these factors is Mr. Jinnah's declaration that "as a result of my talk I feel that the Viceroy is determined to play fair." The League President is not ordinarily lavish with his praise, especially of British intentions. It is significant that in the present instance he should have paid an advance tribute to the fairness of the Viceroy. This leads one to believe that he must have obtained some assurance from Lord Mountbatten. True, Mr. Jinnah's remark, quoted above, was made with particular reference to the situation in the North-West Frontier Province. Even so, it has a bearing on the all-India issue. The League-Frontier agitation is clearly designed to overthrow the present Congress Ministry in order that the province may have Leaguers at the helm at the time of the change-over on the assumption that power would be transferred to the then existing Government.

Lord Mountbatten's visit to the Frontier is intended to enable him to study conditions at first hand and assess the claims of the contending parties. The recent conference in Delhi between the Viceroy, the Governor and Premier of the Frontier Province and Pandit Nehru, and the concessions announced by the provincial Governments have all to be regarded in this context. The village to village and house to house tour contemplated by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan has also a political and constitutional significance. For aught one knows it may be a preliminary election campaign. Fresh elections, if held, will doubtless determine not only the complexion of the provincial Government but also whether the country of the Pathans will go with Pakistan or Hindustan.

LAST EFFORT

Events and utterances relating to the Frontier are by no means the only indication of the shape of the future. Reports from Delhi suggest the possibility of an early round table conference. If it materialises, it may prove to be the last effort to reach an agreement on the process of transfer. It is evidently hoped that the demand for the division of the Punjab and Bengal which is daily growing in strength and with which Lord Mountbatten is said to be in sympathy, may cool Mr. Jinnah's ardour for Pakistan and induce him to return to the Cabinet Mission's scheme.

If there is no agreement before long, the Viceroy will have to reach his own independent decision, of course in consultation with, and with the approval of, His Majesty's Government. Since the march of events in India requires the conti-

nued presence of Lord Mountbatten, the consultation will be done through Lord Ismay who is leaving for London this week on "the first of these periodic visits." He may carry the Viceroy's tentative conclusions or merely the terms and conditions of the various Indian leaders. At all events, his departure in a couple of days suggests that the tortuous Indian drama is fast reaching a climax.

FINAL SCENE

Whether the final scene is enacted in pursuance of internal agreement or according to an "award" by His Majesty's Government or Lord Mountbatten does not affect the certainty of an early termination of suspense. The suspense relates, however, only to the finality of the thing. The pros and cons have been discussed threadbare. Every passing day confirms the fear that Mr. Jinnah has burnt his boats. Every move he has made from the League Council meeting of last July, barring perhaps the manner of the League's entry into the Interim Government, proves his determination not to have anything to do with one political machine for all-India.

The latest reports from the capital to the effect that Mr. Jinnah has agreed to unified defence machinery for the whole of India may well be a case of the exception proving the rule. That is to say, if it is true, it shows that in no other matter will he agree to share in joint machinery, although the possibility envisaged by a well known British weekly, namely, that the absence of a visible Pakistan may bring Mr. Jinnah back to the State Paper of May 16 last, cannot altogether be ruled out. The fact of the matter is that his Muslim following has been worked up to such a pitch that he will find it difficult to turn back even if he wants to.

DOMINION STATUS

The same applies to the Congress vis-a-vis Dominion Status. Major Woodrow Wyatt the other day expressed the hope that India might, at least for a few years more, rest content with Dominion Status. Even assuming that the present leadership of the Congress wishes to retain a form of connection with the Commonwealth—a few responsible Congress leaders have publicly expressed a wish to maintain friendly relationship with Britain—they will find it almost impossible to carry the Congress with them. The rank and file of Congressmen will not look at anything short of complete independence, just as the average Leaguer will insist on having a sovereign independent Muslim State.

That there may have to be a division of the country is realised in increasing measure by the Congress leadership too. But there is one essential difference in this regard between the Congress and the League. Whereas the League desires and hopes for a division on the basis of the existing provincial boundaries, the Congress insists that if there is to be a division, there should be a further division of two of the provinces. Indeed, there is a suggestion that even in the event of a united India materialising there should be a bifurcation of the administration of the present Punjab.

