

## 論文の英文要旨

論文題目	The Ethical Practice of Intellectuals in Liberal Italy: Through the Development of Arguments on the “Social Problems”
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<p>This dissertation focuses on the horizon of “Social Problems” established by intellectuals’ practices in liberal period Italy from the late 19th century to the early 20th century, through examining the ideas of “ethics” and “practice” which problematized these arguments.</p> <p>In the mid 1870s, Italian intellectuals discovered the “Social Problem,” which could not be resolved by the <i>Risorgimento</i> movement. It was elaborated as an argument which tried to situate “southern people” or “peasants,” who were forced to suffer under an overwhelming difficulties derived from cultural and economic difference, into the inside of the society (Introduction).</p> <p>In the discovery and development of “social issues,” the academic trend of positivism, which emphasized to consider observation of phenomenon rather than manipulation of ideas, gave an opportunity and instrument for proceeding with the process. Seeing positivism from the view of “Social Problems” in the period of liberal Italy, however, also allowed for a strong ethical tendency that seemingly opposed to positivism, one that is conventionally conceived as a representation of objectivism or scientific discipline. When Pasquale Villari, as a figure who introduced positivism into Italy, dealt with the “Southern Question” through his positivist historical method, he thought that the cause of the “Southern Question” must be ascribed to the responsibility of the bourgeois ruling class, who were not interested in the issue at all. Therefore, for Villari, the solution to the “Southern Question” prepared an ethical foundation bourgeois self-reforms. Through examining of Villari’s argument on the “Southern Question” and his positivist historical method by comparing with each other, it becomes obvious that the</p>	

direction of positivism toward practice precisely introduces this ethics. (First chapter)

This characteristic becomes proper tendency peculiar to the various arguments on the “Social Problems,” such as the “Southern Question” since the mid 1870s. It rigidly creates a bourgeois-centrism in which the responsibility for “Social Problems” is ascribed to the ruling class (or the northern region) and demands a “guidance for good” which is accompanied by ethical self-development. Such a paternalistic epistemic schema, however, also means at the same time positioning regions or people regarded as “problems” under a single perspective of the future of the nation-state and that of the ruling class. In other words, by setting an ethical locus of “responsibility,” the leading class and “lower strata” could be placed on the same horizon.

The fact that to be ethical means to be practical does not only belong to the field of human sciences. Giovanni Verga, a representative writer of *Verismo*, a positivist movement in Italian literature, tried to describe the “defeated” people as they really were through a style influenced by positivistic science. For Verga, those who were fishermen, peasants, or in other words, people located in the lowest strata of Sicilian society were regarded as the most vivid reality in society. In this practice of describing the “defeated,” a combination of *form*, based on the idea of positivism, and subject as *life in itself* is realized. Here we can find the intellectual process of mutual penetration of idealism-positivism from Francesco De Sanctis to Pasquale Villari, and from De Sanctis to Verga, through Luigi Capuana. This is the combination of the belief that any discipline must be close to *life itself* and positivism. I would like to suggest that an origin of ethics inherent to positivism in Italian intellectual discourse can be attributed to this point. Although he never identified himself with the “defeated,” nonetheless, Verga’s attitude of finding life and reality itself within their lives overlapped early writers on the “Southern Question” such as Villari. In the works of Verga, in a strict sense, the “defeated” are not limited to the people in the lower strata since anyone could become “defeated” in the next turn in the grand river of circulating destiny. However, through his mythical perspective of the world, it is possible to conceive that two kinds of people share a fatal community: the “defeated people” actually described in his works who fall into a more miserable situation since they can not adapt themselves to the institutions of modern state on the one hand, and the people who survive in the society on the other hand. In this sense, Verga’s practice of literature can be thought of as a kind of *form* of intellectual practice bearing the view of “Social Problems.” (Second chapter)