It is not necessary to discuss here the relative merits of the two demands, nor the motives underlying the Congress demand. What is important is that the Congress fears and is even preparing for a division. Congress leaders have for some time past been giving broad hints of this. The time schedule of the Constituent Assembly is being arranged in preparation for the expectation, or rather the fear, of a division of India.

'The Times of India'

Sunday, May 1, 1947

The Lessons Of Partition

A profound change has come over the Indian political scene as the result of the British Government's plan for the transfer of power. That the plan will result in a division of India seems inevitable, but that sequel will not accord with the wishes either of the Viceroy or of the British Government. Nobody realises this more clearly than Mr. Gandhi. At two of his prayer meetings last week Mr. Gandhi placed the blame for the partition of the country fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Indian political parties. On Friday, for example, he said there were still people who suspected the *bona fides* of the British, but it was not the British who were dividing India, since they claimed unity of rule as their greatest achievement. "The division was the result of an agreement, however reluctant, between the Congress and the League. He himself believed that the Viceroy was sincere." We stress these statements by Mr. Gandhi for the simple reason that unless the profound truth contained in them is recognised by Indians of all classes and creeds, there will be no end to the tragic misunderstandings which have led to the calamity of partition. Chief among these misunderstandings was the Congress belief that the Muslim League and all its works were creatures of the British, and would vanish into thin air as soon as British authority was withdrawn. Much of the bitter criticism levelled today against Congress leadership is justified, but it is easy for many critics to be wise after the event; had they brought proper influence to bear on the Congress leaders at the right time, the mistakes of the last decade might have been avoided. Partition is plainly due to a failure in the past correctly to diagnose the disease in the Indian body politic and to apply the correct remedy. Unless the Indian people and their leaders clearly recognise the true causes of the tragedy which has overtaken them, they can never hope to undo the evil of today.

CONSEQUENCES

The consequences, which must flow from partition may well dismay the stoutest heart. There is first and foremost the breaking up of the finest defence organisation in Asia and the best guarantee of peace in this part of the world—the

Indian Army. Here we have a machine which has been welded into a united whole despite its differences of caste and creed, a microcosm of the India of the future which most of us hoped to see. The protection of the natural land and sea frontiers of the sub-continent is so obviously the concern of the whole country that we can only hope the paramount need for a common and co-ordinated defence policy will be recognised. How else, it may be asked, can the problem of India's naval security be tackled. Then we have massive difficulties connected with the apportionment of the sterling debt due to India, and the division of customs, communications and economic assets, to mention only a few. There is only one justification for so drastic a surgical operation on a country which has been united throughout the long period of British rule, and that is that it will bring peace to the India of the future. That is why Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru declared in his broadcast "I am convinced that our present decision is the right one even from the larger viewpoint", even although he commended it with no joy in his heart. That is why Mr. Gandhi, hitherto the stout champion of a united India, advises his followers to accept the Congress leaders' decision. Both Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Nehru were obviously thinking of the horrors enacted during the communal disturbances in Bengal, Bihar, the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. The restraint, both compulsory and voluntary, exercised by the press in connection with these disorders has undoubtedly given an incomplete picture—a chastened version—to people outside the affected areas. It is the object of the plan about to be submitted to the Indian public for their approval to put an end to the grim tale of suffering and loss caused by fratricidal warfare.

NO BICKERING

Now that the die is cast, there must be an end also of bickering and recrimination. It will not be easy to alter an attitude of mind which has, despite repeated attempts to stop the rot, brought India to its present pass. We foresee difficulties over the position of the Sikhs, who are unhappy at the prospect of being divided. The work of the boundary commissions in areas where the population figures are calculated to defy the wisdom of Solomon is liable to create unhealthy excitement. National and provincial leaders of all communities must see clearly that unless these problems are faced in a friendly and accom-