The phenomenon of emigration, which explosively increased in the late 19th century, was also considered to be one of the “Social Problems.” In Villari’s lectures and essays given when he was president of the second generation of the Dante Alighieri Association, which mainly provided education in Italian language and culture to Italian emigrants, he showed an ethical responsibility for emigrants as “socially weak,” as well as referred to the “Southern Question.” In his arguments, he first approved free emigration, and then demanded that providing education in the Italian language as the language of civilization to emigrants should be an ethical responsibility. This responsibility, which accompanied “superior civilization,” extended to other ethnic nations with whom Italian emigrants encountered in emigrant countries. The responsibility should extend to other ethnic nations if they seek education in Italian language in order to achieve their development for *themselves*. This is the ambiguity that the view of “Social Problems” always involves. Even if in this logic of ethical responsibility- “the mission of civilization” - is seen off and on, other nations are not the object of judgment for Villari. On an ideal level, there is a certain kind of schema at work in which nations harmonize and live together while maintaining their independence beneath “the sublime civilization.” Thus, Villari’s scheme seems to be based on a different logic from later arguments of emigration, which is colored by supremacism. The argument of “Social Problems” certainly echoes nationalism in various aspects. The argument of “Social Problems” puts forth the concept of nations that must be protected or nations that need the benefit of civilization. Yet, in terms of the ideas of people who must be protected and enjoyed the benefits of civilization, there is exclusiveness in Villari’s claim of nationalism different from the idea of *Risorgimento* on which the “Social Problems” stand. Within this idea of nationalism, since the concept of “Italians” already became a closed community, anyone cannot be permitted to enter into it, even if it is under the condition of the benefits of civilization. (Third chapter)

The argument of “Social Problems” includes the question of the intellectual’s social role in its gesture of addressing the message to public opinion. At this point, the argument of Sidney Sonnino on institutional reform obviously will display a practical space opened up by the view of “Social Problems.” Sonnino also arrived at the very idea of the responsibility of the ruling classes as well as Villari’s recognition of the “Southern Question,” through his work, “Sicily in 1876.” For Sonnino, a realist and pragmatist, it is through universal suffrage that the ruling

classes can sufficiently discharge their social obligations, which are then centralized in executive powers. They discharge the responsibility of executive power only on the sovereign, who is the representative of “general interest.”

Sonnino thought the cause of the split between social reality and the state, which occurred in the discourse of “Social Problems,” should be ascribed to the problem of the will of the majority of the nation not reflecting that of the national administration. Thus, he planned a regime to overcome that. What is important in his idea is that a majority of the nation, whose will must be listened to, should be led to voluntarily participate in the national administration at the last stage. The people recognized as “problems,” such as peasants, urban factory workers, are subsequently not regarded as people who are the object of guidance towards “the good” or manipulation, but as people who should participate independently in national administration and society through education. The view point of “Social Problems” here prepared a scheme from which to deal with the populace of the lower strata as a subject whose will and voices need to be listened to. Then, for Sonnino, social reform should be the responsible to the majority of the nation and is not a “reform from above” in the pure sense since in the end, it demands the independence and subjectivity of the “majority.” (Fourth chapter)

With the unification of the state, the Italian elite created a strange existence within society. The strangers became verbalized in detail as “Social Problems” and described as peasants, workers and lower classes. Then, the argument of “Social Problems” constituted the epistemological schema to grasp the difficult situation of the populace, who became a disruption from the ideal goal of the modern state, and were treated from the standpoint of ethical responsibility. The populace, appeared as receivers of a social change, transformed into a social group whose will and demand should be drawn from on the one hand, and regarded as a social existence whose subjective agreement was necessary to guarantee the legitimacy of the regime on the other hand. In this sense, the standpoint of “Social Problems” established the ethics necessary for democracy. This ethics, at the same time, included a germ from which an idea of totalitarian state came. At any rate, it is sure that this ethics was an intellectual and ethical practice since it became an *imperative* that social reforms should obey in a broader sense.