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There will be no lack of goodwill from Great Britain. Mr. Churchill's immediate declaration that the Conservative Party will approve in principle of the grant of Dominion Status to India, whether it be to one Government or two, is a welcome guarantee that no bickering on major issues will come from Parliament. Preparations are already well in hand for the legislation which Parliament will pass recognising the Dominion or Dominions of India by August 15. On the day when Lord Mountbatten sheds his title of Viceroy and becomes simply Governor-General, the last vestiges of British authority will disappear. To keep pace with this somewhat breathless time-table action in India will have to be equally speedy and effective. One urgent problem awaiting solution is the character of the Centre in each of the new States. That more powers will accrue to the Centre of, say, Hindustan than were contemplated in the British Cabinet Mission's scheme is, of course, certain. But the Centre will have to be sufficiently elastic to permit federation with Indian States which, with the winding up of the Princes' Chamber, are now free to decide their own future. Unfortunately among the Indian States there is the same lack of unity as that afflicting British India. Here, too, statesmanship of the highest calibre is needed. Moderating spirit, there may be no peace even in a divided India. If the Muslims are convinced that their progress and welfare are possible only in a separate Pakistan; let them have Pakistan with the goodwill of the rest of the country. It would, we feel, be fatal for one part of India to attempt to exercise economic or any other kind of pressure on the other, merely for reasons of annoyance or spite. The factors making for unity, especially economic unity, are so powerful that one hopes they will eventually triumph over communal considerations. But reunion cannot spring from coercion in any shape or form; it must come from the free and unfettered recognition by the two parts of the country that in some kind of unity lies their greatest welfare. That is the goal at which men of goodwill should aim.

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INDIA'S STERLING BALANCES

Indian reaction to the suggestion by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer that Britain's war debts should be scaled down has naturally been unfavourable. Her sterling balances are a vital factor in India's economy. As Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan said in his Budget speech, they represent "by and large, the entire reserve of foreign exchange which this country will have at its disposal in the years to come for purchases of capital equipment required for our development programme and for meeting any unfavourable balance of payments." At the same time we cannot support the suggestion of even so eminent an authority as Mr. A. D. Shroff that, if Dr. Dalton's statement is to be regarded as the basis on which Britain desires to reach a settlement, there would be no point in an Indian delegation going to London to continue negotiations. A settlement of the sterling balances issue is of fundamental importance to both countries. The preliminary conversations in New Delhi in February between officers of the British Treasury and the Bank of England on the one side and the Finance Department and the Reserve Bank of India on the other were officially described as having been "extremely useful." Talks at a higher level, such as those proposed in London, must inevitably lead to better understanding of each other's position. India, therefore, would stand to gain nothing if she declined to continue negotiations simply because of Dr. Dalton's speech.

Dr. Dalton so far has done nothing more than express an opinion. Presumably that opinion is shared by a majority of his colleagues in the British Cabinet, and it is clearly held by many sections in Britain. But even a widely held view, voiced by no less a person than the Chancellor of the Exchequer, does not represent the considered policy of the British Government. It is wrong to assume that Dr. Dalton's speech indicates any intention by Britain not to fulfil her pledges to India. Lord Keynes gave a categorical assurance about sterling balances at the Bretton Woods Conference. Britain, he said, was grateful to India for having placed her resources at Britain's disposal and would endeavour to settle "honourably what was honourably and generously given." Hasty

jumping to conclusions must therefore be avoided. Britain has unquestionably a very strong case in support of her argument that her war burdens should be shared by other countries. She can be expected to press it with all the emphasis at her command. India is equally firm in her stand against a reduction of the sterling balances. Only negotiations at the highest level can reconcile these two standpoints and secure a satisfactory settlement.

These negotiations must take into account Britain's capacity to pay. Of more pressing necessity than the eventual scaling down of war debts is the amount of the sterling balances which Britain must make available immediately for free spending in dollars. This is linked up with her severely restricted dollar resources. Additional dollars made available by the American loan are rapidly disappearing. In the United States itself there is talk of the possibility of having to make another loan to save Britain. America realises full well the catastrophe that would follow a total British economic collapse. India needs must do the same: it is in her interest as much as in Britain's that she should insist on no more than a practicable and reasonable immediate release of sterling balances. Britain's economy is inherently sound, and India will lay the firmest foundations for future mutually advantageous trade relations if she takes a sensible view of Britain's difficulties and helps her to weather the present economic crisis. It is unfortunate that Dr. Dalton should have chosen the eve of negotiations with India for his disturbing statement. Belated though his action is, however, it has brought creditor countries face to face with the reality of Britain's economic difficulties. On the spirit of accommodation and statesmanship which those countries now show will depend very largely the recovery of world trade and Britain's ability to meet her commitments.

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